REVIEWER 2: PROPERTY
Querubin v. Alconcel
G.R. No. L-23050, September 18, 1975
not only his ownership of the land subject of the suit
but also the identity thereof.
14. Hence this petition.
FACTS
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
The petitioner Federico Querubin instituted a
reinvindicatory action involving approximately 11
hectares of land situated in Caoayan, Ilocos Sur,
against the respondents Victorio Alconcel, Placida
Quicio, Mauricia Alconcel, Brigido Alconcel, Anacleto
Alconcel, Gervacio Alconcel, Manuel Quiani, Tiburcio
Quiani and Guadalupe Quiani.
The information posesoria held by Querubin which was
recorded at the Registry of Property in Vigan.
Querubin’s father, Fulgencio Querubin, had used the
property described in the information for pasture until
the year 1905 when it was inundated by the Immornos
river that ran beside it.
Gradually, thru a shifting of the river bed westward, the
land emerged anew.
It was then stony and sandy and unfit for cultivation.
For about a period of thirty years, including the time
that the land was submerged, the property remained
uncultivated.
Subsequently, however, several persons, including the
respondents Alconcel, et al., entered the land, cleared
it of stones and sand and made it fit for agricultural
enterprise.
Querubin sought to recover possession of the property
occupied by Alconcel, et al. and have his title over the
same judicially affirmed to which they offered
evidence to show open and continuous possession of
their respective land holdings in the concept of owners
since time immemorial.
They traced their ownership through various
predecessors and presented in court assorted tax
declarations that supposedly embrace the disputed
areas.
After a protracted hearing that lasted for over 16
years, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the
petitioner, ordering the eviction of the respondents
Alconcel, et al.
The trial court held that the tax declarations
certificates presented by Alconcel et. al only dates
back to 1939, whereas the informacion posesoria of
Querubin dates back to the year 1934.
The trial court held that the accretion and
abandonment by the river of its former bed had, in
law, enlarged the area of the property of Querubin.
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision because
Querubin’s information posesoria could not have
possibly covered the 20 hectares of land he claims, the
presumption of ownership in favor of the respondents
Alconcel, et al. arising from their actual possesion of
their respective portions since 1938, 1939 and 1942
naturally prevails.
The Court of Appeals further held that Querubin had
failed to discharge the burden imposed by law upon
the plaintiff in a reinvindicatory action, pointing out
that in order that an action for recovery of title may
prosper, it is indispensable that the plaintiff fully prove
ISSUE: Is the Court of Appeals correct in ruling that
Querubin cannot be entitled of the ownership of the land
due to failure to prove the identity of the subject property
in its action?
RULING:
No. The SC held that the interpretation of CA of the actual
measurement of the subject property was erroneous. The
Supreme Court explained that the word “circumbalacion”
used in the informacion of Querubin, while wanting in
correct spelling and geometric precision, conveys
sufficient meaning as a basis for computing the area of the
property it describes.“Circunvalacion” is the act of
surrounding a place. It is a term that is derived from the
word “circuir,” which means to surround, to encompass, to
encircle.
The phrase “1001 brazas de circumbalacion” can mean no
other than that the perimeter or circumference of the
property has a total length of 1,001 brazas.
The petitioner Querubin submitted a computation prepared
by private land surveyor Pedro Pacis converting the old
Spanish standards of measurement to those currently in
use.
It can be concluded thereof that, as per the above
mathematical computations, the area of the said parcel
of land in question which is very close to its actual area
due to the irregularity of its geometric shape, is 189,950
square meters or 18 hectars, 99 ares and 50 centares.”
Alconcel, et al. offered no mathematical method or
process for arriving at the correct computation of the area
of the land in question. On the other hand, the solution
advanced by Pacis is logical and sound, and amply
convinces us that the informacion held by Querubin
indeed originally embraced close to 19 hectares of land.
There is thus no fantastic increase in the present claim of
Querubin of about 20 hectares as to warrant the total
disregard thereof by the Court of Appeals.
AS TO BOUNDARIES
The trial court, in its decision, identified the boundaries of
the land covered by the information, and no question has
been raised as to the accuracy of such identification.
Whatever accretion to the land or increase in its area
occasioned by the action of the river there might have
been, would, strictly speaking, not affect the identity of the
land, for the information simply cites the river as its
boundary on the west, the inconsequential discrepancy
between 19 hectares, the area covered by the
informacion, and 20 hectares, the area claimed by
Querubin, does not vitiate an award of ownership in his
favor, it appearing that the land is so definitively described
by boundaries as to put its identification beyond doubt.
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REVIEWER 2: PROPERTY
This Court has invariably held that a possessory information
inscribed in the property registry demonstrates prima facie
that the possessor of the land to which it refers is the owner
thereof.
Further, under the provisions of sections 39, 40, and 41 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, the lapse of a period ten
years was sufficient for the possessor of realty inscribed in
the registry to be regarded thereafter as the legitimate
owner of said realty, when his possession had been
inscribed in the registry for over ten years.
Garcia v. CA
G.R. No. 133140, August 10, 1999:
DOCTRINE: Ownership exists when a thing pertaining to one
person is completely subjected to his will in a manner not
prohibited by law and consistent with the rights of others
while possession is defined as the holding of a thing or the
enjoyment of a right.
FACTS:
1.
In the case at bar, the trial court found that Fulgencio
Querubin, the father of the petitioner, had inscribed his
possessory information in the Registry of Property of Vigan,
Ilocos Sur, as early as April 26, 1895, and had been in
continuous possession of the land therein described for
more than 10 years, excluding the time that the property
was submerged. Thus, the petitioner Querubin must be
deemed to have conclusively proved his ownership of the
property in dispute, or, in the very least, shown a prima
facie title of ownership thereto. In the latter situation, the
respondents Alconcel, et al. may dislodge Querubin from
his claim only by a superior title. Considering, however, that
Alconcel, et al. have no more than mere tax declarations
covering their respective claims the earliest of which dates
back only to 1939 (contrasted with Querubin’s tax
declaration dated 1934), it follows that Querubin’s claim
must prevail over that of Alconcel, et al.
2.
Thus, the petitioner Querubin must be deemed to have
conclusively proved his ownership of the property in
dispute, or, in the very least, shown a prima facie title of
ownership thereto.
7.
3.
4.
5.
6.
8.
Notes
9.
Identity of property claimed. —The invariable applicable
rule is to the effect that in order to maintain an action to
recover ownership, the person who claims that he has a
better right to the property must prove not only his
ownership of the property claimed but also the identity
hereof. The party who desires to recover must fix the
identity of the land he claims. And where doubt and
uncertainty exist as to the identity of the land claimed, a
court should resolve the question by recourse to the
pleadings and the record as well as to extrinsic evidence,
oral or written. (Laluan vs. Malpaya, L-21231, July 30,1975).
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
Atty. Pedro V. Garcia was the owner of a parcel of
land situated at Bel Air II Village, Makati.
With his wife's consent, he sold the same to their
daughter Ma. Luisa Magpayo and her husband Luisito
Magpayo.
The spouses Magpayo mortgaged the land to PBcom
to secure a loan amounting to P564,000.00 according
to them. But P1,200,000.00, according to PBcom.
As a result of the sale, Atty. Garcia's title was cancelled
and a new Title was issued in favor of the spouses
Magpayo.
The Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was registered at
the Makati Register of Deeds and annotated on the
Magpayos title.
The Magpayos defaulted, hence the mortgage was
extrajudicially foreclosed and at the public auction
sale, PBCom which was the highest bidder bought the
land and the title was issued under the latter since the
the Magpayos failed to redeem the same within the
redemption period.
Magpayos filed a complaint at the RTC Makati seeking
nullification of the extrajudicial foreclosure but was
dismissed for failure to prosecute.
PBCom then filed at the RTC Makati a petition for the
issuance of a writ of possession over the land which
was granted.
When the service of the writ of possession was served,
the brother of Mrs. Magpayo, Jose Maria Garcia, who
is in possession of the property, refused to honor the
writ and filed a motion for intervention in PBcom's
petition.
“Garcia thereupon filed against PBCom, the
Magpayos, and the RTC Sheriff the instant suit for
recovery of realty and damages wherein he alleged,
inter alia, that he inherited the land as one of the heirs
of his mother Remedios T. Garcia, and that PBCom
acquired no right thereover.
PBCom averred, inter alia, that Garcia’s claim over the
land is belied by the fact that it is not among the
properties owned by his mother listed in the Inventory
of Real Estate.
“The Magpayos, on the other hand, asserted that title
over the land was transferred to them by Mrs.
Magpayo’s parents to enable them (Magpayos) to
borrow from PBCom.
“Garcia filed a Motion for Summary Judgment praying
that judgment be rendered in his favor to which
PBCom counter-motioned that judgment should be
rendered in its favor.
“The court a quo denied the motion for summary
judgment on the ground that PBCom raised in its
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REVIEWER 2: PROPERTY
answer both factual and legal issues which could only
be ventilated in a full-blown trial.
15. “The court a quo, however, later issued a summary
judgment.
16. In its summary judgment, the lower court held that the
mortgage executed by the Magpayo spouses in favor
of PBCom was void because at the time the property
was mortgaged to PBcom, Magpayos were not yet
the owners of the same.
The Magpayo spouses could not have acquired the
said property merely by the execution of the Deed of
Sale because the property was in the possession of the
plaintiff. The vendor, Pedro V. Garcia, was not in
possession and hence could not deliver the property
merely by the execution of the document.
17. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial
court.
Since the execution of the deed of sale by Atty. Pedro
V. Garcia in favor of the Magpayos took place earlier
or on August 1, 1980, then contrary to his claim,
plaintiff-appellee (Jose Garcia) was not in possession
of the property at the time of the execution of said
public instrument.
“Furthermore, it appearing that the vendor Atty.
Garcia had control of the property which was
registered in his name and that the deed of sale was
likewise registered, then the sale was consummated
and the Magpayos were free to exercise the attributes
of ownership including the right to mortgage the land.
‘When the land is registered in the vendor’s name, and
the public instrument of sale is also registered, the sale
may be considered consummated and the buyer may
exercise the actions of an owner.
18. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Is Garcia’s possession of the subject property is in
the concept of an owner?
RULING:
No. The Court held that the Court of Appeals resolved the
issues of “ownership– and “possession" found in PBCom's
appellate brief. It explained therein that Garcia’s
possession is certainly not in the concept of an owner. This
is so because as early as 1981, title thereto was registered
in the name of the Magpayo Spouses which title was
subsequently cancelled when the property was purchased
by PBCom in a public auction sale resulting in the issuance
of title in favor of the latter in 1985.
Plaintiff-appellee’s possession which started only in 1986,
the time of the filing of the complaint, could not ripen into
ownership. He has no valid title thereto. His possession in
fact was that of an intruder, one done in bad faith.
There was no error on the part of the appellate court in
resorting to summary judgment as prayed for by both
parties.
The Court stressed that possession and ownership are
distinct legal concepts. Ownership exists when a thing
pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will
in a manner not prohibited by law and consistent with the
rights of others. Ownership confers certain rights to the
owner, one of which is the right to dispose of the thing by
way of sale.
Atty. Pedro Garcia and his wife Remedios exercised their
right to dispose of what they owned when they sold the
subject property to the Magpayo spouses.
On the other hand, possession is defined as the holding of
a thing or the enjoyment of a right. Literally, to possess
means to actually and physically occupy a thing with or
without right.
Possession may be had in one of two ways: possession in
the concept of an owner and possession of a holder. A
possessor in the concept of an owner may be the owner
himself or one who claims to be so. On the other hand, one
who possesses as a mere holder acknowledges in another
a superior right which he believes to be ownership, whether
his belief be right or wrong.
The records show that petitioner occupied the property not
in the concept of an owner for his stay was merely
tolerated by his parents.
Consequently, it is of no moment that petitioner was in
possession of the property at the time of the sale to the
Magpayo spouses. It was not a hindrance to a valid
transfer of ownership. On the other hand, petitioner’s
subsequent claim of ownership as successor to his mother’s
share in the conjugal asset is belied by the fact that the
property was not included in the inventory of the estate
submitted by his father to the intestate court. This buttresses
the ruling that indeed the property was no longer
considered owned by petitioner’s parents.
The Court upheld the Court of Appeals in holding that the
mortgage to PBCom by the Magpayo spouses is valid
notwithstanding that the transfer certificate of title over the
property was issued to them after the mortgage contract
was entered into.
Registration does not confer ownership, it is merely
evidence of such ownership over a particular property.
The deed of sale operates as a formal or symbolic delivery
of the property sold and authorizes the buyer to use the
document as proof of ownership. All said, the Magpayo
spouses were already the owners when they mortgaged
the property to PBCom.
---
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REVIEWER 2: PROPERTY
Javier v. Veridiano
G.R. No. L-48050, October 10, 1994
simply including additional parties in a subsequent
litigation.
DOCTRINE: A judgment rendered in a case for recovery of
possession is conclusive only on the question of possession
and not on the ownership.
In the case at bench, it is evident that private
respondent Reino Rosete is a successor in interest of
BenBabol by title subsequent to the commencement
and termination of the first action. Hence, there is
actual, if not substantial, identity of parties between
the two actions.
FACTS:
1.
In 1963, Felicidad Javier filed a Miscellaneous Sales
Application for Lot No. 1641 with the District Land
Officer, Bureau of Lands, Olongapo City.
2. In 1970, she alleges that she was forcibly dispossessed
of a portion of the land by a certain Ben Babol,
leading her to file a complaint for forcible entry.
3. The complaint alleges that Ben Babol, with the
assistance of hired helpers, started construction of
riprap along the Kalaklan River perimeter of said
portion of land; said entry was further augmented by
removing plaintiff’s chain link, fence with galvanized
iron posts embedded in concrete, likewise destroying
plants introduced by plaintiff by removing existing BL
(Bureau of Lands) monuments thereon, and by these
actions, defendant started exercising illegal possession
of said portion of land which contains an area of 200
square meters, more or less.”
4. City Court of Olongapo City dismissed that complaint
ruling that the area in question is outside the land
owned by Javier.
5. The decision became final on April 1973, when CFI
Zambales and Olongapo City dismissed the appeal.
6. On December 1973, Javier was granted Miscellaneous
Sales Patent No. 5548 and issued Original Certificate of
Title No. P-3259 covering Lot No.1641.
7. Meanwhile, Babol had sold the property he was
occupying including the land subject in the forcible
entry case to Reino Rosete.
8. Javier then demanded the area in dispute to Rosete.
9. In 1977, Javier once again filed a complaint for
quieting of title and recovery of possession with
damages against Ben Babol and Reino Rosete of the
disputed land.
10. Rosete moved to dismiss citing the principle of res
judicata. Ben did not file a pleading.
11. CFI Zambales granted the motion to dismiss.
12. Hence, the petition for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the principle of res judicata finds
application in this case.
RULING:
Civil Case No. 926 is a complaint for forcible entry,
where what is at issue is prior possession, regardless of
who has lawful title over the disputed property.
Thus,“[t]he only issue in an action for forcible entry is
the physical or material possession of real property,
that is, possession de facto and not possession de
jure. The philosophy underlying this remedy is that
irrespective of the actual condition of the title to the
property, the party in peaceable quiet possession
shall not be turned out by strong hand, violence or
terror.” And, a judgment rendered in a case for
recovery of possession is conclusive only on the
question of possession and not on the ownership. It
does not in any way bind the title or affects the
ownership of the land or building.
While the second civil case inaccurately captioned
as an action for “Quieting of Title and Recovery of
Possession with Damages” is in reality an action to
recover a parcel of land or an accion reivindicatoria
under Art. 434 of the Civil Code, and should be
distinguished from Civil Case No. 926, which is an
accion interdictal.
Plaintiff therein (petitioner herein) clearly sets up title
to herself and prays that respondent Rosete be
ejected from the disputed land and that she be
declared the owner and given possession thereof.
Important information:
Accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion is
thus an action whereby plaintiff alleges ownership
over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full
possession.
It is different from accion interdictal or accion
publiciana where plaintiff merely alleges proof of a
better right to possess without claim of title.
No. While the court agrees that there is substantial
identities on the parties involved, there is merit in
petitioner’s argument that there is no identity of
causes of action between the two civil cases.
The Court ruled that for res judicata to apply, what is
required is not the absolute but only substantial
identity of parties. It is fundamental that the
application of res judicata may not be evaded by
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REVIEWER 2: PROPERTY
German Management & Services v. CA
G.R. No. L-76216, September 14, 1989
DOCTRINE: Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and
never determines the actual title to an estate. Title is not
involved.
FACTS:
1. Spouses Cynthia and Manual Jose are residents of
Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA are owners of the land
situated in sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal
which is the land being disputed in this case.
2. The spouses Jose executed a special power of
attorney authorizing petitioner German Management
Services to develop their property.
3. They have already acquired the proper permits to do
so but they discovered that the land was occupied by
the respondent with 20 other farmers (members of the
Concerned of Farmer’s Association.)
4. These farmers have occupied the land for the last
twelve to fifteen years prior to the issuance of the
permits and they already have their crops all over the
property. In short, they are in actual possession of the
land.
5. Petitioners tried to forcibly drive the farmers away by
demolishing and bulldozing their crops and property.
6. The respondents filed in CFI because they were
deprived of their property without due process of law
by trespassing, demolishing and bulldozing their crops
and property situated in the land.
7. CFI and RTC denied, but the Court of Appeals reversed
the decision. Petitioners tried to appeal the decision in
CA but were denied hence this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents are entitled to
file a forcible entry case against petitioner.
RULING:
Yes, they are entitled to file a forcible entry case.
Notwithstanding petitioner’s claim that it was duly
authorized by the owners to develop the subject property,
private respondents, as actual possessors, can commence
a forcible entry case against petitioner because ownership
is not in issue. Forcible entry is merely a quieting process
and never determines the actual title to an estate. Title is
not involved.
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that at the time
petitioner entered the property, private respondents were
already in possession thereof. There is no evidence that the
spouses Jose were ever in possession of the subject
property. On the contrary, private respondents’
peaceable possession was manifested by the fact that
they even planted rice, corn and fruit bearing trees twelve
to fifteen years prior to petitioner’s act of destroying their
crops.
It must be stated that regardless of the actual condition of
the title to the property the party in peaceable quiet
possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand,
violence, or terror. Thus, a party who can prove prior
possession can recover such possession even against the
owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his
possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the
security that entitles him to remain on the property until he
is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by
accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.
Moreover, the doctrine of self-help, which the petitioners
were using to justify their actions, are not applicable in the
case because it can only be exercised at the time of
actual or threatened dispossession which is absent in the
case at bar (in fact they are the ones who are threatening
to remove the respondents with the use of force.)
Article 536 basically tells us that the owner or a person who
has a better right over the land must resort to judicial
means to recover the property from another person who
possesses the land.’ When possession has already been
lost, the owner must resort to judicial process for the
recovery of property. As clearly stated in Article 536- ―In no
case may possession be acquired through force or
intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects
thereto. He who believes that he has an action or right to
deprive another of the holding of a thing must invoke the
aid of the competent court, if the holder should refuse to
deliver the thing. WHEREFORE, the Court resolved to DENY
the instant petition. The decision of the Court of Appeals
dated July24, 1986 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner. SO ORDERED.
Yu v. De lara, et. Al.,
G.R. No. L-16084, November 30, 1962
DOCTRINE: Property is considered abandoned and
possession thereof lost only when the hope of recovery
and the intent to return are given up.
FACTS:
1.
2.
3.
4.
This is an ejectment case which orders De Lara to
vacate the premises in question and to pay the
monthly rental of P115.00 from the time this action was
filed up to the time they vacate the premises.
a. A lot in Grace Park subdivision is the disputed
property, which was subsequently acquired by
the Philippine Realty Corporation and sold to
John O. Yu on Nov 28 1956.
In 1945, several persons settled on the property and
constructed houses without permission from Philippine
Realty Corporation
Between 1947 and 1952, De Lara bought houses from
settlers and continued in occupancy without paying
any rents to the owner of the land.
De Lara contests that
a. Philippine Realty Corporation had lost
possession of the property by abandonment
Article 555 (1) of the Civil Code, in failing to
take action against them and showing lack of
interest in said property since they started their
occupancy.
b. The action of unlawful detainer was improperly
brought against them
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REVIEWER 2: PROPERTY
c.
CFI lacked jurisdiction to decide because
there were prejudicial questions pending
which concerns the same property.
ISSUE: Does Philippine Realty Corporation lost possession of
the property by abandonment?
RULING:
No. The circumstances adverted to are insufficient to
constitute abandonment, which requires not only physical
relinquishment of the thing but also a clear intention not to
reclaim or reassume ownership or enjoyment thereof.
Indeed, abandonment which according to Manresa (Vol.
4, 5th ed., p. 277) convert the thing into res nullius,
ownership of which may be acquired by occupation, can
hardly apply to land, as to which said mode of acquisition
is not available (Art. 714, Civil Code), let alone to registered
land, to which "no title . . . in derogation to that of the
registered owner shall be acquired by occupation, can
hardly apply to land, as to which said mode of acquisition
is not available (Art. 714, Civil Code), let alone to registered
land, to which "no title . . . in derogation to that of the
registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession." (Sec. 46, Act No. 496).
No possessory rights whatsoever can be recognized in
favor of appellants, because they are in fact nothing but
squatters, who settled on the land without any agreement
with the owner paying neither rents to him, nor land taxes
to the government, and who impliedly recognized their
squatters' status by purchasing only the houses built by the
original settlers. Their occupancy of the land was at the
owner's sufference, and their acts were merely tolerated
which could not affect the owner's possession (Arts. 537
and 1119, Civil Code).
Appellants next contend that since there is no showing
that there was any promise on their part, express or
implied, to return the land to appellee, or that they failed
to do so after their right to retain it had expired, they
cannot be considered as unlawfully withholding possession
within the meaning of Section 1 of Rule 72. The implication
of the argument is that this action of unlawful detainer was
improperly brought against them in the Justice of the
Peace Court of Caloocan.
-
They did not raised the propriety of the remedy sought
by plaintiff-appellee in the Justice of Peace Court.
A person who occupies the land of another at the latter's
tolerance or permission, without any contract between
them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he
will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action
for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. In any
event, whatever might be said on this point in so far as it
relates to the original jurisdiction of the Justice of the
Peace Court — and hence to the appellate jurisdiction
Court of First Instance — it does not appear that the
question was raised in the former court at all. Consequently
the latter court could take cognizance of the case — as
one for recovery by the owner of the right of possession in
the exercise of its original jurisdiction, pursuant to section
11 of Rule 40.
The third and last contention of appellants is that the Court
of First Instance lacked jurisdiction to this case because
there were prejudicial question pending before us on
appeal in cases G.R. Nos. L-12614 and L-12615 concerning
the same property. The issue in those two cases was the
propriety of the registration of appellants' adverse claim to
the said land, which was resolved against them by the
Land Registration Commissioner. In the first place the issue
was not prejudicial in nature: it could not affect appellee's
right to the possess his land, which has nothing to do with
the registration or non-registrability of appellants' alleged
adverse and secondly, the said cases have already been
decided by us on January 29, 1960, by upholding the
action by the Land Registration Commissioner.
Baleares, Baleares v. Espanto
G.R. No. 229645, June 6, 2018
DOCTRINE: An action for unlawful detainer is summary in
nature and the only issue that needs to be resolved is who
is entitled to physical possession of the premises, possession
referring to possession de facto, and not possession de jure.
FACTS:
1.
Espanto is the current registered owner of the land in
dispute in this case while the petitioners were the heirs
of Santos Baleares, who is one of the original coowners of the subject property.
2.
The Baleares siblings mortgaged the property to Arnold
Maranan to which the property was foreclosed after
some time and sold at a public auction where
Maranan won as the highest bidder. This fact was
unknown to the heirs of Santos.
3.
Believing that the mortgage prescribed over the tenyear prescriptive period, the heirs of Santos asked for
the cancellation of the mortgage.
4.
During the pendency of the case, a Certificate of Sale
was issued to Arnold for the subject property.
5.
Respondent, after some time, filed a complaint against
Maranan for Nullification of Mortgage believing that
Arnold failed to enforce his mortgaged right over the
subject property within right 10-year prescriptive
period..
6.
The RTC cancelled the mortgage on the subject
property for prescription. The CA also affirmed this
decision.
7.
However, Maranan was able to sell the subject
property to the respondent himself.
8.
He allowed the petitioners to remain in the property as
they are his blood relatives.
9.
After some time, the respondent sent a demand letter
to the petitioners for them to vacate the property as
he wanted to construct an apartment therein.
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REVIEWER 2: PROPERTY
10. Petitioners refused arguing that they have a better
right of possession over the property being the heirs of
the original owners.
It is true that a title issued under the Torrens system is
entitled to all the attributes of property ownership, which
necessarily includes possession.
11. A final demand letter was issued to the petitioners
which was ignored as well. Respondent then filed a
Complaint for Unlawful Detainer after failure of
barangay settlement.
As such, ordinarily, the Torrens title holder over the subject
properties is considered the rightful owner who is entitled to
possession thereof. But, in this case, it has not been
disputed that the petitioners have been in continuous
possession of the subject property in the concept of
ownership and not by mere tolerance of the respondent.
12. In their Verified Answer with Motion to Dismiss and
Counterclaim, the petitioners averred that the MeTC
has no jurisdiction over the instant action, as it is one
for recovery of possession and not for unlawful
detainer. They also raise the existence of litis
pendentia, as there are allegedly two pending cases
involving similar issues of ownership and possession that
are still pending before the RTC-Makati City.
13. MeTC ruled for the respondent and granted the
Complaint. It found the complaint to be sufficient for
an unlawful detainer case and upheld that the case
should not be dismissed on the ground of litis
pendentia, as the issues in the alleged two pending
cases before the RTC-Makati City do not abate
ejectment suit.
14. On appeal, the RTC affirmed in its entirety the MeTC
ruling.
15. On further appeal, the CA affirmed both the Decision
and the Order of the RTC.
16. Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE: Who between the petitioners and the respondent
has a better right of possession over the subject property?
RULING:
This Court rules for the petitioners.
An action for unlawful detainer is summary in nature and
the only issue that needs to be resolved is who is entitled to
physical possession of the premises, possession referring to
possession de facto, and not possession de jure.
Nonetheless, where the parties to an ejectment case raise
the issue of ownership and such is inseparably linked to
that of possession, the courts may pass upon that issue to
determine who between the parties has the better right to
possess the property.
The adjudication of the ownership issue, however, is not
final and binding. The same is only for the purpose of
resolving the issue of possession. Otherwise stated, the
adjudication of the issue of ownership is only provisional,
and not a bar to an action between the same parties
involving title to the property.
Here, the petitioners claim that they have a better right of
possession over the subject property as they are the heirs
of one of its original co owners and they have been in
lawful possession and occupation thereof ever since, thus,
they cannot be dispossessed of the subject property.
The respondent, on the other hand, based his claim of
ownership and right of possession over the subject property
on a certificate of title issued in his name.
However, the respondent, being a mere transferee of the
subject property who has knowledge that his transferor's
mortgaged right over the same has been cancelled with
finality by the court, merely stepped into his transferor's
shoes, thus, he has no right over the subject property.
It bears stressing that the herein ruling is limited only to the
determination as to who between the parties has the better
right of possession. It will not in any way bar any of the
parties from filing an action with the proper court to resolve
conclusively the issue of ownership.
Spouses Santiago v. Northbay Knitting Inc. (NKI)
G.R. No. 217296, October 11, 2017
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
1. This is a petition praying to set aside the Court of
Appeals decision holding in favor of NKI.
2. This case is rooted on the ejectment complaint filed by
the herein respondent Northbay Knitting Inc. (NKI)
against the herein petitioners spouses Santiago,
spouses Manimtim, among others.
3. It is said to be that the petitioners were doing business
and occupying the parcel of land allegedly owned by
NKI. It is located in Dagat-Dagatan project in Navotas
City.
4. Accordingly, petitioners are said to be occupying the
said land without paying neither rent nor taxes.
5. On March 5, 2009, NKI have sent demand letters to the
petitioners asking them to vacate the property within
(5) days from receipt and they shall also be paying
rent if they refuse to do so.
6. As a defense, petitioners questioned the authenticity
or validity of the ownership of NKI towards the parcel
of land.
7. They contend that NKI only gain possession of the
property on June of 2008, while on the other hand,
petitioners obtain possession to the same through their
predecessor-in-interest, Hermeginildo Odan, and have
been continuously in possession since 1970.
8. It is said that the land was just sold by NHA to NKI
without giving petitioners, as the actual occupants
that time, the right of first refusal granted under the
law.
9. Thus, petitioners filed a case questioning said sale.
10. Petitioners contended that this case on the issue of
their right of first refusal is a prejudicial question that
must be resolved first before the MeTC can take
cognizance of the ejectment case.
11. Still, the Navotas MeTC ruled in favor of NKI. Petitioners
were ordered to vacate the property and pay the rent
equivalent to the months they have occupied since
May 4, 2009. Also, they were asked to pay for
attorney’s fees.
12. However, Malabon RTC set aside the decision of
Navotas MeTC due to lack of jurisdiction.
13. When directed to CA, CA on the other hand reversed
the decision of Malabon RTC and reinstated the earlier
decision of Navotas MeTC.
14. Hence, this petition.
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REVIEWER 2: PROPERTY
ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in reinstating Navotas
MeTC decision and reversing Malabon RTC decision.
RULING:
The court held that CA did not err in reinstating the Navotas
MeTC decision.
It emphasized that settled is the rule that jurisdiction over
the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined
by the material allegations of the complaint. It cannot be
acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of the
parties; neither can it be cured by their silence,
acquiescence, or even express consent. In ejectment
cases, the complaint should embody such statement of
facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases
for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these
proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint must
show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction
without resort to parol evidence.
In the case at bar, NKI's complaint sufficiently shows all the
allegations required to support a case for unlawful
detainer, thereby vesting jurisdiction in the MeTC over the
case. Petitioners, who are the actual occupants of said
property, never paid rent but continued to possess the
property upon NKI's mere tolerance. Despite receipt of
NKI's demand letters to vacate, petitioners refused and
continued to occupy the property.
A requisite for a valid cause of action in an unlawful
detainer case is that possession must be originally lawful,
and such possession must have turned unlawful only upon
the expiration of the right to possess. It must be shown that
the possession was initially lawful; hence, the basis of such
lawful possession must be established. If, as in the instant
case, the claim is that such possession is by mere tolerance
of the plaintiff, the acts of tolerance must be proved.
Possession de Jure – De jure is a Latin word meaning “in
law”; lawful, legitimate or a matter of law. De jure
possessions are legally recognized possessions regardless of
whether it exists in reality or not. It is also known as juridical
possession meaning possession in the eyes of law.
For example, An owner of the house could cease a man to
live in a house but without intending and to abandon it for
good. It is a case of De jure possession.
Right of First refusal – Right of first refusal is a contractual
right that gives its holder the option to enter a business
transaction with the owner of something, according to
specified terms, before the owner is entitled to enter into
that transaction with a third party.
Parol Evidence - In general, the parol evidence rule
prevents the introduction of evidence of prior or
contemporaneous negotiations and agreements that
contradict, modify, or vary the contractual terms of a
written contract when the written contract is intended to
be a complete and final expression of the parties'
agreement.
Gutierrez v. Rosario
G.R. No. 4145, January 28, 1910
DOCTRINE: Justices of the peace do not have jurisdiction in
an action of forcible entry and detainer unless the action is
commenced within one year from the date of the wrongful
possession. (Sec. 80 of Act No. 190, as amended by Act
No. 1778.) Neither can the action of forcible entry and
detainer commenced in the court of the justice of the
peace be amended in the Court of First Instance so as to
change the nature of the cause of action.
FACTS:
Clearly, when NKI demanded that they leave the premises
and petitioners refused to do so, their possession had
already become unlawful. As the registered owner, NKI
had a right to the possession of the property, which is one
of the attributes of its ownership.
1.
Moreover, in the argument of the petitioners questioning
the validity of the sale of the disputed property to NKI
consequently affecting the validity of its title to said
property, the Court find such argument as a clear
collateral attack on NKI’s title to which is not allowed in an
unlawful detainer case. The present case only covers the
issue of who has the better right of possession in relation to
the issue of disputed ownership of the subject properties.
Questions as to the validity of NKI's title can be ventilated in
a proper suit instituted separately to directly attack its
validity, an issue that cannot be definitively resolved in the
extant unlawful detainer case.
2.
Keywords:
Possession de Facto - It is a Latin word meaning ‘in fact’.
De facto possession means the possession which exists in
reality even if it is not legally recognized.
For example, A common law spouse can be considered as
a de facto wife or de facto husband though they are not
lawfully married, yet they live like a married couple.
3.
The plaintiff Gutierrez commenced an action in the
court of the justice of the peace of the pueblo of San
Carlos, of the Province of Pangasinan, to recover from
the defendants the possession of a certain parcel of
land in an action of forcible entry and detainer.
Upon a consideration of the facts adduced during the
trial of the cause the justice of the peace dismissed
said action.
The CFI Pangasinan, after hearing the evidence
adduced during the trial of the cause, said judge
found from a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendants had been in possession of the land for
more than one year prior to the time of the
commencement of the action in the court of the
justice of the peace and, applying the provisions of
section 80 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions,
decided:
a. that the action was improperly commenced
before the justice of the peace;
b. that the justice of the peace did not have
jurisdiction to try said cause;
c. that an action of forcible entry and detainer
cannot be commenced in the court of a
justice of the peace where the defendants
have been in possession of the land for a
period of more than one year prior to the
commencement of the action.
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REVIEWER 2: PROPERTY
4.
The plaintiff appealed.
that the action was one over which the courts of
justices of the peace had exclusive jurisdiction.
CFI Isabela sustained the demurrer citing lack of
jurisdiction. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Does the Justice of Peace have jurisdiction over the
action of forcible entry and detainer?
4.
RULING:
ISSUE: Does CFI Isabela have jurisdiction over the case?
No. The Justice of Peace does not have jurisdiction over
the present action of forcible entry and detainer.
RULING:
Justices of the peace do not have jurisdiction in an action
of forcible entry and detainer unless the action is
commenced within one year from the date of the wrongful
possession. (Sec. 80 of Act No. 190, as amended by Act
No. 1778.) Neither can the action of forcible entry and
detainer commenced in the court of the justice of the
peace be amended in the Court of First Instance so as to
change the nature of the cause of action.
It is a well-established rule of pleading and practice, that in
all pleadings filed in courts of special jurisdiction, the
special jurisdictional facts must be alleged. Unless the
special jurisdictional facts are alleged, the complaint is
demurrable. In an action for forcible entry and detainer
the deprivation of possession must be alleged to be
resulting from force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth
pursuant to Section 80 of the Code of Procedure in Civil
Actions.
In the present case, the lower court did not decide that
the plaintiff was not entitled to the possession of the land in
question. The decision of the lower court was to the effect
that an action for the possession of the land in question
could not be maintained in the court of the justice of the
peace for the reason that more than one year had
elapsed after the alleged illegal possession and before the
commencement of the action. It is possible that in an
action of ejectment, commenced in the proper court, the
plaintiff may be able to show that he is entitled to the
possession of the land in question.
Further, the action being one for forcible entry and
detainer, commenced in the court of the justice of the
peace, and could not be changed to an action of
ejectment by an amendment of the pleadings in the Court
of First Instance. The above conclusion, of course, in no
way indicates that the plaintiff is not entitled to the
possession of the land in question.
Gumiran v. Gumiran
G.R. No. 6364, January 11, 1912
Yes. CFI is vested with jurisdiction over the case.
The present action simply states “deprived” of possession
without any specific allegations of special circumstances
mentioned under Section 80. The complaint in the present
case not containing allegations showing the special
jurisdiction of the justice of the peace, the same would
have been demurrable had it been filed in the court of a
justice of the peace although the filing is within one (1)
year since dispossession occurred.
Section 80 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions, does
not cover all of the cases of dispossession of lands.
Whenever the owner is dispossessed by any other means
than those mentioned in said section, he may maintain his
action in a Court of First Instance, and it is not necessary for
him to wait until the expiration of twelve months before
commencing an action to be repossessed and to be
declared to be the owner of said land.
Regalado v. Dela Peña
G.R No. 2012448, December 13, 2017
DOCTRINE:
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
FACTS:
1.
1.
2.
3.
In 1909, plaintiffs commenced an action in the Court of
First Instance of the Province of Isabela, relating to the
possession of a certain parcel of land, described in
paragraph 2 of said complaint.
The plaintiffs alleged that they were the absolute
owners and entitled to the possession of said land; that
upon the 6thday of May, 1908, they were in possession
of said land and had been from time immemorial, and
that, without any right or title, the defendant deprived
them of the possession of the same, that the
defendant was still in possession of said land and that
the plaintiffs, by reason of such wrongful dispossession,
had suffered damages in the sum of P500.
To the foregoing complaint the defendant presented
a demurrer, based upon the ground that the Court of
First Instance did not have jurisdiction of said cause—
2.
3.
4.
5.
The case herein is a petition for review on certiorari
seeking to reverse and set aside the decision of the
RTC for “Recovery of Possession and Damages with
Injunction.”
Emma, Jesusa, Johnny, Johanna, Jose, Jessica, and
Jaime Antonio (Jaime) all surnamed de la Pena
(respondents), are the registered owners of two
parcels of land with a total area of 44 hectares
located in Murcia, Negros Occidental.
In 1994, without the knowledge and consent of
respondents, Joseph Regalado, petitioner herein,
entered, took possession of, and planted sugar cane
on the subject properties without paying rent to
respondents.
In the crop year 1995-1996, respondents discovered
such illegal entry, which prompted them to verbally
demand from petitioner to vacate the properties but
the latter failed to do so.
The parties appeared before the Brgy. Office of
Cansilayan but failed to arrive at any amicable
settlement.
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REVIEWER 2: PROPERTY
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
A Certificate to File Action was issued and respondents
filed a Complaint for recovery of possession and
damages with injunction against petitioner.
Petitioner countered that Emma, Jesusa, Johnny,
Johanna, and Jessica executed their separate Waivers
of Undivided Share of Lands renouncing their rights
and interests over the subject properties in favor of
Jaime
Jaime, on the other hand, Jaime subsequently waived
his rights and interests on the same properties to
petitioner.
Petitioner claimed that respondents did not attempt to
enter the properties as they already intentionally
relinquished their interests thereon.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground,
among others, that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case.
Petitioner posited that based on the allegations in the
Complaint, the action involved recovery of physical
possession of the properties in dispute; said Complaint
was also filed within one year from the date the parties
had a confrontation before the Barangay; and thus,
the case was one for Ejectment and must be filed with
the proper Municipal Trial Court (MTC).
Respondents alleged that the waiver of rights in favor
of Jaime was conditioned on the payment of their P6.7
million loan with the Republic Planters Bank (RPB) and
Philippine National Bank (PNB); and, in case the
subject properties would be sold, its proceeds shall be
equally distributed to respondents
They added that the subsequent waiver executed by
Jaime to petitioner should have been with conformity
of the banks where the properties were mortgaged;
and conditioned on the payment of the P6.7 million
loan.
They pointed out that neither Jaime nor petitioner paid
any amount to RPB or PNB; and as a result, the waivers
of rights in favor of Jaime, and later to petitioner, were
void
Respondents contended that the RTC had jurisdiction
over the case because their demand for petitioner to
vacate the properties was made during the crop year
1995-1996, which was earlier than the referral of the
matter to Barangay Cansilayan.
RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss. It held that it had
jurisdiction over the case because the area of the
subject properties was 44 hectares more or less, and “it
is safe to presume that the value of the same is more
than P20,000.00.”
RTC rendered a Decision ordering petitioner to turn
over the subject properties to respondents and to pay
them P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
CA affirmed the RTC’s Decision.
ISSUE: Does the RTC have jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case?
RULING:
Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7691 (RA 7691), the proper
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), MTC, or Municipal Circuit
Trial Court (MCTC) has exclusive original jurisdiction over
ejectment cases. Moreover, jurisdiction of the MeTC, MTC,
and MCTC shall include civil actions involving title to or
possession of real property, or any interest therein where
the assessed value of the property does not exceed
P20,000.00 (or P50,000.00 in Metro Manila). On the other
hand, the RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over civil
actions involving title to or possession of real property, or
any interest therein in case the assessed value of the
property exceeds P20,000.00 (or P50,000.00 in Metro
Manila).
On the other hand, the RTC has exclusive original
jurisdiction over civil actions involving title to or possession
of real property, or any interest therein in case the assessed
value of the property exceeds P.20, 000.00 (or P50, 000.00
in Metro Manila).
Jurisdiction is thus determined not only by the type of
action filed but also by the assessed value of the property.
It follows that in accion publiciana and reinvindicatoria,
the assessed value of the real property is a jurisdictional
element to determine the court that can take cognizance
of the action. As such, to ascertain the proper court that
has jurisdiction, reference must be made to the averments
in the complaint, and the law in force at the
commencement of the action. This is because only the
facts alleged in the complaint can be the basis for
determining the nature of the action, and the court that
can take cognizance of the case.
The Court agrees with petitioner that while this case is an
accion publiciana. However, it also ruled that there was no
clear showing that the RTC has jurisdiction over it. Wellsettled is the rule that jurisdiction is conferred only by law. It
cannot be presumed or implied, and must distinctly
appear from the law. It cannot also be vested upon a
court by the agreement of the parties; or by the court's
erroneous belief that it had jurisdiction over a case. The
complaint by the respondents failed to specify the
assessed value of the subject properties. Thus, it is unclear if
the RTC properly acquired jurisdiction, or the MTC has
jurisdiction, over respondents' action. In the absence of
any allegation in the Complaint of the assessed value of
the subject properties, it cannot be determined which
court has exclusive original jurisdiction over respondents'
Complaint. Courts cannot simply take judicial notice of the
assessed value, or even market value of the land.
Resultantly, for lack of jurisdiction, all proceedings .before
the RTC, including its decision, are void.
No. In our jurisdiction, there are three kinds of action for
recovery of possession of real property: 1) ejectment
(either for unlawful detainer or forcible entry) in case the
dispossession has lasted for not more than a year; 2)
accion publiciana or a plenary action for recovery of real
right of possession when dispossession has lasted for more
than one year; and, 3) accion reinvindicatoria or an action
for recovery of ownership.
10
REVIEWER 2: PROPERTY
Santiago v. Santos
G.R No. L-20241, November 22, 1974
Arjonillo v. Pagulayan
G.R. No. 196074, October 4, 2017
DOCTRINE: Admission made in the pleadings cannot be
controverted by the party making such admission and are
conclusive as to him, and that all proofs submitted by him
contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith, should be
ignored, whether objection is interposed by the party or
not.
DOCTRINE: In order to successfully maintain actions for
recovery of ownership of a real property, the complainants
must prove the identity of the land and their title thereto as
provided under Article 434 of the Civil Code. They have the
burden of proof to establish the averments in the
complaint.
FACTS:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Plaintiff-appellant, Luis Santiago applied for registration
of his title over a parcel of land located in San Mateo,
Rizal.
The application was opposed by the Director of Lands,
Director of Forestry and by Mrs. Pacita V. de los Santos
stating that the property applied for is part of the
public domain which was leased to Mrs. de los Santos
under Pasture Lease Agreement No. 1305.
The Court sided with the Director of the Forestry and
Mrs. De los Santos and ordered the dismissal of the
case application filed by Santiago.
On appeal, Santiago was represented by new
thorough and comprehensive counsel, the firm of Luna
and Manalo seeking the reversal of the decision by
Judge Cecilia Munoz-Palma.
It was alleged that the land portion of the said parcel
of land subject of this registration which was claimed
as part of the public forest has already been released
by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
for agricultural purposes.
ISSUE: Should the judgment of the court be reversed on the
dismissal of the registration of the subject parcel of land?
FACTS:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
RULING:
No. The judgment should not be reversed.
According to Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Joe's Radio & Electrical
Supply v. Alto Electronics Corp., “that an admission made
in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party
making such admission and are conclusive as to him, and
that all proofs submitted by him contrary thereto or
inconsistent therewith, should be ignored, whether
objection is interposed by the party or not ...."
In this case, the pleading filed by the previous counsel of
the petitioner herein left no choice to the then Judge
Muñoz Palma except to dismiss the case. Attached to such
pleading were the documents, which, in the language of
the then Judge Palma, “show that the land object of this
registration proceeding is part of the public domain.”
Former counsel ought to have realized the fatal effect on
his client's case of such an admission. If it were his intention
to demolish entirely the pretension of plaintiff to the claim
that he had been in open, public, uninterrupted, peaceful
and adverse possession in the concept of owner from July
26, 1894 up to the present, he could not have succeeded
any better. What was so categorically therein set forth as
to such parcel of land being a part of a public forest,
although thereafter released by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources for agricultural purposes,
is conclusive and binding.
Hence, the judgment is affirmed.
8.
In 1987, Avelardo Cue died intestate in Tuguegarao,
Cagayan.
He was survived by his herein petitioner as his niece,
and other close relatives both descendants and
ascendants.
The heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement of the
estate of Cue in 1989.
Lot 999-B-3-B, however, is registered in the name of
Demetria Pagulayan with TCT issued by RD for the
Province of Cagayan.
Arjonillo and some of the heirs filed for reivindicacion,
with Partition alleging that Cue was the one who
purchased the property and Pagulayan was just a
paramour of Cue and exercised undue influence to
get the latter register the property exclusively under
her name.
Pagulayan argued that the property was acquired
from a valid sale in 1976 as evidenced by a Deed of
Sale from Spouses Chua Bun Gui and Esmeralda
Valdepanas Chua.
RTC ruled that Pagulayan is not the rightful owner of
the property and ordered partition of the same in favor
of the heirs of Cue. It ruled that Pagulayan had no
financial capacity to purchase the same.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC
for failure of the heirs to prove their allegations.
ISSUE: Is Pagulayan the rightful owner of the disputed
property?
RULING:
Yes. Pagulayan is the rightful owner.
In order to successfully maintain actions for recovery of
ownership of a real property, the complainants must prove
the identity of the land and their title thereto as provided
under Article 434 of the Civil Code. They have the burden
of proof to establish the averments in the complaint by
preponderance of evidence, relying on the strength of
their own evidence and not upon the weakness of their
opponent’s evidence.
In this case, rather than dispensing with their burden of
proof as required under the law, Arjonillo and her coheirs
concentrated on attacking Pagulayan’s claim of
ownership over the subject properties on the ground of the
latter’s alleged lack of financial capability to purchase the
land and erect a building thereon. The testimony of
presented witness, the nephew of Spouses Chua whom the
alleged seller of the land, is considered hearsay for lack of
personal knowledge of the same to the actual sale.
11
REVIEWER 2: PROPERTY
Pagulayan was also able to present proof of the sale and
ownership of the land. Although subject for dispute, it is
fundamental that a certificate of title serves as evidence
of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property
in favor of the person whose name appears therein. The
title holder is entitled to all the attributes of ownership,
including possession of the property.
Caisip v. People
G.R. No. L-28716, November 18, 1970
DOCTRINE: The doctrine of self-help cannot be invoked
against a lawful co-possessor of the land.
FACTS:
1. Spouses Gloria Cabalag and Marcelino Guevarra
cultivated a parcel of land known as Lot 105-A of
Hacienda Palico situated in Sitio Bote-bote, Barrio
Tampisao, Nasugbu, Batangas.
2. The overseer of the hacienda is petitioner Felix Caisip
and the owner of the same is Roxas y Cia.
3. The latter acquired a court ruling against the spouses
Gloria and Marcelino for forcible entry which orders
them to vacate the premises within 20 days.
4. The order was carried out June 6, 1959, giving them
until June 26 to vacate it.
5. On June 17, Gloria was seen by Felix Caisip weeding
the portion of Lot 105-A, which is a rice field.
6. The latter bade her to stop what she was doing and to
leave the premises.
7. When Gloria refused, Caisip called for Sgt. Rjales and
Cpl. Villadelrey to help him shoo her away.
8. Gloria stuck to her attitude and still refused to stop and
leave so the two police officers, by means of force,
stopped her and dragged her away.
9. As a result, the clothes of Gloria got torn. One of
Gloria’s neighbours caught sight of the event and
asked the officers to release her.
10. Gloria was later turned over to the police on duty for
interrogation.
11. A case filed against the petitioners, Caisip and the
officers, for Grave Coercion. One of their defenses was
Article 429 of the Civil Code based on the Doctrine of
Self-Help.
12. CFI convicted the accused of Grave Coercion. CA
Affirmed.
ISSUE: Can the petitioners invoke the doctrine of self-help?
RULING:
No. Art. 429 of the Civil Code which provides that “the
owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to
exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal
thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as may be
reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or
threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his
property." cannot be used as a defense of the petitioner to
justify their action.
Having been given 20 days from June 6, 1959, within which
to vacate Lot 105-A, Gloria did not, on June 17, 1959 — or
within said period — invade or usurp said lot. She had
merely remained in possession thereof, even though the
hacienda owner may have become its co-possessor.
Appellants did not "repel or prevent in actual or
threatened ... physical invasion or usurpation."
They expelled Gloria from a property of which she and her
husband were in possession even before the action for
forcible entry was filed against them on May 17, 1958,
despite the fact that the Sheriff had explicitly authorized
them to stay in said property up to June 26, 1959, and had
expressed the view that he could not oust them therefrom
On June 17, 1959, without a judicial order therefor.
It is, accordingly, clear that appellants herein had, by
means of violence, and without legal authority therefor,
prevented the complainant from "doing something not
prohibited by law," (weeding and being in Lot 105-A), and
compelled her "to do something against" her will (stopping
the weeding and leaving said lot), "whether it be right or
wrong ," thereby taking the law into their hands, in violation
of Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code.
People v. Pletcha
G.R. No. 19029, June 27, 1977
DOCTRINE: Under Article 429 of the principle of self-help,
the use of such necessary force to protect proprietary or
possessory rights constitutes a justifying circumstance under
our penal laws.
FACTS:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Tito Pletcha is a farmer who owns a land which he has
been cultivating for 19 years.
Eight men from a private corporation sought to take
over the aforementioned land by fencing 4 hectares
of his property. Such fencing was without authority or
court order.
Because of this, Pletcha fought-off the take over and
resisted the company.
This forced the company to file a case for grave
coercion against Pletcha in the Municipal Court of
Murcia, Negros Occidental.
Pletcha, Jr. invokes the protective mantle of Article 429
of the Civil Code which gives him the right to use
reasonable force to exclude any person threatening
his exclusive ownership over the land.
The People asks for affirmance on the ground that the
appellant should not have taken the law into his own
hands but rather have the courts decide the case.
ISSUE: Can Pletcha, Jr. properly avail the defense of selfhelp?
RULING:
No. Pletcha, Jr. may avail the defense of the doctrine of
self-help.
Pursuant to Article 429 of the New Civil Code, "the owner or
lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any
person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this
purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably
necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened
unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property."
12
REVIEWER 2: PROPERTY
The principle of self-defense and the protective measures
related thereto covers not only his life, but also his liberty
and property.
RULING:
In this case, the appellant has real interest on that parcel
of land sought to be fenced by virtue of his 19-year
uninterrupted and open occupation. From the testimonies
of the witnesses themselves, there is not a scintilla of doubt
that the appellant made a valid claim on the land being
invaded.
The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and
dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those
established by law. It is within the right of petitioners, as
owners, to enclose and fence their property. Article 430 of
the Civil Code provides that "every owner may enclose or
fence his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live
or dead hedges, or by any other means without detriment
to servitudes constituted thereon.
Inasmuch as this right was disregarded or violated, the
appellant was justified to retaliate in self-defense invoking
the principle of self-help as embodied in Article 429 of the
Civil Code, especially in the absence of evidence he used
force in so doing. The act of fencing the land which is yet
to be completed constitutes force in contemplation of the
law.
The Court finds that it was not the appellant, who enjoys
the legal presumption of just title, who took the law into his
hands, but it was the complainants for trying to scare away
the appellant by acts of vandalism and strategy.
Custodio v. CA
G.R. No. 116100, February 9, 1996
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Private respondent-heirs of the deceased original
plaintiff owned a parcel of land with a two-door
apartment located at P. Burgos St. in Taguig, Metro
Manila.
The said property were surrounded by other
immovables to which were owned by herein
petitioners; On the left side is the property of the Sps
Custodio and Sps Santos.
Now when one of the tenants of Mabasa vacated the
apartment, Mabasa visited said property and noticed
that there were adobe fences created by the herein
petitioners that made the passageway narrower
before it can reach the property owned by Mabasa.
Herein petitioner spouses Santos defended that they
created such adobe fences because there was an
incident when her daughter was dragged by a bicycle
pedalled by a son of one of the tenants in said
apartment along the first passageway, among other
inconveniences.
When raised judicially, RTC ordered Custodios and
Santoses to give plaintiff permanent access ingress
and egress, to the public street; and ordered the
plaintiff-Mabasa to pay Custodios and Santoses the
sum of Eight Thousand Pesos(P8,000) as indemnity for
the permanent use of the passageway. Still not
contended with the ruling, Mabasa raised the matter
to CA praying for award of damages.
The CA then affirmed the RTC decision and modifies it
in extent of adding award of damages in favor of
Mabasa. Hence this petition.
No. The Court of Appeals erred in awarding the damages.
A person has a right to the natural use and enjoyment of
his own property, according to his pleasure, for all the
purposes to which such property is usually applied. As a
general rule, therefore, there is no cause of action for acts
done by one person upon his own property in a lawful and
proper manner, although such acts incidentally cause
damage or an unavoidable loss to another, as such
damage or loss is damnum absque injuria.
The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot
is a valid exercise of their right as owners, hence not
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. In the
case at bar, although there was damage, there was no
legal injury. Contrary to the claim of private respondents,
petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle
of abuse of right. In order that the principle of abuse of
right provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code can be
applied, it is essential that the following requisites concur:
(1) The defendant should have acted in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy;(2) The
acts should be willful; and (3) There was damage or injury
to the plaintiff.
The mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not
give rise to a right to recover damages. To warrant the
recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action
for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage
resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage,
or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of
action, since damages are merely part of the remedy
allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong.
By way of emphasis the Court said that in order that the
law will give redress for an act causing damage, that act
must be not only hurtful, but wrongful. There must be
damnum et injuria. If, as may happen in many cases, a
person sustains actual damage, that is, harm or loss to his
person or property, without sustaining any legal injury, that
is, an act or omission which the law does not deem an
injury, the damage is regarded as damnum absque injuria.
ISSUE: Is CA correct in awarding the damages?
13
REVIEWER 2: PROPERTY
Andamo v. IAC
G.R. No. 74761, November 6, 1990
DOCTRINE: It must be stressed that the use of one’s
property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil
Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use
thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third
person."
FACTS:
1.
2.
3.
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus is whether a corporation, which has built
through its agents, waterpaths, water conductors and
contrivances within its land, thereby causing
inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can be
held civilly liable for damages under Articles 2176 and
2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts such that the
resulting civil case can proceed independently of the
criminal case.
Petitioner sps. Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are
the owners of a parcel of land situated in Biga (Biluso)
Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private
respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc.,
a religious corporation where waterpaths and
contrivances, including an artificial lake, were
constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded
petitioners’ land, caused a young man to drown,
damaged petitioners’ crops and plants, washed away
costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and
their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and
exposed plants and other improvements to
destruction.
Petitioner spouses then filed 2 separate cases against
the Missionaries, one being penal while the other civil
in nature. The RTC of Cavite ordered the suspension of
the Civil Case until after the judgment in the related
criminal case, anchoring on the rule that once a
criminal action has been commenced the civil action
cannot be instituted until final judgment has been
rendered in the criminal action. The Sps. appealed
before the Intermediate Appellate Court alleging that
the RTC erred; however, the former affirmed the
decision of the latter.
ISSUE: WoN there was quasi delict even if the cause of the
damage was caused in one’s own private property.
RULING:
Yes.
A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint
shows that the civil action is one under Articles 2176 and
2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of
a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by
the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or
some other person for whose acts he must respond; and
(c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault
or negligence of the defendant and the damages
incurred by the plaintiff.
Clearly, from petitioners’ complaint, the waterpaths and
contrivances built by Respondent Corporation are alleged
to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is
therefore, an assertion of a causal connection between
the act of building these waterpaths and the damage
sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes
fault or negligence which may be the basis for the
recovery of damages.
While the property involved in the cited case belonged to
the public domain and the property subject of the instant
case is privately owned, the fact remains that petitioners’
complaint sufficiently alleges that petitioners have
sustained and will continue to sustain damage due to the
waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent
corporation. Indeed, the recitals of the complaint, the
alleged presence of damage to the petitioners, the act or
omission of respondent corporation supposedly
constituting fault or negligence, and the causal
connection between the act and the damage, with no
pre-existing contractual obligation between the parties
make a clear case of a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.
It must be stressed that the use of one’s property is not
without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides
that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such
a manner as to injure the rights of a third person." SIC UTERE
TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining
landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which
require that each must use his own land in a reasonable
manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of
others.
Although the Court recognizes the right of an owner to
build structures on his land, such structures must be so
constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so
that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners
and can withstand the usual and expected forces of
nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an
adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can claim
indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.
A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal
institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its
own, and individuality that is entirely apart and
independent from a delict or crime — a distinction exists
between the civil liability arising from a crime and the
responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual.
The same negligence causing damages may produce civil
liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or
create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extracontractual under the Civil Code. Therefore, the acquittal
or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the
civil case, unless, of course, in the event of an acquittal
where the court has declared that the fact from which the
civil action arose did not exist, in which case the extinction
of the criminal liability would carry with it the extinction of
the civil liability.chanrobles.com.ph
14
REVIEWER 2: PROPERTY
Higgins Oil & Fuel Co. v. Guaranty Oil Co., 145 la 233, 82 So.
206 as cited in 2 TOLENTINO, supra at 67
DOCTRINE: An owner is not bound to do-anything to save
his neighbor from loss. The only restriction upon him is that
he abstains from doing anything that may cause a loss.
FACTS:
In this case, the defendant's duty to be neighborly was
upheld and his privileges in using his land to dig for oil were
correspondingly narrowed. The defendant had sunk an oil
well on his land which caused air to get into the plaintiff's
pump in a well on the latter's land, resulting in a great
decrease in the productivity of the plaintiff's well. Although
the defendant's well was a non-producer and could be
closed without trouble or expense by simply putting back a
plug, the defendant refused to close it. The court discusses
both civil and common-law authorities and decides that
the plaintiff is entitled to relief.
ISSUE: WON the defendant is compelled to close the oil
well as it causes damage to the plaintiff’s oil production
RULING:
No. An owner is not bound to do-anything to save his
neighbor from loss. The only restriction upon him is that he
abstains from doing anything that may cause a loss.
In the present ease defendant is not charged with mere
inaction, but with the action of having bored this well and
thereby opened a vent for the air to penetrate where it
causes injury. Had defendant left things in their original
condition, plaintiff would not be suffering. Defendant is
causing this air to pass from its land to that of plaintiff. True,
defendant is now merely passive or inactive; but the
agency complained of was set in motion by defendant.
Defendant alone is responsible for its beginning and its
continuing: its activity is therefore that of defendant.
Hence, the complaint is set aside.
Republic v. CA, Dela Rosa
G.R. No. L-43938, April 15, 1988
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
1.
2.
3.
These consolidated cases arose from the application
for registration of a parcel of land filed on February 11,
1965, by Jose de la Rosa on his own behalf and on
behalf of his three children, Victoria, Benjamin and
Eduardo.
The land, situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province,
was divided into 9 lots and covered by plan Psu225009. According to the application, Lots 1-5 were
sold to Jose de la Rosa and Lots 6-9 to his children by
Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Alberto, respectively, in
1964.
The application was separately opposed by Benguet
Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots 1-5, Atok Big Wedge
Corporation, as to Portions of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-
9, and by the Republic of the Philippines, through the
Bureau of Forestry Development, as to lots 1-9.
4. In support of the application, both Balbalio and
Alberto testified that they had acquired the subject
land by virtue of prescription; Balbalio claimed to have
received Lots 1-5 from her father shortly after the
Liberation.
5. Benguet opposed on the ground that the “June Bug”
mineral claim covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it on
September 22, 1934, by the successors-in-interest of
James Kelly, who located the claim in September 1909
and recorded it on October 14, 1909.
6. From the date of its purchase, Benguet had been in
actual, continuous and exclusive possession of the
land in concept of owner, as evidenced by its
construction of adits, its affidavits of annual
assessment, its geological mappings, geological
samplings and trench side cuts, and its payment of
taxes on the land.
7. For its part, Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and
all of Lots 6-9 were covered by the Emma and Fredia
mineral claims located by Harrison and Reynolds on
December 25, 1930, and recorded on January 2, 1931,
in the office of the mining recorder of Baguio.
8. These claims were purchased from these locators on
November 2, 1931, by Atok, which has since then been
in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the
said lots as evidenced by its annual assessment work
on the claims, such as the boring of tunnels, and its
payment of annual taxes thereon.
9. The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its
objection, arguing that the land sought to be
registered was covered by the Central Cordillera
Forest Reserve under Proclamation No. 217 dated
February 16, 1929. Moreover, by reason of its nature, it
was not subject to alienation under the Constitutions of
1935 and 1973.
10. The trial court denied the application, holding that the
applicants had failed to prove their claim of possession
and ownership of the land sought to be registered.
11. The applicants appealed to the respondent court,
which reversed the trial court and recognized the
claims of the applicant, but subject to the rights of
Benguet and Atok respecting their mining claims.
12. In other words, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at
the same time reserving the sub-surface rights of
Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claims. Both
Benguet and Atok have appealed to this Court,
invoking their superior right of ownership.
ISSUE: Whether or not applicants all surnamed Dela Rosa
have superior rights of ownership over the surface rights
over the land in question while oppositors Benguet
Consolidated, Inc. and Atok Big Wedge Mining Company
are reserved of their sub-surface rights by virtue of their
mining claim as decided by the respondent court.
RULING:
NO. Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive
rights to the property in question by virtue of their
respective mining claims which they validly acquired
15
REVIEWER 2: PROPERTY
before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited the alienation of
all lands of the public domain except agricultural lands,
subject to vested rights existing at the time of its adoption.
The land was not and could not have been transferred to
the private respondents by virtue of acquisitive
prescription, nor could its use be shared simultaneously by
them and the mining companies for agricultural and
mineral purposes. It is true that the subject property was
considered forest land and included in the Central
Cordillera Forest Reserve, but this did not impair the rights
already vested in Benguet and Atok at that time. Such
rights were not affected either by the stricture in the
Commonwealth Constitution against the alienation of all
lands of the public domain except those agricultural in
nature for this was made subject to existing rights. The
perfection of the mining claim converted the property to
mineral land and under the laws then in force removed it
from the public domain. By such act, the locators acquired
exclusive rights over the land, against even the
government, without need of any further act such as the
purchase of the land or the obtention of a patent over it.
As the land had become the private property of the
locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as they
did, to Benguet and Atok. The Court of Appeals justified
this by saying there is “no conflict of interest” between the
owners of the surface rights and the owners of the subsurface rights. This is rather doctrine, for it is a well-known
principle that the owner of piece of land has rights not only
to its surface but also to everything underneath and the
airspace above it up to a reasonable height. Under the
aforesaid ruling, the land is classified as mineral
underneath and agricultural on the surface, subject to
separate claims of title. This is also difficult to understand,
especially in its practical application.
The Regalian doctrine which, as its name implies, is
intended for the benefit of the State, not of private
persons. The rule simply reserves to the State all minerals
that may be found in public and even private land
devoted to "agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential
or (for) any purpose other than mining." Thus, if a person is
the owner of agricultural land in which minerals are
discovered, his ownership of such land does not give him
the right to extract or utilize the said minerals without the
permission of the State to which such minerals belong.
The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in
supposing that the rights over the land could be used for
both mining and non-mining purposes simultaneously. The
correct interpretation is that once minerals are discovered
in the land, whatever the use to which it is being devoted
at the time, such use may be discontinued by the State to
enable it to extract the minerals therein in the exercise of its
sovereign prerogative. The land is thus converted to
mineral land and may not be used by any private party,
including the registered owner thereof, for any other
purpose that will impede the mining operations to be
undertaken therein. The Regalian doctrine then extends
not only to land but also to “all natural wealth that may be
found in the bowels of the earth.”
National Power Corp v. Ibrahim
G.R. No. 168732, June 29, 2007
DOCTRINE: The landowners’ right to subsurface of the
land he owns extends to such height or depth where
it is possible for them to obtain some benefit or
enjoyment, and it is extinguished beyond such limit
as there would be no more interest protected by
law.
FACTS:
1.
The National Power Corporation constructed
underground tunnels on several parcels of land owned
in common by Ibrahim and his co-owners situated in
Lanao Del Sur.
2. NAPOCOR constructed the tunnels in 1978 but its
existence was discovered by the land owners only in
1992.
3. The tunnels were apparently being used by NAPOCOR
in siphoning the water of Lake Lanao and in the
operation of NAPOCOR’s other projects located in
other parts of Mindanao.
4. The existence of the tunnels came to the attention of
the co-owners only when one of them applied for a
permit with the Marawi City Water District to construct
and/or install a motorized deep well.
5. The application was denied on the ground that the
construction of the deep well would cause danger to
lives and property because Marawi City lies in an area
of local volcanic and tectonic activity and because of
the existence of tunnels underneath the surface of
their property.
6. He was then informed that underneath the land are
underground tunnels of the NAPOCOR.
7. Upon such discovery, the co-owners filed an action
against NAPOCOR for recovery of land and damages.
8. NAPOCOR maintains that the sub-terrain portion where
the underground tunnels were constructed does not
belong to the private respondents (the co-owners)
even if they owned the property because their right to
the subsoil does not extend beyond what is necessary
to enable them to obtain all the utility and
convenience that such property can normally give.
9. NAPOCOR also asserts that respondents were still able
to use the subject property even with the existence of
the tunnels.
10. The trial court denied the prayer of the co-owners for
the dismantling of the tunnels but ordered NAPOCOR
to pay them just compensation since there was
“taking” of their property.
11. The Court of Appeals sustained the decision of the trial
Court.
12. Hence, NAPOCOR elevated the matter to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Up to what extent will the land owner’s right be
with respect to the sub-surface?
16
REVIEWER 2: PROPERTY
RULING:
In finding the arguments of NAPOCOR to be without
merit, the Supreme Court held that pursuant to Article
437 of the Civil Code, the ownership of land extends
to the surface as well as to the subsoil under it.
The Court explained that the argument by the
petitioner that the landowners’ right extends to the
sub-soil insofar as necessary for their practical
interests serves only to further weaken its case
because the theory would limit the right to the subsoil upon the economic utility which such area offers
to the surface owners. Presumably, according to the
Court, the landowners’ right extends to such height or
depth where it is possible for them to obtain some
benefit or enjoyment, and it is extinguished beyond
such limit as there would be no more interest
protected by law. In this case, the landowners could
have dug upon their property motorized deep wells
but were prevented from doing so by the authorities
precisely because of the construction and existence
of the tunnels underneath the surface of their
property. Hence, the land owners still had a legal
interest in the sub-terrain portion insofar as they
could have excavated the same for the construction
of the deep well.
There was, therefore, in this case, “taking” of private
respondents’ property which entitled the latter to the
payment of just compensation.
In disregarding this procedure and failing to
recognize respondents’ ownership of the sub-terrain
portion, petitioner took a risk and exposed itself to
greater liability with the passage of time. It must be
emphasized that the acquisition of the easement is
not without expense. The underground tunnels
impose limitations on respondents’ use of the
property for an indefinite period and deprive them of
its ordinary use.
Based upon the foregoing, respondents are clearly
entitled to the payment of just compensation.
Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner only
occupies the sub-terrain portion, it is liable to pay not
merely an easement fee but rather the full
compensation for land. This is so because in this case,
the nature of the easement practically deprives the
owners of its normal beneficial use. Respondents, as
the owners of the property thus expropriated, are
entitled to a just compensation which should be
neither more nor less, whenever it is possible to make
the assessment, than the money equivalent of said
property.
17