Prepared by Kasim Yilma( MBA and MA in Peace and Conflict Studies)
March 19, 2021
Wollo University/Ethiopia
Chapter One
1.1. What Is Global Governance?
‘Global governance’ is an ill-defined term. Although it has become widely used in academic and
policy literature, it is often unclear what is included in its scope. The term is used with reference
to formal international institutions, international norms and ideas, transnational business, even
international crime. It has been observed that ‘global governance appears to be virtually
anything.’ Such broad conceptions of global governance are clearly not useful. It seems clear that
global governance is an international version of a concept more easily understood within the
nation-state: ‘Global governance is governing, without sovereign authority, relationships that
transcend national frontiers. Global governance is doing internationally what governments do at
home.’
And yet, ‘governance’ is a broader concept than ‘government’. The Commission on Global
Governance defined governance as ‘the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions,
public and private, manage their common affairs. It is the continuing process through which
conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and cooperative action taken.’ In fact,
‘governance’ is usually used to apply to situations without government, or without credible and
complete government. In the international realm, we can think of governance as being concerned
with ‘government-like behavior’ in the absence of world government or ‘what world government
we actually have.’ So, global governance refers to functions in the international system which we
would normally associate with government (rather than the free market). Such functions might
include the establishment of a rule of law, regulation of the market and the re-distribution of
wealth. When we consider the way in which these functions are delivered at the global level, we
need to ask how rules (broadly defined) are made, implemented and enforced.
The subjects of global governance might be states (e.g. international treaties restrict what
individual states can do), private businesses (e.g. TNCs are subject to international
environmental regulations), civil society groups (e.g. the role of the ILO and others in the trade
union movement) or individuals (e.g. protection of human rights). The Commission on Global
Governance definition given above suggested that governance has two broad purposes –
accommodating diverse or conflicting interests and taking cooperative action.
1.2. Theoretical basis of international order, cooperation and institutions
Through undertaking a comprehensive review of the theoretical literature on global order and
global governance, five key themes that were recurrent throughout each of the paradigms and are
addressed differently in them, have been selected to function as the basis for structuring the
ensuing comparative analysis.
The themes are:
(1) The architecture of the world order;
(2) The role of the state in international relations;
(3) The role of agency beyond the state;
(4) Adaptiveness, accountability and legitimacy of global governance; and,
(5) The distribution of power.
1.2.1. Realist Paradigm
The realist paradigm considers the architecture of the global order to be one that is anarchic. It
positions self-interested states – unitary rational actors – as the most important players in world
politics and leaves little room for agency beyond the state; thus, denying the role of non-state
actors, civil society and intergovernmental organizations among others. According to the realist
paradigm, states seek to survive and maximize power, and calculate their interests in terms of
power – traditionally defined in terms of physical force. Resultantly, the international realm is
assumed to be fraught with conflict. Indeed, as states are central to this paradigm, they are
considered to be the only accountable and legitimate actors in world politics.
Within the paradigm, global governance, equated to state-centered multilateralism, is considered
to be contrived by rational autonomous states in their efforts to improve their standing and
increase their relative power in international economic competition, influence weaker states,
and/or compete for international prestige. Although they may recognize the existence of
additional actors and institutions within global governance, ultimately international institutions
are determined by and governed by states, specifically the hegemonic states that created them,
and other actors also have states as their origin. Although other IR paradigms point to the
increasing interdependence of states as contributing to a new global order, realists in contrary
said that we are witnessing the increasing inequality of states.
1.2.2. Institutionalist Paradigm
Institutionalist paradigm–on global governance with particular attention to the concepts of
complex interdependence in order to demonstrate how institutionalism contributes to the
conceptualization of global governance by focusing on institutions as agents of governance in the
global realm. Accordingly they perceive that institutions are the principal factor structuring
collective behavior and generating distinctive outcomes. Within this framework, institutions
provide for regularized patterns of conduct by controlling options, allocating resources, and
distributing power, structuring incentives and providing actors with varying degrees of certainty
about the present and future behavior of other actors. For this paradigm, interests and objectives
are created in institutional contexts and are not exogenous to institutions. Thus, within the
institutionalist paradigm, the international system is not anarchic; rather, it has an implicit or
explicit structure that impacts how states will act.
Although institutionalists rarely insist that institutions are the only causal force in international
politics – as they are considered to be located within a causal chain that accommodates a role for
other factors –institutions are considered to be a primary determining factor, thus leaving little
room for agency. Within this paradigm, accountability and legitimacy within the international
realm are sought through institutions. Furthermore, a notable feature of institutionalism is the
prominent role of power and asymmetrical relations of power in the operation and development
of institutions, and to this end, the argue that institutions disproportionately distribute power and
access to decision making and agenda setting so that some groups have more or less power than
other groups.
The institutionalist paradigm has much to contribute to the conceptualization of global
governance, particularly in terms of its emphasis on types of interdependence, international
regimes, and formal and systemic/structural institutions that take us beyond the realist statecentered approach to reveal a more complex and layered understanding of international politics.
Despite its many contributions, the limits of the institutionalist perspectives specifically are: its
inability to explain change because of its emphasis on continuity; the limited role for agency;
and, minimal attention paid to causality in terms of determining how institutions affect behavior.
1.2.3. Constructivist Paradigm
The constructivist approach criticized state-centered approaches for considering the identity and
interests of other actors as being exogenous and given, and problematized state-centered
approaches as:(1) neglecting how the identity and interests of other actors came to be
constructed; (2) failing to account for changes in identity and interests over time; and (3)
overlooking how identities and ideas can shape state interests. Rejecting the realist claim that the
architecture of the world order is one of anarchy, constructivists assert, “Anarchy is what states
make of it” in that anarchy does not exist in and of itself, rather it has been constructed.
Rather than the realist assertion that the distribution of capabilities determines international
relations, according to the constructivist approach, international politics is determined by shared
culture and ideas, such that capabilities only have meaning because of the ideas that we attach to
them. Thus, the state itself is a construct considered to be no more than a complex set of social
functions. Likewise, power, accountability and legitimacy are also considered to be social
constructs. The constructivist paradigm provides for agency in that “individuals and groups
become functionally linked as they discover that they share common interests and needs that
transcend existing frontiers”. Within this conglomerate system, functional linkages and identities
between the actors overlap and create “transnational perceptions of mutual interest” and lead to
regularized and often institutionalized relations among groups. Thus, according to
constructivists, new actors in the global system emerge as a result of the deficiency of the
territorially delimitated state to respond to changes.
The interpretation of the concept of global governance by constructivists is premised on the
system of ideation –constituted by identity and culture – wherein ideational factors have
normative and instrumental dimensions that are expressed individually and collectively, and are
context dependent. The identities and interests of actors within global governance and the
constitution of the concept itself is a product of international interaction. Indeed, according to the
constructivist approach, “the global governance structure is invented according to legitimacy and
social consent” and therefore is not necessarily a product of efforts to reduce transaction costs;
rather, is a result of ongoing interactions between actors. Resultantly, according the
constructivist paradigm, no particular structure of global governance would be permanent, and–
has asserted the context and temporal-spatial dependency of any structure. The constructivist
paradigm provides the concept of global governance with an inter-subjective dimension and a
more expansive understanding of how international institutions help to construct “actors,
interests and social purposes that state-centered theories cannot”. Nevertheless, it fails to provide
substantive explanations for societal change and the implications of social movements.
1.2.4. Pluralist Paradigm
The pluralist paradigm provides for the role of non-state actors and does not ascribe the state to
be a central unitary actor; rather, conceives of the balanced interactions among societal forces.
Opposed to state-centered conceptualizations of global governance, from this paradigm the
architecture of the international system is a product of competing interests, and asserts that states
are just one of many actors. The pluralist paradigm enables a better understanding of agency
beyond the state and considers non-state actors to be important in international politics.
Furthermore, the state is looked upon as constituting a multiplicity of actors, interests and groups
– unions, civil society organizations, international non-governmental organizations among others
– that compete, build coalitions and compromise with each other to influence the making of laws
by the state. Legitimacy and accountability are derived from inclusion of interests and the
participation of groups in the taking of decisions. The more powerful actors and interests have a
greater propensity to affect change and rules.
The pluralist paradigm contributes to the conceptualization of global governance an
understanding of agency beyond the state and the notion of interests and actors as determining
the state and the international system. Turner (1998) posits global civil society as an alternative
to state-centered realism, including international institutions such as the United Nations,
international separatist movements in places like Chechnya and Sri Lanka, international terrorist
organizations like Hamas, multinational corporations like General Motors, and international nongovernmental organizations like Amnesty International. According to Turner, global civil society
is mobilized around issues that the state and market systems have failed to address (1998: 29).
Turner notes that global civil society is enabled by new technologies. Indeed, in The Rise of
Network Societies, Manual Castells (1996) asserts that network logic has been greatly assisted
by and organized around the “revolution in information technology”, resulting in the decline of
states as the primary political entity. Turner notes that although global civil society actors may be
interrelated and interact with states, they are increasingly independent from states. This paradigm
contributes to our understanding of global governance by emphasizing the significance of nonstate actors in shaping the international system and the increasing prevalence of global networks.
Nevertheless, this paradigm tends to overlook critical issues of the asymmetric distribution of
power and elitism in the international system.
Bridging the Theoretical Paradigms
Indeed, as global governance is multifaceted, no single theoretical paradigm assessed above has
been able to capture the full complexity of the process. In order develop a comprehensive, as
each paradigm provides particular insights to understand global governance, their cumulative
insights can take us further in conceptualizing global governance.
The realist paradigm contributes to the conceptualization of global governance to the
centrality of states, the importance of asymmetrical power in the international realm, and
the anarchic nature of the international realm.
Institutionalists expand this exercise by positioning institutions, norms, practices and
conventions as additional agents of governance, emphasizing types of interdependence to
reveal a layered understanding of international politics.
The pluralist paradigm emphasizes the significance of non-state actors in shaping the
international system and the increasing prevalence of global networks.
The constructivist paradigm contributes to the conceptualization an inter subjective
dimension by focusing on ideational factors and the way norms, rules and institutions
constitute the identities and interests of actors and vice versa, as well as contributes the
notions of context dependency of the global order.
Although particular theoretical paradigms within IR emphasize specific characteristics of global
governance, no single paradigm has been capable of fully capturing the complexity of global
governance. Resultantly, the conceptualization of global governance requires a combination of
particular aspects of realism, institutionalism, constructivism, and pluralism. And thus, the
following aggregate/eclectic conceptualization of global governance is organized according to
the aforementioned key themes. (1) The architecture of the global order is one of anarchy, not as
the realist would have it as a constant state of war, rather as an ordered system that is intersubjectively and ideationally constructed by a multiplicity of actors and interests. Global
governance constitutes this order, and is a layered and complex system of independent and
interdependent ideas, interests, institutions, actors, movements, and relations that perform
governance functions. (2) Within global governance, states remain active and critical actors in
the global order; nevertheless, their position is not as dominant as it once was and their role will
continue to change over time. The centrality of states has been socially constructed and based on
consent. Resultantly, the relative power, authority and functions of states and other actors are
context specific and will change and will be redistributed and reconstituted over time. (3) Global
governance accounts for significant agency beyond and below the state that engage
internationally–ranging from international non-governmental organizations, multinational
corporations, international economic institutions to transnational social movements–and
considers the ideas and identities of actors as critical to shaping the international system and
institutions. Indeed, the multiplicity of actors at inter subjective/ideational level fashion the
system of global governance, as ideas and identities inform behaviors and objectives, which
persist to inform global politics and institutions, and vice versa. Within global governance, states
and other actors assume particular governance functions in steering the global order, whether
those functions are economic, social, political, environmental, administrative, or adjudicative in
nature. (4) The system of global governance adapts and changes over time. Accountability and
legitimacy in this global order is attained through accounting for and engaging actors in taking
decisions that will affect them. (5) Power is considered to be a social construct that is consented
to the relative power of particular actors and the distribution of power within the system of
global governance greatly determined by whose interests will most likely be served by the global
order and changes over time.
Chapter Two
The Form, Function and Evolution of Global Governance
2.1. A (very) short history of global governance since 1900
In the first half of the 20th Century, most of the world was carved up into empires. While empire
was itself a form of global governance, governance within empires often had more in common
with governance within present-day states than the international institutions. There was,
however, a range of international institutions in the age of empire which mediated between and
linked the great powers. These included the gold standard (which regulated international
currency markets), the balance of power (which provided a system of military alliances) and
some aspects of international law (e.g. the international enforcement of contracts).
Two world wars tore this international order apart. The inter-war years are often thought of as a
failure of global governance, but in fact important pre-cursors to current institutions and systems
were developed at this time. The League of Nations, for example, while failing to prevent a
second world war, did demonstrate the potential of formal international institutions to resolve
international problems such as refugee flows.
After World War II, there was a flurry of institution building at the international level. The fact
that the world sought international institutions to both repair the damage of war (e.g. the World
Bank) and prevent its recurrence (e.g. the UN) is interesting given the perceived failures of interwar internationalism. The institutions created ranged from the formal (e.g. the UN) to the less
formal (e.g. the GATT). The USA and the other ‘great powers’ (initially including the USSR)
played a key role in their creation.
Very quickly, though, the international system faced radical change. The emergence of the Cold
War divided the great powers, and paralyzed elements of the international system for decades
(e.g. the UN Security Council). Decolonization also created scores of new countries, which
needed to be integrated into the international system. Initially, developing countries were able to
gain influence through initiatives such as the Non-Aligned Movement and the New International
Economic Order, but this proved short lived as economic shocks and political changes reduced
their negotiating power.
The post-war period also saw the emergence of significant regional institutions such as the
European Community (EC). The EC (which became the EU in 1994) grew out of specific
economic agreements between European member states, and consistently grew in membership
and scope from the early 1950s onwards. Other regional institutions such as the Organization of
African Unity (OAU, now replaced by the African Union (AU)) and the Association of SouthEast Asian Nations (ASEAN) were also formed in this period, with a variety of principle aims
(solidarity and anti-colonialism in the case of the OAU and security and anti-communism in the
case of ASEAN).
Since the end of the Cold War, the international system has changed yet again. Although the
much heralded ‘peace dividend’ has not materialized, there is a good deal more consensus
between the major powers. There is, however, a continuing divide between the rich and the poor
in the international system – this is perhaps the most salient division in the system today. The
liberal consensus heralded as the ‘end of history’ has not emerged, in large part because it has
not delivered for the poor. A range of new institutions (e.g. the WTO) has been created in the
post-Cold War world, but it is not clear how widely the consensus which underpins them
extends. Where there are more consensuses among states, integration has accelerated (e.g. the
EU).
Although ‘globalization’ is a highly contested concept, it is undoubtedly the case that in some
respects the post-Cold War world is more interconnected than at any point in history. We have
seen the rise of international private and social networks, facilitated in part by changes in
technology. NGOs have become global players, and we have also seen the emergence of private
governance structures (e.g. bond rating agencies).
The history of the last century is not a straightforward story of states gradually giving up more
power to international bodies, as often described. The nature of states themselves has radically
changed across the period, and states faced considerable international constraints even in the
early part of the century. We should also remember that most developing countries as we know
them today entered an international system which was established in their absence, and which
has, in many cases, dominated their political and economic lives ever since.
2.2. Characteristics of global governance:
 Fragmented: this idea of fragmentation came from international law. The concept of
global governance narrates that the world is made up of a number of distinct fragments,
which are bound together by cooperation. These fragments are meant to refer to States.
The possibility of conflict can never be ruled out, no matter how cooperative these
fragments may be. Growing number of treaties and tribunals are evidence of it.
 Complex: many international relations scholars opined that the process of global
governance is very complex. Since there is no specific authority here, it occurs
spontaneously. At the collective level, similarities are found between global governance
and public administration.
 Polycentricity : the term ‘polycentricism’ is derived from Elinor Ostrom's Polycentric
Systems for Coping with Collective Action and Global Environmental Change'. The
subject of the book was managing the commons. Global organizations are coming
together to achieve a common goal. Organizations will positively maintain a connection
between themselves when normal conditions are met. Where the previously discussed
concept of fragmentation speaks of a coherent and integrated system of governance,
polycentricism advocates decentralization rather than monolithic systems.
 Intergovernmental: global governance is bringing the governments of different countries
into a mutual space, as a result of pluralism is seen in decision making. In most cases,
however, the sovereignty of the state remains intact. Everyone’s opinion matters when
making decisions in the global level.
 Diversity of actors: the range of global governance includes States, inter-state
organization as well as organizations like NGO, TNO global civil society. As a result the
boundaries between governmental and non-governmental spheres became increasingly
blurred.
 Multilevel process: the process of global governance operates at different stages
(municipal, provincial, national, regional and global) the absence of any one stage makes
the whole process irrelevant.
 Deformalized: this process is more effective in policy-based informal structures then in
informal and law-strict constitutional structures.
From this discussion the structure of global governance can be roughly guessed. The concept of
fragmentation refers to a flat and unidirectional hierarchical structure. Poly centricity, on the
other hand, indicates uneven, bumpy and scattered structure. Again complexity refers to the
concept of a hierarchical model that does not always follow the same rule. It should be noted,
however, that none of the structures described by this features are always functional, but rather
that the combined form of all these things can be found in international sphere.
2.3. Reasons for the Emergence of Global Governance
What is the underlying reasons /drivers/ for this emerging regulatory scheme of global
governance? The causes for this development are indeed manifold, making it impossible to
discuss them all at length in the course of this contribution. However, prominently among them
are the processes that are commonly summarized by the term “globalization”. Despite the
prevailing concentration on the well-known economic side of globalization, the economic aspect
is only one among many other processes that contribute and belong to this phenomenon.
Other relevant developments are, for example, the revolution in telecommunications and
information technologies, most prominently being represented by the Internet, that are by many
scholars considered to be the “basis of globalization” and made possible a permanent worldwide
dialogue and exchange of information between people who share the same interests – whether
benign or not; the globalization of security interests caused by transnational organized crime as
well as the emergence of truly global terrorist networks; the “globalization of public health”
resulting, interalia, from the worldwide spread of infectious diseases; and the phenomenon of
what might be called “ecological globalization” caused by threats to the global environment such
as climate change.
All these various processes of globalization, especially by way of reinforcing each other, have
one thing in common: They lead to an increasing loss by states of their previously held and
virtually unchallenged ability to control these processes even if they take place on their own
territory. In particular, states acting individually are to a growing extend lacking the necessary
steering capacity to effectively channel the various processes of globalization to the benefit of
their citizens and in pursuance of the promotion of global public goods such as the protection of
human rights and the environment as well as the enforcement of core labor and social standards:
Transnational enterprises can shift – or at least threaten to shift – their production plants to more
“comfortable” places, trans boundary capital movements can take place in minutes, individual
states cannot successfully combat global warming or the worldwide spread of infectious
diseases. This phenomenon of a “denationalization of clusters of political, economic and social
activities”, caused by the processes of globalization, and the resulting decline in the steering
capacity ultimately require states to create and participate in formal as well as informal
cooperative mechanisms with not just other states and international organizations, but also with
increasingly influential non-state actors like NGOs, business organizations, trade unions and
transnational enterprises in order to provide an effective regulatory scheme for the political,
economic, ecological, and social processes they are to a growing extend unable to control while
acting on their own. Furthermore it forces states to tolerate self-regulatory mechanisms in areas
that are nearly completely outside of their control. Thus, in the absence of something close to a
world government – whether such an institution would be feasible or even only desirable is an
open question– the processes of globalization require states to contribute to, to tolerate and to
actively participate in the emergence of what is called global governance.
The previous sections have indicated that the attainment of governance goals by international
governance systems has become increasingly difficult. This is particularly true for transsovereign problems. This lack of effectiveness has been referred to as the governance systems’
reduced output legitimacy. In general, output legitimacy is achieved or maintained whenever
‘‘collectively binding decisions…serve the common interest of the constituency. Obviously,
international governance systems have not been sufficiently effective in dealing with existing
problems and have thus failed, for the most part, to achieve output legitimacy.
Three major governance gaps have contributed to the undermining of the output legitimacy of
international governance systems, as follows.
1. A jurisdictional gap: Even though many political challenges are global today, public
policymaking is still predominantly national in both focus and scope. The most
prominent example of this kind of border-crossing or globally relevant problems is the
trans-sovereign problems already mentioned above, e.g. environmental degradation.
Global threats such as the greenhouse effect, for example, cannot effectively be countered
by uncoordinated national policies and thus call for a global climate policy to regulate the
behavior of all states as well as non-state actors.
2. An operational gap: Policy makers and public institutions lack the policy-relevant
information and analysis as well as the necessary policy instruments to respond to the
daunting complexity of policy issues. This is especially true in environmental politics.
Since clear-cut causal chains are rare in this issue area, decision-making is often impeded
by informational uncertainty. Furthermore, the management of current problems is often
interrupted by the advent of even more pressing new ecological problems. To meet these
requirements, a permanent process of learning and adjustment is necessary. Therefore,
scientific experts as well as NGOs play an important part in the processes of decision
making in this issue area by providing scientific analysis, transforming it into policyrelevant knowledge, and proposing adequate policy responses.
3. An incentive gap: Since international cooperation has become more salient in
international relations, the implementation of international agreements has become
essential. Today, the operational follow-up of international agreements remains
underdeveloped; moral suasion, or shaming, frequently is the only mechanism available
to induce states to comply with international obligations. This compliance problem makes
it difficult for international institutions (as parts of the existing international governance
systems and evolving global governance) to contribute effectively to the attainment of
governance goals as they continue to depend on the willingness of individual states to
implement international regulations.
In addition to these three governance gaps, which undermine the output legitimacy of
international governance systems, a fourth, participatory gap has opened up. As more and more
public policies are made by or within international institutions, the general public or particular
stakeholders are frequently excluded from their deliberations and decisions.
Thus, input legitimacy is reduced as well. Input legitimacy is given when collectively binding
decisions derive from the constituents’ active consent. Participation and consent thus are
essential elements of input legitimacy. The addressees’ acceptance of norms and rules as binding
hinges on their participation in creating and implementing them. Input legitimacy may be
undermined by several factors: (1) new social forces with the power to revolt against the
established order are denied access to the political process; or (2) participation is devalued for
recognized actors who still have sufficient power to hamper a smooth functioning of the
governance system. In both cases, these actors feel deprived of their part in influencing rule
creation and rule management affecting their interests.
And these difficulties derive from at least two basic developments. First, owing to the ever
expanding and ever-deepening transnational connections, national governments are successively
losing their monopoly of representing their societies in international political processes. As
suggested in the previous sections, influential new actors with a growing ability to affect the
authoritative allocation of values have emerged in the global arena. These new actors challenge
the input legitimacy of purely intergovernmental policymaking. Second, as a result of the
growing need for international or global solutions for formerly national problems, the subjects of
democratic states, having minimal influence on the processes of collective decision-making on
the international level, feel increasingly alienated from the political process. The United Nations
may serve to underpin this argument. Like other international institutions, the UN system is
state-centric. Even if the governments of the member states are elected democratically (and many
of them are not), the input legitimacy of public policy-making within these institutions is rather
low because of the distance between decision makers and the people affected by these decisions.
From international to global governance:
Current international governance and evolving global governance have to be regarded, rather, as
a patchwork of heterogeneous elements deriving from governance under the hegemonic umbrella
(e.g. in security communities, cf. Peou, chap. 3) as well as governance without world
government (e.g. international regimes). As governance without world government appears to be
the most desirable and feasible of possible governance models, it is discussed in this section in
more detail. To gain a foothold in the future, global governance will have to overcome the
governance gaps (jurisdictional, operational, incentive, and participatory gaps) that curtailed the
effectiveness and legitimacy of twentieth-century international governance systems. However,
there is no general consensus about how these gaps can and should be narrowed or even closed.
Several reform proposals, especially concerning the structures and functions of international
organizations have been put forward. The following section summarizes these reform proposals
and discusses the prospects of these reform endeavors. As the UN system plays a central role in
global governance, we especially focus on its contributions to the closure of the governance
gaps.
Closing the jurisdictional gap
The jurisdictional gap results from the discrepancy between a globalizing world and separate
national units of policy-making. Although it is generally acknowledged that international or
Trans sovereign problems are most effectively handled on the international level, national policy
makers in many countries still partly recoil from institutionalized international cooperation. In
general, there are three conceivable ways of closing the jurisdictional gap:
1. To ensure an acceptable solution to pressing global problems, all decision-making could
be transferred to the international or global level. This modus operandi would call for the
establishment of a world state or global governance under the hegemonic umbrella.
2. All decision-making could be transferred back to the state level. There is no need for
international regulation unless global ‘‘evils’’ cross state borders and collective action
problems need to be solved. In the twenty-first century, however, such a perspective
seems to be highly unrealistic as interactions and transactions between international
actors have never been more lively than today.
3. A so-called ‘‘jurisdictional loop’’ ‘‘that runs from the national to the international and
back to the national – by way of several intermediate levels, regional and sub-regional’’
could be established. Whereas in international governance the most important loci of
governance have been the states (and intergovernmental institutions), in global
governance other actors on different levels, such as local, sub-regional, and regional,
influence public policy-making as well. The actors’ relevance and influence varies with
the issue-area and topic. Global governance thus is a wide-ranging dynamic process of
complex interactive decision-making which is subject to continuous development
according to the frequently changing circumstances
To narrow the jurisdictional gap, the United Nations may extend its cooperation with regional
organizations; it would, thereby, contribute to putting the principle of subsidiarity on a firm
basis. Strengthening the regional organizations’ role in the UN system and in world politics in
general, is frequently proposed by scholars (cf. for the issue area peace and security as well as
diplomats. As early as 1992, former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali already
acknowledged this necessity in his ‘‘Agenda for Peace,’’ and the current Secretary-General Kofi
Annan has repeatedly confirmed Boutros-Ghali’s view.
However, a ‘‘regionalization’’ of the United Nations has not yet taken place and is not very
likely to occur in the near future. One reason is that there are few regional organizations that can
be considered ‘‘acceptable’’ regional counterparts of the UN system with regard to their
effectiveness and legitimacy. Even if more effective and legitimate regional organizations
existed, establishing a division of labor between them and the United Nations would be
problematic.
Closing the operational gap
In the last decades, a profound lack of necessary information, analysis, and policy instruments
has prevented policy makers and public institutions from responding effectively to the daunting
complexity of policy issues. By working more closely together with non-state actors, policy
makers could narrow the operational gap. Global public-policy (GPP) networks or public–private
partnerships (PPP) in general, may help to bridge the operational gap. These (tri-sectorial) networks connect individuals and institutions with common interests across borders and different
sectors of activity: these include local, national, and regional governments, transnational
corporations, and other business actors, as well as their associations and civil society. This wide
range of members from different backgrounds enables the networks to collect a wide range of
information and expertise and thus to provide ‘‘a more complete picture of particular policy
issues and giving voice to previously unheard groups’’.
Closing the incentive gap
Global governance has been defined as the output of non-hierarchical networks of international
and transnational regimes. To work effectively, global governance is strictly dependent on the
performance of these institutions. An incentive gap (i.e. a malfunctioning of the operational
follow-up of international agreements) severely threatens this effectiveness. A primary task
among the efforts towards the establishment of global governance is thus the closure of the
incentive gap. The closure of the incentive gap (i.e. the establishment of effective compliance
mechanisms) can be achieved by different strategies. As a first step, institutions may enhance
compliance in a cooperative, problem solving approach. This approach is based on the
assumption that non-compliance frequently does not derive from a conscious decision to
disregard norms and rules but from the member states’ inability to abide by them, as well as from
a certain incomprehensibility of the norms and rules themselves. ‘‘Active management,’’ i.e.
capacity building, dispute settlement, and the adaptation and modification of norms set forth in
treaties, may thus be a useful tool for improving compliance. The actors’ efforts towards
complete fulfillment of their obligations can be effectively supported and organized by
institutions.
The ozone regime, for instance, has implemented this managerial strategy for enhancing
compliance. If a member state fails to comply with the Montreal Protocol’s rules, the
Implementation Committee submits recommendations to the Meeting of the Parties to agree on
suitable measures. Hitherto, the Implementation Committee has mostly recommended offers of
assistance to non-complying states. The Russian Federation, for example, received additional
funding through the Global Environmental Facility in order to speed up the conversion of
chlorofluorocarbon (CFC)-production facilities.
If the managerial model of compliance does not positively influence the actors’ behaviour, a
second measure of closing the incentive gap is required – namely, authoritative dispute
settlement. Compliance with the agreed norms and rules can be enhanced by hauling deviant
actors before a court of law or a body akin to it. In fact, more and more international institutions
tend to establish specific compliance mechanisms based on judicial or quasi-judicial disputesettlement procedures, thus taking an important (though not universal) step towards the
legalization of world politics. Legalization is defined as ‘‘the degree to which rules are
obligatory, the precision of those rules, and the delegation of some functions and interpretation,
monitoring, and implementation to third parties’’. ‘‘Legalized institutions’’ adopt precise rules
and delegate authority to a neutral entity for implementation of the agreed rules. Typically,
compliance in these legalized institutions is higher than that in non-legalized institutions.
The WTO is an example of such a legalized institution. WTO members have agreed that, if they
believe that a state is violating the WTO’s rules, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) will deal
with these violations on the basis of clearly defined rules with definite timetables for reaching a
decision. Once a decision has been handed down, the DSB also has the power to authorize
retaliation against a state that does not comply with a ruling. Since 1995, the DSB has authorized
five suspensions of trade concessions.
Closing the participatory gap
The participatory gap emerged from the primarily state-centric orientation of international
governance. As state-centric international institutions were still crucial to international
governance systems at the end of the twentieth century, non-state actors have been kept at arms’
length from decision-making. Both NGOs and intergovernmental organizations have criticized
this fact, the latter having finally recognized the important function of NGOs (both advocacy and
service organizations) in formulating and implementing international public policies and
numerous proposals to expand the role of non-state actors in global governance have been made,
including, for instance, the establishment of a Second UN Assembly. Apart from certain
differences in both electoral mode and general mandate of a possible Second Assembly, all
proposals aim at strengthening the role of societal actors in the United Nations.
In contrast to the present diplomatic UN representation, members of a Second Assembly would
be accountable not to their governments but to their popular constituencies. Furthermore, any
national group of deputies would represent their polity in its political, social, and cultural
diversity. The distance between rulers and addressees of public policies would thus be
minimized.
Although the revision of the UN system’s arrangements for NGO participation will narrow the
participatory gap, the efforts will not be sufficient to close it. There are two reasons for this.
First, the different bodies of the United Nations still vary in their openness towards NGOs.
Second, for closing (or narrowing) the participatory gap, balanced representation of the global
civil society in international organizations is necessary; this calls for the incorporation of
southern NGOs in addition to northern NGOs. Transnational NGOs with their predominantly
northern membership distort the inequalities of power and influence in world politics even
further: these NGOs are only adding yet another channel of influence to those people and
governments who already are powerfully represented.
2.4. Processes of Global Governance: Multilateralism Matters
Multilateral negotiations have become “management tools in international politics” (Hampson
1995: 6) and a key variable in global governance outcomes. John Ruggie (1993: 8) has stated,
“At its core, multilateralism refers to coordinating relations among three or more states in
accordance with certain principles.” Thus relationships are defined by agreed-upon rules,
principles, and perhaps by organizations. Participants expect that outcomes will yield “diffuse
reciprocity” (Keohane 1984) or roughly equal benefits over time. For example, the principle of
nondiscrimination or most-favored nation (MFN) governing the global trade system prohibits
countries from discriminating against imports from other countries. By contrast, bilateralism is
expected to provide specific reciprocity and roughly balanced (but not necessarily equal)
exchanges by each party at all times.
Complex Diplomacy
Twentieth-century diplomacy saw the accelerated trend from bilateral to multilateral diplomacy
to institutions, especially formal organizations, and the growth of conference diplomacy. What
makes multilateralism at the beginning of the twenty-first century different from multilateralism
at the end of World War II is its complexity. There are now literally scores of participants. States
alone have almost quadrupled in number since 1945. The various other types of actors add to the
complexity, as do various coalitions of states. Greater numbers of players (and coalitions of
players) mean multiple interests, multiple rules, issues, and hierarchies that are constantly in
flux. These all complicate the processes of multilateral diplomacy and negotiation— of finding
common ground for reaching agreements on collective action, norms, or rules.
How Do Decisions Get Made?
Historically, since IGOs have been created by states, the principle of sovereign equality has
dictated one-state, one-vote decision-making. Indeed, until well into the twentieth century, all
decisions had to be unanimous as states would not accept the concept of majority decisionmaking. This is often cited as one of the sources of failure for the League of Nations.
An alternative principle accords greater weight to some states on the basis of population or
wealth and results in weighted or qualified voting. In the IMF and World Bank, for example,
votes are weighted according to financial contribution. In the European Union’s Council of
Ministers, qualified majority voting applies to issues where the EU has supranational authority
over member states.
Since the 1980s, much of the decision-making in the UN General Assembly, Security Council,
and other bodies, as well as in global conferences, the World Trade Organization, and many
other multilateral settings have taken the form of consensus. “Pressure toward consensus,”
Courtney Smith (1999: 173) notes, “now dominates almost all multilateral efforts at global
problem solving.” The puzzle, he suggests, is “how an organization that is composed of 185 [sic]
member states, influenced by numerous nongovernmental organizations, lobbied by
multinational corporations, and serviced by an international secretariat.
Leadership
One unique feature of multilateral diplomacy is that leadership can come from diverse sources:
powerful and not-so-powerful states, a coalition of states, an NGO or coalition of NGOs, or a
skillful individual diplomat. It may involve a government’s (or any other actor’s) willingness to
act first—to commit monetary resources to a program, to change trade laws, or to renounce
development of a new weapons system. Leadership in multilateral diplomacy can also be a UN
secretary-general.
Actor Strategies
The nature of the multilateral arena means that actors cannot just present their individual
positions on an issue and then sit down. Delegates must actively engage in efforts to discern the
flexibility or rigidity of their respective positions. They must build personal relationships in order
to establish the trust essential to working together. The face-to-face interactions of the
individuals representing participating states are what caucusing is all about. It may take place at
the back of the General Assembly hall, in the delegates’ dining room, in a hotel lobby bar, at
receptions hosted by particular countries.
A hallmark of multilateral diplomacy is the formation of groups or coalitions of states and,
increasingly in many contexts, coalitions of NGOs. Coalitions are a way of managing large
numbers of participants. States can pool their power and resources to try to obtain a better
outcome than they might by going it alone. Very early in the UN’s history, regional groups
formed to elect nonpermanent representatives to the Security Council and other bodies. The Cold
War produced two competing groups under the leadership of the Soviet Union and United States
as well as a growing group of nonaligned countries. In 1964, Latin American, African, and Asian
states formed the Group of 77 (G-77) that remains an active part of UN politics today. Since the
mid-1960s, group diplomacy has been pervasive throughout much of the UN system.
2.5. The Politics and Effectiveness of Global Governance
The politics of global governance reflects “struggles over wealth, power, and knowledge” in the
world (C. Murphy 2000: 798). Thus, U.S. power and preferences shaped, and continue to shape,
many of the pieces of global governance, especially the liberal international economic system,
and ensures that U.S. interests (and often European as well) are accommodated in many regimes.
Power: Who Gets What?
Power and influence in global governance, however, does not belong just to powerful states or
coalitions of states. Susan Strange (1996: 54), along with others, has noted that “TNCs have
come to play a significant role in who gets-what in the world system.” -economic liberalism and
the increased influence of multilateral institutions has only intensified “market-driven poverty”
for the vast majority of Africans, Eastern Europeans, and others whose states are failing.
Legitimacy
Thomas Franck in The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (1990: 24) defines legitimacy as “a
property of a rule or rulemaking institution which itself exerts a pull toward compliance on those
addressed normatively because those addressed believe that the rule or institution has come into
being and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles of right process.” - key
aspect of legitimacy in the international system is membership in the international community
whose system of multilateral, reciprocal interactions helps to validate its members, institutions,
and rules. International institutions like the UN, for example, are perceived as legitimate to the
extent that they are created and function according to certain principles of right process such as
one-state, one-vote.
The UN Security Council’s legitimacy as the core institution in the international system imbued
with authority to authorize the use of force derives from the widespread acceptance of that role,
but as we will discuss in Chapter 4, that legitimacy is also under challenge. As political theorists
have long noted, flags and rituals are important symbols of legitimate authority.
Accountability
As a result of the diffusion of domestic democratic norms into the international arena,
international institutions also have faced growing demands for greater accountability, gender
balance in staffing, and transparency. Some of these demands come from NGOs and civil society
groups; others from democratic governments. The World Bank, World Trade Organization, and
IMF have particularly been charged with operating in secrecy. Likewise, there is an active debate
over the “democratic deficit” in EU institutions
Effectiveness: Measuring Success and Failure
A third critical challenge involves the effectiveness of governance and the success or failure of
different approaches to addressing needs and problems. As Simmons and de Jonge Oudraat
(2001:13–14) note, “Effectiveness goes beyond formal compliance; parties may come into
compliance with agreements effortlessly for a time and without undertaking any measures that
change behavior or contribute to solving the problem. Agreements themselves may not be
ambitious enough to provide more than temporary or cosmetic relief of global problems.”
The key question is: “What works?”
“The complexity of international issues, their overlapping nature, and the turmoil of the arena in
which they surface defy tidy theorizing about effective management.” There are many points of
view and interests to be reconciled, shifting politics, and uncertainties about the efficacies of
different policy alternatives.
The challenges of global governance, then, include a variety of international policy problems and
issues that require governance. Many pieces are not necessarily global in scope. Rather, what we
see is a multilevel and often very diffuse system of pieces of governance with many different
actors playing key roles alongside states. The need for more pieces of governance is clearly
rising with globalization and other developments; the processes are complex; the politics, even in
a world with a single superpower, is an ongoing struggle to control “who gets what”; and the
issues of legitimacy, accountability, and effectiveness require constant attention.
Chapter Three
The Pieces of Global Governance
Piece of global governance: it is not a single world order; it is not a top-down, hierarchical
structure of authority. It is the collection of governance-related activities | are the cooperative
problem-solving arrangements and activities that states and other actors have put into place to
deal with various issues and problems.
International Law: public international law has expanded tremendously since the 1960s. the
Statute of the International Court of Justice recognizes five sources of international law (treaties
or conventions, customary practice, the writings of legal scholars, judicial decisions, and general
principles of law) | By far the largest number of new multilateral agreements deals with
economic issues. Treaty-based law has been particularly valued because the process of
negotiation now involves all affected countries.
LIMITS: At present, except within the European Union (EU), multilateral agreements cannot be
used directly to bind individuals, multinational corporations, nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), paramilitary forces, terrorists, or international criminals | Another problem is the
absence of international enforcement mechanisms and the role of self-interest in shaping states’
decisions about whether or not to accept treaties and other forms of international rules.
In short, the “force” of international law often comes from the “felt need to coordinate activities .
. . and to ensure stable and predictive patterns of behavior” and the reality is “imperfect, varied,
and changing implementation and compliance -Chayes and Antonia Chayes (1995), instead, cite
efficiency, interests, and norms as key factors and lack of capability or treaty ambiguity as
principal sources of noncompliance. States often value a reputation for law-abiding behavior and
desire the benefits of reciprocity - For weaker and developing states, failure to comply can be a
consequence of inadequate local expertise and governmental capacity to do what is required for
compliance.
International Norms or “Soft Law”: Many international legal conventions set forth what are
not in fact binding obligations for states, but rather norms or standards of behavior, sometimes
referred to as “soft law.” Some human rights and labor rights, the concept of the global commons
applied to the high seas, outer space, and polar regions, as well as the concept of sustainable
development | Protocols are used to supplement the initial framework convention, and they are
considered to form the “hard” law dealing with the issue.
Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) IGOs are organizations whose members include at
least three states, that have activities in several states, and whose members are held together by a
formal intergovernmental agreement. | Members may come from primarily one geographic
region (Organization of American States [OAS]) or from all geographic regions (World Bank).
Although some IGOs are designed to achieve a single purpose (Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries [OPEC]), others have been developed for multiple tasks (United Nations
[UN]).
ICJ: IGOs are recognized subjects of international law with separate standing from their member
states | UN: exercising and enjoying, functions and rights which can only be explained on the
basis of international personality and the capacity to operate upon an international plane. It is at
present the supreme type of international organization, and it could not carry out the intentions of
its founders
IGOs are instrumental in forming stable habits of cooperation through regular meetings,
information, gathering and analysis, and dispute settlement as well as operational activities| they
differ in the amount of resources available and by level and degree of bureaucratization. Why do
states join such organizations? Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal (1998: 4–5) answer these
questions by suggesting that “IOs [intergovernmental organizations] allow for the centralization
of collective activities through a concrete and stable organizational structure and a supportive
administrative apparatus. These increase the efficiency of collective activities and enhance the
organization’s ability to affect the understandings, environment, and interests of states.” Thus,
states join to participate in a stable negotiating forum, permitting rapid reactions in times of
crisis. By participating, they agree to shape international debate on important issues and forge
critical norms of behavior. Yet states still maintain their sovereignty and varying degrees of
independence of action.
IGOs not only create opportunities for their member states, but they also exercise influence and
impose constraints on their member states’ policies and processes. IGOs affect member states by
setting international and, hence, national agendas and forcing governments to take positions on
issues. Explores how China’s admission to the World Trade Organization affects its national
policies and requires extensive governmental reforms.
IGO Functions
 Informational—gathering, analyzing, and disseminating data
 Forum—providing place for exchange of views and decision-making
 Normative—defining standards of behavior
 Rule-creating—drafting legally binding treaties
 Rule-supervisory—monitoring compliance with rules, settling disputes, taking
enforcement measures
 Operational—allocating resources, providing technical assistance and relief, deploying
forces
The “power” of IGOs is limited in terms of their ability to enforce decisions, except in specific
cases such as the EU, which has supranational authority over member states in many policy
domains. Most IGO actions are, in fact, recommendations. In 2003/04, the Yearbook of
International Organizations (Union of International Associations UIA) identified about 238
IGOs.
Nongovernmental Organizations
NGOs are private voluntary organizations whose members are individuals or associations that
come together to achieve a common purpose. Some organizations are formed to advocate a
particular cause such as human rights, peace, or environmental protection. Others are established
to provide services such as disaster relief, humanitarian aid | International NGOs, like IGOs, may
draw their members from one region or several regions, and they may have very specific
functions or be multifunctional.
The Yearbook of International Organizations identifies over 6,500 nongovernmental
organizations that have an international dimension | Examples include the International
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Oxfam, CARE, Medicines Sans Frontiers
(Doctors Without Borders), World Wildlife Fund, Transparency International
NGO’S AND IGO’S: NGOs’ governance functions parallel many functions provided by IGOs.
They create and mobilize global networks, gathering information on local conditions and
mobilizing pressures both within states and transnationally. In fact, they have become key
sources of information and technical expertise on a wide variety of international issues from the
environment to human rights. They participate at least indirectly in IGO-sponsored conferences,
raising new issues, submitting documents, and disseminating their expertise. They play
increasingly important governance roles in monitoring implementation of human rights norms
and environmental regulations-NGOs are playing an ever-increasing role. Services once
provided by governments or IGOs are being contracted out to private, nongovernmental
organizations.
International Regimes
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES: some instances the rules, norms, and structures are linked
together in what some scholars refer to as international regimes to govern a particular problem
such as nuclear weapons proliferation, whaling, trade, food aid. Where an international regime
exists, participating states and other international actors recognize the existence of certain
obligations and feel compelled to honor them. They expect other states and actors also to comply
and to utilize dispute settlement procedures to resolve conflicts. Key characteristics of
international regimes are their association with a specific issue area and the links among the
constituent elements.
International regimes encompass rules and norms, as well as the practices of actors that show
both how their expectations converge and their acceptance of and compliance with rules. IGO
decision-making procedures, bureaucracy, budget, headquarters building, and legal personality
may be required (or established) within a given issue area – individual IGOs do not constitute a
regime.
Ad Hoc Arrangements
In situations where an existing IGO does not provide a suitable forum for dealing with a
particular problem and a new IGO is not needed, states and other actors may create an ad hoc
arrangement. The pattern can be best illustrated with three examples. The Group of 7 (G-7), for
example, began in an ad hoc fashion in the mid-1970s when summit meetings of governmental
leaders |When Canadian Prime Minister Lloyd Axworthy decided to negotiate a convention
banning antipersonnel landmines in 1996, Axworthy convened a special conference in Ottawa in
December 1997 for the sole purpose of securing agreement on a total ban | In the mid-1990s,
ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia and genocide in Rwanda prompted the UN Security
Council to create ad hoc war crimes tribunals to bring those responsible to justice.
Global Conferences
During the 1990s, the United Nations convened nine global conferences on economic and social
matters, following a similar series in the 1970s and 1980s. They included meetings of heads of
state and government. NGO participation in parallel conferences grew exponentially.
Conferences like the Summit for Children (1990), the Earth Summit in Rio (1992), or the Fourth
World Conference on Women in Beijing (1995) have become an important part of the global
political processes for addressing interdependence issues, for seeking ways to improve the lives
and wellbeing of humans, and for strengthening other pieces of governance. They also serve to
raise awareness of interdependence issues; galvanize the creation, dissemination, and sharing of
knowledge; create new norms and new international law; create new structures; and define
global political priorities.| often the results are disappointing to those most concerned about the
issues because they may represent the least common denominator of agreement among the large
number of participants
Private Governance
Private governance is a growing, but little studied phenomenon. Although the very meaning of
the term is controversial, it involves authoritative decision-making in areas that once were part of
national legal frameworks- Examples include international accounting standards; the private
bond-rating agencies such as Moody’s Investors Service, whose rules can shape government
actions through the threatened drop in a country’s rating; International Chamber of Commerce
rules and actions; private industry governance such as the Worldwide Responsible Apparel
Manufacturing Principles.
Private authorities are neither inherently good nor bad. “What is evident, though,” Spar (48)
says, “is that private entities will play an ever-increasing role in the development and
management of electronic interaction . . . They will assume quasi-governmental functions in
many instances, regulating activity in their particular spheres. HYBRIDS: An interesting hybrid
of public and private governance is illustrated by the World Commission on Dams, composed of
representatives from government, private industry, and NGO.
Actors in Global Governance
The complexity of global governance is a function not only of many pieces, but also of many
actors that are frequently linked in transnational and Trans-governmental networks. Such
networks have become increasingly dense since the 1970s when Robert Keohane and Joseph
Nye (1971) first pointed out the importance of regular interactions across national boundaries of
governmental and nongovernmental actors.
1. States
States continue to be key actors in global governance, creating many of the pieces and carrying
out many of the activities. States alone have sovereignty. States create IGOs and determine what
actions they can or cannot take; they create international law and norms and determine their
effectiveness | IGOs offered a way to create structures compatible with American notions of
political order and through which to promote U.S. political and economic interests | Today as the
sole superpower, however, the United States cannot shape global governance alone, as even a
hegemonic state has to act in coordination with others. In coordination with the other four
permanent members of the Security Council: Russia, Great Britain, China, and France. In
international economic governance, the United States works most closely with the G-7 that
includes Germany, Japan, Italy, Britain, France, and Canada
Middle-power states play a particularly critical role, not as individual states but often acting in
concert in the United Nations and other IGOs. Thus, states such as Canada, Australia, Norway,
Sweden, Argentina, Brazil, India, and Nigeria are known for their commitment to
multilateralism, ability to forge compromises, and support for reform in the international system.
The steady concentration of power in the hands of states that began in 1648 with the Peace of
Westphalia is over, at least for a while.” Power, indeed, is less concentrated in states and has
diffused to the other actors in global governance.
2. IGOs Intergovernmental Organizations
In considering the significance of IGOs in shaping global governance, we focus not on the
structural attributes and programs but on the organizations as actors. This means the IGO
officials who play key roles in getting states to act, coordinating the efforts of different groups,
providing the diplomatic skills to secure agreements, and ensuring programs’ effectiveness.
3. NGOs
Like IGOs, NGOs are both pieces of governance and key actors. The growth of NGOs and NGO
networks in the 1990s has been a major factor in their increasing involvement in governance at
all levels from global to local. In addition to the 6,500 or so internationally active NGOs, there
are literally millions of small grassroots NGOs in countries around the world.
4. Experts
In a world whose problems seem to grow steadily more complex, knowledge and expertise are
critical to governance efforts. There is a need to understand the science behind environmental
problems such as climate change, ozone depletion, or declining fish stocks in order to consider
policy options. Experts from different countries’ governmental agencies, research institutes,
private industry, or universities have increasingly been drawn into international efforts to deal
with different issues. Often these experts may be part of transnational networks and participate in
international conferences.
5. Global Policy Networks
Experts may also be among the actors in global policy networks that link key individuals in
government agencies, IGOs, corporations, professional associations, and NGOs. In 1999, surveys
by the World Bank identified about fifty such networks that ranged in focus from fisheries to
global climate change to HIV/AIDS. The loose alliances of a broad range of participants “join
together to achieve what none can accomplish on its own”.
6. Multinational Corporations (MNCs)
MNCs are a particular form of nongovernmental actor organized to conduct for-profit business
transactions and operations across the borders of three or more states. Multinational corporations
can take many different forms, -What they share in common is that they are companies based in
one state with affiliated branches or subsidiaries and activities in other states. As actors in global
governance, MNCs have “profoundly altered the structure and functioning of the global
economy” (Gilpin 2001: 290). By choosing where to invest or not to invest, MNCs shape the
economic development opportunities of individual communities, countries, and entire regions
such as Africa, where little foreign investment takes place compared to East Asia. UN SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan has been a champion of new mechanisms to regulate corporate behavior and
to engage MNCs as positive contributors to global governance. In 1999, Annan broke new
ground for the UN by convening a meeting with world business leaders and exhorting them to
embrace the UN Global Compact whose nine principles cover human rights, labor, and the
environment.
CHAPTER FOUR:
AFRICAN REGIONAL GOVERNANCE AND POLITICAL DYNAMISM
1.1 Defining Regionalism
For several decades now, the world has witnessed a tremendous surge in regionalism. The result
has been a kaleidoscope of interlocking regional organizations that vary greatly in terms of size,
scope, purpose and institutional arrangements. They range from large intergovernmental
organizations that span across whole continents, such as the African Union, UNASUR or
NAFTA, to small micro-regional organizations like the Zambezi River Basin Initiative or crossborder initiatives such as the Regional Integration Facilitation Forum. Some of these are
traditional free trade areas and customs unions, while others are focused on security cooperation
or deal with specific environmental and cross-border issues. And while some of them have
developed complex supranational institutional structures, others rely on more informal
arrangements.
The rapid increase and growing complexity of regional arrangements spurned a continuing
academic debate about the role and nature of regionalism and its relevance and impact on world
politics and global governance. Despite the intensity of this debate, there has been a considerable
lack of consensus about both the nature and driving forces of regionalism. According to one of
the earliest definitions by Joseph Nye, a region consists of “a limited number of states linked by
a geographical relationship and by a degree of mutual interdependence” (Nye 1968: vii).
Regionalism, Nye elaborates, results from “the formation of interstate associations or groupings
on the basis of regions.”
While many analysts agree that an element of geographic proximity remains essential for
defining a region, most now regard Nye’s definition as too narrow. Some of the earlier studies of
the topic underline that intense interactions on the economic, political and cultural level are of
specific importance (Deutsch 1957). Others have gone further by emphasizing the significance of
shared political values and perceptions amongst the participating states (Russet 1967; Thompson
1973). More recently, there has been a tendency to deemphasize the geographic elements of
regions altogether, by focusing on the political and ideational character of regions instead. Thus,
for Peter Katzenstein “regions are politically made” (Katzenstein 2005: 9), whereas Frederik
Söderbaum defines a region as a “body of ideas, values, and concrete objectives that are aimed at
creating, maintaining or modifying the provision of security and wealth, peace, and
development.” (Söderbaum 2002: 5).
Given these large differences about what constitutes a region, it is of little surprise that opinions
similarly diverge about the nature of regionalism and its sources. To start with, the literature
distinguishes between regionalism tout court and the process of regionalization. Although
considerable differences remain over the concrete content of each of these terms, most agree on
what differentiates the one from the other. While regionalism connotes intergovernmental, topdown, political and usually highly institutionalized practices, regionalization is seen as a societal,
bottom-up and often economically-driven process that is in constant flux (Mansfield & Solingen
2010). According to Breslin and Higgott, regionalism represents “those state-led projects of
cooperation that emerge as a result of intergovernmental dialogue and treaties,” whereas
regionalization represents “processes of integration which albeit seldom unaffected by state
policies derive their driving force from markets, from private trade and investment flows, and
from the policies and decisions of companies” rather than predetermined government plans
(Breslin & Higgott 2000: 344). Despite these broad differences, both concepts are closely
intertwined. Thus, informal societal processes of regionalization might in time engender state-led
regionalism and vice versa, making both of them part of the same overall trend.
This has led some to conclude that regionalization is in essence a feature of regionalism or a
form of “soft regionalism” (Hurrel 1995). All of this shows that regionalism is an increasingly
complex and diverse phenomenon that is used to describe various levels of interaction amongst a
broad set of regional actors. Regionalism is also increasingly multidimensional in that it touches
upon economic, political and social processes between these actors. But why do certain regions
display increasing levels of “regionness” while others do not (Hettne & Söderbaum 2000; van
Langenhove 2003)? And what distinguishes a region from a “non-region”? Björn Hettne and
Frederik Söderbaum have argued that a region can be identified on the basis of its distinctiveness
as a relatively coherent territorial subsystem from the rest of the global system. According to
them, “when different processes of regionalization in various fields and at various levels
intensify and converge within the same geographical area the cohesiveness and thereby the
distinctiveness of the region in the making increases.” Regionness therefore describes a process
“whereby a geographical area is transformed from a passive object to an active subject capable
of articulating the transnational interests of the emerging region” (Hettne & Söderbaum 2000:
361). As part of this process, regions gain different levels of regionness which can be increasing
or decreasing over time.
According to some, the ultimate outcome of these processes of regionalization is “region hood” –
a concept that can be understood in analogy to the concept of “statehood”. A region endowed
with region hood can therefore be described as a “non-sovereign governance system with
(partial) statehood properties” (van Langenhove 2003). Others have argued that region hood is
only part of the equation and that “regionness” increases along with greater degrees of
institutionalization or the redefinition of common norms and identities. More recently, it has
been claimed that while these endogenous characteristics are essential they have to be combined
with a number of exogenous characteristics in order to bestow regionness amongst a territorial
entity. These exogenous characteristics include recognition by outside actors and the ability to
interact or influence other regions or the global governance level (de Lombaerde, et al 2010). A
region therefore can be seen as distinguishing itself from other regions and non-regions, due to a
combination of these various endogenous and exogenous characteristics.
When it comes to the dynamics that have been feeding the astonishing growth of regionalism,
most authors have pointed towards its correlation with the process of globalization. According to
Björn Hettne, “the two processes of globalization and regionalization are articulated within the
same larger process of global structural change” (Hettne 1999: 2). Indeed, the growth of global
interdependence has meant that state’s capacities of self-governance have been reduced because
“information, pollution, migrants, arms, ideas, images, news, crime, narcotics, disease, amongst
other things, readily and frequently flow across national territorial boundaries” which have
become increasingly porous (McGrew, 1997: 6). This has resulted in a growing demand for
multilateral institutions that can help states and societies deal with these new issues.
The growth of regionalism is generally seen as being part of this larger trend. Here, one of the
central issues of the debate has been whether regionalism is a stepping-stone or a stumbling
block for multilateral economic interdependence. While some regard regionalism as a reaction
against globalization that encourages protectionism and undermines global multilateralism
(Bhagwati 1991; Mattli 1999), others have seen it as a way of reducing obstacles to collective
action and consolidate economic reforms (Krugman 1993; Lawrence 1996). Perhaps the easiest
way out of this dilemma is to conclude along with Robert Gilpin that regionalism may have both
benign and malevolent strains in that it may promote peace and economic stability or serve as a
cover for mercantilism and an unequal distribution of welfare (Gilpin 1975: 235).
It is this large conceptual pluralism that makes regionalism a phenomenon that is notoriously
difficult to study beyond the remit of specific case studies of regional organizations. Still,
through the fog of academic concepts and definitions it is possible to conclude that all regional
projects share four essential elements: (1) a common geography; (2) regular and intense
interactions on both a political and economic level; (3) commonly shared regional perceptions;
and (4) agency and outside recognition (Tavares 2004). Beyond these, it is possible to note that
regionalism evolves in close relationship with both global and national forces, which it
influences in its turn. The various definitions and models that have been developed to analyze
regionalism are to a large extent a reflection of the great variety and diversity of existing regional
integration process that are complicating any attempt to draw up a definitive typology of
regionalism.
Regionalism in Africa
Regionalism in Africa has also become more dynamic throughout the 2000s. The shift from the
Organization of African Unity (OAU) to the African Union (AU) provided the continent with a
more formal and functional regional organization. In a considerable shift from the OAU, the AU
explicitly recognized the “responsibility to protect” and with that preserved for itself the right of
intervening in the affairs of its member states on humanitarian and human rights grounds
(Murithi 2005). These aspirations have resulted in the setting-up of a new institutional structure
that allowed the AU to conduct several small scale crisis management operations – often with
international support. AU missions have been carried out in several crises spots, including
Sudan, Burundi, Somalia and the Comoros. Most of these missions only had mixed results due to
the tremendous organizational and financial shortcomings the AU continue to face (Murithi
2008).
To address these shortcomings, the AU and other regional organizations launched the African
Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) with international support in 2004. APSA’s aspiration
is to create an African Standby Force, comprised of five contingents on the sub-regional level.
To fulfill these aspirations, further international support in terms of financial resources and
expertise will be necessary (Vines & Middleton 2008).
While there has been some progress when it comes to security cooperation, economic integration
in Africa still remains stymied. The launching of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development
(NEPAD) in 2001 sought to address these shortcomings by promoting sustainable development,
economic integration and good governance. To ensure the latter, NEPAD established the African
Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) monitoring good governance issues on a voluntary basis
(Hope 2005). Despite these efforts, regional economic integration remains low and has primarily
played out on a sub-regional scale where it has been driven by some of the continent’s growth
poles (Soko, 2007). It was only in 2008 that the South African Development Community
(SADC), the East African Community (EAC), and the Common Market of Eastern and Southern
African States (COMESA) agreed to establish a common free trade zone.
Several problems account for this lack of regional economic integration (Lamy 2010). Widespread poverty has deprived markets of the fuel that has been an instrumental driver elsewhere.
Neither has the private sector served as a motor for integration. The lack of appropriate
infrastructure, Africa’s difficult geography and the small size of African economies are other
factors that have complicated the development of a regional division of labor. Finally, the
persistence of monopolistic structures and the focus of economic activities on the production of
raw materials have further hindered integration.
As a result, the outlook for African regionalism remains mixed. Unlike Latin America or Asia
(or indeed Europe), Africa lacks one powerful country that has the economic resources and
influence to steer regional integration (NIC 2010). Instead the future of African regionalism
hinges on the development of a number of key countries, including South Africa, Nigeria,
Ethiopia and Congo. Moreover, poverty and the presence of fragile and failing states will
continue to hinder regional cooperation. Renewed international competition for Africa’s natural
resources, as witnessed by a recent flood of Chinese and other investments, moreover, will have
an uncertain impact on African regionalism, with the potential of reinforcing both integration and
fragmentation.
The prospects are somewhat better when it comes to sub-regional integration in Sub-Saharan
Africa. This is especially the case in East Africa, where the East African Community (EAC) has
progressed in strides since being revived in 2000. In 2010, the five East African member states
Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi signed a common market protocol that will lead
to a progressive liberalization of restrictions to the movement of trade, capital, labor and services
amongst these countries. East African leaders have also expressed the ambition of moving
towards the adoption of a common currency unit by 2012 and towards a political union by 2015.
While progress has been substantial when it comes to the legal and institutional framework of the
EAC these political ambitions are judged by most as still being somewhat immature (Kasaija
2004). Other sub-regional organizations, like ECOWAS and SADC, while taking steps to further
deepening their cooperation remain similarly beholden to regional problems.
African regionalism in perspective
The Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) became the champion of regional integration,
already in the mid-1960s proposing the division of Africa into regions for the purposes of
economic development. Current African integration arrangements can be divided into two broad
groups: those that fit into the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) adopted in April 1980, and those that
were either in existence or came about outside the LPA.
The Lagos Plan was promoted by the ECA and launched in a special initiative by the OAU. It
envisaged three regional arrangements aimed at the creation of separate but convergent and overarching integration arrangements in three sub-Saharan sub-regions. West Africa would be served
by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) which pre-dated the Lagos
Plan. A Preferential Trade Area (PTA) was established in 1981 to cover the countries of East and
Southern Africa, which was eventually replaced in 1993 by the Common Market for Eastern and
Southern Africa (COMESA). For Central Africa the treaty of the Economic Community of
Central African States (ECCAS) was approved in 1983 but remains to be fully ratified. Together
with the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) in North Africa, these arrangements were expected to lead
to an all-African common market by the year 2025. The Lagos Plan was followed up in 1991 by
the Abuja Treaty, re-affirming the commitment of the OAU’s Heads of State to an integrated
African economy (McCarthy, 1995). In April 2001, African Heads of State launched the African
Union at Sirte to replace the OAU.
A second group of integration arrangements has grown up outside the LPA. Two important
RTAs are associated with the former CFA zone. There is the West African Economic and
Monetary Union (WAEMU) within the ambit of ECOWAS and the Economic and Monetary
Union of Central Africa (CEMAC) within the proposed ECCAS region. Within the geographic
area of COMESA there are the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) with its associated
monetary union (the Common Monetary Area, CMA), the Southern African Development
Community (SADC) and the East African Community (EAC). Some countries in this region are
also joined with countries in the Horn of Africa in the Intergovernmental Authority on
Development (IGAD).
Reasons for the past lack of success of African regional groupings
Despite the multiplicity of groupings, SSA regional groupings have not been very effective.
Among the reasons for this can be mentioned the following:

Intra-regional trade in Africa as a share of total foreign trade has traditionally been low
compared to other regions. Figures in the early 1990s suggest that the proportion was
only 8.4 per cent in 1993 compared with Western Europe (69.9 per cent), Asia (49.7 per
cent), North America (33 per cent) and Latin America (19.4 per cent) (WTO source,
quoted in McCarthy, 1995, p. 21). However, recorded trade underestimates the volume of
actual trade and, if proper account was taken of the size of informal trade, the African
numbers would not look so out of line. Furthermore, there is evidence that the importance
of intra-regional trade has been steadily increasing in recent years.

Most African states have suffered from severe macroeconomic disequilibria, foreign debt
service burdens, over-valued currencies, lack of trade finance, and a narrow tax base,
with customs duties a substantial source of revenue. The protective import substitution
strategies adopted by most countries since independence resulted in a host of regulations
restricting trade such as licensing, administrative foreign exchange allocation, special
taxes for acquiring foreign exchange, advance import deposits etc. Thus the economic
context has been unfavorable to the development of regional commitments.

The design of African integration schemes around inward-looking industrialization meant
that the economic costs of participation for member states are often immediate and
concrete (in the form of lower tariff revenues and greater import competition), while the
economic benefits are long-term and uncertain and are often unevenly distributed among
member states.

The dominance of a few countries and the huge disparities in size among members of
regional groupings led to concerns about the distribution of benefits. Regions have found
it difficult to address the equitable distribution of gains and losses from integration.
Mechanisms to provide compensation to the less developed members of groupings have
been either absent or ineffective.

The dependence of many African countries on their former colonial powers tended to
work against viable regional groupings. The importance of North-South linkages
(Franco-African and Commonwealth links and various Lomé Conventions) may have
distracted commitment from intra-African groupings.

Regionalism has been driven from above by public sector organizations and has lacked
the support and involvement of the private sector and the general public. Cooperation has
been seen as involving bloated and expensive bureaucracies, rather than opportunities for
growth and development.

Institutional weaknesses, including the existence of too many regional organizations, a
tendency towards top-heavy structures with too many political appointments, failures by
governments to meet their financial obligations to regional organizations, poor
preparation before meetings, and lack of follow up by sectoral ministries on decisions
taken at regional meetings by Heads of State.

Integration is hampered by the existence of weak states and political opposition to
sharing sovereignty. Integration arrangements are not characterized by strong
supranational bodies and virtually all integration institutions are intergovernmental.
The debate on the “new regionalism” in Africa
Cross-Border Initiative
Despite these problems, there is a new optimism that the new approach to regionalism may have
greater success in Africa. An example of the new approach in action is the Regional Integration
Facilitation Forum (RIFF) which originated as the Cross-Border Initiative (CBI) in 1992 as a
framework of harmonized policies to facilitate a market-driven concept of integration in Eastern
and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean countries. Fourteen countries participate in the
CBI/RIFF, which is co-sponsored by the African Development Bank, the European Union, the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Given the ongoing economic reform programs
in these countries, the underlying premise is that regional integration can accelerate the pace of
economic growth by fostering efficient cross-border investment and trade flows. In contrast to
previous regional initiatives the CBI/RIFF is characterized by: (i) outward-orientation and
openness to the rest of the world to ensure that regionalism is accompanied by greater integration
of the sub-region into the world economy; (ii) avoidance of the creation of new institutions; (iii)
direct involvement of the private sector in the formulation and implementation of a conductive
policy environment; (iv) peer pressure from fast reformers setting the pace of integration.
Assessments by the co-sponsors suggested that good if variable progress has been achieved by
the Initiative and that the model represents an effective example of regional partnership
(Fajgenbaum et al, 1999). While the CBI/RIFF is criticized as being incompatible with the ECAdriven regional framework for Africa and for proposing a market-driven rather than
development-oriented regionalism model (Asante, 1997), its particular emphasis on private
sector participation in formulating strategy and programs would be useful to encourage in other
SSA regional groups.
The Cotonou Agreement
The restructuring of trade relations between the ACP States and the EU foreseen in the Cotonou
Agreement will also help to develop momentum behind regional integration in Africa in this
decade. Trade relations, which are now based on non-reciprocal trade preferences granted by the
EU, will in future be based on economic integration agreements. The EU intends to negotiate
these Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with ACP countries engaged in a regional
integration process, and not with individual States except in exceptional circumstances. EPAs are
thus intended to consolidate regional integration initiatives within the ACP. Formal negotiations
of EPAs started in September 2002 in a two-phase process. The first phase of the negotiations
takes place between the EU and the ACP group as a whole with the aim of defining the format,
structure and principles for the negotiations, to be followed by the negotiation of individual
EPAs. It is envisaged that EPAs will enter into force by 1 January 2008 at the latest.
Decisions about the geographical configuration of future EPAs are still outstanding. Under the
Cotonou Agreement, this decision lies with the ACP countries, but the EU has added the rider
that it is up to the Community to ensure that this decision is in line with the objectives and
principles of the Agreement. The EU has published “Orientations on the Qualification of ACP
Regions for the Negotiation of EPAs” setting out the Commission’s views in this respect (EU
Commission, 2001).
Criteria for ACP regions...
The criteria for eligible regions are clear enough; the difficulty lies in implementing them in the
specific context of the existing structure of African regional groupings. Thus, the Commission
favors groupings which are large enough to constitute “poles of attraction” which would create
positive trade and economic dynamics, which aim at forming a customs union, which are willing
to tackle the non-border barriers to a common market and which have effective enforcement
mechanisms. It highlights the importance of structural funds financed by customs and taxation
revenues to assist weaker partners in the integration scheme to ensure an equitable distribution of
the gains of regional integration. Finally, it recommends that integration should take account of
existing infrastructures, trading and production links. It is not a requirement that eligible regional
groupings exhibit these characteristics at the start of EPA negotiations but they “should aim,
within reasonable timeframes, to build on these principles in order to provide an optimal
framework for the attainment of the development objectives of the Cotonou Agreement”.
In implementing these principles, the Commission rules out of eligibility for the negotiation of
EPAs regional groupings which are “not effectively engaged in an economic integration process
but rather pursue common political or economic objectives through co-operation”. The key
requirement is that the negotiations must take place “in one single setting, including appropriate
co-ordination between the member states of the organization or initiative, and lead to one single
agreement”. This requirement runs up against the overlapping membership and fragmented
nature of African regional organizations. There are a number of permutations. The simplest is
where one grouping is a sub-group of another, possibly embarked on pursuing deeper integration
as an example of variable geometry. An example typical in West and Southern Africa is where
there is a wide free trade area arrangement, within which a sub-group has established a customs
union or an even more deeply integrated group. Here the options are for the negotiations to
proceed with either one group or the other as it would be impossible to have two negotiations in
parallel, one with respect to the free trade area and one with the customs union. The difficulty is
that if negotiations proceed with the customs union sub-group, it is hard to see how this could
avoid fragmenting the larger grouping unless it decides to accelerate its own integration
ambitions.
More tricky situations arise with groupings that have members in common. In this situation,
overlapping membership would lead to the negotiation of two or more EPAs with the same
countries, which is not conceivable. The Commission does not rule out overlapping membership
but points to the obvious corollary that the regional groupings concerned would have to
harmonize their negotiating position vis-à-vis the EU to ensure that all countries of both
groupings have the same access arrangements to the EU, and that negotiations take place in one
setting. As overlapping memberships mainly affect the broad, free trade groupings, this could
effectively end up forcing even larger integration arrangements than currently exist.
Another difficult situation is where groupings have non-ACP States as members. The
Commission points out that while, legally, arrangements could be put in place to allow free
circulation of goods within the free trade area while confining the benefits of the EPA to the
ACP members of the group, in practice this situation would not be tenable in the longer term
because of the possibility of trade deflection. Given that the EU will have entered into separate
FTAs with many of these non-ACP African states, it suggests that a logical step would be to
extend the geographical coverage of EPAs by merging the existing agreements. An obvious case
in point is South Africa (which has now signed its own FTA with the EU) and SADC.
Finally, the EU has now classified the ACP countries into developing and least developed
countries in the sense that the latter benefit from the unilateral duty-free access offered to all
least-developed countries (LDCs) under the “Everything But Arms” initiative. While this might
imply that only the former are required to provide some measure of reciprocity under the new
regime, in practice it is hard to see how LDCs which are members of regional groupings with
non-LDC ACP States can retain external protection against EU imports. The EU Commission
states that “It has sometimes been understood that the principle of differentiation implies that
reciprocity would not be required from least developed countries participating in an EPA. This
is, of course, not the case” (EU Commission, 2001, p. 13). It goes on to suggest that the
appropriate response for LDCs in a regional grouping is to adopt a variable speed approach
under which they would be offered a delayed start or a slower pace of tariff dismantlement. In
practice, such an arrangement would give rise to the potential for goods with reduced (or zero)
tariffs to be imported from the EU by the more advanced ACP members and re-exported under
the FTA to LDC members which have the right to protect themselves by higher tariffs. While the
problem can be avoided in principle by proper documentation of rules of origin, the difficulties
of policing these may in practice undermine the tariff policies of the least developed countries.
As the LDCs also lose out because of the potential for trade diversion under EPAs as EU
exporters now gain better access to the markets of ACP countries at their expense, there is a
strong case for compensation measures in their favor.
Although the issue of the composition of Sub-Sahara African regional groupings has been
highlighted here, the EU-ACP negotiations raise many of the issues pertinent to regional
integration among developing countries raised in this paper (see also Bilal and Van Hove, 2002).
These include whether trade diversion will dominate trade creation, the loss of fiscal revenues
from the abolition of customs duties, the limited capacity in most ACP countries to conduct
parallel sets of trade negotiations, and how to provide for sufficient scope for flexibility, special
and differential treatment and asymmetry while ensuring that the agreements reached remain
WTO-compatible. The fact that the interpretation of Article XXIV itself is under discussion in
the Doha Development Round makes the legal context of the EPA negotiations all the more
complicated.
The future of regional integration in Africa
Despite competing visions of regional integration...
We have seen how a new momentum is building up behind regionalism in Africa, but that there
are competing visions for the objectives and design of regional integration arrangements. On the
one hand, there are those who argue that, because of the poor record of regional economic
integration, African countries should “forget theoretical schemes of the pan-African type (a
‘United States of Africa’) or the neo-colonial type (a customs union), replacing them with
simpler, cheaper, more productive, and more cost-effective models of integration through
projects - choosing priority sectors for development (agriculture, industry, power, transportation,
and training) and identifying specific, concrete projects in each sector to be implemented on a
community basis, with possible financial support from outside (Diouf, quoted in McCarthy,
1995, p. 37). On the other hand, there are the erstwhile sceptics among the donors who have been
converted to supporting regionalism of a certain type, one which is outward-looking, which is
focused on trade facilitation, which has strong private sector involvement and which has light
institutional structures. Finally, there is the traditional model of top-down African regionalism,
espoused by the OAU and endorsed by African Heads of State, which has a strong rhetorical
basis and a largely political significance.
The EU’s desire to encourage regional economic groupings as potential trade partners in
negotiating EPAs under the Cotonou Agreement implies that trade integration as well as
functional co-operation will necessarily be an important policy instrument of African
regionalism during the next decade. This has implications for those interested in promoting a
food security dimension to these agreements as outlined more fully in Chapter 5. For example,
food security is explicitly addressed in the Cotonou Agreement in the provision which reads:
“The Agreements shall include provisions aimed at fostering food security in accordance with
WTO rules”.
If the new regional groupings in Africa are to have a role in tackling food security, they need to
be placed on a firmer footing. The new regionalism must address the following issues which
have been partly responsible for the poor record of the past:

Overlapping memberships of competing groups should be resolved to allow a clear
political commitment to particular country groupings.

For a common market to function its members at least need to be at peace. The wars and
conflicts in a number of African regions which have devastated transport networks,
communications and other basic infrastructure need to be peacefully resolved.

Ways must be found to involve the private sector in the integration process. It should not
be expected that all private sector groups will favor regional integration. In some
countries, farmers may fear low-cost competition from elsewhere in the region and may
take quite a protectionist stance. The participation of consumer groups and other NGOs
should be encouraged as these groups can also gain from exploiting the opportunities for
greater intra-regional trade.

Given the disparities in economic weight that exist between members of some groupings,
new policy instruments to deal with the fears of economic polarization must be found, for
example, multispeed arrangements (allowing weaker members more time to liberalize),
compensation schemes, regional investment banks, or structural solidarity funds such as
the Food Security.

Dispute settlement mechanisms need to be strengthened and ways to ensure policy
credibility must be put in place. Investors need to have confidence that integration
measures will not be reversed and that barriers to regional markets will not be reinstituted overnight. Binding liberalization commitments in the WTO should be
encouraged where possible, while the opportunity of the REPA negotiations with the EU
should also be used to bind and enforce policy commitments.