The most important factor for the mass appeal of Nazism was the legacy of World War I, and
particularly the Versailles Treaty. To what extent do you agree with this statement?
I agree with the statement to a large extent. Although the Great Depression is often cited as the key factor in
allowing the rise of the Nazi party, this explanation fails to account for the lack of success similar Fascist
parties had during the same economic conditions across the Western world. While Oswald Moseley’s British
Union of Fascists, and Francis De Groot’s New Guard gained significant publicity in their respective countries
during the early 1930s, they failed to mobilise the widespread popular support needed to seriously threaten
existing power structures. This was largely due to their lack of key unifying symbol of aggravation, around
which the manufacture of public opinion could take place. In Germany, this was not the case. The Treaty of
Versailles became a transcendental symbol through which hatreds and prejudices of the population could be
corralled and focused with laser precision upon the ideological enemies of the Nazi Party. It provided the
foundational myth that allowed the Nazi policy program to be put into place: the idea that the treacherous
‘elites’ had betrayed Germany in the final months of the First World War; that Germany had been denied its
rightful place as the pre-eminent imperial power in Europe by the machinations of a cabal of international
Jews. This played perfectly to a nation still reeling from the humiliation of defeat, and the harsh, immiserating
conditions mandated by the Treaty of Versailles.
World War One can largely be seen as the birth of propaganda in its modern form. In order to maintain public
support for a war conducted for reasons largely abstract from the common citizen, immense public relations
teams were engaged by the Governments of all participants, painting their own militaries as bravely fighting
against the inhuman savages of the opposing side, suffering minimal losses and inflicting terrible casualties
upon the enemy. This had wide-ranging unintended consequences. Edward Bernays, in his 1928 book
‘Propaganda’, states that public opinion is “composed of inherited prejudices and symbols and cliches and
verbal formulas supplied to them by the leaders.” He wrote this based largely upon his own experience as a
propagandist for the US Government in World War One, and can largely be seen to imply the public at large
has no real access to an objective view of how the war was being fought, and even who was ultimately
winning. This led to a situation in 1918 whereby the citizens of both the Triple Entente and the Central Powers
both believed they were imminently going to win the war. When the Central Powers surrendered, this illusory
simulacrum collapsed. It seemed unbelievable to the German citizen - through propaganda, they had been told
they were in complete control against the rapacious forces of distilled barbarism that comprised the Triple
Entente. To have lost was unthinkable; there had to be another explanation. The great national humiliation
caused by defeat in a war the majority had been led to believe they were winning was profound. It created an
immense wave of seething resentment that was duly harnessed by the Nazi party. The symbol of their betrayal
- the Treaty of Versailles - was transmuted into a manifestation of all things evil, onto which the concerns,
hatreds and prejudices of the German people could be projected and heightened to hitherto unseen levels,
carefully guided by the skillful propagandists of the Nazi party.
The Treaty was an easy document to hate, if you were a German citizen. It contained many provisions that
were blatantly unjust and ahistoric: assigning all blame for the war to Germany, requiring reparations that
exceeded Germany’s industrial capacity to sustainably produce, and ceding valuable land to its neighbours.
The unrealistic nature of the treaty soon became apparent. Due to reparations destroying Germany’s capacity
for trade earnings, German currency soon became worthless, and the hyperinflation crisis of 1921-1923
ensued. This caused starvation, job loss and general despair. In another blow, failure to pay reparations in a
timely manner led to the French Army occupying the Ruhr region, home of Germany’s most lucrative industrial
production. This humiliation and genuine socio-economic suffering provided fertile ground for the Nazis to
exploit.