LTD Cases
1. Krivenko GR No. L630
2. Beumer 195670
3. Rep. 108998
4. PBC L17587
5. Borromeo 159310
6. Muller 149615
7. Fritz 143958
8. Cheesman 74833
9. De Castro 31956
10. Vasquez L3676
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
1.
G.R. No. L-630
November 15, 1947
ALEXANDER A. KRIVENKO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, CITY OF MANILA, respondent and appellee.
Gibbs, Gibbs, Chuidian and Quasha of petitioner-appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Carreon for respondent-appellee.
Marcelino Lontok appeared as amicus curies.
MORAN, C.J.:
Alenxander A. Kriventor alien, bought a residential lot from the Magdalena Estate, Inc., in December of
1941, the registration of which was interrupted by the war. In May, 1945, he sought to accomplish said
registration but was denied by the register of deeds of Manila on the ground that, being an alien, he
cannot acquire land in this jurisdiction. Krivenko then brought the case to the fourth branch of the Court
of First Instance of Manila by means of a consulta, and that court rendered judgment sustaining the
refusal of the register of deeds, from which Krivenko appealed to this Court.
There is no dispute as to these facts. The real point in issue is whether or not an alien under our
Constitution may acquire residential land.
It is said that the decision of the case on the merits is unnecessary, there being a motion to withdraw the
appeal which should have been granted outright, and reference is made to the ruling laid down by this
Court in another case to the effect that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question if its
judgment may be made to rest upon other grounds. There is, we believe, a confusion of ideas in this
reasoning. It cannot be denied that the constitutional question is unavoidable if we choose to decide this
case upon the merits. Our judgment cannot to be made to rest upon other grounds if we have to render
any judgment at all. And we cannot avoid our judgment simply because we have to avoid a
constitutional question. We cannot, for instance, grant the motion withdrawing the appeal only because
we wish to evade the constitutional; issue. Whether the motion should be, or should not be, granted, is a
question involving different considerations now to be stated.
According to Rule 52, section 4, of the Rules of Court, it is discretionary upon this Court to grant a
withdrawal of appeal after the briefs have been presented. At the time the motion for withdrawal was
filed in this case, not only had the briefs been prensented, but the case had already been voted and the
majority decision was being prepared. The motion for withdrawal stated no reason whatsoever, and the
Solicitor General was agreeable to it. While the motion was pending in this Court, came the new circular
of the Department of Justice, instructing all register of deeds to accept for registration all transfers of
residential lots to aliens. The herein respondent-appellee was naturally one of the registers of deeds to
obey the new circular, as against his own stand in this case which had been maintained by the trial court
and firmly defended in this Court by the Solicitor General. If we grant the withdrawal, the the result would
be that petitioner-appellant Alexander A. Krivenko wins his case, not by a decision of this Court, but by
the decision or circular of the Department of Justice, issued while this case was pending before this
Court. Whether or not this is the reason why appellant seeks the withdrawal of his appeal and why the
Solicitor General readily agrees to that withdrawal, is now immaterial. What is material and indeed very
important, is whether or not we should allow interference with the regular and complete exercise by this
Court of its constitutional functions, and whether or not after having held long deliberations and after
having reached a clear and positive conviction as to what the constitutional mandate is, we may still
allow our conviction to be silenced, and the constitutional mandate to be ignored or misconceived, with
all the harmful consequences that might be brought upon the national patromony. For it is but natural
that the new circular be taken full advantage of by many, with the circumstance that perhaps the
constitutional question may never come up again before this court, because both vendors and vendees
will have no interest but to uphold the validity of their transactions, and very unlikely will the register of
deeds venture to disobey the orders of their superior. Thus, the possibility for this court to voice its
conviction in a future case may be remote, with the result that our indifference of today might signify a
permanent offense to the Constitution.
All thse circumstances were thoroughly considered and weighted by this Court for a number of days and
the legal result of the last vote was a denial of the motion withdrawing the appeal. We are thus
confronted, at this stage of the proceedings, with our duty, the constitutional question becomes
unavoidable. We shall then proceed to decide that question.
Article XIII, section 1, of the Constitutional is as follows:
Article XIII. — Conservation and utilization of natural resources.
SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, water, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the
Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be
limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the
capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at
the time of the inaguration of the Government established uunder this Constitution. Natural resources,
with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no licence, concession, or lease
for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a
period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights
for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water "power" in
which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.
The scope of this constitutional provision, according to its heading and its language, embraces all lands
of any kind of the public domain, its purpose being to establish a permanent and fundamental policy for
the conservation and utilization of all natural resources of the Nation. When, therefore, this provision,
with reference to lands of the public domain, makes mention of only agricultural, timber and mineral
lands, it means that all lands of the public domain are classified into said three groups, namely,
agricultural, timber and mineral. And this classification finds corroboration in the circumstance that at the
time of the adoption of the Constitution, that was the basic classification existing in the public laws and
judicial decisions in the Philippines, and the term "public agricultural lands" under said classification had
then acquired a technical meaning that was well-known to the members of the Constitutional
Convention who were mostly members of the legal profession.
As early as 1908, in the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil., 175, 182), this Court said that
the phrase "agricultural public lands" as defined in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, which phrase is
also to be found in several sections of the Public Land Act (No. 926), means "those public lands
acquired from Spain which are neither mineral for timber lands." This definition has been followed in
long line of decisions of this Court. (See Montano vs. Insular Government, 12 Phil., 593; Ibañez de
Aldecoa vs. Insular Government, 13 Phil., 159; Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil., 175;
Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, 39 Phil., 560; Ankron vs. Government of the Philippines, 40 Phil., 10.)
And with respect to residential lands, it has been held that since they are neither mineral nor timber
lands, of necessity they must be classified as agricultural. In Ibañez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government
(13 Phil., 159, 163), this Court said:
Hence, any parcel of land or building lot is susceptible of cultivation, and may be converted into a field,
and planted with all kinds of vegetation; for this reason, where land is not mining or forestal in its nature,
it must necessarily be included within the classification of agricultural land, not because it is actually
used for the purposes of agriculture, but because it was originally agricultural and may again become so
under other circumstances; besides, the Act of Congress contains only three classification, and makes
no special provision with respect to building lots or urban lands that have ceased to be agricultural land.
In other words, the Court ruled that in determining whether a parcel of land is agricultural, the test is not
only whether it is actually agricultural, but also its susceptibility to cultivation for agricultural purposes.
But whatever the test might be, the fact remains that at the time the Constitution was adopted, lands of
the public domain were classified in our laws and jurisprudence into agricultural, mineral, and timber,
and that the term "public agricultural lands" was construed as referring to those lands that were not
timber or mineral, and as including residential lands. It may safely be presumed, therefore, that what the
members of the Constitutional Convention had in mind when they drafted the Constitution was this
well-known classification and its technical meaning then prevailing.
Certain expressions which appear in Constitutions, . . . are obviously technical; and where such words
have been in use prior to the adoption of a Constitution, it is presumed that its framers and the people
who ratified it have used such expressions in accordance with their technical meaning. (11 Am. Jur., sec.
66, p. 683.) Also Calder vs. Bull, 3 Dall. [U.S.], 386; 1 Law. ed., 648; Bronson vs. Syverson, 88 Wash.,
264; 152 P., 1039.)
It is a fundamental rule that, in construing constitutions, terms employed therein shall be given the
meaning which had been put upon them, and which they possessed, at the time of the framing and
adoption of the instrument. If a word has acquired a fixed, technical meaning in legal and constitutional
history, it will be presumed to have been employed in that sense in a written Constitution.
(McKinney vs. Barker, 180 Ky., 526; 203 S.W., 303; L.R.A., 1918 E, 581.)
Where words have been long used in a technical sense and have been judicially construed to have a
certain meaning, and have been adopted by the legislature as having a certain meaning prior to a
particular statute in which they are used, the rule of construction requires that the words used in such
statute should be construed according to the sense in which they have been so previously used,
although the sense may vary from strict literal meaning of the words. (II Sutherland, Statutory
Construction, p. 758.)
Therefore, the phrase "public agricultural lands" appearing in section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution
must be construed as including residential lands, and this is in conformity with a legislative interpretation
given after the adoption of the Constitution. Well known is the rule that "where the Legislature has
revised a statute after a Constitution has been adopted, such a revision is to be regarded as a legislative
construction that the statute so revised conforms to the Constitution." (59 C.J., 1102.) Soon after the
Constitution was adopted, the National Assembly revised the Public Land Law and passed
Commonwealth Act No. 141, and sections 58, 59 and 60 thereof permit the sale of residential lots to
Filipino citizens or to associations or corporations controlled by such citizens, which is equivalent to a
solemn declaration that residential lots are considered as agricultural lands, for, under the Constitution,
only agricultural lands may be alienated.
It is true that in section 9 of said Commonwealth Act No. 141, "alienable or disposable public lands"
which are the same "public agriculture lands" under the Constitution, are classified into agricultural,
residential, commercial, industrial and for other puposes. This simply means that the term "public
agricultural lands" has both a broad and a particular meaning. Under its broad or general meaning, as
used in the Constitution, it embraces all lands that are neither timber nor mineral. This broad meaning is
particularized in section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 which classifies "public agricultural lands" for
purposes of alienation or disposition, into lands that are stricly agricultural or actually devoted to
cultivation for agricultural puposes; lands that are residential; commercial; industrial; or lands for other
purposes. The fact that these lands are made alienable or disposable under Commonwealth Act No.
141, in favor of Filipino citizens, is a conclusive indication of their character as public agricultural lands
under said statute and under the Constitution.
It must be observed, in this connection that prior to the Constitution, under section 24 of Public Land Act
No. 2874, aliens could acquire public agricultural lands used for industrial or residential puposes, but
after the Constitution and under section 23 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the right of aliens to acquire
such kind of lands is completely stricken out, undoubtedly in pursuance of the constitutional limitation.
And, again, prior to the Constitution, under section 57 of Public Land Act No. 2874, land of the public
domain suitable for residence or industrial purposes could be sold or leased to aliens, but after the
Constitution and under section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, such land may only be leased, but not
sold, to aliens, and the lease granted shall only be valid while the land is used for the purposes referred
to. The exclusion of sale in the new Act is undoubtedly in pursuance of the constitutional limitation, and
this again is another legislative construction that the term "public agricultural land" includes land for
residence purposes.
Such legislative interpretation is also in harmony with the interpretation given by the Executive
Department of the Government. Way back in 1939, Secretary of Justice Jose Abad Santos, in answer to
a query as to "whether or not the phrase 'public agricultural lands' in section 1 of Article XII (now XIII) of
the Constitution may be interpreted to include residential, commercial, and industrial lands for purposes
of their disposition," rendered the following short, sharp and crystal-clear opinion:
Section 1, Article XII (now XIII) of the Constitution classifies lands of the public domain in the Philippines
into agricultural, timber and mineral. This is the basic classification adopted since the enactment of the
Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, known as the Philippine Bill. At the time of the adoption of the
Constitution of the Philippines, the term 'agricultural public lands' and, therefore, acquired a technical
meaning in our public laws. The Supreme Court of the Philippines in the leading case of Mapa vs.
Insular Government, 10 Phil., 175, held that the phrase 'agricultural public lands' means those public
lands acquired from Spain which are neither timber nor mineral lands. This definition has been followed
by our Supreme Court in many subsequent case. . . .
Residential commercial, or industrial lots forming part of the public domain must have to be included in
one or more of these classes. Clearly, they are neither timber nor mineral, of necessity, therefore, they
must be classified as agricultural.
Viewed from another angle, it has been held that in determining whether lands are agricultural or not,
the character of the land is the test (Odell vs. Durant, 62 N.W., 524; Lorch vs. Missoula Brick and Tile
Co., 123 p.25). In other words, it is the susceptibility of the land to cultivation for agricultural purposes by
ordinary farming methods which determines whether it is agricultural or not (State vs. Stewart, 190 p.
129).
Furthermore, as said by the Director of Lands, no reason is seen why a piece of land, which may be sold
to a person if he is to devote it to agricultural, cannot be sold to him if he intends to use it as a site for his
home.
This opinion is important not alone because it comes from a Secratary of Justice who later became the
Chief Justice of this Court, but also because it was rendered by a member of the cabinet of the late
President Quezon who actively participated in the drafting of the constitutional provision under
consideration. (2 Aruego, Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p. 598.) And the opinion of the Quezon
administration was reiterated by the Secretary of Justice under the Osmeña administration, and it was
firmly maintained in this Court by the Solicitor General of both administrations.
It is thus clear that the three great departments of the Government — judicial, legislative and executive
— have always maintained that lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, mineral and
timber, and that agricultural lands include residential lots.
Under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural resources, with the exception of public
agricultural land, shall not be aliented," and with respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is
limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in the hands
of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their
agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly to prevent this result that section 5 is included in Article
XIII, and it reads as follows:
Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be transferred or
assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain in the Philippines.
This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural resources may
leak into aliens' hands. It would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to
aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the
hands of Filipino citizens. Undoubtedly, as above indicated, section 5 is intended to insure the policy of
nationalization contained in section 1. Both sections must, therefore, be read together for they have the
same purpose and the same subject matter. It must be noticed that the persons against whom the
prohibition is directed in section 5 are the very same persons who under section 1 are disqualified "to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines." And the subject matter of both sections is
the same, namely, the non-transferability of "agricultural land" to aliens. Since "agricultural land" under
section 1 includes residential lots, the same technical meaning should be attached to "agricultural land
under section 5. It is a rule of statutory construction that "a word or phrase repeated in a statute will bear
the same meaning throughout the statute, unless a different intention appears." (II Sutherland, Statutory
Construction, p. 758.) The only difference between "agricultural land" under section 5, is that the former
is public and the latter private. But such difference refers to ownership and not to the class of land. The
lands are the same in both sections, and, for the conservation of the national patrimony, what is
important is the nature or class of the property regardless of whether it is owned by the State or by its
citizens.
Reference is made to an opinion rendered on September 19, 1941, by the Hon. Teofilo Sison, then
Secretary of Justice, to the effect that residential lands of the public domain may be considered as
agricultural lands, whereas residential lands of private ownership cannot be so considered. No reason
whatsoever is given in the opinion for such a distinction, and no valid reason can be adduced for such a
discriminatory view, particularly having in mind that the purpose of the constitutional provision is the
conservation of the national patrimony, and private residential lands are as much an integral part of the
national patrimony as the residential lands of the public domain. Specially is this so where, as indicated
above, the prohibition as to the alienable of public residential lots would become superflous if the same
prohibition is not equally applied to private residential lots. Indeed, the prohibition as to private
residential lands will eventually become more important, for time will come when, in view of the constant
disposition of public lands in favor of private individuals, almost all, if not all, the residential lands of the
public domain shall have become private residential lands.
It is maintained that in the first draft of section 5, the words "no land of private ownership" were used and
later changed into "no agricultural land of private ownership," and lastly into "no private agricultural land"
and from these changes it is argued that the word "agricultural" introduced in the second and final drafts
was intended to limit the meaning of the word "land" to land actually used for agricultural purposes. The
implication is not accurate. The wording of the first draft was amended for no other purpose than to
clarify concepts and avoid uncertainties. The words "no land" of the first draft, unqualified by the word
"agricultural," may be mistaken to include timber and mineral lands, and since under section 1, this kind
of lands can never be private, the prohibition to transfer the same would be superfluous. Upon the other
hand, section 5 had to be drafted in harmony with section 1 to which it is supplementary, as above
indicated. Inasmuch as under section 1, timber and mineral lands can never be private, and the only
lands that may become private are agricultural lands, the words "no land of private ownership" of the
first draft can have no other meaning than "private agricultural land." And thus the change in the final
draft is merely one of words in order to make its subject matter more specific with a view to avoiding the
possible confusion of ideas that could have arisen from the first draft.
If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including residential lots or lands not
strictly agricultural, the result would be that "aliens may freely acquire and possess not only residential
lots and houses for themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole towns and cities," and that "they may
validly buy and hold in their names lands of any area for building homes, factories, industrial plants,
fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health and vacation resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds, airfields,
and a host of other uses and purposes that are not, in appellant's words, strictly agricultural." (Solicitor
General's Brief, p. 6.) That this is obnoxious to the conservative spirit of the Constitution is beyond
question.
One of the fundamental principles underlying the provision of Article XIII of the Constitution and which
was embodied in the report of the Committee on Nationalization and Preservation of Lands and other
Natural Resources of the Constitutional Convention, is "that lands, minerals, forests, and other natural
resources constitute the exclusive heritage of the Filipino nation. They should, therefore, be preserved
for those under the sovereign authority of that nation and for their posterity." (2 Aruego, Framing of the
Filipino Constitution, p. 595.) Delegate Ledesma, Chairman of the Committee on Agricultural
Development of the Constitutional Convention, in a speech delivered in connection with the national
policy on agricultural lands, said: "The exclusion of aliens from the privilege of acquiring public
agricultural lands and of owning real estate is a necessary part of the Public Land Laws of the
Philippines to keep pace with the idea of preserving the Philippines for the Filipinos." (Emphasis ours.)
And, of the same tenor was the speech of Delegate Montilla who said: "With the complete
nationalization of our lands and natural resources it is to be understood that our God-given birthright
should be one hundred per cent in Filipino hands . . .. Lands and natural resources are immovables and
as such can be compared to the vital organs of a person's body, the lack of possession of which may
cause instant death or the shortening of life. If we do not completely antionalize these two of our most
important belongings, I am afraid that the time will come when we shall be sorry for the time we were
born. Our independence will be just a mockery, for what kind of independence are we going to have if a
part of our country is not in our hands but in those of foreigners?" (Emphasis ours.) Professor Aruego
says that since the opening days of the Constitutional Convention one of its fixed and dominating
objectives was the conservation and nationalization of the natural resources of the country. (2 Aruego,
Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p 592.) This is ratified by the members of the Constitutional
Convention who are now members of this Court, namely, Mr. Justice Perfecto, Mr. Justice Briones, and
Mr. Justice Hontiveros. And, indeed, if under Article XIV, section 8, of the Constitution, an alien may not
even operate a small jitney for hire, it is certainly not hard to understand that neither is he allowed to own
a pieace of land.
This constitutional intent is made more patent and is strongly implemented by an act of the National
Assembly passed soon after the Constitution was approved. We are referring again to Commonwealth
Act No. 141. Prior to the Constitution, there were in the Public Land Act No. 2874 sections 120 and 121
which granted aliens the right to acquire private only by way of reciprocity. Said section reads as follows:
SEC. 120. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act, nor any permanent
improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or transferred, except to persons,
corporations, associations, or partnerships who may acquire lands of the public domain under this Act;
to corporations organized in the Philippine Islands authorized therefor by their charters, and, upon
express authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of countries the laws of which grant to
citizens of the Philippine Islands the same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or
alienate land, or permanent improvements thereon, or any interest therein, as to their own citizens, only
in the manner and to the extent specified in such laws, and while the same are in force but not
thereafter.
SEC. 121. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of the former Public Land Act
or of any other Act, ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other provision of law formerly in force in
the Philippine Islands with regard to public lands, terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any other
denomination that were actually or presumptively of the public domain or by royal grant or in any other
form, nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or conveyed,
except to persons, corporations, or associations who may acquire land of the public domain under this
Act; to corporate bodies organized in the Philippine Islands whose charters may authorize them to do so,
and, upon express authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of the countries the laws of
which grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands the same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber,
dispose of, or alienate land or pemanent improvements thereon or any interest therein, as to their own
citizens, and only in the manner and to the extent specified in such laws, and while the same are in force,
but not thereafter: Provided, however, That this prohibition shall not be applicable to the conveyance or
acquisition by reason of hereditary succession duly acknowledged and legalized by competent courts,
nor to lands and improvements acquired or held for industrial or residence purposes, while used for
such purposes: Provided, further, That in the event of the ownership of the lands and improvements
mentioned in this section and in the last preceding section being transferred by judicial decree to
persons,corporations or associations not legally capacitated to acquire the same under the provisions of
this Act, such persons, corporations, or associations shall be obliged to alienate said lands or
improvements to others so capacitated within the precise period of five years, under the penalty of such
property reverting to the Government in the contrary case." (Public Land Act, No. 2874.)
It is to be observed that the pharase "no land" used in these section refers to all private lands, whether
strictly agricultural, residential or otherwise, there being practically no private land which had not been
acquired by any of the means provided in said two sections. Therefore, the prohibition contained in
these two provisions was, in effect, that no private land could be transferred to aliens except "upon
express authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of Philippine Islands the same right to
acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land." In other words, aliens were granted the
right to acquire private land merely by way of reciprocity. Then came the Constitution and
Commonwealth Act No. 141 was passed, sections 122 and 123 of which read as follows:
SEC. 122. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act, nor any permanent
improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or transferred, except to persons,
corporations, associations, or partnerships who may acquire lands of the public domain under this Act or
to corporations organized in the Philippines authorized thereof by their charters.
SEC. 123. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of any previous Act,
ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other provision of law formerly in force in the Philippines
with regard to public lands terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any other denomination that were
actually or presumptively of the public domain, or by royal grant or in any other form, nor any permanent
improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or conveyed, except to persons,
corporations or associations who may acquire land of the public domain under this Act or to corporate
bodies organized in the Philippines whose charters authorize them to do so: Provided, however, That
this prohibition shall not be applicable to the conveyance or acquisition by reason of hereditary
succession duly acknowledged and legalized by competent courts: Provided, further, That in the event
of the ownership of the lands and improvements mentioned in this section and in the last preceding
section being transferred by judicial decree to persons, corporations or associations not legally
capacitated to acquire the same under the provisions of this Act, such persons, corporations, or
associations shall be obliged to alienate said lands or improvements to others so capacitated within the
precise period of five years; otherwise, such property shall revert to the Government.
These two sections are almost literally the same as sections 120 and 121 of Act No. 2874, the only
difference being that in the new provisions, the right to reciprocity granted to aliens is completely
stricken out. This, undoubtedly, is to conform to the absolute policy contained in section 5 of Article XIII
of the Constitution which, in prohibiting the alienation of private agricultural lands to aliens, grants them
no right of reciprocity. This legislative construction carries exceptional weight, for prominent members of
the National Assembly who approved the new Act had been members of the Constitutional Convention.
It is said that the lot question does not come within the purview of sections 122 and 123 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, there being no proof that the same had been acquired by one of the means
provided in said provisions. We are not, however, diciding the instant case under the provisions of the
Public Land Act, which have to refer to land that had been formerly of the public domain, otherwise their
constitutionality may be doubtful. We are deciding the instant case under section 5 of Article XIII of the
Constitution which is more comprehensive and more absolute in the sense that it prohibits the transfer
to alien of any private agricultural land including residential land whatever its origin might have been.
And, finally, on June 14, 1947, the Congress approved Republic Act No. 133 which allows mortgage of
"private real property" of any kind in favor of aliens but with a qualification consisting of expressly
prohibiting aliens to bid or take part in any sale of such real property as a consequence of the mortgage.
This prohibition makes no distinction between private lands that are strictly agricultural and private lands
that are residental or commercial. The prohibition embraces the sale of private lands of any kind in favor
of aliens, which is again a clear implementation and a legislative interpretation of the constitutional
prohibition. Had the Congress been of opinion that private residential lands may be sold to aliens under
the Constitution, no legislative measure would have been found necessary to authorize mortgage which
would have been deemed also permissible under the Constitution. But clearly it was the opinion of the
Congress that such sale is forbidden by the Constitution and it was such opinion that prompted the
legislative measure intended to clarify that mortgage is not within the constitutional prohibition.
It is well to note at this juncture that in the present case we have no choice. We are construing the
Constitution as it is and not as we may desire it to be. Perhaps the effect of our construction is to
preclude aliens, admitted freely into the Philippines from owning sites where they may build their homes.
But if this is the solemn mandate of the Constitution, we will not attempt to compromise it even in the
name of amity or equity. We are satisfied, however, that aliens are not completely excluded by the
Constitution from the use of lands for residential purposes. Since their residence in the Philippines is
temporary, they may be granted temporary rights such as a lease contract which is not forbidden by the
Constitution. Should they desire to remain here forever and share our fortunes and misfortunes, Filipino
citizenship is not impossible to acquire.
For all the foregoing, we hold that under the Constitution aliens may not acquire private or public
agricultural lands, including residential lands, and, accordingly, judgment is affirmed, without costs.
Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, and Briones, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinion
PERFECTO, J., concurring:
Today, which is the day set for the promulgation of this Court's decision might be remembered by future
generations always with joy, with gratitude, with pride. The failure of the highest tribunal of the land to do
its duty in this case would have amounted to a national disaster. We would have refused to share the
responsibility of causing it by, wittingly or unwittingly, allowing ourselves to act as tools in a conspiracy
to sabotage the most important safeguard of the age-long patrimony of our people, the land which
destiny of Providence has set aside to be the permanent abode of our race for unending generations.
We who have children and grandchildren, and who expect to leave long and ramifying dendriform lines
of descendants, could not bear the thought of the curse they may fling at us should the day arrive when
our people will be foreigners in their fatherland, because in the crucial moment of our history , when the
vision of judicial statemanship demanded on us the resolution and boldness to affirm and withhold the
letter and spirit of the Constitution, we faltered. We would have prefered heroic defeat to inglorious
desertion. Rather than abandon the sacred folds of the banner of our convictions for truth, for justice, for
racial survival. We are happy to record that this Supreme Court turned an impending failure to a glorious
success, saving our people from a looming catastrophe.
On July 3, 1946, the case of Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, (43 Off. Gaz., 866), was submitted for our
decision. The case was initiated in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas on January 17, 1940, when an
alien, Oh Cho, a citizen of China, applied for title and registration of a parcel of land located in the
residential district of Guinayangan, Tayabas, with a house thereon. The Director of Lands opposed the
application, one of the main grounds being that "the applicant, being a Chinese, is not qualified to
acquire public or private agricultural lands under the provisions of the Constitution."
On August 15, 1940, Judge P. Magsalin rendered decision granting the application. The Director of
Lands appealed. In the brief filed by Solicitor General Roman Ozaeta, afterwards Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court and now Secretary of Justice, and Assistant Solicitor General Rafael Amparo,
appellant made only two assignments of error, although both raised but one question, the legal one
stated in the first assignment of error as follows:
The lower court erred in declaring the registration of the land in question in favor of the applicant who,
according to his own voluntary admission is a citizen of the Chinese Republic.
The brief was accompanied, as Appendix A, by the opinion of Secretary of Justice Jose A. Santos —
who, while Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, suffered heroic martyrdom at the hands of the Japanese
— addressed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce on July 15, 1939, supporting the same
theory as the one advanced by the Director of Lands. The same legal question raised by appellant is
discussed, not only in the brief for the appellee, but also in the briefs of the several amici curiae allowed
by the Supreme Court to appear in the case.
As a matter of fact, the case has been submitted for final decision of the Supreme Court since July of
1941, that is, six years ago. It remained undecided when the Pacific War broke out in December, 1941.
After the Supreme Court was recognized in the middle of 1945, it was found that the case was among
those which were destroyed in February, 1945, during the battle for the liberation of Manila. The case
had to be reconstituted upon motion of the office of the Solicitor General, filed with this Court on January
14, 1946, in which it was also prayed that, after being reconstituted, the case be submitted for final
adjudication. The case was for the second time submitted for decision on July 3, 1946.
After the last submission, it took the Supreme Court many days to deliberate on the case, especially on
the legal question as to whether an alien may, under the Constitution, acquire private urban lands. An
overwhelming majority answered no. But when the decision was promulgated on August 31, 1946, a
majority resolved to ignore the question, notwithstanding our efforts to have the question, which is vital,
pressing and far-reaching, decided once and for all, to dispel definitely the uncertainty gnawing the
conscience of the people. It has been out lot to be alone in expressing in unmistakable terms our opinion
and decision on the main legal question raised by the appellant. The constitutional question was
by-passed by the majority because they were of opinion that it was not necessary to be decided,
notwithstanding the fact that it was the main and only legal question upon which appellant Director of
Lands relied in his appeal, and the question has been almost exhaustively argued in four printed briefs
filed by the parties and the amici curiae. Assurance was, nevertheless, given that in the next case in
which the same constitutional question is raised, the majority shall make known their stand on the
question.
The next case came when the present one submitted to us for decision on February 3, 1947. Again, we
deliberated on the constitutional question for several days.
On February 24, 1947, the case was submitted for final vote, and the result was that the constitutional
question was decided against petitioner. The majority was also overwhelming. There were eight of us,
more than two-thirds of the Supreme Court. Only three Justices dissented.
While the decision was being drafted, somehow, the way the majority had voted must have leaked out.
On July 10, 1947, appellant Krivenko filed a motion for withdrawal of his appeal, for the evident purpose
of preventing the rendering of the majority decision, which would settle once and for all the all-important
constitutional question as to whether aliens may acquire urban lots in the Philippines.
Appellant chose to keep silent as to his reason for filing the motion. The Solicitor General's office gave
its conformity to the withdrawal of the appeal. This surprising assent was given without expressing any
ground at all. Would the Supreme Court permit itself to be cheated of its decision voted since February
24, 1947?
Discussion immediately ensued as to whether the motion should be granted or denied, that is, whether
this Court should abstain from promulgating the decision in accordance with the result of the vote taken
on February 24, 1947, as if, after more than six years during which the question has been submitted for
the decision of the highest tribunal of the land, the same has failed to form a definite opinion.
After a two-day deliberation, the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Paras, Mr. Justice Hontiveros, Mr. Justice
Padilla and and Mr. Justice Tuason voted to grant the motion for withdrawal. Those who voted to deny
the motion were Mr. Justice Feria, Mr. Justice Pablo, ourselves, Mr. Justice Hilado and Mr. Justice
Bengzon. The vote thus resulted in a tie, 5-5. The deadlock resulting from the tie should have the effect
of denying the motion, as provided by section 2 of Rule 56 to the effect that "where the Court in banc is
equally divided in opinion . . . on all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied." And we
proposed that the rule be complied with, and the denial be promulgated.
Notwithstanding this, as Mr. Justice Briones was then absent, our brethren resolved to give him the
opportunity of casting his vote on the question, although we insisted that it was unnecessary. Days later,
when all the members of the Court were already present, a new vote was taken. Mr. Justice Briones
voted for the denial of the motion, and his vote would have resulted, as must be expected, in 6 votes for
the denial against 5 for granting. But the final result was different. Seven votes were cast for granting the
motion and only four were cast for its denial.
But then, by providential design or simply by a happy stroke of luck or fate, on the occasion of the
registration by the register of deeds of Manila of land purchases of two aliens, a heated public polemic
flared up in one section of the press, followed by controversial speeches, broadcast by radio, and
culminating in the issuance on August 12, 1947, of Circular No. 128 of the Secretary of Justice which
reads as follows:
TO ALL REGISTER OF DEEDS:
Paragraph 5 of Circular No. 14, dated August 25, 1945, is hereby amended so as to read as follows:
5"(a). Instruments by which private real property is mortgaged in favor of any individual, corporation, or
association for a period not exceeding five years, renewable for another five years, may be accepted for
registration. (Section 1, Republic Act No. 138.)
"(b). Deeds or documents by which private residential, commercial, industrial or other classes of urban
lands, or any right, title or interest therein is transferred, assigned or encumbered to an alien, who is not
an enemy national, may be registered. Such classes of land are not deemed included within the purview
of the prohibition contained in section 5, Article XIII of the Constitution against the acquisition or holding
of "private agricultural land" by those who are not qualified to hold or acquire lands of the public domain.
This is in conformity with Opinion No. 284, series of 1941, of the Secretary of Justice and with the
practice consistently followed for nearly ten years since the Constitution took effect on November 15,
1935.
"(c). During the effectivity of the Executive Agreement entered into between the Republic of the
Philippines and the Government of the United States on July 4, 1946, in pursuance of the so-called
Parity Amendment to the Constitution, citizens of the United States and corporations or associations
owned or controlled by such citizens are deemed to have the same rights as citizens of the Philippines
and corporations or associations owned or controlled by such are deemed to have the same rights as
citizens of the Philippines and corporations or associations owned or controlled by citizens of the
Philippines in the acquisition of all classes of lands in the Philippines, whether of private ownership or
pertaining to the public domain."
ROMAN OZAETA
Secretary of Justice
Paragraph 5 of Circular No. 14 dated August 25, 1945, amended by the above is as follows:
Deeds or other documents by which a real property, or a right, or title thereto, or an interest therein, is
transferred, assigned or encumbered to an alien, who is not enemy national, may be entered in the
primary entry book; but, the registration of said deeds or other documents shall be denied — unless
and/or until otherwise specifically directed by a final decision or order of a competent court — and the
party in interest shall be advised of such denial, so that he could avail himself of the right to appeal
therefrom, under the provisions of section 200 of the Revised Administrative Code. The denial of
registration of shall be predicated upon the prohibition contained in section 5, Article XIII (formerly
Article XII) of the Constitution of the Philippines, and sections 122 and 123 of Commonwealth Act No.
141, the former as amended by the Commonwealth Act No. 615.
The polemic found echo even in the Olympic serenity of a cloistered Supreme Court and the final result
of long and tense deliberation which ensued is concisely recorded in the following resolution adopted on
August 29, 1947:
In Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds, City of Manila, L-630, a case already submitted for decision, the
appellant filed a motion to withdraw his appeal with the conformity of the adverse party. After full
discussion of the matter specially in relation to the Court's discretion (Rule 52, section 4, and Rule 58),
Mr. Justice Paras, Mr. Justice Hilado, Mr. Justice Bengzon, Mr. Justice Padilla and Mr. Justice Tuazon
voted to grant, while the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Feria, Mr,. Justice Pablo, Mr. Justice Perfecto and Mr.
Justice Briones voted to deny it. A redeliberation was consequently had, with the same result.
Thereupon Mr. Justice Paras proposed that Mr. Justice Hontiveros be asked to sit and break the tie; but
in view of the latter's absence due to illness and petition for retirement, the Court by a vote of seven to
three did not approve the proposition. Therefore, under Rule 56, section 2, the motion to withdraw is
considered denied.
Mr. Justice Padilla states that in his opinion the tie could not have the effect of overruling the previous
vote of seven against four in favor of the motion to withdraw.
Mr. Justice Paras states: Justice Hontiveros is aware of and conversant with the controversy. He has
voted once on the motion to withdraw the appeal. He is still a member of the Court and, on a moment's
notice, can be present at any session of the Court. Last month, when all the members were present, the
votes on the motion stood 7 to 4. Now, in the absence of one member, on reconsideration, another
changed his vote resulting in a tie. Section 2 of Rule 56 requires that all efforts be exerted to break a
deadlock in the votes. I deplore the inability of the majority to agree to my proposition that Mr. Justice
Hontiveros be asked to participate in the resolution of the motion for withdrawal. I hold it to be
fundamental and necessary that the votes of all the members be taken in cases like this.
Mr. Justice Perfecto stated, for purposes of completeness of the narration of facts, that when the petition
to withdraw the appeal was submitted for resolution of this Court two days after this petition was filed,
five justices voted to grant and five others voted to deny, and expressed the opinion that since then,
according to the rules, the petition should have been considered denied. Said first vote took place many
days before the one alluded to by Mr. Justice Padilla.
Mr. Justice Tuason states: The motion to withdraw the appeal was first voted upon with the result that 5
were granting and 5 for denial. Mr. Justice Briones was absent and it was decided to wait for him. Some
time later, the same subject was deliberated upon and a new voting was had, on which occasion all the
11 justices were present. The voting stood 7 for allowing the dismissal of the appeal and 4 against. Mr.
Justice Perfecto and Mr. Justice Briones expressed the intention to put in writing their dissents. Before
these dissents were filed, about one month afterwards, without any previous notice the matter was
brought up again and re-voted upon; the result was 5 to 5. Mr. Justice Hontiveros, who was ill but might
have been able to attend if advised of the necessity of his presence, was absent. As the voting thus
stood, Mr. Justice Hontiveros' vote would have changed its result unless he changed his mind, a fact of
which no one is aware. My opinion is that since there was no formal motion for reconsideration nor a
previous notice that this matter would be taken up once more, and since Mr. Justice Hontiveros had
every reason to believe that the matter was over as far as he was concerned, this Justice's vote in the
penultimate voting should, if he was not to be given an opportunity to recast his vote, be counted in favor
of the vote for the allowance of the motion to withdraw. Above all, that opportunity should not have been
denied on grounds of pure technicality never invoked before. I counted that the proceeding was arbitrary
and illegal.
The resolution does not recite all the reasons why Mr. Justice Hontiveros did not participate in that last
two votings and why it became unnecessary to wait for him any further to attend the sessions of the
Court and to cast his vote on the question.
Appellant Krivenko moved for the reconsideration of the denial of his withdrawal of appeal, alleging that
it became moot in view of the ruling made by the Secretary of Justice in circular No. 128, thus giving us
a hint that the latter, wittingly or unwittingly, had the effect of trying to take away from the Supreme Court
the decision of an important constitutional question, submitted to us in a pending litigation. We denied
the motion for reconsideration. We did not want to entertain any obstruction to the promulgation of our
decision.
If the processes had in this case had been given the publicity suggested by us for all the official
actuations of this Supreme Court, it should have been known by the whole world that since July, 1946,
that is, more than a year ago, the opinion of the members of this Court had already been crystallized to
the effect that under the Constitution, aliens are forbidded from acquiring urban lands in the Philippines,
and it must have known that in this case a great majority had voted in that sense on February 24, 1947.
The constitutional question involved in this case cannot be left undecided without jeopardizing public
interest. The uncertainty in the public mind should be dispelled without further delay. While the doubt
among the people as to what is the correct answer to the question remains to be dissipated, there will be
uneasiness, undermining public morale and leading to evils of unpredictable extent. This Supreme
Tribunal, by overwhelming majority, already knows what the correct answer is, and should not withhold
and keep it for itself with the same zealousness with which the ancient families of the Eumolpides and
Keryces were keeping the Eleusinian mysteries. The oracle of Delphus must speak so that the people
may know for their guidance what destiny has in store for them.
The great question as to whether the land bequeathed to us by our forefathers should remain as one of
the most cherished treasures of our people and transmitted by inheritance to unending generations of
our race, is not a new one. The long chain of land-grabbing invasions, conquests, depredations, and
colonial imperialism recorded in the darkest and bloodiest pages of history from the bellicose
enterprises of the Hittites in the plains of old Assyria, irrigated by the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates,
and the invasion of Egypt by the Hyksos, up to the conquests of Hernan Cortes and Pizarro, the
achievements of Cecil Rhodes, and the formation of the Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, French and
German colonial empires, had many of its iron links forged in our soil since Magellan, the greatest
navigator of all history, had set foot at Limasawa and paid, for his daring enterprises, with his life at the
hands of Lapulapu's men in the battle of Mactan.
Since then, almost four centuries ago, our people have continuously been engaged in an unrelentless
struggle to defend the national patrimony against the aggressive onslaughts of foreigners bent on
grabbing our lands. First came the Spanish encomenderos and other gratuitous concessioners who
were granted by the Spanish crown immense areas of land. Immediately came the friars and other
religious corporations who, notwithstanding their sacred vow of poverty, felt their greed whetted by the
bountiful opportunities for easy and unscrupulous enrichment. Taking advantage of the uncontrollable
religious leadership, on one side, and of the Christian virtues of obedience, resignation, humility, and
credulity of a people who, after conversion to Catholicism, embraced with tacit faith all its tenets and
practiced them with the loyalty and fidelity of persons still immune from the disappointments and
bitterness caused by the vices of modern civilization, the foreign religious orders set aside all
compunction to acquire by foul means many large estates. Through the practice of confession and other
means of moral intimidation, mostly based on the eternal tortures of hell, they were able to obtain by
donation or by will the lands of many simple and credulous Catholics who, in order to conquer the
eternal bliss of heaven, renounced all their property in favor of religious orders and priests, many under
the guise of chaplaincies or other apparently religious purposes, leaving in destitute their decendants
and relatives. Thus big religious landed estates were formed, and under the system unbearable
iniquities were committed. The case of the family of Rizal is just an index of the situation, which, under
the moral leadership of the hero, finally drove our people into a national revolution not only against the
Spanish sovereignty under which the social cancer had grown to unlimited proportions.
Profiting from the lessons of history, the Delegates to our Constitutional Convention felt it their duty to
insert in the fundamental law effective guarantees for conserving the national patrimony, the wisdom of
which cannot be disputed in a world divided into nations and nationalities. In the same way that
scientists and technicians resorted to radar, sonars, thermistors and other long range detection devices
to stave off far-away enemy attacks in war, said Delegates set the guarantees to ward off open inroads
or devious incursions into the national patrimony as a means of insuring racial safety and survival.
When the ideal of one world should have been translated into reality, those guarantees might not be
needed and our people may eliminate them. But in the meantime, it is our inescapable devoir, as the
ultimate guardians of the Constitution, never to neglect the enforcement of its provisions whenever our
action is called upon in a case, like the one now before us.
One of the fundamental purposes of the government established by our Constitution is, in its very words,
that it "shall conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation." That mandate is addressed to all
departments and branches of our government, without excluding this Supreme Court. To make more
specific the mandate, Article XIII has been inserted so as to avoid all doubt that all the natural resources
of the country are reserved to Filipino citizens. Our land is the most important of our natural resources.
That land should be kept in the hands of our people until, by constitutional amendment, they should
decide to renounce that age-long patrimony. Save by hereditary succession — the only exception
allowed by the Constitution — no foreigner may by any means acquire any land, any kind of land, in the
Philippines. That was the overwhelming sentiment prevailing in the Constitutional Convention, that was
the overpowering desire of the great majority of the Delegates, that was the dominating thought that was
intended to be expressed in the great document, that was what the Committee on Style — the drafter of
the final text — has written in the Constitution, and that was what was solemnly ratified in the plebiscite
by our people, who then were rankling by the sore spot of illegally Japanized Davao.
The urgency of settling once and forever the constitutional question raised in this case cannot be
overemphasized. If we should decide this question after many urban lots have been transferred to and
registered in the name of alien purchasers, a situation may be created in which it will be hard to nullify
the transfers and the nullification may create complications and problems highly distasteful to solve. The
Georgia case is an objective lesson upon which we can mirror ourselves. From pages 22 and 23 of the
book of Charless P. Curtiss, Jr. entitled "Lions Under the Throne," we quote the following:
It is of interest that it seems to have happened chiefly in important cases. Fletcher vs. Peck, in 1810, is
the stock example. That was the first case in which the Court held a state statute void. It involved a
national scandal. The 1795 legislature of Georgia sold its western lands, most of Alabama and
Mississippi, to speculators. Perhaps it was the greatest real estate steal in our history. The purchase
price was only half a million dollars. The next legislature repealed the statute for fraud, the bribery of
legislator, but not before the land companies had completed the deal and unloaded. By that time, and
increasingly soon afterwards, more and more people had bought, and their title was in issue. Eleven
million of the acres had been bought for eleven cents an acre by leading citizens of Boston. How could
they clear their title? Alexander Hamilton gave an opinion, that the repeal of the grant was void under
the Constitution as an impairment of the obligation of a contract.
But could they not get a decision from the Supreme Court? Robert Fletcher of Anhirst, New Hampshire,
had bought fifteen thousand acres from John Peck of Boston. He sued Peck, and he won. Fletcher
appealed. Plainly it was a friendly suit. Marshall was nobody's fool. He told Cranch that the Court was
reluctant to decide the case "as it appeared manifestly made up for the purpose of getting the Court's
judgment." John Quincy Adams so reports in his diary. Yet Marshall decided it, and he held the repeal
void, just as Hamilton said it was. "The fact that Marshall rendered an opinion, under the
circumstances," says Beveridge, "is one of the finest proofs of his greatness. A weaker man than John
Marshall, and one less wise and courageous, would have dismissed the appeal." That may be, but it
was the act of a stateman, not of a judge. The Court has always been able to overcome its judicial
diffidence on state occasions.
We see from the above how millions of acres of land were stolen from the people of Georgia and due to
legal technicalities the people were unable to recover the stolen property. But in the case of Georgia, the
lands had fallen into American hands and although the scandal was of gigantic proportions, no national
disaster ensued. In our case if our lands should fall into foreign hands, although there may not be any
scandal at all, the catastrophe sought to be avoided by the Delegates to our Constitutional Convention
will surely be in no remote offing.
We conclude that, under the provisions of the Constitution, aliens are not allowed to acquire the
ownership of urban or residential lands in the Philippines and, as consequence, all acquisitions made in
contravention of the prohibitions since the fundamental law became effective are null and void per
se and ab initio. As all public officials have sworn, and are duty bound, to obey and defend the
Constitution, all those who, by their functions, are in charge of enforcing the prohibition as laid down and
interpreted in the decision in this case, should spare no efforts so that any and all violations which may
have taken place should be corrected.
We decide, therefore, that, upon the above premises, appellant Alexander A. Krivenko, not being a
Filipino citizen, could not acquire by purchase the urban or residential lot here in question, the sale
made in his favor by the Magdalena Estate, Inc. being null and void ab initio, and that the lower court
acted correctly in rendering the appealed decision, which we affirm.
HILADO, J., concurring:
Upon appellant's motion to withdraw his appeal herein with the conformity of the Solicitor General in
behalf of appellee, indulging, at that time, all possible intendments in favor of another department, I
ultimately voted to grant the motion after the matter was finally deliberated and voted upon. But the
votes of the ten Justices participating were evenly divided, and under Rule 52, section 4, in relation, with
Rule 56, section 2, the motion was denied. The resolution to deny was adopted in the exercise of the
court's discretion under Rule 52, section 4, by virtue of which it has discretion to deny the withdrawal of
the appeal even though both appellant and appellee agree upon the withdrawal, when appellee's brief
has been filed. Under the principle that where the necessary number have concurred in an opinion or
resolution, the decision or determination rendered is the decision or determination of the court (2 C.J.S.,
296), the resolution denying the motion to withdraw the appeal was the resolution of the court. Pursuant
to Rule 56, section 2, where the court in banc is equally divided in opinion, such a motion "shall be
denied." As a necessary consequence, the court as to decide the case upon the merits.
After all, a consistent advocate and defender of the principle of separation of powers in a government
like ours that I have always been, I think that under the circumstances it is well for all concerned that the
Court should go ahead and decide the constitutional question presented. The very doctrine that the
three coordinate, co-equal and independent departments should be maintained supreme in their
respective legitimate spheres, makes it at once the right and duty of each to defend and uphold its own
peculiar powers and authority. Public respect for and confidence in each department must be striven for
and kept, for any lowering of the respect and diminution of that confidence will in the same measure take
away from the very usefulness of the respective department to the people. For this reason, I believe that
we should avert and avoid any tendency in this direction with respect to this Court.
I am one of those who presume that Circular No. 128, dated August 12, 1947, of the Secretary of Justice,
was issued in good faith. But at the same time, that declaration in sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 5 of
Circular No. 14, which was already amended, to the effect that private residential, commercial, industrial
or other classes of urban lands "are not deemed included within the purview of the prohibition contained
in section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution", made at a time when the self-same question was pending
decision of this Court, gives rise to the serious danger that should this Court refrain from deciding said
question and giving its own interpretation of the constitutional mandate, the people may see in such an
attitude an abandonment by this Court of a bounden duty, peculiarly its own, to decide a question of
such a momentous transcedence, in view of an opinion, given in advance of its own decision, by an
officer of another department. This will naturally detract in no small degree from public respect and
confidence towards the highest Court of land. Of course, none of us — the other governmental
departments included — would desire such a situation to ensue.
I have distinctively noticed that the decision of the majority is confined to the constitutional question here
presented, namely, "whether or not an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential land."
(Opinion, p. 2) Leases of residential lands, or acquisition, ownership or lease of a house or building
thereon, for example, are not covered by the decision.
With these preliminary remarks and the statement of my concurrence in the opinion ably written by the
Chief Justice, I have signed said decision.
BRIONES, M., conforme:
Estoy conforme en un todo con la ponencia, a la cual no e puede añadir ni quitar nada, tal es su
acabada y compacta elaboracion. Escribo, sin embargo, esta opinion separada nada mas que para
unas observaciones, particularmente sobre ciertas fases extraordinarias de este asunto harto singular y
extraordinario.
I. Conforme se relata en la concurrencia del Magistrado Sr. Perfecto, despues de laboriosas
deliberaciones este asunto se puso finalmente a votacion el 24 de Febrero de este año, confirmandose
la sentencia apelada por una buena mayoria. En algunos comentarios adelantados por cierta parte de
la prensa — impaciencia que solo puede hallar explicacion en un nervioso y excesivo celo en la
vigilancia de los intereses publicos, maxime tratandose, como se trata, de la conservacion del
patrimonio nacional — se ha hecho la pregunta de por que se ha demorado la promulgacion de la
sentencia, habiendose votado el asunto todavia desde case comienzos del año.
A simple vista, la pregunta tiene justificacion; pero bien considerados los hechos se vera que no ha
habido demora en el presente caso, mucho menos una demora desusada, alarmante, que autorice y
justifique una critica contra los metodos de trabajo de esta corte. El curso seguido por el asunto ha sido
normal, bajo las circunstancias. En realidad, no yan en esta Corte ahora, sino aun en el pasado, antes
de la guerra, hubo mas lentitud en casos no tan dificiles ni tan complicados como el que nos ocupa, en
que las cuestiones planteadas y discutidas no tenian la densidad constitucional y juridica de las que se
discuten en el presente caso. Hay que tener en cuenta que desde el 24 de Febrero en que se voto
finalmente el asunto hasta el 1.0 de Abril en que comenzaron las vacaciones judiciales, no habian
transcurrido mas que 34 dias; y cuando se reanudaron formalmente las sesiones de esta Corte en Julio
se suscito un incidente de lo mas extraordinario — incidente que practicamente vino a impedir, a
paralizar la pronta promulgacion de la sentencia. Me refiero a la mocion que el 10 de Julio persentaron
los abogados del apelante pidiendo permiso para retirar su apelacion. Lo sorpredente de esta mocion
es que viene redactada escuetamente, sin explicar el por que de la retirada, ni expresar ningun
fundamento. Pero lo mas sorpredente todavia es la conformidad dada por el Procurador General,
tambien escueta e inceremoniosamente.
Digo que es sorprendente la retirada de la apelacion porque pocos casos he visto que hayan sido
arguidos con tanta energiaa, tanto interes y tanto celo por la parte apelante como este que nos ocupa.
Los abogados del apelante no solo presentaron un alegato concienzudo de 34 paginas, sino que
cuando se llamo a vista el asunto informaron verbalmente ante esta Corte argumentando vigorosa y
extensamente sobre el caso. El Procurador General, por su parte, ha presentado un alegato igualmente
denso, de 31 paginas, en que se discuten acabadamente, hasta el punto maximo de saturacion y
agotamiento, todos los angulos de la formidable cuestion constitutional objeto de este asunto. Tambien
informo el Procurador General verbalmente ante esta Corte, entablando fuerte lid con los abogados del
apelante.
Con la mocion de retirada de la apelacion se hubo de retardar necesariamente la promulgacion de la
sentencia, pues trabajosas deliberaciones fueron necesarias para resolver la cuestion, dividiendose
casi por igual los miembros de la Corte sobre si debia o no permitirse la retirada. Habia unanimidad en
que bajo la regla 52, seccion 4, del Reglamento de los Tribunales teniamos absoluta discrecion para
conceder o denegar la mocion, toda vez que los alegatos estaban sometidos desde hacia tiempo, el
asunto estaba votado y no faltaba mas que la firma y promulgacion de la decision juntamente con las
disidencias. Sin embargo, algunos Magistrados opinaban que la discrecion debia ejercitarse en favor de
la retirada en virtud de la practica de evitar la aplicacion de la Constitucion a la solucion de un litigio
siempre que se puede sentenciarlo de otra manera. (Entre los Magistrados que pensaban de esta
manera se incluian algunos que en el fundo del asunto estaban a favor de la confirmacion de la
sentencia apelada, es decir, creian que la Constitucion prohibe a los extranjeros la adquisicion a titulo
dominical de todo genero de propiedad inmueble, sin excluir los solares residenciales, comerciales e
industriales.) Pero otros Magistrados opinaban que en el estado tan avanzado en que se hallaba el
asunto los dictados del interes publico y de la sana discrecion requerian imperiosamente que la
cuestion se atacase y decidiese frontalmente; que si una mayoria de esta Corte estaba convencida,
como al parecer lo estaba, de que existia esa interdiccion constitucional contra la facultad adquisitiva de
los extranjeros, nuestro claro deber era apresurarnos a dar pleno y positivo cumplimiento a la
Constitucion al presentarse la primera oportunidad; que el meollo del asunto, la lis mota era eso — la
interdiccion constitucional — ; por tanto, no habia otra manera de decidirlo mas que aplicando la
Constitucion; obrar de otra manera seria desercion, abandono de un deber jurado.
Asi estaban las deliberaciones cuando ocurre otro incidente mucho mas extraordinario y sorprendente
todavia que la retirada no explicada de la apelacion con la insolita conformidad del Procurador General;
algo asi como si de un cielo sereno, sin nubes, cayera de pronto un bolido en medio de nosotros, en
medio de la Corte: me refiero a la circular num. 128 del Secretario de Justicia expedida el 12 de Agosto
proximo pasado, esto es, 32 dias despues de presentada la mocion de retirada de la apelacion. Esa
circular se cita comprensivamente en la ponencia y su texto se copia integramente en la concurrencia
del Magistrado Sr. Perfecto; asi que me creo excusado de transcibirla in toto. En breves terminos, la
circular reforma el parrafo 5 de la circular num. 14 del mismo Departamento de Justicia de fecha 25 de
Agosto, 1945, y levanta la prohibicion o interdiccion sobre el registro e inscripcion en el registro de la
propiedad de las "escrituras o documentos en virtud de los cuales terrenos privados residencias,
comerciales, industriales u otras clases de terrenos urbanos, o cualquier derecho, titulo o interes en
ellos, se transfieren, ceden o gravan a un extranjero que no es nacional enemigo." En otras palabras, el
Secretario de Justicia, por medio de esta circular dejaba sin efecto la prohibicion contenida en lacircular
num. 14 del mismo Departamento — la prohibicion que precisamente ataca el apelante Krivenko en el
asunto que tenemos ante Nos — y authorizaba y ordenaba a todoslos Registradores de Titulos en
Filipinas para que inscribiesen las escrituras o documentos de venta, hipoteca o cualquier otro
gravamen a favor de extranjeros, siempre que no se tratase de terrenos publicos o de "terrenos
privados agricolas," es decir, siempre que los terrenos objeto de la escritura fuesen "residenciales,
comerciales e industriales."
La comparacion de esa circular con un bolido caido subitamenteen medio de la Corte no es un simple
tropo, no esuna mera imagen retorica; refleja una verdadera realidad.Esa circular, al derogar la
prohibicion decretada en elparrafo 5 de la circular num. 14 — prohibicion que, comoqueda dicho, es
precisamente el objeto del presente asunto — venia practicamente a escamotear la cuestion discutida,
lacuestion sub judice sustrayendola de la jurisdiccion de lostribunales. Dicho crudamente, el
Departamento de Justiciavenia a arrebatar el asunto de nuestras manos, delas manos de esta Corte,
anticipandose a resolverlo por simismo y dando efectividad y vigor inmediatos a su resolucionmediante
la correspondiente autorizacion a los Registradoresde Titulos.
A la luz de esa circular queda perfectamente explicadala mocion de retirada de la apelacion consentida
insolitamentepor el Procurador General. ¿ Para que esperar ladecision de la Corte Suprema que acaso
podria ser adversa? ¿ No estaba ya esa circular bajo la cual podian registrarseahora la ventas de
terrenos residenciales, comerciales oindustriales a extranjeros? Por eso no es extraño quelos
abogados del apelante Krivenko, en su mocion de 1.0 de Septiembre, 1947, pidiendo la
reconsideracion de nuestroauto denegando la retirada de la apelacion, dijeran porprimera vez como
fundamento que la cuestion ya era simplemente academica ("question is now moot") en vista deesa
circular y de la conformidad del Procurador Generalcon la retirada de la apelacion. He aqui las propias
palabras de la mocion del apelante Krivenko:
In view of Circular No. 128 of the Department of Justice, dated August 12, 1947, which amends Circular
No. 14 by expressly authorizing the registration of the sale of urban lands to aliens, and in view of the
fact that the Solicitor General has joined in the motion for withdrawal of the appeal, there is no longer a
controversy between the parties and the question is now moot. For this reason the court no longer has
jurisdiction to act on the case.1
Lo menos que se puede decir de esa accion del Departamentode Justicia atravesandose en el camino
de los tribunalesmientras un asunto esta sub judice, es que ello no tieneprecedentes, que yo sepa, en
los anales de la administracionde justicia en Filipinas en cerca de medio siglo que llevamosde
existencia bajo un gobierno constitucional y sustancialmente republicano. Ni aun en los llamados dias
del Imperio, cuando la soberania americana era mas propensa a manejar el baston grueso y afirmar
vigorosamente losfueros de su poder y autoridad, se vio jamas a un departamento de Justicia o a
alguna de sus dependencias entrometerseen el ejercicio ordenado por los tribunales de sujurisdiccion y
competencia. Era una tradicion firmamenteestablecida en las esfersas del Poder Ejecutivo —
tradicioninviolada e inviolable — maxime en el Departamento de Justicia y en la Fiscalia General, el
inhibirse de expresar algunaopinion sobre un asunto ya sometido a los tribunales, excepto cuando
venian llamados a hacerlo, en representaciondel gobierno, en los tramites de un litigio, civil o
criminal,propiamente planteado ante dichos tribunales. Fuera deestos casos, la inhibicion era
tradicionalmente absoluta,observada con la devocion y la escrupulosidad de un rito.Y la razon era muy
sencilla: hamas se queria estorbar nientorpecer la funcion de los tribunales de justicia, loscuales, bajo
la carta organica y las leyes, tenian absolutoderecho a actuar con maximo desembarazo, libres de
todaingerencia extraña. Esto se hizo bajo la Ley Cooper; estose hizo bajo la Ley Jones; y esto se hizo
bajo la Ley Tydings-McDuffie, la ley organica del Commonwealth. Creo que el pueblo filipino tiene
derecho a que eso mismo se haga bajo el gobierno de la Republica, que es suyo, que es de su propia
hechura. ¡ No faltaba mas que los hombres de su propia raza le nieguen lo que no le negaron
gobernantesde otra raza!
No se niega la facultad de supervision que tiene el Departamento de Justicia sobre las oficinas y
dependenciasque caen bajo su jurisdiccion, entre ellas las varias oficinasde registro de la propiedad en
Manila y en las provincias.Tampoco se niega la facultad que tiene dicho Departamentopara expedir
circulares, ya de caracter puramente administrativo,ya de caracter semijudicial, dando
instrucciones,vgr., a los registradores acerca de como deben desempenarsus funciones. De hecho la
circular num. 14 de 25 deAgosto, 1945, es de esta ultima naturaleza: en ella seinstruye y ordena a los
registradores de titulos que noregistren ni inscriban ventas de propiedad inmueble aextranjeros, asi
sean terrenos residenciales, comerciales oindustriales. Pero la facultad llega solo hasta alli; fuerade
esas fronteras el campo ya es pura y exclusivamentejudicial. Cuando una determinada circular del
Departamentoa los registradores es combatida o puesta en telade juicio ante los tribunales, ora por
fundamentosconstitucionales, ora por razones meramente legales, ya no esel Departamento el que
tiene que determinar o resolverla disputa, sino que eso compete en absoluto a los tribunalesde justicia.
Asi lo dispone terminantemente el articulo200 del Codigo Administrativo. Segun este articulo, elasunto
o disputa debe elevarse en forma de consulta a la Sala Cuarta del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de
Manila.La ley no confiere ninguna facultad al Departamento deJusticia para enjuiciar y decidir el caso. Y
cuando unaparte no estuviere conforme con la decision de la SalaCuarta, ella puede alzarse de la
sentencia para ante laCorte Suprema. He aqui el texto integro del articulo 200 del Codigo
Administrativo:
SEC. 200. Reference of doubtful matter to judge of fourth branch of Court of First Instance at Manila. —
When the register of deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken or memorandum to be
made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage, or other instrument presented for registration or where any
party in interest does not agree with the register of deeds with reference to any such matter, the
question shall be referred to the judge of the fourth branch of the Court of First Instance of the Ninth
Judicial District either on the certificate of the register of deeds stating the question upon which he is in
doubt or upon the suggestion in writing of the party in interest; and thereupon said judge, upon
consideration of the matter as shown by the record certified to him, and in case of registered lands, after
notice to the parties and hearing, shall enter an order prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum
to be made.
Tal es lo que ha ocurrido en el presente caso. Krivenkopresento su escritura de compraventa al
Registrador de laPropiedad de Manila. Este denego la inscripcion solicitadaen virtud de la prohibicion
contenida en la circular num.14. ¿ Que hizo Krivenko entonces? Elevo acaso el asuntoal Departamento
de Justicia? No. Lo que hicieron susabogados entonces fue presentar una demanda el 23 de
Noviembre, 1945, contra el Registrador de Titulos ante laSala Cuarta del Juzgado de Primera Instancia
de Manila,numerandose dicha demanda como consulta num. 1289; ycuando esta Sala decidio el
asunto confirmando la acciondel Registrador, Krivenko trajo a esta Corte la apelacionque estamos
considerando. Tan elemental es esto que enla misma circular num. 14 se dice que la prohibicion
quedadecretada hasta que los tribunales resuelvan lo contrario. He aqui la fraseologia pertinente de
dicha circularnum. 14:
. . . the registration of said deeds or other documents shall be denied, — unless and /or until otherwise
specifically directed by a final decision or order of a competent court — and the party in interest shall be
advised of such denial, so that he could avail himself of the right to appeal therefrom, under the
provisions of section 200 of the Revised Administrative Code.
La posicion de la Corte Suprema ante este caso claro ypositivo de intromision (interference) en sus
funciones esde lo mas peculiar. Tenemos en el Reglamento de losTribunales algunas disposiciones
que proveen sancion pordesacato para ciertos actos de intromision en el ejercicio de lasfunciones
judiciales.2 Pero se preguntara naturalmente;son aplicables estas disposiciones cuando la
intromisionprocede de un ramo del poder ejecutivo, el cual, como sesabe, en la mecanica de los
poderes del Estado, es — usandoun anglicismo-coigual y coordinado con el poder judicial,maxime si
esa intromision se ha realizado so capa de unacto oficial? Cualquiera, pues, puede imaginarse la
situaciontremendamente embarazosa, inclusive angustiosa enque esta Corte ha quedado colocada con
motivo de esa intromision departamental, exponiendose a chocar con otropoder del Estado. En casos
recientes en que estaban envueltos otros poderes, esta Corte, estimando dudosa suposicion
constitucional, prefirio adoptar una actitud deelegante inhibicion, de "manos fuera" (hands-off), si
bienhay que hacer constar que con la fuerte disidencia dealgunos Magistrados, entre ellos el
opinante.3 Tenemos, portanto, un caso de verdadera intromision en que siendo, porlo menos, dudosa la
facultad de esta Corte para imponeruna sancion por desacato de acuerdo con el Reglamento delos
Tribunales, le queda el unico recurso decente, ordenado:registrar su excepcion sin ambages ni
eufemismos contrala intromision, y reafirmar con todo vigor, con toda firmezasu independencia.
Se arguye con tenaz persitencia que debiamos de haberconcedido la mocion de retirada de la
apelacion, por dosrazones: (a) porque el Procurador General estaba conformecon dicha retirada; (b)
para evitar la resolucion delpunto constitucional envuelto, en virtud de la practica,segun se dice, de
soslayar toda cuestion constitucionalsiempre que se pueda. Respecto de la primera razon
serasuficiente decir que el Procurador General es libre de entraren cualquiera transaccion sobre un
asunto en que interviene,pero es evidente que su accion no ata no obliga aesta Corte en el ejercicio de
la discrecion que le confierela regla, 52, seccion 4, del Reglamento de los Tribunales,que reza como
sigue:
Rule 52, SEC. 4 — An appeal may be withdrawn as of right at any time before the filing of appelle's
brief. After that brief is filed the withdrawal may be allowed by the court in its discretion. . . . (Las
cursivas son nuestras.)
Como se ve, nuestra discrecion es absoluta:no estacondicionada por la conformidad o disconformidad
de una delas partes. Y la incondicionalidad de esa discrecion es masabsoluta e imperativa alli donde el
litigio versa sobre unamateria queno afecta solo a un interes privado, sino quees de interes publico,
como el caso presente en que el Procurador General ha transigido no sobre un asunto suyopersonal o
de un cliente particular, sino de un cliente demucha mayor monta y significacion — el pueblo filipino —
ysiendo materia del litigio la propiedad del suelo, parte, vitalisima del patrimonio nacional que nuestro
pueblo hacolocado bajo la salvaguardia de la Constitucion.
Respecto del segundo fundamento, o se que debiamospermitir la retirada dela apelacion para no tener
queresolver la cuestion constitucional disputada, bastara decirque la practica, prinsipio o doctrina que
se invoca, llevaconsigo una salvedad o cualificacion y es que el litigio se pueda resolver de otra mañera.
¿ Podemos soslayar elpunto constitucional discutido en el pleito que nos ocupa? ¿ Podemos decidirlo
bajo otra ratio decidendi, esto es, queno sea la constitucionalidad o inconstitucionalidad de laventa del
inmueble al apelante Krivenko, en virtud desucondicion de extranjero? Indudablemente que no: la lis
mota, la unica, es la misma constitucionalidad de la compraventa de que se trata. Para decidir si al
recurrido apelado, Registrador de Titulos de la Ciudad de Manila,le asiste o no razon para denegar la
inscripcion solicitada por el recurrente y apelante, Krivenko, la unica disposicionlegal que se puede
aplicar es el articulo XIII, seccion 5, dela Constitucion de Filipinas, invocado por el Registrador como
defensa e inserto en el parrafo 5 de la circular num.14 como fundamento de la prohibicion o interdiccion
contrael registro de las ventas de terreno a extranjeros. Nohay otra ley para el caso.
El caso de Oh Cho contra el Director de Terrenos43 Gac. Of., No. 3 pag. 866), que se cita en unade las
disidencias, es completamente diferente. Es verdadque alli se planteo tambien la cuestion
constitucional de quese trata, por cierto que el que lo planteaba en nombre delGobierno era el actual
Secretario de Justicia que entoncesera Procurador General, y lo pleantaba en un sentido absolumente
concorde con la circular num. 14. Pero esta Corte, con la disidencia de algunos Magistrados, opto
porsoslayar el punot constitucional denegando el registro solicitadopor Oh Cho, por fundamento de que
bajo la LeyNo. 2874 sobre terrenos de dominio publico los extranjerosestan excluidos de dichos
terrenos; es decir, que el terrenosolicitado se considero como terreno publico. ¿ Podemos hacer la
misma evasion en el presente caso, acogiendonosa la ley No. 2874 o a cualquier otra ley?
Indudablemente que no porque ningun Magistrado de esta Corte, muchomenos los disidentes,
consideran el terreno reclamado por Krivenko como terreno publico. Luego todos los caminosestan
bloqueados para nosotros, menos el camino constitucional.Luego el segundo fundamento alegado
paracubrir la evasiva tambien debe descartarse totalmente.
Se insinua que no debiamos darnos prisa en resolver constitucionalmente el presente asunto, puesto
que puedenpresentarse otros de igual naturaleza en tiempo no remoto,y en efecto se cita el caso de
Rellosa contra Gaw Chee Hun(49 Off. Gaz., 4345), en que los alegatos de ambas partesya estan
sometidos y se halla ahora pendiente de decision.Es evidente que esto tampoco arguye en favor de la
evasiva,en primer lugar, porque cuando se le somete el deber de iraveriguando en su Escribania si hay
casos de igual naturaleza, sino que los casos se someten por orden de prelaciony prioridad de tiempo a
medida que esten preparados paracaso debe decidirse por sus propios meritos y conforme ala ley
pertinente. La salvedad o cualificacion de la doctrinao practica que se invoca no dice: "hay qoe soslayar
la cuestionconstitucional siempre que se pueda resolver de otra manera, reservando dicha cuestion
constitucional para otro caso; la salvedad es dentro del mismo caso. De otro modono seria un
simple soslayo legal, sino que seria unsub terfugio impropio, indebido, ilegal. En el presente caso no ha
habido ninguna prisa, excesivo celo, como se insinua;desde luego no mayor prisa que en otros asuntos.
Elcurso, el ritmo de los tramites ha sido normal; en realidad,si ha habido algo, ha sido un poco de
parsimonia, lentitud.
¿ Habia justificacion para demorar el pronto, rapido pronunciamento de nuestro veredicto sobre la
formidablecuestion constitucional debatida, por lo menos, tan pronto como fuese posible? ¿ Habia
alguna razon de interespublico para justificar una evasiva? Absolutamenteninguna. Por el contrario,
nuestro deber ineludible, imperioso,era formular y promulgar inmediatamente ese veredicto. Lo
debiamos a nuestras conciencias; lo debiamos, sobretodo, al pais para la tranquilidad y conveniencia
de todos — del pueblo filipino y de los extranjeros residentes o quetuvieren voluntad de residir o
negociar en estas Islas. Asicada cual podria hacer su composicion de lugar, podriaorientarse sin
zozobras ni miedo a la incertidumbre. Tantonacionales como extranjeros sabrian donde invertir
sudinero. Todo lo que necesitabamos era tener dentro de esta Corte una provee la interdiccion de que
se trata. Tuvimosesa mayoria cunado se voto por primera vez este asuntoen Febrero de este año (8
contra 3); la tuvimos cuandodespues de laboriosas deliberaciones quedo denegada lamocion de
retirada de la mayoria haya cambiado de opinionsobre el fondo de la cuestion; la tenemos ahora
naturalmente.Por tanto, nada hace falta ya para que se de lasenal de "luz verde" a la promulgacion de
la sentencia.Toda evasiva seira neglignecia, desidia. Es mas: seriaabandono de un deber jurado, como
digo en otra parte deesta concurrencia; y la Corte Suprema naturalmente npha de permitir que se la
pueda proferir el cargo de queha abandonado su puesto privilegiado de vigia, de centinela avanzado de
la Constitucion.
No es que la Corte Suprema, con esto, pretenda tener"un monopolio de la virtud de sostener y poner en
vigor,o de suplir una deficiencia en la Constitucion," o que segobierno, como se insinua en una de las
disidencias. Nohay tal cosa. El principio de la supremacia judicial no esuna pretension ni mucho menos
un ademan de inmodestiao arrogancia, sino que es una parte vital de nuestrasinstutuciones, una
condicion peculiarisima de nuestro sistema de gobierno en que la judicatura, como uno de lostres
poderes del Estado, corresponde la facultad exclusivade disponer de los asuntos judiciales. Con
respecto a losasuntos de registro particularmente esa facultad exclusivano solo se infiere del principio
de la supremacia judicial, sino que, como ya se ha dicho en otra parte de esta concurrencia,se halla
especificamente estutuida en el articulo 200del Codigo Administrativo transcrito arriba. Este
articuloconfiere jurisdiccion exclusiva a los tribunales de justiciapara decidir las cuestiones sobre
registro, y esto lo ha reconocido el mismo Departamento de Justicia en su circularnum. 14 al referir
tales cuestiones a la determinacion oarbitrio judicial en casos de duda o litigio.
Es injustificada la insinuacion de que, al parecer, la mayoria denego la retirada de la apelacion no tanto
para resolver el asunto en su fondo o por sus meritos, como paraenrvar los efectos de la circular
num. !28 del Departamentode Justicia, pues Krivenko, el apelante, habriaganado entonces su pleito no
en virtud de una sentenciajudicial, sino pasando por la puerta trasera abierta por esacircular. Tampoco
hay tal cosa. Ya repetidas veces seha dicho que el presente asunto se habia votado muchoantes de
que se expidiese esa circular. Lo que mascorrectamente podria decirse es que antes de la expedicion
deesa desafortunada circular poderosas razones de interespublico aconsejaban que se denegase la
retirada de la apelacion y se diese fin al asunto mediante una sentencia enel fondo, despues de la
expidicion esas razones quedaroncentuplicadas. La explicacion es sencilla: nuestra aquiescenciaa la
reirada hubiera podico interpretarse entoncescomo que nuestra jurisdiccion. Es mas: hubiera
podidointerpretarse como una abyecta rendicion en la pugna porsostener los fueros de cada
ramo coigual y coordinado del gobierno.
Es todavia mas injustificada la insinuacion de que ladenegacion de la retirada de la apelacion equivale
"a asumir queel solicitante-apelante y el Procurador General sehan confabulado con el Departamento
de Justicia no solopara ingerirse en las funciones de esta Corte, sino paraenajenar el patrimonio
nacional a los extranjeros." Estoes inconcebible. La corte presume que todos han obradode buena fe,
de acuerdo con los dictados de su conciencia.Se ha denegado la retirada de la apelacion por
razonespuramente juridicas y objectivas, sin consideracion a losmotivos de nadie.
Por ultimo, estimo que debe rectificarse la asercion de queel Magistrado Hontiveros fue excluido de la
votacion queculmino en un emmpate y que determino el rechazamientode la retirada de la apelacion, a
tenor de la regla 56, seccion2, Reglamento de los Tribunales. El Magistrado Hontiverosno estaba
presente en la sesion por estar enfermo;pero estaban presentes 10 Magistrados, es decir, mas queel
numero necesario para formar quorum y para despacharlos asuntos. La rueda de la justicia en la Corte
Supremajamas ha dejado de rodar por la ausencia de uno o dosmiembros, siempre que
hubiese quorum. A la votacionprecedieron muy laboriosas y vivas deliberaciones. Ningun Magistrado
Ilamo la atencion de la Corte hacia la ausencia del Sr. Hontiveros. Ningun Magistrado pidio que se
leesperase o llamase al Sr. Hontiveros. Todos se conformaroncon que se efectuase la votacion, no
obstante la ausencia del Sr. Hontiveros. En efecto, se hace la votaciony resulta un empate, es decir, 5
contra 5. De acuerdo conla regla 56, quedaba naturalmente denegrada la mocion deretirada. ¿Donde
esta, pues, la "ilegalidad", donde la"arbitrariedad"?
Algunos dias despues se presento una mocion de reconsideracion,la misma en que ya se alegaba
como ndamentoel hecho de que la cuestion era simplemente academica (moot question) por la
conformidad del Procurador Generalcon la retirada y por la circular num. !28 del Departamento de
Justicia. Tampoco estaba presente el Sr. Hontiverosal someterse la mocion, la cual fue de nuevo
denegada.Pregunto otra vez: ¿donde esta la "arbitrariedad"? Queculpa tenia la Corte de que el Sr.
Hontiveros no pudieraestar presente por estar enfermo? ¿Iba a detenerse larueda de la justicia por eso?
Conviene, sin embargo, hacerconstar que sobre el fondo de la cuestion el Sr. Hontiverosera uno de los
8 que habian votado en favor de la confirmacion de la sentencia apelada, es decir, en favor delveredicto
de que la Contitucion excluye a los extrajerosde la propiedad de bienes raices en Filipinas.
II. No queda casi nada decir sobre el fondo de lacuestion. Todos los angulos y fases de la misma
estanacabadamente tratados y discutidos en la ponencia. Melimitare, por tanto, a hacer unas cuantas
observaciones,unas sobre hermeneutica legal, y otra sobre historia nacionalcontemporanea,
aprovachando en este ultimo respectomis reminiscencias y mi experiencia como humilde miembroque
fui de la Asamblea Constituyente que redacto y arobola Constitucion de Filipinas.
Toda la cuestion, a mi juicio, se reduce a determinar einterpretar la palabra "agricola" (agricultural)
usada enel articulo XIII, seccion 5, de la Constitucion. He aqui eltexto completo de la seccion:
SEC. 5. — Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or
assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain in the Philippines.
¿Incluye la palabra "agricultural" aqui empleada los terrenosresidenciales, comerciales e industriales?
Tal es lacuestion: la mayoria de esta Corte que si; los disidentesdicen que no.
Es indudable que por razones sanas de hermenuetica legalel articulo XIII de que se trata debe
interpretarse como untodo homogeneo, simetrico. En otras palabras, los cocablosalli empleados deben
interpretarse en el sentido de quetienen un mismo significado. Es absurdo pensar o suponerque en el
texto de una ley, sobre todo dentro del estrechomarco de un articulo, un vocablo tenga dos o mas
significadosdistintos, a menos que la misma ley asi to diga expresamente. Lapresuncion es que el
legislador sigue y seatiene a las reglas literarias elementales.
Ahora bien: el articulo XIII consta de dos partes — laprimera, que trata de los terrenos agricolas de
dominiopublico, y la segunda, que se a los terrenos agricolaprivados o partuculares.
La primera parte se compone de las secciones 1 y 2que vinculanla propiedad de los terrenos publicos
enel Estado y disponen que solo se pueden enajenar a favorde ciudadanos filipinos, o de corporaciones
o asociacionesen que el 60 por ciento del cacital, por lo menos, pertenecea tales ciudadanos. En
secciones se emplea literalmentela frase "public agricultural land."
La segunda parte la componen las secciones 3 y 5: laseccion 3 perceptua que "the Congress may
determine bylaw the size of private agricultural land which individuals,coporations, or associations may
acquire and hold, subjectto rights existing prior to the enactment of such law"4 ;y la seccion 5 es la que
queda transcrita mas arriba y esobjeto del presente litigio. En ambas secciones se emplealiteralmente
la frase "private agricultural land."
No hay ninguna cuestion de que la frase "public agriculturalland" empleada en la primera parte
comprende terrenosresidenciales, comerciales e industriales; lo admitenlos mismos abogados del
apelante y los Sres. Magistradosdisidentes. Y ¿por que lo admiten? Sera porque en laConstitucion se
define la palabra "agricultural" aplicadaa terrenos publicos, en el sentido de incluir solaresresidenciales,
comerciales e industriales? Indudablementeque no, porque en ninguna parte de la Constitucion se datal
definicion. Lo admiten porque en esta jurisdicciontenemos una serie consistente de sentencias de esta
CorteSuprema en que es jurisprudencia firmamente establecidala doctrina de que la palabra
"agricultural" usada en laLey del Congreso de los Estados Unidos de 1902 (LeyCooper) y en nuestras
leyes de terrenos publicos comprendey abarca solares residenciales, comerciales, industriales
yqualquier otra clase de terrenos, excepto forestales yminerales.5 Es decir, que se aplica a la actual
Constitucion deFilipinas una interpretacion clasica, tradicional, embebidaen nuestra jurisprudencia de
cerca de medio siglo.
Ahora bien, pregunto: si la palabra "agricultural" empleadaen la primera parte del articulo XIII tiene
talsignificado — y lo tiene porque la Constitucion no da otrodiferente — ¿por que esa misma palabra
empleada en lasegunda parte, unas cuantas lineas mas adelante, no hade tener el mismo significado?
¿Da acaso la Constitucionuna definicion de la palabra "agricultural" cuandose refiere a terreno privado?
¿Donde esta esa definicion? ¿O es que se pretende que la diferenciacion opera no envirtud de la
palabra "agricultural", sino en virtud delvocablo "public" o "private", segun que se trate de terrenopublico
o privado?
Si la intencion de la Asemblea Constituyente fuera eldar a la palabra "agricultural" aplicada a terreno
privadoun significado distinto de cuando se refiere a terreno publico, lo hubiese hecho constar asi
expresamente en elmismo texto de la Constitucion Si, como se admite, laAsemblea opto por no definir
la palabra "agricultural"aplicada a terreno poblico porque contaba para ello con ladefinicion clasica
establecida en la jurisprudencia, cuandola misma Asemblea tampoco definio la palabra con relaciona
terreno privado, es logico inferir que tuvo la mismaintencion, esto es, aplicar la definicion de la
jurisprudenciaa ambos tipos de terreno — el publico y el privado. Pensarde otra manera podria ser
ofensivo, insultante; podriaequivaler a decir que aquella Asemblea estaba compuestade miembros
ignorantes, desconocederos de las reglas elementalesen la tecnica de redaccion legislativa.
Tuve el honor de partenecer a aquella Asemblea comouno de los Delegados por Cebu. Tambien me
cupo elhonor de partenecer al llamado Comite de Siete — elcomite encargado finalmente de redactar la
ponencia dela Constitucion. No digo que aquella Asemblea estabacompuesta de sabios, pero
indudablemente no era inferiora ninguna otra de su tipo en cualquiera otra partedel mundo. Alli habia un
plantel de buenos abogados,algunos versados y especialistas en derecho constitucional.Alli estaba el
Presidente de la Universidad de FilipinasDr. Rafael Palma; alli estaba el propio Presidentede la
Asemblea Constituyente Hon. Claro M. Recto, conlos prestigios de su reconocida cultura juridica y
humanista; alli estaba tambien el Dr. Jose P. Laurel, considerado comouna de las primeras autoridades
en derecho constitucionaly politico en nuestro pais. En el Comite de Siete o dePonencia figuraban el
actual Presidente de Filipinas Hon.Manuel Roxas; el ex-Senador de Cebu Hon. Filemon Sotto;el Hon.
Vicente Singson Encarnacion, lider de la minoria en la primera Asemblea Filipina, ex-miembro de la
Comisionde FIlipinas, ex-Senador y ex-Secretario de Gabinete;el ex-Magistrado de la Corte Suprema
Hon. NorbertoRomualdez; el actual Secretario de Hacienda Hon. MiguelCuaderno; y el ex-Decano del
Colegio de Artes Liberalesde la Universidad de Filipinas, Hon. Conrado Benitez.
No se puede concebir como bajo la inspiracion y guiade estas personas pudiera redactarse el texto de
un articuloenque un vocablo — el vocablo "agricultural" — tuviera dosacepciones diferentes: una,
aplicada a terrenos publicos;y otra, aplicada a terrenos privados. Menos se concibeque, si fuese esta la
intencion, se incurriese en una comisionimperdonable: la omision de una definicion especifica,
diferenciadora, que evitase caos y confusion en la mente delos abogados y del publico. Teniendo en
cuenta la innegablecompetencia de los Delegados a la Asemblea Constituyentey de sus liders, lo mas
logico pensar es que alno definir la palabra "agricultural" y al no diferenciarsu aplicacion entre terrenos
publicos y privados, lo hicierondeliberamente, esto es, conla manifiesta intencion dedejar enteramente
la interpretacion de la palabra a la luzde una sola comun definicin — la establecida en la
jurisprudenciadel asunto tipico de Mapa contra Gobierno Insular y otrossimilares (supra); es decir, que
la palabra "agricultural",aplicada a terrenos privados, incluye tambien solaresresidenciales, comerciales,
e industriales.
A word or phrase repeated in a statute will bear the same meaning throughout the statute, unless a
different intention appears. . . . Where words have been long used in a technical sense and have been
judicially construed to have a certain meaning, and have been adopted by the legislature as having a
certain meaning prior to a particular statute in which they are used, the rule of construction requires that
the words used in such statute should be construed according to the sense in which they have been so
previously used, although that sense may vary from the strict literal meaning of the words." (II
Sutherland, Stat. Construction, p. 758.)
Pero acaso se diga que la Asemblea Constituyente hadejado sin definir la palabra "agricultural"
referente aterreno particular, dando a entendar con su silencio queendosaba la definicion al diccionario
o a la usanza popular.La suposicion es igualmente insostenible. ?Por queen un caso se entrega la
definicion a la jurisprudencia,y por que en otro al diccionario, o al habla popular?Aparte de que los
miembros y dirigentes de la AsembleaConstituyente sabian muy bien que esto causaria unatremenda
confusion. Ni los diccionarios, ni mucho menosel lenguaje popular, ofrecen apoyo seguro para una fiely
autorizada interpretacion. Si el texto mismo de la ley,con definiciones especificas y casuisticas, todavia
ofrecedudas a veces ¿como no el lexico vulgar, con su infinitavariedad de matices e idiotismos?
Ahora mismo ¿no estamos presenciando una confusionn,una perplejidad? ¿Hay acaso uniformidad en
la definicionde lo que es un terreno privado agricola? No; cadacual lo define a su manera. Uno de los
disidentesel Magistrado Sr. Tuason toma su definicion de la palabra "agricultural " del Diccionario
Internacional de Webster que dice . . . "of or pertaining to agricultural connected with, or engaged in,
tillage; as the agricultural class; agricultural implements, wages etc." Tambien hacereferncia el mismo
Magistrado al concepto popular. Otrodisidente el Magistrado Sr. Padilla dice que "the termprivate
agricultural land means lands privately owneddevoted to cultivation, to the raising of
agriculturalproducts." El Magistrado Sr Paras no da ninguna definicion;da por definida la palabra
"agricultural", al parecer, segunel concepto popular.
Pero, sobre todo, los abogados del apelante definen elvocablo de una manera distinta. Segun ellos,
"land spoken of as `agricultural' naturally refers to land not only susceptible of agricultural or cultivation
but more valuable for such than for another purpose, say residential,commercial or educational. . . . The
criterion is notmere susceptibility of conversion into a farm but its greater value when devoted to one or
the other purpose." Demode que, segun esta definicion, lo que determina la calidaddel terreno es su
valor relativo, segun que se dedique alcultivo, o a residencia, o al comercio, o a la industria.Los autores
de esta definicion indudablemente tienen encuenta el hecho de que en las afueras de las ciudades
existenterrenos immensos que desde tiempo inmemorial se handedicado a la agricultura, pero que se
han convertido ensubdivisiones multiplicandose su valor en mil por cientosi no mas. De hecho esos
terrenos son agricolas; comoque todavia se ven alli los pilapiles y ciertas partes estancultivadas; pero
en virtud de su mayor valor para residencia,comercio e industria se les aquiere colocar fuera dela
prohibicion constitucional. En verdad, el criterio nopuede ser mas elastico y convencional, y denota
cuanincierta y cuan confusa es la situacion a que da lugar latesis del apelante y de los que le sostienen.
Si hubieramos de hacer depender la definicion de loque es un terreno agricola del concepto popular y
de losdiccionarios, asi sean los mejores y mas cientificamente elaborados ¿que normas claras,
concretas y definitivasde diferenciacion podrian establecerse? ¿Podrian trazarsefronteras
inconfundibles entre lo que es agricola y lo quees residencial, comercial e industrial? ¿Podria
hacerseuna clasificacion que no fuese arbitraria? Indudablementeque no. El patron mas usual de
diferenciacion es lanaturaleza urbana o rural del terreno; se considera comoresidencial, comercial e
industrial todo lo que esta dentrode una urbe, ciudad o poblacion. Pero ¿resolveria esto la dificultad?
Proporcionaria un patron exacto, cientifico,no arbitrario? Tampoco. Por que dentro de una ciudado
poblacio puede haber y hay terrenos agricolas. Comodijo muy bien el Magistrado Sr. Willard en el
asunto clasico de Mapa contra Gobierno Insular, "uno de los inconvenientes de la adopcion de este
criterio es que es tanvago e indeterminado, que seria muy dificil aplicarlo enla practica. ¿Que terrenos
son agricolas por naturaleza? l mismo Fiscal General, en su alegato presentado en este asunto, dice:
'La montaña mas pedregosa y el suelo mas pobre son susceptible de cultivo mediante la mano del
hombre'" (Mapa contra Insular, 10 Jur. Fil.,183). Y Luego el Sr. Willard añade las siguietes
observacionessumamente petinentes e ilustratives para una correctare solucion del asunto que nos
ocupa, a saber:
. . . Tales terrenos (agricolas, quiere decir) se pueden encontrar dentro de los limites de cualquier
ciudad. Hay dentrode la ciudad de Manila, y en la parte densamente poblada de lamisma, una granja
experimental. Esta es por su naturaleza agricola. Contigua a la Luneta, en la misma ciudad, hay una
gran extension de terreno denominado Camp Wallace, destinada a sports. El terreno que circuda los
muros de la ciudad de Manila, situado entre estos y el paseo del Malecon por el Sur y Este contiene
muchas hectareas de extension y es de naturaleza agricola. La Luneta misma podria en cualquier
tiempo destinarse al cultivo.
La dificultad es mayor tratanndose de diferenciar unterreno agricola de un terreno industrial. En este
respectoes preciso tener en cuenta que un terreno industiralno tienee que ser necesariamente urbano;
en realidad,la tendencia moderna es a situar las industrias fuera deas ciudades en vastas zonas rurales.
Verbigracia; anpredor de la famosa cascada de Maria Cristina en Lanao existen grandes extensiones
de terreno agricola, algunasde propiedad particular. Cuando, se industrialice aquellaformidable fuerza
hidraulica bajo el llamado Plan Beyster ¿que normas segfuras se podrian establecer para poner envigor
la prohibicion constitucional fuese burlada enajenandosetierras agricolas de propiedad privada a
favorde extranjeros, ya sean individuos, ya sean corporacioneso asociaciones, so pretexto de ser
industriales?
Resulta evidence de lo expueto que los redactores denuetra Constitucion no pudienron haber tenido la
idea deque el articulo XIII fuera interpretado a la luz de ese criterio vago e indeterminado que llama el
Sr. Willard. Es mas logico pensar que el criterio que ellos tenian enla mente era el criterio establicido en
la jurisprudencia sentada en el asunto clasico de Mapa contra Gobierno y otros asuntos concomitantes
citados — criterio mas frime, mas seguro, menos expuesto a confusion y arbitrariedad, y sobre todo,
"que ofrece menos inconvenientes", parafraseando otra vez al Magistrado Sr. Willard, (supra, p. 185).
Otro serio inconveniente, La seccion 3, articulo XIIIde;la Constitucion, dispone que "el Congreso puedo
determinarpor ley l;a eextension superficial del terrenoprivado agricola que los individous,
corporaciones o asociaciones pueden adquirir y poseer, sujeto a los derechos existentes antes de la
aprobacion de dicha ley." Si seinterpretase que la frase "private agricultural land" noincluye terrenos
residenciales, comerciales e industriales,entonces estas ultimas clases de yterreno quedarian excluidas
de la facultad reguladora concedida por la Constitucion al Congreso mediante dicha seccion 3.
Entoncesun individuo o una corporacion podrian ser dueños de todoslos terrenos de una ciudad; no
habria limite a las adquisicionesy posesiones en lo tocante a terrenos residenciales,comerciales e
industriles. Esto parece absurdo, peroseria obligada consecuencia de la tesis sustentada por
elapelante.
Se hace hincapie en el argumento de que el el procesode tamizacion del articulo XIII durante las
deliberacionesde la Asamblea Constituyente y de los Comites de Ponnnnenciay de estilo al principio no
figuraba el adjetivo "agricola"en la seccion 5, diciendose solo "terreno privado" y quesolo mas trade se
añadio la palabra calificativa agricola—"private agricultural land" De este se quiere inferir quela adicion
de la palabra "agricultural" debio de ser poralgun motivo y este no podia ser mas que el de que sequiso
excluir los terrenos residenciales comerciales e industriales, limitandose el precepto a los propia o
estrictamenteagricolas.
La deduccion es incorrecta y sin fundamento. No cabedecir que la adicion de la plabra "agricultural" en
estecaso equivale a excuir los terrenos residenciales, comercialese industriales, por la sencilla razon de
que la Constitucion no solo no define lo que es residencial comercial e industrial, comercial e industrial.
En cambio ya hemosvisto que la palabra "agricultral" tiene una significaciontradicionalmente bien
establecida en nuestra jurisprudenciay en nuestro vocabulario juridico: incluye no solo
terrenoscultivados o susceptibles fe cultivo, sino tambien residencialescomerciales e industriales. Se
admite por todo elmundo que la palabra tiene tal significacion en el articuloXIII, seccion 5, de la
Constitucion, en cuanto se refierea terreno publico. Ahora bien; ¿que diferencia hay, despuesde todo,
entire un terreno publico agricolo y uno sea a la calidad de agricola, absolutamente ninguna.Uno no es
mas menois agricola que el otro. La unicadiferencia se refiere a la propiedad, al titulo dominical — en
que el uno es del Estado y el otro es de un particular.
En realidad, creo que la diferencia es mas bien psicologica,subjetiva — en que vulgarmente hablando
pareceque los conceptos de "agricola" y "residencial" se repelen.No se debe menospreciar la influencia
del vulgo en algunascosas; en la misma literatura el vulgo juega su papel; digasi no la formacion
popular del romancero. Pero es indudable que cietas cosas estan por encima del conceptovulgar —
una de estae la interpretacion de la leyes, lahermeneutica legal. Esto no es exagerar la importancia de
la tecnica sino que es simplemente colocar las cosasensu verdadero lugar. La interpretacion de la ley
es unafuncion de minoria — los abogados. Si no fuera asi paraque los abogados? ¿Y para que las
escuelas de dercho,y para que los exmenes, cada vez mas rigidos, para de purar el alma de la toga,
que dijo un gran abogado español?6 Asi que cuando decimos que el precepto constitucional en cuestion
debe interpretatarse tecnicamente, a la luz de la jurisprudencia, por ser ello el metodo mas seguro para
hallar la verdad judicial, no importa que ello repugne al concepto vulgar a simple vista, no ponemos,en
realidad, nionguna pica en Flandes, sino que propugnamos una cosa harto elememntal por lo sabida.
Por tanto no es necesario especular o devanarse lossesos tratando de inquirir por que en la tamizacion
delprecepto se añadio el adjetivo 'agricultural" a las palabras"private land" en vez de dejarlas solas sin
cualificacion.Algunos diran que fue por razon de simentria para hacer"pendant diran que fue por razon
de simetria para hacer"pendant" con la frase "public agricultural land" puestamas arriba. Pero esto np
tiene ninguna importancia. Loimportante es saber que la añadidura, tal como esta jurisdiccion, de la
palbra "agricultural" empleada en dicho texto. Eso es todo; lo demas creo que es puro bizantinis mo.
III. Cero que una examen de los documentos y debatesde la Asamblea Constituyente para ver de
inquirir la motivacion y finalidad del precepto constitucional que nos ocupapuede ayudar grandemente y
arrojar no poca luz en lainterpretacion de la letra y espiritu de dicho precepto.Este genero de inquisicion
es perfectamente propio y permisible en hermeneutica constitucional, y se ha hechosiempre, segun las
majores autoridades sobre la materia. Cooley, en su authorizado tratado sobre Limitaciones
Constitucionales (Constitutional Limitations) dice a este efectolo sigiuente:
When the inquiry is directedto ascertaining the mischief designed to be remedied, or
the purpose sought to be accomplished by a particular provision, it may be proper to examine the
proceedings of the convention which framed the instrument. Where the proceedings clearly point out the
purpose of the provision, the aid will be valuable and satisfactory; but where the question is one of
abstract meaning, it will be difficult to derive from this source much reliable assistance in interpretation.
(1 Cooley on Constitutional Limitations [8th ed.], p. 142.)
¿Que atmosfera prevalecia en la Asamblea sobre elproblema de la tierra en general sobre el problema
capitalismo de los terrenos naturales? ¿Cual era la tendenciapredominante entre los Delegados? Y
¿como era tambienel giro de la opinion, del sentimiento publico es decir comoera el pulso del pueblo
mismo del cual la Asamblea despuesde todo no era mas que organo e interprete?
Varios discursos sobre el particular se pronounciaronen la Asamblea Constituyente. El tono
predomionante entodos ellos era un fuerte, profundo nacionalismo. Tanto dentro como fuera de la
Asamblea Constituyente era evidente, acusado, el afan unanime y decidido de conservar el patrimonio
nacional no solo para las presentes generaciones filipinas, sino tambien para la posteridad.
Y patrimonio nacional tenia, en la mente de todos un significadocategorio e indubitable; significion de si
es dedominio publico o privado. Muestras tipicas y representativas de este tono pecular y dominantes
de la ideologiaconstituyente son ciertas m,anifestaciones que constanen el diario de serines has en el
curso de los debateso en el proceso de la redaccion del proyecto constitucionalpor Delegados de
palabra autorizadam bien por su significacion personal bein por el papel particula que desempeñaban
en las treas constituyentes. Por ejemplo el Delegado Montilla por Negros Occidental, conspicuo
representante del agro, usando del privilegio de madia horaparlamentaria dijo en parte lo siguinte:
. . . Con la completa nacionnalization de nuestras tierras y recursos natural debe entenderse que nuetro
patrimonio nacional debe estar vinculado 100 por 100 en manos filipinas. Tierras y recursos naturales
son inm,uebles y como tales pueden compararse con los organos vitales del cuerpo de una persona: la
falta de posesion de los mismo puede caussar la muete instantannea o el abreviamiento de la vida
(Diario de Sesiones Asamblea Constituyente, inedita, "Framing of the Constitution," tit. 2 0 pag. 592
Libro del Profesor Aruego).
Como se ve el Delegado Montilla habla de tierras sin adjetivacion, es decir sin difenciar entre propiedad
publica y privada.
El Delgado Ledesma, por Iloilo, otro conspicuo representante del agro presidente del comte de
agricultura de la Asamblea que los extramnjeros no podian ser mismas palabras:
La exclusion de los extranjeros del privilegio de adquirir terrenos publicos agricolas y de poder se
dueños de propiedades inmuebles (real estate) es una parte necesaria de las leyes de terrenos
publicos de Filipinas para mantener firme la idea de conservar Filipinaspara los filipos' (Diario de
Sesiones, id.; Libro de Aruego, supra, pag. 593.)
Es harto significtativo que en el informe del Colite de Nacionalizacion y Conservacion de Recursos
Naturales de la Asamblea Constituyente la plabra tierra (land) se usa generricamente sin cualificacion
de publica o privada. Dice el Comite:
Que la tierra, los minerales los bosques y otros recursos naturalesconstituyen la herencia exclusiva de
la nacion filipina. Deben,por tanto, ser conservados para aquellos que se halian bajo la autoridad
soberana de esa nacion y para su posteridad. (Libro de Aruego, supra, pag. 595.)
La conservacion y fomento del patrimonio nacional fue una verdadera obsesion en la Asamblea
Constituyente. Sus mienbros que todavia viven recordaran l;a infinita paciencia, el esmero de orfe
breria con que se trabajo el preambulo de la Constitucion. Cada frase, cada concepto se sometio a un
rigido proceso de seleccion y las gemas resultans es la labor benedictina una de las gemas redel
patrimonio nacional. He aqui el preambulo:
The Filipino people, imploring the aid of Divene Providence,in order to establish a government that shall
enbody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and
secure to themslves and their posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty,
and democracy, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.
El espiritu fuertemente nacionalista que saturaba la Asamblea Constituyente con respecto a la tierre y
recursosnaturales es de facil explicacion. Estabamos escribiendouna Constitucion no solo para el
Commonwealth, sino tambien para la republica que advendria despues de10 años. Querianos, puesd
asegurar firmemente las basesde nuestra nacionalidad. ¿Que cosa major para ello quebildar por los
cuatro costrados el cuerpo dela mnacion delcual — parodiando al Delegado Montilla — la tierra y
losresoursos naturales son como organos vitales cuya perdidapuede causar la muerte instantanea o el
abreviamiento dela vida?
Para aprociar el pulso de la nacion en aquel memontohistorico es preciso tener en cuenta las
cirucmstancias.Nos debamos perfecta cuenta de nuetra posicion geografica,asi como tambien de
nuestras
limitaciones
demograficas.Se
trataba,
por
ciento
de
una
conciencia
agudamenteatormentadora y alarmante. Estabamos roodeadosde enormes mesas humanas —
centenares de milliones — economica y biologicamente agresivas, avidad de desbordarsepor tadas
partes, poir las areas del Pafico particularmente,en busca de espacio vitales. China, Japon-Japon,
sobretodo que estaba entonces en el apogeo de su delirio deengrandecimiento economico y militarista.
Teniamos apantadoal mismo corazon, como espada rutilante de Samurrai,el pavoroso problema de
Davao, donde, por errores incialesdel Gobierno, Japon tenia el control de la tierra, instituyendos alli una
especie de Japon en miniatura, con todaslas amenasas y peligros que ello implicaba para la
integridadde nuestra existancia nacional. Como que Davaoya se llamaba popular y sarcasticamente
Davaoko, entragica rima con Manchuko.
Tambien nos obsesionaban otras lecciones dolorosas dehistoria contemporanea. Texas, Mejico, Cuba
y otraspaises del Mar Caribe y de la America Latina que todaviaexpiaban, como una terrible maldicion
el error de susgobernantes al permitir la enajenacion del suelo a extranjeros.
Con el commercio y la industria principalmente en manosno-filipinas, los Delegados a la Constituyente
se haciancargo tambien de la vitalisima necesidad de, por lo menos,vincular el apatrimonio nacional,
entre otras cosas la tierra, en manos de los filipinos.
Que de extraño habia, pues, que en semejante atmosfera y tales circumstancias se aprobase un
articulo rigidamentenacionalismta como es el Article XIII? La motivacion y finalidad, como ya se ha
dicho, era triple: (a)consetvar el patrimonio nacional para las presentes yfuturas generaciones filipinas;
(b) vincular, por lo menos,la propiedad de la tierra y de los recursos naturales en manos filipinas como
la mejor manera de mantener elequilibrio de un sistema economico dominado principalmente por
extranjeros en virtud de su tecnica (know-how) superior y de su abudancia de capitales: (c) prefictos y
complicaciones internacionales.
No se concibe que los Delegados tuvieran la intercionde excluir del precepto los terrenos residenciales
comercialese industrial, pues sabian muy bien que los finesque se trataban de conseguir y los peligros
quie se trataban de evitar con la politica de nacionalizacion y conservacionrezaban tanto para una clase
de terrenos como para otra. ¿Por que se iba a temer, verbigracia, el dominio extranjero sobre un
terreno estrictamente, agricola, sujeto a cultivo, y no sobre el terreno en que estuviera instalada
unaformidable industria o fabrica?
Otro detalle significativo. Era tan vigoroso el sentimiento nacionalista en la Asamblea Constituyente que,
noobstante el natural sentimiento de gratitud que nos obligabaa favor de los americanos., a estos no se
les concedioningun privilegio en relacion con la tierra y demas recusosnaturales, sino que se les coloco
en el mismo plano que alos otros extranjeros. Como que ha habido necesidad deuna reforma
constitucional — la llmada reforma sobre laparidad — para equipararlos a los filipinos.
The mere literal construction of a section in a statute ought not to prevail if it is opposed to the intention
of the legislature apparent by the statute; and if the words are sufficiently flexible to admit of some other
construction it is to be adopted to effectuate that intention. The intent prevails over the letter, and the
latter will, if possible, be so read as to conform to the spirit of the act. While the intention of the
legislature must be ascertained from the words used to express it, the manifest reason and the obvious
purpose of the law should not be sacrificed to a literal interpretation of such words. (II Sutherland, Stat.
Construction, pp. 721, 722.)
IV. — Se insinua que no debieramos declarar que laConstitucion excluye a loc extranjeros de la
propiedadsobre terrenos residenciales e industriales,porque ello imposibilitaria toda accion legislativa
en sentidocontrario para el caso de que el Congreso Ilegagealguna vez a pensar que semejante
interdiccio debialevantarse. Se dice que es majes y mas conveniente dejaresta cuestion en manos del
Congreso para que haya maselasticidad en las soluciones de los diferentes problemassobre la tierra.
Cometeriamos un grave error si esto hicieramos. Estaes una cuestion constitucional por excelencia.
Solamenteel pueblo puede disponer del patrimonio nacional. Ni el Congreso, ni mucho menos los
tribunales, pueden disponerde ese patrimonio. Lo mas que puede hecer el Congreso es proponer una
reforma constitucional mediante los votosde tres cuartas (3/4) de sus miembros; y el pueblo tienela
ultima palabra que se expresara en una eleccion oplebiscito convocado al efecto.
El argumento de que esto costaria dinero es insostenible. Seria una economia mal entendida. Si no se
escatiman gastos para celebrar elctiones ordinarias periodicamente ¿como ha del pueblo en un asunto
tan vital como es la disposicion del patrimonio nacional, base de su mismaexistencia? para reformar la
Constitucion, apoyado portres cuartas (3/4) del Congreso, por lo menos.
En el entretanto el articulo XIII de la Constitucion debequedar tal como es, e interpretarse en la forma
como lo interpretamos en nuestra decision.
Se confirma la sentencia.
PARAS, J., dissenting:
Section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution provides that "save in cases of hereditary succession, no
private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines." The important
question that arises is whether private residential land is included in the terms "private agricultural land."
There is no doubt that under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, quoted in the majority opinion,
lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, timber,or mineral. There can be no doubt, also,
that public lands suitable or actually used for residential purposes, must of necessity come under any of
the three classes.
But may it be reasonably supposed that lands already of private ownership at the time of the approval of
the Constitution, have the same classification? An affirmative answer will lead to the conclusion —
which is at once absurd and anomalous — that private timber and mineral lands may be transferred or
assigned to aliens by a mode other than hereditary succession. It is, however, contended that timber
and mineral lands can never be private, and reliance is placed on section 1, Article XIII, of the
Constitution providing that "all agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public domain . . . belong to
the State," and limiting the alienation of natural resources only to public agricultural land. The contention
is obviously untenable. This constitutional provision, far from stating that all timber and mineral lands
existing at the time of its approval belong to the State, merely proclaims ownership by the Government
of all such lands as are then of the public domain; and although, after the approval of the Constitution,
no public timber or mineral land may be alienated, it does not follow that timber or mineral lands
theretofore already of private ownership also became part of the public domain. We have held, quite
recently, that lands in the possession of occupants and their predecessors in interest since time
immemorial do not belong to the Government, for such possession justifies the presumption that said
lands had been private properties even before the Spanish conquest. (Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 43
Off. Gaz., 866.) This gives effect to the pronouncement in Cariño vs. Insular Government (212 U.S., 446;
53 Law. ed., 594), that it could not be supposed that "every native who had not a paper title is a
trespasser." It is easy to imagine that some of such lands may be timber or mineral. However, if there
are absolutely no private timber or mineral. However, if there are absolutely no private timber or mineral
lands, why did the framers of the Constitution bother about speaking of "private agricultural land" in
sections 3 and 5 of Article XIII, and merely of "lands" in section 4?
SEC. 3. The Congress may determine by law the size of private agricultural land which individuals,
corporations, or associations may acquire and hold, subject to rights existing prior to the enactmentof
such law.
SEC. 4. The Congress may authorize, upon payment of just compensation, the expropriation of lands to
be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals.
SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or
assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain in the Philippines.
Under section 3, the Congress may determine by law the size of private agricultural land which
individuals, corporations, or associations may acquire and hold, subbject to rights existing prior to the
enactment of such law, and under section 4 it may authorize, upon payment of just compensation, the
expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals. The latter
section clearly negatives the idea that private lands can only be agricultural. If the exclusive
classification of public lands contained in section 1 is held applicable to private lands, and , as we have
shown, there may be private timber and mineral lands, there would be neither sense nor justification in
authorizing the Congress to determine the size of private agricultural land only, and in not extending the
prohibition of section 5 to timber and mineral lands.
In may opinion, private lands are not contemplated or controlled by the classification of public lands, and
the term "agricultural" appearing in section 5 was used as it is commonly understood, namely, as
denoting lands devoted to agricultural. In other words, residential or urban lots are not embraced within
the inhibition established in said provision. It is noteworthy that the original draft referred merely to
"private land." This certainty would have been comprehensive enough to included any kind of land. The
insertion of the adjective "agricultural " is therefore significant. If the Constitution prohibits the alienation
to foreigners of private lands of and kind, no legislation can ever be enacted with a view to permitting
limited areas of land for residential, commercial, or industrial use, and said prohibition may readily affect
any effort towards the attainment of rapid progress in Philippine economy. On the other hand, should
any danger arise from the absence of such constitutional prohibition, a law may be passed to remedy
the situation, thereby enabling the Government to adopt such elastic policy as may from time to time be
necessary, unhampered by any inconveniences or difficulties in amending the Constitution. The power
of expropriation is, furthermore, a handy safeguard against undersirable effects of unrestricted
alienation to, or ownership by, aliens of urban properties. The majority argue that the original draft in
which the more general terms "private land" was used, was amended in the same that the adjective
"agricultural" was inserted in order merely "to clarify concepts and avoid uncertainties" and because, as
under section 1, timber and mineral lands can never be private, "the prohibition to transfer the same,
would be superfluous." In answer, it may be stated that section 4 of Article XIII, referring to the right of
expropriation, uses "lands" without any qualification, and it is logical to believe that the use was made
knowingly in contradistinctions with the limited term "private agricultural land" in section 3 and 5.
Following the line of reasoning of the majority, "lands" in section 4 necessarily implies that what may be
expropriated is not only private agricultural land but also private timber and mineral lands, as well, of
course, as private residential lands. This of course tears apart the majority's contention that there cannot
be any private timber or mineral land.
Any doubt in the matter will be removed when it is, borne in mind that no less than Honorable Filemon
Sotto, Chairman of the Sponsorship Committee of the Constitutional Convention, in supporting section 3
of the Article XIII, explained that the same refers to agricultural land, and not to urban properties, and
such explanation is somewhat confirmed by the statement of another member of the Convention
(delegate Sevilla) to the effect that said section "is discriminatory and unjust with regard to the
agriculturists."
Sr. SOTTO (F) Señor Presidente: "Que hay caballeros de laConvencion en el fondo de esta cuestion al
parecer inocente yordinaria para que tanto revuelo haya metido tanto en la sesion de ayer como en la
de hoy? Que hay de misterios en el fondo de este problem, para que politicos del volumen del caballero
por Iloilo y del caballero por Batangas, tomen con gran interes una macion para reconsiderar lo
acordado ayer? Voy a ser frio, señores. Parece que es meyor tratar estas cuestiones con calma y no
apasionamiento. He prestado atencion, como siempre suelo hacer a todos los argumentos aqui en
contra del precepto contenido en el draft y a favor ahora de la reconsideracion y siento decir lo siguiente;
todos son argumentos muy buenos a posteriori. Cuando la Asamble Nacional se haya reunido, sera la
ocasion de ver si procede o no expropiar terrenos o latifundios existentes ahorao existentes despues.
En el presente, yo me limito a invitar la atencion de la Convencion al hecho de que el procepto no tome
las medidas necesarias en tiempo oportuno, cuando el problema del latifundismo se haya presentado
con caracterres tales que el beinestar, interes y orden publico lo requieran. Permitame la Convencion
que lo discuta en globo las dos pates del articulo 9. Hay tal engranaje en los dos mandatos que tiene
dicho precepto, hay tral eslabon en una u otra parte que es imposible, que es dificil que quitaramos
deslindes si nos limitasemos a considerar una sola parte. La primera parte autoriza a la legislatura para
fijar el limite maximo de propiedad agricola que los ciudadanos particulares puede tener. Parece que es
un punto que ha pasado desapercibido. No se trata aqui ahora de propiedades urbanas, sino de
propiedades agricolas, y es por la razon de que con mucha especialidad en las regiones agricolas, en
las zones rusticas es donde el latifundismo se extiende con facilidad, y desde alli los pequeños
propietariou precisamente para ahogarles y para intilizarles. Esta pues, a salvo completamente la
cuestion de las propiedades urbans. Cietos grandes soleres de nuestras ciudaes que con pretexto de
tener cietos eficios, que en realidad no necesitan de tales extensos solares para su existencia ni para
su mantenimineto, puedan dormir transquilos. No Vamos contra esas propiedades. Por una causa o por
otra el pasado nos legardo ese lastre doloroso. Pero la region agricola, la region menos explotada por
nuetro pueblo, la region que necesitamos si queremos vivir cuenta propia la region que es el mayor
incentivo no para solo para los grandes capitalistas de fuera merece todos los ciudados del gobierno.
Voy a pasar ahora a la relacion que tiene la seggunda parte de la enmiendad con la primera. Una vez
demostrado ante la Lehgislatura, una vez convencida la Asamblea Nacional de que existe un
latifundismo y que este laitifundismo puede producir males e esta produciendo daños a la comunidad,
es cuando entonces la Legislatura puede acordar la expropiacion de los latifundios. Donde esta el mal
que los opositores a este es un postulado que todos conocen. Bien, voy a admitir para los propositos
del argumento que hoy no existen laifundios, y si los opostores al precepto quieren mas vamos a
convenir en que no existrian en el futuro. Pues, entonces, donde este el temor de que el hijo de tal no
pueda recibir la herencia de cual? Por lo demas el ejemplo repetidas veces presentado ayer yhoy en
cuanto al herdero y al causahabiente no es completamente exacto. Vamos a suponer que
efectivamente un padre de familia posee un numero tal de hectareas de terreno, superior o exedente a
lo que fija la ley. Creen los Caballeros, creen los opositorees al precepto que la Legislatura, la
Asamblea Nacional va a ser tan imprudente, tan loca que inmediatemente disponga por ley que aquella
porcion excedente del terreno que ha de recibir un hijo de su padre no podra poseerlo, no podra tenerlo
o recibirlo el heredero.
Esa es una materia para la Asamblea Nacional. La asamblea Nacional sabe que no puede dictar leyes
o medidas imposibles de cumplir. Fijara el plazo, fijara la proporcion de acuedo con las circunstancias
del tiempo entonces en que vivamos. Es posible que ahora un numero determinado de hectereas sea
excesivo; es posible que por desenvolvimientos economics del paius ese numero de hectareas puede
ser elevado o reducido. Es por esto porque el Comite precisamente no ha querido fijar desde ahora el
numero de hectareas presamente no ha querido fijar desde ahora el numero de hectareas, prefireindo
dejar a la sabiduria, a la prudencia, al patriotismo y a la justicia de la Asambela Nacional el fijar ese
numero.
Lomismo digo de la expropiacion. Se habla de que el gobierno no tendra dinero; se hablqa de que no
podra revender las propieedades. Pero, Caballeros de la Convencion, caballeros opositores del
precepto; si la Legislatura, si la AsambleaNacional estuviera convencida de que el gobierno no puede
hecer una exporpiacion, va a hecerlo? La Asamblea Nacional dictara una ley autorizando la
expropiacion de tal a cual latifundio cuando este convencida, primero, de que la existencia de ese
latifundio es amenazante para el publico; y segundo, cuando la asamblea Nacional este convencida de
que el gobierno esta disposicion para disponer la expropiacion.
Visto, pues, desde este punto el asunto, no es malo autorizar,fijar los limites, ni macho menos es malo
autorizar a la Legislatura para dictar leyes de expropiacion.
Pero voy a molestaros por un minuto mas. Se ha mentado aquicon algun exito esta mañana — y digo
con exito porque he oidoalgunos aplausos — se ha mentado la posibilidad de que los comunistas
hagan un issue de esta disposicion que existe en el draft; podran los comunistas pedir los votos del
electorado para ser elloslos que dicten las leyes fijando el limite del terreno y ordenen la expropriacion?
¡Que argumento mas bonito si tuviera base! Lo mas natural, creo yo, es que el pueblo, el electorado, al
ver queno es una Asamblea Constituyente comunista la que ha puestoesta disposicion, otorgue sus
votors a esta misma Asamblea Nacional, o a esos condidatos no comunistas. ¿Quien esta en
disposicion de terminar mejor una obra aquel que trazado y puesto los primeros pilares, o aquel que
viene de gorra al final de la obra para decir: "Aqui estoy poner el tejado?"
Es sensible, sin embargo, que una cuetion de importancia tannacional como este, pretendamos ligarla
a los votos de los comulites de terreno; no ha de venir porque nosotros fijemos loslimites de terreno; no
ha de venir porque prohibamos los latifundiosmediante expropiacion forzosa, no; ha de venir
precisamentepor causa de los grandes propietarios de terreno, y ha de venir,queramoslo o no, porque
el mundo esta evolucionando y se va aconvencer de que la vida no es solamente para unos cuantos
sinopara todos , porque Dios no la dio, con la libertad, el aire, la luz,la tierra para vivir (Grandes
Aplausosz), y por algo se ha dichoque en los comienzos de la vida himana debio haber sido
fusilado,matado, a aquel primero que puso un cerco a un pedazo de tierrareclamando ser suya a
propiedad.
Por estas razones, señor Presidente, y sintiendo que mi tiempoesta para terminar, voy a dar fin a mi
discurso agradeciendo a la Convencion. (Speech of Delegate Sotto.)
I would further add, Mr. President, that this precept by limiting private individuals to holding and
acquiring lands, private agricultural lands . . . is discriminatory and unjust with regard to the agriculturists.
Why not, Mr. President, extend this provision also to those who are engaged in commerce and
industries? Both elements amass wealth. If the purpose of the Committee, Mr. President, is to distribute
the wealth in such a manner that it will no breed discontent, I see no reason for the discrimination
against the agricultural. In view of these reasons, Mr. President, I do not want to speak further and I
submit this amendment because many reasons have been given already yesterday and this morning.
(Speech of Delegate Sevilla.)
Delegate Sotto was not interpellated, much less contradicted, on the observation that section 3 of Article
XIII does not embrace private urban lands. There is of course every reason to believe that the sense in
which the terms "private agricultural lands" were employed in section 3 must be the same as that in
section 5, if consistency is to be attributed to the framers of the Constitution.
We should not be concluded by te remarks, cited in the majority opinion, made by Delegate Ledesma to
the effect that "the exclusion of aleins from the private of acquiring public agricultural lands and of
owning real estate is a necessary part of the Public Land Laws," and of the statement of Delegate
Montilla regarding "the complete nationalization of our lands and natural resources," because (1) the
remarks of Delegate Ledesma expressly mentions "public agricultural lands" and the terms "real estate"
must undoubtedly carry the same meaning as the preceding words "public agricultural lands", under the
principle of "ejusdem generis"; (2) Delegate Ledesma must have in mind purely "agricultural" lands,
sicne he was the Chairman of the Committee on Agricultural Development and his speech was made in
connection with the national policy on agricultural lands; (3) the general nature of the explanations of
both Delegate Ledesma and Delegate Montilla, cannot control the more specific clarification of Delegate
Sotto that agricultural lands in section 3 do not include urban propeties. Neither are we bound to give
reater force to the view (apparently based on mere mental recollections) of the Justices who were
members of the Constitutional Convention than tot he specific recorded manifestation of Delegate Sotto.
The decision in the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil., 175), invoked by the majority, is
surely not controlling, because, first, it dealt with "agricultural public lands" and, secondly, in that case it
was expressly held that the phrase "agricultural land" as used in Act No. 926 "means those public
lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands," — the definition held to be found in
section 13 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902.
We hold that there is to found in the act of Congress a definition of the phrase "agricultural public lands,"
and after a carefully consideration of the question we are satisfied that the only definition which exists in
said act is the definition adopted by the court below. Section 13 says that the Government shall "make
rules and regulations for the lease, sale or other disposition of the public lands other than timber or
mineral lands." To our minds that is the only definition that can be said to be given to agricultural lands.
In other words, that the phrase "agricultural land" as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands
accquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands. (Mapa vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil.,
182.)
The majority, in support of their construction, invoke Commonwealth Act No. 141, enected after the
approval of the Constitution, which prohibits the alienation to foreigners of "land originally acquired in
any manner under the provisions of this Act," (section 122) or "land originally acquired in any manner
under the provisions of any previous Act, ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other provision of
law formerly in force in the Philippines with regard to public lands, terrenos baldios realengos, or lands
of any other denomination that were actually or presumptively of the public domain." (Section 123.) They
hold that the constitutional intent "is made more patent and is strongly implemented by said Act." The
majority have evidently overlooked the fact that the prohibition contained in said sections refer to lands
originally acquired under said sections referto land originally acqured under said Act or otherlegal
provisions lands, which of course do not include lands not originally of the public domain. The lands that
may be acquired under Act No. 141 necessarily have to be public agricultural lands, since they are the
only kinds that are subject to alienation or disposition under the Constitution. Hence, even if they
become private, said lands retained their original agricultural character and may not therefore be
alienated to foreigners. It is only in this sense, I think, that act No. 141 seeks to carry out and implement
the constitutional objective. In the case before us, however, there is no pretense that the land bought by
the appellant was originally acquired under said Act or other legal provisions contemplated therein.
The majority is also mistaken in arguing that "prior to the Constitution, under section 24 of the Public
Land Act No. 2874 aliens could acquire public agricultural lands used for industrial or residential
purposes, but after the Constitution and under section 23 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the right of
aliens to acquire such kind of lands is completely stricken out, undoubtedly in pursuanceof the
Constitutional limitation," and that "prior to the Constitution, under section 57 of the Public Land Act
No.2874, land of the public domain suitable for residence or industrial purposes could
be sold or leased to aliens, but after the Constitution and under section 60 of Commonwealth Act No.
141, such land may only be leased, but not sold, to aliens, and the lease granted shall only be valid
while the land is used for the purpose referred to." Section 1 of article XIII of the Constitution speaks of
"public agricultural lands" and quite logically, Commonwealth Act No. 141, enacted after the approval of
the Constitution, has to limit the alienation of its subject matter (public agricultural land, which includes
public residential or industrial land) to Filipino citizens. But it is not correct to consider said Act as a
legislation on, or a limitation against, the right of aliens to acquire residential land that was already of
private ownership prior to the approval of the Constitution.
The sweeping assertion of the majority that "the three great departments of the Government — Judicial,
Legislative and Executive — have always maintained that lands of the public domain are classified into
agricultural, mineral and timber, and that agricultural lands include residential lots," is rather misleading
and not inconsistent, with our position. While the construction mistakenly invoked by the majority refers
exclusively to lands of the public domain, our view is that private residential lands are not embraced
within the terms "private agricultural land" in section 5 of Article XIII. Let us particularize in somewhat
chronological order. We have already pointed out that the leading case of Mapa vs. Insular Government,
supra, only held that agricultural public lands are those public lands acquired from Spain which are
neither timber nor mineral lands. The opinion of the Secretary of Justice dated July 15, 1939, quoted in
the majority opinion, limited itself in affirming that "residential, commercial or industrial lots forming part
of the public domain . . . must be classified as agricultural." Indeed, the limited scope of said opinion is
clearly pointed out in the following subsequent opinion of the Secretary of Justice dated September 25,
1941, expressly hoding that "in cases involving the prohibition in section 5 of Article XIII (formerly Article
XII) regarding transfer or assignment of private agricultural lands to foreigners, the opinion that
residential lots are not agricultural lands is applicable."
This is with reference to your first indorsement dated July 30, 1941, forwarding the request of the
Register of Deeds of Oriental Misamis for an opinion as to whether Opinion No. 130, dated July 15,
1939, of this Department quoted in its Circular No. 28, dated May 13, 1941, holding among others, that
the phrase "public agricultural land" in section 1, Article XIII (formerly article XII) of the Constitution of
the Philippines, includes residential, commercial or industrial lots for purposes of their disposition,
amends or supersedeas a decision or order of the fourth branch of the Court of First Instance of the City
of Manila rendered pursuant to section 200 of the Administrative Code which holds that a residential lot
is not an agricultural land, and therefore, the prohibition in section 5, Article XIII (formerly Article XII) of
the Constitution of the Philippines does not apply.
There is no conflict between the two opinions.
Section 1, Artcile XIII (formerly article XII of the Constitution of the Philippines, speaks of public
agricultural lands while section 5 of the same article treats of private agricultural lands. A holding,
therefore, that a residential lot is not private agricultural land within the meaning of that phrase as found
in section 5 of Article XIII (formerly Article XII) does not conflict with an opinion that residential,
commercial or industrial lots forming part of the public domain are included within the phrase "public
agricultural land" found in section 1, Article XIII (formerly Article XII) of the Constitution of the Philippines.
In cases involving the prohibition in section 5 of Article XIII (formerly Article XII) regarding transfer or
assignment of private agricultural lands to foreigners, the opinion that residential lots are not agricultural
lands is applicable. In cases involving the prohibition in section 1 of Article XIII (formerly Article XII)
regarding disposition in favor of, and exploitation, development or utilization by foreigners of public
agricultural lands, the opinion that residential, commercial or industrial lots forming part of the public
domain are included within the phrase "public agricultural land" found in said section 1 of the Article XIII
(formerly Article XII) governs.
Commonwealth Act No. 141, passed after the approval of the Constitution limited its restriction against
transfers in favor of alien to public agricultural lands or to lands originally acquired under said Act or
other legal provisions formerly in force in the Philippines with regard to public lands. On November 29,
1943, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming that of the Court of First rendered a decision
affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac in a case in which it was held that private residential
lots are not included in the prohibition in section 5 of Article XIII. (CA-G. R. No. 29.) During theJapanese
occupation, the Constitution of the then Republic of the Philippines contained an almost verbatim
reproduction of said section 5 of Article XIII; and the then National Assembly passed an Act providing
that "no natural or juridical person who is not a Filipino citizen shall acquire directly or indirectly any title
to private lands (which are not agricultural lands) including buildings and other improvements thereon or
leasehold rights on said lands, except by legal succession of proper cases, unless authorized by the
President of the Republic of the Philippines." (Off. Gaz., Vol. I, p. 497, February,1944.) It is true that the
Secretary of Justice in 1945 appears to have rendered an opinion on the matter, but it cannot have any
persuasive force because it merely suspended the effect of the previous opinion of his Department
pending judicial determination of the question. Very recently, the Secretary of Justice issued a circular
adopting in effect the opinion of his Department rendered in1941. Last but not least, since the approval
of the Constitution, numerous transactions involving transfers of private residential lots to aliens had
been allowed to be registered without any opposition on the part of the Government. It will thus be seen
that, contrary to what the majority believe, our Government has constantly adopted the view that private
residential lands do not fall under the limitation contained in section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution.
I do not question or doubt the nationalistic spirit permeating the Constitution, but I will not permit myself
to be blinded by any sentimental feeling or conjectural considerations to such a degree as to attribute to
any of its provisions a construction not justified by or beyond what the plain written words purport to
convey. We need not express any unnecessary concern over the possibility that entire towns and cities
may come to the hands of aliens, as long as we have faith in our independence and in our power to
supply any deficiency in the Constitution either by its amendment or by Congressional action.
There should really have been no occasion for writing this dissent, because the appellant, with the
conformity of the appellee, had filed a motion for the withdrawal of the appeal and the same should have
been granted outright. In Co Chiong vs. Dinglasan (p. 122, ante),decided only a few days ago, we
reiterated the well-settled rule that "a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a
law to be unconstitutional or invalid unless such question is raised by the the parties, and that when it is
raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that
course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until a case arises in
which a decision upon such question will be unavoidable." In other words, a court will always avoid a
constitutional question, if possible. In the present case, that course of action was not only possible but
absolutely imperative. If appellant's motion for withdrawal had been opposed by the appellee, there
might be some reasons for its denial, in view of section 4 of Rule 52 which provides that after the filing of
appellee's brief, "the withdrawal may be allowed by the court in its discretion." At any rate, this discretion
should always be exercised in favor of a withdrawal where a constitutional question will thereby be
avoided.
In this connection, let us describe the proceedings (called "arbitrary and illegal" by Mr. Justice Tuason)
that led to teh denial of the motion for withdrawal. During the deliberation in which all the eleven
members were present, seven voted to allow and four to deny. Subsequently, without any previous
notice and when Mr. Justice Hontiveros was absent, the matter was again submitted to a vote, and one
Justice (who previously was in favor of the withdrawal) reversed his stand, with the result that the votes
were five to five. This result was officially released and the motion denied under the technicality provided
in Rule of Court No. 56, section 2. It is very interesting to observe that Mr. Justice Hontiveros, who was
still a member of the Court and could have attended the later deliberation, if notified and requested,
previously voted for the granting of the motion. The real explanation for excluding Mr. Justice Hontiveros,
against my objection, and for the reversal of the vote of one Justice who originally was in favor of the
withdrawal is found in the confession made in the majority opinion to the effect that the circular of the
Department of Justice instructing all registers of deeds to accept for registration transfers of residential
lots to aliens, was an "interference with the regular and complete exercise by this Court of its
constitutional functions," and that "if we grant the withdrawal, the result is that petitioner-appellant
Alexander A. Krivenko wins his case, not by a decision of this Court, but by the decision or circular of the
Department of Justice issued while this case was pending before this Court." The zealousness thus
shown in denying the motion for wuthdrawal is open to question. The denial of course is another way of
assuming that the petitioner-appellant and the Solicitor General had connived with the Department of
Justice in a scheme not only to interfere with the functions of this Court but to dispose of the national
patrimony in favor of aliens.
In the absence of any injunction from this Court, we should recognize tha right of the Department of
Justice to issue any circular it may deem legal and proper on any subject, and the corollary right of the
appellant to take advantage thereof. What is most regrettable is the implication that the Department of
Justice, as a part of the Executive Department, cannot be as patriotic and able as this Court in
defending the Constitution. If the circular in question is objectionable, the same can be said of the
opinion of the Secretary of Justice in 1945 in effect prohibiting the registration of transfers of private
residential lots in favor of aliens, notwithstanding the pendency in this Court of the case of Oh Cho vs.
Director of Lands (43 Off. Gaz., 866), wherin according to the appellant, the only question raised was
whether, or not "an alien can acquire a residential lot and register it in his name," and notwithstanding
the fact that in said case the appealed decision was in favor of the alien applicant and that, as
hereinbefore stated, the Court of Appeals in another case (CA-G.R. No. 29) had renderd in 1943 a
decision holding that private residential lots are not included in the prohibition in section 5 of Article XIII
of the Constitution. And yet this Court, failing to consider said opinion as an "interference," chose to
evade the only issue raised by the appellant and squarely met by the appellee in the Oh Cho case which
already required a decision on the constitutional question resolved in the case at bar against, so to say,
the will of the parties litigant. In other words, the majority did not allow the withdrawal of the present
appeal not so much as to dispose of it on the merits, but to annul the circular of the Department of
Justice which is, needless to say, not involved in this case. I cannot accept the shallow excuse of the
majority that the denial of the motion for withdrawal was promted by the fear that "our indifference of
today might signify a permanent offense to the Constitution," because it carries the rather immodest
implication that this Court has a monopoly of the virtue of upholding and enforcing, or supplying any
deficiency in, the Constitution. Indeed, the fallacy of the impliation is made glaring when Senator
Franscisco lost no time in introducing a bill that would clarify the constitutional provision in question in
the sense desired by the majority. Upon the other hand, the majority should not worry about the
remoteness of the opportunity that will enable this Court to pass upon this constitutional question,
because we can take advance notice of the fact that in Rellosa vs. Gaw Chee Hun (49 Off. Gaz., 4345),
in which the parties have already presented. But even disregarding said case, I am sure that, in view of
the recent newspaper discussion which naturally reached the length and breadth of the country, there
will be those who will dispute their sales of residential lots in favor of aliens and invoke the constitutional
prohibition.
BENGZON, J., dissenting:
It is unnecessary to deliver at this time any opinion about the extent of the constitutional prohibition.
Both parties having agreed to writer finis to the litigation, there is no obligation to hold forth on the issue.
It is not our mission to give advice to other person who might be interested to give advice to other
persons who might be interested to know the validity or invalidity of their sales or purchases. That is the
work of lawyers and juriscounsults.
There is much to what Mr. Justice Padilla explains regarding any eagerness to solve the constitutional
problem. It must be remembered that the other departments of the Government are not prevented from
passing on constitutional question arising in the exercise of their official powers. (Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, 8th ed., p. 101.) This Tribunal was not established, nor is it expected to play the role of an
overseer to supervise the other Government departments, with the obligation to seize any opportunity to
correct what we may believe to be erroneous application of the constitutional mandate. I cannot agree to
the suggestion that the way the incumbent Secretary of Justice has interpreted the fundamental law, no
case will ever arise before the court, because the registers of deeds under his command, will transfer on
thier books all sales to aliens. It is easy to perceive several probabilities: (1) a new secretary may
entertain opposite views; (2) parties legally affected — like heirs or or creditors of the seller — may wish
to avoid the conveyance to aliens, invoking the constitutional inhibition. Then, in a truly contested case,
with opposing litigants actively arguing their sides we shall be in a position to do full justice. It is not
enough that briefs — as in this case — have been filed; it is desirable, perhaps essential, to make sure
that in a motion for reconsideration, or in a re-hearing in case of tie, our attention shall be invited to
points inadequately touched or improperly considered.
It is stated that sales to aliens of residential lots are currently being effected. No matter. Those sales will
be subject to the final decision we shall reach in a properly submitted litigation. To spell necessity out of
the existence of such conveyances, might amount to begging the issue with the assumption that such
transfers are obviously barred by the Organic Law. And yet sales to foreigners of residential lots have
taken place since our Constitution was approved in 1935, and no one questioned their validity in Court
until nine years later in 1945, after the Japanese authorities had shown distaste for such transfers.
The Court should have, I submit, ample time to discuss this all-important point, and reflect upon the
conflicting politico-economic philosophies of those who advocate national isolation against international
cooperation, and vice-versa. We could also delve into several aspects necessarily involved, to wit:
(a) Whether the prohibition in the Constitution operated to curtail the freedom to dispose of landowners
at the time of its adoption; or whether it merely affected the rights of those who should become
landowners after the approval of the Constitution;7
(b) What consequences would a ruling adverse to aliens have upon our position and commitments in the
United Nations Organization, and upon our treaty-making negotiations with other nations of the worlds;
and
(c) When in 1941 Krivenko acquired this land he was a Russian citizen. Under the treaties between the
United States and Russia, were Russian nationals allowed to acquire residential lots in places under the
jurisdiction of the United States? If so, did our Constitution have the effect of modifying such treaty
during the existence of the Commonwealth Government?
The foregoing view and doubts induced me to vote for dismissal of the appeal as requested by the
parties, and for withholding of any ruling on the constitutional prohibition. However, I am now ready to
cast my vote. I am convinced that the organic law bans the sales of agricultural lands as they are
popularly understood — not including residential, commercial, industrial or urban lots. This belief is
founded on the reasons ably expounded by Mr. Justice Paras, Mr. Justice Padilla and Mr. Justice
Tuason. I am particularly moved by the consideration that a restricted interpretation of the prohibition, if
erroneous or contrary to the poeple's desire, may be remedied by legislation amplifying it; whereas a
liberal and wide application, if erroneous, would need the cumbersome and highly expensive process of
a constitutional amendment.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
The question submitted for decision is whether a parcel of land of private ownership suitable or intended
for residence may be alienated or sold to an alien.
Section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution provides:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain in the Philippines.
The majority holds that a parcel of land of privateownership suitable or intended or used for residence is
included in the term "private agricultural land" and comes within the prohibition of the Constitution. In
support of the opinion that lands of private ownership suitable for residence are included in the term
"private agricultural land" and cannot be alienated or sold to aliens, the majority invokes the decision of
this Court in Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil., 175), which holds that urban lands of the public
domain are included in the term "public agricultural land." But the opinion of the majority overlooks the
fact that the inclusion by this Court of public lands suitable for residence in the term "public agricultural
land" was due to the classification made by the Congress of the United States in the Act of 1 July 1902,
commonly known as the Philippine Bill. In said Act, lands of the public domain were classified into
agricultural, timber and mineral. The only alienable or disposable lands of the public domain were those
belonging to the first class. Hence a parcel of land of the public domain suitable for residence, which
was neither timber nor mineral, could not be disposed of or alienated unless classified as public
agricultural land. The susceptibility of a residential lot of the public domain of being cultivated is not the
real reason for the inclusion of such lot in the classification of public agricultural land, for there are lands,
such as foreshore lands, which would hardly be susceptible of cultivation (Ibañez de Aldecoa vs. Insular
Government, 13 Phil., 159, 167-168), and yet the same come under the classification of public
agricultural land. The fact, therefore, that parcels of land of the public domain suitable for residence are
included in the classification of public agricultural land, is not a safe guide or index of what the framers of
the Constitution intended to mean by the term "private agricultural land." It is contrary to the rules of
statutory construction to attach technical meaning to terms or phrases that have a common or ordinary
meaning as understood by he average citizen.
At the time of the adoption of the Constitution (8 February 1935), the Public Land Act in force was Act
No. 2874. Under this Act, only citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the United States and corporations
or associations described in section 23 thereof, and citizens of countries the laws of which grant to
citizens of the Philippine Islands the same right to acquire the public land as to their own citizens, could
acquire by purchase agricultural land of the public domain (section 23, Act No. 2874). This was the
general rule. There was an exception. Section 24of the Act provides:
No person, corporation, association or partnership other than those mentioned in the last preceding
section may acquire or own agricultural public land or land of any other denomination or
classification, not used for industrial or residence purposes, that is at the time or was originally, really or
presumptively, of the public domain, or any permanent improvement thereon, or any real right on such
land and improvement: Provided, however, That persons, corporations, associations, or partnerships
which at the date upon which this Act shall take effect, hold agricultural public lands or land of any other
denomination not used for industrial or residence purposes, that belonged originally, really or
presumptively, to the public domain, or permanent improvements on such lands, or a real right upon
such lands and improvements, having acquired the same under the laws and regulations in force at the
date of such acquisition, shall be authorized to continue holding the same as if such persons,
corporations, associations, or partnerships were qualified under the last preceding section; but they
shall not encumber, convey, or alienate the same to persons, corporations, associations or partnerships
not included in section twenty-three of this Act, except by reason of hereditary succession, duly
legalized and acknowledged by competent Courts. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 57 of the Act, dealing with lands of the public domain suitable for residential, commercial,
industrial, or other productive purposes other than agricultural, provides:
Any tract of land comprised under this title may be leased or sold, as the case may be, to any person,
corporation, or association authorized to purchase or lease public lands for agricultural
purposes. . . . Provided further, That any person, corporation, association, or
partnership disqualified from purchasing public land for agricultural purposes under the provisions of
this Act, may purchase or lease land included under this title suitable for industrial or residence
purposes, but the title or lease granted shall only be valid while such land issued for the purposes
referred to. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 121 of the Act provides:
No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of the former Public Land Act or of any
other Act, ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other provision of law formerly in force in the
Philippine Islands with regard to public lands, terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any other
denomination that were actually or presumptively of the public domain, or by royal grant or in any other
form, nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or conveyed,
except to persons, corporations, or associations who may acquire land of the public domain under this
Act; . . . Provided, however, That this prohibition shall not be applicable to the conveyance or acquisition
by reason of hereditary succession duly acknowledged and legalized by competent Courts, nor to lands
and improvements acquired or held for industrial or residence purposes, while used for such
purposes: . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
Under and pursuant to the above quoted provisions of Act No. 2874, lands of the public domain, that
were neither timber nor mineral, held for industrial or residence purposes, could be acquired by aliens
disqualified from acquiring by purchase or lease public agricultural lands (sections 24, 57, 121, Act No.
2874). The delegates to the Constituent Assembly were familiar with the provisions of the Public Land
Act referred to. The prohibition to alienate public agricultural lands to disqualified persons, corporations
or associations did not apply to "lands and improvements acquired or held for industrial or residence
purposes, while used for such purposes." Even under the provisions of Act No. 926, the first Public Land
Act, lots for townsites could be acquired by any person irrespective of citizenship, pursuant to section 47
of the said Act. In spite of the nationalistic spirit that pervades all the provisions of Act No. 2874, the
Philippine Legislature did not deem it necessary to exclude aliens from acquiring and owning lands of
the public domain suitable for industrial or residence purposes. It adopted the policy of excluding aliens
from acquiring agricultural lands of the public domain not "suitable for residential, commercial, industrial,
or other productive purposes," which, together with timber, mineral and private agricultural lands,
constitute the mainstay of the nation. Act No. 2874 was in force for nearly sixteen years — from 1919 to
1935. There is nothing recorded in the journals of proceedings of the Constituent Assembly regarding
the matter which would have justified a departure from the policy theretofore adopted.
If under the law in force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, aliens could acquire by purchase
or lease lands of the public domain, that were neither timber nor mineral, held for industrial or residence
purposes, how can it be presumed that the framers of the Constitution intended to exclude such aliens
from acquiring by purchase private lands suitable for industrial or residence purposes? If pursuant to the
law in force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, lands of the public domain and improvements
thereon acquired or held for industrial or residence purposes were not included in the prohibition found
in section 121 of ActNo. 2874, there is every reason for believing that the framers of the Constitution,
who were familiar with the law then in force, did not have the intention of applying the prohibition
contained in section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution to lands of private ownership suitable or intended
or used for residence, there being nothing recorded in the journals of proceedings of the Constituent
Assembly regarding the matter which, as above stated, would have justified a departure from the policy
then existing. If the term "private agricultural land" comprehends lands of private ownership suitable or
intended or used for residence, as held by the majority, there was no need of implementing a
self-executory prohibition found in the Constitution. The prohibition to alienate such lands found in
section 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 is a clear indication and proof that section 5, Article XIII, of
the Constitution does not apply to lands of private ownership suitable or intended or used for residence.
The term "private agricultural land" means privately owned lands devoted to cultivation, to the raising of
agricultural products, and does not include urban lands of private ownership suitable for industrial or
residence purposes. The use of the adjective "agricultural" has the effect of excluding all other private
lands that are not agricultural. Timber and mineral ands are not, however, included among the excluded,
because these lands could not and can never become private lands. From the land grants known
as caballerias and peonias under the Laws of Indies down to those under the Royal Decrees of 25 June
1880 and 13 February 1894, the Philippine Bill, Act No. 926, the Jones Law, Act No. 2874, the
Constitution, and Commonwealth Act No. 141, timber and mineral lands have always been excluded
from alienation. The repeal by sections 23, 60, 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 of the exception
provided for in sections 24, 57, 121 of Act No. 2874, did not change the meaning of the term "private
agricultural land," as intended by the framers of the Constitution and understood by the people that
adopted it.
The next question is whether the court below was justified under the in confirming the refusal of the
Register of Deeds of Manila to record the sale of the private land for residence purposes to the appellant
who is an alien.
There is no evidence to show the kind of land, the deed of sale of which is sought to be recorded by the
appellant — whether it is one of those described in section 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141; or a
private land that had never been a part of the public domain (Carino vs. Insular Government, 212 U.S.,
449; Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 43 Off. Gaz., 866). If it is the latter, the prohibition of section 123 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 does not apply. If it is the former, section 123 of Commonwealth Act No.
141, which providesthat —
No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of any previous Act, ordinance, royal
order, royal decree, or any other provision of law formerly in force in the Philippines with regard to public
lands, terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any other denomination that were actually or
presumptively of the public domain, or by royal grant or in any other form, nor any permanent
improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or conveyed, except to persons,
corporations or associations who may acquire land of the public domain under this Act or to corporate
bodies organized in the Philippines whose charters authorize them to do so: . . .
is similar in nature to section 121 of Act No. 2874. This Court held the last mentioned section
unconstitutional, for it violates section 3 of the Act of Congress of 29 August 1916, commonly known as
the Jones Law (Central Capiz vs. Ramirez, 40 Phil., 883). Section 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141,
following the rule laid down in the aforecited case, must also be declared unconstitutional, for it violates
section 21 (1), Article VI, of the Constitution, which is exactly the same as the one infringed upon by
section 121 of Act No. 2874. This does not mean that a law may not be passed by Congress to prohibit
alienation to foreigners of urban lands of private ownership; but in so doing, it must avoid offending
against the constitutional provision referred to above.
Before closing, I cannot help but comment on the action taken by the Court in considering the merits of
the case, despite the withdrawal of the appeal by the appellants, consented to by the appellee. If
discretion was to be exercised, this Court did not exercise it wisely. Courts of last resort generally avoid
passing upon constitutional questions if the case where such questions are raised may be decided on
other grounds. Courts of last resort do not express their opinion on a consitutional question except when
it is the very lis mota (Yangco vs. Board of Public Utility Commissioners, 36 Phil., 116, 120; Co
Chiong vs. Dinglasan, p. 122, ante). Moreover, the interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution is
no exclusive of the courts. The other coordinate branches of the government may interpret such
provisions acting on matters coming within their jurisdiction. And although such interpretation is only
persuasive and not binding upon the courts, nevertheless they cannot be deprived of such power. Of
course, the final say on what is the correct interpretation of a constitutional provision must come from
and be made by this Court in an appropriate action submitted to it for decision. The correct interpretation
of a constitutional provision is that which gives effect to the intent of its framers and primarily to the
understanding of such provision by the poeple that adopted it. This Court is only an interpreter of the
instrument which embodies what its framers had in mind and especially what the people understood it to
be when they adopted it. The eagerness of this Court to express its opinion on the constitutional
provision involved in this case, notwithstanding of the withdrawal of the appeal, is unusualf or a Court of
last resort. It seems as if it were afraid to be deprived by the other coordinate branches of the
government of its prerogative to pass upon the constitutional question herein involved. If all the
members of the Court were unanimous in the interpretation of the constitutional provision under scrutiny,
that eagerness might be justified, but when some members of the Court do not agree to the
interpretation placed upon such provision, that eagerness becomes recklessness. The interpretation
thus placed by the majority of the Court upon the constitutional provision referred to will be binding upon
the other coordinate branches of the government. If, in the course of time, such opinion should turn out
to be erroneous and against the welfare of the country,an amendment to the Constitution — a costly
process — would have to be proposed and adopted. But, if the Court had granted the motion for the
withdrawal of the appeal, it would not have to express its opinion upon the constitutional provision in
question. It would let the other coordinate branches of the Government act according to their wisdom,
foresight and patriotism. They, too, possess those qualities and virtues. These are not of the exclusive
possession of the members of this Court. The end sought to be accomplished by the decision of this
Court may be carried out by the enactment of a law. And if the law should turn out to be against the
well-being of the people, its amendment or repeal would not be as costly a process as a constitutional
amendment.
In view of the denial by this Court of the motion to dismiss the appeal, as prayed for by the appellant and
consented to by the appellee, I am constrained to record my opinion, that, for the reasons hereinbefore
set forth, the judgment under review should be reversed.
TUASON, J., dissenting:
The decision concludes with the assertion that there is no choice. "We are construing" it says, "the
Constitution as we see it and not as we may wish it to be. If this is the solemn mandate of the
Constitution, we cannot compromise it even in the name of equity." We wish deep in our heart that we
were given the light to see as the majority do and could share their opinion. As it is, we perceive things
the other way around. As we see it, the decision by-passed what according to our humble understanding
is the plain intent of the Constitution and groped out of its way in search of the ideal result. The denial by
this Court of the motion to withdraw the appeal to which the Solicitor General gave his conformity
collides with the professed sorrow that the decision cannot be helped.
Section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution reads:
5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain in the Philippines.
The sole and simple question at issue is, what is the meaning of the term "agricultural land" as used in
this section? Before answering the question, it is convenient to refresh our memory of the pertinent rule
in the interpretation of constitutions as expounded in decisions of courts of last resort and by law
authors.
It is a cardinal rule in the interpretation of constitutions that the instrument must be a construed so to
give effect to the intention of the people who adopted it. This intention is to be sought in the constitution
itself, and the apparent meaning of the words employed is to be taken as expressing it, except in cases
where the assumption would lead to absurdity, ambiguity, or contradiction. Black on Interpretation of
Laws, 2nd ed., p. 20.)
Every word employed in the constitution is to be expounded in its plain, obvious, and common sense,
unless the context furnishes some ground to control, qualify, or enlarge it. Constitutions are not
designed for metaphysical or logical subtleties, for niceties of expression, for critical propriety, for
elaborate shades of meaning, or for the exercise of philosophical acuteness or judicial research. They
are instruments of a practical nature founded on the common business of human life adapted to
common wants, designed for common use, and fitted for common understandings. The people make
them, the people adopt them, the people must be supposed to read them with the help of common
sense, and cannot be presumed to admit in them any recondite meaningor any extraordinary gloss. (1
Story, Const. sec. 451.)
Marshall , Ch. J., says:
The framers of the Constitution, and the people who adopted it, "must be understood to have employed
words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they have said." (Gibbons vs. Ogdon, 9 Wheat,
1, 188; 6 Law. ed., 23).
Questions as to the wisdom, expediency, or justice of constitutional provisions afford no basis for
construction where the intent to adopt such provisions is expressed in clear and unmistakable terms.
Nor can construction read into the provisions of a constitution some unexpressed general policy or spirit,
supposed to underline and pervade the instrument and to render it consonant to the genius of the
institutions of the state. The courts are not at liberty to declare an act void because they deem it
opposed to the spirit of the Constitution. (12 C.J., 702-703.)
There is no obscurity or ambiguity in the section of the Constitution above quoted, nor does a literal
interpretation of the words "agricultural land" lead to any un-the majority opinion, the phrase has no
technical meaning, and the same could not have been used in any sense other than that in which it is
understood by the men in the street.
That there are lands of private ownership will not be denied, inspite of the fiction tha all lands proceed
from the sovereign. And, that lands of private ownership are known as agricultural, residential,
commercial and industrial, is another truth which no one can successfully dispute. In prohibiting the
alienation of private agricultural land to aliens, the Constitution, by necessary implication, authorizes the
alienation of other kinds of private property. The express mention of one thing excludes all others of the
same kind.
Let us then ascertain the meaning of the word "agricultural" so that by process of elimination we can see
what lands do not fall within the purview of the constitutional inhibition. Webster's New international
Dictionary defines this word as "of or pertaining to agriculture connected with, or engaged in, tillage; as,
the agricultural class; agricultural implements, wages, etc." According to this definition and according to
the popular conception of the word, lands in cities and towns intended or used for buildings or other
kinds of structure are never understood to mean agricultural lands. They are either residential,
commercial, or industrial lands. In all city plannings, communities are divided into residential,
commercial and industrial sections. It would be extremely out of the ordinary, not to say ridiculous, to
imagine that the Constitutional Convention considered a lot on the Escolta with its improvement as
agricultural land.
If extrinsic evidence is needed, a reference to the history of the constitutional provision under
consideration will dispel all doubts that urban lands were in the minds of the framers of the Constitution
as properties that may be assigned to foreigners.
Dean Aruego, himself a member of the Constitutional Convention, is authority for the statement that the
committee on nationalization and preservation of lands and other natural resources in its report
recommended the incorporation into the Constitution of the following provision:
SEC. 4. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no land of private ownership shall be transferred or
assigned by the owner thereof except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or
hold lands of the public domain in the Philippine Islands; and the Government shall regulate the transfer
or assignment of land now owned by persons, or corporations,or associations not qualified under the
provisions of this Constitution to acquire or hold lands in the Philippine Islands.
In Article XIII, entitled "General Provisions," of the first draft of the Constitution, the sub-committee of
seven embodied the following provision which had been recommended in the reports of the committee
on agricultural development, national defense, industry, and nationalization and preservation of lands
and other natural resources:
SEC. 16. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no land of private ownership shall be transferred or
assigned by the owner thereof except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or
hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
But on January 22, 1935, the sub-committee of seven submitted to the Convention a revised draft of the
articleo n General Provisions of the first draft, which revised draft had been prepared by the committee
in consultation with President Quezon. The revised draft as it touches private lands provides as follows:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no agricultural land of private ownership shall be transferred or
assigned by the owner thereof except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or
hold lands, of the public domain in the Philippine Islands. (2 The Framing of the Philippine Constitution,
Aruego, 595-599.)
The last-quoted proposal became section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution in its final form with sligh
alteration in the phraseology.
It will thus be seen that two committees in their reports and the sub-committee of seven in its first draft of
the Constitution all proposed to prescribe the transfer to non-Filipino citizens of any land of private
ownership without regard to its nature or use, but that the last mentioned sub-committee later amended
that proposal by putting the word "agricultural" before the word "land." What are we to conclude from this
modification? Its self-evident purpose was to confine the prohibition to agricultural lands, allowing the
ownership by foreigners of private lands that do not partake of agricultural character. The insertion of the
word "agricultural" was studied and deliberated, thereby eliminating any possibility that its implication
was not comprehended.
In the following paragraphs we shall, in our inadequate way, attempt to show that the conclusions in this
Court's decision are erroneous either because the premises are wrong or because the conclusions do
not follow the premises.
According to the decision, the insertion of the word "agricultural" was not intended to change the scope
of the provision. It says that "the wording of the first draft was amended for no other purpose than to
clarify concepts and avoid uncertainties."
If this was the intention of the Constitutional Assembly, that could not have devised a better way of
messing up and obscuring the meaning of the provision than what it did. If the purpose was "to clarify
concepts and avoid uncertainties," the insertion of the word "agricultural" before the word "land"
produced the exact opposite of the result which the change was expected to accomplish — as witness
the present sharp and bitter controversy which would not have arisen had they let well enough alone.
But the assumption is untenable. To brush aside the introduction of the word "agricultural" into the final
draft as "merely one of words" is utterly unsupported by evidence, by the text of the Constitution, or by
sound principles of construction. There is absolutely no warrant or the statement that the Constitutional
Convention, which was guided by wise men, men of ability and experience in different fields of endeavor,
used the termafter mature deliberation and reflection and after consultation with the President, without
intending to give it its natural signification and connotation. "We are not at liberty to presume that the
framers of the Constitution, or the people who adopted it, did not understand the force of language."
(People vs. Rathbone, 32 N.Y.S., 108.) The Constitution will be scanned in vain for any reasonable
indication that its authors made the change with intention that it should not operate according to the
rules of grammar and the ordinary process of drawing logical inferences. The theory is against the
presumption, based on human experience, that the framers of a constitution "have expressed
themselves in careful and measured terms, corresponding with the immense importance of the powers
delegated, leaving as little as possible to implication." (1 Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., 128,
129.) "As men, whose intention require no concealment, generally employ the words which most directly
and aptly express the ideas they intend to convey, the enlightened patriots who framed our constitution,
and the people who adopted it, must be understood to have employed words in their natural sense and
to have intended what they have said." (Gibbons vs. Ogden, ante.)
When instead of prohibiting the acquisition of private land of any kind by foreigners, as originally
proposed, the prohibition was changed to private agricultural lands, the average man's faculty of
reasoning tells him that other lands may be acquired. The elementary rules of speech with which men of
average intelligence, and, above all, the members of the Constitutional Assembly were familiar, inform
us that the object of a descriptive adjective is to specify a thing as distinct from another. It is from this
process of reasoning that the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius stems; a familiar rule of
interpretation often quoted, and admitted as agreeable to natural reason.
If then a foreigner may acquire private lands that are not agricultural, what lands are they? Timber land
or mineral land, or both? As the decision itself says these lands are not susceptible of private ownership,
the answer can only be residential, commercial, industrial or other lands that are not agricultural.
Whether a property is more suitable and profitable to the owners as residential, commercial or industrial
than if he devotes it to the cultivation of crops is a matter that has to be decided according to the value of
the property, its size, and other attending circumstances.
The main burden of this Court's argument is that, as lands of the public domain which are suitable for
home building are considered agricultural land, the Constitution intended that private residential,
commercial or industrial lands should be considered also agricultural lands. The Court says that "what
the members of the Constitutional Convention had in mind when they drafted the Constitution was this
well-known classification (timber, mineral and agricultural) and its technical meaning then prevailing."
As far as private lands are concerned, there is no factual or legal basis for this assumption. The
classification of public lands was used for one purpose not contemplated in the classification of private
lands. At the outset, it should be distinctively made clear that it was this Court's previous decisions and
not an Act of Congress which declared that public lands which were not forest or mineral were
agricultural lands. Little reflection on the background of this Court's decisions and the nature of the
question presented in relation to the peculia rprovisions of the enactments which came up for
construction, will bring into relief the error of applying to private lands the classification of public lands.
In the first place, we cannot classify private lands in the same manner as public lands for the very simple
and manifest reason that only lands pertaining to one of the three groups of public lands — agricultural
— can find their way into the hands of private persons. Forest lands and mineral lands are preserved by
the State for itself and for posterity. Granting what is possible, that there are here and there forest lands
and mineral lands to which private persons have obtained patents or titles, it would be pointless to
suppose that such properties are the ones which section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution wants to
distinguish from private agricultural lands as lienable. The majority themselves will not admit that the
Constitution which forbids the alienation or private agricultural lands allows the conveyance of private
forests and mines.
In the second place, public lands are classified under special conditions and with a different object in
view. Classification of public lands was and is made for purposes of administration; for the purpose
principally of segregating lands that may be sold from lands that should be conserved. The Act of July 1,
1902, of the United States Congress designated what lands of the public domain might be alienated and
what should be kept by the State. Public lands are divided into three classes to the end that natural
resources may be used without waste. Subject to some exceptions and limitation, agricultural lands may
be disposed of by the Government. Preservation of forest and mineral lands was and is a dominant
preoccupation. These are important parts of the country's natural resources. Private non-agricultural
land does not come within the category of natural resources. Natural resources are defined in Webster's
Standard Dictionary as materials supplied or produced by nature. The United States Congress evinced
very little if any concern with private lands.
It should also be distinctively kept in mind that the Act of Congress of the United States above
mentioned was an organic law and dealt with vast tracts of untouched public lands. It was enacted by a
Congress whose members were not closely familiar with local conditions affecting lands. Under the
circumstances, it was natural that the Congress employed "words in a comprehensive sense as
expressive of general ideas rather than of finer shades of thought or of narrow distinctions. "The United
States Congress was content with laying down a broad outline governing the administration, exploitation,
and disposition of the public wealth, leaving the details to be worked out by the local authorities and
courts entrusted with the enforcement and interpretation of the law.
It was a result of this broad classification that questions crept for a definition of the status of scattered
small parcels of public lands that were neither forest, mineral, nor agricultural, and with which the
Congress had not bothered itself to mention separately or specifically. This Court, forced by nature of its
duty to decide legal controversies, ruled that public lands that were fit for residential purposes, public
swamps and other public lands that were neither forest nor mineral, were to be regarded as agricultural
lands. In other words, there was an apparent void, often inevitable in a law or constitution, and this Court
merely filled that void. It should be noted that this Court did not say that agricultural lands and residential
lands are the same or alike in their character and use. It merely said that for the purpose of judging their
alienability, residential, commercial or industrial lands should be brought under the class of agricultural
lands.
On the other hand, section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution treats of private lands with a different aim.
This Court is not now confronted with any problem for which there is no specific provision, such as faced
it when the question of determining the character of public residential land came up for decision. This
Court is not called to rule whether a private residential land is forest, mineral or agricultural. This Court is
not, in regard to private lands, in the position where it found itself with reference to public lands,
compelled by the limited field of its choice for a name to call public residential lands, agricultural lands.
When it comes to determining the character of private non-agricultural lands, the Court's task is not to
compare it with forests, mines and agricultural lands, to see which of these bears the closest
resembrance to the land in question. Since there are no private timber nor mineral lands, and if there
were, they could not be transferred to foreigners, and since the object of section 5 of Article XIII of the
Constitution is radically at variance withthat of the laws covering public lands, we have to have different
standards of comparison and have to look of the intent of this constitutional provision from a different
angle and perspective. When a private non-agricultural land demands to know where it stands, we do
not acquire, is it mineral, forest or agricultural? We only ask, is it agricultural? To ascertain whether it is
within the inhibition of section 5 of Article XIII.
The last question in turn resolves itself into what is understood by agricultural land. Stripped of the
special considerations which dictated the classification of public lands into three general groups, there is
no alternative but to take the term "agricultural land" in its natural and popular signification; and thus
regarded, it imports a distinct connotation which involves no absurdity and no contradiction between
different parts of the organic law. Its meaning is that agricultural land is specified in section 5 of Article
XIII to differentiate it from lands that are used or are more suitable for purposes other than agriculture.
It would profit us to take notice of the admonition of two of the most revered writers on constitutional law,
Justice Story and Professor Cooley:
"As a general thing, it is to be supposed that the same word is used in the same sense wherever it
occurs in a constitution. Here again, however, great caution must be observed in applying an arbitrary
rule; for, as Mr. Justice Story has well observed; `It does not follow, either logically or grammatically, that
because a word is found in one connection in the Constitution with a definite sense, therefore the same
is to be adopted in every other connection in which it occurs. This would be to suppose that the framers
weighed only the force of single words, as philologists or critics, and not whole clauses and objects, as
statesmen and practical reasoners. And yet nothing has been more common than to subject the
Constitution to this narrow and mischievous criticism. Men of ingenious and subtle minds, who seek for
symmetry and harmony in language, having found in the Constitution a word used in some sense which
falls in with their favorite theory of interpreting it, have made that the standard by which to measure its
use in every other part of the instrument. They have thus stretched it, as it were, on the bed of
Procrustes, lopping off its meaning when it seemed too large for their purposes, and extending it, when
it seemed too short. They have thus distorted it to the most unnatural shapes, and crippled where they
have sought only to adjust its proportions according to their own opinions? And he gives many instances
where, in the National Constitution, it is very manifest the same word is employed in different meanings.
So that, while the rule may be sound as one of presumption merely, its force is but slight, and it must
readily give way to a different intent appearing in the instrument." (1 Cooley's Constitutional Limitations,
8th ed., 135.)
As to the proposition that the words "agricultural lands" have been given a technical meaning and that
the Constitution has employed them in that sense, it can only be accepted in reference to public lands. If
a technical import has been affixed to the term, it can not be extended to private lands if we are not to be
led to an absurdity and if we are avoid the charge that we are resorting to subtle and ingenious
refinement to force from the Constitution a meaning which its framers never held. While in the
construction of a constitution words must be given the technical meaning which they have acquired, the
rule is limited to the "well-understood meaning" "which the people must be supposed to have had in
view in adopting them." To give an example. "When the constitution speaks of an ex post facto law, it
means a law technically known by that designation; the meaning of the phrase having become definite
in the history of constitutional law, and being so familiar to the people that it is not necessary to employ
language of a more popular character to designate it." In reality, this is not a departure from the general
rule that the language used is to be taken in the sense it conveys to the popular mind, "for the technical
sense in these cases is the sense popularly understood, because that is the sense fixed upon the words
in legal and constitutional history where they have been employed for the protection of popular rights."
(1 Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., 132-133.) Viewed from this angle, "agricultural land" does
not possess the quality of a technical term. Even as applied to public lands, and even among lawyers
and judges, how many are familiar with the decisions of this Court which hold that public swamps and
public lands more appropriate for buildings and other structures than for agriculture are agricultural
lands? The same can be truthfully said of members of the Constitutional Assembly.
The speeches of delegates Montilla and Ledesma cannot serve as a means of interpretation. The
sentiments expressed in those speeches, like the first drafts of section 5 of Article XIII, may have
reflected the sentiments of the Convention in the first stages of the deliberation or down to its close. If
they were, those sentiments were relaxed and not given full sway for reasons on which we need not
speculate. Speeches in support of a project can be a valuable criterion for judging the intention of a law
or constitution only if no changes were afterward affected. If anything, the change in section 5 of Article
XIII wrought in the face of a strong advocacy for complete and absolute nationalization of all lands,
without exception, offers itself as the best proof that to the framers of the Constitution the change was
not "merely one of words" but represented something real and substantial. Firm and resolute convictions
are expressed in a document in strong, unequivocal and unqualified language. This is specially true
when the instrument is a constitution, "the most solemn and deliberate of human writings, always
carefully drawn, and calculated for permanent endurance."
The decision quotes from the Framing of the Constitution by Dean Aruego a sentence which says that
one of the principles underlying the provision of Article XIII of the Constitution is "that lands, minerals,
forests and other natural resources constitute the exclusive heritage of the Filipino Nation." In underlying
the word lands the Court wants to insinuate that all lands without exceptions are included. This is
nothing to be enthusiastic over. It is hyperbole, "a figure of speech in which the statement expresses
more than the truth" but "is accepted as a legal form of expression." It is an expression that "lies but
does not deceive." When we say men must fight we do not mean all men, and every one knows we
don't.
The decision says:
It is true that in section 9 of said Commonwealth Act No. 141,"alienable or disposable public lands"
which are the same as "public agricultural lands" under the Constitution, are classified into agricultural,
residential, commercial, industrial and for other purposes. This simply means that the term "public
agricultural lands" has both a broad and a particular meaning. Under its broad or general meaning, as
used in the Constitution, it embraces all lands that are neither timber nor mineral. This broad meaning is
particularized in section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 which classifies "public agricultural lands" for
purposes of alienation or disposition, into lands that are strictly agricultural or actually devoted to
cultivation for agricultural purposes; lands that are residential; commercial; industrial; or lands for other
purposes. The fact that these lands are made alienable or disposable under Commonwealth Act No.
141, in favor of Filipino Citizen, is a conclusive indication of their character as public agricultural lands
under said statute and under the Constitution."
If I am not mistaken in my understanding of the line of reasoning in the foregoing passage, my humble
opinion is that there is no logical connection between the premise and the conclusion. What to me
seems clearly to emerge from it is that Commonwealth Act No. 141, so far from sustaining that Court's
theory, actually pulls down its case which it has built upon the foundation of parallel classification of
public and private lands into forest, mineral and agricultural lands, and the inexistence of such things as
residential, industrial or commercial lands. It is to be noted that Act No. 141, section 9, classifies
disposable lands into agricultural, industrial, residential, commercial, etc. And these are lands of the
public domain.
The fact that the provisions regarding alienation of private lands happens to be included in Article XIII,
which is entitled "Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources," is no ground for treating public
lands and private lands on the same footing. The inference should rather be the exact reverse.
Agricultural lands, whether public or private, are natural resources. But residential, commercial, and
industrial lands, as we have seen, are not natural resources either in the sense these words convey to
the popular mind or as defined in the dictionary. This fact may have been one factor which prompted the
elimination of private non-agricultural lands from the range of the prohibition, along with reasons, of
foreign policy, economics and politics.
From the opinion of Secretary of Justice Jose A. Santos in 1939, the majority can not derive any comfort
unless we cling to the serious argument that as public lands go so go private lands. In that opinion the
question propounded was whether a piece of public land which was more profitable as a homesite might
not be sold and considered as agricultural. The illustrious Secretary answered yes, which was correct.
But the classification of private lands was not directly or indirectly involved. It is the opinion of the
present Secretary of Justice that is to the point. If the construction placed by the law-officer of the
government on a constitutional provision may properly be invoked, as the majority say but which I doubt,
as representing the true intent of the instrument, this Court, if it is to be consistent, should adopt
Secretary Ozaeta's view. If the Solicitor General's attitude as interested counsel for the government in a
judicial action is — as the decision also suggests but which, I think, is still more incorrect both in theory
and in practice — then this Court should have given heed to the motion for withdrawal of the present
appeal, which had been concurred in by the Solicitor General in line presumably with the opinion of the
head of his department.
The Court fears that "this constitutional purpose of conserving agricultural resources in the hands of
Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their
agricultural lands in favor of aliens." It reasons that "it would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of
public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming private
agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens." Sections122 and 123 of Act No. 141 should banish
this fear. These sections, quoted and relied upon in the majority opinion, prevent private lands that have
been acquired under any of the public land laws from falling into alien possession in fee simple. Without
this law, the fear would be well-founded if we adopt the majority's theory, which we precisely reject, that
agricultural and residential lands are synonymous, be they public or private. The fear would not
materialize under our theory, that only lands which are not agricultural may be owned by persons other
than FIlipino citizens.
Act No. 141, by the way, supplies the best argument against the majority's interpretation of section 5 of
Article XIII. Prohibiting the acquisition by foreigners of any lands originally acquired in any manner under
its provisions or under the provisions of any previous law, ordinace, royal order, royal decree, or any
other law formerly enforced in the Philippines with regard to public lands, etc., it is a mute eloquent
testimony that in the minds of the legislature, whose interpretation the majority correctly say should be
looked to as authoritative, the Constitution did not carry such prohibition. For if the Constitution already
barred the alienation of lands of any kind in favor of aliens, the provisions of sections 122 and 123 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 would have been superfluous.
The decision says that "if under Article XIV section 8, of the Constitution, an alien may not even operate
a small jeepney for hire, it is certainly not hard to understand that neither is he allowed to own a piece of
land." There is no similitude between owning a lot for a home or a factory or a store and operating a
jeepney for hire. It is not the ownership of a jeepney that is forbidden; it is the use of it for public service
that is not allowed. A foreigner is not barred from owning the costliest motor cars, steamships or
airplanes in any number, for his private use or that of his friends and relatives. He can not use a jeepney
for hire because the operation of public utilities is reserved to Filipino nationals, and the operation of a
jeepney happens to be within this policy. The use of a jeepney for hire maybe insignificant in itself but it
falls within a class of industry that performs a vital function in the country's economic life, closely
associated with its advancing civilization, supplying needs so fundamental for communal living and for
the development of the country's economy, that the government finds need of subjecting them to some
measure of control and the Constitution deems it necessary to limit their operation by Filipino citizens.
The importance of using a jeepney for hire cannot be sneered at or minimized just as a vote for public
office by a single foreign citizen can not be looked at with a shrug of the shoulder on the theory that it
would not cause a ripple in the political complexion or scene of the nation.
This Court quotes with approval from the Solicitor General's brief this passage: "If the term `private
agricultural lands' is to be construed as not including residential lots or lands of similar nature, the result
will be that aliens may freely acquire and possess not only residential lots and houses for themselves
but entire subdivisions and whole towns and cities, and that they may validly buy and hold in their
names lands of any area for building homes, factories, industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools,
health and vacation resorts, markets, golf — courses, playgrounds, airfields and a host of other uses
and purposes that are not, in appellant's words, strictly agricultural." Arguments like this have no place
where there is no ambiguity in the constitution or law. The courts are not at liberty to disregard a
provision that is clear and certain simply because its enforcement would work inconvenience or
hardship or lead to what they believe pernicious results. Courts have nothing to do with inconvenience
or consequences. This role is founded on sound principles of constitutional government and is so well
known as to make citations of authorities presumptuous.
Granting the possibility or probability of the consequences which this Court and the Solicitor General
dread, we should not overlook the fact that there is the Congress standing guard to curtail or stop such
excesses or abuses if and when the menace should show its head. The fact that the Constitution has
not prohibited, as we contend, the transfer of private non-agricultural lands to aliens does not prevent
the Congress from passing legislation to regulate or prohibit such transfer, to define the size of private
lands a foreigner may possess in fee simple, or to specify the uses for which lands may be dedicated, in
order to prevent aliens from conducting fisheries, hatcheries, vacation resorts, markets, golf-courses,
cemeteries. The Congress could, if it wants, go so far as to exclude foreigners from entering the country
or settling here. If I may be permitted to guess, the alteration in the original draft of section 5 of Article
XIII may have been prompted precisely by the thought that it is the better policy to leave to the political
departments of the Government the regulation or absolute prohibition of all land ownership by foreigners,
as the changed, changing and ever-changing conditions demand. The Commonwealth Legislature did
that with respect to lands that were originally public lands, through Commonwealth Act No. 141, and the
Legislative Assembly during the Japanese occupation extended the prohibition to all private lands, as
Mr. Justice Paras has pointed out. In the present Congress, at least two bills have been introduced
proposing Congressional legislation in the same direction. All of which is an infallible sign that the
Constitution does not carry such prohibition, in the opinion of three legislatures, an opinion which, we
entirely agree with the majority, should be given serious consideration by the courts (if needed there
were any doubt), both as a matter of policy, and also because it may be presumed to represent the true
intent of the instrument. (12 C.J., 714.) In truth, the decision lays special emphasis on the fact that
"many members of the National Assembly who approved the new Act (No. 141) had been members of
the Constitutional Convention." May I add that Senator Francisco, who is the author of one of the bills I
have referred to, in the Senate, was a leading, active and influential member of the Constitutional
Convention?
Footnotes
En vista de la circular num. 128 del Departamento de Justicia fechada el 12 de Agosto, 1947, la cual
enmienda la circular num. 14 en el sentido de autorizar el registro de la venta de terrenos urbanos a
extranjeros, y en vista del hecho de que el Procurador General se ha unido a la mocion para la retirada
de la apelacion, ya no existe ninguna controversia entre las partes y la cuestion es ahora
academica. Por esta razon, la Corte ya no tiene jurisdiccion sobre el caso (Traduccion; las cursivas son
nuestras).
1
2
Vease regla 64, seccion 3, incisos c y d, Reglamento de los Tribunales.
Vease el asunto de Vera contra Avelino
Mabanag contra Lopez Vito (78 Phil., 1).
3
(77
Phil.,
192); vease
tambien el
asunto
de
El Congreso puede determinar por ley la extencion del terreno privado agricola que los individuos,
corporaciones, o asociaciones pueden adquirir y poseer, sujeto alos derechos existentes antes de la
promulgacion de dicha ley.
4
Vease los
siguientes
asuntos:
Mapa contra Gobierno
Insular,
10
Jur.
Fil.,
178;
Montano contra Gobierno Insular, 12 Jur. Fil., 592; Santiago contra Gobierno Insular, 12 Jur. Fil., 615;
Ibañez de Aldecoa contra Gobierno Insular, 13 Jur. Fil., 163; Ramos contra Director de Terrenos, 39 Jur.
Fil., 184; y Jocson contra Director de Montes, 39 Jur. Fil., 569; Ankron contra Gobierno de Filipinas, 40
Jur. Fil., 10.
5
6
Osorio y Gallardo.
7
Cf. Buchanan vs. Worley, 245 U.S. 60, 38 S. Ct. 16.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
2.
G.R. No. 195670
December 3, 2012
WILLEM BEUMER, Petitioner,
vs.
AVELINA AMORES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of CoLlli assailing the
October 8, 2009 Decision and January 24, 2011 Resolution of the court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 01940, which affirmed the February 28, 2007 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros
Oriental, Branch 34 in Civil Case No. I 2884. The foregoing rulings dissolved the conjugal partnership of
gains of Willem Beumer (petitioner) and Avelina Amores (respondent) and distributed the properties
forming part of the said property regime.
1
2
3
4
The Factual Antecedents
Petitioner, a Dutch National, and respondent, a Filipina, married in March 29, 1980. After several years,
the RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch 32, declared the nullity of their marriage in the Decision dated
November 10, 2000 on the basis of the former’s psychological incapacity as contemplated in Article 36
of the Family Code.
5
Consequently, petitioner filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership dated December 14,
2000 praying for the distribution of the following described properties claimed to have been acquired
during the subsistence of their marriage, to wit:
6
By Purchase:
a. Lot 1, Block 3 of the consolidated survey of Lots 2144 & 2147 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 22846, containing an area of 252 square meters (sq.m.),
including a residential house constructed thereon.
b. Lot 2142 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 21974, containing an area of 806 sq.m.,
including a residential house constructed thereon.
c. Lot 5845 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 21306, containing an area of 756 sq.m.
d. Lot 4, Block 4 of the consolidated survey of Lots 2144 & 2147 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered
by TCT No. 21307, containing an area of 45 sq.m.
By way of inheritance:
e. 1/7 of Lot 2055-A of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 23567, containing an area of
2,635 sq.m. (the area that appertains to the conjugal partnership is 376.45 sq.m.).
f. 1/15 of Lot 2055-I of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 23575, containing an area of 360
sq.m. (the area that appertains to the conjugal partnership is 24 sq.m.).
7
In defense, respondent averred that, with the exception of their two (2) residential houses on Lots 1 and
2142, she and petitioner did not acquire any conjugal properties during their marriage, the truth being
that she used her own personal money to purchase Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 out of her personal funds
and Lots 2055-A and 2055-I by way of inheritance. She submitted a joint affidavit executed by her and
petitioner attesting to the fact that she purchased Lot 2142 and the improvements thereon using her own
money. Accordingly, respondent sought the dismissal of the petition for dissolution as well as payment
for attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.
8
9
10
11
During trial, petitioner testified that while Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 were registered in the name of
respondent, these properties were acquired with the money he received from the Dutch government as
his disability benefit since respondent did not have sufficient income to pay for their acquisition. He also
claimed that the joint affidavit they submitted before the Register of Deeds of Dumaguete City was
contrary to Article 89 of the Family Code, hence, invalid.
12
13
For her part, respondent maintained that the money used for the purchase of the lots came exclusively
from her personal funds, in particular, her earnings from selling jewelry as well as products from Avon,
Triumph and Tupperware. She further asserted that after she filed for annulment of their marriage in
1996, petitioner transferred to their second house and brought along with him certain personal
properties, consisting of drills, a welding machine, grinders, clamps, etc. She alleged that these tools
and equipment have a total cost of P500,000.00.
14
15
The RTC Ruling
On February 28, 2007, the RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch 34 rendered its Decision, dissolving the
parties’ conjugal partnership, awarding all the parcels of land to respondent as her paraphernal
properties; the tools and equipment in favor of petitioner as his exclusive properties; the two (2) houses
standing on Lots 1 and 2142 as co-owned by the parties, the dispositive of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered granting the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of
gains between petitioner Willem Beumer and respondent Avelina Amores considering the fact that their
marriage was previously annulled by Branch 32 of this Court. The parcels of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Titles Nos. 22846, 21974, 21306, 21307, 23567 and 23575 are hereby declared
paraphernal properties of respondent Avelina Amores due to the fact that while these real properties
were acquired by onerous title during their marital union, Willem Beumer, being a foreigner, is not
allowed by law to acquire any private land in the Philippines, except through inheritance.
The personal properties, i.e., tools and equipment mentioned in the complaint which were brought out
by Willem from the conjugal dwelling are hereby declared to be exclusively owned by the petitioner.
The two houses standing on the lots covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 21974 and 22846 are
hereby declared to be co-owned by the petitioner and the respondent since these were acquired during
their marital union and since there is no prohibition on foreigners from owning buildings and residential
units. Petitioner and respondent are, thereby, directed to subject this court for approval their project of
partition on the two houses aforementioned.
The Court finds no sufficient justification to award the counterclaim of respondent for attorney’s fees
considering the well settled doctrine that there should be no premium on the right to litigate. The prayer
for moral damages are likewise denied for lack of merit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
16
It ruled that, regardless of the source of funds for the acquisition of Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4, petitioner
could not have acquired any right whatsoever over these properties as petitioner still attempted to
acquire them notwithstanding his knowledge of the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership
of private lands. This was made evident by the sworn statements petitioner executed purporting to
show that the subject parcels of land were purchased from the exclusive funds of his wife, the herein
respondent. Petitioner’s plea for reimbursement for the amount he had paid to purchase the foregoing
properties on the basis of equity was likewise denied for not having come to court with clean hands.
17
18
The CA Ruling
Petitioner elevated the matter to the CA, contesting only the RTC’s award of Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 in
favor of respondent. He insisted that the money used to purchase the foregoing properties came from
his own capital funds and that they were registered in the name of his former wife only because of the
constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership. Thus, he prayed for reimbursement of one-half (1/2)
of the value of what he had paid in the purchase of the said properties, waiving the other half in favor of
his estranged ex-wife.
19
On October 8, 2009, the CA promulgated a Decision affirming in toto the judgment rendered by the
RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch 34. The CA stressed the fact that petitioner was "well-aware of the
constitutional prohibition for aliens to acquire lands in the Philippines." Hence, he cannot invoke equity
to support his claim for reimbursement.
20
21
Consequently, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the CA Decision due
to the following error:
UNDER THE FACTS ESTABLISHED, THE COURT ERRED IN NOT SUSTAINING THE
PETITIONER’S ATTEMPT AT SUBSEQUENTLY ASSERTING OR CLAIMING A RIGHT
OF HALF OR WHOLE OF THE PURCHASE PRICE USED IN THE PURCHASE OF
THE REAL PROPERTIES SUBJECT OF THIS CASE. (Emphasis supplied)
22
The Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
The issue to be resolved is not of first impression. In In Re: Petition For Separation of Property-Elena
Buenaventura Muller v. Helmut Muller the Court had already denied a claim for reimbursement of the
value of purchased parcels of Philippine land instituted by a foreigner Helmut Muller, against his former
Filipina spouse, Elena Buenaventura Muller. It held that Helmut Muller cannot seek reimbursement on
the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the
prohibition against foreign ownership of Philippine land enshrined under Section 7, Article XII of the
1987 Philippine Constitution which reads:
23
24
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain.
Undeniably, petitioner openly admitted that he "is well aware of the above-cited constitutional
prohibition" and even asseverated that, because of such prohibition, he and respondent registered the
subject properties in the latter’s name. Clearly, petitioner’s actuations showed his palpable intent to
skirt the constitutional prohibition. On the basis of such admission, the Court finds no reason why it
should not apply the Muller ruling and accordingly, deny petitioner’s claim for reimbursement.
25
26
As also explained in Muller, the time-honored principle is that he who seeks equity must do equity, and
he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. Conversely stated, he who has done inequity
shall not be accorded equity. Thus, a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that
his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful.
27
In this case, petitioner’s statements regarding the real source of the funds used to purchase the subject
parcels of land dilute the veracity of his claims: While admitting to have previously executed a joint
affidavit that respondent’s personal funds were used to purchase Lot 1, he likewise claimed that his
personal disability funds were used to acquire the same. Evidently, these inconsistencies show his
untruthfulness. Thus, as petitioner has come before the Court with unclean hands, he is now precluded
from seeking any equitable refuge.
28
In any event, the Court cannot, even on the grounds of equity, grant reimbursement to petitioner given
that he acquired no right whatsoever over the subject properties by virtue of its unconstitutional
purchase. It is well-established that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done
indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly. Surely, a contract that violates the
Constitution and the law is null and void, vests no rights, creates no obligations and produces no legal
effect at all. Corollary thereto, under Article 1412 of the Civil Code, petitioner cannot have the subject
properties deeded to him or allow him to recover the money he had spent for the purchase thereof. The
law will not aid either party to an illegal contract or agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds them.
Indeed, one cannot salvage any rights from an unconstitutional transaction knowingly entered into.
29
30
31
32
Neither can the Court grant petitioner’s claim for reimbursement on the basis of unjust enrichment. As
held in Frenzel v. Catito, a case also involving a foreigner seeking monetary reimbursement for money
spent on purchase of Philippine land, the provision on unjust enrichment does not apply if the action is
proscribed by the Constitution, to wit:
33
Futile, too, is petitioner's reliance on Article 22 of the New Civil Code which reads:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or
comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return
the same to him.
1âwphi1
The provision is expressed in the maxim: "MEMO CUM ALTERIUS DETER DETREMENTO PROTEST"
(No person should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another). An action for recovery of what has
been paid without just cause has been designated as an accion in rem verso. This provision does not
apply if, as in this case, the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by the application of the pari
delicto doctrine. It may be unfair and unjust to bar the petitioner from filing an accion in rem verso over
the subject properties, or from recovering the money he paid for the said properties, but, as Lord
Mansfield stated in the early case of Holman v. Johnson: "The objection that a contract is immoral or
illegal as between the plaintiff and the defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of the
defendant. It is not for his sake, however, that the objection is ever allowed; but it is founded in general
principles of policy, which the defendant has the advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as between
him and the plaintiff." (Citations omitted)
34
Nor would the denial of his claim amount to an injustice based on his foreign citizenship. Precisely, it is
the Constitution itself which demarcates the rights of citizens and non-citizens in owning Philippine land.
To be sure, the constitutional ban against foreigners applies only to ownership of Philippine land and not
to the improvements built thereon, such as the two (2) houses standing on Lots 1 and 2142 which were
properly declared to be co-owned by the parties subject to partition. Needless to state, the purpose of
the prohibition is to conserve the national patrimony and it is this policy which the Court is duty-bound
to protect.
35
36
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the assailed October 8, 2009 Decision and January
24, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 01940 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
Rollo. pp. 11-25.
Penned by Acting Executive Justice Franchito N. Diamante, with Associate Justices Edgarclo L. Delos
Santos and Samuel II. Gaerlan, concurring. Id. at 26-38.
2
Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo L. Delos Santos, with Associate Justices Agnes Reyes-Carpio
and Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr., concurring. Id. at 45-46.
3
4
Penned by Judge Rosendo B. Bandal, Jr. Id. at 80-86.
5
See Annex "E" of the Petition. Penned by Judge Eleuterio E. Chiu (Civil Case No. 11754). Id. at 53-62.
6
Annex "E" of the Petition. Id. at 47-52.
7
Id. at 48-49a.
8
See attached as Annex "E" of the Petitioner. Respondent’s Answer. Id. at 76-79.
9
Id. at 76.
10
Id. at 79.
11
Id. at 77.
12
Id. at 81.
13
Id. at 82.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 85-86.
Id. at 84, citing Cheesman v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74833, January 21, 1991, 193
SCRA 93, 103.
17
18
Id.
19
Id. at 91.
20
Id. at 26-38.
21
Id. at 33.
22
Id. at 17.
23
G.R. No. 149615, August 29, 2006, 500 SCRA 65.
24
Id. at 72.
25
Rollo, p. 17.
26
Id. at 18.
27
Supra note 23 at 73, citing University of the Philippines v. Catungal, Jr., 338 Phil. 728, 734-744 (1997).
28
Id. at 82.
29
Frenzel v. Catito, G.R. No. 143958, July 11, 2003, 406 SCRA 55, 70.
30
Id. at 69-70, citing Chavez s. Presidential Commission on Good Government, 307 SCRA 394 (1998).
Re: Art. 1412. If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause consists does not constitute a criminal
offense, the following rules shall be observed:
31
(1) When the fault is on the part of both contracting parties, neither may recover what he has given by
virtue of the contract, or demand the performance of the other's undertaking
xxxx
32
Id., citing Rellosa v. Hun, 93 Phil. 827 (1953).
33
Rollo, p. 20.
Supra note 29 at 74, citing I. Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines (1990 ), p. 85 and Marissey v.
Bologna, 123 So. 2d 537 (1960).
34
35
Rollo, pp. 19-21.
36
See Krivenko v. Register of Deeds. 79 Phil. 461 (1947).
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 108998 August 24, 1994
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES MARIO B. LAPIÑA AND FLOR DE VEGA, respondents.
Byron V. Belarmino and Juan B. Belarmino for private respondents.
BIDIN, J.:
Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which he acquired by purchase
while still a citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor who has complied with the requirements for
registration under the Public Land Act (CA 141)?
The Republic would have us rule on the negative and asks this Court to nullify the decision of the
appellate court which affirmed the judgment of the court a quo in granting the application of respondent
spouses for registration over the lots in question.
On June 17, 1978, respondent spouses bought Lots 347 and 348, Cad. s38-D, as their residence with a
total area of 91.77 sq. m. situated in San Pablo City, from one Cristeta Dazo Belen (Rollo, p. 41). At the
time of the purchase, respondent spouses where then natural-born Filipino citizens.
On February 5, 1987, the spouses filed an application for registration of title of the two (2) parcels of
land before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Branch XXXI. This time, however, they were no
longer Filipino citizens and have opted to embrace Canadian citizenship through naturalization.
An opposition was filed by the Republic and after the parties have presented their respective evidence,
the court a quo rendered a decision confirming private respondents' title to the lots in question, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby approves the said application and confirms
the title and possession of herein applicants over Lots 347 and 348, Ap-04-003755 in the names of
spouses Mario B. Lapiña and Flor de Vega, all of legal age, Filipino citizens by birth but now Canadian
citizens by naturalization and residing at 14 A. Mabini Street, San Pablo City and/or 201-1170-124
Street, Edmonton, Alberta T5M-OK9, Canada.
Once this Decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree of registration be issued. In the
certificate of title to be issued, there shall be annotated an easement of .265 meters road right-of-way.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 25)
On appeal, respondent court affirmed the decision of the trial court based on the following ratiocination:
In the present case, it is undisputed that both applicants were still Filipino citizens when they bought the
land in controversy from its former owner. For this reason, the prohibition against the acquisition of
private lands by aliens could not apply. In justice and equity, they are the rightful owners of the subject
realty considering also that they had paid for it quite a large sum of money. Their purpose in initiating the
instant action is merely to confirm their title over the land, for, as has been passed upon, they had been
the owners of the same since 1978. It ought to be pointed out that registration is not a mode of acquiring
ownership. The Torrens System was not established as a means for the acquisition of title to private
land. It is intended merely to confirm and register the title which one may already have (Municipality of
Victorias vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-31189, March 31, 1987). With particular reference to the main
issue at bar, the High Court has ruled that title and ownership over lands within the meaning and for the
purposes of the constitutional prohibition dates back to the time of their purchase, not later. The fact that
the applicants-appellees are not Filipino citizens now cannot be taken against them for they were not
disqualified from acquiring the land in question (Bollozos vs. Yu Tieng Su, G.R. No. L-29442, November
11, 1987). (Rollo, pp. 27-28)
Expectedly, respondent court's disposition did not merit petitioner's approval, hence this present
recourse, which was belatedly filed.
Ordinarily, this petition would have been denied outright for having been filed out of time had it not been
for the constitutional issue presented therein.
At the outset, petitioner submits that private respondents have not acquired proprietary rights over the
subject properties before they acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization to justify the
registration thereof in their favor. It maintains that even privately owned unregistered lands are
presumed to be public lands under the principle that lands of whatever classification belong to the State
under the Regalian doctrine. Thus, before the issuance of the certificate of title, the occupant is not in
the jurisdical sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains to the State. Petitioner further argued
that it is only when the court adjudicates the land to the applicant for confirmation of title would the land
become privately owned land, for in the same proceeding, the court may declare it public land,
depending on the evidence.
As found by the trial court:
The evidence thus presented established that applicants, by themselves and their
predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, public, peaceful, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the two adjacent parcels of land applied for registration of title under a
bona-fide claim of ownership long before June 12, 1945. Such being the case, it is conclusively
presumed that all the conditions essential to the confirmation of their title over the two adjacent parcels
of land are sought to be registered have been complied with thereby entitling them to the issuance of the
corresponding certificate of title pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise
known as the Property Registration Decree. (Rollo, p. 26)
Respondent court echoed the court a quo's observation, thus:
The land sought to be registered has been declared to be within the alienable and disposable zone
established by the Bureau of Forest Development (Exhibit "P"). The investigation conducted by the
Bureau of Lands, Natural Resources District (IV-2) reveals that the disputed realty had been occupied
by the applicants "whose house of strong materials stands thereon"; that it had been declared for
taxation purposes in the name of applicants-spouses since 1979; that they acquired the same by means
of a public instrument entitled "Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan" duly executed by the vendor, Cristeta
Dazo Belen, on June 17, 1978 (Exhibits "I" and "J"); and that applicants and their predecessors in
interest had been in possession of the land for more than 30 years prior to the filing of the application for
registration. But what is of great significance in the instant case is the circumstance that at the time the
applicants purchased the subject lot in 1978, both of them were Filipino citizens such that when they
filed their application for registration in 1987, ownership over the land in dispute had already passed to
them. (Rollo, p., 27)
The Republic disagrees with the appellate court's concept of possession and argues:
17. The Court of Appeals found that the land was declared for taxation purposes in the name of
respondent spouses only since 1979. However, tax declarations or reality tax payments of property are
not conclusive evidence of ownership. (citing cases)
18. Then again, the appellate court found that "applicants (respondents) and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land for more than 30 years prior to the filing of
the application for registration." This is not, however, the same as saying that respondents have been in
possession "since June 12, 1945." (PD No. 1073, amending Sec. 48 [b], CA NO. 141; sec. also Sec. 14,
PD No. 1529). So there is a void in respondents' possession. They fall short of the required possession
since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto. And, even if they needed only to prove thirty (30) years possession
prior to the filing of their application (on February 5, 1987), they would still be short of the required
possession if the starting point is 1979 when, according to the Court of Appeals, the land was declared
for taxation purposes in their name. (Rollo, pp. 14-15)
The argument is myopic, to say the least. Following the logic of petitioner, any transferee is thus
foreclosed to apply for registration of title over a parcel of land notwithstanding the fact that the
transferor, or his predecessor-in-interest has been in open, notorious and exclusive possession thereof
for thirty (30) years or more. This is not, however, what the law provides.
As petitioner itself argues, Section 48 of the Public Land Act (CA 141) reads:
Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court
of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of the province where the land is located for confirmation of
their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of
the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by wars or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall
be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis supplied)
As amended by PD 1073:
Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act are
hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945.
It must be noted that with respect to possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain, the law employs the terms "by themselves", "the applicant himself or through his
predecessor-in-interest". Thus, it matters not whether the vendee/applicant has been in possession of
the subject property for only a day so long as the period and/or legal requirements for confirmation of
title has been complied with by his predecessor-in-interest, the said period is tacked to his possession.
In the case at bar, respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of the disputed land not only since June 12, 1945, but even as early as 1937.
Petitioner does not deny this except that respondent spouses, in its perception, were in possession of
the land sought to be registered only in 1978 and therefore short of the required length of time. As
aforesaid, the disputed parcels of land were acquired by private respondents through their
predecessors-in-interest, who, in turn, have been in open and continued possession thereof since 1937.
Private respondents stepped into the shoes of their predecessors-in-interest and by virtue thereof,
acquired all the legal rights necessary to confirm what could otherwise be deemed as an imperfect title.
At this juncture, petitioner's reliance in Republic v. Villanueva (114 SCRA 875 [1982]) deserves scant
consideration. There, it was held that before the issuance of the certificate of title, the occupant is not in
the juridical sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains to the State.
Suffice it to state that the ruling in Republic v. Villanueva (supra), has already been abandoned in the
1986 case of Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court (146 SCRA 509; and reiterated in
Director of Lands v. Iglesia ni Cristo, 200 SCRA 606 [1991]) where the Court, through then Associate
Justice, now Chief Justice Narvasa, declared that:
(The weight of authority is) that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for
the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite
period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes
private property. . . .
Herico in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative:
. . . Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act
No. 1942, which the respondent Court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the latter's
proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his
predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land from the
mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by free
patent . . .
xxx
xxx
xxx
As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are complied
with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government
grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the
public domain and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for
confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would
be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent.
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public land
which is of the character and duration prescribed by the statute as the equivalent of an express grant
from the State than the dictum of the statute itself (Section 48 [b]) that the possessor(s) ". . . shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall
be entitled to a certificate of title ..." No proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption,
confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the most limited to
ascertaining whether the possession claims is of the required character and length of time; and
registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The
proceedings would not originally convert the land from public to private land, but only confirm such a
conversion already affected by operation of law from the moment the required period of possession
became complete. As was so well put in Cariño, ". . .(There are indications that registration was
expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost.
The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already
conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. (Emphasis supplied)
Subsequent cases have hewed to the above pronouncement such that open, continuous and exclusive
possession for at least 30 years of alienable public land ipso jure converts the same to private property
(Director of Lands v. IAC, 214 SCRA 604 [1992]; Pineda v. CA, 183 SCRA 602 [1990]). This means that
occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years by an applicant and his predecessors-in-interest, vest
title on such applicant so as to segregate the land from the mass of public and (National Power
Corporation v. CA, 218 SCRA 41 [1993]).
The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is alienable public land and
(b) his possession, in the concept above stated, must be either since time immemorial or for the period
prescribed in the Public Land Act (Director of Lands v. Buyco, 216 SCRA 78 [1992]). When the
conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right
to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued (National Power
Corporation v. CA, supra). As such, the land ceases to be a part of the public domain and goes beyond
the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of.
In other words, the Torrens system was not established as a means for the acquisition of title to private
land (Municipality of Victorias v. CA, 149 SCRA 32 [1987]). It merely confirms, but does not confer
ownership. As could be gleaned from the evidence adduced, private respondents were able to establish
the nature of possession of their predecessors-in-interest. Evidence was offered to prove that their
predecessors-in-interest had paid taxes on the subject land and introduced improvements thereon
(Exhibits "F" to "F9"). A certified true copy of the affidavit executed by Cristeta Dazo and her sister
Simplicia was also formally offered to prove that the subject parcels of land were inherited by vendor
Cristeta Dazo from her father Pedro Dazo with the conformity of her only sister Simplicia (Exhibit "G").
Likewise, a report from the Bureau of Lands was presented in evidence together with a letter from the
Bureau of Forest Development, to prove that the questioned lots were part of the alienable and
disposable zone of the government and that no forestry interest was affected (CA GR No. 28953,
Records, p. 33).
In the main, petitioner seeks to defeat respondents' application for registration of title on the ground of
foreign nationality. Accordingly, the ruling in Director of Lands v. Buyco (supra) supports petitioner's
thesis.
We disagree.
In Buyco, the applicants therein were likewise foreign nationals but were natural-born Filipino citizens at
the time of their supposed acquisition of the property. But this is where the similarity ends. The
applicants in Buyco sought to register a large tract of land under the provisions of the Land Registration
Act, and in the alternative, under the provisions of the Public Land Act. The land registration court
decided in favor of the applicants and was affirmed by the appellate court on appeal. The Director of
Lands brought the matter before us on review and we reversed.
This Court, speaking through Justice Davide, Jr., stated:
As could be gleaned from the evidence adduced, the private respondents do not rely on fee simple
ownership based on a Spanish grant or possessory information title under Section 19 of the Land
Registration Act; the private respondents did not present any proof that they or their
predecessors-in-interest derived title from an old Spanish grant such as (a) the "titulo real" or royal grant
(b) the "concession especial" or especial grant; (c) the "composicion con el estado" title or adjustment
title; (d) the "titulo de compra" or title by purchase; and (e) the "informacion posesoria" or possessory
information title, which could become a "titulo gratuito" or a gratuitous title (Director of Forestry v. Muñoz,
23 SCRA 1183 [1968]). The primary basis of their claim is possession, by themselves and their
predecessors-in-interest, since time immemorial.
If indeed private respondents and their predecessors have been in possession since time immemorial,
the rulings of both courts could be upheld for, as this Court stated in Oh Cho v. Director of Lands (75
Phil. 890 [1946]):
. . . All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the
public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an
occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify
the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that if had been a private
property even before the Spanish conquest (Cariño v. Insular Government, 41 Phil 935 [1909]; 212 U.S.
449; 53 Law. Ed., 594) The applicant does not come under the exception, for the earliest possession of
the lot by his first predecessor in interest began in 1880.
. . . alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly,
continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under the Public Land Act, as
amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure.
(Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra)
It is obvious from the foregoing rule that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is alienable public
land and (b) his possession, in the concept above stated, must be either since time immemorial, as
ruled in both Cariño and Susi, or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. As to the latter, this
Court, in Gutierrez Hermanos v. Court of Appeals (178 SCRA 37 [1989]), adopted the rule enunciated
by the Court of Appeals, per then Associate Justice Hugo R. Gutierrez, Jr., . . ., that an applicant for
registration under Section 48 of the Public Land Act must secure a certification from the Government
that the lands which he claims to have possessed as owner for more than thirty (30) years are alienable
and disposable. It is the burden of the applicant to prove its positive averments.
In the instant case, private respondents offered no evidence at all to prove that the property subject of
the application is an alienable and disposable land. On the contrary, the entire property . . . was pasture
land (and therefore inalienable under the then 1973 Constitution).
. . . (P)rivate respondents' evidence miserably failed to establish their imperfect title to the property in
question. Their allegation of possession since time immemorial, . . ., is patently baseless. . . . When
referring to possession, specifically "immemorial possession," it means possession of which no man
living has seen the beginning, and the existence of which he has learned from his elders (Susi v. Razon,
supra). Such possession was never present in the case of private respondents. . . .
. . ., there does not even exist a reasonable basis for the finding that the private respondents and their
predecessors-in-interest possessed the land for more than eighty (80) years, . . .
xxx xxx xxx
To this Court's mind, private respondents failed to prove that (their predecessor-in-interest) had
possessed the property allegedly covered by Tax Declaration No. 15853 and made the subject of both
his last will and testament and the project of partition of his estate among his heirs — in such manner as
to remove the same from the public domain under the Cariño and Susi doctrines. Thus, (when the
predecessor-in-interest) died on 31 May 1937, he transmitted no right whatsoever, with respect to the
said property, to his heirs. This being the case, his possession cannot be tacked to that of the private
respondents for the latter's benefit pursuant to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the alternative
ground relied upon in their application . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Considering that the private respondents became American citizens before such filing, it goes without
saying that they had acquired no vested right, consisting of an imperfect title, over the property before
they lost their Philippine citizenship. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the application in Buyco were denied registration of title not merely because they were
American citizens at the time of their application therefor. Respondents therein failed to prove
possession of their predecessor-in-interest since time immemorial or possession in such a manner that
the property has been segregated from public domain; such that at the time of their application, as
American citizens, they have acquired no vested rights over the parcel of land.
In the case at bar, private respondents were undoubtedly natural-born Filipino citizens at the time of the
acquisition of the properties and by virtue thereof, acquired vested rights thereon, tacking in the process,
the possession in the concept of owner and the prescribed period of time held by their
predecessors-in-interest under the Public Land Act. In addition, private respondents have constructed a
house of strong materials on the contested property, now occupied by respondent Lapiñas mother.
But what should not be missed in the disposition of this case is the fact that the Constitution itself allows
private respondents to register the contested parcels of land in their favor. Sections 7 and 8 of Article XII
of the Constitution contain the following pertinent provisions, to wit:
Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except
to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject to
limitations provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 8, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution above quoted is similar to Section 15, Article XIV of the
then 1973 Constitution which reads:
Sec. 15. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines who has lost his citizenship may be a transferee of private land, for use by him as his
residence, as the Batasang Pambansa may provide.
Pursuant thereto, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185 was passed into law, the relevant provision of which
provides:
Sec. 2. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship and who has
the legal capacity to enter into a contract under Philippine laws may be a transferee of a private land up
to a maximum area of one thousand square meters, in the case of urban land, or one hectare in the
case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence. In the case of married couples, one of them may
avail of the privilege herein granted; Provided, That if both shall avail of the same, the total area
acquired shall not exceed the maximum herein fixed.
In case the transferee already owns urban or rural lands for residential purposes, he shall still be entitled
to be a transferee of an additional urban or rural lands for residential purposes which, when added to
those already owned by him, shall not exceed the maximum areas herein authorized.
From the adoption of the 1987 Constitution up to the present, no other law has been passed by the
legislature on the same subject. Thus, what governs the disposition of private lands in favor of a
natural-born Filipino citizen who has lost his Philippine citizenship remains to be BP 185.
Even if private respondents were already Canadian citizens at the time they applied for registration of
the properties in question, said properties as discussed above were already private lands; consequently,
there could be no legal impediment for the registration thereof by respondents in view of what the
Constitution ordains. The parcels of land sought to be registered no longer form part of the public
domain. They are already private in character since private respondents' predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous and exclusive possession and occupation thereof under claim of ownership
prior to June 12, 1945 or since 1937. The law provides that a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who
has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of 1,000
sq.m., if urban, or one (1) hectare in case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence (BP 185).
It is undisputed that private respondents, as vendees of a private land, were natural-born citizens of the
Philippines. For the purpose of transfer and/or acquisition of a parcel of residential land, it is not
significant whether private respondents are no longer Filipino citizens at the time they purchased or
registered the parcels of land in question. What is important is that private respondents were formerly
natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and as transferees of a private land, they could apply for
registration in accordance with the mandate of Section 8, Article XII of the Constitution. Considering that
private respondents were able to prove the requisite period and character of possession of their
predecessors-in-interest over the subject lots, their application for registration of title must perforce be
approved.
The dissenting opinion, however, states that the requirements in BP 185, must also be complied with by
private respondents. Specifically, it refers to Section 6, which provides:
Sec. 6. In addition to the requirements provided for in other laws for the registration of titles to lands, no
private land shall be transferred under this Act, unless the transferee shall submit to the register of
deeds of the province or city where the property is located a sworn statement showing the date and
place of his birth; the names and addresses of his parents, of his spouse and children, if any; the area,
the location and the mode of acquisition of his landholdings in the Philippines, if any; his intention to
reside permanently in the Philippines; the date he lost his Philippine citizenship and the country of which
he is presently a citizen; and such other information as may be required under Section 8 of this Act.
The Court is of the view that the requirements in Sec. 6 of BP 185 do not apply in the instant case since
said requirements are primarily directed to the register of deeds before whom compliance therewith is to
be submitted. Nowhere in the provision is it stated, much less implied, that the requirements must
likewise be submitted before the land registration court prior to the approval of an application for
registration of title. An application for registration of title before a land registration court should not be
confused with the issuance of a certificate of title by the register of deeds. It is only when the judgment of
the land registration court approving the application for registration has become final that a decree of
registration is issued. And that is the time when the requirements of Sec. 6, BP 185, before the register
of deeds should be complied with by the applicants. This decree of registration is the one that is
submitted to the office of the register of deeds for issuance of the certificate of title in favor of the
applicant. Prior to the issuance of the decree of registration, the register of deeds has no participation in
the approval of the application for registration of title as the decree of registration is yet to be issued.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno,
Vitug, Kapunan, and Mendoza, JJ.,concur.
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
With all due respect, I have to dissent.
The ponencia begins by posing the issue thus:
Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which he acquired by purchase
while still a citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor who has complied with the requirements for
registration under the Public Land Act (CA 141)?
There is no question that the property is private land and thus subject to registration by qualified persons.
It was really needless to elaborate on Buyco, which is clearly inapplicable here. We can agree that the
ruling case is Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, which is not challenged in this petition.
But I think the ponencia misses the point. The finding that the respondent spouses were natural-born
Filpinos at the time they acquired the land does not settle the question posed.
The important point is that the respondent spouses are no longer citizens of the Philippines but
naturalized Canadians. It does not follow that because they were citizens of the Philippines when they
acquired the land, they can register it in their names now even if they are no longer Filipinos.
Section 7 of Article XII of the Constitution is irrelevant because it is not disputed that the respondent
spouses were qualified to acquire the land in question when it was transferred to them.
Section 8 of the same article is not applicable either because it speaks of a transfer of private land to a
former natural-born citizen of the Philippines after he became a foreigner.
Thus it states:
Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject to
limitations provided by law.
Even if it be assumed that the provision is applicable, it does not appear that the private respondents
have observed "the limitations provided by law."
The ponencia finds that all the requisites for the registration of the land in the private respondents' name
have been complied with. I do not believe so for there is no showing that B.P. 185 has also been
enforced.
The view has been expressed that we should confine ourselves to the requirements for registration
under the Public Land Act. I respectfully submit that the requirements in B.P. 185 have been read into
the Act and should also be applied.
Strict compliance is necessary because of the special privilege granted to former Filipinos who have
become foreigners by their own choice. If we can be so strict with our own citizens, I see no reason why
we should be less so with those who have renounced our country.
Feliciano, J.: concurring
I agree with the great bulk of the majority opinion written by Mr. Justice Bidin and the result reached
therein.
This separate statement is concerned only with the last two (2) paragraphs, just before the dispositive
portion, of the majority opinion. In my view, it should be stressed that B.P. Blg. 185 which took effect on
16 March 1982, does not purport to cover the set of facts before the Court in this case: i.e.,
the respondent spouses became transferees (on 17 June 1978) of the land here involved while they
were natural-born Philippine citizens who happened sometime later to have been naturalized as citizens
of another country. B.P. Blg. 185, as far as I can determine, addresses itself only to a situation
of persons who were already foreign nationals at the time they became transferees of private land in the
Philippines, but who were previously natural-born Philippine citizens. It is difficult, therefore, to see how
B.P. Blg. 185 can become applicable to the present situation even at the subsequent time when the
respondent spouses would come before the Register of Deeds. B.P. Blg. 185, especially Section 6
thereof, imposes certain requirements, including a specific limitation on the quantity of land (not more
than 1,000 square meters) which may be acquired thereunder, an amount limitation which must not be
exceeded both by the land of which such foreign national becomes transferee and by such land taken
together with other land previously acquired by such foreign national. (2nd paragraph, Section 2, B.P.
Blg. 185)
B.P. Blg. 185 would, of course, apply to subsequent purchases of land by the respondent spouses, that
is, purchases made after they were naturalized as Canadian nationals.
# Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
With all due respect, I have to dissent.
The ponencia begins by posing the issue thus:
Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which he acquired by purchase
while still a citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor who has complied with the requirements for
registration under the Public Land Act (CA 141)?
There is no question that the property is private land and thus subject to registration by qualified persons.
It was really needless to elaborate on Buyco, which is clearly inapplicable here. We can agree that the
ruling case is Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, which is not challenged in this petition.
But I think the ponencia misses the point. The finding that the respondent spouses were natural-born
Filpinos at the time they acquired the land does not settle the question posed.
The important point is that the respondent spouses are no longer citizens of the Philippines but
naturalized Canadians. It does not follow that because they were citizens of the Philippines when they
acquired the land, they can register it in their names now even if they are no longer Filipinos.
Section 7 of Article XII of the Constitution is irrelevant because it is not disputed that the respondent
spouses were qualified to acquire the land in question when it was transferred to them.
Section 8 of the same article is not applicable either because it speaks of a transfer of private land to a
former natural-born citizen of the Philippines after he became a foreigner.
Thus it states:
Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject to
limitations provided by law.
Even if it be assumed that the provision is applicable, it does not appear that the private respondents
have observed "the limitations provided by law."
The ponencia finds that all the requisites for the registration of the land in the private respondents' name
have been complied with. I do not believe so for there is no showing that B.P. 185 has also been
enforced.
The view has been expressed that we should confine ourselves to the requirements for registration
under the Public Land Act. I respectfully submit that the requirements in B.P. 185 have been read into
the Act and should also be applied.
Strict compliance is necessary because of the special privilege granted to former Filipinos who have
become foreigners by their own choice. If we can be so strict with our own citizens, I see no reason why
we should be less so with those who have renounced our country.
Feliciano, J.: concurring
I agree with the great bulk of the majority opinion written by Mr. Justice Bidin and the result reached
therein.
This separate statement is concerned only with the last two (2) paragraphs, just before the dispositive
portion, of the majority opinion. In my view, it should be stressed that B.P. Blg. 185 which took effect on
16 March 1982, does not purport to cover the set of facts before the Court in this case: i.e.,
the respondent spouses became transferees (on 17 June 1978) of the land here involved while they
were natural-born Philippine citizens who happened sometime later to have been naturalized as citizens
of another country. B.P. Blg. 185, as far as I can determine, addresses itself only to a situation
of persons who were already foreign nationals at the time they became transferees of private land in the
Philippines, but who were previously natural-born Philippine citizens. It is difficult, therefore, to see how
B.P. Blg. 185 can become applicable to the present situation even at the subsequent time when the
respondent spouses would come before the Register of Deeds. B.P. Blg. 185, especially Section 6
thereof, imposes certain requirements, including a specific limitation on the quantity of land (not more
than 1,000 square meters) which may be acquired thereunder, an amount limitation which must not be
exceeded both by the land of which such foreign national becomes transferee and by such land taken
together with other land previously acquired by such foreign national. (2nd paragraph, Section 2, B.P.
Blg. 185)
B.P. Blg. 185 would, of course, apply to subsequent purchases of land by the respondent spouses, that
is, purchases made after they were naturalized as Canadian nationals.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17587
September 12, 1967
PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION, representing the estate of JUSTINA SANTOS Y CANON
FAUSTINO, deceased, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
LUI SHE in her own behalf and as administratrix of the intestate estate of Wong Heng,
deceased, defendant-appellant.
Nicanor S. Sison for plaintiff-appellant.
Ozaeta, Gibbs & Ozaeta for defendant-appellant.
CASTRO, J.:
Justina Santos y Canon Faustino and her sister Lorenzo were the owners in common of a piece of land
in Manila. This parcel, with an area of 2,582.30 square meters, is located on Rizal Avenue and opens
into Florentino Torres street at the back and Katubusan street on one side. In it are two residential
houses with entrance on Florentino Torres street and the Hen Wah Restaurant with entrance on Rizal
Avenue. The sisters lived in one of the houses, while Wong Heng, a Chinese, lived with his family in the
restaurant. Wong had been a long-time lessee of a portion of the property, paying a monthly rental of
P2,620.
On September 22, 1957 Justina Santos became the owner of the entire property as her sister died with
no other heir. Then already well advanced in years, being at the time 90 years old, blind, crippled and an
invalid, she was left with no other relative to live with. Her only companions in the house were her 17
dogs and 8 maids. Her otherwise dreary existence was brightened now and then by the visits of Wong's
four children who had become the joy of her life. Wong himself was the trusted man to whom she
delivered various amounts for safekeeping, including rentals from her property at the corner of Ongpin
and Salazar streets and the rentals which Wong himself paid as lessee of a part of the Rizal Avenue
property. Wong also took care of the payment; in her behalf, of taxes, lawyers' fees, funeral expenses,
masses, salaries of maids and security guard, and her household expenses.
"In grateful acknowledgment of the personal services of the lessee to her," Justina Santos executed on
November 15, 1957 a contract of lease (Plff Exh. 3) in favor of Wong, covering the portion then already
leased to him and another portion fronting Florentino Torres street. The lease was for 50 years, although
the lessee was given the right to withdraw at any time from the agreement; the monthly rental was
P3,120. The contract covered an area of 1,124 square meters. Ten days later (November 25), the
contract was amended (Plff Exh. 4) so as to make it cover the entire property, including the portion on
which the house of Justina Santos stood, at an additional monthly rental of P360. For his part Wong
undertook to pay, out of the rental due from him, an amount not exceeding P1,000 a month for the food
of her dogs and the salaries of her maids.
On December 21 she executed another contract (Plff Exh. 7) giving Wong the option to buy the leased
premises for P120,000, payable within ten years at a monthly installment of P1,000. The option, written
in Tagalog, imposed on him the obligation to pay for the food of the dogs and the salaries of the maids in
her household, the charge not to exceed P1,800 a month. The option was conditioned on his obtaining
Philippine citizenship, a petition for which was then pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. It
appears, however, that this application for naturalization was withdrawn when it was discovered that he
was not a resident of Rizal. On October 28, 1958 she filed a petition to adopt him and his children on the
erroneous belief that adoption would confer on them Philippine citizenship. The error was discovered
and the proceedings were abandoned.
On November 18, 1958 she executed two other contracts, one (Plff Exh. 5) extending the term of the
lease to 99 years, and another (Plff Exh. 6) fixing the term of the option of 50 years. Both contracts are
written in Tagalog.
In two wills executed on August 24 and 29, 1959 (Def Exhs. 285 & 279), she bade her legatees to
respect the contracts she had entered into with Wong, but in a codicil (Plff Exh. 17) of a later date
(November 4, 1959) she appears to have a change of heart. Claiming that the various contracts were
made by her because of machinations and inducements practiced by him, she now directed her
executor to secure the annulment of the contracts.
On November 18 the present action was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila. The complaint
alleged that the contracts were obtained by Wong "through fraud, misrepresentation, inequitable
conduct, undue influence and abuse of confidence and trust of and (by) taking advantage of the
helplessness of the plaintiff and were made to circumvent the constitutional provision prohibiting aliens
from acquiring lands in the Philippines and also of the Philippine Naturalization Laws." The court was
asked to direct the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel the registration of the contracts and to order
Wong to pay Justina Santos the additional rent of P3,120 a month from November 15, 1957 on the
allegation that the reasonable rental of the leased premises was P6,240 a month.
In his answer, Wong admitted that he enjoyed her trust and confidence as proof of which he volunteered
the information that, in addition to the sum of P3,000 which he said she had delivered to him for
safekeeping, another sum of P22,000 had been deposited in a joint account which he had with one of
her maids. But he denied having taken advantage of her trust in order to secure the execution of the
contracts in question. As counterclaim he sought the recovery of P9,210.49 which he said she owed him
for advances.
Wong's admission of the receipt of P22,000 and P3,000 was the cue for the filing of an amended
complaint. Thus on June 9, 1960, aside from the nullity of the contracts, the collection of various
amounts allegedly delivered on different occasions was sought. These amounts and the dates of their
delivery are P33,724.27 (Nov. 4, 1957); P7,344.42 (Dec. 1, 1957); P10,000 (Dec. 6, 1957); P22,000 and
P3,000 (as admitted in his answer). An accounting of the rentals from the Ongpin and Rizal Avenue
properties was also demanded.
In the meantime as a result of a petition for guardianship filed in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court, the Security Bank & Trust Co. was appointed guardian of the properties of Justina Santos, while
Ephraim G. Gochangco was appointed guardian of her person.
In his answer, Wong insisted that the various contracts were freely and voluntarily entered into by the
parties. He likewise disclaimed knowledge of the sum of P33,724.27, admitted receipt of P7,344.42 and
P10,000, but contended that these amounts had been spent in accordance with the instructions of
Justina Santos; he expressed readiness to comply with any order that the court might make with respect
to the sums of P22,000 in the bank and P3,000 in his possession.
The case was heard, after which the lower court rendered judgment as follows:
[A]ll the documents mentioned in the first cause of action, with the exception of the first which is the
lease contract of 15 November 1957, are declared null and void; Wong Heng is condemned to pay unto
plaintiff thru guardian of her property the sum of P55,554.25 with legal interest from the date of the filing
of the amended complaint; he is also ordered to pay the sum of P3,120.00 for every month of his
occupation as lessee under the document of lease herein sustained, from 15 November 1959, and the
moneys he has consigned since then shall be imputed to that; costs against Wong Heng.
From this judgment both parties appealed directly to this Court. After the case was submitted for
decision, both parties died, Wong Heng on October 21, 1962 and Justina Santos on December 28, 1964.
Wong was substituted by his wife, Lui She, the other defendant in this case, while Justina Santos was
substituted by the Philippine Banking Corporation.
Justina Santos maintained — now reiterated by the Philippine Banking Corporation — that the lease
contract (Plff Exh. 3) should have been annulled along with the four other contracts (Plff Exhs. 4-7)
because it lacks mutuality; because it included a portion which, at the time, was in custodia legis;
because the contract was obtained in violation of the fiduciary relations of the parties; because her
consent was obtained through undue influence, fraud and misrepresentation; and because the lease
contract, like the rest of the contracts, is absolutely simulated.
Paragraph 5 of the lease contract states that "The lessee may at any time withdraw from this
agreement." It is claimed that this stipulation offends article 1308 of the Civil Code which provides that
"the contract must bind both contracting parties; its validity or compliance cannot be left to the will of one
of them."
We have had occasion to delineate the scope and application of article 1308 in the early case of Taylor
v. Uy Tieng Piao.1 We said in that case:
Article 1256 [now art. 1308] of the Civil Code in our opinion creates no impediment to the insertion in a
contract for personal service of a resolutory condition permitting the cancellation of the contract by one
of the parties. Such a stipulation, as can be readily seen, does not make either the validity or the
fulfillment of the contract dependent upon the will of the party to whom is conceded the privilege of
cancellation; for where the contracting parties have agreed that such option shall exist, the exercise of
the option is as much in the fulfillment of the contract as any other act which may have been the subject
of agreement. Indeed, the cancellation of a contract in accordance with conditions agreed upon
beforehand is fulfillment.2
And so it was held in Melencio v. Dy Tiao Lay 3 that a "provision in a lease contract that the lessee, at
any time before he erected any building on the land, might rescind the lease, can hardly be regarded as
a violation of article 1256 [now art. 1308] of the Civil Code."
The case of Singson Encarnacion v. Baldomar 4 cannot be cited in support of the claim of want of
mutuality, because of a difference in factual setting. In that case, the lessees argued that they could
occupy the premises as long as they paid the rent. This is of course untenable, for as this Court said, "If
this defense were to be allowed, so long as defendants elected to continue the lease by continuing the
payment of the rentals, the owner would never be able to discontinue it; conversely, although the owner
should desire the lease to continue the lessees could effectively thwart his purpose if they should prefer
to terminate the contract by the simple expedient of stopping payment of the rentals." Here, in contrast,
the right of the lessee to continue the lease or to terminate it is so circumscribed by the term of the
contract that it cannot be said that the continuance of the lease depends upon his will. At any rate, even
if no term had been fixed in the agreement, this case would at most justify the fixing of a period 5 but not
the annulment of the contract.
Nor is there merit in the claim that as the portion of the property formerly owned by the sister of Justina
Santos was still in the process of settlement in the probate court at the time it was leased, the lease is
invalid as to such portion. Justina Santos became the owner of the entire property upon the death of her
sister Lorenzo on September 22, 1957 by force of article 777 of the Civil Code. Hence, when she leased
the property on November 15, she did so already as owner thereof. As this Court explained in upholding
the sale made by an heir of a property under judicial administration:
That the land could not ordinarily be levied upon while in custodia legis does not mean that one of the
heirs may not sell the right, interest or participation which he has or might have in the lands under
administration. The ordinary execution of property in custodia legis is prohibited in order to avoid
interference with the possession by the court. But the sale made by an heir of his share in an inheritance,
subject to the result of the pending administration, in no wise stands in the way of such administration.6
It is next contended that the lease contract was obtained by Wong in violation of his fiduciary
relationship with Justina Santos, contrary to article 1646, in relation to article 1941 of the Civil Code,
which disqualifies "agents (from leasing) the property whose administration or sale may have been
entrusted to them." But Wong was never an agent of Justina Santos. The relationship of the parties,
although admittedly close and confidential, did not amount to an agency so as to bring the case within
the prohibition of the law.
Just the same, it is argued that Wong so completely dominated her life and affairs that the contracts
express not her will but only his. Counsel for Justina Santos cites the testimony of Atty. Tomas S. Yumol
who said that he prepared the lease contract on the basis of data given to him by Wong and that she
told him that "whatever Mr. Wong wants must be followed."7
The testimony of Atty. Yumol cannot be read out of context in order to warrant a finding that Wong
practically dictated the terms of the contract. What this witness said was:
Q Did you explain carefully to your client, Doña Justina, the contents of this document before she signed
it?
A I explained to her each and every one of these conditions and I also told her these conditions were
quite onerous for her, I don't really know if I have expressed my opinion, but I told her that we would
rather not execute any contract anymore, but to hold it as it was before, on a verbal month to month
contract of lease.
Q But, she did not follow your advice, and she went with the contract just the same?
A She agreed first . . .
Q Agreed what?
A Agreed with my objectives that it is really onerous and that I was really right, but after that, I was called
again by her and she told me to follow the wishes of Mr. Wong Heng.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q So, as far as consent is concerned, you were satisfied that this document was perfectly proper?
xxx
xxx
xxx
A Your Honor, if I have to express my personal opinion, I would say she is not, because, as I said before,
she told me — "Whatever Mr. Wong wants must be followed."8
Wong might indeed have supplied the data which Atty. Yumol embodied in the lease contract, but to say
this is not to detract from the binding force of the contract. For the contract was fully explained to Justina
Santos by her own lawyer. One incident, related by the same witness, makes clear that she voluntarily
consented to the lease contract. This witness said that the original term fixed for the lease was 99 years
but that as he doubted the validity of a lease to an alien for that length of time, he tried to persuade her
to enter instead into a lease on a month-to-month basis. She was, however, firm and unyielding. Instead
of heeding the advice of the lawyer, she ordered him, "Just follow Mr. Wong Heng." 9 Recounting the
incident, Atty. Yumol declared on cross examination:
Considering her age, ninety (90) years old at the time and her condition, she is a wealthy woman, it is
just natural when she said "This is what I want and this will be done." In particular reference to this
contract of lease, when I said "This is not proper," she said — "You just go ahead, you prepare that, I am
the owner, and if there is any illegality, I am the only one that can question the illegality."10
Atty. Yumol further testified that she signed the lease contract in the presence of her close friend,
Hermenegilda Lao, and her maid, Natividad Luna, who was constantly by her side. 11 Any of them could
have testified on the undue influence that Wong supposedly wielded over Justina Santos, but neither of
them was presented as a witness. The truth is that even after giving his client time to think the matter
over, the lawyer could not make her change her mind. This persuaded the lower court to uphold the
validity of the lease contract against the claim that it was procured through undue influence.
Indeed, the charge of undue influence in this case rests on a mere inference12 drawn from the fact that
Justina Santos could not read (as she was blind) and did not understand the English language in which
the contract is written, but that inference has been overcome by her own evidence.
Nor is there merit in the claim that her consent to the lease contract, as well as to the rest of the
contracts in question, was given out of a mistaken sense of gratitude to Wong who, she was made to
believe, had saved her and her sister from a fire that destroyed their house during the liberation of
Manila. For while a witness claimed that the sisters were saved by other persons (the brothers Edilberto
and Mariano Sta. Ana)13 it was Justina Santos herself who, according to her own witness, Benjamin C.
Alonzo, said "very emphatically" that she and her sister would have perished in the fire had it not been
for Wong.14 Hence the recital in the deed of conditional option (Plff Exh. 7) that "[I]tong si Wong Heng
ang siyang nagligtas sa aming dalawang magkapatid sa halos ay tiyak na kamatayan", and the equally
emphatic avowal of gratitude in the lease contract (Plff Exh. 3).
As it was with the lease contract (Plff Exh. 3), so it was with the rest of the contracts (Plff Exhs. 4-7) —
the consent of Justina Santos was given freely and voluntarily. As Atty. Alonzo, testifying for her, said:
[I]n nearly all documents, it was either Mr. Wong Heng or Judge Torres and/or both. When we had
conferences, they used to tell me what the documents should contain. But, as I said, I would always ask
the old woman about them and invariably the old woman used to tell me: "That's okay. It's all right."15
But the lower court set aside all the contracts, with the exception of the lease contract of November 15,
1957, on the ground that they are contrary to the expressed wish of Justina Santos and that their
considerations are fictitious. Wong stated in his deposition that he did not pay P360 a month for the
additional premises leased to him, because she did not want him to, but the trial court did not believe
him. Neither did it believe his statement that he paid P1,000 as consideration for each of the contracts
(namely, the option to buy the leased premises, the extension of the lease to 99 years, and the fixing of
the term of the option at 50 years), but that the amount was returned to him by her for safekeeping.
Instead, the court relied on the testimony of Atty. Alonzo in reaching the conclusion that the contracts
are void for want of consideration.
Atty. Alonzo declared that he saw no money paid at the time of the execution of the documents, but his
negative testimony does not rule out the possibility that the considerations were paid at some other time
as the contracts in fact recite. What is more, the consideration need not pass from one party to the other
at the time a contract is executed because the promise of one is the consideration for the other.16
With respect to the lower court's finding that in all probability Justina Santos could not have intended to
part with her property while she was alive nor even to lease it in its entirety as her house was built on it,
suffice it to quote the testimony of her own witness and lawyer who prepared the contracts (Plff Exhs.
4-7) in question, Atty. Alonzo:
The ambition of the old woman, before her death, according to her revelation to me, was to see to it that
these properties be enjoyed, even to own them, by Wong Heng because Doña Justina told me that she
did not have any relatives, near or far, and she considered Wong Heng as a son and his children her
grandchildren; especially her consolation in life was when she would hear the children reciting prayers in
Tagalog.17
She was very emphatic in the care of the seventeen (17) dogs and of the maids who helped her much,
and she told me to see to it that no one could disturb Wong Heng from those properties. That is why we
thought of the ninety-nine (99) years lease; we thought of adoption, believing that thru adoption Wong
Heng might acquire Filipino citizenship; being the adopted child of a Filipino citizen.18
This is not to say, however, that the contracts (Plff Exhs. 3-7) are valid. For the testimony just quoted,
while dispelling doubt as to the intention of Justina Santos, at the same time gives the clue to what we
view as a scheme to circumvent the Constitutional prohibition against the transfer of lands to aliens.
"The illicit purpose then becomes the illegal causa"19 rendering the contracts void.
Taken singly, the contracts show nothing that is necessarily illegal, but considered collectively, they
reveal an insidious pattern to subvert by indirection what the Constitution directly prohibits. To be sure, a
lease to an alien for a reasonable period is valid. So is an option giving an alien the right to buy real
property on condition that he is granted Philippine citizenship. As this Court said in Krivenko v. Register
of Deeds:20
[A]liens are not completely excluded by the Constitution from the use of lands for residential purposes.
Since their residence in the Philippines is temporary, they may be granted temporary rights such as a
lease contract which is not forbidden by the Constitution. Should they desire to remain here forever and
share our fortunes and misfortunes, Filipino citizenship is not impossible to acquire.
But if an alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy, a piece of land, by virtue of which
the Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose of his property,21 this to last for 50 years, then it
becomes clear that the arrangement is a virtual transfer of ownership whereby the owner divests himself
in stages not only of the right to enjoy the land ( jus possidendi, jus utendi, jus fruendi and jus abutendi)
but also of the right to dispose of it ( jus disponendi) — rights the sum total of which make up ownership.
It is just as if today the possession is transferred, tomorrow, the use, the next day, the disposition, and
so on, until ultimately all the rights of which ownership is made up are consolidated in an alien. And yet
this is just exactly what the parties in this case did within the space of one year, with the result that
Justina Santos' ownership of her property was reduced to a hollow concept. If this can be done, then the
Constitutional ban against alien landholding in the Philippines, as announced in Krivenko v. Register of
Deeds,22 is indeed in grave peril.
It does not follow from what has been said, however, that because the parties are in pari delicto they will
be left where they are, without relief. For one thing, the original parties who were guilty of a violation of
the fundamental charter have died and have since been substituted by their administrators to whom it
would be unjust to impute their guilt.23 For another thing, and this is not only cogent but also important,
article 1416 of the Civil Code provides, as an exception to the rule on pari delicto, that "When the
agreement is not illegal per se but is merely prohibited, and the prohibition by law is designed for the
protection of the plaintiff, he may, if public policy is thereby enhanced, recover what he has paid or
delivered." The Constitutional provision that "Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines"24 is an expression of public
policy to conserve lands for the Filipinos. As this Court said in Krivenko:
It is well to note at this juncture that in the present case we have no choice. We are construing the
Constitution as it is and not as we may desire it to be. Perhaps the effect of our construction is to
preclude aliens admitted freely into the Philippines from owning sites where they may build their homes.
But if this is the solemn mandate of the Constitution, we will not attempt to compromise it even in the
name of amity or equity . . . .
For all the foregoing, we hold that under the Constitution aliens may not acquire private or public
agricultural lands, including residential lands, and, accordingly, judgment is affirmed, without costs.25
That policy would be defeated and its continued violation sanctioned if, instead of setting the contracts
aside and ordering the restoration of the land to the estate of the deceased Justina Santos, this Court
should apply the general rule of pari delicto. To the extent that our ruling in this case conflicts with that
laid down in Rellosa v. Gaw Chee Hun 26 and subsequent similar cases, the latter must be considered
as pro tanto qualified.
The claim for increased rentals and attorney's fees, made in behalf of Justina Santos, must be denied
for lack of merit.
And what of the various amounts which Wong received in trust from her? It appears that he kept two
classes of accounts, one pertaining to amount which she entrusted to him from time to time, and another
pertaining to rentals from the Ongpin property and from the Rizal Avenue property, which he himself
was leasing.
With respect to the first account, the evidence shows that he received P33,724.27 on November 8, 1957
(Plff Exh. 16); P7,354.42 on December 1, 1957 (Plff Exh. 13); P10,000 on December 6, 1957 (Plff Exh.
14) ; and P18,928.50 on August 26, 1959 (Def. Exh. 246), or a total of P70,007.19. He claims, however,
that he settled his accounts and that the last amount of P18,928.50 was in fact payment to him of what
in the liquidation was found to be due to him.
He made disbursements from this account to discharge Justina Santos' obligations for taxes, attorneys'
fees, funeral services and security guard services, but the checks (Def Exhs. 247-278) drawn by him for
this purpose amount to only P38,442.84.27 Besides, if he had really settled his accounts with her on
August 26, 1959, we cannot understand why he still had P22,000 in the bank and P3,000 in his
possession, or a total of P25,000. In his answer, he offered to pay this amount if the court so directed
him. On these two grounds, therefore, his claim of liquidation and settlement of accounts must be
rejected.
After subtracting P38,442.84 (expenditures) from P70,007.19 (receipts), there is a difference of P31,564
which, added to the amount of P25,000, leaves a balance of P56,564.3528 in favor of Justina Santos.
As to the second account, the evidence shows that the monthly income from the Ongpin property until
its sale in Rizal Avenue July, 1959 was P1,000, and that from the Rizal Avenue property, of which Wong
was the lessee, was P3,120. Against this account the household expenses and disbursements for the
care of the 17 dogs and the salaries of the 8 maids of Justina Santos were charged. This account is
contained in a notebook (Def. Exh. 6) which shows a balance of P9,210.49 in favor of Wong. But it is
claimed that the rental from both the Ongpin and Rizal Avenue properties was more than enough to pay
for her monthly expenses and that, as a matter of fact, there should be a balance in her favor. The lower
court did not allow either party to recover against the other. Said the court:
[T]he documents bear the earmarks of genuineness; the trouble is that they were made only by
Francisco Wong and Antonia Matias, nick-named Toning, — which was the way she signed the loose
sheets, and there is no clear proof that Doña Justina had authorized these two to act for her in such
liquidation; on the contrary if the result of that was a deficit as alleged and sought to be there shown, of
P9,210.49, that was not what Doña Justina apparently understood for as the Court understands her
statement to the Honorable Judge of the Juvenile Court . . . the reason why she preferred to stay in her
home was because there she did not incur in any debts . . . this being the case, . . . the Court will not
adjudicate in favor of Wong Heng on his counterclaim; on the other hand, while it is claimed that the
expenses were much less than the rentals and there in fact should be a superavit, . . . this Court must
concede that daily expenses are not easy to compute, for this reason, the Court faced with the choice of
the two alternatives will choose the middle course which after all is permitted by the rules of proof, Sec.
69, Rule 123 for in the ordinary course of things, a person will live within his income so that the
conclusion of the Court will be that there is neither deficit nor superavit and will let the matter rest here.
Both parties on appeal reiterate their respective claims but we agree with the lower court that both
claims should be denied. Aside from the reasons given by the court, we think that the claim of Justina
Santos totalling P37,235, as rentals due to her after deducting various expenses, should be rejected as
the evidence is none too clear about the amounts spent by Wong for food29 masses30 and salaries of her
maids.31 His claim for P9,210.49 must likewise be rejected as his averment of liquidation is belied by his
own admission that even as late as 1960 he still had P22,000 in the bank and P3,000 in his possession.
ACCORDINGLY, the contracts in question (Plff Exhs. 3-7) are annulled and set aside; the land
subject-matter of the contracts is ordered returned to the estate of Justina Santos as represented by the
Philippine Banking Corporation; Wong Heng (as substituted by the defendant-appellant Lui She) is
ordered to pay the Philippine Banking Corporation the sum of P56,564.35, with legal interest from the
date of the filing of the amended complaint; and the amounts consigned in court by Wong Heng shall be
applied to the payment of rental from November 15, 1959 until the premises shall have been vacated by
his heirs. Costs against the defendant-appellant.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Angeles, JJ.,
concur.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J., concurring:
With the able and well-written opinion of Justice Castro, I am in full agreement. The exposition of the
facts leaves nothing to be desired and the statement of the law is notable for its comprehensiveness and
clarity. This concurring opinion has been written solely to express what I consider to be the unfortunate
and deplorable consequences of applying the pari delicto concept, as was, to my mind, indiscriminately
done, to alien landholding declared illegal under the Krivenko doctrine in some past decisions.
It is to be remembered that in Krivenko v. The Register of Deeds of Manila,1 this Court over strong
dissents held that residential and commercial lots may be considered agricultural within the meaning of
the constitutional provision prohibiting the transfer of any private agricultural land to individuals,
corporations or associations not qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines
save in cases of hereditary succession.
That provision of the Constitution took effect on November 15, 1935 when the Commonwealth
Government was established. The interpretation as set forth in the Krivenko decision was only handed
down on November 15, 1947. Prior to that date there were many who were of the opinion that the
phrase agricultural
land should
be
construed
strictly
and
not
be
made
to
cover residential and commercial lots. Acting on that belief, several transactions were entered into
transferring such lots to alien vendees by Filipino-vendors.
After the Krivenko decision, some Filipino vendors sought recovery of the lots in question on the ground
that the sales were null and void. No definite ruling was made by this Court until September of 1953,
when on the 29th of said month, Rellosa v. Gaw Chee Hun,2 Bautista v. Uy Isabelo,3 Talento v.
Makiki,4 Caoile v. Chiao Peng5 were decided.
Of the four decisions in September, 1953, the most extensive discussion of the question is found
in Rellosa v. Gaw Chee Hun, the opinion being penned by retired Justice Bautista Angelo with the
concurrence only of one Justice, Justice Labrador, also retired. Former Chief Justice Paras as well as
the former Justices Tuason and Montemayor concurred in the result. The necessary sixth vote for a
decision was given by the then Justice Bengzon, who had a two-paragraph concurring opinion
disagreeing with the main opinion as to the force to be accorded to the two cases,6 therein cited. There
were two dissenting opinions by former Justices Pablo and Alex Reyes. The doctrine as announced in
the Rellosa case is that while the sale by a Filipino-vendor to an alien-vendee of a residential or a
commercial lot is null and void as held in the Krivenko case, still the Filipino-vendor has no right to
recover under a civil law doctrine, the parties being in pari delicto. The only remedy to prevent this
continuing violation of the Constitution which the decision impliedly sanctions by allowing the alien
vendees to retain the lots in question is either escheat or reversion. Thus: "By following either of these
remedies, or by approving an implementary law as above suggested, we can enforce the fundamental
policy of our Constitution regarding our natural resources without doing violence to the principle of pari
delicto."7
Were the parties really in pari delicto? Had the sale by and between Filipino-vendor and alien-vendee
occurred after the decision in the Krivenko case, then the above view would be correct that both
Filipino-vendor and alien-vendee could not be considered as innocent parties within the contemplation
of the law. Both of them should be held equally guilty of evasion of the Constitution.
Since, however, the sales in question took place prior to the Krivenko decision, at a time when the
assumption could be honestly entertained that there was no constitutional prohibition against the sale of
commercial or residential lots by Filipino-vendor to alien-vendee, in the absence of a definite decision by
the Supreme Court, it would not be doing violence to reason to free them from the imputation of evading
the Constitution. For evidently evasion implies at the very least knowledge of what is being evaded. The
new Civil Code expressly provides: "Mistakes upon a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the
basis of good faith."8
According to the Rellosa opinion, both parties are equally guilty of evasion of the Constitution, based on
the broader principle that "both parties are presumed to know the law." This statement that the sales
entered into prior to the Krivenko decision were at that time already vitiated by a guilty knowledge of the
parties may be too extreme a view. It appears to ignore a postulate of a constitutional system, wherein
the words of the Constitution acquire meaning through Supreme Court adjudication.
1awphîl.nèt
Reference may be made by way of analogy to a decision adjudging a statute void. Under the orthodox
theory of constitutional law, the act having been found unconstitutional was not a law, conferred no
rights, imposed no duty, afforded no protection.9 As pointed out by former Chief Justice Hughes though
in Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank:10 "It is quite clear, however, that such broad
statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications.
The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration. The effect of subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various
aspects, — with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private
and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations
deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the
statute and of its previous application, demand examination."
After the Krivenko decision, there is no doubt that continued possession by alien-vendee of property
acquired before its promulgation is violative of the Constitution. It is as if an act granting aliens the right
to acquire residential and commercial lots were annulled by the Supreme Court as contrary to the
provision of the Constitution prohibiting aliens from acquiring private agricultural land.
The question then as now, therefore, was and is how to divest the alien of such property rights on terms
equitable to both parties. That question should be justly resolved in accordance with the mandates of
the Constitution not by a wholesale condemnation of both parties for entering into a contract at a time
when there was no ban as yet arising from the Krivenko decision, which could not have been anticipated.
Unfortunately, under the Rellosa case, it was assumed that the parties, being in pari delicto, would be
left in the situation in which they were, neither being in a position to seek judicial redress.
Would it not have been more in consonance with the Constitution, if instead the decision compelled the
restitution of the property by the alien-vendee to the Filipino-vendor? Krivenko decision held in clear,
explicit and unambigous language that: "We are deciding the instant case under section 5 of Article XIII
of the Constitution which is more comprehensive and more absolute in the sense that it prohibits the
transfer to aliens of any private agricultural land including residential land whatever its origin might have
been . . . . This prohibition [Rep. Act No. 133] makes no distinction between private lands that are strictly
agricultural and private lands that are residential or commercial. The prohibition embraces the sale of
private lands of any kind in favor of aliens, which is again a clear implementation and a legislative
interpretation of the constitutional prohibition. . . . It is well to note at this juncture that in the present case
we have no choice. We are construing the Constitution as it is and not as we may desire it to be.
Perhaps the effect of our construction is to preclude aliens, admitted freely into the Philippines, from
owning sites where they may build their homes. But if this is the solemn mandate of the Constitution, we
will not attempt to compromise it even in the name of amity or equity."11
Alien-vendee is therefore incapacitated or disqualified to acquire and hold real estate. That incapacity
and that disqualification should date from the adoption of the Constitution on November 15, 1935. That
incapacity and that disqualification, however, was made known to Filipino-vendor and to alien-vendee
only upon the promulgation of the Krivenko decision on November 15, 1947. Alien-vendee, therefore,
cannot be allowed to continue owning and exercising acts of ownership over said property, when it is
clearly included within the Constitutional prohibition. Alien-vendee should thus be made to restore the
property with its fruits and rents to Filipino-vendor, its previous owner, if it could be shown that in the
utmost good faith, he transferred his title over the same to alien-vendee, upon restitution of the purchase
price of course.
The Constitution bars alien-vendees from owning the property in question. By dismissing those suits,
the lots remained in alien hands. Notwithstanding the solution of escheat or reversion offered, they are
still at the moment of writing, for the most part in alien hands. There have been after almost twenty years
no proceedings for escheat or reversion.
Yet it is clear that an alien-vendee cannot consistently with the constitutional provision, as interpreted in
the Krivenko decision, continue owning and exercising acts of ownership over the real estate in question.
It ought to follow then, if such a continuing violation of the fundamental law is to be put an end to, that
the Filipino-vendor, who in good faith entered into, a contract with an incapacitated person, transferring
ownership of a piece of land after the Constitution went into full force and effect, should, in the light of
the ruling in the Krivenko case, be restored to the possession and ownership thereof, where he has filed
the appropriate case or proceeding. Any other construction would defeat the ends and purposes not
only of this particular provision in question but the rest of the Constitution itself.
The Constitution frowns upon the title remaining in the alien-vendees. Restoration of the property upon
payment of price received by Filipino vendor or its reasonable equivalent as fixed by the court is the
answer. To give the constitutional provision full force and effect, in consonance with the dictates of
equity and justice, the restoration to Filipino-vendor upon the payment of a price fixed by the court is the
better remedy. He thought he could transfer the property to an alien and did so. After the Krivenko case
had made clear that he had no right to sell nor an alien-vendee to purchase the property in question, the
obvious solution would be for him to reacquire the same. That way the Constitution would be given, as it
ought to be given, respect and deference.
It may be said that it is too late at this stage to hope for such a solution, the Rellosa opinion, although
originally concurred in by only one justice, being too firmly imbedded. The writer however sees a
welcome sign in the adoption by the Court in this case of the concurring opinion of the then Justice, later
Chief Justice, Bengzon. Had it been followed then, the problem would not be still with us now.
Fortunately, it is never too late — not even in constitutional adjudication.
Footnotes
1
43 Phil. 873 (1922).
2
Id. at 876.
3
55 Phil. 99 (1930).
4
77 Phil. 470 (1946).
5
Civ. Code, art. 1197.
6
Jakosalem vs. Rafols, 73 Phil. 628 (1942).
7
T.s.n., pp. 73-74, June 20, 1960.
8
T.s.n., pp. 70-71, 73-74, June 20, 1960 (emphasis added).
9
T.s.n., pp. 54-55, June 6, 1960.
10
T.s.n., p. 86, June 20, 1960 (emphasis added).
11
T.s.n., pp. 69-70, June 20, 1960.
Article 1332 of the Civil Code provides that "When one of the parties is unable to read or if the contract
is in a language not understood by him, and mistake or fraud is alleged, the person enforcing the
contract must show that the terms thereof have been fully explained to the former."
12
13
T.s.n., p. 11, June 21, 1960.
14
T.s.n., pp. 119-120, June 20, 1960.
15
T.s.n., p. 76, June 6, 1960.
Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, G.R. L-23002, July 31, 1967; Enriquez de la Cavada v. Diaz, 37 Phil. 982
(1918) ; see also Puato v. Mendoza, 64 Phil. 457 (1937).
16
17
T.s.n., p. 79, June 6, 1960 (emphasis added).
18
T.s.n., p. 121, June 20, 1960.
19
Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, supra, note 16.
79 Phil. 461, 480-481 (1947) (emphasis added). The statement in Smith, Bell & Co. v. Register of
Deeds, 96 Phil. 53, 61-62 (1954), to the effect that an alien may lease lands in the Philippines for as long
as 99 years under article 1643 of the Civil Code, is obiter as the term of the lease in that case for 25
years only, renewable for a like period, and the character (whether temporary or permanent) of rights
under a 99-year lease was not considered.
20
The contract (Plff Exh. 6) of November 18, 1958 provides that "Sa loob nang nabanggit na panahon
limangpung (50) taon na hindi pa ginagamit ni WONG o kaniyang kaanak ang karapatan nilang bumili,
ay ang nabanggit na lupa ay hindi maaring ipagbili, ibigay, isangla, o itali ng MAY-ARI sa iba" [Within the
said period of fifty (50) years during which neither WONG nor any of his children has exercised the
option to buy, the said piece of land cannot be sold, donated, mortgaged or encumbered in favor of
other persons by the owner].
21
22
Supra, note 20.
Cf. Rellosa v. Gaw Chee Hun, 93 Phil. 827, 836 (1953) (Cesar Bengzon, J., concurring) : "Perhaps the
innocent spouse of the seller and his creditors are not barred from raising the issue of invalidity."
23
24
Const. art. XIII sec. 5.
25
Supra, note 20, at 480-481.
26
93 Phil. 827 (1953).
According to the lower court the amount should be P38,422.94, but the difference appears to be the
result of an error in addition.
27
According to the trial court the amount should be P56,554.25, but the difference appears to be due to
the error pointed out in note 27.
28
29
T.s.n., pp. 6-8, July 26, 1960.
30
T.s.n., p. 35, July 26, 1960.
31
T.s.n., pp. 31-35, July 26, 1960.
FERNANDO, J., concurring:
1
79 Phil. 461 (1947).
2
93 Phil. 827.
3
93 Phil. 843.
4
93 Phil. 855.
93 Phil. 861. See also Arambulo v. Cua So, (1954) 95 Phil. 749; Dinglasan v. Lee Bun Ting, (1956) 99
Phil. 427.
5
6
Bough v. Cantiveros, (1919) 40 Phil. 210 and Perez v. Herranz (1902) 7 Phil. 693.
7
At p. 835.
Art. 526, par. 3. The above provision is merely a reiteration of the doctrine announced in the case
of Kasilag v. Rodriguez decided on December 7, 1939 (69 Phil. 217), the pertinent excerpt follows:
8
"This being the case, the question is whether good faith may be premised upon ignorance of the laws.
Manresa, commenting on article 434 in connection with the preceding article, sustains the affirmative.
He says:
"'We do not believe that in real life there are not many cases of good faith founded upon an error of law.
When the acquisition appears in a public document, the capacity of the parties has already been passed
upon by competent authority, and even established by appeals taken from final judgments and
administrative remedies against the qualification of registrars, and the possibility of error is remote under
such circumstances; but, unfortunately, private documents and even verbal agreements far exceed
public documents in number, and while no one should be ignorant of the law, the truth is that even we
who are called upon to know and apply it fall into error not infrequently. However, a clear, manifest, and
truly unexcusable ignorance is one thing, to which undoubtedly refers article 2, and another and
different thing is possible and excusable error arising from complex legal principle and from the
interpretation of conflicting doctrines.
"But even ignorance of the law may be based upon an error of fact, or better still, ignorance of a fact is
possible as to the capacity to transmit and as to the intervention of certain persons, compliance with
certain formalities and appreciation of certain acts, and error of law is possible in the interpretation of
doubtful doctrines.'" (Manresa, Commentaries on the Spanish Civil Code, Volume IV, pp. 100, 101 and
102.)
9
Norton v. Shelby County, (1886) 118 U.S. 425.
10
308 U.S. 731 (1940).
11
79 Phil. 461, 480 (1947).
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 159310
February 24, 2009
CAMILO F. BORROMEO, Petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIETTA O. DESCALLAR, Respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
What are the rights of an alien (and his successor-in-interest) who acquired real properties in the
country as against his former Filipina girlfriend in whose sole name the properties were registered under
the Torrens system?
The facts are as follows:
Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, arrived in the Philippines in 1983 after he was assigned by his employer,
Simmering-Graz Panker A.G., an Austrian company, to work at a project in Mindoro. In 1984, he
transferred to Cebu and worked at the Naga II Project of the National Power Corporation. There, he met
respondent Antonietta Opalla-Descallar, a separated mother of two boys who was working as a waitress
at St. Moritz Hotel. Jambrich befriended respondent and asked her to tutor him in English. In dire need
of additional income to support her children, respondent agreed. The tutorials were held in Antonietta’s
residence at a squatters’ area in Gorordo Avenue.
Jambrich and respondent fell in love and decided to live together in a rented house in Hernan Cortes,
Mandaue City. Later, they transferred to their own house and lots at Agro-Macro Subdivision,
Cabancalan, Mandaue City. In the Contracts to Sell dated November 18, 1985 1 and March 10,
19862 covering the properties, Jambrich and respondent were referred to as the buyers. A Deed of
Absolute Sale dated November 16, 19873 was likewise issued in their favor. However, when the Deed of
Absolute Sale was presented for registration before the Register of Deeds, registration was refused on
the ground that Jambrich was an alien and could not acquire alienable lands of the public domain.
Consequently, Jambrich’s name was erased from the document. But it could be noted that his signature
remained on the left hand margin of page 1, beside respondent’s signature as buyer on page 3, and at
the bottom of page 4 which is the last page. Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 24790, 24791 and
24792 over the properties were issued in respondent’s name alone.
Jambrich also formally adopted respondent’s two sons in Sp. Proc. No. 39-MAN,4 and per Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City dated May 5, 1988.5
However, the idyll lasted only until April 1991. By then, respondent found a new boyfriend while
Jambrich began to live with another woman in Danao City. Jambrich supported respondent’s sons for
only two months after the break up.
Jambrich met petitioner Camilo F. Borromeo sometime in 1986. Petitioner was engaged in the real
estate business. He also built and repaired speedboats as a hobby. In 1989, Jambrich purchased an
engine and some accessories for his boat from petitioner, for which he became indebted to the latter for
about ₱150,000.00. To pay for his debt, he sold his rights and interests in the Agro-Macro properties to
petitioner for ₱250,000, as evidenced by a "Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment."6 On July 26, 1991,
when petitioner sought to register the deed of assignment, he discovered that titles to the three lots have
been transferred in the name of respondent, and that the subject property has already been mortgaged.
On August 2, 1991, petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for recovery of real property before
the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City. Petitioner alleged that the Contracts to Sell dated November
18, 1985 and March 10, 1986 and the Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 16, 1987 over the
properties which identified both Jambrich and respondent as buyers do not reflect the true agreement of
the parties since respondent did not pay a single centavo of the purchase price and was not in fact a
buyer; that it was Jambrich alone who paid for the properties using his exclusive funds; that Jambrich
was the real and absolute owner of the properties; and, that petitioner acquired absolute ownership by
virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment dated July 11, 1991 which Jambrich executed in his
favor.
In her Answer, respondent belied the allegation that she did not pay a single centavo of the purchase
price. On the contrary, she claimed that she "solely and exclusively used her own personal funds to
defray and pay for the purchase price of the subject lots in question," and that Jambrich, being an alien,
was prohibited to acquire or own real property in the Philippines.
At the trial, respondent presented evidence showing her alleged financial capacity to buy the disputed
property with money from a supposed copra business. Petitioner, in turn, presented Jambrich as his
witness and documentary evidence showing the substantial salaries which Jambrich received while still
employed by the Austrian company, Simmering-Graz Panker A.G.
In its decision, the court a quo found—
Evidence on hand clearly show that at the time of the purchase and acquisition of [the] properties under
litigation that Wilhelm Jambrich was still working and earning much. This fact of Jambrich earning much
is not only supported by documentary evidence but also by the admission made by the defendant
Antoniet[t]a Opalla. So that, Jambrich’s financial capacity to acquire and purchase the properties . . . is
not disputed.7
xxx
On the other hand, evidence . . . clearly show that before defendant met Jambrich sometime in the latter
part of 1984, she was only working as a waitress at the St. Moritz Hotel with an income of ₱1,000.00 a
month and was . . . renting and living only in . . . [a] room at . . . [a] squatter area at Gorordo Ave., Cebu
City; that Jambrich took pity of her and the situation of her children that he offered her a better life which
she readily accepted. In fact, this miserable financial situation of hers and her two children . . . are all
stated and reflected in the Child Study Report dated April 20, 1983 (Exhs. "G" and "G-1") which facts
she supplied to the Social Worker who prepared the same when she was personally interviewed by her
in connection with the adoption of her two children by Wilhelm Jambrich. So that, if such facts were not
true because these are now denied by her . . . and if it was also true that during this time she was
already earning as much as ₱8,000.00 to ₱9,000.00 as profit per month from her copra business, it
would be highly unbelievable and impossible for her to be living only in such a miserable condition since
it is the observation of this Court that she is not only an extravagant but also an expensive person and
not thrifty as she wanted to impress this Court in order to have a big saving as clearly shown by her
actuation when she was already cohabiting and living with Jambrich that according to her . . . the
allowance given . . . by him in the amount of $500.00 a month is not enough to maintain the education
and maintenance of her children.8
This being the case, it is highly improbable and impossible that she could acquire the properties under
litigation or could contribute any amount for their acquisition which according to her is worth more than
₱700,000.00 when while she was working as [a] waitress at St. Moritz Hotel earning ₱1,000.00 a month
as salary and tips of more or less ₱2,000.00 she could not even provide [for] the daily needs of her
family so much so that it is safe to conclude that she was really in financial distress when she met and
accepted the offer of Jambrich to come and live with him because that was a big financial opportunity for
her and her children who were already abandoned by her husband.9
xxx
The only probable and possible reason why her name appeared and was included in [the contracts to
sell dated November 18, 1985 and March 10, 1986 and finally, the deed of absolute sale dated
November 16, 1987] as buyer is because as observed by the Court, she being a scheming and
exploitive woman, she has taken advantage of the goodness of Jambrich who at that time was still
bewitched by her beauty, sweetness, and good attitude shown by her to him since he could still very well
provide for everything she needs, he being earning (sic) much yet at that time. In fact, as observed by
this Court, the acquisition of these properties under litigation was at the time when their relationship was
still going smoothly and harmoniously.10 [Emphasis supplied.]
The dispositive portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, . . . Decision is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant
Antoniet[t]a Opalla by:
1) Declaring plaintiff as the owner in fee simple over the residential house of strong materials and three
parcels of land designated as Lot Nos. 1, 3 and 5 which are covered by TCT Nos. 24790, 24791 and
24792 issued by the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City;
2) Declaring as null and void TCT Nos. 24790, 24791 and 24792 issued in the name of defendant
Antoniet[t]a Descallar by the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City;
3) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City to cancel TCT Nos. 24790, 24791 and 24792 in the
name of defendant Antoniet[t]a Descallar and to issue new ones in the name of plaintiff Camilo F.
Borromeo;
4) Declaring the contracts now marked as Exhibits "I," "K" and "L" as avoided insofar as they appear to
convey rights and interests over the properties in question to the defendant Antoniet[t]a Descallar;
5) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff attorney’s fees in the amount of ₱25,000.00 and litigation
expenses in the amount of ₱10,000.00; and,
6) To pay the costs.11
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated April 10, 2002,12 the appellate court
reversed the decision of the trial court. In ruling for the respondent, the Court of Appeals held:
We disagree with the lower court’s conclusion. The circumstances involved in the case cited by the
lower court and similar cases decided on by the Supreme Court which upheld the validity of the title of
the subsequent Filipino purchasers are absent in the case at bar. It should be noted that in said cases,
the title to the subject property has been issued in the name of the alien transferee (Godinez et al., vs.
Fong Pak Luen et al., 120 SCRA 223 citing Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds of Manila, 79 Phils. 461;
United Church Board for World Ministries vs. Sebastian, 159 SCRA 446, citing the case of Sarsosa Vda.
De Barsobia vs. Cuenco, 113 SCRA 547; Tejido vs. Zamacoma, 138 SCRA 78). In the case at bar, the
title of the subject property is not in the name of Jambrich but in the name of defendant-appellant. Thus,
Jambrich could not have transferred a property he has no title thereto.13
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, this petition for review.
Petitioner assigns the following errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DISREGARDING
RESPONDENT’S JUDICIAL ADMISSION AND OTHER OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE
ESTABLISHING JAMBRICH’S PARTICIPATION, INTEREST AND OWNERSHIP OF
THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION AS FOUND BY THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
JAMBRICH HAS NO TITLE TO THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION AND MAY NOT
THEREFORE TRANSFER AND ASSIGN ANY RIGHTS AND INTERESTS IN FAVOR
OF PETITIONER.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN REVERSING
THE WELL-REASONED DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AND IN IMPOSING
DOUBLE COSTS AGAINST HEREIN PETITIONER (THEN, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE).14
First, who purchased the subject properties?
The evidence clearly shows, as pointed out by the trial court, who between respondent and Jambrich
possesses the financial capacity to acquire the properties in dispute. At the time of the acquisition of the
properties in 1985 to 1986, Jambrich was gainfully employed at Simmering-Graz Panker A.G., an
Austrian company. He was earning an estimated monthly salary of ₱50,000.00. Then, Jambrich was
assigned to Syria for almost one year where his monthly salary was approximately ₱90,000.00.
On the other hand, respondent was employed as a waitress from 1984 to 1985 with a monthly salary of
not more than ₱1,000.00. In 1986, when the parcels of land were acquired, she was unemployed, as
admitted by her during the pre-trial conference. Her allegations of income from a copra business were
unsubstantiated. The supposed copra business was actually the business of her mother and their family,
with ten siblings. She has no license to sell copra, and had not filed any income tax return. All the
motorized bancas of her mother were lost to fire, and the last one left standing was already scrap.
Further, the Child Study Report15 submitted by the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD) in the adoption proceedings of respondent’s two sons by Jambrich disclosed that:
Antonietta tried all types of job to support the children until she was accepted as a waitress at St. Moritz
Restaurant in 1984. At first she had no problem with money because most of the customers of St. Moritz
are (sic) foreigners and they gave good tips but towards the end of 1984 there were no more foreigners
coming because of the situation in the Philippines at that time. Her financial problem started then. She
was even renting a small room in a squatters area in Gorordo Ave., Cebu City. It was during her time of
great financial distress that she met Wilhelm Jambrich who later offered her a decent place for herself
and her children.16
The DSWD Home Study Report17 further disclosed that:
[Jambrich] was then at the Restaurant of St. Moritz when he saw Antonietta Descallar, one of the
waitresses of the said Restaurants. He made friends with the girl and asked her to tutor him in [the]
English language. Antonietta accepted the offer because she was in need of additional income to
support [her] 2 young children who were abandoned by their father. Their session was agreed to be
scheduled every afternoon at the residence of Antonietta in the squatters area in Gorordo Avenue, Cebu
City. The Austrian was observing the situation of the family particularly the children who were
malnourished. After a few months sessions, Mr. Jambrich offered to transfer the family into a decent
place. He told Antonietta that the place is not good for the children. Antonietta who was miserable and
financially distressed at that time accepted the offer for the sake of the children.18
Further, the following additional pieces of evidence point to Jambrich as the source of fund used to
purchase the three parcels of land, and to construct the house thereon:
(1) Respondent Descallar herself affirmed under oath, during her re-direct examination and during the
proceedings for the adoption of her minor children, that Jambrich was the owner of the properties in
question, but that his name was deleted in the Deed of Absolute Sale because of legal constraints.
Nonetheless, his signature remained in the deed of sale, where he signed as buyer.
(2) The money used to pay the subject parcels of land in installments was in postdated checks issued by
Jambrich. Respondent has never opened any account with any bank. Receipts of the installment
payments were also in the name of Jambrich and respondent.
(3) In 1986-1987, respondent lived in Syria with Jambrich and her two children for ten months, where
she was completely under the support of Jambrich.
(4) Jambrich executed a Last Will and Testament, where he, as owner, bequeathed the subject
properties to respondent.
Thus, Jambrich has all authority to transfer all his rights, interests and participation over the subject
properties to petitioner by virtue of the Deed of Assignment he executed on July 11, 1991.
Well-settled is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. The findings of fact of the trial court are
accorded great weight and respect, if not finality by this Court, subject to a number of exceptions. In the
instant case, we find no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court. Even the appellate court
did not controvert the factual findings of the trial court. They differed only in their conclusions of law.
Further, the fact that the disputed properties were acquired during the couple’s cohabitation also does
not help respondent. The rule that co-ownership applies to a man and a woman living exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, but are otherwise capacitated to marry
each other, does not apply.19 In the instant case, respondent was still legally married to another when
she and Jambrich lived together. In such an adulterous relationship, no co-ownership exists between
the parties. It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the
acquisition of property in order to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership
and equal contribution do not apply.20
Second, we dispose of the issue of registration of the properties in the name of respondent alone.
Having found that the true buyer of the disputed house and lots was the Austrian Wilhelm Jambrich,
what now is the effect of registration of the properties in the name of respondent?
It is settled that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership.21 It is only a means of confirming the
fact of its existence with notice to the world at large.22 Certificates of title are not a source of right. The
mere possession of a title does not make one the true owner of the property. Thus, the mere fact that
respondent has the titles of the disputed properties in her name does not necessarily, conclusively and
absolutely make her the owner. The rule on indefeasibility of title likewise does not apply to respondent.
A certificate of title implies that the title is quiet,23 and that it is perfect, absolute and
indefeasible.24 However, there are well-defined exceptions to this rule, as when the transferee is not a
holder in good faith and did not acquire the subject properties for a valuable consideration.25 This is the
situation in the instant case. Respondent did not contribute a single centavo in the acquisition of the
properties. She had no income of her own at that time, nor did she have any savings. She and her two
sons were then fully supported by Jambrich.
Respondent argued that aliens are prohibited from acquiring private land. This is embodied in Section 7,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution,26 which is basically a reproduction of Section 5, Article XIII of the
1935 Constitution,27 and Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution.28 The capacity to acquire
private land is dependent on the capacity "to acquire or hold lands of the public domain." Private land
may be transferred only to individuals or entities "qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain."
Only Filipino citizens or corporations at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos are
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Thus, as the rule now stands, the fundamental
law explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring or holding title to private lands, except only by way of
legal succession or if the acquisition was made by a former natural-born citizen.29
Therefore, in the instant case, the transfer of land from Agro-Macro Development Corporation to
Jambrich, who is an Austrian, would have been declared invalid if challenged, had not Jambrich
conveyed the properties to petitioner who is a Filipino citizen. In United Church Board for World
Ministries v. Sebastian,30 the Court reiterated the consistent ruling in a number of cases31 that if land is
invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a Filipino citizen or transfers it to a Filipino,
the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.
Applying United Church Board for World Ministries, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioner, viz.:
[W]hile the acquisition and the purchase of (sic) Wilhelm Jambrich of the properties under litigation
[were] void ab initio since [they were] contrary to the Constitution of the Philippines, he being a foreigner,
yet, the acquisition of these properties by plaintiff who is a Filipino citizen from him, has cured the flaw in
the original transaction and the title of the transferee is valid.
The trial court upheld the sale by Jambrich in favor of petitioner and ordered the cancellation of the
TCTs in the name of respondent. It declared petitioner as owner in fee simple of the residential house of
strong materials and three parcels of land designated as Lot Nos. 1, 3 and 5, and ordered the Register
of Deeds of Mandaue City to issue new certificates of title in his name. The trial court likewise ordered
respondent to pay petitioner ₱25,000 as attorney’s fees and ₱10,000 as litigation expenses, as well as
the costs of suit.
We affirm the Regional Trial Court.
The rationale behind the Court’s ruling in United Church Board for World Ministries, as reiterated in
subsequent cases,32 is this – since the ban on aliens is intended to preserve the nation’s land for future
generations of Filipinos, that aim is achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens
who became Filipino citizens by naturalization or those transfers made by aliens to Filipino citizens. As
the property in dispute is already in the hands of a qualified person, a Filipino citizen, there would be no
more public policy to be protected. The objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in
Filipino hands has been achieved.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV
No. 42929 dated April 10, 2002 and its Resolution dated July 8, 2003 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City in Civil Case No. MAN-1148 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
Exhibit "I," Original Records, p. 104.
2
Exhibit "K," id. at 105.
3
Exhibit "L," id. at 106-109.
4
Exhibit "C," id. at 87-89.
5
Exhibit "H," id. at 101-103.
6
Exhibit "O," id. at 155.
7
Decision, id. at 294.
8
Id. at 295-296.
9
Id. at 296.
10
Id. at 297.
11
Id. at 297-298.
12
Id. at 71-83.
13
CA rollo, pp. 225-226.
14
Rollo, p. 15.
15
Exhibit "G," Original Records, pp. 97-100.
16
Id. at 100.
17
Exhibit "F," id. at 92-96.
18
Id. at 93.
19
Art. 144, Civil Code; Art. 147, Family Code.
Art. 148, Family Code; Rivera v. Heirs of Romualdo Villanueva, G.R. No. 141501, July 21, 2006, 496
SCRA 135.
20
21
Bollozos v. Yu Tieng Su, No. L-29442, November 11, 1987, 155 SCRA 506.
22
Id. at 517, citing Bautista v. Dy Bun Chin, CA-L-6983-R, 49 O.G. 179.
23
Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590 (1915).
24
Government v. Avila, 38 Phil. 38 (1918).
Ignacio v. Chua Beng, 52 Phil. 940 (1929); Acosta v. Gomez, 52 Phil. 744 (1929); Cruz v. Fabie, 35
Phil. 144 (1916).
25
SECTION 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or
conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain.
26
SECTION 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred
or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain in the Philippines.
27
SECTION 14. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be transferred or
conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain.
28
1987 Constitution, Art. XII, Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of
private lands, subject to limitations provided by law.
29
30
G.R. No. L-34672, March 30, 1988, 159 SCRA 446.
Sarsosa Vda. de Barsobia v. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-33048, April 16, 1982, 113 SCRA 547; Godinez v.
Pak Luen, G.R. No. L-36731, January 27, 1983, 120 SCRA 223, Vasquez v. Li Seng Giap & Sons, 96
Phil. 447 (1955); Herrera v. Luy King Guan, G.R. No. L-17043, January 31, 1961, 1 SCRA 406; Yap v.
Maravillas, G.R. No. L-31606, March 28, 1983, 121 SCRA 244; and De Castro v. Tan, G.R. No. L-31956,
April 30, 1984, 129 SCRA 85.
31
Hko Ah Pao v. Ting, G.R. No. 153476, September 27, 2006, 503 SCRA 551; Muller v. Muller, G.R. No.
149615, August 29, 2006, 500 SCRA 65; Lee v. Republic, G.R. No. 128195, October 3, 2001, 366
SCRA 524.
32
G.R. No. 149615 August 29, 2006
IN RE: PETITION FOR SEPARATION
MULLER, Petitioner,
vs.
HELMUT MULLER, Respondent.
OF
PROPERTY
DECISION
ELENA
BUENAVENTURA
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari 1 assails the February 26, 2001 Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 59321 affirming with modification the August 12, 1996 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 86 in Civil Case No. Q-94-21862, which terminated the regime of absolute
community of property between petitioner and respondent, as well as the Resolution 4 dated August 13,
2001 denying the motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married in Hamburg,
Germany on September 22, 1989. The couple resided in Germany at a house owned by respondent’s
parents but decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines in 1992. By this time, respondent
had inherited the house in Germany from his parents which he sold and used the proceeds for the
purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal at the cost of P528,000.00 and the construction of a
house amounting to P2,300,000.00. The Antipolo property was registered in the name of petitioner
under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 219438 5 of the Register of Deeds of Marikina, Metro Manila.
Due to incompatibilities and respondent’s alleged womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment, the spouses
eventually separated. On September 26, 1994, respondent filed a petition 6 for separation of properties
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
On August 12, 1996, the trial court rendered a decision which terminated the regime of absolute
community of property between the petitioner and respondent. It also decreed the separation of
properties between them and ordered the equal partition of personal properties located within the
country, excluding those acquired by gratuitous title during the marriage. With regard to the Antipolo
property, the court held that it was acquired using paraphernal funds of the respondent. However, it
ruled that respondent cannot recover his funds because the property was purchased in violation of
Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution. Thus –
However, pursuant to Article 92 of the Family Code, properties acquired by gratuitous title by either
spouse during the marriage shall be excluded from the community property. The real property, therefore,
inherited by petitioner in Germany is excluded from the absolute community of property of the herein
spouses. Necessarily, the proceeds of the sale of said real property as well as the personal properties
purchased thereby, belong exclusively to the petitioner. However, the part of that inheritance used by
the petitioner for acquiring the house and lot in this country cannot be recovered by the petitioner, its
acquisition being a violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution which provides that "save in
cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain." The law will leave
the parties in the situation where they are in without prejudice to a voluntary partition by the parties of
the said real property. x x x
xxxx
As regards the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 219438 of the Registry of Deeds of
Marikina, Metro Manila, situated in Antipolo, Rizal and the improvements thereon, the Court shall not
make any pronouncement on constitutional grounds. 7
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered the assailed decision modifying the trial
court’s Decision. It held that respondent merely prayed for reimbursement for the purchase of the
Antipolo property, and not acquisition or transfer of ownership to him. It also considered petitioner’s
ownership over the property in trust for the respondent. As regards the house, the Court of Appeals
ruled that there is nothing in the Constitution which prohibits respondent from acquiring the same. The
dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the lower court dated August 12, 1996 is hereby
MODIFIED. Respondent Elena Buenaventura Muller is hereby ordered to REIMBURSE the petitioner
the amount of P528,000.00 for the acquisition of the land and the amount of P2,300,000.00 for the
construction of the house situated in Atnipolo, Rizal, deducting therefrom the amount respondent spent
for the preservation, maintenance and development of the aforesaid real property including the
depreciation cost of the house or in the alternative to SELL the house and lot in the event respondent
does not have the means to reimburse the petitioner out of her own money and from the proceeds
thereof, reimburse the petitioner of the cost of the land and the house deducting the expenses for its
maintenance and preservation spent by the respondent. Should there be profit, the same shall be
divided in proportion to the equity each has over the property. The case is REMANDED to the lower
court for reception of evidence as to the amount claimed by the respondents for the preservation and
maintenance of the property.
SO ORDERED. 8
Hence, the instant petition for review raising the following issues:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
RESPONDENT HEREIN IS ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT OF THE AMOUNT USED TO
PURCHASE THE LAND AS WELL AS THE COSTS FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE HOUSE,
FOR IN SO RULING, IT INDIRECTLY ALLOWED AN ACT DONE WHICH OTHERWISE COULD NOT
BE DIRECTLY x x x DONE, WITHOUT DOING VIOLENCE TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROSCRIPTION THAT AN ALIEN IS PROHIBITED FROM ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP OF REAL
PROPERTIES LOCATED IN THE PHILIPPINES.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN SUSTAINING RESPONDENT’S CAUSE OF
ACTION WHICH IS ACTUALLY A DESPERATE ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN OWNERSHIP OVER THE
LOT IN QUESTION, CLOTHED UNDER THE GUISE OF CLAIMING REIMBURSEMENT.
Petitioner contends that respondent, being an alien, is disqualified to own private lands in the
Philippines; that respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition but circumvented the same; and
that respondent’s purpose for filing an action for separation of property is to obtain exclusive possession,
control and disposition of the Antipolo property.
Respondent claims that he is not praying for transfer of ownership of the Antipolo property but merely
reimbursement; that the funds paid by him for the said property were in consideration of his marriage to
petitioner; that the funds were given to petitioner in trust; and that equity demands that respondent
should be reimbursed of his personal funds.
The issue for resolution is whether respondent is entitled to reimbursement of the funds used for the
acquisition of the Antipolo property.
The petition has merit.
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain.
Hence, they are also disqualified from acquiring private lands. 9 The primary purpose of the
constitutional provision is the conservation of the national patrimony. In the case of Krivenko v. Register
of Deeds, 10 the Court held:
Under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural resources, with the exception of public
agricultural land, shall not be alienated," and with respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is
limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in the hands
of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their
agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly to prevent this result that section 5 is included in Article
XIII, and it reads as follows:
"Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be transferred or
assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain in the Philippines."
This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural resources may
leak into aliens’ hands. It would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to
aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the
hands of Filipino citizens. x x x
xxxx
If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including residential lots or lands not
strictly agricultural, the result would be that "aliens may freely acquire and possess not only residential
lots and houses for themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole towns and cities," and that "they may
validly buy and hold in their names lands of any area for building homes, factories, industrial plants,
fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health and vacation resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds, airfields,
and a host of other uses and purposes that are not, in appellant’s words, strictly agricultural." (Solicitor
General’s Brief, p. 6.) That this is obnoxious to the conservative spirit of the Constitution is beyond
question.
Respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition and expressly admitted his knowledge thereof to
this Court. 11 He declared that he had the Antipolo property titled in the name of petitioner because of the
said prohibition. 12 His attempt at subsequently asserting or claiming a right on the said property cannot
be sustained.
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied trust was created and resulted by operation of law
in view of petitioner’s marriage to respondent. Save for the exception provided in cases of hereditary
succession, respondent’s disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is absolute. Not even an
ownership in trust is allowed. Besides, where the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and
in evasion of its express provision, no trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud. 13 To
hold otherwise would allow circumvention of the constitutional prohibition.
Invoking the principle that a court is not only a court of law but also a court of equity, is likewise
misplaced. It has been held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done
indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly. 14 He who seeks equity must do
equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. The latter is a frequently stated
maxim which is also expressed in the principle that he who has done inequity shall not have equity. It
signifies that a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been
inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue. 15
Thus, in the instant case, respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is
clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the constitutional prohibition.
Further, the distinction made between transfer of ownership as opposed to recovery of funds is a futile
exercise on respondent’s part. To allow reimbursement would in effect permit respondent to enjoy the
fruits of a property which he is not allowed to own. Thus, it is likewise proscribed by law. As expressly
held in Cheesman v. Intermediate Appellate Court: 16
Finally, the fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land. Section 14, Article XIV of the
1973 Constitution ordains that, "Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain." Petitioner Thomas Cheesman was, of course, charged with knowledge of
this prohibition. Thus, assuming that it was his intention that the lot in question be purchased by him and
his wife, he acquired no right whatever over the property by virtue of that purchase; and in attempting to
acquire a right or interest in land, vicariously and clandestinely, he knowingly violated the Constitution;
the sale as to him was null and void. In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to question
the subsequent sale of the same property by his wife on the theory that in so doing he is merely
exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would
permit indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be declared
conjugal, this would accord to the alien husband a not insubstantial interest and right over land, as he
would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does
not permit him to have.
As already observed, the finding that his wife had used her own money to purchase the property cannot,
and will not, at this stage of the proceedings be reviewed and overturned. But even if it were a fact that
said wife had used conjugal funds to make the acquisition, the considerations just set out to militate, on
high constitutional grounds, against his recovering and holding the property so acquired, or any part
thereof. And whether in such an event, he may recover from his wife any share of the money used for
the purchase or charge her with unauthorized disposition or expenditure of conjugal funds is not now
inquired into; that would be, in the premises, a purely academic exercise. (Emphasis added)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated February
26, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59321 ordering petitioner Elena Buenaventura
Muller to reimburse respondent Helmut Muller the amount of P528,000 for the acquisition of the land
and the amount of P2,300,000 for the construction of the house in Antipolo City, and the Resolution
dated August 13, 2001 denying reconsideration thereof, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The August
12, 1996 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 86 in Civil Case No. Q-94-21862
terminating the regime of absolute community between the petitioner and respondent, decreeing a
separation of property between them and ordering the partition of the personal properties located in the
Philippines equally, is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
Rollo, pp. 31-50.
Id. at 8-13. Penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices
Ruben T. Reyes and Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (who is now a Member of this Court).
2
3
Id. at 98-101. Penned by Judge Teodoro A. Bay.
4
Id. at 22.
5
Id. at 58.
6
Id. at 52-57.
7
Id. at 100-101.
8
Id. at 12.
9
Ong Ching Po v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 113472-73, December 20, 1994, 239 SCRA 341, 346.
10
79 Phil. 461, 473, 476 (1947).
11
Rollo, p. 114.
12
TSN, April 18, 1995, p. 12.
13
Morales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117228, June 19, 1997, 274 SCRA 282, 299.
14
Frenzel v. Catito, 453 Phil. 885, 905 (2003).
15
University of the Philippines v. Catungal, Jr., 338 Phil. 728, 743-744 (1997).
16
G.R. No. 74833, January 21, 1991, 193 SCRA 93, 103-104.
G.R. No. 143958
July 11, 2003
ALFRED FRITZ FRENZEL, petitioner,
vs.
EDERLINA P. CATITO, respondent.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 53485
which affirmed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 14, in Civil Case No.
17,817 dismissing the petitioner's complaint, and the resolution of the Court of Appeals denying his
motion for reconsideration of the said decision.
The Antecedents3
As gleaned from the evidence of the petitioner, the case at bar stemmed from the following factual
backdrop:
Petitioner Alfred Fritz Frenzel is an Australian citizen of German descent. He is an electrical engineer by
profession, but worked as a pilot with the New Guinea Airlines. He arrived in the Philippines in 1974,
started engaging in business in the country two years thereafter, and married Teresita Santos, a Filipino
citizen. In 1981, Alfred and Teresita separated from bed and board without obtaining a divorce.
Sometime in February 1983, Alfred arrived in Sydney, Australia for a vacation. He went to King's Cross,
a night spot in Sydney, for a massage where he met Ederlina Catito, a Filipina and a native of Bajada,
Davao City. Unknown to Alfred, she resided for a time in Germany and was married to Klaus Muller, a
German national. She left Germany and tried her luck in Sydney, Australia, where she found
employment as a masseuse in the King's Cross nightclub. She was fluent in German, and Alfred
enjoyed talking with her. The two saw each other again; this time Ederlina ended up staying in Alfred's
hotel for three days. Alfred gave Ederlina sums of money for her services.4
Alfred was so enamored with Ederlina that he persuaded her to stop working at King's Cross, return to
the Philippines, and engage in a wholesome business of her own. He also proposed that they meet in
Manila, to which she assented. Alfred gave her money for her plane fare to the Philippines. Within two
weeks of Ederlina's arrival in Manila, Alfred joined her. Alfred reiterated his proposal for Ederlina to stay
in the Philippines and engage in business, even offering to finance her business venture. Ederlina was
delighted at the idea and proposed to put up a beauty parlor. Alfred happily agreed.
Alfred told Ederlina that he was married but that he was eager to divorce his wife in Australia. Alfred
proposed marriage to Ederlina, but she replied that they should wait a little bit longer.
Ederlina found a building at No. 444 M.H. del Pilar corner Arquiza Street, Ermita, Manila, owned by one
Atty. Jose Hidalgo who offered to convey his rights over the property for P18,000.00. Alfred and Ederlina
accepted the offer. Ederlina put up a beauty parlor on the property under the business name Edorial
Beauty Salon, and had it registered with the Department of Trade and Industry under her name. Alfred
paid Atty. Hidalgo P20,000.00 for his right over the property and gave P300,000.00 to Ederlina for the
purchase of equipment and furniture for the parlor. As Ederlina was going to Germany, she executed a
special power of attorney on December 13, 19835 appointing her brother, Aser Catito, as her
attorney-in-fact in managing the beauty parlor business. She stated in the said deed that she was
married to Klaus Muller. Alfred went back to Papua New Guinea to resume his work as a pilot.
When Alfred returned to the Philippines, he visited Ederlina in her Manila residence and found it
unsuitable for her. He decided to purchase a house and lot owned by Victoria Binuya Steckel in San
Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 218429 for
US$20,000.00. Since Alfred knew that as an alien he was disqualified from owning lands in the
Philippines, he agreed that only Ederlina's name would appear in the deed of sale as the buyer of the
property, as well as in the title covering the same. After all, he was planning to marry Ederlina and he
believed that after their marriage, the two of them would jointly own the property. On January 23, 1984,
a Contract to Sell was entered into between Victoria Binuya Steckel as the vendor and Ederlina as the
sole vendee. Alfred signed therein as a witness.6 Victoria received from Alfred, for and in behalf of
Ederlina, the amount of US$10,000.00 as partial payment, for which Victoria issued a receipt.7 When
Victoria executed the deed of absolute sale over the property on March 6, 1984,8 she received from
Alfred, for and in behalf of Ederlina, the amount of US$10,000.00 as final and full payment. Victoria
likewise issued a receipt for the said amount.9 After Victoria had vacated the property, Ederlina moved
into her new house. When she left for Germany to visit Klaus, she had her father Narciso Catito and her
two sisters occupy the property.
Alfred decided to stay in the Philippines for good and live with Ederlina. He returned to Australia and
sold his fiber glass pleasure boat to John Reid for $7,500.00 on May 4, 1984.10 He also sold his
television and video business in Papua New Guinea for K135,000.00 to Tekeraoi Pty. Ltd. 11 He had his
personal properties shipped to the Philippines and stored at No. 14 Fernandez Street, San Francisco
del Monte, Quezon City. The proceeds of the sale were deposited in Alfred's account with the Hong
Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC), Kowloon Branch under Bank Account No.
018-2-807016.12 When Alfred was in Papua New Guinea selling his other properties, the bank sent
telegraphic letters updating him of his account.13 Several checks were credited to his HSBC bank
account from Papua New Guinea Banking Corporation, Westpac Bank of Australia and New Zealand
Banking Group Limited and Westpac Bank-PNG-Limited. Alfred also had a peso savings account with
HSBC, Manila, under Savings Account No. 01-725-183-01.14
Once, when Alfred and Ederlina were in Hong Kong, they opened another account with HSBC, Kowloon,
this time in the name of Ederlina, under Savings Account No. 018-0-807950.15 Alfred transferred his
deposits in Savings Account No. 018-2-807016 with the said bank to this new account. Ederlina also
opened a savings account with the Bank of America Kowloon Main Office under Account No.
30069016.16
On July 28, 1984, while Alfred was in Papua New Guinea, he received a Letter dated December 7, 1983
from Klaus Muller who was then residing in Berlin, Germany. Klaus informed Alfred that he and Ederlina
had been married on October 16, 1978 and had a blissful married life until Alfred intruded therein. Klaus
stated that he knew of Alfred and Ederlina's amorous relationship, and discovered the same sometime
in November 1983 when he arrived in Manila. He also begged Alfred to leave Ederlina alone and to
return her to him, saying that Alfred could not possibly build his future on his (Klaus') misfortune.17
Alfred had occasion to talk to Sally MacCarron, a close friend of Ederlina. He inquired if there was any
truth to Klaus' statements and Sally confirmed that Klaus was married to Ederlina. When Alfred
confronted Ederlina, she admitted that she and Klaus were, indeed, married. But she assured Alfred that
she would divorce Klaus. Alfred was appeased. He agreed to continue the amorous relationship and
wait for the outcome of Ederlina's petition for divorce. After all, he intended to marry her. He retained the
services of Rechtsanwaltin Banzhaf with offices in Berlin, as her counsel who informed her of the
progress of the proceedings.18 Alfred paid for the services of the lawyer.
In the meantime, Alfred decided to purchase another house and lot, owned by Rodolfo Morelos covered
by TCT No. 92456 located in Peña Street, Bajada, Davao City.19 Alfred again agreed to have the deed of
sale made out in the name of Ederlina. On September 7, 1984, Rodolfo Morelos executed a deed of
absolute sale over the said property in favor of Ederlina as the sole vendee for the amount of
P80,000.00.20 Alfred paid US$12,500.00 for the property.
Alfred purchased another parcel of land from one Atty. Mardoecheo Camporedondo, located in
Moncado, Babak, Davao, covered by TCT No. 35251. Alfred once more agreed for the name of Ederlina
to appear as the sole vendee in the deed of sale. On December 31, 1984, Atty. Camporedondo
executed a deed of sale over the property for P65,000.00 in favor of Ederlina as the sole
vendee.21 Alfred, through Ederlina, paid the lot at the cost of P33,682.00 and US$7,000.00, respectively,
for which the vendor signed receipts.22 On August 14, 1985, TCT No. 47246 was issued to Ederlina as
the sole owner of the said property.23
Meanwhile, Ederlina deposited on December 27, 1985, the total amount of US$250,000 with the HSBC
Kowloon under Joint Deposit Account No. 018-462341-145.24
The couple decided to put up a beach resort on a four-hectare land in Camudmud, Babak, Davao,
owned by spouses Enrique and Rosela Serrano. Alfred purchased the property from the spouses for
P90,000.00, and the latter issued a receipt therefor.25 A draftsman commissioned by the couple
submitted a sketch of the beach resort.26 Beach houses were forthwith constructed on a portion of the
property and were eventually rented out by Ederlina's father, Narciso Catito. The rentals were collected
by Narciso, while Ederlina kept the proceeds of the sale of copra from the coconut trees in the property.
By this time, Alfred had already spent P200,000.00 for the purchase, construction and upkeep of the
property.
Ederlina often wrote letters to her family informing them of her life with Alfred. In a Letter dated January
21, 1985, she wrote about how Alfred had financed the purchases of some real properties, the
establishment of her beauty parlor business, and her petition to divorce Klaus.27
Because Ederlina was preoccupied with her business in Manila, she executed on July 8, 1985, two
special powers of attorney28 appointing Alfred as attorney-in-fact to receive in her behalf the title and the
deed of sale over the property sold by the spouses Enrique Serrano.
In the meantime, Ederlina's petition for divorce was denied because Klaus opposed the same. A second
petition filed by her met the same fate. Klaus wanted half of all the properties owned by Ederlina in the
Philippines before he would agree to a divorce. Worse, Klaus threatened to file a bigamy case against
Ederlina.29
Alfred proposed the creation of a partnership to Ederlina, or as an alternative, the establishment of a
corporation, with Ederlina owning 30% of the equity thereof. She initially agreed to put up a corporation
and contacted Atty. Armando Dominguez to prepare the necessary documents. Ederlina changed her
mind at the last minute when she was advised to insist on claiming ownership over the properties
acquired by them during their coverture.
Alfred and Ederlina's relationship started deteriorating. Ederlina had not been able to secure a divorce
from Klaus. The latter could charge her for bigamy and could even involve Alfred, who himself was still
married. To avoid complications, Alfred decided to live separately from Ederlina and cut off all contacts
with her. In one of her letters to Alfred, Ederlina complained that he had ruined her life. She admitted
that the money used for the purchase of the properties in Davao were his. She offered to convey the
properties deeded to her by Atty. Mardoecheo Camporedondo and Rodolfo Morelos, asking Alfred to
prepare her affidavit for the said purpose and send it to her for her signature.30 The last straw for Alfred
came on September 2, 1985, when someone smashed the front and rear windshields of Alfred's car and
damaged the windows. Alfred thereafter executed an affidavit-complaint charging Ederlina and Sally
MacCarron with malicious mischief.31
On October 15, 1985, Alfred wrote to Ederlina's father, complaining that Ederlina had taken all his life
savings and because of this, he was virtually penniless. He further accused the Catito family of acquiring
for themselves the properties he had purchased with his own money. He demanded the return of all the
amounts that Ederlina and her family had "stolen" and turn over all the properties acquired by him and
Ederlina during their coverture.32
Shortly thereafter, Alfred filed a Complaint33 dated October 28, 1985, against Ederlina, with the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, for recovery of real and personal properties located in Quezon City and
Manila. In his complaint, Alfred alleged, inter alia, that Ederlina, without his knowledge and consent,
managed to transfer funds from their joint account in HSBC Hong Kong, to her own account with the
same bank. Using the said funds, Ederlina was able to purchase the properties subject of the complaints.
He also alleged that the beauty parlor in Ermita was established with his own funds, and that the
Quezon City property was likewise acquired by him with his personal funds.34
Ederlina failed to file her answer and was declared in default. Alfred adduced his evidence ex parte.
In the meantime, on November 7, 1985, Alfred also filed a complaint35 against Ederlina with the
Regional Trial Court, Davao City, for specific performance, declaration of ownership of real and personal
properties, sum of money, and damages. He alleged, inter alia, in his complaint:
4. That during the period of their common-law relationship, plaintiff solely through his own efforts and
resources acquired in the Philippines real and personal properties valued more or less at P724,000.00;
The defendant's common-law wife or live-in partner did not contribute anything financially to the
acquisition of the said real and personal properties. These properties are as follows:
I. Real Properties
a. TCT No. T-92456 located at Bajada, Davao City, consisting of 286 square meters, (with residential
house) registered in the name of the original title owner Rodolfo M. Morelos but already fully paid by
plaintiff. Valued at P342,000.00;
b. TCT No. T-47246 (with residential house) located at Babak, Samal, Davao, consisting of 600 square
meters, registered in the name of Ederlina Catito, with the Register of Deeds of Tagum, Davao del Norte
valued at P144,000.00;
c. A parcel of agricultural land located at Camudmud, Babak, Samal, Davao del Norte, consisting of
4.2936 hectares purchased from Enrique Serrano and Rosela B. Serrano. Already paid in full by plaintiff.
Valued at P228,608.32;
II. Personal Properties:
a. Furniture valued at P10,000.00.
...
5. That defendant made no contribution at all to the acquisition, of the above-mentioned properties as all
the monies (sic) used in acquiring said properties belonged solely to plaintiff;36
Alfred prayed that after hearing, judgment be rendered in his favor:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, it is respectfully prayed that judgment be rendered in
favor of plaintiff and against defendant:
a) Ordering the defendant to execute the corresponding deeds of transfer and/or conveyances in favor
of plaintiff over those real and personal properties enumerated in Paragraph 4 of this complaint;
b) Ordering the defendant to deliver to the plaintiff all the above real and personal properties or their
money value, which are in defendant's name and custody because these were acquired solely with
plaintiffs money and resources during the duration of the common-law relationship between plaintiff and
defendant, the description of which are as follows:
(1) TCT No. T-92456 (with residential house) located at Bajada, Davao City, consisting of 286 square
meters, registered in the name of the original title owner Rodolfo Morelos but already fully paid by
plaintiff. Valued at P342,000.00;
(2) TCT No. T-47246 (with residential house) located at Babak, Samal, Davao, consisting of 600 square
meters, registered in the name of Ederlina Catito, with the Register of Deeds of Tagum, Davao del Norte,
valued at P144,000.00;
(3) A parcel of agricultural land located at Camudmud, Babak, Samal, Davao del Norte, consisting of
4.2936 hectares purchased from Enrique Serrano and Rosela B. Serrano. Already fully paid by plaintiff.
Valued at P228,608.32;
c) Declaring the plaintiff to be the sole and absolute owner of the above-mentioned real and personal
properties;
d) Awarding moral damages to plaintiff in an amount deemed reasonable by the trial court;
e) To reimburse plaintiff the sum of P12,000.00 as attorney's fees for having compelled the plaintiff to
litigate;
f) To reimburse plaintiff the sum of P5,000.00 incurred as litigation expenses also for having compelled
the plaintiff to litigate; and
g) To pay the costs of this suit;
Plaintiff prays other reliefs just and equitable in the premises.37
In her answer, Ederlina denied all the material allegations in the complaint, insisting that she acquired
the said properties with her personal funds, and as such, Alfred had no right to the same. She alleged
that the deeds of sale, the receipts, and certificates of titles of the subject properties were all made out in
her name.38 By way of special and affirmative defense, she alleged that Alfred had no cause of action
against her. She interposed counterclaims against the petitioner.39
In the meantime, the petitioner filed a Complaint dated August 25, 1987, against the HSBC in the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City40 for recovery of bank deposits and damages.41 He prayed that after
due proceedings, judgment be rendered in his favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, plaintiff respectfully prays that the Honorable Court adjudge defendant bank, upon
hearing the evidence that the parties might present, to pay plaintiff:
1. ONE HUNDRED TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED AND THIRTY U.S. DOLLARS AND
NINETY EIGHT CENTS (US$126,230.98) plus legal interests, either of Hong Kong or of the Philippines,
from 20 December 1984 up to the date of execution or satisfaction of judgment, as actual damages or in
restoration of plaintiffs lost dollar savings;
2. The same amount in (1) above as moral damages;
3. Attorney's fees in the amount equivalent to TWENTY FIVE PER CENT (25%) of (1) and (2) above;
4. Litigation expenses in the amount equivalent to TEN PER CENT (10%) of the amount in (1) above;
and
5. For such other reliefs as are just and equitable under the circumstances.42
On April 28, 1986, the RTC of Quezon City rendered its decision in Civil Case No. Q-46350, in favor of
Alfred, the decretal portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant to perform
the following:
(1) To execute a document waiving her claim to the house and lot in No. 14 Fernandez St., San
Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City in favor of plaintiff or to return to the plaintiff the acquisition cost of
the same in the amount of $20,000.00, or to sell the said property and turn over the proceeds thereof to
the plaintiff;
(2) To deliver to the plaintiff the rights of ownership and management of the beauty parlor located at 444
Arquiza St., Ermita, Manila, including the equipment and fixtures therein;
(3) To account for the earnings of rental of the house and lot in No. 14 Fernandez St., San Francisco Del
Monte, Quezon City, as well as the earnings in the beauty parlor at 444 Arquiza St., Ermita, Manila and
turn over one-half of the net earnings of both properties to the plaintiff;
(4) To surrender or return to the plaintiff the personal properties of the latter left in the house at San
Francisco Del Monte, to wit:
"(1) Mamya automatic camera
(1) 12 inch "Sonny" T.V. set, colored with remote control.
(1) Micro oven
(1) Electric fan (tall, adjustable stand)
(1) Office safe with (2) drawers and safe
(1) Electric Washing Machine
(1) Office desk and chair
(1) Double bed suits
(1) Mirror/dresser
(1) Heavy duty voice/working mechanic
(1) "Sony" Beta-Movie camera
(1) Suitcase with personal belongings
(1) Cardboard box with belongings
(1) Guitar Amplifier
(1) Hanger with men's suit (white)."
To return to the plaintiff, (1) Hi-Fi Stereo equipment left at 444 Arquiza Street, Ermita, Manila, as well as
the Fronte Suzuki car.
(4) To account for the monies (sic) deposited with the joint account of the plaintiff and defendant
(Account No. 018-0-807950); and to restore to the plaintiff all the monies (sic) spent by the defendant
without proper authority;
(5) To pay the amount of P5,000.00 by way of attorney's fees, and the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.43
However, after due proceedings in the RTC of Davao City, in Civil Case No. 17,817, the trial court
rendered judgment on September 28, 1995 in favor of Ederlina, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court cannot give due course to the complaint and hereby orders its dismissal. The
counterclaims of the defendant are likewise dismissed.
SO ORDERED.44
The trial court ruled that based on documentary evidence, the purchaser of the three parcels of land
subject of the complaint was Ederlina. The court further stated that even if Alfred was the buyer of the
properties; he had no cause of action against Ederlina for the recovery of the same because as an alien,
he was disqualified from acquiring and owning lands in the Philippines. The sale of the three parcels of
land to the petitioner was null and void ab initio. Applying the pari delicto doctrine, the petitioner was
precluded from recovering the properties from the respondent.
Alfred appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals45 in which the petitioner posited the view that
although he prayed in his complaint in the court a quo that he be declared the owner of the three parcels
of land, he had no intention of owning the same permanently. His principal intention therein was to be
declared the transient owner for the purpose of selling the properties at public auction, ultimately
enabling him to recover the money he had spent for the purchase thereof.
On March 8, 2000, the CA rendered a decision affirming in toto the decision of the RTC. The appellate
court ruled that the petitioner knowingly violated the Constitution; hence, was barred from recovering the
money used in the purchase of the three parcels of land. It held that to allow the petitioner to recover the
money used for the purchase of the properties would embolden aliens to violate the Constitution, and
defeat, rather than enhance, the public policy.46
Hence, the petition at bar.
The petitioner assails the decision of the court contending that:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE RULE OF IN PARI DELICTO IN
THE INSTANT CASE BECAUSE BY THE FACTS AS NARRATED IN THE DECISION IT IS
APPARENT THAT THE PARTIES ARE NOT EQUALLY GUILTY BUT RATHER IT WAS THE
RESPONDENT WHO EMPLOYED FRAUD AS WHEN SHE DID NOT INFORM PETITIONER THAT
SHE WAS ALREADY MARRIED TO ANOTHER GERMAN NATIONAL AND WITHOUT SUCH
FRAUDULENT DESIGN PETITIONER COULD NOT HAVE PARTED WITH HIS MONEY FOR THE
PURCHASE OF THE PROPERTIES.47
and
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE INTENTION OF THE
PETITIONER IS NOT TO OWN REAL PROPERTIES IN THE PHILIPPINES BUT TO SELL THEM AT
PUBLIC AUCTION TO BE ABLE TO RECOVER HIS MONEY USED IN PURCHASING THEM. 48
Since the assignment of errors are intertwined with each other, the Court shall resolve the same
simultaneously.
The petitioner contends that he purchased the three parcels of land subject of his complaint because of
his desire to marry the respondent, and not to violate the Philippine Constitution. He was, however,
deceived by the respondent when the latter failed to disclose her previous marriage to Klaus Muller. It
cannot, thus, be said that he and the respondent are "equally guilty;" as such, the pari delicto doctrine is
not applicable to him. He acted in good faith, on the advice of the respondent's uncle, Atty. Mardoecheo
Camporedondo. There is no evidence on record that he was aware of the constitutional prohibition
against aliens acquiring real property in the Philippines when he purchased the real properties subject of
his complaint with his own funds. The transactions were not illegal per se but merely prohibited, and
under Article 1416 of the New Civil Code, he is entitled to recover the money used for the purchase of
the properties. At any rate, the petitioner avers, he filed his complaint in the court a quo merely for the
purpose of having him declared as the owner of the properties, to enable him to sell the same at public
auction. Applying by analogy Republic Act No. 13349 as amended by Rep. Act No. 4381 and Rep. Act
No. 4882, the proceeds of the sale would be remitted to him, by way of refund for the money he used to
purchase the said properties. To bar the petitioner from recovering the subject properties, or at the very
least, the money used for the purchase thereof, is to allow the respondent to enrich herself at the
expense of the petitioner in violation of Article 22 of the New Civil Code.
The petition is bereft of merit.
Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution provides, as follows:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands in the public domain.50
Lands of the public domain, which include private lands, may be transferred or conveyed only to
individuals or entities qualified to acquire or hold private lands or lands of the public domain. Aliens,
whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain.
Hence, they have also been disqualified from acquiring private lands.51
Even if, as claimed by the petitioner, the sales in question were entered into by him as the real vendee,
the said transactions are in violation of the Constitution; hence, are null and void ab initio.52 A contract
that violates the Constitution and the law, is null and void and vests no rights and creates no obligations.
It produces no legal effect at all.53 The petitioner, being a party to an illegal contract, cannot come into a
court of law and ask to have his illegal objective carried out. One who loses his money or property by
knowingly engaging in a contract or transaction which involves his own moral turpitude may not maintain
an action for his losses. To him who moves in deliberation and premeditation, the law is
unyielding.54 The law will not aid either party to an illegal contract or agreement; it leaves the parties
where it finds them.55 Under Article 1412 of the New Civil Code, the petitioner cannot have the subject
properties deeded to him or allow him to recover the money he had spent for the purchase
thereof.56 Equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because
of public policy, cannot be done directly.57 Where the wrong of one party equals that of the other, the
defendant is in the stronger position . . . it signifies that in such a situation, neither a court of equity nor a
court of law will administer a remedy.58 The rule is expressed. in the maxims: EX DOLO ORITUR
ACTIO and IN PARI DELICTO POTIOR EST CONDITIO DEFENDENTIS.59
The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the constitutional proscription, nor claim that he acted in good
faith, let alone assert that he is less guilty than the respondent. The petitioner is charged with knowledge
of the constitutional prohibition.60 As can be gleaned from the decision of the trial court, the petitioner
was fully aware that he was disqualified from acquiring and owning lands under Philippine law even
before he purchased the properties in question; and, to skirt the constitutional prohibition, the petitioner
had the deed of sale placed under the respondent's name as the sole vendee thereof:
Such being the case, the plaintiff is subject to the constitutional restrictions governing the acquisition of
real properties in the Philippines by aliens.
From the plaintiff's complaint before the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch
84, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-46350 he alleged:
x x x "That on account that foreigners are not allowed by the Philippine laws to acquire real properties in
their name as in the case of my vendor Miss Victoria Vinuya (sic) although married to a foreigner, we
agreed and I consented in having the title to subject property placed in defendant's name alone although
I paid for the whole price out of my own exclusive funds." (paragraph IV, Exhibit "W.")
and his testimony before this Court which is hereby quoted:
ATTY. ABARQUEZ:
Q.
In whose name the said house and lot placed, by the way, where is his house and lot
located?
A.
In 14 Fernandez St., San Francisco, del Monte, Manila.
Q.
In whose name was the house placed?
A.
Ederlina Catito because I was informed being not a Filipino, I cannot own the property. (tsn, p.
11, August 27, 1986).
xxx
xxx
xxx
COURT:
Q.
So you understand that you are a foreigner that you cannot buy land in the Philippines?
A.
That is correct but as she would eventually be my wife that would be owned by us later on.
(tsn, p. 5, September 3, 1986)
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q.
What happened after that?
A.
She said you foreigner you are using Filipinos to buy property.
Q.
And what did you answer?
A:
I said thank you very much for the property I bought because I gave you a lot of money (tsn., p.
14, ibid).
It is evident that the plaintiff was fully aware that as a non-citizen of the Philippines, he was disqualified
from validly purchasing any land within the country.61
The petitioner's claim that he acquired the subject properties because of his desire to marry the
respondent, believing that both of them would thereafter jointly own the said properties, is belied by his
own evidence. It is merely an afterthought to salvage a lost cause. The petitioner admitted on
cross-examination that he was all along legally married to Teresita Santos Frenzel, while he was having
an amorous relationship with the respondent:
ATTY. YAP:
Q
When you were asked to identify yourself on direct examination you claimed before this
Honorable Court that your status is that of being married, do you confirm that?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
To whom are you married?
A
To a Filipina, since 1976.
Q
Would you tell us who is that particular person you are married since 1976?
A
Teresita Santos Frenzel.
Q
Where is she now?
A
In Australia.
Q
Is this not the person of Teresita Frenzel who became an Australian citizen?
A
I am not sure, since 1981 we were separated.
Q
You were only separated, in fact, but not legally separated?
A
Thru my counsel in Australia I filed a separation case.
Q
As of the present you are not legally divorce[d]?
A
I am still legally married.62
The respondent was herself married to Klaus Muller, a German citizen. Thus, the petitioner and the
respondent could not lawfully join in wedlock. The evidence on record shows that the petitioner in fact
knew of the respondent's marriage to another man, but nonetheless purchased the subject properties
under the name of the respondent and paid the purchase prices therefor. Even if it is assumed gratia
arguendi that the respondent and the petitioner were capacitated to marry, the petitioner is still
disqualified to own the properties in tandem with the respondent.63
The petitioner cannot find solace in Article 1416 of the New Civil Code which reads:
Art. 1416. When the agreement is not illegal per se but is merely prohibited, and the prohibition by the
law is designed for the protection of the plaintiff, he may, if public policy is thereby enhanced, recover
what he has paid or delivered.64
The provision applies only to those contracts which are merely prohibited, in order to benefit private
interests. It does not apply to contracts void ab initio. The sales of three parcels of land in favor of the
petitioner who is a foreigner is illegal per se. The transactions are void ab initio because they were
entered into in violation of the Constitution. Thus, to allow the petitioner to recover the properties or the
money used in the purchase of the parcels of land would be subversive of public policy.
Neither may the petitioner find solace in Rep. Act No. 133, as amended by Rep. Act No. 4882, which
reads:
SEC. 1. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, private real property may be mortgaged in
favor of any individual, corporation, or association, but the mortgagee or his successor-in-interest, if
disqualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines, shall not take possession of
the mortgaged property during the existence of the mortgage and shall not take possession of
mortgaged property except after default and for the sole purpose of foreclosure, receivership,
enforcement or other proceedings and in no case for a period of more than five years from actual
possession and shall not bid or take part in any sale of such real property in case of
foreclosure: Provided, That said mortgagee or successor-in-interest may take possession of said
property after default in accordance with the prescribed judicial procedures for foreclosure and
receivership and in no case exceeding five years from actual possession.65
From the evidence on record, the three parcels of land subject of the complaint were not mortgaged to
the petitioner by the owners thereof but were sold to the respondent as the vendee, albeit with the use
of the petitioner's personal funds.
Futile, too, is petitioner's reliance on Article 22 of the New Civil Code which reads:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or
comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return
the same to him.66
The provision is expressed in the maxim: "MEMO CUM ALTERIUS DETER DETREMENTO PROTEST"
(No person should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another). An action for recovery of what has
been paid without just cause has been designated as an accion in rem verso.67 This provision does not
apply if, as in this case, the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by the application of the pari
delicto doctrine. 68 It may be unfair and unjust to bar the petitioner from filing an accion in rem
verso over the subject properties, or from recovering the money he paid for the said properties, but, as
Lord Mansfield stated in the early case of Holman vs. Johnson:69 "The objection that a contract is
immoral or illegal as between the plaintiff and the defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of
the defendant. It is not for his sake, however, that the objection is ever allowed; but it is founded in
general principles of policy, which the defendant has the advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as
between him and the plaintiff."
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Austria-Martinez and Tinga, JJ ., concur.
Quisumbing, J ., is on leave.
Footnotes
Penned by Justice Martin Villarama, Jr., with Presiding Justice Cancio C. Garcia and Justice Andres B.
Reyes, Jr. concurring.
1
2
Penned by Judge William M. Layague.
The petitioner adduced testimonial and documentary evidence. The respondent did not adduce any
testimonial evidence, but adduced as Exhibit "5," the petitioner's complaint in Civil Case No. 18,750-87
filed with the RTC of Davao City.
3
4
Exhibits "A" to "D-4."
5
Exhibits "B" and "B-1."
6
Exhibit "C."
7
Exhibit "E."
8
Exhibit "D."
9
Exhibit "F."
10
Exhibit "G."
11
Exhibits "H" to "H-12."
12
Exhibit "J."
13
Exhibits "K" to "K-5."
14
Exhibit "L."
15
Exhibit "M."
16
Exhibit "V."
17
Exhibit "N."
18
Exhibits "O" to "O-4."
19
Exhibit "P-4."
20
Exhibit "P" & "P-1."
21
Exhibit "Q" & "Q-1."
22
Exhibits "Q-4" to "Q-6."
23
Exhibit "Q-20."
24
Exhibits "V-4"–"V-10."
25
Exhibit "R-5."
26
Exhibit "R-13."
27
Exhibit "BB."
28
Exhibits "S" and "T."
29
Exhibit "BB."
30
Exhibits "CC" to "CC-4."
31
Exhibit "U;" Entitled and docketed as Alfred Fritz Frenzel vs. Ederlina P. Catito, Civil Case No. 46350.
32
Exhibit "GG."
33
Entitled and docketed as Alfred Fritz Frenzel vs. Ederlina P. Catito, Civil Case No. Q-46350.
34
Exhibit "W."
35
Entitled and docketed as Alfred Frenzel vs. Ederlina P. Catito, Civil Case No. 17,817.
36
Records, p. 2.
37
Records, pp. 4–5.
38
Exhibit "5."
39
Records, pp. 13–16.
40
Docketed as Civil Case No. 18,750-87.
41
Exhibit "5;" Records, pp. 194–198.
42
Exhibit "5-D;" Records, pp. 197–198.
43
Exhibit "X-2"–"X-3."
44
Records, p. 232.
45
Docketed as CA-G.R. CV. No. 53485.
46
Rollo, p. 30.
47
Id., at 16.
48
Id., at 19.
An act to authorize the mortgage of private real property in favor of any individual, corporation or
association subject to certain conditions.
49
50
Supra. The conveyances subject of the case were executed when the 1973 Constitution was in effect.
51
Ong Ching Po vs. Court of Appeals, 239 SCRA 341 [1994].
Alexander Krivenko, vs. Register of Deeds, et al., 79 Phil. 461 [1947]; Rellosa vs. Hun, 93 Phil. 827
[1953]; Caoile vs. Peng, 93 Phil. 861 [1953]; Ong Ching Po vs. Court of Appeals, supra.
52
53
Francisco Chavez vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government, et al., 307 SCRA 394 [1999].
54
Aikman vs. City of Wheeling, Southeastern Reporter, 667 [1938].
55
Rellosa vs. Hun, supra.
ART. 1412. If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause consists does not constitute a criminal
offense, the following rules shall be observed:
56
(1) When the fault is on the part of both contracting parties, neither may recover what he has given by
virtue of the contract, or demand the performance of the other's undertaking. . .
Corkins vs. Ritter, 40 N.W., Reporter, 2d 726 [1950], Daley vs. City of Melvindale, 260 N.W. Reporter,
898 [1935].
57
58
19 Am. Jur., Equity, Section 478.
59
Bough & Bough vs. Cantiveros and Hanopol, 40 Phil. 209 [1919], Reporter.
60
Cheesman vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 193 SCRA 93 [1991].
61
Records, pp. 230–231.
62
TSN, 7 April 1987, pp. 2–3 (Frenzel).
63
See note 57.
64
Supra.
65
Supra.
66
Supra.
67
Id., at 85.
68
Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1990 ed., Vol. I, p. 85.
69
Cited in Marissey vs. Bologna, 123 So. 2d 537 [1960].
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 74833
January 21, 1991
THOMAS C. CHEESMAN, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ESTELITA PADILLA, respondents.
Estanislao L. Cesa, Jr. for petitioner.
Benjamin I. Fernandez for private respondent.
NARVASA, J.:
This appeal concerns the attempt by an American citizen (petitioner Thomas Cheesman) to annul — for
lack of consent on his part — the sale by his Filipino wife (Criselda) of a residential lot and building to
Estelita Padilla, also a Filipino.
Thomas Cheesman and Criselda P. Cheesman were married on December 4, 1970 but have been
separated since February 15,1981.
1
On June 4, 1974, a "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Possessory Rights" was executed by Armando
Altares conveying a parcel of unregistered land and the house thereon (at No. 7 Neptune Street, Gordon
Heights, Olongapo City) in favor of "Criselda P. Cheesman, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to
Thomas Cheesman, and residing at Lot No. 1, Blk. 8, Filtration Road, Sta. Rita, Olongapo
City . . ." Thomas Cheesman, although aware of the deed, did not object to the transfer being made only
to his wife.
2
3
Thereafter—and again with the knowledge of Thomas Cheesman and also without any protest by
him—tax declarations for the property purchased were issued in the name only of Criselda Cheesman
and Criselda assumed exclusive management and administration of said property, leasing it to tenants.
4
On July 1, 1981, Criselda Cheesman sold the property to Estelita M. Padilla, without the knowledge or
consent of Thomas Cheesman. The deed described Criselda as being" . . . of legal age, married to an
American citizen,. . ."
5
6
Thirty days later, or on July 31, 1981, Thomas Cheesman brought suit in the Court of First Instance at
Olongapo City against his wife, Criselda, and Estelita Padilla, praying for the annulment of the sale on
the ground that the transaction had been executed without his knowledge and consent.
7
An answer was filed in the names of both defendants, alleging that (1) the property sold was
paraphernal, having been purchased by Criselda with funds exclusively belonging to her ("her own
separate money"); (2) Thomas Cheesman, being an American, was disqualified to have any interest or
right of ownership in the land; and (3) Estelita Padilla was a buyer in good faith.
8
During the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed upon certain facts which were subsequently set out in
a pre-trial Order dated October 22, 1981, as follows:
9
1. Both parties recognize the existence of the Deed of Sale over the residential house located at No. 7
Granada St., Gordon Heights, Olongapo City, which was acquired from Armando Altares on June 4,
1974 and sold by defendant Criselda Cheesman to Estelita Padilla on July 12, 1981; and
2. That the transaction regarding the transfer of their property took place during the existence of their
marriage as the couple were married on December 4, 1970 and the questioned property was acquired
sometime on June 4,1974.
The action resulted in a judgment dated June 24, 1982, declaring void ab initio the sale executed by
Criselda Cheesman in favor of Estelita M. Padilla, and ordering the delivery of the property to Thomas
Cheesman as administrator of the conjugal partnership property, and the payment to him of P5,000.00
as attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
10
11
The judgment was however set aside as regards Estelita Padilla on a petition for relief filed by the latter,
grounded on "fraud, mistake and/or excusable negligence" which had seriously impaired her right to
present her case adequately. "After the petition for relief from judgment was given due course,"
according to petitioner, "a new judge presided over the case."
12
13
Estelita Padilla filed a supplemental pleading on December 20, 1982 as her own answer to the
complaint, and a motion for summary judgment on May 17, 1983. Although there was initial opposition
by Thomas Cheesman to the motion, the parties ultimately agreed on the rendition by the court of a
summary judgment after entering into a stipulation of facts, at the hearing of the motion on June 21,
1983, the stipulation being of the following tenor:
14
(1) that the property in question was bought during the existence of the marriage between the plaintiff
and the defendant Criselda P. Cheesman;
(2) that the property bought during the marriage was registered in the name of Criselda Cheesman and
that the Deed of Sale and Transfer of Possessory Rights executed by the former owner-vendor
Armando Altares in favor of Criselda Cheesman made no mention of the plaintiff;
(3) that the property, subject of the proceedings, was sold by defendant Criselda Cheesman in favor of
the other defendant Estelita M. Padilla, without the written consent of the plaintiff.
Obviously upon the theory that no genuine issue existed any longer and there was hence no need of a
trial, the parties having in fact submitted, as also stipulated, their respective memoranda each praying
for a favorable verdict, the Trial Court rendered a "Summary Judgment" dated August 3, 1982 declaring
"the sale executed by . . . Criselda Cheesman in favor of . . . Estelita Padilla to be valid," dismissing
15
Thomas Cheesman's complaint and ordering him "to immediately turn over the possession of the house
and lot subject of . . . (the) case to . . . Estelita Padilla . . ."
16
The Trial Court found t hat —
1) the evidence on record satisfactorily overcame the disputable presumption in Article 160 of the Civil
Code—that all property of the marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership "unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife"—and that the immovable in question was in truth
Criselda's paraphernal property;
2) that moreover, said legal presumption in Article 160 could not apply "inasmuch as the
husband-plaintiff is an American citizen and therefore disqualified under the Constitution to acquire and
own real properties; and
3) that the exercise by Criselda of exclusive acts of dominion with the knowledge of her husband "had
led . . . Estelita Padilla to believe that the properties were the exclusive properties of Criselda Cheesman
and on the faith of such a belief she bought the properties from her and for value," and therefore,
Thomas Cheesman was, under Article 1473 of the Civil Code, estopped to impugn the transfer to
Estelita Padilla.
Thomas Cheesman appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court. There he assailed the Trial Court
acts (1) of granting Estelita Padilla's petition for relief, and its resolution of matters not subject of said
petition; (2) of declaring valid the sale to Estelita Padilla despite the lack of consent thereto by him, and
the presumption of the conjugal character of the property in question pursuant to Article 160 of the Civil
Code; (3) of disregarding the judgment of June 24, 1982 which, not having been set aside as against
Criselda Cheesman, continued to be binding on her; and (4) of making findings of fact not supported by
evidence. All of these contentions were found to be without merit by the Appellate Tribunal which, on
January 7, 1986, promulgated a decision (erroneously denominated, "Report") affirming the "Summary
Judgment complained of," "having found no reversible error" therein.
17
Once more, Thomas Cheesman availed of the remedy of appeal, this time to this Court. Here, he argues
that it was reversible error for the Intermediate Appellate Court —
1) to find that the presumption that the property in question is conjugal in accordance
with Article 160 had been satisfactorily overcome by Estelita Padilla;
18
2) to rule that Estelita Padilla was a purchaser of said property in good faith, it appearing:
a) that the deed by which the property was conveyed to Criselda Cheesman described
her as "married to Thomas C. Cheesman," as well as the deed by which the property
was later conveyed to Estelita Padilla by Criselda Cheesman also described her as
"married to an American citizen," and both said descriptions had thus "placed Estelita on
knowledge of the conjugal nature of the property;" and
b) that furthermore, Estelita had admitted to stating in the deed by which she acquired
the property a price much lower than that actually paid "in order to avoid payment of
more obligation to the government;"
19
3) to decline to declare that the evidence did not warrant the grant of Estelita Padilla's
petition for relief on the ground of "fraud, mistake and/or excusable negligence;"
20
4) to hold that Thomas Cheesman had waived his objection to Estelita's petition for relief
by failing to appeal from the order granting the same;
5) to accord to Estelita Padilla a relief other than that she had specifically prayed for in
her petition for relief, ie., "the restoration of the purchase price which Estelita allegedly
paid to Criselda;" and
21
6) to fail to declare that Thomas Cheesman's citizenship is not a bar to his action to
recover the lot and house for the conjugal partnership.
22
Such conclusions as that (1) fraud, mistake or excusable negligence existed in the premises justifying
relief to Estelita Padilla under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, or (2) that Criselda Cheesman had used
money she had brought into her marriage to Thomas Cheesman to purchase the lot and house in
question, or (3) that Estelita Padilla believed in good faith that Criselda Cheesman was the exclusive
owner of the property that she (Estelita) intended to and did in fact buy—derived from the evidence
adduced by the parties, the facts set out in the pleadings or otherwise appearing on record—are
conclusions or findings of fact. As distinguished from a question of law—which exists "when the doubt or
difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts" — "there is a question of fact when the
doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts;" or when the "query
necessarily invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of witnesses,
existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation; to each other and to the
whole and the probabilities of the situation."
23
24
Now, it is axiomatic that only questions of law, distinctly set forth, may be raised in a petition for the
review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals presented to this Court. As everyone knows or
ought to know, the appellate jurisdiction of this Court is limited to reviewing errors of law, accepting as
conclusive the factual findings of the lower court upon its own assessment of the evidence. The
creation of the Court of Appeals was precisely intended to take away from the Supreme Court the work
of examining the evidence, and confine its task to the determination of questions which do not call for
the reading and study of transcripts containing the testimony of witnesses. The rule of
conclusiveness of the factual findings or conclusions of the Court of Appeals is, to be sure, subject to
certain exceptions, none of which however obtains in the case at bar.
25
26
27
28
It is noteworthy that both the Trial Court and the Intermediate Appellate Court reached the same
conclusions on the three (3) factual matters above set forth, after assessment of the evidence and
determination of the probative value thereof. Both Courts found that the facts on record adequately
proved fraud, mistake or excusable negligence by which Estelita Padilla's rights had been substantially
impaired; that the funds used by Criselda Cheesman was money she had earned and saved prior to her
marriage to Thomas Cheesman, and that Estelita Padilla did believe in good faith that Criselda
Cheesman was the sole owner of the property in question. Consequently, these determinations of fact
will not be here disturbed, this Court having been cited to no reason for doing so.
These considerations dispose of the first three (3) points that petitioner Cheesman seeks to make in his
appeal. They also make unnecessary an extended discussion of the other issues raised by him. As to
them, it should suffice to restate certain fundamental propositions.
1âwphi1
An order of a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) granting a petition for relief under Rule
38 is interlocutory and is not appealable. Hence, the failure of the party who opposed the petition to
appeal from said order, or his participation in the proceedings subsequently had, cannot be construed
as a waiver of his objection to the petition for relief so as to preclude his raising the same question on
appeal from the judgment on the merits of the main case. Such a party need not repeat his objections to
the petition for relief, or perform any act thereafter (e.g., take formal exception) in order to preserve his
right to question the same eventually, on appeal, it being sufficient for this purpose that he has made of
record "the action which he desires the court to take or his objection to the action of the court and his
grounds therefor."
29
Again, the prayer in a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 is not necessarily the same prayer
in the petitioner's complaint, answer or other basic pleading. This should be obvious. Equally obvious is
that once a petition for relief is granted and the judgment subject thereof set aside, and further
proceedings are thereafter had, the Court in its judgment on the merits may properly grant the relief
sought in the petitioner's basic pleadings, although different from that stated in his petition for relief.
Finally, the fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land. Section 14, Article XIV of the
1973 Constitution ordains that, "Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain." Petitioner Thomas Cheesman was, of course, charged with knowledge of
this prohibition. Thus, assuming that it was his intention that the lot in question be purchased by him and
his wife, he acquired no right whatever over the property by virtue of that purchase; and in attempting to
acquire a right or interest in land, vicariously and clandestinely, he knowingly violated the Constitution;
the sale as to him was null and void. In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to
question the subsequent sale of the same property by his wife on the theory that in so doing he is merely
exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would
permit indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be declared
conjugal, this would accord to the alien husband a not insubstantial interest and right over land, as he
would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does
not permit him to have.
30
31
As already observed, the finding that his wife had used her own money to purchase the property cannot,
and will not, at this stage of the proceedings be reviewed and overturned. But even if it were a fact that
said wife had used conjugal funds to make the acquisition, the considerations just set out militate, on
high constitutional grounds, against his recovering and holding the property so acquired or any part
thereof. And whether in such an event, he may recover from his wife any share of the money used for
the purchase or charge her with unauthorized disposition or expenditure of conjugal funds is not now
inquired into; that would be, in the premises, a purely academic exercise. An equally decisive
consideration is that Estelita Padilla is a purchaser in good faith, both the Trial Court and the Appellate
Court having found that Cheesman's own conduct had led her to believe the property to be exclusive
property of the latter's wife, freely disposable by her without his consent or intervention. An innocent
buyer for value, she is entitled to the protection of the law in her purchase, particularly as against
Cheesman, who would assert rights to the property denied him by both letter and spirit of the
Constitution itself.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
Rollo, p. 50 (Decision [Report] of the Second Civil Cases Division, Intermediate Appellate Court); p.
226 (petitioner's brief).
1
2
Id., p. 227.
3
Factual finding of Trial Court, adopted by the Court of Appeals: rollo, pp. 55-56.
4
Factual findings of Trial Court, adopted by the Court of appeals: rollo, pp. 55-56.
5
Rollo, p. 50.
6
Id., p. 228.
7
Id., pp. 10, 50, 103, 229.
8
Id., pp. 50.
9
Id., pp. 11, 232-235.
10
Rendered by Hon. Regino T. Veridiano, who has since been transferred to Manila.
Id., p. 12. It appears that a writ of execution was issued and on Aug. 26, 1982 the house and lot in
question were delivered to Thomas Cheesman (See rollo, p. 283).
11
12
Id., pp. 14, 51.
13
Id., p. 14. The "new judge" was Hon. Nicias O. Mendoza.
Id., pp. 284-285; the petitioner acknowledges that "in the hearing of June 21, 1983, the parties agreed
to submit the case for decision upon some stipulation of facts" (rollo, p. 247)
14
15
Since renamed, in virtue of BP 129, "Regional Trial Court (Branch LXXIV at Olongapo City)
16
Rollo, pp. 281-291.
17
Id., pp. 42-49, 50-57, 58.
18
Id., pp. 24-25,
19
Id., pp. 26-28.
20
Id., pp. 28-32, 251-255.
21
Id., pp. 33-35.
22
Id., pp. 36-38.
Ramos, et al. vs. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the P.I., et al., 19 SCRA 289, 292, citing II Bouvier's Law
Dictionary, 2784, and II Martin, Rules of Court, 255; See also, Francisco, The Rules of Court, Annotated
and Commented, 1968, ed., Vol. III, pp. 485- 488.
23
SEE Lim v. Calaguas, 83 Phil. 796, 799, and Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Rich, 28 SCRA 699, 705,
cited in Moran, Comments on the Rules, 1979 ed., p. 474.
24
Sec. 2, Rule 45, Rules of Court; Villanueva v. IAC, G.R. No. 67582, Oct. 29, 1987; Andres v.
Manufacturers Hanover & Trust Corp., G.R. No. 82670, Sept. 15, 1989.
25
See Moran, Comments on the Rules, 1979 ed., Vol. 2, 472-473, citing Evangelista & Co. v. Abad
Santos, June 28, 1973, 51 SCRA 416, 419; See, too, Francisco, op. cit., p. 489; Korean Airlines, Ltd. v.
C.A., G.R. No. 61418, Sept. 24, 1987.
26
27
Moran, op. cit., p. 473, citing Sta. Ana v. Hernandez, 18 SCRA 973, 978.
28
SEE Ramos v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the Phil., 19 SCRA 289, 291-292.
29
Sec. 1, Rule 41, Rules of Court.
Identical to Sec. 7, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution, and Sec. 5, ART. XIII of the 1935 Constitution
(except that the latter section refers not simply to "private land" but to "private agricultural land".
30
Rellosa v. Gaw Chee Hun, 93 Phil. 827 (1953) applying the pari delicto rule to disallow the Filipino
vendor from recovering the land sold to an alien (See also Bautista v. Uy Isabelo, 93 Phil. 843; Talento v.
Makiki, 93 Phil. 855; Caoile v. Chiao Peng, 93 Phil. 861; Arambulo v. Cua So, 95 Phil. 749; Dinglasan v.
Lee Bun Ting, 99 Phil. 427); and Philippine Banking Corporation v. Lui She, 21 SCRA 52, which
declared that the pari delicto rule should not apply where the original parties had already died and had
been succeeded by administrators to whom it would have been unjust and to impute guilt, and recovery
would enhance the declared public policy of preserving lands for Filipinos.
31
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-31956 April 30, 1984
FILOMENA GERONA DE CASTRO, petitioner,
vs.
JOAQUIN TENG QUEEN TAN, TAN TENG BIO, DOLORES TAN, ROSARIO TAN HUA ING, and TO
O. HIAP, respondents.
Pascual G. Mier for petitioner.
Eddie Tamondong for respondent Joaquin Teng Queen Tan.
Carlos Buenviaje for respondent Tan Teng Bio.
Arnulfo L. Perete for respondent Ong Shi (To O. Hiap).
PLANA, J.:
ñé+ .£ª wp h!1
Review on certiorari of the order of the former Court of First Instance of Sorsogon dismissing petitioner's
action for annulment of contract with damages.
In 1938, petitioner Filomena Gerona de Castro sold a 1,258 sq. m. residential lot in Bulan, Sorsogon to
Tan Tai, a Chinese. In 1956, Tan Tai died leaving herein respondents — his widow, To O. Hiap, and
children Joaquin Teng Queen Tan, Tan Teng Bio, Dolores Tan and Rosario Tan Hua Ing.
Before the death of Tan Tai or on August 11, 1956, one of his sons, Joaquin, became a naturalized
Filipino. Six years after Tan Tai's death, or on November 18, 1962, his heirs executed an extra-judicial
settlement of estate with sale, whereby the disputed lot in its entirety was alloted to Joaquin.
On July 15, 1968, petitioner commenced suit against the heirs of Tan Tai for annulment of the sale for
alleged violation of the 1935 Constitution prohibiting the sale of land to aliens.
Except for respondent Tan Teng Bio who filed an answer to the complaint, respondents moved to
dismiss the complaint on the grounds of (a) lack of cause of action, the plaintiff being in pari delicto with
the vendee, and the land being already owned by a Philippine citizen; (b) laches; and (c) acquisitive
prescription.
Over the opposition of petitioner, the court a quo dismissed the complaint, sustaining the first two
grounds invoked by the movants. It is this order of dismissal that is now the subject of this review.
The assailed order must be sustained.
Independently of the doctrine of pari delicto, the petitioner cannot have the sale annulled and recover
the lot she herself has sold. While the vendee was an alien at the time of the sale, the land has since
become the property, of respondent Joaquin Teng, a naturalized Philippine citizen, who is
constitutionally qualified to own land.
têñ.£îhqwâ £
... The litigated property is now in the hands of a naturalized Filipino. It is no longer owned by a
disqualified vendee. Respondent, as a naturalized citizen, was constitutionally qualified to own the
subject property. There would be no more public policy to be served in allowing petitioner Epifania to
recover the land as it is already in the hands of a qualified person. Applying by analogy the ruling of this
Court in Vasquez vs. Giap and Li Seng Giap & Sons:
têñ. £îhqw â£
... if the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural but also urban lands, as construed by this
Court in the Krivenko case, is to preserve the nation's lands for future generations of Filipinos, that aim
or purpose would not be thwarted but achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens
who became Filipino citizens by naturalization. (Sarsosa Vda. de Barsobia vs. Cuenco, 113 SCRA 547,
at 553.)
Laches also militates against petitioner's cause. She sold the disputed lot in 1938. She instituted the
action to annul the sale only on July 15, 1968. What the Court said in the cited Sarsosa case applies
with equal force to the petitioner.
têñ.£îhqw â£
... it is likewise inescapable that petitioner Epifania had slept on her rights for 26 years from 1936 to
1962. By her long inaction of inexcusable neglect, she should be held barred from asserting her claim to
the litigated property (Sotto vs. Teves, 86 SCRA 157 [1978]).
têñ.£îh qwâ£
Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time,
to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. (Tijam, et al. vs. Sibonghanoy, et al., No.
L-21450, April 15, 1968, 23 SCRA 29, 35). (cited in Sotto vs. Teves, 86 SCRA 154 [1978]).
Respondent, therefore, must be declared to be the rightful owner of the property. (p. 553.)
WHEREFORE, the appealed order is affirmed. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
1äwphï1 .ñët
Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr. and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-3676
January 31, 1955
SOCORRO VASQUEZ, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
LI SENG GIAPand LI SENG GIAP & SONS, defendants-appellees.
Jose S. Sarte for appellant.
Lee, Orendain and Guzman for appellees.
PADILLA, J.:
This is an action to rescind the sale of a parcel of land together with the improvements erected thereon,
described in the complaint, which was sold by the plaintiff to the defendant Li Seng Giap on 22 January
1940, on the ground that the vendee was an alien and under the Constitution incapable to own and hold
title to lands. The case was decided upon the following stipulation of facts:
Plaintiff and defendants in the above-entitled case, by their respective attorneys, hereby stipulate and
agree that the facts involved in this litigation are as follows:.
That plaintiff and defendant Li Seng Giap are, and were at all times mentioned herein, of legal age and
residents of the City of Manila, Philippines; that defendant Li Seng Giap & Sons, Inc., is a corporation
duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines, with principal office in the
City of Manila, Philippines.
II.
That on January 22, 1940, plaintiff sold and transferred to defendant Li Seng Giap, then Chinese citizen,
for the sum of P14,500, a parcel of land together with a house of strong materials existing thereon, more
particularly bounded and described as follows:.
A PARCEL OF LAND (Lot No. 22-A of the subdivision plan Psd-15360, being a portion of Lot No. 22,
Block No. 2809 of the Cadastral survey of Manila, G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No. 192), situated in the
District of Tondo, City of Manila. Bounded on the NE. by lot No. 23, Block No. 2809, on the SE. by Lot
No. 22-B, Block No. 2809; on the SW. by Lot No. 21, Block No. 2809; and on the NW. by Calle
Magdalena; * * * containing an area of four hundred twenty-three square meters and forty-five square
decimeters (423.45) more or less. (Assessed Value — P15,579.00).
III.
That on August 21, 1940, defendant Li Seng Giap sold and transferred unto defendant Li Seng Giap &
Sons, Inc., whose shareholdings then were owned by Chinese citizens, for the same sum of P14,500,
the above-mentioned parcel, together with the improvements thereon, and duly registered under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 59684 of the Office of the Register of Deeds for the city of Manila on
August 23, 1940.
IV.
That defendant Li Seng Giap was duly naturalized as a Filipino citizen on May 10, 1941, under
Certificate of Naturalization No. 515, the records of which were duly reconstituted under an order of this
Honorable Court in Case No. R-603 dated May 24, 1946.
V.
That defendant Li Seng Giap & Sons, Inc., is now a Filipino corporation, 96.67 per cent of its stock being
owned by Filipinos, and duly authorized by its articles of incorporation to own, acquire or dispose of real
properties.
VI.
That the following are the names and respective citizenship and shareholdings of the present
stockholders of Li Seng Giap & Sons, Inc:
Names Citizenship No. of Shares Per cent Total Amount.
Li Seng Giap Filipino 3,400 56.67 P340,000.00 Tang Ho de Li Seng Giap Filipino 1,200 20.00
120,000.00 William Lee Filipino 200 3.33 20,000.00 Henry Lee Filipino 200 3.33 20,000.00 Thomas J.
Lee Filipino 200 3.33 20,000.00 Sofia Lee Teehankee Filipino 200 3.33 20,000.00 Julian M. Lee Filipino
200 3.33 20,000.00 Anthony P. Lee Chinese 200 3.33 20,000.00 6,000 100.00% P600,000.00.
VII.
That Henry Lee was duly naturalized as a Filipino citizen on October 21, 1936, under Certificate of
Naturalization No. 352, the records of which were duly reconstituted under an order of this Honorable
Court in Case No. R-407 dated May 24, 1946.
VIII.
That Thomas J. Lee was duly naturalized as a Filipino citizen on May 10, 1941, under Certificate of
Naturalization No. 516, the records of which were duly reconstituted under an order of this Honorable
Court in Case No. R-604 dated May 24, 1946.
IX.
That William Lee was duly naturalized as a Filipino citizen on November 1, 1948, under Certificate of
Naturalization No. 2 of the Court of First Instance of Daet, Camarines Norte.
X.
That Sofia Lee Teehankee is a Filipino citizen being married to Dr. Rafael Teehankee, a Filipino citizen.
XI.
That Julia M. Lee and Charles Lee are both Filipinos by operation of law as they were both minors when
their father, Li Seng Giap, became a Filipino citizen on May 10, 1941.
Manila, Philippines, September 7, 1949.
Respectfully Submitted:
(Sgd.) JOSE S. SARTE Counsel for the Plaintiff Room 213 Central Hotel, Manila.
LEE, ORENDAIN, & GUZMAN Counsel for the Defendants 60 Novaliches St., Manila.
By: (Sgd.) LEONARDO M. GUZMAN
The Court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint with cost against the plaintiff. She has appealed.
In Caoile vs. Yu Chiao, 49 Off. Gaz., 4321; Talento vs. Makiki, 49 Off. Gaz., 4331; Bautista vs. Uy 49
Off. Gaz., 4331; Rellosa vs. Gaw Chee, 49 Off. Gaz., 4345 and Mercado vs. Go Bio, 49 Off. Gaz., 5360,
the majority of this Court has ruled that in Sales of real estate to aliens incapable of holding title thereto
by virtue of the provisions of the Constitution 1 both the vendor and the vendee are deemed to have
committed the constitutional violation and being thus in pari delicto the courts will not afford protection to
either party.2 From this ruling three Justices dissented.3
The action is not of rescission because it is not postulated upon any of the grounds provided for in
Article 1291 of the old Civil Code and because the action of rescission involves lesion or damage and
seeks to repair it. It is an action for annulment under Chapter VI, Title II, Book II, on nullity of contracts,
based on a defect in the contract which invalidates it independently of such lesion or damages. 4 It is
very likely that the majority of this Court proceeded upon that theory when it applied the in pari
delicto rule referred to above.
In the United States the rule is that in a sale of real estate to an alien disqualified to hold title thereto the
vendor divests himself of the title to such real estate and has no recourse against the vendee despite
the latter's disability on account of alienage to hold title to such real estate and the vendee may hold it
against the whole except as against the State. It is only the State that is entitled by proceedings in the
nature of office found to have a forfeiture or escheat declared against the vendee who is incapable of
holding title to the real estate sold and conveyed to him.5
However, if the State does not commence such proceedings and in the meantime the alien becomes
naturalized citizen the State is deemed to have waived its right to escheat the real property and the title
The
Rule in the United States that in a sale of real estate to an alien disqualified to
hold title thereto, the vendor divests himself of the title to such real estate and is
not permitted to sue for the annulment of his contract, is also the rule under the
Civil Code. * * *Article 1302 of the old Civil Code provides: * * *Persons sui
juris cannot, however, avail themselves of the incapacity of those with whom
they contracted; * * *.".
of the alien thereto becomes lawful and valid as of the date of its conveyance or transfer to him.
6
Manresa's comment on this clause of article 1302 of the Civil Code is as follows:.
Irresponsabilidad del defecto alegada.— Es la segunda de las condiciones necesarias para el ejercicio
de la accion. Algunos la expresan diciendo que solo puede intrenar aquella el perjudicado, pero esta
expresion puede conducir a ideas equivocadas, ya quela nulidad es independiente de la lesion, como
declara el art. 1.300, y es licito al favorecido economicamente por el contrato pedir la nulidad
basandose en causas a el no imputables, y en cambio no autoriza la ley el caso inverso.
Sencilla la regla contenida en el parrafo segundo de este articulo,puede complicarse cuando coexisten
dos defectos del contrato, comopuede suceder, derivandose a veces de un mismo hecho, verbigracia,el
contrato celebrado con un incapaz por quien ignora que lo es: eneste ejemplo es indudable que la
persona capaz no podra pedir lanulidad fundado en la incapacidad de la otra, pero si alegar elerror o el
dolo que padeciera si las circunstancias del sujetoeran de decisiva influencia en el contrato. (Supra,
pp.709-709.).
Appellant argues that if at the time of the conveyance of the real property the appellee was incapable of
holding title to such real estate, the contract of sale was null or void and may be annulled, and his
subsequent naturalization as a Filipino citizen cannot retroact to the date of the conveyance to make it
lawful and valid. However, if the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural but also urban lands,
as construed by this Court in the Krivenko case, is to preserve the nation's lands for future generations
of Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but achieved by making lawful the acquisition of
real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization. The title to the parcel of land of the
vendee, a naturalized Filipino citizen, being valid that of the domestic corporation to which the parcel of
land has been transferred, must also be valid, 96.67 per cent of its capital stock being owned by
Filipinos.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, without costs.
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, and Labrador, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
REYES, J.B.L., J., concurring:.
I fully concur with the opinion of Justice Padilla, but wish to stress, as an additional reason for the
decision in the present case, that when this action was instituted in 1948, the disability of the original
vendee had been already removed, since he was naturalized in 1941; and that the stockholders of the
second transferee, Li Seng Giap & Sons, Inc., who hold more than 60 per cent of its capital stock, had
likewise become Filipino citizens before, and not after, the action to annul was filed.
Footnotes
1
Section 5, Article XIII; Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds, 44 Off. Gaz., 471.
2
Article 1305, old Civil Code; Article 1411, new Civil Code.
Mr. Justice Pablo, My. Justice Alex. Reyes and the writer. See Caoile vs. Yu Chiao, Talento vs. Makiki,
Bautista vs. Uy, Rellosa vs. Gaw Chee and Mercado vs. Go Bio, supra.
3
4
Manresa, Commentarios al Codigo Civil Espanol, Vol. VIII, p. 698, 4th ed.
Abrams vs. State, 88 Pac. 327; Craig vs. Leslie et al., 4 Law, Ed. 460; 3 Wheat, 563, 589-590; Cross
vs. Del Valle, 1 Wall, (U.S.) 513; 17 Law. Ed., 515; Governeur vs. Robertson, 11 Wheat, 332, 6 Law. Ed.,
488.
5
Osterman vs. Baldwin, 6 Wall, 116, 18 Law ed. 730; Manuel vs. Wulff, 152 U.S. 505, 38 Law. ed. 532;
Pembroke vs Houston, 79 SW 470; Fieorella vs. Jones, 259 SW 782.
6