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Criminal law cases table
Criminal Law (The University of the West Indies Cave Hill Campus)
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Criminal Law Cases Table
Criminal Law (University of Leicester)
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Actus Reus
Ratio
Case
Actus reus involves:
Lipman [1970]
(1) An act
(2) Committed in legally relevant circumstances
(3) Causation (For result crimes) causing the prohibited
result (each offends different AR)
Winzar v CC of Kent [1983]
Facts
D took LSD with girlfriend; thought he was covered in
snakes and strangled them, which happened to be his
girlfriend. Court said he was not blameless because he
chose to take drugs (the doctrine of prior thought).
Brought to hospital, doctors found he was drunk and asked
him to leave; he was found in corridor, so police were
called; police found him drunk in a highway and charged
him with being drunk in a public place; he argued he was
put there; held his circumstances of being there were
immaterial. There was proceeding fault.
OMMISSIONS
Ratio
The parents owed a duty to protect and care for the
children
Mother owed a duty to the daughter but not the stepdaughter
A parent did not owe a duty to their 18-year-old daughter
who did not live at home).
Case
Special Relationship
Downes [1875]
Evans [2009]
Facts
The parent failed to call the doctor on religious grounds
and the children died
Victim overdosed on heroin and the mother and step-sister
did not call for help
Shepard [1862]
Assumption of Responsibility
A duty was imposed upon D to supply the deceased with
sufficient food to maintain life, and that, the death of the
aunt having been accelerated by the neglect of such duty.
Common duty arose to enforce moral obligations.
Instan [1893]
D lives with 73yr old aunt who developed gangrene in her
leg. D didn’t feed, care or call for help. D charged with
manslaughter, held they had assumed responsibility for
her.
1
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They had taken her into their home, they had assumed a
duty of care for her and had been grossly negligent in the
performance of that duty
Stone & Dobinson [1977]
Sinclair was guilty because they had a close relationship
and had assumed responsibility for him.
The other friend did not have the same relationship and
therefore was a held to a different standard.
Sinclair
S and D, allowed S's anorexic sister and her condition
deteriorated, until she became bed-ridden. She needed
medical help, but none was summoned, and she eventually
died in squalor, covered in bed sores and filth.
Defendant stayed with the Victim while they did drugs. The
V overdosed, and they only tried to pour water on him. Did
not call an ambulance until it was too late
Contractual Duty
The contract is evidence of an assumption of responsibility
creating an expectation in the mind of others that the
defendant will act.
Failing to provide for a child in one’s care can be an offence
Certain obligations on employers that if they fail they are
committing many offences
Duties on members of the same house hold.
D was under a duty to act as he became aware of the risk,
he had to prevent or minimise the damage. Convicted of
arson, not for starting the fire but for failing to do anything
about it.
Where someone created a danger and thereby exposed
another to a reasonably foreseeable risk of injury, there
was an evidential basis for the actus reus of an assault
occasioning actual bodily harm.
A train gatekeeper failed to close the gate and the victim
died
R v Pittwood [1902]
Statutory Duty
s.1(1) Children and Young
Persons Act 1933;
ss.2-7 Health and Safety at
Work Act 1974
Domestic Violence Crime and
Victims act 2005
Creating a Dangerous Situation
R v Miller [1983]
Santana-Bermudez (2003)
D a vagrant fell asleep on his mattress when he woke up,
he saw that his cigarette had caused the mattress to
smoulder. Instead of calling for help, just moved into
another room. The fire flared up and spread.
D injured a woman police officer by allowing her to search
him, knowing he had hypodermic needles in his pockets
which stabbed her. D denied having any needles or sharps
when asked.
2
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CAUSATION
Ratio
Case
Factual Causation
White [1910]
The answer to the question 'But for what the defendant
did would she have died?'
Facts
Legal Causation
D’s actions must be the legal cause, it must be approximate
to the result, a significant substantial cause, more than
trivial.
Hughes
Novus Actus Interveniens
Natural Events
The test is one of reasonable foresight. If it is reasonably
foreseeable it will not break the causal chain.
Hart
D’s attacked the victim, left her unconscious on a beach
below high-water mark. She was drowned by the incoming
tide. Held that the event was reasonably foreseeable, and
the D caused the death of the victim.
Acts of a Third Party
D's actions need not be the sole or even the main cause of
death as long as they contributed significantly to that
result
Held only in the most extraordinary/unusual circumstances
will the chain be broken
Injuries inflicted by 3rd parties were so completely different
from injuries for which D was responsible that they
overwhelmed those injuries.
If at the time of death, the original wound is still an
operating cause and a substantial cause, then death can be
said to be a result of the wound albeit that some other
cause is also operating.
R v Cheshire [1991]
D shot V in an argument in a chip shop, and V was taken to
hospital where a tracheotomy was performed. Six weeks
later, V suffered breathing problems because of the
tracheotomy scar and died. The hospital had been
negligent - perhaps even reckless - in not recognising the
likely cause of V's problems and responding to them.
Empress Car
Rafferty [2007]
D and 2 others assaulted and robbed V on a beach. D then
took V’s debit card and went to a cash machine. Others
then dragged V into sea where V drowned.
R v Smith [1959]
(Medical negligence)
D stabbed V with a bayonet during a fight in barracks. V's
friend took him to the first aid post, but on the way, he
dropped V twice. At the first aid post the medical officer
was busy and took some time to get to V who died about
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Only if the original wound is setting the setting in which
another cause operates will it not be the legal cause.
The medical treatment was 'palpably wrong' and would
have 'precluded' a jury from holding that death was
caused by D's action.
R v Jordan [1956]
(Medical negligence)
‘The defendant will have caused the death(s) only if you
are sure that it could sensibly have been anticipated that
a fatal collision might occur in the circumstances in which
the second collision did occur.’
Whether the result was reasonably foreseeable. If V does
something daft and unexpected chain will be broken.
The victim has a choice as to whether to inject and so this
breaks the causal chain
Defendant is not to be treated as causing V to act in a
certain way (and thereby causing V’s death) if V makes a
voluntary and informed decision to act in that way.
Causation could be established when the D and V were
acting jointly
Gridler [2010]
(Dangerous driving)
Victim Escaping
R v Roberts
two hours after the stabbing. Had he been given proper
treatment he would probably have recovered.
D stabbed V, and V died from bronchopneumonia in
hospital about a week later. New evidence not available at
the trial indicated that the bronchopneumonia was
probably caused by B's unusual reaction to terramycin
(which had been given even after his allergy had been
discovered) and/or by an excess dose of intravenous fluids.
An accident propelled the taxi into the fast lane of traffic
where he was struck by another car and both of them died.
The Defendant was the only one left alive.
Jury convicted the D for causing the Taxi drivers death
Defendant made sexual advances to his passenger as he
was driving, and she jumped out of the car while its moving
and injures herself.
Drug Supply
Dias [2002]
Kennedy (No. 2) [2008]
Defendant prepared syringe of heroin and handed it to
Victim who injected himself. Defendant then left the room
and Victim died.
Burgess; Byran [2008]
D filled syringe with heroin and went to V, pulled the tie
and helped V find a vein; placed tip of needle against it
Thin Skull Rule
It has long been the policy of the law that those who use
violence on other people must leave their victims as they
find them.
Blaue [1975]
Defendant hit V over head with TV. Victim died of burst
ulcer which could not be treated due to injuries.
What is reasonably foreseeable in relation to that specific victim.
Defendant’s act need not be medical cause of death
Mckechnie
Woman was stabbed in the lung, she refused blood
transfusion (Jehovah’s witness), she was advised if she
didn’t she would die (medical evidence proved this).
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Held that in assessing whether the V’s response in jumping
out the car was reasonably foreseeable one had to bear in
mind “any particular characteristics of the V”.
The test enables the V’s condition/characteristics to be
considered and provided from indication of whether the
V’s actions were voluntary or not.
Williams & Davis [1992]
Corbett [1996]
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MENS REA
Ratio
Cognitive Mens Rea
Capacity Conception (Subjective Test)
Normative Mens Rea
Character Conception (Objective Test)

“A court or jury, in determining whether a person has
committed an offenceo Shall not be bound in law to infer that he
intended or foresaw a result of his actions by
reason only of its being a natural and probable
consequence of these actions; but
o Shall decide whether he did intend or foresee
that result by reference to all the evidence,
drawing such inferences from the evidence as
appear proper in the circumstances.”
Case
Conceptions
(1) Intention
(2) Subjective recklessness
(had a choice to make a smart
choice)
Facts
A person must both understand the nature of her actions,
knowing the relevant circumstances and being aware of
possible consequences and have a genuine opportunity to
otherwise than she does – to exercise control over actions
by means of choice.
(1) Intention
Ascriptions of responsibility are based upon judgements
(2) recklessness
about the character of the agent: actions for which we hold
(3) negligence
a person fully responsible are those in which her usual
character is centrally expressed.
Proof of Criminal Intent – Mens Rea
CJA 1967 s.8
Emphasized intention is a SUBJECTIVE TEST.
It doesn’t define intention/recklessness, it only tells us
HOW to prove intentional recklessness. Still need to look at
facts and draw inferences.
Oblique Intention
A consequence is intended when it is the aim or objective of the actor, or is foreseen as a virtual practical or moral certainty as a by-product of the actor’s
The mens rea for murder is satisfied if D knew death or
DPP v Hyam [1975]
Poured petrol to the mailbox of the house knowing people
serious harm was highly probable.
(Overruled)
were asleep.
‘Held intent could be inferred where the D foresaw the
Moloney [1985]
V and stepfather (D) did a shotgun contest; D killed V.
consequence as a natural consequence of his act.
(overruled)
2 striking miners, pushed a concrete lump from a bridge;
‘The greater the probability of a consequence the more
Hancock and Shankland [1986]
struck a taxi and killed driver. Ds claimed they hadn’t
likely it is that the consequence was foreseen and that if
(not good law)
meant to kill or cause injury but only wanted to frighten
that consequence was foreseen the greater the probability
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is that that consequence was also intended.’
jury MAY infer intention if foreseen as virtually certain”.
‘the jury may FIND intention if foreseen as virtually
certain”.
the miners or block the road. Convicted of manslaughter.
***
Nedrick
***
For everything but homicide
***
R v Woolin [1998]
***
(For Homicide ONLY)
2 interpretations of Woollin
They have given us a definition of intention. A result
foreseen as virtually certain IS intention = no room for
movement.
DEFINITIONAL
Still no definition of intention, where a consequence is
seen as virtually certain this is evidence where a jury MAY
infer intention = MORAL ELBOW ROOM.
EVIDENTIAL
Under the definitional approach the jury would be forced
to conclude he intended to assist the enemy, he would
have foreseen the consequence as a virtual certainty.
Steane [1947]
Under evidential the jury would have more room.
Approved the evidential interpretation.
D poured paraffin through the letterbox of a house and set
it alight, resulting in the death of a child.
Mathews & Alleyne [2003]
D lost his temper with his three-month-old son and threw
the child onto a hard surface, causing head injuries from
which the child died.
British film actor working in Germany when WWII broke
out; he was arrested; because of threats to his wife and
children in concentration camp and threats to himself he
agreed to broadcast on the radio for the Germans. After
war he was convicted of doing acts likely to assist the
enemy and sentenced to 3yrs in prison.
D’s deliberately threw a non-swimmer into a river where
he drowned. Convicted of murder and appealed on the
grounds the judge had misdirected the jury to use the
evidential interpretation. CA said the conduct was
reprehensible and therefore the jury will ALWAYS draw the
inference.
Recklessness
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Subjective TEST
 D went into the cellar of an house that was converted
1. Did the Defendant foresee the possibility of the
into two. He tore the gas meter from the wall and from
its pipes and stole money from it. He did not turn off
consequence occurring?
the gas at a stop tap nearby and gas escaped, seeped
2. Was it unjustifiable or unreasonable to take the
***
through the dividing wall of the cellar and partially
risk?
asphyxiated his prospective mother-in-law, who was
Applicable to;
R v Cunningham [1957]
asleep in her bedroom.
 Theft Act offences;
 D was charged, with having unlawfully and maliciously
***
 Offences Against the Person;
caused W to take a certain noxious thing, coal gas, so as
 Common law offences;
thereby to endanger her life.
 Rape
D set fire by night to a residential hotel where he had been
OVERRULLED by [R v G and Another]
employed. He bore a grudge against the proprietor.
‘Recklessness in the context of Criminal Damage does not
Caldwell [1982]
According to his evidence he was so drunk at the time that
require subjective appreciation of the risk of causing
it did not occur to him that there might be people there
damage but is also satisfied by a failure to consider an
whose lives might be endangered.
obvious risk.’
Implications of Caldwell/Lawrence: By 2003 Caldwell/Lawrence only applied to 2 crimes (1) criminal damage and (2) reckless driving.
17/18yr old martial arts professional tried to demonstrate
Ruling out risk
Ruling out risk does not constitute as defence, D must
his skills on a glass window. He never thought he would
actually think there was NO risk; not rule it out.
CC of Avon v Shimmen (1987)
shatter it, he argued that he ruled out the risk of breaking
the window, to be held liable he would need to create an
obvious risk and have thought about it
Obvious risk – to whom?
14yr old girl with learning difficulties, after staying out all
This is a strict test, the risk had to be obvious the ordinary
night poured spirit on carpet of a garden shed and lit it.
reasonable person.
Elliott v C (A Minor) (1984)
Fire destroyed shed; charged with criminal damage. Held
because of her age, lack of understanding, experience and
exhaustion the risk wouldn’t have been obvious to her.
Held she was not reckless. She was charged with criminal
damage.
Variable meaning
Recklessness could be interpreted differently for difference
Reid [1992]
offences.
"A person acts recklessly within the meaning of section 1 of
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2 boys ages 11 and 12 set fire to newspapers and threw
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the Criminal Damage Act 1971 with respect to –
(i) a circumstance when he is aware of a risk that it
exists or will exist;
(ii) a result when he is aware of a risk that it will
occur;
and it is, in the circumstances known to him,
unreasonable to take the risk."
***
R v G and Another [2003]
***
them under a wheelie-bin; caught adjoining buildings on
fire; claimed they thought the lit newspapers would burn
themselves out on concrete floor. Convicted of arson.
Judge said that whether it was an obvious risk should be
assessed by the reasonable man. HL disapproved Caldwell
(overruled) and Cunningham (subjectivity) was strongly
approved.
!!!Applies to Criminal Damage!!!
Negligence does not consist of cognition so it’s not part of
mens rea
Mens rea is broader, even though it includes their state of
mind it has to do with an overall moral assessment and
judgement of a persons’ actions.
Negligence
Cognitive view
Normative view
15 yr old girl, dominated by her father, charged with
causing unnecessary suffering to cat. Held that when
establishing whether she was negligent, they should take
into account her age and position in father’s house.
Relationship of Mens Rea and Actus Reus
Transferred Malice
The doctrine of transferred malice only works if the actus
D, a soldier during an argument with another man C in a
reus intended is that actus reus which was caused.
Latimer
pub, took off his belt swung it at C, missed and wounded
the landlady V.
You cannot transfer malice between offences.
D broke a pub window by picking up a stone and throwing
His "malice" in intending to strike another person could not
Pembliton [1874]
it at the group of men he had been fighting, missed them
be transferred to an intention to break the window.
and broke the window behind them.
Cannot transfer the malice to a foetus
AG Reference (no.3) [1998]
BM and D both had intention of killing each other. BM
Gnango (aka Bandana Man)
killed a passer-by. BM was not found. D could have killed a
passer-by as well. So, BM’s murder of the passer-by can be
transferred to D. D guilty of murder.
Coincidence of Mens Rea and Actus Reus
It was appropriate to take into account D’s capacity.
RSPA v C [2006]
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It was not a coincidence between actus reus and mens rea.
Held where there was a plan, if you could at any point
prove a mens rea there was a coincide/overlap.
sober and reasonable person would appreciate risk of
some physical harm.
Plan to murder a man, they struck him with an axe,
thinking he was dead they rolled his body off a cliff. V was
actually alive but died later due to exposure
Thabo Meli [1954]
Church [1965]
As long as at some point the actus reus and mesn rea were
established then it could be considered a continuing action.
Fagan v MPC [1968]
D assaulted PC Morris by parking his car on his foot. Initially
he drove onto the officer’s foot accidentally. When first
asked to remove the car, he refused but eventually
complied.
Mistake as to Fact
Sexual Offences Act 2003
Mens Rea for rape and other sexual assaults, the
Defendants belief must be reasonable
Element of actus reus:
An ‘honest belief approach’
B (A Minor) v DPP [2000]
Element of defence:
Held that what you need for an assault was that the
surrounding circumstances must be unlawful but here the
man thought he was helping and thus acting lawfully.
Whether his belief was reasonable or not, he was entitled
to the defence. An honest and genuine belief will amount
Element of defence:
Held since he honestly believed it was a burglar he could
use it as a defence. It has become 100% subjective and is
now confirmed by statute (Criminal Justice and
Immigration Act 2008 s.76(3)).
Element of defence: Drunken mistake isn’t a defence.
15 yrs old boy invited 13yr old girl to perform oral sec on
school bus; he was charged; he said he believed she was
over 14. Held he could not be liable because he didn’t have
mens rea.
W saw a man beating a boy; he got involved but it was a
mistake because the man was stopping the boy from
stealing.
Williams (Gladstone) (1984)
Faraj [2007]
D believed someone was a burglar (engineer coming to fix
something), so he produced a knife, grabbed and tied him
up; charged with wrongful imprisonment.
O’rady
Mistake as to Law
Ignorance of the law is not a defence
NON-FATAL OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON
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Ratio
Case
Assault (Actus Reus)
‘An assault is any act by which someone, intentionally or
recklessly, causes another person to apprehend immediate
and personal violence.’
An assault might be committed by words or gestures
alone, depending on the circumstances; and that where
the making of a silent telephone call caused fear of
immediate and unlawful violence; the caller would be
guilty of an assault.
Immediacy: She was fearful of the “possibility”. Arrival at
the door may be immediate.
Conditional threats can amount to an assault
It’s irrelevant that the threat cannot be carried out.
Facts
Fagan v MPC [1969]
HL definition
R v Ireland; Burstow [1997]
Read v Coker [1853]
Smith v Chief Superintendent,
Woking Police Station
Immediacy of the assault need not be present
R v Constanza [1997]
D's (separate trials) made a large number of telephone calls
to women and remaining silent when they answered. A
psychiatrist stated that as a result of the repeated
telephone calls each of them had suffered psychological
damage.
D threatened to break V’s neck if he didn’t leave the
building.
D frightened V by looking through her bedroom window
late at night. V a policewoman was "absolutely terrified, to
the extent that she was very nervous and jumpy for a few
days afterwards."
D sent 800 threatening letters to V; V interpreted the last 2
as clearer threats; she feared that at some time, not
excluding the immediate future that violence could follow.
Held she had been assaulted.
Assault (Mens Rea)
Confirms Spratt who confirmed Cunningham recklessness.
An assault is any act by which someone, intentionally or
recklessly, causes another person to apprehend immediate
and personal violence.
"unlawful application of force by the defendant upon the
victim"
There is no need for direct force and that force can
probably be applied indirectly.
Savage; Parmenter
Battery (Actus Reus)
R v Ireland
Definition
Martin
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Show at a theatre, D barred the exit and yelled, “fire!”
People injured, D convicted of s. 20. Held it constituted
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Indirect force can amount to a battery
DPP v K
Confirms indirectly applied force is sufficient for battery.
Haystead [2000]
Where someone created a danger and thereby exposed
another to a reasonably foreseeable risk of injury, there
was an evidential basis for the actus reus of an assault
occasioning actual bodily harm.
Can be by omission
Santana-Bermudez [2004]
battery.
D, a 15yr old school boy; poured sulphuric acid in hot air
drier to hide it; another student used the drier and acid
burned his face. D charged with assault occasioning ABH.
D punched woman who was holding child. Child fell and hit
his head.
D injured a woman police officer by allowing her to search
him, knowing he had hypodermic needles in his pockets
which stabbed her. D denied having any needles or sharps
when asked.
Battery (Mens Rea)
D intentionally or recklessly applies unlawful force
R v Venna [1975]
D struggled with the police officers who were arresting
him. D fell to the ground and lashed out wildly with his
legs, fracturing a bone in the hand of an officer.
Common assault and battery shall be summary offences
Criminal Justice Act 1988 s.39:
and a person guilty of either of them shall be liable to a
Common Assault and Battery to
fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale, to
imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, or to
be summary offences
both.
Assault Occasioning in Actual Bodily Harm (Actus Reus)
Penalty: Max 5 years.
Section 47 OAPA 1861
(1) An assault (technical/battery/both)
(2) Occasioning ABH (Roberts [1972])
Elements
(3) Amounting to injuries interfering with health/comfort
(Miller [1954]/Chan-Fook [1994])
ABH includes ‘any hurt or injury calculated (meaning
considering MR) to interfere with health or comfort’
Miller [1954]
touching was a battery even if it was her clothes. Causation
must be proved.
Roberts (1972)
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D had non-consensual sexual intercourse with his wife,
after which she was "in a hysterical and nervous
condition".
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Minor harm can constitute ABH, must be more than
trivial. ABH included parts of the body such as nervous
system/brain, thus ABH can include psychiatric harm even
without physical harm. Must be recognizable psychiatric
illness.
Hair falls within the meaning of ‘bodily’
Chan-Fook [1994]
DPP v Smith [2006]
D subjected V to questioning about the theft of a ring
belonging to D's fiancée. D then dragged V upstairs to a
room and locked him in. V feared D's return and injured
himself when he fell to the ground escaping through a
window.
D caused actual bodily harm to V by cutting off her pony
tail. D went to the home of his ex-partner and cut of her
pony tail with kitchen scissors.
Where there is a case of s.47 and the ABH is psychiatric
injury you need Expert evidence is required
Morris [1998]
Assault Occasioning in Actual Bodily Harm (Mens Rea)
Prosecution need not prove D intended to cause ABH or
Mrs. S threw her pint of beer at her friend, glass slipped,
was reckless as to such harm. Only need MR of assault.
Savage; Parmenter
broke and cut the other woman. She had no mens rea of
ABH, she only had it for common assault (throwing beer).
Malicious Wounding and Inflicting GBH (Actus Reus)
“Whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously wound or
inflict any grievous bodily harm upon any other person,
Section 20 OAPA 1861
either with or without any weapon or instrument, shall be
guilty of [an offence]”
Wound
A wound necessitates that the continuity of the skin (both
Moriarty
the dermis and epidermis) be broken.
GBH
DPP v Smith
“really serious bodily harm” – it’s a question for the jury.
whether an injury amounts to really serious harm can
depend on the vulnerability of the victim.
Inflict
Bollom [2004]
‘D could be liable for s.20 for passing on HIV’
If psychiatric injury can be inflicted without direct or
indirect force so can physical injury.
Dica [2004]
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‘no need for application of force on V’s body; psychiatric
Ireland; Burstow
harm can be ‘inflicted’
Malicious Wounding and Inflicting GBH (Mens Rea)
Maliciously
D struck V several times, knocking him unconscious. D's
‘It is enough that [D foresaw] ... that some physical harm
Mowatt [1967]
companion had taken money from V.
to some person, albeit of a minor character, might result’
V had seized D by the lapels and demanded to know where
D's companion was.
Cunningham Recklessness applies
Wounding and Causing GBH with Intent (Actus Reus)
‘Whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously by any means
whatsoever wound or cause any grievous bodily harm to
any person, with intent to do some grievous bodily harm
Section 18 OAPA 1861
to any person, or with intent to resist or prevent the
lawful apprehension or detainer of any person, shall be
liable to be kept in penal servitude for life”
Wounding and Causing GBH with Intent (Mens Rea)
intent to resist lawful arrest
D trying to escape from police woman, she grabbed his
Morrison (1989)
coat, he dragged her and jumped through a glass window,
she got cut. Held he didn’t intend GBH but he was trying to
resist arrest and foresaw bodily harm.
SEXUAL OFFENCES
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Ratio

Case
Rape (s.1)
Section 1 (4) SOA 2003
Imprisonment for life
A person commits an offence if –
o He intentionally penetrates the vagina, anus or
mouth of another person (B) with his penis
o B does not consent to the penetration
o A does not reasonably believe that B consents
Section 1 SOA 2003
Non-consensual penile penetration
Actus Reus
Intentional penetration and no reasonable belief in
consent
Only need to direct the jury on the issue of reasonableness
if there is evidence that a) D did not consent and b) D
believed V did.
A delusional belief in consent would be irrational by
definition and thus unreasonable, not reasonable.
Mens Rea
Imprisonment for life
(1) A person commits an offence if –
(a) he intentionally penetrates the vagina, anus or
mouth of another person with his penis, and
(b) the other person is under 13.
Strict liability and he has a rape conviction even though it
was consensual.
Facts
R v Taran [2006]
R v B [2013]
Rape of a Child Under 13 (s. 5)
Section 5 (2) SOA 2003
Section 5 SOA 2003
R v G [2009]
15yr old boy had sex with a 12 yr old girl who was
consenting. Held that he had intentionally penetrated her
and therefore he was a rapist despite consent. HL held that
Art. 6 (right to fair trial) and Art. 8 (right to privacy) didn’t
apply here. Minority think s. 5 is too
harsh/disproportionate.
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Evidential Presumption of Consent s. 75
If... it is proved
a) that the D did the relevant act,
b) that any of the circumstances in (2) existed, and
c) that the D knew those circumstances existed,
C is taken not to have consented, and the D is to be taken
not to have reasonably believed in consent unless
sufficient evidence is adduced by the defence
(a, b) Using violence – must be a threat of immediate
(flexible) violence, against a person (not property)
(c) Unlawful Detention – can be for a short period of
time, difficult to rebut.
(d) Unconscious – can be difficult to rebut.
(e) Physical disability preventing communication –
must be a physical disability so a mental disability
will not generate this presumption.
(f) Stupefying substances –
Does the presumption apply? Did the prosecution give
enough evidence? (It is an evidential burden). If sufficient
evidence to rebut, return to s74.
CA held: it is not enough evidence. It is speculative
evidence only. If there are some evidence beyond the
fanciful or speculative to rebut the presumption.
A person consents if he agrees by choice, and has the
freedom and capacity to make that choice
There is a difference between Consent and Submission
Before a complete loss of consciousness arises, a state of
incapacity to consent can nevertheless be reached.
Consideration must be given to the degree of
Section 75 SOA 2003
R v Zhang [2007]
R v Ciccarelli [2011]
The V was asleep or otherwise unconscious s75(2)(d). The
issue of whether there is sufficient evidence to displace the
presumption falls to the trial judge –
Question was whether there was an issue regarding his
belief in consent. Law presumed she was not consenting.
While D was arguing he believed she was consenting. She
made advances on D earlier that day. However, it is still a
question for the jury to decide.
Consent s. 74
Section 74 SOA 2003
R v Olugboja [1981]
(Old Law)
R v Kamki [2013]
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consciousness or otherwise to determine the issue of
capacity.
Mere submission is not consent.
R v Doyle [2010]
Trying her and removing her underwear.
Grooming does not mean consent since it removes once
capacity of freedom and choice.
R v Ali [2015]
Wife consented to sex only if he D (husband) wouldn’t
If the applicant ‘was deprived of choice relating to the
R v Director of PP [2013]
ejaculate inside her.
crucial feature on which her original consent to sexual
intercourse was based’ then there was no consent.
Mental capacity to consent – learning difficulties + autism =
A Local Authority v H [2012]
she lacked mental capacity to consent
Conclusive presumptions about consent: s.76
(1) If ... it is proved that the D did the relevant act and that
any of the circumstances in ss (2) existed, it is to be
conclusively presumed
(a) C did not consent to the relevant act, and
(b) D did not believe C consented
(2) There are irrefutable presumptions:
2 (a) Deception as to the nature or purpose of penetrations
Deception had to be of the nature or purpose.
Jheeta [2007]
D deceived as to the circumstances but not to the purpose.
Because S.76 lays down a conclusive presumption that
cannot be rebutted, then it must be interpreted strictly.
It underlines that “choice” is crucial to the issue of
Assange v Swedish Prosecution
“consent”.
Authority [2011]
(blackmailing for nudes) Court assumed to be s76 offence
R v B [2013]
and held there was no deception in the nature of the
The deception should be in the nature of the purpose.
purpose, V was aware it was a sexual activity. (can be
argued on s.74)
2 (b) Impersonation
V believed she was consenting to sex with a male not a
R v McNally [2013]
female. CA held: deception took away her freedom of
choice.
16yr old boy broke up with his girlfriend, her father
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decided to get revenge; he pretended to be a 20yr old
Devonald [2008]
woman on the internet and got the boy to masturbate on a
web cam. Father was charged with deception as to the
purpose.
Causing a person to engage in sexual activity without consent: s.4
(5) Unless subsection (4) applies, a person guilty of an
offence under this section is liable—
(a)on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a
term not exceeding 6 months or to a fine not
Section 4 (5) SOA 2003
exceeding the statutory maximum or both;
(b)on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment
for a term not exceeding 10 years
A person (A) commits an offence if
Devonald [2008]
(a) he intentionally causes another person (B) to
Section 4 SOA 2003
R v B [2013]
engage in an activity
(b) the activity is sexual
(c) B does not consent to engaging in the activity, and
(d) A does not reasonably believe that B consents.
Assault by Penetration (s.2)
Imprisonment for life
Section 2 (4)
(1) A person (A) commits an offence if(a) he intentionally penetrates the vagina or anus
of another person (B) with a part of his body or
anything else,
(b) the penetration is sexual,
Section 2 SOA 2003
(c) B does not consent to the penetration, and
(d) A does not reasonably believe that B consents.
S79(2) Penetration is a continuing act from entry to
withdrawal.
S79(3) References to a bodily part include references to a
part surgically constructed (in particular through gender
reassignment surgery).
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Intentionally penetrates the vagina, anus or mouth of
another person with a part of his body or anything else,
and the penetration is sexual, and without consent.
D must intentionally penetrate or does not reasonably
believe V consents
Actus Reus
Mens Rea
Sexual s.78
...penetration, touching or any other activity is sexual if a
reasonable person would consider that—
(a) whatever its circumstances or any person’s
purpose in relation to it, it is because of its nature
sexual, or
(b) because of its nature it may be sexual and
because of its circumstances or the purpose of any
person in relation to it (or both) it is sexual.
If it’s unambiguous it would fall in (a) if it’s ambiguous it
would be covered in s. (b)
Imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years.
(1) A person (A) commits an offence if(a) he intentionally touches another person (B),
(b) the touching is sexual,
(c) B does not consent to the touching, and
(d) A does not reasonably believe that B consents.
(2) Whether a belief is reasonable is to be determined
having regard to all the circumstances, including any steps
S.78 SOA 2003
&
R v H [2005]
Price [2004]
R v H [2005]
o First, would they, as twelve reasonable people,
consider that because of its nature the touching that
took place in the particular case before them could be
sexual?
o If the answer to that question was ‘No’, the jury
would find the defendant not guilty,
o If “Yes”, they would have to go on to ask themselves
whether in view of the circumstances and/or the
purpose of any person in relation to the touching (or
both), the touching was in fact sexual.
o If so satisfied – guilty.
D had a shoe fetish; he removed her shoe and began
stroking her lower leg.
Sexual Assault (s.3)
Section 3 (4) SOA 2003
Section 3 SOA 2003
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A has taken to ascertain whether B consents.
S79 (8) SOA 2003 - Touching includes touching—
(a) with any part of the body,
(b) with anything else,
(c) through anything.
AR  D touches another person, touching is sexual,
without consent.
MR  Do touches intentionally and does not reasonably
believe V consents
R v H [2005]
D said to women “do you fancy a share?” then grabbed her
track suite bottom. Held to be sexual assault, physical
contact with the actual body isn’t necessary.
HOMICIDE
Ratio
Case
Murder
"Murder is when a man of sound memory, and at the age
of discretion(10), unlawfully killeth within any county of the
realm any reasonable creature in rerum natura [human
Definition
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Facts
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being or person] under the king's peace, with malice
aforethought, either expressed by the party or implied by
law, so as the party wounded, or hurt etc. die of the wound
or hurt etc.’
 The defendant did the act or omitted to do a legally
recognised duty. (an act or omission)
 The act was deliberate.
 The act was unlawful. (As opposed to killing in selfdefence).
 The act was a significant cause of death.
 The death was of a person in being.
‘Malice aforethought’ is the same as intention. It can be an
intention to kill or an intention to cause GBH
Direct Intention:
If D intends really serious bodily harm, there is always a
probability that death may result.
‘The jury, should be directed that they are entitled to
find the necessary intention if they feel sure that death or
serious bodily harm was a virtual certainty - barring some
unforeseen intervention - as a result of the defendant’s
actions, and that the defendant realised such was the
case, but should be reminded that the decision is one for
them on a consideration of all the evidence. Murder is a
crime of specific intent. If for any reason (including selfinduced intoxication) the killer does not form the necessary
intent, he cannot be convicted of murder’
Actus Reus
Mens Rea
Vickers [1957]
D lost his temper with his three-month-old son and threw
the child onto a hard surface, causing head injuries from
which the child died.
R v Woolin [1998]
Voluntary Manslaughter
Loss of Control



The requirements
There needs to be a loss of control.
There is a qualifying trigger for the loss of control.
A person of the defendant's sex and age, with a normal

Section 54 Coroners & Justice
Act 2009
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degree of tolerance and self-restraint, might have
reacted in the same or in a similar way to the
defendant.
Loss of Self Control
‘some act, or series of acts, done by the dead man to the
accused which would cause in any reasonable person, and
actually causes in the accused, a sudden and temporary
loss of self control, rendering the accused so subject to
passion as to make him or her for the moment not master
of his mind’
Qualifying Triggers
(2) A loss of self-control had a qualifying trigger if
subsection (3), (4) or (5) applies.
FEAR
(3) This subsection applies if D's loss of self-control was
attributable to D's fear of serious violence from V against D
or another identified person.
ANGER
(4) This subsection applies if D's loss of self-control was
attributable to a thing or things done or said (or both)
which—
(a) constituted circumstances of an extremely grave
character, and
(b) caused D to have a justifiable sense of being
seriously wronged.

R v Duffy
The appellant attacked and killed her husband with a
hammer and a hatchet whilst he was sleeping in bed.
He had subjected her to violence throughout their
marriage.
Section 55 Coroners & Justice
Act 2009
Diminished Responsibility
s.2(1) A person (“D”) who kills or is a party to the killing of
another is not to be convicted of murder if D was suffering
from an abnormality of mental functioning which—
(a) arose from a recognised medical condition,
(b) substantially impaired D's ability to do one or
more of the things mentioned in subsection (1A),
and
Section 2 Homicide Act 1957



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Normal English Version
An abnormality of mental functioning
From a recognized medical condition
That substantially impairs Defendants ability to;
o Understand the nature of his conduct
o From a rational self-judgement or
o Exercise self-control
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(c) provides an explanation for D's acts and
omissions in doing or being a party to the killing.
(1A) Those things are—
(a) to understand the nature of D's conduct;
(b) to form a rational judgment;
(c) to exercise self-control.
Abnormality of Mental Functioning
‘the extent to which a person’s acts are the choice of a free
and rational mind’
Recognized Medical Condition
‘medical evidence is no doubt of importance, but the jury
are entitled to take into consideration all the evidence,
including the acts or statements of the accused and his
demeanour. They are not bound to accept the medical
evidence if there is other material before them which, in
their good judgment, conflicts with it and outweighs it’
Substantially impairs Defendant’s Ability
What amounts to ‘Substantial’ impairment is:
(i) the jury should approach the word in a broad common
sense way or
(ii) the word meant ‘more than some trivial degree of
impairment which does not make any appreciable
difference to a person’s ability to control himself, but it
means less than total impairment’
Alcoholism
‘The resolution of this issue embraces questions such as
whether the defendant's craving for alcohol was or was not
irresistible, and whether his consumption of alcohol in the
period leading up to the killing was voluntary (and if so, to
what extent) or was not voluntary, and leads to the
ultimate decision, which is whether the defendant's mental
responsibility for his actions when killing the deceased was
substantially impaired as a result of the alcohol consumed

Provides an explanation for Defendant’s acts, that is it
caused or was a significant contributory factor in
causing, Defendant to carry out the conduct

D strangled to death and then mutilated a young
woman in a YWCA, confessing to both in full. D raised
the defence of diminished responsibility. Since
childhood he had suffered from perverted sexual
desires that created irresistible impulses. His acts were
driven by one of these impulses on the day in question.
R v Williams [2013]
R v Bryne [1960]
R v Lloyd [1966]
R v Wood [2008]
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under the baneful influence of the syndrome.’
Reverse Burden
Burden did not breach ECHR (Article 6) because;
1. DR is an exceptional defence available in an
appropriate case with a view to avoiding the
mandatory sentence which would otherwise apply, so
that a discretionary sentence can be imposed, tailored
to the circumstances of the individual case
2. DR depends on the highly personal condition of
Defendant himself, indeed on the internal functioning
of his mental processes
3. A wholly impractical position would arise if the Crown
had to bear the onus of disproving DR whenever it was
raised on the evidence and that could lead to an unfair
trial

The defendant was convicted of murder of a fellow
prisoner after a jury rejected his defence of diminished
responsibility

The Defendant drove away while the person still had
their head half way through the window
Caused serious damage
R v Foye [2013]
Involuntary Manslaughter
Reckless Manslaughter
This is the only known reckless manslaughter conviction,
were the probability of serious harm or death was present,
and that risk was assessed and then taken by the
defendant
R v Lidar

Constructive Manslaughter
An unlawful act
The death must be caused by an unlawful act, a tortious
act is not enough
1. It is long settled that it is not in point to consider
whether an act is unlawful merely from the angle of
civil liabilities.
2. For the act to be unlawful it must constitute at least a
technical assault (BOTH AR AND MR), which was not
established by the evidence.
3. Regarding criminal negligence, D might properly be
convicted if his belief that there was no danger in

R v Franklin [1883]

R v Lamb [1967]
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D took a box from another man's stall on a pier and
threw it into the sea. The box struck and killed V, who
was swimming.
D and a friend V were playing with a revolver. In the
chamber there were two bullets, but neither was
opposite the hammer when D, in jest, pointed the gun
at V and pulled the trigger. The chamber rotated and V
was killed.
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pulling the trigger was formed in a criminally negligent
way.
The unlawful act is dangerous
‘such as all sober and reasonable people would inevitably
recognise must subject the other person to, at least, the
risk of some harm resulting there from, albeit not serious
harm’
'an objective test. In judging whether the act was
dangerous, the test is not did the accused recognise that it
was dangerous but would all sober and reasonable people
recognise its danger ...'.
The act causes the death of the victim
‘If D intentionally committed an unlawful and objectively
dangerous act that caused the death of a living human
being, there was no reason why he should not be convicted
of "unlawful act" manslaughter. His act clearly carried a
risk of some injury to V, even if not necessarily to B, and
that (with the other elements) was enough to constitute
manslaughter even though it was B rather than V who
ultimately died’

D took V to a van for sexual purposes. V mocked D and
slapped him D knocked V unconscious. Unable to revive
her he panicked and threw her into a river. V drowned.

N. and J two teenage boys pushed a paving stone off a
railway bridge on to the train below, causing the death
of a guard.

D stabbed his pregnant girlfriend V in the abdomen;
she gave birth prematurely, and the baby B died some
four months later as a result of its immaturity.

D, an anaesthetist, failed to observe during an eye
operation that the tube inserted in V’s mouth had
become detached from the ventilator, causing V to
suffer a cardiac arrest and eventually die.

DD were involved in the management of a company
that contracted to clean a resin storage tank. V, an
apprentice died when an explosion occurred because a
halogen lamp was knocked over by another
apprentice.
The defendants (appellant doctors) sought to challenge
R v Church [1965]
DPP v Newbury [1977]
Attorney-General's Reference
(No.3 of 1994) [1997]
Gross Negligence Manslaughter
Essential ingredients of involuntary manslaughter by
breach of duty:
(1) proof of the existence of the duty;
(2) breach of that duty causing death; and
(3) gross negligence which the jury considered justified a
criminal conviction.
Actual foresight by D of the risk of death was not essential
in gross negligence manslaughter
The circularity of the TEST for Gross Negligence
R v Adomako [1994]
R v Mark and Another [2004]

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Manslaughter does not infringe Article 7 of the ECHR.
R v Misra & Srivastava [2005]
the circularity of offence of gross negligence
manslaughter following their conviction for the neglect
of their patients
Other statutory Homicide Offences
RATIO
CASE/Act
Causing/allowing death of child or vulnerable adult
Imprisonment for not exceeding 14 years or a fine, or both.
Section 7 Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004
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(1) D is guilty if V (vulnerable child or adult) dies as a result of the
unlawful act of D, who was a (i) member of the same household as V
and had (ii) frequent contact with him, (b) at the time of the act. There
was a (c) significant risk of serious harm being caused to V and it was
D’s (d) act that caused V’s death; or D (i) ought to be aware of the risk,
(ii) failed to take reasonable steps to protect V and (iii) foresaw the
kind of the circumstances.
If the D is (3)(a) under the age of 16 and/or is (5)(b)(i) under the age of
ten or (ii) can rely on insanity defence, then D is not charged.
(4)(a) to be regarded as a “member”, D has to visit often and for such
periods. D does not have to live in the house.
Section 5 Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004
(6) “Vulnerable child” means a person under the age of 16 and
“vulnerable adult” means a person aged 16 or over whose ability to
protect himself/herself from violence, abuse or neglect is significantly
impaired through physical or mental disability or illness, through old
age or otherwise.
The word “significant” is to be defined by the jury, judge should not
interfere.
Stephensen and Mujuru
If asked by the jury, judge should give the word its ordinary meaning.
Brutus v Cozens
Vehicular Homicide – Motor Manslaughter/Murder
Motor manslaughter not abolished by creation of statutory offence.
Governor of Holloway, ex p Jennings [1983]
Manslaughter only prosecuted “in a very grave case”.
CPS Legal Guidance is that GNM should not be charged unless there is
Adomako [1995]
something such as a very high risk of death to set the case apart from
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those cases where a statutory offence.
Causing Death by Dangerous Driving
Maximum penalty of 14 years’ imprisonment.
Criminal Justice Act 2003
s.1: A person who causes the death of another person by driving a
mechanically propelled vehicle dangerously on a road or other public
place is guilty of an offence.
s.2A (1) Dangerous driving is when (a) the drivers’ skills falls far below
Section 1 – 2A Road Traffic Act 1988
from the standard of a competent and a careful driver whom this would
(amended by RTA 1991)
be (b) obvious that is dangerous.
s.2A (3) “Dangerous” means posing a danger of injury to person or
serious damage to property. In determining “dangerousness” only facts
which D could be expected to be aware of and any circumstances
shown to have been within D’s knowledge.
Toulson LJ: "... it is ultimately for the jury to decide whether, considering
all the evidence, they are sure that the defendant should fairly be
R v L [2011]
regarded as having brought about the death of the victim by his careless
driving. That is a question of fact for them."
Causing Death by Careless Driving
Maximum 5 years of imprisonment with mandatory minimum period of
disqualification of 12 months. D must be disqualified from driving for 2
years.
s.2B A person who causes the death of another person by driving a
mechanically propelled vehicle on a road or other public place without
due care and attention, or without reasonable consideration for other
persons using the road or place, is guilty of an offence.
s.3ZA (2) only if the way he drives falls below what would be expected
s.2B – s.3ZA Road Traffic Act 1988
(amended by RSA 2006)
of a competent and careful driver.
s.3ZA (3) determining the expectation is by circumstances shown to
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have been within D’s knowledge
Careless Driving by Unlicensed, or Uninsured Driving
2 years' imprisonment and a minimum disqualification of 12 months.
Driving otherwise than in accordance with a licence (c) using motor
S.3ZB Road Traffic Act 1988
(amended by RSA 2006)
vehicle while uninsured or unsecured against third party risks.
It is not necessary for D to prove careless or inconsiderate driving BUT
there must be something open to criticism in the driving of D, beyond
Hughes [2013]
the mere presence of the vehicle on the road, and which contributed in
some more than minimal way to the death.
Causing Death by Disqualified Driving
2 years' imprisonment and a minimum disqualification of 12 months.
A person is guilty under s.3ZC if (a) causes death of another person, and
S.3ZC & 103(1)(b) Road Traffic Act 1988
(b) is committing an offence under s 103(1)(b) of this Act (driving while
(amended by RSA 2006)
disqualified)
Causing Death by careless driving when under the influence of drink or drugs
Maximum of 14 years imprisonment and/or an unlimited fine. D must
be disqualified from driving for 2-3 years.
Driving without due care and attention causes death and is either (a)
unfit through drink/drugs or (b) Breath/Blood/Urine’s alcohol
concentration over prescribed limit or (ba) Blood/Urine’s specified
S. 3A Road Traffic Act 1988
controlled drug proportion exceeds the specified limit or (c) failure to
provide specimen.
PROPERTY OFFENCES
Ratio
Case
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Facts
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Theft
‘A person is guilty of theft if he dishonestly appropriates
property belonging to another with the intention of
permanently depriving the other of it; and ‘thief’ and ‘steal’
shall be construed accordingly.’
Max 7 years imprisonment.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
appropriation (AR)
property (AR)
belonging to another (AR)
dishonesty (MR)
with the intention of permanently depriving the other
(MR)
1. Appropriation
“(1) Any assumption by a person of the rights of an owner
amounts to an appropriation, and this includes, where he
has come by the property (innocently or not) without
stealing it, any later assumption of a right to it by keeping
or dealing with it as owner.”
(2) Where property or a right or interest in property is or
purports to be transferred for value to a person acting in
good faith, no later assumption by him of rights which he
believed himself to be acquiring shall, by reason of any
defect in the transferor’s title, amount to theft of the
property
Consent is Irrelevant
‘Belief or absence of belief that the owner consented to the
appropriation may be relevant to the issue of dishonesty
but not to the issue of appropriation.’
‘There was an appropriation even though he acted with the
authority of the shop manager. Lawrence was the
appropriate authority on the issue of appropriation. The
consent of the owner was irrelevant in deciding whether an
appropriation had taken place’
Section 1 Theft Act 1968
Section 7 Theft Act 1968
5 Elements of Theft
Section 3 Theft Act 1968
R v Lawerence [1971]
DPP V Gomez [1993]
Italian student, unfamiliar with British currency; handed to
wallet to taxi driver to take fare; taxi drivers removed more
than the actual fair; driver argued this couldn’t amount to
appropriation because the student had consented.
D accepted worthless cheques at the store and told
manager they were valid; as a result, manager released
property; D argued he couldn’t be liable because manager
had consented to relapse of the property
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HL followed Gomez and held that receipt of a gift that
amounted to a valid transfer of ownership at civil law could
still amount to theft if it was dishonestly induced by D.
Further widening the definition of appropriation
2. Property
(1) “Property” includes money and all other property, real
or personal, including things in action and other intangible
property.”
(a) He is a trustee
(b) He is not in possession of the land
(c) Under a tenancy
Person picks plants growing wild on any land… for reward
or for sale or other commercial purpose.
Wild creatures, tamed or untamed, shall be regarded as
property.
A person who dishonestly uses without due authority, or
dishonestly causes to be wasted or diverted, any electricity
shall on conviction on indictment be liable to imprisonment
for a term not exceeding five years.
information doesn’t amount to property within s.4(1).
Hinks [2000]
Section 4 Theft Act 1968
Section 4 (2)
Limitations on the theft of land
Section 4 (3)
Things growing wild on land
Section 4 (4)
Wild creatures
Section 13
Abstracting Electricity
Confidential information
Bentham [2005]: Held that one does not possess one’s
hand or any part of the body that is not separate and
distinct from oneself BUT once a limb/organ/ sample has
been removed and stored in, say, it possesses all the
attributes of personal property and should fall within
s.4(1).
Smith [2011]: Can unlawful goods be stolen? CA Held:
Nothing in Theft Act 1968 to suggest that what would
otherwise constitute or be regarded as “property” ceased
to be so because possession or control of it was, for
whatever reason, unlawful, illegal or prohibited
D encouraged V, a man of limited intelligence, to withdraw
money from building society and deposit into her account;
she argued they were valid gifts.
The human body and its parts
Low v Blease [1975]: electricity is not property capable of
being appropriated for the purposes of theft however the
statute above creates a special offence of “abstracting”
electricity, which is wasting, diverting or stopping it.
Oxford v Moss (1978): Student took an exam, copied it,
and then returned the original. No intention to
permanently keep the exam paper; held not to be theft
o Yearworth [2009]: Semen stored in hospital’s fertility
storage was property owned that who provided the
samples. Rothery: same for blood, Welsh: same for
urine
o Kelly and Lindsay [1998]: D held liable for theft of body
parts which were used for training of surgeons.
Property that is unlawful to
possess
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3. Belonging to Another
‘Property shall be regarded as belonging to any person
having possession or control of it, or having in it any
proprietary right or interest …’
Section 5 Theft Act 1968
Where property is subject to a trust, the person to whom it
belongs shall be regarded as including any person having a
right to enforce the trust…
Where a person receives property from or on account of
another and is under an obligation to retain or deal with
that property or its proceeds in a particular way, the
property or proceeds shall be regarded (as against him) as
belonging to the other.
Section 5 (2)
Section 5(3)
If someone gives you something by mistake, it will continue
to belong to him or her; you are under an obligation to
make restoration of the property or its proceeds or the
value thereof.
4. Dishonesty
(1) A person’s appropriation of property belonging to
another is not to be regarded as dishonest—
(a) if he appropriates the property in the belief that
he has in law the right to deprive the other of it, on behalf
of himself or of a third person; or
(b) if he appropriates the property in the belief that
he would have the other’s consent if the other knew of the
o Turner (No.2) (1971): You can steal your own car if
someone else has a proprietary right/interest.
o Marshall [1998]: (re-selling used tickets – argued they
were gifts – found guilty of theft).
o Williams v Philips [1957]: (predates the act): the
rubbish outside is not abandoned property, it remains
the property of those who throw it away until the local
authority has collected it.
Section 5 (4)
o Gilks (1972): Obligation to retain and deal with
property in s.5(3) and (4) means a legal, not merely a
social or moral obligation.
o Hall [1973]: D had not received this money under an
obligation to deal with it in a particular way.
o D.P.P v Huskisson [1988]: D gave his landlord some of
his rent with his housing benefit and spent remainder
on himself; held not theft.
o Attorney-General’s Reference [1985]: D, a police
woman, was overpaid by direct debt; and she decided
to keep it. CA held she was under an obligation to pay it
back or else she would be guilty of theft.
o Webster [2006]: Duplicate of a medal constituted
“property belonging to another”.
Section 3 Theft Act 1968
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appropriation and the circumstances of it; or
(c) … if he appropriates the property in the belief
that the person to whom the property belongs cannot be
discovered by taking reasonable steps.
Test
1. Was D dishonest according to ‘ordinary standards of
reasonable and honest people’? (objective)
2. Did D realise his/her conduct was dishonest by those
standards? (subjective)
1. The fact-finding tribunal (in criminal context –
magistrates and jurors) must first ascertain
(subjectively) the actual state of the individual’s
knowledge or belief as to the facts
2. When once his actual state of mind as to knowledge or
belief as to facts is established, the question whether
his conduct was honest or dishonest is to be
determined by the fact-finder by applying the
(objective) standards of ordinary decent people.
5. Intention to Permanently Deprive
(1) A person appropriating property belonging to another
without meaning the other permanently to lose the
thing itself is nevertheless to be regarded as having the
intention of permanently depriving the other of it if his
intention is to treat the thing as his own to dispose of
regardless of the other’s rights; and a borrowing or
lending may amount to so treating it if, but only if, the
borrowing or lending is for a period and in
circumstances making it equivalent to an outright
taking or disposal.
‘…a mere borrowing is never enough to constitute the
necessary guilty mind unless the intention is to return the

DPP v Patterson [2017]: as a matter lower courts are
still bind by Ghosh.

Mr Ivey was a professional gambler who won £7.7
million playing a card game in a casino. The casino
refused to pay because they claimed Ivey had cheated.
The issue of, inter alia, whether Ivey was dishonest was
considered by the Supreme Court.

D a projectionist at a cinema secretly borrowed films
and lent them to friends who made illegal copies of
R v Ghosh [1982]
Ivey v Genting Casinos (UK) Ltd
[2017]
Abolished the second limb of
the Ghosh Test
Section 6 Theft Act 1968
R v Lloyd [1985]
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“thing” in such a changed state that it can truly be said
that all its goodness or virtue has gone…’
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1)
above, where a person, having possession or control
(lawfully or not) of property belonging to another,
parts with property under a condition as to its return
which he may not be able to perform, this (if done for
purposes of his own and without the other’s authority)
amounts to treating the property as his own to dispose
of regardless of the other’s rights.

Section 6 (2)
them. The films were returned after a few hours
undamaged to the cinema in time for the performance.
R v Fernandez [1996]: A solicitor dishonestly made an
insecure investment of a client’s money. Held s.6 may
apply to a person in possession or control of another’s
property who dishonestly and for his own purpose,
deals with that property in such a manner that he
knows he is risking its loss.
Robbery
(1)A person is guilty of robbery if he steals, and
immediately before or at the time of doing so, and in order
to do so, he uses force on any person or puts or seeks to
put any person in fear of being then and there subjected to
force.
Section 8 Theft Act 1968
(2)A person guilty of robbery, or of an assault with intent to
rob, shall on conviction on indictment be liable to
imprisonment for life.
Max life imprisonment
1. There must be a theft; and
2. There must be force or the threat of use of force; and
3. Threat or use of force must be immediately before or
at the time of the theft
4. D must be dishonest and must intend to permanently
deprive the other of the property; and
5. D must intend to use force in order to steal.
Use of Force
Whether D’s actions amount to force is a question for the
jury.
Whether force had been used or not is a matter to be left
to the jury. The jury were entitled to conclude that pulling
Section 8 (2)

5 Elements of Robbery
R v Robinson (1977): Where one element of theft is not
present, D cannot be liable of robbery. In this case the
D was not dishonest, he thought he had a right to get
the money; no robbery.
Dawson and James (1976)
R v Clouden [1987]
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Snatching a bag amounted to force.
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a bag down amounted to force.
It does not matter whether the victim was actually put in
fear. It is enough that D sought to put the victim in fear of
force.
Physical contact with a person is required.
Immediately before or at the time of theft
'The act of appropriation does not suddenly cease. It is a
continuous act and it is a matter for the jury to decide
whether or not the act of appropriation has finished.'
B and R v DPP (2007)
P v DPP (2012)
Snatching cigarettes didn’t amount to force.
R v Hale [1978]
D and E, burgled V's house. D was upstairs stealing V's
jewellery box E was downstairs tying up V.
Burglary
(1)A person is guilty of burglary if—
(a)he enters any building or part of a building as a
trespasser and with intent to commit any such
offence as is mentioned in subsection (2) below; or
(b)having entered any building or part of a building
as a trespasser he steals or attempts to steal
anything in the building or that part of it or inflicts
or attempts to inflict on any person therein any
grievous bodily harm.
Max 14 years for a dwelling, max 10 for rest.
 Enters (AR)
 A building or part of a building (AR)
 As a trespasser (AR)
 Knowledge or subjective recklessness as to whether
he was trespassing; and (MR)
 [for 9(1)(a)] intending to commit theft, GBH or
unlawful damage when entering a building as a
trespasser; or
 [for 9(1)(b)] having entered the building develops the
intend to commit theft or GBH.
Enters
Jury must be satisfied that D made ‘a substantial and
Section 9 Theft Act 1968
Section 9 (3)
Elements of Burglary
R v Collins [1973]
D climbed a ladder up to a woman’s window and peered in.
She woke up saw a naked man with an erect penis and,
thinking he was her boyfriend invited him in; they then had
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effective entry’.
sexual intercourse. She then realised that it was not her
boyfriend.
Entry need only be “effective”.
Brown [1985]
Ryan [1996]
Building or Part of a Building
inhabited vehicle or vessel at times when the person having
a habitation in it is not there as well as at times when he is
should amount to a building.
“Parts of a building” includes areas such as those behind
counters in shops from which the defendant is excluded
(doesn’t necessarily mean a separate room).
What a dwelling is, is a question for the jury.
Held it was incorrect to say an empty property undergoing
renovations was a dwelling.
Trespassing
D was a trespasser if he entered premises knowing that or
being reckless whether he was entering in excess of any
permission that had been given to him to enter.
“to be convicted for entering as a trespasser the person
entering must do so knowing that he is a trespasser and
nevertheless deliberately enters, or, at the very least, is
reckless as to whether or not he is entering the premises of
another without the other party’s consent"
Jury is entitled to consider whether there was an entry
where D’s head and arm were inside a window but get
became trapped.
s. 9(4) Theft Act 1968
Walkington (1979)
Flack [2013]
Sticklen [2013]

R v Jones and Smith (1976)

R v Collins [1973]
Aggravated Burglary
(1)A person is guilty of aggravated burglary if he commits
any burglary and at the time has with him any firearm or
imitation firearm, any weapon of offence, or any
explosive; and for this purpose—
o For a (9)(1)(a) burglary, he must have it at the moment
of entry as a trespasser.
o For a 9(1)(b) burglary he must have it at some point
Section 10 Theft Act 1968
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D stole two televisions from his father's house, which
he had general permission to enter. He had left home
but was allowed to visit.
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when he commits or attempts to commit one of the
ulterior offences (theft or GBH).
Imprisonment for life
It must be shown that D entered with mens rea i.e. he
either knew that he was entering as a trespasser or was
reckless as to whether this was so.
Max 10-year imprisonment
Section 10 (2)

R v O’Leary [1986]
D entered a house with intent to steal. In the house he
picked up a knife and threatened the householder, he
was liable under 9(1)(b).
Fraud
Section 1(1)(b)
Fraud by False Representation Section 2 Fraud Act 2006
(1) A person is in breach of this section if he –
(a)dishonestly makes a false representation, and
(b) intends, by making the representation –
(i) to make a gain for himself or another, or
(ii) to cause loss to another or to expose
another to a risk of loss.
1. Making (AR)
2. A false representation (AR)
3. D knew the representation was or might be untrue or
misleading (MR)
4. With intent to gain or cause loss (MR)
5. Dishonestly (MR)
False Representation
(2) A representation is false if –
(a) it is untrue or misleading, and
(b) the person making it knows that it is, or might
be, untrue or misleading.
Knowledge that the representation was or might be
untrue or misleading
“What is required is that the accused person knows that
the representation is, or might be, misleading. It is not
enough that a reasonable person might have known this;
what matters is the accused person’s actual knowledge.”
Section 2(1)
Elements of Fraud
Section 2(2)
R v Auguans [2013]
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Gain or Loss
(1) The references to gain and loss in sections 2 to 4 are to
be read in accordance with this section.
(2) “Gain” and “loss”–
(a) extend only to gain or loss in money or other
property;
(b) include any such gain or loss whether temporary
or permanent;
and “property” means any property whether real or
personal (including things in action and other
intangible property).
(3) “Gain” includes a gain by keeping what one has, as well
as a gain by getting what one does not have.
(4) “Loss” includes a loss by not getting what one might
get, as well as a loss by parting with what one has.
Must be a causative link between the false representation
and the defendant’s intention: the defendant must intend
“by making the representation” to make a gain or cause
loss.
Gain or loss is the distinguishing feature of the offence of
fraud and is what transforms a lie into a criminal offence.
Section 5
Gilbert [2012]
Failure to Disclose Information Section 3 Fraud Act 2006
A person is in breach of this section if he(a) dishonestly fails to disclose to another person
information which he is under a legal duty to
disclose, and
(b) intends, by failing to disclose the information(i) to make a gain for himself or another, or
(ii) to cause loss to another or to expose
another to a risk of loss
1. Failure to disclose information (AR)
2. Dishonestly (MR)
3. Intends to make gain for self or other or cause loss to
another or expose another to a risk of loss (MR)
Section 3
Elements of Failure to Disclose
D’s failure to inform motor insurers that he was a
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Martin [2013]
disqualified driver, when he was applying for car insurance,
amounted to false representation; it was a legal duty.
Fraud by Abuse of Position Section 4 Fraud Act 2006
A person is in breach of this section if he(a) occupies a position in which he is expected to
safeguard, or not to act against, the financial
interests of another person,
(b) dishonestly abuses that position, and
(c) intends, by means of the abuse of that position(i) to make a gain for himself or another, or
(ii) to cause loss to another or to expose
another to a risk of loss
1. Occupies a position in which he is expected to
safeguard, or not to act against, the financial interests
of another person (AR)
2. Abuses that position (AR)
3. Dishonesty (MR)
4. Intends to make gain for self or other or cause loss to
another or expose another to a risk of (MR)
Defines abuse “a good working meaning might be: ‘uses
incorrectly’ or ‘puts to improper use’ the position held in a
manner that is contrary to the expectation that arises
because of that position.”
Section 4
Elements of Abuse of Position
R v Pennock and Pennock
[2014]
R v Turner (Ruth Louise) [2013]
&
Knowles [2013]
Employees diverting money owed to their employer into
their own accounts.
Obtaining Services Dishonestly Section 11 Fraud Act 2006
(1) A person is guilty of an offence under this section if he
obtains services for himself or another(a) by a dishonest act, and
(b) in breach of subsection 2.
(2) A person obtains services in breach of this subsection
Section 11
 Actus Reus: D (1) acts (cannot be committed by an
omission alone), (2) obtains (actually obtaining the
service is required and causation must be established),
(3) services (must be something that is made available
on the basis that it has been, is being, or will be, paid
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if(a) they are made available on the basis that
payment has been, is being or will be made for or in
respect of them,
(b) he obtains them without any payment having
been made for or in respect of them or without
payment having been made in full, and
(c) when he obtains then, he knows(i) that they are being made available on the
basis described in paragraph (a), or
(ii) that they might be,
But intends that payment will not be made or will not be
made in full.
1. Obtaining (AR)
2. By an act (AR)
3. Services that are to be paid for (AR)
4. Failing to pay (AR)
5. Dishonestly (MR)
6. Knowing that the services are to be paid for or that
they might have to be paid for (MR)
7. With intent to avoid payment in whole or in part (MR)
for), and (4) without payment (only for services induced
on the understanding that they will be paid for)
 Mens Rea: D (1) dishonesty, receives a service, (2)
knowing payment required, and (3) intending not to
pay (recklessness does not suffice).
Elements of Obtaining Services
Dishonestly
DEFENCES
Ratio
‘where more than trivial injury was concerned the activity
Case
Consent
Facts

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needed to be in the ‘public interest’ for consent to be valid’
R v Brown
Consensual branding was akin to tattooing and was not in
the public interest to criminalise
R v Wilson [1996]
‘in the context of highly competitive sports ‘conduct
outside the rules can be expected to occur in the heat of
the moment’
Consent can be given in HIV cases but there was no
knowledge of the HIV and therefore there could be no
consent
ABH and wounding a under the Offences Against the
Person Act 1861. The injuries were inflicted during
consensual homosexual sadomasochist activities.


R v Barnes [2005]

R v Konzani [2005]
The appellant branded his initials on his wife’s buttocks
with a hot knife. She had asked him to do so. Her skin
became infected and she sought medical treatment
from her doctor. The doctor reported the matter to the
police and the husband was charged with ABH under
s.47 Offences Against the Person Act 1861.
The appellant was an amateur footballer. He was
playing a football match, went in for a tackle and
seriously injured his opponent’s leg. He was charged
with inflicting grievous bodily harm under section 20 of
the Offences Against the Person Act 1861.
Konzani was HIV positive and aware of his condition. He
had unprotected sexual intercourse with three
complainants without informing them of his condition.
Consequently, the three complainants contracted HIV.
Self-Defence and Justified Force
“A person may use such force as is reasonable in the
circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or
assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected
offenders or persons unlawfully at large.”
Covered if the threat to property amounts to a criminal
offence.
The question whether the degree of force used by D was
reasonable in the circumstances is to be decided by
reference to the circumstances as D believed them to be
Intoxicated Mistake
drunk defendant not entitled to rely on his mistake that he
was under attack or mistake as to the degree of force
s.3 Criminal Law Act [1967]
R v Bayer [2004]
s.76(3) Criminal Justice and
Immigration Act 2008

R v O’Grady [1987]
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The appellant was an alcoholic. He had spent the day
drinking large quantities of alcohol with two friends.
The friends then retired to the appellant's home and
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necessary
In deciding the question mentioned in subsection (3) the
following considerations are to be taken into account (so
far as relevant in the circumstances of the case)—
(a)that a person acting for a legitimate purpose
may not be able to weigh to a nicety the exact
measure of any necessary action; and
(b)that evidence of a person's having only done
what the person honestly and instinctively thought
was necessary for a legitimate purpose constitutes
strong evidence that only reasonable action was
taken by that person for that purpose
D can only use force as is objectively reasonable in the
circumstances that he subjectively believed them to be.
Amount of force is objective decision for the jury.
In a householder case, the degree of force used by D is not
to be regarded as having been reasonable in the
circumstances as D believed them to be if it was grossly
disproportionate in those circumstances.
Grossly Disproportionate
 If the degree of force is grossly disproportionate it will
not be reasonable
 But the fact it is not grossly disproportionate does not
make it reasonable
Self-defence is NOT a partial defence. Can only be used as
an all or nothing
Immediate Force
‘…the threats … were likely to be no less compelling,
because their execution could not be effected in the court
went to sleep. The appellant claimed he was woken by
one of the friends, McCloskey, hitting him on the head.
He said that he picked up some broken glass and
started hitting McCloskey in order to defend himself.
s.76(7) Criminal Justice and
Immigration Act 2008
R v Owino [1996]
s.76(5A) Criminal Justice and
Immigration Act 2008

D (householder) put an intruder (Collins) in a ‘headlock’
whilst awaiting police. Collins lost consciousness
(suffered serious injury from which he is not expected
to recover).
R v Clegg [1995]

Checkpoint stop where the car drove through it with no
regard for stopping
Duress
R v Hudson and Taylor [1971]

Two teenage girls committed perjury during the trial of
X. They claimed that X's gang had threatened them
with harm if they told the truth and that one of them
R (on the application of Collins)
v Secretary of State for Justice
[2016]
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room, if they could be carried out in the streets of Salford
the same night. [the defence] should have left the jury to
decide whether the threats had overborne the will of the
appellants at the time when they gave the false evidence’
"[The question is whether] a person the subject of duress
could reasonably have extricated himself or could have
sought protection or had what has been called a 'safe
avenue of escape".
Threats need not be made directly
was sitting in the public gallery during the trial.

R v Lynch [1975]
R v Brandford [2016]
There must be a link between the offence and the defence


R v Cole [1986]
1. Whether or not the defendant was compelled to act as
he did because, on the basis of the circumstances as he
honestly believed them to be, he thought his life was in
immediate danger. (Subjective test)
2. Would a sober person of reasonable firmness sharing
the defendant's characteristics have responded in the
same way to the threats? (Objective test)
3. The jury should be directed to disregard any evidence of
the defendant's intoxicated state when assessing
whether he acted under duress, although he may be
permitted to raise intoxication as a separate defence in
its own right.
Low IQ, short of mental impairment or mental
defectiveness are not a relevant characteristics to be
looked at
‘…the defence of duress was not available to a person who
voluntarily and with knowledge of its nature joined a
criminal organisation or gang, which he knew might bring

***
R v Graham [1982]
***


R v Bowen [1996]


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D was an accessory to murder in that he drove a car to
a place under threats from an IRA gunman M. D waited
while M and his associates killed a policeman, and then
drove them away.
There was an indirect threat to the boyfriend by the
drug dealer. The Defendant participated to protect the
boyfriend
Defendant was threatened with violence to him and his
family if he did not repay the money he owes to the
money lenders. He robbed a building society
D killed his wife acting in concert with his homosexual
over who lived in the flat with D and his wife. D was
taking drugs for anxiety, which made him more
susceptible to bullying. One night after both men had
been drinking heavily; the lover put a flex round the
wife's neck, pulled it tight and then told D pull the
other end.
D claimed duress; his fear of his lover
Defendant obtained goods by deception which was a
criminal offence because he was threatened he would
be petrol bombed
He only had an IQ of 62
D joined a gang who carried out a series of armed
robberies at sub-post offices. In the last of these
robberies the sub postmaster was shot and killed by X.
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pressure on him to commit an offence, and was an active
member when he was put under such pressure.’
R v Sharp [1987]
Would a reasonable person realise that joining would
expose oneself to the risk?
Duress is not available as a defence to murder either to a
principal or accessory. Morals, law and policy should deny
a man the right to take an innocent life even at the price of
his own
Graham Test applies
1. Reasonable belief in threat
2. Reasonable steadfastness in response to threat
Imminence test applies
 How imminent was the threat?
 Was there an opportunity for the Defendant to escape?
 Was the threat capable of being carried out
immediately?
Duress of Circumstances and Necessity are used
interchangeably
Necessity can never be a defence to murder. Their sentence
of death was later commuted to six months' imprisonment.
R v Howe [1987]

D acting under duress, took part with others in two
separate murders, and on a third occasion the intended
victim escaped.
Duress of Circumstances
R v Conway [1989]

R v Abdul Hussain [1999]

D was in his car with a passenger who had been
attacked some weeks previously. Two men approached
so he drove off. The two men pursued in another car
and so he continued to try to escape driving recklessly.
The two men were plain-clothes policemen; D claimed
he was trying to protect his passenger.
Charged with hijacking a plane. Fearful if they had to go
back to Iraq, they would be executed
R v Shayler [2002]

MI5 officer was worried about how security was
operating and it posed a threat to public interest. He
was bound by the official secrets Act but made
information public anyways
Necessity
R v Dudley and Stephens [1884]

Three sailors and a cabin boy were shipwrecked and
were adrift in an open boat 1600 miles from land. After
they had been eight days without food, and six without
water, DD decided that their only chance of survival
was to kill the cabin boy and eat him, and this they did.
Four days later they were picked up by a passing ship,
and on returning to England were convicted of murder.
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Medical Necessity
Necessity can succeed if two conditions are satisfied
1. It has to be not possible to communicate with the
person who requires assistance
2. The action taken has to be no more than what a
reasonable person would do in the best interest of the
assisted person

F v Berkshire Health Authority
[1990]

Homicide Necessity
There are three conditions for necessity to operate as a
defence:
1. the act is needed to avoid inevitable and irreparable
evil,
2. no more should be done than is reasonably
necessary for the purpose to be achieved, and,
3. the evil inflicted must not be disproportionate to
the evil avoided

Re A (Conjoined Twins) [2000]
Doctors sought permission to sterilise a 36-year-old
woman with a mental age of five, who had become
sexually active but who because of her condition she
was incapable of giving informed consent.
Doctors agreed that the psychological effects of
pregnancy would be seriously damaging to her, and
sought a declaration that they would be acting lawfully
in sterilising the woman without obtaining her consent,
which she was mentally incapable of giving.
Doctors sought the leave of the court to separate
conjoined twins, as the separation was necessary to
save the life of one of them. If they remained
conjoined both would die. Jodie had a good chance of
a fairly "normal" life. Mary was using Jodie’s heart and
lungs; Mary had no prospect of an independent life. If
they were separated Mary would immediately die
Insanity
Firstly, all defendants are presumed sane.
 On a balance of probabilities, the defendant must
prove that at the time the offence
1. He was labouring under such a defect of reason,
arising from a disease of the mind,
2. That he did not to know the nature and quality of
the act he was doing, or,
3. If he did know it that he did not know that what he
was doing was wrong
A defect of reason DOES NOT include temporary
absentmindedness or confusion. She had retained her
powers of reasoning but didn’t use them
***
M’Naghten Rules
***

R v Clarke [1972]
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Mrs Clarke, a 58 year old woman, absent-mindedly
placed a jar of mincemeat, a jar of coffee and some
butter into her bag whilst shopping in a supermarket.
She had no recollection of placing the items in her bag.
Medical evidence was given at her trial which stated
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‘Disease of the Mind’
Epilepsy is insanity, (not automatism) it affects the mind,
not an external cause such as drugs or alcohol.
It must be an INTERNAL cause rather than an EXTERNAL
cause
Knowledge that an act is ‘wrong’ means legally not morally
wrong

R v Sullivan [1984]
that she was suffering from depression and was
diabetic.
D kicked an 86 yr old neighbour – for whom he
customarily did acts of kindness - in the head and body
while having epileptic fit.

Defendant gave his wife a fatal dose of aspirin and did
it because she was suicidal and thought he was doing
an act of kindness. Helping relieve from her suffering.
Defendant knew act was legally wrong but did not think
it was morally wrong.

D, a nurse, assaulted a patient. He was a diabetic, had
taken insulin and not eaten sufficient food. He drank
whisky and rum he could not remember the assault.
He pleaded automatism.

D took part in a robbery with others. When arrested
she could remember very little, she had been raped a
few days earlier. A psychiatrist diagnosed posttraumatic stress disorder, and suggested she had not at
the time of the robbery been acting with her conscious
mind.

D assaulted 3 people in a fight in pub then one PC who
attend the scene then 2 more officers at the police
station
His defence was that he had been drinking and taken
drugs and had no intention to commit the acts which
R v Windle [1952]
Automatism
'a self-induced incapacity will not excuse ... nor will one
which could have been reasonably foreseen as a result of
either doing or omitting to do something, for example,
taking alcohol against medical advice after using certain
prescribed drugs or failing to have regular meals while
taking insulin’
If psychological blow is serious enough, courts will allow
the defence of automatism
R v Quick [1973]
R v T [1990]
Intoxication
Intoxication is no defence to crime of basic intent. His
conduct in reducing himself to that condition supplies the
evidence of mens rea sufficient for crimes of basic intent.
R v Majewski [1977]

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Involuntary Intoxication
Involuntary intoxication is not a defence to a defendant
who is proved to have the necessary criminal intent when
he committed the offence even if under the influence of
drugs administered secretly to the accused by a third
party.
Dutch Courage
Where D fortifies himself with alcohol to gain the courage
to commit a crime this is known as Dutch Courage and is
no defence.

R v Kingston [1995]
R v Gallagher [1963]
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he did.
D indecently assaulted a 15-year-old boy who had been
drugged unconscious by P who then invited D to
sexually abuse the boy. D claimed that he had no
recollection of the assault, as his drink had also "been
laced" with drugs by the P, who photographed the
indecent act.