Jackup Drilling Rig Tasha
Health, Safety & Environmental (HSE) Case
Part 4 – Risk Management
Doc. No.
Rev. 1
Sp.MAN.TASHA.042.001
Table 4.7a: HSE Critical Equipment/ Systems
Category
Prevention
System
ID
HSECE-001
HSECE-002
HSECE-003
Detection
System
Control
System
Mitigation
System
EER
HSE Critical Equipment/
System
Lifting Equipment and Cranes
Well Control
Structural Integrity
Description

Electro Hydraulic Operated Pedestal Cranes

BOP Hydraulic Lifting Crane

Service Bridge Cranes

Knuckle Boom Crane

Drilling Fluid System (Mud System/ Bulk
System)

BOP and BOP Control System

Diverter System

Choke and Kill System

Legs Structure/ Support

Hull and Primary Structure (Drill Floor,
Derrick, Cantilever)

Towing Bridle
HSECE-004
Navigational Aids

Navigation Aids
HSECE-005
Jackup Stability

Ballast and Bilge System

Rig Jacking System

Fire and Gas Detection System (Fire
Detector, Smoke Detector, Gas Detector,
H2S Detector)

Fire and Gas Control System (F&G Control
Panel, Manual Alarm Call Points, Push
Buttons)

Earth Bonding/ Leakage Protection Circuit
Breakers

Certified Electrical Equipment
HSECE-006
HSECE-007
Fire and Gas Detection
System
Ignition Control
HSECE-008
Drain System

Hazardous Drain System
HSECE-009
HVAC system

Hazardous Area Ventilation

Non-hazardous Area Ventilation
HSECE-010
Emergency Shutdown System

Emergency Shutdown System
HSECE-011
Passive Fire Protection

Fire Rated Decks, Walls and Bulkheads
HSECE-012
Active Fire Protection

Deluge System

Helideck Foam System

CO2 Fixed Fire Extinguishing System

LQ Water Spray System

Fire Water Pumps and Distribution

Portable Firefighting Equipment

Emergency Communication System (Internal
and External Communication System)
HSECE-013
Communication Systems
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Jackup Drilling Rig Tasha
Health, Safety & Environmental (HSE) Case
Part 4 – Risk Management
Doc. No.
Category
ID
HSECE-014
Rev. 1
Sp.MAN.TASHA.042.001
HSE Critical Equipment/
System
Means of Evacuation
Description

TEMPSC/ Lifeboats

Life Rafts
HSECE-015
Muster Area

Muster Area (Primary and Secondary)
HSECE-016
Escape and Egress Routes

Escape and Egress Routes

Stairways

Ladders

Escape line
HSECE-017
Emergency Lighting System

Emergency Lighting
HSECE-018
Emergency Response and
Rescue Facilities

SBV

Medical Facilities

Helicopter Crash Box (Rescue Equipment)
HSECE-019
Life Saving Equipment

Personal Life Saving Equipment (PPE,
lifebuoys, lifejackets, immersion suit etc.)
HSECE-020
Emergency Power

Emergency Power System (Emergency
Diesel Generator)

Uninterrupted Power Supply (UPS)

Helideck and associated systems, including
Refuelling System
HSECE-021
Helideck Facilities
These HSE Critical Equipment/ Systems and their sub-components are required to be
maintained to a minimum standard and frequency in order to show that they continue to meet
minimum levels of performance. This information will be integrated with the maintenance
procedures of Apexindo’s Preventive Maintenance System (PMS).
The absence (or reduced effectiveness) of HSE Critical Equipment/ Systems and/ or risk
reduction barriers identified in Bow-Tie [Ref. 3], may potentially lead to situations of increased
risk which could jeopardise personnel safety, asset and environment. As a result, Rig
operations may be interrupted due to potential HSE concerns. The operational boundaries of
the Rig in the event of risk reduction barriers being unavailable or ineffective have been
established during the SOOB Review (Refer to Section 4.8).
In view of the criticality of the identified HSE Critical Equipment/ Systems and other risk
reduction barriers, it is deemed crucial to determine the HSE Critical Activities, which provide
or maintain their corresponding functionality and performance. Clear definition of the HSE
Critical Activities allows all foreseeable hazards on the Rig to be managed effectively with the
associated risks reduced to a tolerable level.
In support of the SHIDAC’s Risk Treatment process (Step 3), HSE Critical Activities in relation
to Apexindo Integrated Management System (AIMS) [Ref. 8] have been assigned to each of
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Jackup Drilling Rig Tasha
Health, Safety & Environmental (HSE) Case
Part 4 – Risk Management
Doc. No.
Sp.MAN.TASHA.042.001
Rev. 1
the HSE Critical Equipment/ System as well as other risk reduction barriers identified during
the Bow-Tie Review. The complete list of HSE Critical Activities is presented in APPENDIX II.
4.8
SUMMARY OF OPERATION BOUNDARIES (SOOB)
A SOOB Review [Ref. 6] has been conducted to understand how the risk of simultaneous
operations or performing typical normal operations during abnormal circumstances (e.g.
adverse weather, safety system offline etc.) could be increased, and identify measures or
restrictions that should be implemented to manage the incremental risk such that it would still
remain tolerable or ALARP.
The SOOB provides a framework to assist Rig personnel to decide when to continue certain
activities, when the effectiveness of some critical barriers may be compromised, and
potentially creating situations of increased risk. The SOOB is vital in establishing the
operational boundaries when operating near limits of tolerability. It also assists the Rig
personnel in distinguishing between a “stop work” condition and a “proceed with caution”
condition.
A total of thirty six (36) typical operational activities, encompassing drilling, marine and support
operations typically conducted on the Rig were identified in the SOOB Workshop.
Furthermore, fifty five (55) credible operational risk factors which could potentially create a
situation of increased risk during routine operations on the Rig have been identified. These
operational risk factors include defeated risk reduction barriers (i.e. those identified in the
HAZID and Bow-Tie Workshops), poor environmental conditions, abnormal operating
conditions etc.
The SOOB Matrix and the corresponding legend are attached in APPENDIX III. Note that the
SOOB Matrix should be considered as a risk reduction guideline on the Rig rather than a rigid
requirement for the various operations on the Rig.
4.9
ALARP DEMONSTRATION
4.9.1 Overview
The overall goal of ALARP Demonstration is to provide assurance that the risks associated
with the MAHs and OWHs identified on the Rig have been assessed, controlled and managed,
and as a result reduced to ALARP. Employing a multi-disciplinary review team, an ALARP
Workshop [Ref. 7] has been conducted to:


Review and discuss the findings of the safety studies (including EERA and QRA)
undertaken for the Rig; and
Identify additional risk reduction measures that might help further mitigate the risk
associated with the major risk contributors such that the risks can be reduced to
ALARP.
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