Energy Policy 148 (2021) 111991
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Energy Policy
journal homepage: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/enpol
Denmark and Nord Stream 2: A small state’s role in global energy politics
Steve Wood a, *, Otto Henke b
a
b
Department of Politics and International Relations, Macquarie University, Sydney, 2109, NSW, Australia
Hamburg, Germany
A R T I C L E I N F O
A B S T R A C T
Keywords:
Denmark
Nord stream 2
Energy politics
Russia
Germany
European Union
United States
Legal aspects
This article analyses Denmark’s involvement with the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project. Impressing the Baltic
as a sea of strategic significance and a potential international flashpoint, the controversial project thrust
Denmark into a position of decision-making importance beyond its size and material power. Geopolitical and
environmental considerations, and normative impetus derived from a liberal democratic political culture,
influenced Danish attitudes towards the project. The impact of these concerns substantially delayed the granting
of a permit for pipeline construction in the Danish marine space, frustrating governments and business in Russia
and Germany. Ultimately, approval was granted because Denmark is a rule of law state. Yet the delay is crucial.
More broadly, the article illustrates how, in the energy policy domain, illiberal regimes attempt to exploit liberaldemocratic legal systems through nominally commercial entities, and considers the responses by other actors in
this case.
1. Introduction
Nord Stream 2 is an energy project enmeshed with international and
domestic politics, security and strategic factors, environmental con­
cerns, complex legalities, and the prospect of huge financial rewards or
losses. The dual natural gas pipeline must pass through the territorial
waters or Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of at least five states. Russia,
Germany, Finland and Sweden approved the first and subsequent pro­
posed routes. Why was Denmark reluctant to approve Nord Stream 2
after accepting Nord Stream 1 a few years earlier? The article aims: i) to
explain the involvement of Denmark with Nord Stream 2; ii) to illumi­
nate a case of multidimensional politics pervading the energy policy
field. We argue that the behaviour of President Vladimir Putin’s regime
in Russia prompted a reappraisal among Denmark’s political class,
especially its foreign and security policy sector, and the public, of the
country’s role in regional and world affairs. Russia’s annexation of
Crimea in 2014 was a turning point. Support for Ukraine, Baltic states
(Wrange and Bengtsson 2019) and Poland, aversion to Russian military
manoeuvres and provocations, and disquiet about European dependence
on Russian gas, influenced local perceptions as Denmark was thrust into
a role as a decisionmaker on the future of Nord Stream 2. As politici­
zation by opponents and proponents intensified, Danish authorities
wanted to appear meticulously neutral; legally and technically. The
deferral resonated, ironically, of a Russian bureaucratic politics of delay
and subterfuge witnessed in other energy projects, though not for the
same reasons. Delaying of a construction permit for Nord Stream 2
recalled Sakhalin 2 and other hydrocarbon ventures, when Russian
brinkmanship sought to extract better deals and control for state firms
(Baran 2007: 142; Karm 2008). The Danish review process affirmed the
implausibility of claims by Nord Stream 2 AG, and German and Russian
officials, that the project was ‘not political’. The political character of its
predecessor Nord Stream 1 was magnified by Nord Stream 2.1
The case is an illustration of how illiberal regimes strive to exploit
liberal-democratic legal systems without adhering to similar operations
of law domestically or internationally, and how some other actors have
responded. After two and half years, a conditional permit for pipeline
construction was granted by the Danish Energy Agency (DEA) because
Denmark is a rule of law state with autonomous authorities. Although
the process was prolonged well beyond what Nord Stream 2 AG, the
Russian government, and other project supporters considered accept­
able, the DEA could not infinitely delay or refuse a permit based on
designated environmental or safety criteria and the law of the sea
(UNCLOS). In that period, and since, a multi-vector politics intensified.
Nord Stream 2 was due for completion at the end of 2019. Postponement
* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: steve.wood@mq.edu.au (S. Wood).
1
A letter from the Polish Economics Minister to Nord Stream’s Managing Director, Matthias Warnig (Government of Poland 2007), another by eight CEE leaders
(Sytas 2016), and the exclusion of Polish waters or EEZ as options, were a few of numerous indications how political both projects are.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2020.111991
Received 9 June 2020; Received in revised form 20 September 2020; Accepted 18 October 2020
Available online 10 November 2020
0301-4215/© 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
S. Wood and O. Henke
Energy Policy 148 (2021) 111991
compelled Gazprom to negotiate a new transit contract with Ukraine. It
also extended the time for legal challenges, for the US to portend or
implement sanctions against persons and companies associated with the
project, for the German regulator Bundesnetzagentur (BNetzA) to
consider the consortium’s application for derogation from EU rules, and
progress in the construction of a gas supply alternative in the form of
Baltic Pipe.
alternative infrastructure that may recast European and Eurasian energy
politics. We then appraise the involvements of Germany and the United
States before a discussion section. A conclusion with policy implications
follows. Limitations of the inquiry include that its focus on Denmark
means less attention can be paid to other actors. We cannot address all
aspects of a very expansive theme, for example, those enhanced by
economic modelling or extensive statistical data. The uncertain out­
comes of some legal proceedings, or of other potential cases, cannot at
present be fully assessed.
2. Methods and materials
3. Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2
The authors apply methods of documentary analysis and process
tracing to a case study of Denmark and the Nord Stream 2 project. The
topic also requires attention to the positions and conduct of other actors,
including in Denmark’s neighbour Germany, EU institutions, Russia, the
US, Poland, and Nord Stream 2 AG. We integrate material from Danish
ministries, agencies and political groups, EU sources, companies, and
global media. We incorporate semi-structured interviews with the
German Commissioner for Relations with Russia and Central Asia, Dirk
Wiese, a German Foreign Ministry official, and a senior desk officer at
the US diplomatic representation in Germany. We also draw on a range
of scholarly literature.
The contribution offers an alternative to analyses emphasising
technical or economic dimensions of energy policy. In that regard we
follow Martin Jirušek (2020), whose qualitative and content analysis
compares Visegrad countries’ relations with Russia/Gazprom, conflated
as effectively a single entity. We aim to illuminate the political compe­
tition, international, domestic, and ‘supranational’, that defines the
theme (Cf. Wood, 2010; Maltby 2013; Schmidt-Felzmann 2020). Sup­
port for that view is imparted by Sziklai et al. (2020: 9), who, having
applied a cooperative game model of bargaining to an economic
cost-benefit perspective, declare that ‘the Crimean conflict provided a
precedent where Russia was willing to take financial losses to achieve
political gains (both domestic and international). The question is
whether the geopolitical gains exceed the costs of the closure of the
Ukrainian route? In any case, a credible threat will likely increase the
geopolitical influence of Russia’. The passage affirms that, for Nord
Stream 2, politics trumps economics. Vatansever’s (2017) study on
surplus capacity and whether Russia is building too many pipelines also
ranks political over economic motives. It could be plausibly argued that,
for Russia’s rulers, Nord Stream 2 has become as much a status issue or
‘prestige project’ as one of economic-financial benefit, given the time
and costs accrued (Wood, 2013). Looking to 2030, Eser et al. (2019)
provide a very detailed and ‘highly resolved’ series of simulations,
through which they seek to ‘capture the real-world behaviour of actors
in the gas market’. Most of this excellent analysis prioritises presumed
market choices in an implicitly liberal legal framework. The possible
shift of transit fees from Poland and Ukraine to Germany is a key factor.
Ultimately, the problematique is distilled as increased political risk (for
Russian gas imports) versus technical and financial risks (for LNG im­
ports).2 While potential supply disruptions are addressed, the scope of
political risk foreseen by the authors is restricted if one considers that
two major players, Russia and Ukraine, are de facto at war, and that a
high level of antagonism permeates the multi-actor context. For these
reasons we do not approach the topic as a cooperative game. Parties
involved are competing, for or against the project, between and within
individual countries, and in some contradictory ways.
The article proceeds with an outline of the two Nord Stream projects.
It then considers Denmark in international affairs, Denmark and EU
energy policy, Danish domestic politics, and how Russian foreign policy
and the Nord Stream 2 project have impacted on these contexts. It then
examines proposed routes for the pipeline and the response of Danish
authorities. The next section looks at the Baltic Pipe project, an
Nord Stream 1 is a Russian-German venture, promoted from 2005 by
President Putin and then German Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder. Gaz­
prom, the Russian state gas company, owned 51 per cent, and German
firms E. ON Ruhrgas and BASF/Wintershall each 24.5 per cent. The
latter two each sold 4.5 per cent to Dutch company, Gasunie. The
original Nord Stream company is incorporated in Switzerland. Having
approved the project and facilitated a €1 billion loan for Gazprom while
Chancellor, Schröder took up an executive position with Nord Stream
AG shortly after losing the 2005 election (Whist 2008). Dual pipelines
for the first Nord Stream project run from Viborg in Russia to Lubmin,
near Greifswald, in Germany. Construction began in 2010 and was
completed in 2012. It has capacity to deliver 55bcm of gas per year to
European customers. According to Nord Stream.com (2013) the total
investment in the project was €7.4 billion, much less than estimates by
economists who put the total costs at between $19.9 billion and $23
billion (Chyong et al. 2010: 9).
Nord Stream 2 is also intended to deliver 55bcm of gas annually
through a pipeline running from Ust-Luga to Lubmin. It is owned by
Gazprom and co-funded by a consortium of ‘investors’ comprising
Wintershall and Uniper (previously E. ON), OMV of Austria, Royal Dutch
Shell (Netherlands/UK), and French company Engie. 27 financial en­
tities provided credit. Like its forerunner, Nord Stream 2 AG has its
corporate seat in Switzerland. This has the semiotic purpose of trans­
mitting the project as a ‘European’ venture. The company projected a
cost of €9.5 billion. Expenditure continues to rise, for re-routing and
spiralling litigation costs. Piotr Przybyło (2019), who estimated Nord
Stream 1 as costing €15.7 billion, calculated the total cost of Nord
Stream 2, from source to consumer markets, at €17.2 billion, far more
than three alternative onshore construction routes. Transit tariffs for any
of Przybyło’s suggested alternative routes would be cheaper than those
for Nord Stream 2. Based on the 2009 Gazprom-Naftogaz contract,
transit fees through Ukraine would be equivalent to the estimates for
Nord Stream 2’s offshore route. Proposed new Ukrainian tariffs3 makes
transit through that country more expensive, although compared with
that option it would take twenty-two years to recoup the savings
through Nord Stream 2 (Przybyło 2019).4
4. Denmark’s reassessment of its place in regional and world
politics
Danish perceptions of Denmark as an international entity oscillated
between a ‘small state’ with a moral right to exercise influence and one
with little power to do so (Thorhallssen and Wivel, 2006; Doeser 2011;
Mellander and Mouritzen 2016). Few studies have specifically
3
This may cost about $2 billion in 2020 (Platts 2020a) or $7 billion over five
years from 2020 (RFE/FL, 2019).
4
According to Platts (2020b), ‘Gazprom Export’s head of pricing, Sergei
Komlev, told investors June 22 that the company expected its average gas
export price in 2020 to be $130-$140/1000 cu m’. Applying a very rough
calculation, if gas were to flow at $130 per 1000 cm x a full capacity of 55bcm
p.a., it would result in revenue of $7.15 billion. If gas did not flow, it would
result in foregone revenue of the same sum.
2
The unit of measurement cannot be the same for both sides (political versus
technical-financial) of this equation.
2
S. Wood and O. Henke
Energy Policy 148 (2021) 111991
investigated Danish involvement with the Nord Stream ventures. Got­
kowska and Szymanski’s (2016) appraisal of Nordic countries is a partial
exception. Ann-Sofie Hermanson (2018) applies a multi-level gover­
nance perspective on energy security with a Baltic Sea focus. Nord
Stream 2 is briefly addressed though Denmark is scarcely noted. Nina
Tynkkynen (2017; 2018) examines Russian participation in or influence
on environmental governance in the Baltic Sea. Denmark is an implicit
party though it is not assessed. Goldthau and Sitter (2020: 122) do
mention the ‘interesting case’ of Denmark, which ‘separated security
from regulatory aspects’. The authors list it (2020: 117) as ‘against NS2
for geopolitical reasons’. Denmark receives more attention in Anke
Schmidt-Felzmann’s (2020) instructive analysis of Nord Stream 2 and
conflicts or interactions among many actors.
Despite interruptions of gas supply from Russia in 2006 (Baran 2007;
Chow and Elkind 2009; Richter and Holz 2015), the Russo-Georgian war
in 2008, and Polish protests, the Danish government was less sceptical
about the first Nord Stream than, for example, Swedes (Lidskog and
Elander 2012). There was opposition, prominently from Uffe
Ellemann-Jensen, a former Danish foreign minister and vigorous sup­
porter of small states in international relations (Ellemann-Jensen, 2009).
Official approval coincided with an agreement of energy company
DONG, whose major shareholder was the Danish Finance Ministry, and
Gazprom to double gas delivery volumes (Schmidt-Felzmann 2011: 588;
DONG, 2009). Procuring relatively low-cost energy resources was then
prioritised. In 2006 Gazprom and DONG signed an agreement in which
from 2011 ‘Denmark’ would ‘annually purchase 1 billion cubic meters of
Russian gas during a period of 20 years’. In 2009, volume was doubled
through another contract specifying that for 18 years from 2012 ‘Dong
Energy will annually receive 1 billion cubic meters of gas more through
the second line of the undersea pipeline’ (Gazprom/DONG 2006; Gaz­
prom 2011). These contracts left Denmark, by association with DONG,
with a legacy.5
Nord Stream 1 proceeded in a comparatively less tense political sit­
uation and when key actors in EU institutions and member states held
different preferences. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and destabilisation
of Ukraine imperilled European security and principles of territorial
integrity. These events irradiated Nord Stream 2 as more than an energy
project and divulged change in Denmark’s self-perception and role in
European politics. Denmark’s reassessment was displayed in a review on
diplomacy and defence that acknowledged a changing world in which
Russia, named as a challenge for Europe, and security of energy supply,
are high on the agenda (Danish MFA, 2016; Youngs 2020). The review
recommended a more focused foreign policy and highlighted three
categories: interests, partnerships, and influence. Denmark is motivated
to address marine-strategic, energy, and environmental issues and ach­
ieve EU commitments and goals. It ‘must increasingly be able to work
closely with other EU member states in Brussels as well as in the main
policy driving countries’ capitals’ (Danish MFA, 2016: 8). In a 2017
proposed defence agreement, Russia was identified as a threat, including
on ‘hidden fronts’ (Danish Ministry of Defence 2017). A Danish Foreign
and Security Policy Strategy 2019–2020 reinforced themes in the 2016
Review and gave additional guidelines for navigation in a changing
world order (Danish Government 2018). The document mentions Russia
twenty times, including a reference to it not having ‘changed its
aggressive conduct in the Baltic Sea region’ (Danish Government 2018:
12; Mölder 2011). It emphasised a common, robust, and principled EU
stance externally, and cohesion and resilience internally. Denmark
views itself as a ‘responsible global actor’ that ‘contributes actively’ to
solving global challenges and upholding international law and human
rights (Danish MFA, 2019).
As Minister of Defence and a contributor to other security reviews,
Claus Hjort Frederiksen (2018; 2019) reiterated new and ‘complex
threats against Denmark’, some emanating from Russia (Jakobsen and
Rynning 2018: 878; Saxi 2019). Foreign Minister, Anders Samuelsen,
said Russia is ‘definitely not working in the interest of Denmark in
general’ (Russian Business Today, 2019). Russian leaders did little to
ameliorate problems. NotPetya, a computer virus designed by hackers
working for the Russian military, wrecked Ukraine’s government sys­
tems along with hospitals, power companies, airports, and banks. It also
crippled Danish shipping company Maersk and other commercial en­
tities (Ashford 2019).
4.1. Denmark and EU energy policy
Danes had been ambivalent about the EU but support an energy
policy that reduces if not ends dependency on external states who may
(or may not) reliably deliver raw materials but are objectionable for
other reasons. Tension persists between EU-Russia energy relations and
the EU’s attempt to mediate an end to the Russia-Ukraine conflict
(Krickovic 2015; Wigell and Vihma 2016). Applying ‘Construal-Level
Theory (CLT)’, Tom Casier (2016: 764) aimed to show how ‘at an ab­
stract level one tends to overlook the enormous complexity of
day-to-day energy relations and to replace it by simple, in this case
geopolitical, explanations’. He argued that ‘a broader political process of
geopoliticisation of EU-Russia relations took place – outside the energy
sector – in which both parties started to frame each other’s behaviour
increasingly in terms of assumed geopolitical agendas’ (Casier 2016:
772). The geopolitical aspect cannot be dismissed (Romanova 2016). It
impacts on other areas of bilateral affairs and the Danish foreign affairs
sector regards it as very relevant.
Energy relations with Russia also infuse EU internal dynamics,
within and between member states and institutions. In the lead-up to
Nord Stream 1, a constellation of Germany holding the EU Presidency,
France under President Nicolas Sarkozy, and the first José Barroso
Commission produced optimistic assessments of ‘strategic partnership’
with Russia (European Commission 2007a, 2007b; Bozhilova and
Hashimoto 2010; Schmidt-Felzmann 2011). The Commission pursues a
technocratic, economic liberalisation agenda and stresses that it, not
member states, supervises energy policy and regulation (Maltby 2013).
The ‘apolitical’ Commission’s orientation is susceptible to change
dependent on who exercises control over certain portfolios. The Third
Energy Package (gas section) emphasised unbundling of suppliers from
operators, price transparency, and the right for all EU members to access
networks (EU 2009). This stemmed from concerns about Gazprom’s
potential dominance of the EU gas market (Goldthau and Sitter 2015).
EU-Russia relations steadily deteriorated, reaching a nadir over the
Ukraine crisis, from which they have not recovered. US disapproval of
Russian energy deals with EU states made it and the Commission led by
Jean-Claude Juncker, on that issue, allies. About 100 European Parlia­
ment politicians from Green, liberal, and conservative groupings sent an
open letter to Chancellor Angela Merkel, urging her to change the
German government’s position on Nord Stream 2 (Auštrevičius,
Bütikofer, 2018).
Unlike most other EU states, Denmark is not dependent on external
energy suppliers. It is self-sufficient and has low CO2 emissions. DONG
expanded offshore wind power and other non-hydro renewable energy
generation. According to the DEA (2017: 3, 7), the Danish green sector
employed 67,000 people in 2015, and wind turbines can ‘produce more
than the domestic demand’. Natural gas still fuelled about 25 per cent of
heating. Transition towards an entirely green energy mix advanced
when DONG was renamed Ørsted and began divesting itself of fossil
fuels. The Danish state retained 50.1 per cent ownership. DONG’s oil
and gas business was acquired by INEOS Upstream Ltd. Denmark now
supports an EU energy policy that actively implements diversification of
sources and transit countries. According to the former Rasmussen gov­
ernment, Nord Stream 2 contradicted the philosophy and goal of a
5
In 2017, Dong completed a corporate transformation and became Ørsted,
specialising in green energy. According to Gazprom, in 2018 it supplied 1.72
bcm of gas to Ørsted. See Gazprom (2020) at http://www.gazpromexport.ru/e
n/partners/denmark/.
3
S. Wood and O. Henke
Energy Policy 148 (2021) 111991
European energy policy based on solidarity between members and with
immediate neighbours. Russia would export more gas to the EU and
Germany would acquire a dominant position as the entry and distribu­
tion point. Slovakia and Ukraine would lose transit revenue.
139 km–180 km) and issues or refuses permits on behalf of the state. The
original application was for a ‘Base Case Route’ through Denmark’s
territorial waters, 12 nautical miles off the coast, passing Bornholm Is­
land. The company provided an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)
with the application in April 2017. The EIA described project charac­
teristics and technical information, gave ‘assessments of transboundary
impacts’ to neighbouring jurisdictions, and outlined ‘measures to pre­
vent or mitigate potential adverse environmental impacts’ (DEA 2019a;
Nord Stream 2, 2019).
From January 2018, an amendment to the Continental Shelf Act gave
the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs the right to recommend whether
applications for infrastructure projects needed inspection beyond that
provided by the DEA or could remove it as the main authority. The
amended Act entered into force with retroactive effect only for the Nord
Stream 2 project.
4.2. Danish domestic politics
Danish civil society echoed ministerial and political party reserva­
tions about Nord Stream 2. One group asked Danes to petition Prime
Minister Rasmussen ‘to stop the pipeline from hell!’ Their argument
combined environmentalism and disapproval of the Putin regime:
We call on you to block the construction of the Russian-German gas
pipeline Nord Stream 2. It will devastate a pristine nature reserve and
massively solidify Russia’s hold over Europe … shift Europe away
from its dependence on Russian gas and towards renewable energy!
… with this pipeline passing by a small Danish island [Denmark] has
the sovereign right to stop the project. Denmark seems ready to do
this but is worried about standing up to Russia and Germany. Let’s
give them the support of millions … and deliver our call straight to
Denmark’s Prime Minister (AVAAZ 2019).
Pursuant to Art. 79 of UNCLOS 1982, all states are entitled to lay
pipelines on the continental shelf in accordance with the provisions
of that article. The state may therefore not impede the laying or
maintenance of pipelines on grounds other than those including the
exploration of the continental shelf, the exploitation of its natural
resources and the prevention, reduction and control of pollution
from pipelines, c.f. Art. 79(2). Art. 79 does however not affect the
right of the coastal state to establish the conditions for pipelines entering
its territorial sea, c.f. Art. 79(4) (WSCO 2018, emphasis added).
Rasmussen’s government responded, essentially by doing nothing.
Rasmussen expressed that he would ‘do whatever he can to delay the
project, even if he cannot prevent it’ (Boucart 2019). President of the
Social Democratic Party, Mette Frederiksen, was critical when part of
the opposition. She argued that energy policy entailed much more than
energy, as confirmed by the ‘aggressive behaviour of Russia’. Danish
approval of Nord Stream 1 had treated that venture as ‘a purely com­
mercial matter’, something that ‘must not happen again’ (Hansen 2017).
Some analysts perceived that when it became the main force in the new
government from June 2019, the Social Democratic Party would assert
itself vis-à-vis the Trump administration. There were no indications that
it would advocate for Nord Stream 2.
Not all Danish parties oppose the project. The Dansk Folkeparti (DF) is
’positively inclined’. Its foreign affairs spokesperson, Søren Espersen,
averred that Denmark had relations with companies ‘owned by the
Chinese communist state’ and other ‘dictator states’. Nord Stream 2 AG
was ‘a Russian company out to make some good business and deliver
energy to the West. I don’t see that as a problem’. In contrast, (the
misleadingly named) Radikale Venstre, a centrist party, wants Europe to
be independent from Russian gas. The Kremlin could instrumentalize
Nord Stream 2, for which there were precedents, said a spokesperson,
Martin Lidegaard. DF was ‘naïve’ to believe that Nord Stream 2 was a
‘purely commercial’ venture. Lidegaard, a former Foreign Minister and
Climate and Energy Minister, claimed that ‘In Russia, all energy policy is
security policy’. More to the point, ‘the Russians have really abused their
massive gas supply to Europe. They use it as a tool of security policy,
they use it economically, and they threaten other European nations,
such as Ukraine, to tow the Russian line’ (Copenhagen Post 2017a).
More Danish demands to halt Nord Stream 2 were heard after the
poisoning of Russian opposition politician, Alexei Navalny (Jarlner
2020).
Nord Stream 2 AG began exploring other possible routes outside
Danish territorial waters though within the EEZ. Such a route would not
require a parliamentary vote and the DEA could only reject projects on
safety, environmental or logistical grounds. Supported by relevant as­
sessments and survey works, the company identified a route passing
northwest of Bornholm (Nord Stream 2, 2019). In August 2018, the
company submitted a second application. It claimed that permission
processes for both routes, which included consultations with the public
and expert authorities, nationally and internationally, showed that it
had fulfilled all technical and environmental prerequisites, warranting a
permit for either route. On March 26, 2019, the DEA asked Nord Stream
2 AG to assess a third option, without formal rejection of the two
pending applications. The company submitted a third application and an
EIA on April 15, 2019. This route would run through Denmark’s EEZ,
east and south of Bornholm.
In May 2019, the DEA published the EIA for this ‘Southeastern’ third
route. The report again presented technical details, physio-chemical,
biological, and socio-economic assessments, transboundary issues, and
measures to prevent and mitigate adverse impacts. When the DEA
informed of a forum to be held in Ronne on Bornholm, on June 19, 2019,
it reminded people that ‘On January 1, 2018, a new law came into force,
which includes transit pipelines, and thus also the Nord Stream II
project. The law means that before a permit for a transit pipeline in the
territorial waters can be issued, the Foreign Minister must assess if the
project is compatible with Denmark’s foreign, security and defence
policy interests’. The DEA noted that Nord Stream 2 AG had made three
applications before mentioning as a ‘general’ point that ‘Only one permit
can be granted for the project. In relation to the routes on the continental
shelf, a permit can only be issued when it has been clarified which of the
routes is the most optimal from an environmental and safety perspec­
tive’ (DEA 2019b).6 The public, state authorities, and interested orga­
nizations, were invited to comment or raise questions until July 10,
2019, later extended to 17 July, under the auspices of the Espoo
5. Route options and permits
Construction and operation of pipelines that transport hydrocarbons
from outside Denmark through Danish territorial waters and on the
Danish Continental Shelf require permits pursuant to the Continental
Shelf Act (2005), Danish sovereignty, and an Administrative Order on
Pipeline Installations. Entities seeking permits must submit applications
to the DEA, which evaluates them (in this case a submarine stretch of
6
Bornholm had revived significance for a different if connected reason. The
Red Army occupied the island for almost a year from 9 May 1945. Unable to
militarily challenge the Soviet Union, Denmark suffered a ‘national humilia­
tion’ until a diplomatic note to the Soviet government initiated a withdrawal.
Some analogous aspects resonate in the politicization of Nord Stream 2
(Pliusnin 2018).
4
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Energy Policy 148 (2021) 111991
When, on October 30, 2019, the DEA finally issued a permit for
construction in the Danish EEZ, it contained 34 conditions and a four
week window for lodging complants (DEA 2019c). The DEA’s responses
to objections from Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and environmental groups,
were technocratic, describing them as ‘not relevant’ to the process or
effects of laying a gas pipeline in the Danish EEZ (DEA 2019d). Denmark
abided by legal bases (Ecolex 2011; Fao.org, 2005; Fao.org, 2015). At a
meeting with OSCE Secretary-General, Thomas Greminger, Russian
Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, welcomed the decision as ‘a responsible
approach’, citing Putin as saying it was ‘prompted by the interests of
Europe’ and that Denmark had ‘joined the consensus that has long been
formed on Nord Stream 2’. Lavrov added that ‘If someone really wants to
see some political signal, probably that signal might be that economic
and commercial projects should be free from any politicization and
should not become pawns in geopolitical games’ (Russian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs 2019).
In the 49-page document addressed to Warnig granting approval for
the pipeline, the DEA declared that the ‘permit does not cover necessary
permits, approvals, etc. pursuant to any other legislation, nor does it
exempt Nord Stream 2 AG from the obligation to obtain the necessary
permits and approvals pursuant to other legislation’ (DEA 2019c: 2).
There are stipulations requiring pipelaying vessels to have certain
equipment. The DEA ‘assumed that laying will be carried out using a lay
vessel equipped with dynamic positioning (DP vessel)’ and the ‘Laying
of the pipelines will be carried out using a conventional S-laying tech­
nique from a lay vessel with dynamic positioning (DP vessel) or an
anchored vessel. Nord Stream 2 AG expects one DP vessel to be used’
(DEA 2019c: 4, 14). The permit also states:
Fig. 1. Nord Stream 2 pipeline route options.
Source: Global Construction Review
Convention (UN 1991).7 Its terms included that ‘The public (including
environmental NGOs) has a right’
to be informed and to express its comments about decisions which
can affect their environment, even if they are taken by a foreign
country. States are required to evaluate the environmental impact of
industrial projects when such projects can affect the environment of
another state (Fig. 1 and 2).
Other relevant considerations include the Danish Maritime Author­
ity’s work on ‘Blue Denmark’s’ first Maritime Spatial Plan (DMA 2020)
in alignment with an EU directive (EU 2014), and the high volume of
dumped wartime munitions in the immediate area, which entail a last­
ing physical effect and risk (Knobloch et al., 2013; Szarejko and
Namieśnik 2009) (Fig. 3).
Based on compliance with environmental and safety considerations,
approval of route three seemed likely. Nord Stream 2 AG complained
that it was incomprehensible why there was no decision since the
amended Danish Continental Shelf Act entered into force. Moreover,
why was there no decision on the second route, even though there were
no relevant objections? The timing of Danish evaluation and decisionmaking processes impacted on the project, and especially on Gazprom.
Its transit contract with Ukraine’s Naftogaz expired at the end of 2019. If
Nord Stream 2 was not then operational, Gazprom had to negotiate a
new contract, when it intended to terminate its use of Ukrainian infra­
structure. In June, Gazprom board member, Sergey Kuznets, announced
that ‘Denmark’s reluctance to give its consent could result in losses that
Denmark would sooner or later be forced to compensate’. DEA spokes­
person, Ture Falbe-Hansen, said the ‘immediate assessment is that a
southeastern route is more appropriate based on a number of environ­
mental and safety parameters such as impact on shipping and Natura
2000 areas’. The DEA had ‘no further comments to the statement by
Gazprom’ (Jamshaid 2019). Nord Stream 2 AG formally withdrew its
application for a pipeline through Danish territorial waters. Company
CEO, Mathias Warnig, said it was ‘obliged to take this step because in
more than two years since we filed this application, the former Danish
government had not given any indication of coming to a decision’. The
company wanted to remove the Danish Foreign Ministry from influence
over the process, leaving the DEA as the sole decision-maker (Ger­
opoulos 2019). Warnig threatened to sue Denmark and the EU.
To minimise the risk of encountering unexpected chemical munitions
in connection with pipe-laying, a preliminary investigation will be
carried out prior to laying … In addition, a remotely operated vessel
(ROV) will be used … The route has been adapted to take account of
munitions that have been encountered along the proposed NSP2
route, NSP2 route V1 and NSP2 route V2 (DEA 2019c: 21).
The specialist Allseas ship Pioneering Spirit was near Bornholm when
US sanctions resulted in it ceasing pipelaying in December 2019. That
caused further logistical and technical problems for Nord Stream 2.
From May 2020, replacement Russian vessels Akademik Cherskiy and
Fortuna arrived at the German port of Mukran. The latter departed to
Rostock (Marinetraffic.com, 2020a; Marinetraffic.com, 2020b). After
another delay, in July the DEA approved Nord Stream 2 AG’s request to
employ an anchoring vessel and forego a requirement for dynamic
positioning. Appeals could be submitted until August 3, 2020. Denmark
also imposed a halt on construction work because of fish spawning
(Möller 2020). This imposed cessation was to last until the end of
September, later than notified in the permit. Weather conditions also
need to be sufficiently favourable for work to be carried out. Apart from
preparations in German waters, at time of writing there was no pipe­
laying in 2020, leaving the approximately 160 km stretch that remained
at the end of 2019 still to be constructed as 2021 approached.
6. Denmark, Poland, and the Nordic Alternative
Denmark understands the Polish interest in an ‘Energy NATO’,
whose terminology fuses resources supply with other geopolitical and
strategic attributes, and its scepticism towards Nord Stream 1 and 2
(Bouzarovski and Konieczny 2010; Roth 2011). The states revived plans
for a connection to Norway’s gas fields with a new infrastructure, Baltic
Pipe (Warsaw Institute 2018). Danish company Energinet and Polish
operator, GAZ-SYSTEM S.A., combined to begin operations by October
2022. This project will expand Polish and Danish capacity by up to ten
bcm 3 of gas per year. A feasibility study (Ramboll 2017) reported that
Baltic Pipe would bring significant socioeconomic benefits to Poland,
Denmark, the Baltic region, and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) more
7
The Espoo Convention, signed at Espoo (Finland) in 1991, is a UN agree­
ment on environmental impact intended to address decisions taken in one
country that affect the environment in another. Its full title is Convention on
Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context. 44 states and
the EU have ratified it.
5
S. Wood and O. Henke
Energy Policy 148 (2021) 111991
Fig. 2. Detailed map of pipeline routes near Bornholm.
Source: Nord Stream 2 AG
Fig. 3. WWII munitions near Bornholm Island.
Source: Helcom
6
S. Wood and O. Henke
Energy Policy 148 (2021) 111991
broadly. The EU included Baltic Pipe among its ‘Projects of Common
Interest’ (PCI). It will enhance the internal gas market and reinforce
security of supply. An investment decision ensued in November 2018
after the Danish-Polish consortium launched an ‘Open Season’ process
inviting bids for a share of capacity. A first pipeline of 110 km will
connect Norway’s Europipe II in the North Sea to a receiving terminal. It
will require expansion of the Danish transmission system through con­
struction of an onshore pipeline of about 210 km and a compressor
station in Zealand. A 260 km–310 km offshore pipeline will run between
Denmark and Poland. Energinet and GAZ-SYSTEM share costs of
roughly €2 billion. Denmark’s request of Nord Stream 2 AG to provide a
third application came after negotiations between Denmark and Poland
resolved a marine border dispute and demarcated an area southeast of
Bornholm (Energy Reporters 2019) (Fig. 4 and 5).
For Nord Stream 2 to reach Lubmin and Baltic Pipe to reach Poland,
somewhere under the Baltic Sea the two pipelines - presuming both are
completed - must traverse. Baltic Pipe must pass through either the
Swedish or German EEZ. It acquires further relevance due to the refur­
bishment of the Tyra platform in the North Sea. Since 1987, Tyra has
been a source of supply for Danish and Swedish gas consumers. It is out
of production from September 2019 to July 2022. It is assumed that gas
imported from Germany will provide substitute supply.
In April 2019, Polish President Andrzej Duda signed the PolishDanish Agreement. Baltic Pipe received €215 million in EU funding
through the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF). EU money sends a strong
signal. It enables construction of the offshore pipeline connecting gas
transmission systems and enhancing of Polish onshore infrastructure
(Konarzewska 2019; Forsal 2019). Norwegian gas may flow to Denmark
earlier than expected, possibly by January 2022. This would ease pres­
sure during the Tyra redevelopment. Denmark, Poland, and Norway
understand Baltic Pipe as strengthening the European gas market. Any
help in achieving climate targets is a ‘welcome bonus’, said Torben
Brabo, CEO of Energinet Gas TSO (Energinet 2019). Projects encom­
passing existing and planned interconnector pipelines and liquefied
natural gas (LNG) terminals in Poland, Lithuania, and Croatia will
improve EU energy security. Russian media outlets asserted that Baltic
Pipe is a political project and a financial burden with ‘little chance to
replace Nord Stream 2’ (Sputnik News 2018a; RT 2018). Baltic Pipe is
indeed a political as well as an economic project. It received questioning
in Denmark on environmental grounds though has not attracted the
level of negative attention that Nord Stream 2 has. Gas sourced from
Norway does not generate controversy like Russian gas does.
‘great interest in exporting their gas’. US sanctions had ‘extra-territorial
effects’ including on German business (Author Interview, 2019a). A
German foreign ministry official said Nord Stream 2 was a private en­
terprise matter, not political, and certainly ‘no project of the federal
government’, from which it received no financial support. Essentially it
was about ‘cheaper energy’. US LNG would be more expensive. Nord
Stream 2 would assist a planned exit from coal and nuclear power. There
were ‘certain risks, for example, Ukraine’. The ‘Americans say we must
ensure a continuation of a Ukraine gas pipeline’. Ukraine was then
receiving a reverse flow of Russian gas from the EU (Author Interview,
2019c).
It is difficult to conceive of these aspects as apolitical and apposite to
note statements attributed by the Kremlin media site to Sigmar Gabriel,
then FRG Vice-Chancellor, Economics Minister, and Energy Minister, in
a meeting with Putin in 2015 (Cf. Riley 2016: 16).9
Mr Miller and Mr Matthias Warnig will continue to pursue Nord
Stream 2 project. This is in our interests … most important as far as
legal issues are concerned is that we strive to ensure that all this
remains under the competence of the German authorities … then
opportunities for external meddling will be limited. And we are in a
good negotiating position on this matter. … to limit political
meddling in these issues – you are, of course, aware, this is not just a
formality – we need to settle the issue of Ukraine’s role as a transit
nation after 2019 … Ukraine’s gas transportation system is not in
very good state. And, of course, the financial and political role it will
play for Ukraine, as will the backflow of gas. … most important is for
German agencies to maintain authority over settling these issues.
And then, we will limit the possibility of political interference in this
project (Kremlin, 2015).
The report implied that Gabriel, and other officers of the then
German government, would seek to control decisions of ‘German
agencies’, including the independent regulator, and courts, German and
EU. The attempt of German and Russian parties to constrain or at least
limit ‘political interference’ failed. Instead, politicization was exacer­
bated. The succeeding German government, composed of the same
coalition, tried to block revision of the EU directive on gas trans­
portation (EU 2019), which had exempted transit from non-EU sources,
until an agreement, at its core a Franco-German compromise, was
reached in February 2019. Only then did Germany vote in favour of the
Gas Directive amendment in the Council (Gurzu 2019; Yafimava 2019).
Opponents, including signatories to the 2018 letter to Chancellor Mer­
kel, argued that ‘Germany’s position on Nord Stream 2 runs counter to
the goals of the European Energy Union’. The government position
amalgamates responses to commercial interests and emissions targets,
resource requirements, the prospect of tariff revenues, and the depen­
dence of Angela Merkel’s CDU-CSU on their ‘pro-Russian’ SPD coalition
partners. On the last point, a US official claimed that if a ‘Jamaica
coalition’ of CDU-CSU, Greens and FDP (Free Democratic Party) had
formed after the 2017 German election, ‘Nord Stream 2 would have been
dropped the next day’ (Author Interview, 2019b).
Without distribution of gas after it reaches EU territory, Nord Stream
2 is a pipeline to nowhere. In September 2019, the EU’s General Court
ruled that an exemption arrangement for distribution of Nord Stream 1
gas through the OPAL connector pipeline, decided by the Commission in
2016, was ‘adopted in breach of the principle of energy solidarity’ and
annulled (General Court, 2019). The ruling restricts the volume that
Nord Stream 1 can distribute via OPAL to 50 per cent of capacity. Ger­
many appealed to the Court of Justice (CJEU) against the ruling in
December 2019 (Germany v Poland C-848/19). If the Court decision is
upheld, it will likely impact on distribution via pipelines connecting to
7. Germany and Nord Stream 2
Denmark and Germany initiated the Council of Baltic Sea States
(CBSS) (Tassinari 2005: 391). Nearly thirty years later, Germany is the
Nord Stream 2 saga’s pivotal and most contradictory actor. It was an
engine of European integration though some German political and
business figures demur at the EU Energy Union. ‘Grand Coalition’ gov­
ernments of Christian Democratic (CDU-CSU) and Social Democratic
(SPD) parties censured Russia over its behaviour towards Ukraine and
(some unwillingly) supported EU sanctions against it, while Germany
remained Russia’s main economic partner. The current government
endorsed Nord Stream 2, though some members are uncomfortable.
Advocates contend that partnership with Russia is imperative and
emphasise that Nord Stream 2 is a commercial undertaking (Wood,
2020). In June 2019, the Commissioner for Relations with Russia and
Central Asia, Dirk Wiese (SPD), avowed that Nord Stream 2 ‘will
happen’. He saw no inconsistency in German policy. While Russia had to
‘get its house in order’, loosening ties would cause greater problems. US
Ambassador to Germany, Richard Grenell, was ‘no great help with his
utterances about Nord Stream 2’.8 In Wiese’s view, the Americans have
8
9
This was either a serious lapse of confidentiality by Russian authorities or it
was intentional.
Grenell’s tenure as ambassador to the FRG ended in June 2020.
7
S. Wood and O. Henke
Energy Policy 148 (2021) 111991
Fig. 4. Norway-Denmark-Poland baltic pipe project.
Source: Ramboll
Fig. 5. Baltic Pipe pipeline route options.
Source: Ramboll
8
S. Wood and O. Henke
Energy Policy 148 (2021) 111991
Nord Stream 2, should that project commence delivery.10 Gascade, a
Gazprom-Wintershall company, majority owns the EUGAL pipeline,
built to pump Nord Stream 2 gas from Lubmin to destinations in Ger­
many, the Czech Republic, and elsewhere in the EU. To comply with
unbundling legislation, three transmission operators, Fluxys, Gasunie,
and Ontras, were selected. In November 2019, the Bundestag introduced
legislation to enable Nord Stream 2 to circumvent hindrances ensuing
from the amended Gas Directive (Deutscher Bundestag 2019). Nord
Stream 2 AG duly sought a derogation (exemption) from the German
regulator (Bundesnetzagentur 2019). When the German regulator
rejected the derogation application (Bundesnetzagentur 2020), its de­
cision refuted Sigmar Gabriel’s assurances (as reported by the Kremlin)
to Vladimir Putin in 2015 (Fig. 6).
strategic interest held by Russia, Germany, Poland, the United States,
and the EU, in a ‘purely commercial’ venture. Attempts by German ac­
tors to separate energy from other aspects of relations with Russia
contrasts with German exhortations for unity in European policy. Ger­
many assumed the presidency of the EU in the second half of 2020 as
controversy around Nord Stream 2, and policy towards Russia,
continued to escalate.
Nord Stream 2 exacerbated or stimulated new confrontations within
the EU and between opponents or supporters of Russia or the US. It also
generated trade-offs, some which may not be sustained. An interesting
game theoretic analysis (Richman and Ayyilmaz 2019: 8; Cf. Sziklai
et al., 2020) posited that the ‘the overall picture is a mixed one. Even as
the U.S. shale gas boom and competitive global markets constrain both
its politicization and pricing power, Russia retains a certain capacity to
exploit its powerful position as a primary supplier to the European
market for episodic exercises in politicization’. The US administration,
perceived as a promotor of LNG sales to European markets, also has
geostrategic concerns. Merkel’s attempted compromise was to build
terminals that could receive LNG from the US and other sources. It was
recently revealed that German officials had offered to spend $1.2 billion
on related infrastructure (Die Zeit, 2020). That does not change whether
Russia under its current regime is or is not an energy (or other) security
threat. The possibility that it is explains why Nord Stream 2 AG accents
the European aspect of the project and underplays the Russian. The
company and its backers insist that EU law, pertinently for business
arrangements, must be upheld without politicization. Presenting a ‘view
from the project developer’, Lissek (2016: 4), contended during the
pre-construction phase that:
8. The United States and Nord Stream 2
US disapproval of the first Nord Stream project and attempts to avert
construction were ‘brushed aside by key officials in the Commission and
the German government’. The outcome intensified ‘US efforts to build a
coalition for more gas supply diversity’ (Smith 2010: 11). If the Obama
administration was critical of Nord Stream 2, the Trump administration
is implacable (cf. Guliyev 2020). The US recognised Denmark’s signifi­
cance in preventing or at least delaying Nord Stream 2 and invested
much political energy encouraging it (Copenhagen Post, 2017b). The US
is Denmark’s third largest export market and second largest investor. At
a time of ‘assertive’ Russian policy in the Baltic region (Samuelsen,
2018: 21), the Danish government (2018: 11) was unequivocal that
‘American global leadership is in Denmark’s national interest and
crucial to rules-based international cooperation’. The NATO connection
is crucial and impresses the US as indispensable (Mölder 2011; Jakobsen
and Rynning 2018; Saxi 2019).
Gerhard Schröder averred that American pressure explained the
Danish policy of permit delay (Reuters 2019a). He and other supporters
of Nord Stream 2 assert that the US opposes the project because it wants
to sell LNG into Europe. Russian sources intone that LNG will be more
expensive than the gas offered by Gazprom (Sputnik News 2018b). The
European Commission was not so concerned about the option of US LNG
(European Commission 2019: 23–24). A US official maintained that
Nord Stream 2 ‘increases a Russian stranglehold on Europe’ when
diversification of sources and energy types were required. It would
‘further weaken Ukraine when it was in conflict with Russia’. In some
parts of Europe, threat perception of Russia was ‘appallingly low’, the
official claimed (Author Interview, 2019b).
Proposals by Republican and Democrat members of the US Congress
to penalise entities engaged in the project built on other sanctions
against Russia, some supported and regularly prolonged by the EU. By
mid-2020, even some opponents of Nord Stream 2 considered that US
intervention in EU affairs over the issue was excessive, a position
influenced by the unpopularity of the US President. Contrasting reports
emerged on an alleged démarche, supported by 24 EU states, against US
sanctions (Wetzel 2020; Jakóbik 2020).
the rule of law, which is a founding principle of the EU, does not
permit arbitrary application of established laws and regulations
simply in response to current political sentiment. This would violate
many of the very basic values on which the European Union and its
member states are founded. Consequently, Nord Stream 2 expects no
special treatment or exceptions from established legal practice –
either in favour of or against the project. We have full confidence in
the authorities of the countries along the route of Nord Stream 2 to
apply all relevant legislation with the greatest degree of diligence,
reliability, consistency and transparency – including EU law and
international conventions.
Denmark was later accused of deliberately delaying permit approval
to thwart the project (Reuters 2019b). Denmark is a rule of law state, in
which cases and decisions are considered within an independent legal
system. Russia is not a rule of law state. Arguments that Russia and its
state-owned companies should be treated the same as EU member states
with no further assessment overlook this point (Fischer 2016). Some
debate strives to limit the issue to whether Russia is or is not a reliable
supplier of energy resources to the EU. The politics are not so limited,
however. A catalogue of transgressions by the Putin regime makes some
arrangements with it incompatible with the political and legal norms of
rule of law states. According to Tatiana Romanova (2016: 860, 868, 872)
the ‘EU trusts the market economy and … an internal market reliant
upon law and equal conditions for all … Russia, in turn, adheres to state
capitalism’. And ‘Russia’s lack of respect for the rule of law inside the
country mars its use of legal instruments’. While Russia accuses the EU
of ‘double standards’, ‘Russia’s instrumental use of market approaches
leads the EU to accuse Russia of opportunism and non-respect of the
spirit of law’. Assisted by corporate allies and politicians in some EU
states, the Russian government instrumentalized EU legal frameworks
without adhering to international law itself and operating with no
effective separation of powers domestically (Allison 2014, 2017). In
recent years, that strategy has been vigorously responded to. Conse­
quently, proponents of Nord Stream 2 have gone beyond the EU in
seeking favourable resolution. Gazprom announced a new Eurobond
issue and confirmed that Nord Stream 2 AG had initiated arbitration
9. Discussion
Nord Stream 2 propelled a small Nordic state into a spotlight of highintensity international politics, foisting upon it an improbable influence
over the energy and foreign policy agendas of much larger entities. The
project accentuated the Baltic Sea as a space of strategic, political, and
economic contestation and focused attention on the political and
10
An attempt by Nord Stream AG to have the amended Gas Directive (2019/
692) annulled failed when the General Court of the European Union (2020). On
the same day, the General Court dismissed another action for annulment by
Nord Stream 2 AG (T-526/19), finding that it was inadmissible. Further liti­
gation may follow.
9
S. Wood and O. Henke
Energy Policy 148 (2021) 111991
Fig. 6. EUGAL pipeline route.
Source: Gascade
proceedings under UN (UNICTRAL) auspices against the EU. The com­
pany charged that the EU ‘violated obligations’ of the Energy Charter
Treaty by ‘approving discriminatory amendments to the Third Gas
Directive’ (Russia & CIS Business and Financial Daily 2019; Cf. Jeutner,
2019). In July 2020, a ‘Claimant’s Memorial’ was filed by a London legal
firm, asserting the ‘politically motivated’ actions of a ‘coalition of EU
actors’ including several CEE states, the European Commission, ‘in
particular, DG Energy’, and a ‘significant group of European Parlia­
mentarians’ (Herbert Smith Freehills 2020: 63). The case is pending.
energy projects. Denmark’s functioning as a state with authorities that
act in accordance with technical and legal criteria, and EU law where it
prevails, eventually resulted in a permit for a project that much of its
political class and civil society do not favour. Yet the prolonged delay
contributed to a situation whereby, at time of writing, Nord Stream 2 is
not operating. If it never does the Danish role will be viewed retro­
spectively as decisive. May 23, 2019 was another day without a Danish
construction permit for Nord Stream 2. It was also the day when the
revised EU Gas Directive entered into force, restricting possible dero­
gations only to pipelines completed before that date. The amended
Directive had to be implemented in national regulation by February 24,
2020 (EU 2019). Despite the DEA granting a permit for Nord Stream 2 in
late October 2019, the prospect that it will raise other issues should not
be discounted.
There are many potential policy implications. The nexus of energy
policy, foreign and security policy, and law is becoming more intricate
and politicized. The Nord Stream 2 saga exposed fissures among member
10. Conclusion and policy implications
In its 2016 strategy review and later statements, Denmark outlined a
position based on liberal democratic values, geopolitical awareness, and
environmental interests. Through its mandated energy agency, Denmark
engaged in a form of filibuster, substantially delaying Nord Stream 2,
and complicating what was already one of the most contentious of
10
S. Wood and O. Henke
Energy Policy 148 (2021) 111991
states and affirmed how inextricable the energy policy field is from other
political domains. It highlighted increasing tension between Germany
and the USA, and in German domestic politics. If Nord Stream 2 does not
commence operation, Germany may have to recalibrate its energy mix
and even reconsider proposed exits from nuclear and coal. In such a
scenario, the implications could be most serious for Russia and Gaz­
prom. As Romanova (2016: 871) argued, for Russia ‘energy is a strategic
good rather than a commodity like others. Russian policy privileges
security over the market, a top-down style of problem-solving, state
interference and ad hoc solutions … Russian energy supplies to Europe
are so important that Russian companies, Gazprom in particular,
deserve special treatment’. If Nord Stream 2 AG and Gazprom are not
successful through legal avenues, a reconsidering of Russian energy
export options, and Russian foreign policy, will likely occur.
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Author contributions
Conceptualization: Steve Wood and Otto Henke.
Data curation: Steve Wood and Otto Henke.
Formal analysis: Steve Wood and Otto Henke.
Funding acquisition: Steve Wood.
Investigation: Steve Wood and Otto Henke.
Methodology: Steve Wood and Otto Henke.
Project administration: Steve Wood.
Roles/Writing - original draft: Steve Wood and Otto Henke.
Writing - review & editing: Steve Wood.
Funding
Steve Wood thanks the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation for
valuable assistance. Steve Wood thanks the Goethe Universität Frankfurt
and Professor Dr Reinhard Wolf for valuable assistance.
Declaration of Competing Interest
The authors declare that they have no known competing financial
interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence
the work reported in this paper.
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