Limbona vs. Mangelin (G.R. No. 80391) - Digest
Facts:
Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or
Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly). On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid
Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited
petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly of Region XII in a consultation/dialogue with local
government officials. Petitioner accepted the invitation and informed the Assembly members through the
Assembly Secretary that there shall be no session in November as his presence was needed in the house
committee hearing of Congress. However, on November 2, 1987, the Assembly held a session in defiance
of the Limbona's advice, where he was unseated from his position. Petitioner prays that the session's
proceedings be declared null and void and be it declared that he was still the Speaker of the Assembly.
Pending further proceedings of the case, the SC received a resolution from the Assembly expressly
expelling petitioner's membership therefrom. Respondents argue that petitioner had "filed a case before
the Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly on a question which should have been
resolved within the confines of the Assembly," for which the respondents now submit that the petition
had become "moot and academic" because of its resolution.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the expulsion of the petitioner (pending litigation) has made the case moot and
academic.
2. Are the so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao subject to the jurisdiction of the national
courts? In other words, what is the extent of self-government given to the two autonomous governments
of Region 9 and 12?
Ruling:
1. The Court does not agree that the case is moot and academic simply by reason of the expulsion
resolution that was issued. If the expulsion was done purposely to make the petition moot and academic,
it will not make it academic. On the ground of due process, the Court hold that the expulsion is without
force and effect. First, there is no showing that the Sanggunian had conducted an investigation. It also
does not appear that the petitioner had been made aware that he was charged with graft and corruption
before his colleagues. It cannot be said therefore that he was accorded any opportunity to rebut their
accusations. As it stands, the charges now are leveled amount to mere accusations that cannot warrant
expulsion. Thus, the Court ordered reinstatement of the petitioner.
2. The autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized in Regions 9 and 12 by Presidential Decree
No. 1618. In relation to the central government, the Presidential Decree provides that “the President shall
have the power of general supervision and control over the Autonomous Regions...” Now, autonomy is
either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of
administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in
order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments “more
responsive and accountable,” “and ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make
them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress.” At the same
time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to
concentrate on national concerns. The president exercises “general supervision” over them, but only to
“ensure that local affairs are administered according to law.” He has not control over their acts in the
sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on the other hand,
involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local government units declared to be
autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its
future with minimum intervention from central authorities.
According to the Supreme Court, an examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous
governments of Mindanao persuades us to believe that they were never meant to exercise autonomy
through decentralization of power. The Presidential Decree, in the first place, mandates that “the
President shall have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions.” In the
second place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to dischage chiefly administrative
services. Thus, the SC assumes jurisdiction.
Upon the facts presented, the Court finds two sessions held on November to be invalid. Wherefore, the
petition is Granted. The petitioner is reinstated as Member and speaker of the Sanggunian.
MMDA Vs. Bel-Air Village
Facts:
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), petitioner herein, is a Government Agency
tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA),
respondent herein, received a letter of request from the petitioner to open Neptune Street of Bel-Air
Village for the use of the public. The said opening of Neptune Street will be for the safe and convenient
movement of persons and to regulate the flow of traffic in Makati City. This was pursuant to MMDA law
or Republic Act No. 7924. On the same day, the respondent was appraised that the perimeter wall
separating the subdivision and Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.
The respondent, to stop the opening of the said street and demolition of the wall, filed a preliminary
injunction and a temporary restraining order. Respondent claimed that the MMDA had no authority
to do so and the lower court decided in favor of the Respondent. Petitioner appealed the decision of
the lower courts and claimed that it has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic because
it is an agent of the State that can practice police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro
Manila.
Issue: Whether or not the MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic pursuant to
its regulatory and police powers.
Held:
The Court held that the MMDA does not have the capacity to exercise police power. Police power is
primarily lodged in the National Legislature. However, police power may be delegated to government
units. Petitioner herein is a development authority and not a political government unit. Therefore, the
MMDA cannot exercise police power because it cannot be delegated to them.
It is not a legislative unit of the government. Republic Act No. 7924 does not empower the MMDA to
enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants
of Manila. There is no syllable in the said act that grants MMDA police power. It is an agency created for
the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with various national government agencies,
people’s organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and
expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area.
CORDILLERA REGIONAL ASSEMBLY MEMBER ALEXANDER P. ORDILLO v. COMELEC, GR No. 93054, 199012-0
Facts:
On January 30, 1990, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga
Apayao and the city of Bagnio cast their votes in a plebiscite held pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766
entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region."
The official Commission on Elections (COMELEC) results of the plebiscite showed that the creation of the
Region was approved by a majority of 5,889 votes in only the Ifugao Province and was overwhelmingly
rejected by 148,676 votes in the rest of the provinces and city... above-mentioned.
Consequently, the COMELEC, on February 14, 1990, issued Resolution No. 2259 stating that the Organic
Act for the Region has been approved and/or ratified by majority of the votes cast only in the province of
Ifugao. As. a result of this, on March 8, 1990, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6861 setting the elections
in the Cordillera Autonomous Region of Ifugao
Even before the issuance of the COMELEC resolution, the Executive Secretary on February 5, 1990 issued
a Memorandum granting authority to wind up the affairs of the Cordillera Executive Board and the
Cordillera Regional Assembly created under Executive Order No. 220. petitioner filed a petition with
COMELEC to declare the non-ratification of the Organic Act for the Region
President issued Administrative Order No. 160 declaring among others that the Cordillera Executive Board
and Cordillera Regional Assembly, and all the offices created under Executive Order No. 220 were
abolished in view of the ratification of the Organic Act. petitioners maintain that there can be no valid
Cordillera Autonomous Region in only one .province as the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require
that the said Region be composed of more than one constituent unit.
The petitioners, then, pray that the Court: (1) declare null and void COMELEC resolution No. 2259, the
memorandum of the Secretary of Justice, the memorandum of the Executive Secretary, Administrative
Order No. 160, and Republic Act No. 6861 and prohibit and restrain the... respondents from implementing
the same and spending public funds, for the purpose and (2) declare Executive Order No. 220 constituting
the Cordillera Executive Board and the Cordillera Regional Assembly and other offices to be still in force
and effect until another organic law... for the Autonomous Region shall have been enacted by Congress
and the same is duly ratified by the voters in the constituent units.
Issues: whether the sole province of Ifugao can validly and legally constitute the Cordillera Autonomous
Region.
Ruling:
This petition is meritorious.
The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution that:
Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordillera
consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas, sharing common and
distinctivehistorical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant
characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial
integrity of the Republic of the Philippines
The keywords provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote that "region" is to be made
up of more than one constituent unit. The term "region" used in it's ordinary sense means two or more
provinces. This is supported... by the fact that the thirteen (13) regions into which the Philippines is
divided for administrative purposes are groupings of contiguous provinces.
Ifugao is a province by itself. To become part of a region, it must join other provinces, cities, municipalities,
and geographical areas. It joins other units because of their common and distinctive historical and cultural
heritage,... economic and social' structures and other relevant characteristics. The Constitutional,
requirements are not present in this case.
Aside from the 1987 Constitution, a reading of the provisions of Republic Act No. 6766 strengthens the
petitioner's position that the Region cannot be constituted from only one province.
Article III. Sections 1 and 2 of the Statute provide that the Cordillera Autonomous Region is to be
administered by the Cordillera government consisting of the Regional Government and local government
units.
SECTION 2. The Regional Government shall exercise powers and functions necessary for the proper
governance and development of all provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangay or ili within the
Autonomous Region
From these sections, it can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single province may constitute
the autonomous region.
Article V. Sections 1 and 4 of Republic Act 6766 vest the legislative power in the Cordillera Assembly whose
members shall be elected from regional assembly districts apportioned among provinces and the cities
composing the Autonomous Region.
If we follow the respondent's position, the members of such Cordillera Assembly shall then be elected
only from the province of Ifugao creating an awkward predicament of having two legislative bodies - the
Cordillera Assembly and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan - exercising... their legislative powers over the
province of Ifugao.
Article XII, Section 10 of the law creates a Regional Planning and Development Board composed of the
.Cordillera Governor, all the provincial governors and city mayors or their representatives, two members
of the Cordillera Assembly, and members representing the private... sector. The Board has a counterpart
in the provincial level called the Provincial Planning and Development Coordinator. The Board's functions
(Article XII, Section 10, par, 2, Republic Act No. 6766) are almost similar to those of the
Provincial Coordinator's (Title Four, Chapter 3, Article 10, Section 220 (4), Batas Pambansa Big. 337 - Local
Government Code), If it takes only one person in the provincial level to perform such functions while on
the other hand it takes an entire Board to perform almost the... same tasks in the regional level, it could
only mean that a larger area must be covered at the regional level. The respondent's theory of the
Autonomous Region being made up of a single province must, therefore, fail.
Article XXI, Section 13 (B) (c) alloting the huge amount of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000,00) to the
Regional Government for its initial organizational requirements can not be construed as funding only a
lone and small province.
These sections of Republic Act No. 6766 show that a one province Cordillera Autonomous Region was
never contemplated by the law creating it.
The province of Ifugao makes .up only 11% of the total population of the areas enumerated in Article I,
Section 2 (b) of Republic Act No. 6766 which include Benguet, Mountain Province, Abra, Kalinga-Apayao
and Baguio City. It has the second smallest, number... of inhabitants from among the provinces and city
above mentioned.
There are other provisions of Republic Act No. 6766 which are either violated or which cannot be
complied, with. Section 16 of Article V calls for a Regional Commission on Appointments with the Speaker
as Chairman and six (6) members .coming from different... provinces and cities in the Region. Under the
respondents view, the Commission would have a Chairman and only one member. It would never have a
quorum. Section 3 of Article VI calls for cabinet members, as far as... practicable, to come from various
provinces and cities of the Region. Section 1 of Article VII creates a system of tribal courts for the various
indigenous cultural communities of the Region. Section 9 of Article XV requires the development... of a
common regional language based upon the various languages and dialects in the region which regional
language in turn is expected to enrich the national language.
The entirety of Republic Act No. 6766 creating the Cordillera Autonomous Region is infused with
provisions which rule against the sole province of Ifugao constituting the Region.
Our decision in Abbas, et al. v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 89651, November 10, 1989), is not applicable in the
case at bar contrary to the view of the Secretary of Justice.
The Abbas case established the rule to follow on which provinces and cities shall comprise the
autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao which is, consequently, the same rule to follow with regard to
the autonomous region in the Cordillera. However, there... is nothing in the Abba's decision which deals
with the issue on whether an autonomous region, in either Muslim Mindanao or Cordillera could exist
despite the fact that only one province or one city is to constitute it.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.
ARSADI M. DISOMANGCOP v. SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS, GR No. 149848, 200411-25
Facts:
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Republic Act No. 6734 (R.A. 6734), entitled "An Act Providing for
An Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao," was enacted and signed into law In the
ensuing plebiscite held... only four (4) provinces voted for the creation of an autonomous region,... These
provinces became the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
In accordance with R.A. 6734, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 426 (E.O. 426),
entitled "Placing the Control and Supervision of the Offices of the Department of Public Works and
Highways within the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao under the Autonomous Regional
Government, and for other purposes." Sections 1 to 3[9] of the Executive Order are its operative
provisions.
President Corazon C. Aquino flew to Cotabato, the seat of the Regional Government, for the inauguration.
At that point, she had already signed seven (7) Executive Orders devolving to ARMM the powers of seven
(7) cabinet... departments, namely: (1) local government; (2) labor and employment; (3) science and
technology; (4) public works and highways; (5) social welfare and development; (6) tourism; and (7)
environment and national resources Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) Secretary
Gregorio R. Vigilar issued D.O. 119
Sub-District Engineering Office shall be made up of employees of the National Government Section of the
former Marawi City Engineering Office who are now assigned with the Iligan City Sub-District Engineering
Office as may be determined by the DPWH Region XII Regional Director. (Emphasis supplied)... then
President Joseph E. Estrada approved and signed into law R.A. 8999.
SEC. 3. The amount necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act shall be included in the General
Appropriations Act of the year following its enactment into law. Thereafter, such sums as may be
necessary for the maintenance and continued operation of the engineering... district office shall be
included in the annual General Appropriations Act.
Congress later passed Republic Act No. 9054 (R.A. 9054), entitled "An Act to Strengthen and Expand the
Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No.
6734, entitled An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as Amended." Like its
forerunner, R.A. 9054 contains detailed provisions on the powers of the Regional Government and the
retained areas of governance of the National Government.
R.A. 9054 lapsed into law Disomangcop and Dimalotang filed the instant petition, in their capacity as
Officer-in-Charge and District Engineer/Engineer II, respectively, of the First Engineering District of the
Department of Public Works and Highways, Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (DPWH-ARMM) in
Lanao del Sur.
Petitioners seek the following principal reliefs: (1) to annul and set aside D.O. 119;... petitioners allege
that D.O. 119 was issued with grave abuse of discretion and that it violates the constitutional autonomy
of the ARMM.
Petitioners also contend that R.A. 8999 is a piece of legislation that was not intelligently and thoroughly
studied, and that the explanatory note to House Bill No. 995 (H.B. 995) from which the law originated is
questionable. Petitioners assert as well that prior to the... sponsorship of the law, no public hearing nor
consultation with the DPWH-ARMM was made.
Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, maintain the validity of D.O. 119, arguing that it
was issued in accordance with Executive Order No. 124 (E.O. 124).[20] In defense of the... constitutionality
of R.A. 8999, they submit that the powers of the autonomous regions did not diminish the legislative
power of Congress.[21] Respondents also contend that the petitioners have no locus standi or legal
standing to assail the... constitutionality of the law and the department order. They note that petitioners
have no personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.[22]
Issues:
Petitioners contend that R.A. 8999 and D.O. 119 are unconstitutional and were issued with grave abuse
of discretion.
Ruling:
petitioner Disomangcop holds the position of Engineer IV. When he filed this petition, he was the Officerin-Charge, Office of the District Engineer of the First Engineering District of DPWH-ARMM, Lanao del Sur.
On the other hand, petitioner Dimalotang is an Engineer II and President of the rank and file employees
also of the First Engineering District of DPWH-ARMM in Lanao del Sur. Both are charged with the duty and
responsibility of supervising and implementing all public works projects to be undertaken and being
undertaken in Lanao del Sur which is the area of their jurisdiction.[33]
It is thus not far-fetched that the creation of the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office under D.O. 119
and the creation of and appropriation of funds to the First Engineering District of Lanao del Sur as directed
under R.A. 8999 will affect the powers, functions and... responsibilities of the petitioners and the DPWHARMM. As the two offices have apparently been endowed with functions almost identical to those of
DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur, it is likely that petitioners are in imminent danger
of being eased out... of their duties and, not remotely, even their jobs. Their material and substantial
interests will definitely be prejudiced by the enforcement of D.O. 119 and R.A. 8999. Such injury is direct
and immediate. Thus, they can legitimately challenge the validity of the enactments... subject of the
instant case.
Republic Act No. 8999
At the outset, let it be made clear that it is not necessary to declare R.A. No. 8999 unconstitutional for the
adjudication of this case. The accepted rule is that the Court will not resolve a constitutional question
unless it is the lis mota of the case, or if the case... can be disposed of or settled on other grounds.[34]
The plain truth is the challenged law never became operative and was superseded or repealed by a
subsequent enactment.
The ARMM Organic Acts are deemed a part of the regional autonomy scheme. While they are classified
as statutes, the Organic Acts are more than ordinary statutes because they enjoy affirmation by a
plebiscite.[35] Hence, the provisions thereof cannot... be amended by an ordinary statute, such as R.A.
8999 in this case. The amendatory law has to be submitted to a plebiscite.
DPWH Department Order No. 119
Now, the question directly related to D.O. 119.
D.O. 119 creating the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office which has jurisdiction over infrastructure
projects within Marawi City and Lanao del Sur is violative of the provisions of E.O. 426. The Executive
Order was issued pursuant to R.A. 6734 which initiated the... creation of the constitutionally-mandated
autonomous region[87] and which defined the basic structure of the autonomous government.[88] E.O.
426 sought to implement the transfer of the control and supervision of the DPWH within the ARMM to
the Autonomous Regional Government. In particular, it identified four (4) District Engineering Offices in
each of the four (4) provinces, namely: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi.[89] Accordingly,
the First Engineering District of the DPWH-ARMM in Lanao del Sur has jurisdiction over the public works
within the province.
The office created under D.O. 119, having essentially the same powers, is a duplication of the DPWHARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur formed under the aegis of E.O. 426. The department
order, in effect, takes back powers which have been previously devolved... under the said executive order.
D.O. 119 runs counter to the provisions of E.O. 426. The DPWH's order, like spring water, cannot rise
higher than its source of power the Executive.
The fact that the department order was issued pursuant to E.O. 124 signed and approved by President
Aquino in her residual legislative powers is of no moment. It is a finely-imbedded principle in statutory
construction that a special provision or law prevails over a... general one.[90] Lex specialis derogant
generali. As this Court expressed in the case of Leveriza v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[91] "another
basic principle of statutory construction mandates that general... legislation must give way to special
legislation on the same subject, and generally be so interpreted as to embrace only cases in which the
special provisions are not applicable, that specific statute prevails over a general statute and that where
two statutes are of equal... theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed therefor specially
should prevail."
E.O. No. 124, upon which D.O. 119 is based, is a general law reorganizing the Ministry of Public Works and
Highways while E.O. 426 is a special law transferring the control and supervision of the DPWH offices
within ARMM to the Autonomous Regional Government. The latter statute... specifically applies to DPWHARMM offices. E.O. 124 should therefore give way to E.O. 426 in the instant case.
In any event, the ARMM Organic Acts and their ratification in a plebiscite in effect superseded E.O. 124.
In case of an irreconcilable conflict between two laws of different vintages, the later enactment prevails
because it is the later legislative will.[92]
Further, in its repealing clause, R.A. 9054 states that "all laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, and
other issuances or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with this Organic Act, are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly."[93] With the repeal... of E.O. 124 which is the basis of D.O. 119, it necessarily
follows that D.O. 119 was also rendered functus officio by the ARMM Organic Acts.
Grave abuse of discretion
Without doubt, respondents committed grave abuse of discretion. They implemented R.A. 8999 despite
its inoperativeness and repeal. They also put in place and maintained the DPWH Marawi Sub-District
Engineering Office in accordance with D.O. 119 which has been rendered... functus officio by the ARMM
Organic Acts.
Still, on the issue of grave abuse of discretion, this Court, however, cannot uphold petitioners' argument
that R.A. 8999 was signed into law under suspicious circumstances to support the assertion that there was
a capricious and whimsical exercise of legislative authority. Once... more, this Court cannot inquire into
the wisdom, merits, propriety or expediency of the acts of the legislative branch.
Likewise, the alleged lack of consultation or public hearing with the affected agency during the inception
of the law does not render the law infirm. This Court holds that the Congress did not transgress the
Constitution nor any statute or House Rule in failing to invite a... resource person from the DPWH-ARMM
during the Committee meeting. Section 27, Rule VII of the Rules of the House[94] only requires that a
written notice be given to all the members of a Committee seven (7) calendar days before a regularly
scheduled meeting,... specifying the subject matter of the meeting and the names of the invited resource
persons. And it must be emphasized that the questions of who to invite and whether there is a need to
invite resource persons during Committee meetings should be addressed solely to Congress in... its
plenary legislative powers.
Province of zamboanga vs city of Zamboanga
Facts:
Prior to its incorporation as a chartered city, the Municipality of Zamboanga used to be the provincial
capital of the then Zamboanga Province. On October 12, 1936, Commonwealth Act 39 was approved
converting the Municipality of Zamboanga into Zamboanga City. Sec. 50 of the Act also provided that
“Buildings and properties which the province shall abandon upon the transfer of the capital to another
place will be acquired and paid for by the City of Zamboanga at a price to be fixed by the Auditor General.”
Such properties include lots of capitol site, schools, hospitals, leprosarium, high school playgrounds,
burleighs, and hydro-electric sites.
On June 6, 1952, Republic Act 711 was approved dividing the province of Zamboanga into two (2):
Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur. As to how the assets and obligations of the old province
were to be divided between the two new ones, Sec. 6 of that law provided “Upon the approval of this Act,
the funds, assets and other properties and the obligations of the province of Zamboanga shall be divided
equitably between the Province of Zamboanga del Norte and the Province of Zamboanga del Sur by the
President of the Philippines, upon the recommendation of the Auditor General.”
However, on June 17, 1961, Republic Act 3039 was approved amending Sec. 50 of Commonwealth Act 39
by providing that, “All buildings, properties and assets belonging to the former province of Zamboanga
and located within the City of Zamboanga are hereby transferred, free of charge, in favor of the said City
of Zamboanga.”
This constrained Zamboanga del Norte to file on March 5, 1962, a complaint against defendantsappellants Zamboanga City; that, among others, Republic Act 3039 be declared unconstitutional for
depriving Zamboanga del Norte of property without due process and just compensation.
Lower court declared RA 3039 unconstitutional as it deprives Zamboanga del Norte of its private
properties.
Hence the appeal.
Issue:
Whether RA 3039 is unconstitutional on the grounds that it deprives Zamboanga del Norte of its private
properties.
Held:
No. RA 3039 is valid. The properties petitioned by Zamboanga del Norte is a public property.
The validity of the law ultimately depends on the nature of the 50 lots and buildings thereon in question.
For, the matter involved here is the extent of legislative control over the properties of a municipal
corporation, of which a province is one. The principle itself is simple: If the property is owned by the
municipality (meaning municipal corporation) in its public and governmental capacity, the property is
public and Congress has absolute control over it. But if the property is owned in its private or proprietary
capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control. The municipality cannot be deprived
of it without due process and payment of just compensation.
The capacity in which the property is held is, however, dependent on the use to which it is intended and
devoted. Now, which of two norms, i.e., that of the Civil Code or that obtaining under the law of Municipal
Corporations, must be used in classifying the properties in question?
Civil Code
The Civil provide: ART. 423. The property of provinces, cities, and municipalities is divided into property
for public use and patrimonial property; ART. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and
municipalities, consists of the provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains,
public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities, or
municipalities. All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this
Code, without prejudice to the provisions of special laws.
Applying the above cited norm, all the properties in question, except the two (2) lots used as High School
playgrounds, could be considered as patrimonial properties of the former Zamboanga province. Even the
capital site, the hospital and leprosarium sites, and the school sites will be considered patrimonial for they
are not for public use. They would fall under the phrase “public works for public service” for it has been
held that under the ejusdem generis rule, such public works must be for free and indiscriminate use by
anyone, just like the preceding enumerated properties in the first paragraph of Art 424. The playgrounds,
however, would fit into this category.
Law of Municipal Corporations
On the other hand, applying the norm obtaining under the principles constituting the law of Municipal
Corporations, all those of the 50 properties in question which are devoted to public service are deemed
public; the rest remain patrimonial. Under this norm, to be considered public, it is enough that the
property be held and, devoted for governmental purposes like local administration, public education,
public health, etc.
Final Ruling
The controversy here is more along the domains of the Law of Municipal Corporations — State vs. Province
— than along that of Civil Law. If municipal property held and devoted to public service is in the same
category as ordinary private property, then that would mean they can be levied upon and attached; they
can even be acquired thru adverse possession — all these to the detriment of the local community. It is
wrong to consider those properties as ordinary private property.
Lastly, the classification of properties other than those for public use in the municipalities as patrimonial
under Art. 424 of the Civil Code — is “… without prejudice to the provisions of special laws.” For purpose
of this article, the principles, obtaining under the Law of Municipal Corporations can be considered as
“special laws”. Hence, the classification of municipal property devoted for distinctly governmental
purposes as public should prevail over the Civil Code classification in this particular case.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and another judgment is hereby entered as
follows:.
(1) Defendant Zamboanga City is hereby ordered to return to plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte in lump sum
the amount of P43,030.11 which the former took back from the latter out of the sum of P57,373.46
previously paid to the latter; and
(2) Defendants are hereby ordered to effect payments in favor of plaintiff of whatever balance remains of
plaintiff’s 54.39% share in the 26 patrimonial properties, after deducting therefrom the sum of
P57,373.46, on the basis of Resolution No. 7 dated March 26, 1949 of the Appraisal Committee formed by
the Auditor General, by way of quarterly payments from the allotments of defendant City, in the manner
originally adopted by the Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. No costs. So
ordered.