ESTRELLITA JULIANO-LLAVE vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR No. 169766
QUESTION: T married E twice, initially under the Islamic laws and, subsequently, under a civil
ceremony. Since then, E has been representing herself to the whole world as the wife of T, and upon
his death, T’s widow. In their marriage contracts, T’s civil status was indicated as ‘divorced.’ Z and
her son A filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage between S and E for being
bigamous. They averred that T married Z on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this marriage
remained subsisting when he married E in 1993. According to E, T is capacitated to marry her as his
marriage and subsequent divorce with Z is governed by the Muslim Code. Is the marriage between
S and E bigamous?
ANSWER: Yes. T’s prior marriage to Z has been severed by way of divorce under PD 1083, the law
that codified Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083 cannot benefit E. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof
provides that the law applies to "marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein
only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or
this Code in any part of the Philippines." But we already ruled in G.R. No. 126603 that "Article 13 of
PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim
rites." Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and this law cannot
retroactively override the Civil Code which already bestowed certain rights on the marriage of T and
Z.
A marriage contracted by a Muslim male prior to the effectivity of this Code in accordance with nonMuslim law shall be considered as one contracted under Muslim law provided the spouses register
their mutual desire to this effect. Even granting that there was registration of mutual consent for the
marriage to be considered as one contracted under the Muslim law, the registration of mutual
consent between Z and T will still be ineffective, as both are Muslims whose marriage was
celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws. Civil Code governs their personal status since this was
in effect at the time of the celebration of their marriage. In view of T’s prior marriage which subsisted
at the time E married him, their subsequent marriage is correctly adjudged by the CA as void ab
initio.
CARMEN LAPUZ SY vs. EUFEMIO S. EUFEMIO
GR No. L-30977
QUESTION: XX filed a petition for legal separation against EE after discovering that the latter
abandoned her and is cohabiting a Chinese woman, GG. Before the trial could be completed, XX
died in a vehicular accident. Counsel for XX moved to substitute the deceased by her father. Does
the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal separation, abate the action?
ANSWER: Yes. An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board
separation of the spouses (there being no absolute divorce in this jurisdiction) is purely personal.
The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100, by allowing only the innocent
spouse (and no one else) to claim legal separation; and in its Article 108, by providing that the
spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of
legal separation already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one party
to the action causes the death of the action itself — actio personalis moritur cum persona.
In the absence of a statute to the contrary, the death of one of the parties to such action abates the
action, for the reason that death has settled the question of separation beyond all controversy and
deprived the court of jurisdiction, both over the persons of the parties to the action and of the
subject-matter of the action itself.