“MARITIME STRATEGY AND DEFENCE OF THE ARCHIPELAGIC INNER ARC”
LT ANICETO F JALANDONI III PN
Working Paper Nr. 4
INTRODUCTION
According to the research conducted by Walter S. Bateman and Quentin A. Hanich for
University of Wollongong in 2013, “The Pacific Arc of islands and archipelagos to the
north and east of Australia has been characterized both as an arc of instability' and as an
arc of opportunity'. It is the region from or through which a threat to Australia could most
easily be posed, as well as an area providing opportunities for Australia to work on
common interests with the ultimate objective of a more secure and stable region. Maritime
issues are prominent among these common interests. (Bateman and Hanich, 2013). It
shows how the maritime strategy of Australia is an outmost importance to the defense of
the country. This working paper will work on the value of the history of Australia’s Maritime
strategic policy and the archipelagic inner arc.
The Philippines, our country not new on this issue. As a matter of fact, a research was
made by Mary Ann Palma from S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in
Singapore in 2009 mentioned that, the geographic position of the Philippines as well as
the activities in relation to its waters are important to the identity of the Philippines
although critical in securing its maritime interests.
These interests have numerous
dimensions that include the protection of the national territory integrity, maritime
resources and the marine environment not to mention the uplifting of the maritime safety
and security.
In this regard, as the paper progress, we will discuss Australia’s Maritime Strategy and
Defense in relation to other countries which maritime and land formation are archipelagic
in nature.
BODY
The arc, when mentioned with among Australian Strategic Planners was officially defined
as the string of islands from Indonesia in the west, through Papua New Guinea to the
Solomons and the Southwest Pacific. It has been said that the area of the arc is
strategically located for defense and warfare not only in the context of the Naval, but also
in the Army and the Air Forces. The paper talks about how maritime could mean not only
service-related definition and operative word but also as an environmental concept. This
study is not just all about defending the inner arc but also to evaluate the potential threat
and danger of the maritime situation, the flawed strategies and if there is a need for further
studies and development of its maritime defense.
The concept of the defense of the inner arc is lacking not only in the strategic policies but
also in policy.
According to Bateman, “There are two fundamental dimensions to
Australia‘s strategic thinking about the Pacific Arc. Both point to the basic importance of
Australia adopting a maritime strategy for ensuring its own security and the stability of its
surrounding regions.” The first dimension is a recognized Australia’s defense planning in
the Pacific area, the sea-air gap or air-sea gap. The history of its flaws is long standing
and this is being talked about by the Air Force to emphasize its ultimate importance in
securing the defense on land, water and air. This same flaw or gap was seen on the
strategies of the Imperial Army of the Japanese forces when they were defeated by the
Allied Forces in the World War II. Since the Imperial Army focuses on the defense posture
of the terrestrial battle ground, they have miscalculated the power of the seas that was
seized by the Allied Forces which lead them the infiltration of the Japanese Headquarters.
According to F. Uhlig Jr., “The Allied submarine campaign inside and beyond the
defensive perimeter devastated Japan’s sea transport in the most successful blockade in
naval history. This blockade became an award-winning method for the Allied Forces.
George Baer mentioned that, the United States have used the offensive strategy rather
than the defensive strategy that was used by the Japanese. The Americans was able to
exposed the weakness on its naval strategy, United States on the other hand, kept the
enemy off balance with their advanced armaments and flexible naval strategy. It can be
said that the Japanese were defeated with the limitation of strategic options, their only
option is withdrawal to prevent further damages. Japanese were defeated by the Allied
Forces in three reasons: untraditional strategies, submarine war on shipping and US
carrier power. Japanese failed to protect its sea perimeter and did not use the power of
its sea to secure its area from the enemies.
If we are going to study the wars that started and ended in the Pacific Regions, the seapower can make a country make or break its feat. When Gen. Douglas MacArthur was
defeated by the Japanese Imperial Army and Philippines was seized, he retreated by the
sea and made the promise to return. When he indeed returned, Japanese still failed to
consider the protection of its bases from the waters and Gen. MacArthur successfully
returned to our country and successfully seized back Philippines from the Imperial Army.
As the success of King, Nimitz, and MacArthur in the Pacific war regions was all because
of their offensive techniques with their capacity in not only checking the number of officers
they have on hand, not only their capacity in terms of equipment and armaments but also
the logistics of the location. It was sea control which allowed power projection in the inner
arc in the Pacific War.
The maritime strategy of Australia in reference to the Pacific Arc or the inner Archipelagic
Arc must understand the importance of defense engagement and maritime security
interests. This can also mean working with the other countries that are within the arc rim
in managing and controlling the development of the maritime security capabilities.
CONCLUSION