RULE 114 – Bail
A. Definition/Description
B. Conditions/Requirements
- effective upon approval and shall remain in force at all stages of the proceedings until
judgment by the RTC
promulgation of
C. When:
- bail is a matter of right; a matter of discretion;
- bail as a constitutional right
D. Kinds:
a. corporate surety
b. property bond
c. cash bond
d. recognizance: is an obligation of record entered into before some court or magistrate duly
take it, with the condition to do some particular act particularly the appearance of the accused for trial
authorized to
E. Amount of bail; guidelines
F. Where to file bail
- RTC; MTC exercising special jurisdiction
G. Forfeiture vs. Cancellation of Bail
- forfeiture: failure to appear; jumping bail
- cancellation: death; conviction; acquittal; dismissal
Bail as a matter of discretion
Abrogueña
FLORESTA VS. UBIADAS
A.M. No. RTJ-03-1774. May 27, 2004
Bail; Whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, and even if no charge has yet been filed in court against a suspectdetainee, reasonable notice of hearing is required to be given to the prosecutor, or at least his recommendation must be
sought.—Whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, and even if no charge has yet been filed in court against a
respondent-suspect-detainee, reasonable notice of hearing is required to be given to the prosecutor, or at least his
recommendation must be sought. So Fortuna v. Penaco-Sitaca instructs: [A]dmission to bail as a matter of discretion
presupposes the exercise thereof in accordance with law and guided by the applicable legal principles. The prosecution
must first be accorded an opportunity to present evidence because by the very nature of deciding applications for bail, it is
on the basis of such evidence that judicial discretion is weighed against in determining whether the guilt of the accused is
strong. In other words, discretion must be exercised regularly, legally and within the confines of procedural due process,
that is, after the evaluation of the evidence submitted by the prosecution. Any order issued in the absence thereof is not a
product of sound judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and outright arbitrariness.
Where the petition for bail was filed only the day before, at close to noontime, it cannot be said that the prosecution was
afforded reasonable notice and opportunity to present evidence after it received a copy of the petition minutes before it
was filed in court; Reasonable notice depends, of course, upon the circumstances of each particular case, taking into
account, inter alia, the offense committed and the imposable penalties, and the evidence of guilt in the hands of the
prosecution.— True, a hearing of the petition for bail was conducted in Crim. Case No. 271-99 on January 4, 2000 at 8:30
a.m. Given the filing of the petition only the day before, at close to noontime, it cannot be said that the prosecution was
afforded reasonable notice and opportunity to present evidence after it received a copy of the petition minutes before it
was filed in court. It bears stressing that the prosecution should be afforded reasonable opportunity to comment on the
application for bail by showing that evidence of guilt is strong. While in Section 18 of Rule 114 on applications for bail, no
period is provided as it merely requires the court to give a “reasonable notice” of the hearing to the prosecutor or require
him to submit his recommendation, and the general rule on the requirement of a three-day notice for hearing of motions
under Section 4 of Rule 15 allows a court for good cause to set the hearing on shorter notice, there is, in the case of
Mangohig, no showing of good cause to call for hearing his petition for bail on shorter notice. Reasonable notice depends
of course upon the circumstances of each particular case, taking into account, inter alia, the offense committed and the
imposable penalties, and the evidence of guilt in the hands of the prosecution.
A judge is called upon to balance the interests of the accused who is entitled to the presumption of innocence until his
guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt, and to enable him to prepare his defense without being subject to punishment
prior to conviction, against the right of the State to protect the people and the peace of the community from dangerous
elements.—In Crim. Case No. 271-99, Mangohig was arrested for violation of Sec. 5(b), Art. III of R.A. 7610, which is
punishable by reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, and subsequently indicted for statutory rape qualified by
relationship which is punishable by death. Under the circumstances, by respondent’s assailed grant of bail, the
prosecution was deprived of due process for which he is liable for gross ignorance of the law or procedure which is a
serious charge under Sec. 8 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. The charge carries the penalty of dismissal from the
service with forfeiture of all or part of the benefits or suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than
3 but not exceeding 6 months or a fine of more than P20,000 but not exceeding P40,000. This Court takes this occasion
to reiterate the injunction that a judge is called upon to balance the interests of the accused who is entitled to the
presumption of innocence until his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt, and to enable him to prepare his defense
without being subject to punishment prior to conviction, against the right of the State to protect the people and the peace
of the community from dangerous elements.
Facts
By a Sworn Complaint dated January 24, 2000, then Provincial Prosecutor, Dorentino Z. Floresta administratively charged
Judge Eliodoro G. Ubiadas with “gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority and violations of the Code of
Judicial Conduct.”
Complainant furthermore faults respondent for granting, “without giving notice to the prosecution,” the petition for bail of
Jose Mangohig, Jr. who was arrested by virtue of a warrant which found probable cause against him for violation of
Section 5(b), Art. III of Republic Act No. 7610 (“Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act”). Mangohig was arrested for violation of Sec. 5(b), Art. III of R.A. 7610, which is punishable by
reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, and subsequently indicted for statutory rape qualified by relationship which is
punishable by death.
The petition for bail of Mangohig who was then under preliminary investigation, which motion was filed on January 3, 2000
on which same date a copy of said petition was furnished the public prosecutor, was as set by Mangohig heard on the
morning of January 4, 2000 during which there was no appearance from the Prosecutor’s Office; and that as the offense
for which Mangohig was charged is ordinarily a bailable offense, respondent granted him bail.
Issue
Whether or not the respondent Judge erred on granting Mangohig of bail on the ground that there is a failure of notice to
the prosecution.
Held
Yes, Judge Ubiadas committed a violation in granting bail to the accused.
Whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, and even if no charge has yet been filed in court against a respondentsuspect-detainee, reasonable notice of hearing is required to be given to the prosecutor, or at least his recommendation
must be sought.
While in Section 18 of Rule 114 on applications for bail, no period is provided as it merely requires the court to give a
“reasonable notice” of the hearing to the prosecutor or require him to submit his recommendation, and the general rule on
the requirement of a three-day notice for hearing of motions under Section 4 of Rule 15 allows a court for good cause to
set the hearing on shorter notice, there is, in the case of Mangohig, no showing of good cause to call for hearing his
petition for bail on shorter notice.
Reasonable notice depends of course upon the circumstances of each particular case, taking into account, inter alia, the
offense committed and the imposable penalties, and the evidence of guilt in the hands of the prosecution.
Under the circumstances, by respondent’s assailed grant of bail, the prosecution was deprived of due process for which
he is liable for gross ignorance of the law or procedure which is a serious charge under Sec. 8 of Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court. The charge carries the penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all or part of the benefits or
suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than 3 but not exceeding 6 months or a fine of more
than P20,000 but not exceeding P40,000.
This Court takes this occasion to reiterate the injunction that a judge is called upon to balance the interests of the accused
who is entitled to the presumption of innocence until his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt, and to enable him to
prepare his defense without being subject to punishment prior to conviction against the right of the State to protect the
people and the peace of the community from dangerous elements.
Hearing for Granting Bail
Bobiles
CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR JOVENCITO R. ZUÑO, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE ALEJADRINO C. CABEBE, Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte, respondent.
A.M. OCA No. 03-1800-RTJ
November 26, 2004
Criminal Procedure; Bails; Under the present Rules, a hearing is mandatory in granting bail whether it is a matter
of right or discretion; Even in cases where there is no petition for bail, a hearing should still be held. –
In Docena-Caspe vs. Judge Arnulfo O. Bugtas, we held that jurisprudence is replete with decisions on the procedural
necessity of a hearing, whether summary or otherwise, relative to the grant of bail, especially in cases involving offenses
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, where bail is a matter of discretion. Under the present
Rules, a hearing is mandatory in granting bail whether it is a matter of right or discretion. It must be stressed that the grant
or the denial of bail in cases where bail is a matter of discretion, hinges on the issue of whether or not the evidence of guilt
of the accused is strong, and the determination of whether or not the evidence is strong is a matter of judicial discretion
which remains with the judge. In order for the latter to properly exercise his discretion, he must first conduct a hearing to
determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong. In fact, even in cases where there is no petition for bail, a hearing
should still be held
FACTS
Chief State Prosecutor Zuño alleged that a criminal case for illegal possession of prohibited or regulated drugs was filed
with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte where respondent Judge Cabebe was then the presiding
judge, against three police officers and private individuals. Upon arraignment, all the accused, pleaded not guilty. The
prosecution the filed a petition for change of venue but was denied. The accused filed a motion for reconsideration. In the
meantime, the proceedings before respondent's court were suspended.
The accused filed a motion to dismiss invoking their right to a speedy trial. Respondent judge then motu propio, without
the accused's application or motion, issued an Order granting bail to the accused.
The prosecution then filed a motion for reconsideration. Instead of acting thereon, respondent judge inhibited himself from
further proceeding with the case.
Petitioner then filed this administrative case against respondent judge for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, gross
ignorance of the law and partiality.
Respondent denied the charges, alleging, among others, that the granting of bail was premised on the constitutional right
of the accused to a speedy trial.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent judge erred in granting, motu proprio, without the accused's application or motion, bail to the
accused.
HELD
The Court held in affirmative.
In Docena-Caspe vs. Judge Arnulfo O. Bugtas, the Court held that jurisprudence is replete with decisions on the
procedural necessity of a hearing, whether summary or otherwise, relative to the grant of bail, especially in cases
involving offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, where bail is a matter of discretion.
Under the present Rules, a hearing is mandatory in granting bail whether it is a matter of right or discretion. It must be
stressed that the grant or the denial of bail in cases where bail is a matter of discretion, hinges on the issue of whether or
not the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, and the determination of whether or not the evidence is strong is a
matter of judicial discretion which remains with the judge. In order for the latter to properly exercise his discretion, he must
first conduct a hearing to determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong. In fact, even in cases where there is no
petition for bail, a hearing should still be held.
There is no question that respondent judge granted bail to the accused without conducting a hearing, in violation of
Sections 8 and 18, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, quoted as follows:
"Sec. 8. Burden of proof in bail application. – At the hearing of an application for bail filed by a person who is in
custody for the commission of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, the
prosecution has the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence presented during the bail
hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial but, upon motion of either party, the court may
recall any witness for additional examination unless the latter is dead, outside the Philippines, or otherwise unable
to testify."
"Sec. 18. Notice of application to prosecutor. – In the application for bail under section 8 of this Rule, the court
must give reasonable notice of the hearing to the prosecutor or require him to submit his recommendation. (18a)"
In Cortes vs. Catral, we laid down the following rules outlining the duties of the judge in case an application for
bail is filed:
1. In all cases whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the
application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether
or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the
purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion (Section 7 and 8, id.);
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bail bond
(Section 19, id.); otherwise the petition should be denied.
Based on the above-cited procedure, after the hearing, the court's order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary
of the evidence of the prosecution and based thereon, the judge should formulate his own conclusion as to whether the
evidence so presented is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the accused.
Respondent judge did not follow the above Rules and procedure enumerated in Cortes. He did not conduct a hearing
before he granted bail to the accused, thus depriving the prosecution of an opportunity to interpose objections to the grant
of bail. Irrespective of his opinion on the strength or weakness of evidence to prove the guilt of the accused, he should
have conducted a hearing and thereafter made a summary of the evidence of the prosecution. The importance of a bail
hearing and a summary of evidence cannot be downplayed, these are considered aspects of procedural due process for
both the prosecution and the defense; its absence will invalidate the grant or denial of bail.
Neither did respondent require the prosecution to submit its recommendation on whether or not bail should be granted.
He maintains that the prosecution did not object to the grant of bail to the accused, hence, he cannot be held
administratively liable for not conducting a hearing.
In Santos vs. Ofilada, we held that the failure to raise or the absence of an objection on the part of the prosecution in an
application for bail does not dispense with the requirement of a bail hearing. Thus –
"Even the alleged failure of the prosecution to interpose an objection to the granting of bail to the accused will not
justify such grant without hearing. This Court has uniformly ruled that even if the prosecution refuses to adduce
evidence or fails to interpose any objection to the motion for bail, it is still mandatory for the court to conduct a
hearing or ask searching and clarificatory questions from which it may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, or
lack of it, against the accused. Where the prosecutor refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to the application
to grant and fix bail, the court may ask the prosecution such questions as would ascertain the strength of the
State's evidence or judge the adequacy of the amount of bail. Irrespective of respondent judge's opinion that the
evidence of guilt against the accused is not strong, the law and settled jurisprudence demand that a hearing be
conducted before bail may be fixed for the temporary release of the accused, if bail is at all justified.
Thus, although the provincial prosecutor had interposed no objection to the grant of bail to the accused, the
respondent judge therein should nevertheless have set the petition for bail for hearing and diligently ascertain
from the prosecution whether the latter was not in fact contesting the bail application. In addition, a hearing was
also necessary for the court to take into consideration the guidelines set forth in the then Section, 6, Rule 114 of
the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure for the fixing of the amount of the bail, Only after respondent judge had
satisfied himself that these requirements have been met could he then proceed to rule on whether or not to grant
bail."
Clearly, therefore, respondent judge cannot seek refuge on the alleged absence of objection on the part of the
prosecution to the grant of bail to the accused.
Bail in Extradition Cases
Alim
Govt of HK Spec. Adm. Region vs. Olalia, 521 SCRA
G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007
While this Court in Government of the United States of America v. Purganan, 389 SCRA 623 (2002), limited the exercise
of the right to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various international treaties giving recognition and
protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Court’s ruling in Purganan is in
order. – The Philippines, along with other members of the family of nations, committed to uphold the fundamental human
rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our
Constitution which provides: “The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human
rights.” The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty
and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to
decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine
authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their
fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. While this Court in Purganan limited
the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various international treaties giving
recognition and protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Court’s ruling in
Purganan is in order.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, the Court sees no justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition
cases – clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail must be viewed in the light of the various treaty
obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. – In Mejoff v. Director
of Prisons, 90 Phil. 70 (1951) and Chirskoff v. Commission of Immigration, 90 Phil. 256 A (1951), this Court ruled that
foreign nationals against whom no formal criminal charges have been filed may be released on bail pending the finality of
an order of deportation. As previously stated, the Court in Mejoff relied upon the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
in sustaining the detainee’s right to bail. If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should
not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to
deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative
proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue. Clearly, the right of a prospective
extradite to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines
concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor
of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.
Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to demand the surrender of one
accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the other state to surrender him
to the demanding state. – Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) defines
“extradition” as “the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign
authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed
against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or
government.” Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to demand the
surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the other state
to surrender him to the demanding state. It is not a criminal proceeding. Even if the potential extradite is a criminal, for it
is not punishment for a crime, even though such punishment may follow extradition. It is sui generis, tracing its existence
wholly to treaty obligations between different nations. It is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential
extradite. Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character. Its object is to prevent the
escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the
purpose of trial or punishment.
While extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation of liberty on
the part of the potential extradite and (b) the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also “the machinery of
criminal law” – obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal
process. – But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation
of liberty on the part of the potential extradite and (b) the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also “the
machinery of criminal law.” This is shown by Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates
the “immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused” if such “will best serve the interest of justice.” We further
note that Section 20 allows the requesting state “in case of urgency” to ask for the “provisional arrest of the accused,
pending receipt of the request for extradition”; and that release from provisional arrest “shall not prejudice re-arrest and
extradition of the accused if a request for extradition is received subsequently.” Obviously, an extradition proceeding,
while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A potential extradite may be subjected to arrest,
to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state following the proceedings. “Temporary
detention” may be necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time of the detention should be
reasonable.
While our extradition law does not provide for grant of bail to an extradite, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or
her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution. – Records show that private respondent was
arrested on September 23, 1999, and remained incarcerated until December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his
admission to bail. In other words, he had been detained for over two (2) years without having been convicted of any
crime. By any standard, such an extended period of detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty.
In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the extradition court to grant him bail. While our
extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extradite, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her
from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution.
The prospective extradite this bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted
bail. – The applicable standard due process, however, should not be the same as that in criminal proceedings. In the
latter, the standard of due process is premised on the presumption of innocence of the accused. As Purganan correctly
points out, it is from this major premise that the ancillary presumption in favor of admitting to bail arises. Bearing in mind
the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the “temporary
detention” is the possibility of flight of the potential extradite. This is based on the assumption that such extradite is a
fugitive from justice. Given the foregoing, the prospective extradite thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or
she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.
An extraditee should not be deprived of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is
satisfactorily met. – The time-honored principle of pacta sunt survanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations
under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply with
these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does not
necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditee’s rights
to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by
international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right
to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be the
proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases –
the potential extradite must prove by “clear and convincing proof” that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the
orders and processes of the extradition court. – An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof
required in granting or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard
of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character, the standard of substantial
evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the
prospective extradite from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed “clear and convincing evidence” should be used
in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt
but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extradite must prove by “clear and convincing evidence” that
he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court. In this case, there is no
showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should
be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of “clear and
convincing evidence.”
Facts
In 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed an Agreement
for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons. It took effect in 1997. In 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the
Peoples Republic of China and became the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
Juan Antonio Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of accepting an
advantage as agent, in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He
also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong.
Warrants of arrest were issued against him.
The DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of Muoz. The
DOJ then forwarded the request to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which, in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila,
Branch 19 an application for the provisional arrest of Muoz. The RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest.
Hence, the NBI agents arrested and detained him.
Muoz filed with the CA a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for preliminary
mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus questioning the validity of the Order of Arrest. The CA declared the
Order of Arrest void.
The DOJ filed with the SC a petition for review on certiorari, praying that the Decision of the CA be reversed. The
SC rendered a Decision granting the petition of the DOJ and sustaining the validity of the Order of Arrest against Muoz.
Meanwhile, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the
extradition of private respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-95733, raffled off to Branch 10. Muoz filed, in the same
case,- a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner.
After hearing, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine
law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high flight risk. Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself
from further hearing Civil Case No. 99-95733. It was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge Olalio.
Muoz filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail. This was granted by Olalio
allowing private respondent to post bail subject to conditions.
Hence, this petition.
Issue
Whether the right to bail is applicable to extraditees
Held
Yes, the right to bail is applicable even to extraditees.
convincing evidence that he is not a flight risk.
However, an extraditee should prove in clear and
The constitutional right to bail flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not
be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the
presumption of innocence is not at issue.
The exercise of the States power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily limited to criminal
proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine, have likewise been
detained. To limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our jurisprudential history. Philippine
jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only. The Court has admitted to bail
persons who are not involved in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in
detention during the pendency of administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation of the Philippines
under international conventions to uphold human rights.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition
cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no
reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the innocence
or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.
Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the
various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under
these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty
of every individual is not impaired.
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A
potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding
state following the proceedings. Temporary detention may be a necessary step in the process of extradition, but the
length of time of the detention should be reasonable.
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision
prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution.
The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as that in criminal proceedings. In the
latter, the standard of due process is premised on the presumption of innocence of the accused. It is from this major
premise that the ancillary presumption in favor of admitting to bail arises. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition
proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the temporary detention is the possibility of flight
of the potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice. Given the
foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should
be granted bail.
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations under the
Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these
obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily
mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditees rights to life, liberty,
and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international
conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for
bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can neither
be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil
cases. While administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot
likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our
jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed
that a new standard which he termed clear and convincing evidence should be used in granting bail in extradition cases.
According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of
evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is not a flight risk and will abide
with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.
Culla
OKABE VS. GUTIERREZ
Same; Same; Same; Criminal Law; Right to be Informed; It is essential that the accused of be informed of
the facts that are imputed to him as “he is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the
offense.” – The noble object of written accusations cannot be over emphasized. This was explained in the US v. Karelsen:
“the object of this written accusations was – First. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against
him as will enable to make his defense; and second to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a
further prosecution of the same cause; and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether
they are sufficient in law to support a conviction if one should be had. In order that this requirement that may be satisfied,
facts must be stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent; there must be set forth in
the complaint with reasonable particularly of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances. In short, the
complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged.”
(Emphasis supplied) It is essential, therefore, that the accused be informed of the facts that are imputed to him, as “he is
presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The mere allegation in the amended information that the offense was
committed that the accused public officer in relation to his office is not sufficient – that phrase is merely a conclusion of
law, not a factual averment that would show the close intimacy between the offense charged and the discharge of the
accused’s official duties. – The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with such particularity as will reasonably
indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office was, sad to say, not
satisfied. We believe that the mere allegation in the amended information that the offense was committed by the accused
public officer in relation to his office is not sufficient. That phrase is merely as conclusion of law, not a factual averment
that would show the close intimacy that the offense charged and the discharge of the accused’s official duties.
Same; Same; Same; Same; What is controlling is the specific factual allegations in the information that would
indicate the close intimacy between the discharged of the accused’s official duties and the commission of the offense
charged, in order to qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to public office. – In the aforecited case of
People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy that the phrase “committed in relation to public office” does not appear in the
information, which only signifies that the said phrase is not what determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. What is
controlling is the specific factual allegations in the information that would indicate the close intimacy between the
discharge of the accused’s official duties and the commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify the crime as
having been committed in relation to public office.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Where there is failure to show in the informations that the charge of murder was
intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused Philippine National Police officers, the offense
charged is plain murder and, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. – Consequently, for
failure to show in the amended informations that the charged of murder was intimately connected with the discharge
officials functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and,
therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan.
Facts
Cecilia Maruyama filed a case, charging Lorna Tanghal and petitioner Teresita Tanghal Okabe, a.k.a. Shiela
Okabe, with estafa.
The trial court issued a warrant for the arrest of the petitioner with a recommended bond of P40,000. On June 15,
2000, the petitioner posted a personal bail bond in the said amount, duly approved by Judge Demetrio B. Macapagal, the
Presiding Judge of Branch 79 of the RTC of Quezon City, who forthwith recalled the said warrant. The approved personal
bail bond of the petitioner was transmitted to the RTC of Pasig.
Upon her request, the petitioner was furnished with a certified copy of the Information, the resolution and the
criminal complaint which formed part of the records of the said case. The petitioner left the Philippines for Japan on June
17, 2000 without the trial courts permission, and returned to the Philippines on June 28, 2000. She left the Philippines
anew on July 1, 2000, and returned on July 12, 2000.
Private prosecutor filed an urgent ex parte motion for the issuance of the hold departure order.
Petitioner filed a manifestation objecting to her arraignment prior to the resolution of her pending motions. She
alleged that her arraignment for the crime charged should not be made a condition for the granting of her motion to recall
the hold departure order issued against her.
Petitioner filed a motion for the postponement of her arraignment alleging that, in case the trial court ruled adversely
thereon, she would refuse to enter a plea and seek relief from the appellate court.
The court denied the petitioners motions on the following grounds:
“(b) When the petitioner posted a personal bail bond for her provisional liberty, she thereby waived her right to
question the courts finding of the existence of probable cause for her arrest and submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the
court, more so when she filed the motion for the lifting of the hold departure order the court issued, and the motion to
defer the proceedings and her arraignment;”
Petitioner then filed a petition asserting that:
“THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MADE A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT COMPLETELY
DISREGARDED THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 26, RULE 114 OF THE REVISED RULES ON CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE WHICH TOOK EFFECT ON 01 DECEMBER 2000 WHICH IS FAVORABLE TO THE
PETITIONER/ACCUSED.”
By way of comment, the SolGen refuted that:
“The Court of Appeals did not commit a reversible error in ruling that the infirmity, if any, in the issuance by
the respondent Judge of the warrant of arrest against petitioner was cured when petitioner voluntarily submitted to
the trial courts jurisdiction when she posted bail and filed motions seeking for affirmative reliefs from the trial court,
such as the motion to lift/recall Hold Departure Order (HDO) and to allow petitioner to travel regularly to Japan.”
Issue
Whether the CA committed a reversible error in not applying Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure?
Held
YES, the court agrees with the contention of the petitioner.
The law provides:
SEC. 26. Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or irregular preliminary investigation. - An
application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the validity of his arrest or the
legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a
preliminary investigation of the charge against him, provided that he raises them before entering his plea. The
court shall resolve the matter as early as practicable but not later than the start of the trial of the case.
It bears stressing that Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure is a new one, intended to
modify previous rulings of this Court that an application for bail or the admission to bail by the accused shall be
considered as a waiver of his right to assail the warrant issued for his arrest on the legalities or irregularities thereon.
The new rule is curative in nature because precisely, it was designed to supply defects and curb evils in procedural
rules. Hence, the rules governing curative statutes are applicable. Curative statutes are by their essence retroactive in
application.
Moreover, considering the conduct of the petitioner after posting her personal bail bond, it cannot be
argued that she waived her right to question the finding of probable cause and to assail the warrant of arrest issued
against her by the respondent judge. There must be clear and convincing proof that the petitioner had an actual
intention to relinquish her right to question the existence of probable cause. When the only proof of intention rests
on what a party does, his act should be so manifestly consistent with, and indicative of, an intent to voluntarily and
unequivocally relinquish the particular right that no other explanation of his conduct is possible.
Thus, the posting of a personal bail bond was a matter of imperative necessity to avert her incarceration;
it should not be deemed as a waiver of her right to assail her arrest. So this Court ruled in People v. Red:
In view of these circumstances and the number of the accused, it may properly be held that the furnishing of the
bond was prompted by the sheer necessity of not remaining in detention, and in no way implied their waiver of any right,
such as the summary examination of the case before their detention. That they had no intention of waiving this right is
clear from their motion of January 23, 1929, the same day on which they furnished a bond, and the fact that they renewed
this petition on February 23, 1929, praying for the stay of their arrest for lack of the summary examination;
AU
LEVISTE vs. CA
615 SCRA 619
Criminal Procedure; Bail; Bail acts as reconciling mechanism to accommodate both accused’s interest in pretrial liberty
and society’s interesting assuring the accused’s presence at trial.
Bail, the security given by an accused who is in the custody of the law for his release to guarantee his
appearance before any court as may be required,1 is the answer of the criminal justice system to a vexing question: what
is to be done with the accused, whose guilt has not yet been proven, in the "dubious interval," often years long, between
arrest and final adjudication?2 Bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accused’s interest in
pretrial liberty and society’s interest in assuring the accused’s presence at trial.
Same; Same; An erroneously convicted accused who is denied bail loses his liberty to pay debt to society he has never
owed; Under what circumstances an accused may obtain bail pending appeal is a delicate balance between the interests
of society and those of the accused; In the exercise of discretion in the grant of bail pending appeal, the proper courts are
to be guided by the fundamental principle that the allowance of bail pending appeal be exercised not with laxity but with
grave caution and only for strong reasons, considering that the accused has been in fact convicted by the trial court.
Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, the accused who has been sentenced to prison must typically begin serving time immediately unless, on
application, he is admitted to bail. An accused not released on bail is incarcerated before an appellate court confirms that
his conviction is legal and proper. An erroneously convicted accused who is denied bail loses his liberty to pay a debt to
society he has never owed. Even if the conviction is subsequently affirmed, however, the accused’s interest in bail
pending appeal includes freedom pending judicial review, opportunity to efficiently prepare his case and avoidance of
potential hardships of prison. On the other hand, society has a compelling interest in protecting itself by swiftly
incarcerating an individual who is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a crime serious enough to warrant prison time.
Other recognized societal interests in the denial of bail pending appeal include the prevention of the accused’s flight from
court custody, the protection of the community from potential danger and the avoidance of delay in punishment. Under
what circumstances an accused may obtain bail pending appeal, then, is a delicate balance between the interests of
society and those of the accused. Our rules authorize the proper courts to exercise discretion in the grant of bail pending
appeal to those convicted by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. In the exercise of that discretion, the proper courts are to be guided by the fundamental principle that the
allowance of bail pending appeal should be exercised not with laxity but with grave caution and only for strong reasons,
considering that the accused has been in fact convicted by the trial court.
Same; Same; Penalties; The third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where the penalty imposed
on the appellant applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding 6 years – the first scenario deals with the circumstances
enumerated in the said paragraph, and the second scenario contemplates the existence of at least one of the said
circumstances.
The third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where the penalty imposed on the appellant
applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding 6 years. The first scenario deals with the circumstances enumerated in the
said paragraph (namely, recidivism, quasi-recidivism, or habitual delinquency, or commission of the crime aggravated by
the circumstance of reiteration; previous escape from legal confinement, evasion of sentence or has violated the
conditions of his bail without valid justification; commission of the offense while on probation, parole, under conditional
pardon; circumstances indicating the probability of flight if released on bail; or undue risk of committing the crime during
the pendency of the appeal, other similar circumstances). The second scenario contemplates the existence of at least one
of the said circumstances. The implications of this distinction are discussed with erudition and clarity in the commentary of
retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an authority in remedial law: Under present revised Rule114, the
availability of bail to an accused may be summarized in the following rules: x x x x x x x x x x e. After conviction by the
RTC wherein the penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years but no more than 20 years is imprisoned, and not on of the
circumstances is present and proved, bail is a matter of discretion (Sec. 5); f. After conviction by the RTC imposing a
penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more that 20 years, and any of the circumstances stated in Ec. 5 or
any other similar circumstances is present and proved, no bail shall be granted by said court (Sec. 5); x x x.
Facts
Jose Leviste (petitioner) was charged with Murder for the death of Rafael de las Alas. He was convicted by the
RTC of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and
one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
He appealed his conviction to the CA. Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for admission to bail pending
appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his
part.
CA denied petitioner’s application for bail. It invoked the bedrock principle in the matter of bail pending appeal,
that the discretion to extend bail during the course of appeal should be exercised with grave caution and only for strong
reasons. Also, the CA made a preliminary evaluation of petitioner’s case and made a prima facie determination that there
was no reason substantial enough to overturn the evidence of petitioner’s guilt. Thus, petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied.
Issue
WON the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail should automatically be granted
absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.
Held
NO. The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where the penalty imposed on the
appellant applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding six years. The first scenario deals with the circumstances
enumerated in the said paragraph (namely, recidivism, quasi-recidivism, habitual delinquency or commission of the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; previous escape from legal confinement, evasion of sentence or violation of
the conditions of his bail without a valid justification; commission of the offense while under probation, parole or
conditional pardon; circumstances indicating the probability of flight if released on bail; undue risk of committing another
crime during the pendency of the appeal; or other similar circumstances) not present. The second scenario contemplates
the existence of at least one of the said circumstances.
In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This means that, if none of the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate court has the discretion to grant or deny
bail. An application for bail pending appeal may be denied even if the bail-negating circumstances in the third paragraph
of Section 5, Rule 114 are absent. In other words, the appellate courts denial of bail pending appeal where none of the
said circumstances exists does not, by and of itself, constitute abuse of discretion.
On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court exercises a more stringent discretion, that is, to
carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated circumstances in fact exists. If it so determines, it has no other option
except to deny or revoke bail pending appeal. Conversely, if the appellate court grants bail pending appeal, grave abuse
of discretion will thereby be committed.
Petitioner disregards the fine yet substantial distinction between the two different situations that are governed by
the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114. Instead, petitioner insists on a simplistic treatment that unduly dilutes the
import of the said provision and trivializes the established policy governing the grant of bail pending appeal.
In particular, a careful reading of petitioners arguments reveals that it interprets the third paragraph of Section 5,
Rule 114 to cover all situations where the penalty imposed by the trial court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding
six years. For petitioner, in such a situation, the grant of bail pending appeal is always subject to limited discretion, that is,
one restricted to the determination of whether any of the five bail-negating circumstances exists. The implication of this
position is that, if any such circumstance is present, then bail will be denied. Otherwise, bail will be granted pending
appeal.
Petitioners theory therefore reduces the appellate court into a mere fact-finding body whose authority is limited to
determining whether any of the five circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 exists. This
unduly constricts its discretion into merely filling out the checklist of circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5,
Rule 114 in all instances where the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court on the appellant is imprisonment
exceeding six years. In short, petitioners interpretation severely curbs the discretion of the appellate court by requiring it to
determine a singular factual issue whether any of the five bail-negating circumstances is present.
Dequiña
JUAN PONCE ENRILE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 213847
August 18, 2015
Facts
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several others with plunder in the
Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of appropriations under the
Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF).
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several others with plunder in the
Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of appropriations under the
Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF).
On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its resolution denying Enrile’s motion, particularly on the matter of
bail, on the ground of its prematurity considering that Enrile had not yet then voluntarily surrendered or been placed under
the custody of the law.
On the same day that the warrant for his arrest was issued, Enrile voluntarily surrendered to Director Benjamin
Magalong of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) in Camp Crame,
Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital , and his Motion to Fix Bail both dated July 7,
2014, which were heard by the Sandiganbayan on July 8, 2014.
Enrile argued that he should be allowed to post bail because:
(a) the Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his guilt was strong;
(b) although he was charged with plunder, the penalty as to him would only be reclusion temporal , not reclusion perpetua
; and
(c) he was not a flight risk, and his age and physical condition must further be seriously considered.
Sandiganbayan issued its first assailed resolution denying Enrile’s Motion
Issue
Determination of bail as matter of right on the ground that the Petitioner- Senator may be deemed to fall within the
exception only upon concurrence of two (2) circumstances: (i) where the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua, and
(ii) when evidence of guilt is strong which the prosecution fails to establish.
Held
Bail protects the right of the accused to due process and to be presumed innocent
The presumption of innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due process. The purpose of bail is to guarantee the
appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the trial court. Thus, bail acts as a reconciling
mechanism to accommodate both the accused’s interest in his provisional liberty before or during the trial, and the
society’s interest in assuring the accused’s presence at trial.
Bail may be granted as a matter of right or of discretion
Section 7, Rule 114 provides Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
not bailable. — No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution.A capital offense in the context of the rule refers to an offense that, under the law existing at the time of its
commission and the application for admission to bail, may be punished with death.
In all criminal cases within the jurisdiction of MTC or MCTC bail is a matter of right since these courts has no
jurisdiction to try cases with capital offenses or offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment .
However in RTC it is only a matter of right prior to conviction for any offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua , or life imprisonment, or even prior to conviction for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua , or life
imprisonment when evidence of guilt is not strong.
It becomes discretionary for RTC when the following circumstances are attendant
1. upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment;
2.
if the RTC has imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six years, provided none of the
circumstances enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, as follows:
i.
That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
ii.
That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without valid justification
iii.
That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
iv.
That the circumstances of hi s case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail
v.
That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the
appeal.
Admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua is subject to judicial
discretion.
In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to comply with the guidelines outlined in Cortes v.
Catral,
i.
In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the
hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended);
ii.
Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of
whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the
accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion;
(Section 7 and 8, supra)
iii.
Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution;
iv.
If the guilt of the accused is no t strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bailbond
RULE 115 – Rights of the Accused
Distinguish the constitutional from statutory rights of the accused
1. Presumption of Innocence, Del Castillo vs. People, 664 SCRA
2. Right to be Heard, Miguel vs. Sandiganbayan, 675 SCRA
3. Right to Counsel, People vs. Lara, 678 SCRA; People vs. Espiritu, 302 SCRA
4. Right Against Self-Incrimination, People vs. Ayson, 175 SCRA 216
5. Right to Speedy, Impartial and Public Trial, Villaruel vs. People 664 SCRA
Presumption of Innocence
Bartolazo
DEL CASTILLO vs. PEOPLE
664 SCRA
Criminal Procedure; Constitutional Law; Searches and Seizures; Search Warrants; Requisites for the Issuance of a
Search Warrant.—The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such
probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or
affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the
facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be
seized.
Same; Probable Cause; Words and Phrases; Defined.—Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed
and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. A finding of probable
cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was
committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than bare suspicion; it requires less than evidence which
would justify conviction. The judge, in determining probable cause, is to consider the totality of the circumstances made
known to him and not by a fixed and rigid formula, and must employ a flexible, totality of the circumstances standard. The
existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination. This Court,
therefore, is in no position to disturb the factual findings of the judge which led to the issuance of the search warrant. A
magistrate’s determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing
court, as long as there was substantial basis for that determination. Substantial basis means that the questions of the
examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed, and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the
place sought to be searched. A review of the records shows that in the present case, a substantial basis exists.
Same; Constitutional Law; Search Warrants; The warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and
persons or things to be seized in order for it to be valid.—The warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be
searched and persons or things to be seized in order for it to be valid. A designation or description that points out the
place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the
constitutional requirement of definiteness. In the present case, Search Warrant No. 570-9-1197-24 specifically designates
or describes the residence of the petitioner as the place to be searched. Incidentally, the items were seized by a barangay
tanod in a nipa hut, 20 meters away from the residence of the petitioner. The confiscated items, having been found in a
place other than the one described in the search warrant, can be considered as fruits of an invalid warrantless search, the
presentation of which as an evidence is a violation of petitioner’s constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches
and seizure. The OSG argues that, assuming that the items seized were found in another place not designated in the
search warrant, the same items should still be admissible as evidence because the one who discovered them was
a barangay tanod who is a private individual, the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure
being applicable only against government authorities. The contention is devoid of merit.
Same; Same; Administrative Law; Agents of Persons in Authority; Barangay Tanods; The Local Government Code
contains a provision which describes the function of a barangay tanod as an agent of persons in authority.—Having been
established that the assistance of the barangay tanods was sought by the police authorities who effected the searched
warrant, the same barangay tanods therefore acted as agents of persons in authority. Article 152 of the Revised Penal
Code defines persons in authority and agents of persons in authority as: x x x any person directly vested with jurisdiction,
whether as an individual or as a member of some court or governmental corporation, board or commission, shall be
deemed a person in authority. A barangay captain and a barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person in authority.
A person who, by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by competent authority, is charged with the
maintenance of public order and the protection and security of life and property, such as barrio councilman, barrio
policeman and barangay leader, and any person who comes to the aid of persons in authority, shall be deemed an agent
of a person in authority. The Local Government Code also contains a provision which describes the function of
a barangay tanod as an agent of persons in authority
Criminal Procedure; Constitutional Law; Searches and Seizures; While it is not necessary that the property to be searched
or seized should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is issued, there must be sufficient showing
that the property is under appellant’s control or possession.—While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or
seized should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is issued, there must be sufficient showing that
the property is under appellant’s control or possession. The CA, in its Decision, referred to the possession of regulated
drugs by the petitioner as a constructive one. Constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and
control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found. The
records are void of any evidence to show that petitioner owns the nipa hut in question nor was it established that he used
the said structure as a shop. The RTC, as well as the CA, merely presumed that petitioner used the said structure due to
the presence of electrical materials, the petitioner being an electrician by profession.
Same; Same; Presumption of Innocence; Evidence; Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt; The accused, in all criminal
prosecutions, is presumed innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt.—In
considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with the law’s own starting perspective on the status of the accused—in all
criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would convince and
satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment, is indispensable to overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence.
Facts
Pursuant to a confidential information that Del Castillo was engaged in selling shabu, the police officers
conducted surveillance and test buy operation at the house of Del Castillo. The authorities later secured search warrant
from RTC. Upon arrival, somebody shouted “raid” which prompted them to immediately disembark the jeep and went
directly to the house of Del Castillo. The said house is two-storey house and Del Castillo was staying in the second floor.
When they went upstair the police operatives informed the wife of Del Castillo that they will implement the search warrant.
However, before they can search the area, Del Castillo runs towards a nipa hut in front of his house. The police chased
him but fail, because they were not familiar with the entrance and exit of the place. They all went back to the house of Del
Castillo, and searched the area in the presence of a barangay tanod and the elder sister of Del Castillo. They have not
found anything in the house however one barangay tanod was able to confiscate from nipa hut several plastic packs
contacting crystalline substance which was later positive for shabu.
Issue
Whether there is a violation of petitioner’s constitutional rights against unreasonable search and presumption of
innocence.
Held
The search warrant specifically designates the residence of Del Castillo as the place to be searched. Incidentally,
the items were seized by a barangay tanod in a nipa hut 20 meters away from the residence of the petitioner. The
confiscated items, having found in a place other than the one described in the search warrant, can be considered fruits of
an invalid warrantless search, and the presentation of which as an evidence is a violation of constitutional rights of Del
Castillo against unreasonable searched and seizure.
While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned by the person against whom
the search warrant is issued, there must be sufficient showing that the property is under appellant’s control or possession.
The CA, in its Decision, referred to the possession of regulated drugs by the petitioner as a constructive one. Constructive
possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise
dominion and control over the place where it is found. The records are void of any evidence to show that petitioner owns
the nipa hut in question nor was it established that he used the said structure as a shop. The RTC, as well as the CA,
merely presumed that petitioner used the said structure due to the presence of electrical materials, the petitioner being an
electrician by profession.
In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with the law’s own starting perspective on the status of the
accused—in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary is proven beyond
reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty that
would convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment, is indispensable to overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence.
Right to be Heard
Desengano
MIGUEL v. SANDIGANBAYAN
675 SCRA
Same; Pre-Suspension Hearing; While a pre-suspension hearing is aimed at securing for the accused fair and
adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of the information or the regularity of the proceedings against him,
no hard and fast rule exists in regulating its conduct.-While a pre-suspension hearing is aimed at securing for the
accused fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of the information or the regularity of the proceedings
against him, Luciano likewise emphasizes that no hard and fast rule exists in regulating its conduct. With the purpose of a
pre-suspension hearing in mind, the absence of an actual hearing alone cannot be determinative of the validity of a
suspension order.
Same; Right to be heard; It is well settled that "to be heard" does not only mean oral arguments in court; one
may be heard also through pleadings.-Since a pre-suspension hearing is basically a due process requirement, when
an accused public official is given an adequate opportunity to be heard on his possible defenses against mandatory
suspension under R.A. No. 3019, then an accused would have no reason to complain that no actual hearing was
conducted. It is well settled that "to be heard" does not only mean oral arguments in court; one may be heard also through
pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, has been accorded, no denial of
procedural due process exists.
Facts
On year 1996, a letter-complaint was filed before the Ombudsman-Mindanao charging herein petitioner Fernando
Miguel with violation of the Anti-graft and corrupt practices act. The ombudsman found probable cause against petitioner
for violation of the anti-graft and corrupt practices act and Art. 171, par. 4 of the RPC. After the filing of the information
before the Sandiganbayan the petitioner moved for reinvestigation which was granted by the Sandiganbayan and gave
petitioner 10 days to file his counter-affidavit with the OSP. However, intead of submiting his counter-affidavit asked the
Sandiganbayan for a 30 days extension and before the the expiry date, petitioner asked the OSP for another 30 days
extension. Despite the two extension asked and granted, petitioner asked again for another 20 days extension but failed
to submit a counter-affidavit prompting the fiscal to declare him to have waived his right to submit countervailing evidence.
Arraigned was then conducted in whic the petitioner pleaded not guilty, Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) then filed a
motion to suspend petitioner Pendente Lite which was assailed by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration contending that his right to an actual hearing was violated but was denied, he then filed a certiorari before
the Supreme Court.
Issue
Whether or not pre-suspension order is valid even without actual hearing?
Held
Yes. The pre-suspension is valid. There is no specific rules laid down for a pre-suspension hearing. it is sufficient that
the accused was given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of the criminal proceedings againsthim.
Since apre-suspension hearing is basically a due process requirement, when an accused public official is given an
adequate opportunity to be heard on his possible defenses then the accused would have no reason to complain that no
actual hearing was conducted. It is well settled that to be heared does not only mean oral arguments in courts; one may
be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings has been
accorded, no denial of procedural due process exist. Here, petitioner was given several extensions to file his counter
affidavit yet still failed to submit the same, he was then given the opportunity to be heard but have waived it.
Right to Counsel
Briñez
PEOPLE OF THE PHIPPINES vs. ARTURO LARA y ORBISTA
G.R. No. 199877 August 13, 2012
Criminal Procedure; Courts; Jurisdiction; Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be acquired through compulsory
process such as a warrant of arrest or through his voluntary appearance, such as when he surrenders to the police or to
the court. Any objection to the arrest or acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he
enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived.- Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be acquired
through compulsory process such as a warrant of arrest or through his voluntary appearance, such as when he
surrenders to the police or to the court. Any objection to the arrest or acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the
accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. An accused submits to the
jurisdiction of the trial court upon entering a plea and participating actively in the trial and this precludes him invoking any
irregularities that may have attended his arrest. Furthermore, the illegal arrest of an accused is not a sufficient ground to
reverse and set aside a conviction that was arrived upon a complaint duly filed and a trial conducted without error.
Facts
Lara is charged with robbery with homicide filed in the RTC. The ground of the charge was for the robbery from
an accounting staff of San Sebastian Allied Services, Enrique Sumulong, and the killing of Joselito M. Bautista whilst
doing the robbery.
On May 31, 2001 at around 9 am, Sumulong withdrew 230K from Metrobank-Mabini Branch, Pasig City to defray
the salaries of employees of San Sebastian. Going to the bank, he rode a pick-up accompanied by Virgilio Manacob, Jeff
Atie and Joselito Baustista. Upon withdrawal, he put the money in a black bag and immediately left. At around 10:30 am,
in an intersection Lara appeared at the front of the passenger side and pointed a gun to Sumulong asking him to give him
the money. Baustista at the back said not to and Sumulong threw the bag at Bautista’s direction. Bautista went out with
the bag, Lara followed. Sumulong went towards Mercedez Plaza and called up the office of San Sebastian to relay the
accident. When he went back, he saw blood on the ground. The bystanders said that Bautista was shot and the bag was
taken from him. While on his way to San Miguel, Pasig City, he saw Lara walking and alerted the police and thereafter he
was arrested. Atie and Manacob testified against Lara.
On Lara’s defense, on May 31, 2001, he was at his house digging a sewer trench while his brother was working
on constructing a comfort room. They worked from 8am until 9am. At around June 7, 2001, while he was at his cousin’s,
police officers arrived, ask and confirmed that he is Arturo Lara. The police asked him to come with them to the barangay
hall. He was brought to the police station instead of the barangay hall where he was investigated for robbery with
homicide. He told the police that he was at home when the subject took place. His statement was challenged and was
asked to produce witnesses. The police told Sumulong and Atie to point on Lara so they can go home already. Witnesses
arrived the next day and Lara was told that he will be subjected to inquest.
In the RTC, Lara was convicted. He appealed to CA but the latter affirmed his conviction.
Issue
WON the identification made by Sumulong, Atie, and Manacob in the police line-up is inadmissible
because Lara stood there in without the assistance of counsel
Held
NO. When he was placed in a police line-up did not validate the proceedings leading to his conviction. That he
stood at the police line-up without the assistance of counsel did not render Sumulong’s identification of Lara inadmissible.
The right to counsel is deemed to have arisen at the precise moment custodial investigation begins and being made to
stand in a police line-up is not the starting point or a part of custodial investigation. As the court previously ruled in People
v. Amestuzo:
The guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution or the so-called Miranda Rights, may be invoked
only by a person while he is under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation starts when the police investigation is no
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has began to focus on particular suspect taken into custody by the
police who starts the interrogation and propounds questions to the person to elicit incriminating statements. Police line-up
is not part of the custodial investigation; hence the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked
at this stage.
Right Against Self-Incrimination
Dizon
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE RUBEN AYSON, Presiding over Branch 6, Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Baguio City,
and FELIPE RAMOS, respondents.
G.R. No. 85215 July 7, 1989
Constitutional Law; Bill of Rights; 2 sets of Rights under Sec. 20, Art. IV of 1873 Constitution. –
It should at once be apparent that there are two (2) rights, or sets of rights, dealt with in the section, namely: 1)
the right against self-incrimination — i.e., the right of a person not to be compelled to be a witness against himself — set
out in the first sentence, which is a verbatim reproduction of Section 18, Article III of the 1935 Constitution, and is similar
to that accorded by the Fifth Amendment of the American Constitution, and 2) the rights of a person in custodial
interrogation, i.e., the rights of every suspect "under investigation for the commission of an offense."
Same; Same; Same; Right against self-incrimination; Rights in custodial interrogation; The 1987 Constitution more clearly
indicates the disparateness of these rights. –
Parenthetically, the 1987 Constitution indicates much more clearly the individuality and disparateness of these
rights. It has placed the rights in separate sections. The right against self- incrimination, "No person shall be compelled to
be a witness against himself," is now embodied in Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The lights of a person in
custodial interrogation, which have been made more explicit, are now contained in Section 12 of the same Article III.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Subpoena; Meaning of rights against self-incrimination. –
The first right, against self-incrimination, mentioned in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, is accorded
to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or
administrative proceeding. The right is NOT to "be compelled to be a witness against himself." The precept set out in that
first sentence has a settled meaning. It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a
prohibition of inquiry." It simply secures to a witness, whether he be a party or not, the right to refue to answer any
particular incriminatory question, i.e., one the answer to which has a tendency to incriminate him for some crime.
However, the right can be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the
witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to
appear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. The witness receiving a subpoena must
obey it, appear as required, take the stand, be sworn and answer questions. It is only when a particular question is
addressed to him, the answer to which may incriminate him for some offense, that he may refuse to answer on the
strength of the constitutional guaranty.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Nature of rights against self-incrimination; Must be claimed by or in behalf of the witness. –
The right against self-incrimination is not self- executing or automatically operational. It must be claimed. If not
claimed by or in behalf of the witness, the protection does not come into play. It follows that the right may be waived,
expressly, or impliedly, as by a failure to claim it at the appropriate time.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Right in custodial investigation; Miranda Rule summarized the procedural safeguards laid
down for a person “in-custody interrogation”, Objective of. –
In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren summarized the procedural safeguards laid down for a person in police custody,
"in-custody interrogation" being regarded as the commencement of an adversary proceeding against the suspect. He
must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against
him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will
be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise those rights must be afforded to him
throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been given, such opportunity afforded him, the individual may
knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a statement. But unless and until such
warnings and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation
can be used against him. The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated
atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statement without full warnings of constitutional rights."
Same; Same; Same; Same; Custodial interrogation, meaning of. –
The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in "custodial interrogations," or "in-custody interrogation of
accused persons." And, as this Court has already stated, by custodial interrogation is meant "questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way." The situation contemplated has also been more precisely described by this Court." x x After a person is
arrested and his custodial investigation begins a confrontation arises which at best may be tanned unequal. The detainee
is brought to an army camp or police headquarters and there questioned and "cross-examined" not only by one but as
many investigators as may be necessary to break down his morale. He finds himself in strange and unfamiliar
surroundings, and every person he meets he considers hostile to him. The investigators are well-trained and seasoned in
their work. They employ all the methods and means that experience and study have taught them to extract the truth, or
what may pass for it, out of the detainee. Most detainees are unlettered and are not aware of their constitutional rights.
And even if they were, the intimidating and coercive presence of the officers of the law in such an atmosphere
overwhelms them into silence. Section 20 of the Bill of Rights seeks to remedy this imbalance.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A defendant on trial or under preliminary investigation is not under custodial interrogation. –
It seems quite evident that a defendant on trial or under preliminary investigation is not under custodial
interrogation. His interrogation by the police, if any there had been would already have been ended at the time of the filing
of the criminal case in court (or the public prosecutors' office). Hence, with respect to a defendant in a criminal case
already pending in court (or the public prosecutor's office), there is no occasion to speak of his right while under "custodial
interrogation" laid down by the second and subsequent sentences of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, for
the obvious reason that he is no longer under "custodial interrogation."
Same; Same; Same; Same; Right of an accused in court or undergoing preliminary investigation before the public
prosecutor. –
But unquestionably, the accused in court (or undergoing preliminary investigation before the public prosecutor), in
common with all other persons, possesses the right against self- incrimination set out in the first sentence of Section 20
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, i.e., the right to refuse to answer a specific incriminatory question at the time that it is
put to him. Additionally, the accused in a criminal case in court has other rights in the matter of giving testimony or
refusing to do so. An accused "occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness." Under the Rules of Court,
in all criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled among others–1) to be exempt from being a witness against
himself, and 2) to testify as witness in his own behalf; but if he offers himself as a witness he may be cross-examined as
any other witness; however, his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in any manner prejudice or be used against
him.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Witnesses; Accused cannot be compelled to testify or produce evidence in the criminal case
against him. –
The right of the defendant in a criminal case "to be exempt from being a witness against himself' signifies that he
cannot be compelled to testify or produce evidence in the criminal case in which he is the accused, or one of the accused.
He cannot be compelled to do so even by subpoena or other process or order of the Court. He cannot be required to be a
witness either for the prosecution, or for a co-accused, or even for himself. In other words — unlike an ordinary witness
(or a party in a civil action) who may be compelled to testify by subpoena, having only the right to refuse to answer a
particular incriminatory question at the time it is put to him-the defendant in a criminal action can refuse to testify
altogether. He can refuse to take the witness stand, be sworn, answer any question. And, as the law categorically states,
"his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in any manner prejudice or be used against him."
Same; Same; Same; Same; Rights of a person suspected of having committed a crime and subsequently charged with its
commission in court. –
In fine, a person suspected of having committed a crime and subsequently charged with its commission in court,
has the following rights in the matter of his testifying or producing evidence, to wit: 1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN
COURT (or with the public prosecutor, for preliminary investigation), but after having been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his liberty in some significant way, and on being interrogated by the police: the continuing right to remain silent
and to counsel, and to be informed thereof, not to be subjected to force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means
which vitiates the free will; and to have evidence obtained in violation of these rights rejected; and 2) AFTER THE CASE
IS FILED IN COURT — a) to refuse to be a witness; b) not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such
refusal; c) to testify in his own behalf, subject to cross-examination by the prosecution; d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse
to answer a specific question which tends to incriminate him for some crime other than that for which he is then
prosecuted.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Judges; Respondent judge misapprehended the nature and import of the disparate rights set
forth in Sec. 20, Art. IV of the 1973 Constitution; Case at bar. –
It should by now be abundantly apparent that respondent Judge has misapprehended the nature and import of
the disparate rights set forth in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. He has taken them as applying to the same
juridical situation, equating one with the other. In so doing, he has grossly erred. To be sure, His Honor sought to
substantiate his thesis by arguments he took to be cogent and logical. The thesis was however so far divorced from the
actual and correct state of the constitutional and legal principles involved as to make application of said thesis to the case
before him tantamount to totally unfounded, whimsical or capricious exercise of power. His Orders were thus rendered
with grave abuse of discretion. They should be as they are hereby, annulled and set aside.
Facts
Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines and was allegedly involved in irregularities in the
sales of plane tickets. The PAL management notified him of an investigation to be conducted. That investigation was
scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by
it with the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained.
A handwritten notes was sent by Ramos stating his willingness to settle the irregularities. The findings of the Audit
team were given to him, and he refuted that he misused proceeds of tickets also stating that he was prevented from
settling said amounts. He proffered a compromise however this did not ensue.
Two months after a crime of estafa was charged against Ramos. On arraignment on this charge, Ramos pleaded
not guilty. Evidence by the prosecution contained Ramos’ written admission and statement, to which defendants argued
that the confession was taken without the accused being represented by a lawyer. Respondent Judge did not admit those
stating that accused was not reminded of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel. A motion for
reconsideration filed by the prosecutors was denied.
Issue
Whether or not the respondent judge is correct that the admission and statement of Ramos is inadmissible
evidence against him.
Held
No. The judge should admit the evidence in court as the accused was not under custodial investigation when his
statements were taken.
It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that Felipe Ramos was not in any sense under custodial
interrogation, as the term should be properly understood, prior to and during the administrative inquiry into the discovered
irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to have had a hand. The constitutional rights of a person under custodial
interrogation under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution did not therefore come into play, were of no relevance
to the inquiry. It is also clear, too, that Ramos had voluntarily answered questions posed to him on the first day of the
administrative investigation, February 9, 1986 and agreed that the proceedings should be recorded, the record having
thereafter been marked during the trial of the criminal action subsequently filed against him as Exhibit A, just as it is
obvious that the note (later marked as Exhibit K) that he sent to his superiors on February 8,1986, the day before the
investigation, offering to compromise his liability in the alleged irregularities, was a free and even spontaneous act on his
part. They may not be excluded on the ground that the so-called "Miranda rights" had not been accorded to Ramos.
Of course the possibility cannot be discounted that in certain instances the judge's expressed apprehensions may
be realized, that violence or intimidation, undue pressure or influence be brought to bear on an employee under
investigation — or for that matter, on a person being interrogated by another whom he has supposedly offended. In such
an event, any admission or confession wrung from the person under interrogation would be inadmissible in evidence, on
proof of the vice or defect vitiating consent, not because of a violation of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution,
but simply on the general, incontestable proposition that involuntary or coerced statements may not in justice be received
against the makers thereof, and really should not be accorded any evidentiary value at all.
Right to Speedy, Impartial and Public Trial
Corpuz
ARTEMIO VILLAREAL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 151258
The right of the accused to a speedy trial has been enshrined in Sections 14 (2) and 16, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. This right requires that there be a trial free from vexatious, capricious or oppressive delays. The right is
deemed violated when the proceeding is attended with unjustified postponements of trial, or when a long period of time is
allowed to elapse without the case being tried and for no cause or justifiable motive. In determining the right of the
accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the
scheduled hearings of the case. The conduct of both the prosecution and the defense must be weighed. Also to be
considered are factors such as the length of delay, the assertion or non-assertion of the right, and the prejudice wrought
upon the defendant.
Facts
Seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law signified their intention to join the
Aquila Fraternity. The neophytes were briefed what to expect during the initiation rites. The latter were informed that there
would be physical beatings, and that they could quit at any time. The neophytes were then subjected to traditional forms
of Aquilan initiation rites. The neophytes were also indoctrinated with the fraternity principles. They survived their first day
of initiation, and also the morning of their second day. Late in the afternoon, the Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper
and proceeded to torment them physically and psychologically. The neophytes were subjected to the same manner of
hazing that they endured on the first day of initiation. After a few hours, the initiation for the day officially ended. After a
while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation
rites initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity
member then subjected the neophytes to paddling and to additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny received several
paddle blows, one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. After their last session of physical beatings,
Lenny could no longer walk. After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lenny's shivering and
incoherent mumblings. When they realized, though, that Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started
helping him. They removed his clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his condition
worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival.
Issue
Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
dismissed the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano for violation of the right of the accused to speedy trial.
Held
No. The right of the accused to a speedy trial has been enshrined in Sections 14 (2) and 16, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. This right requires that there be a trial free from vexatious, capricious or oppressive delays. The right is
deemed violated when the proceeding is attended with unjustified postponements of trial, or when a long period of time is
allowed to elapse without the case being tried and for no cause or justifiable motive. In determining the right of the
accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the
scheduled hearings of the case. The conduct of both the prosecution and the defense must be weighed. Also to be
considered are factors such as the length of delay, the assertion or non-assertion of the right, and the prejudice wrought
upon the defendant.
An examination of the procedural history of this case would reveal that the several factors contributed to the slow
progress of the proceedings in the case like the fact that the records of the case were elevated to the Court of Appeals
and the prosecution's failure to comply with the order of the court a quo requiring them to secure certified true copies of
the same.
RULE 116 – Arraignment and Plea
A. What is arraignment
How; When, Where, Why
B. Kinds of Plea:
(a) conditional
(b) unconditional
(c) negative/indirect (refusal to plead)
(d) inverted (pleads guilty with exculpatory evidence)
(e) improvident plea (not knowing fully well)
C. Plea of guilty to a capital offense vs. non-capital offense
- requirements
D. Presentation or Inspection of evidence in prosecution’s possession
- modes of discovery (Rules 23-29)
E. Suspension of arraignment
a) when suffering from unsound mental condition
b) prejudicial question
c) petition for review
d) absence of judicial personnel
Read: People vs. Estomaca, 256 SCRA 421
People vs. Pangilinan, 518 SCRA 359
Daan vs. Sandiganbayan, 560 SCRA 233
People vs. Janjalani, 639 SCRA 157
F. Bill of Particulars, Read Enrile vs. People, August 11, 2015
Enriquez
PEOPLE V ESTOMACA
256 SCRA 421
Facts:
Estomaca is an illiterate laborer charged with raping his own daughter Estelita. Five complaints were filed and two of them
are being challenged in this appellate review. The two instances which are the subject of the complaints happened on
December 1993 and March6, 1994. They both took place inside their residence in Iloilo. Lower court imposed penalty of
RP for sexual assault in 1993, and Death for rape allegedly committed in 1994. From a perusal of the records of the case,
it appears that the procedural rules to be observed for the validity of the arraignment of the accused were irregularly
complied with; similar to what happened in the case of Alicando. Estomaca claims to have performed only 2 out 5 cases
filed against him, but he pleaded guilty to all five cases. This shows that the accused did not really understand the
consequences of his actions during the arraignment.
Issue
Whether or not Estomaca’s arraignment was valid.
Held
[People v Albert]: Rationale behind the rule governing pleas of guilty to a capital offense is that courts must proceed with
more care where possible punishment is death because execution of such sentence is irrevocable and experience has
shown that innocentpersons have at times pleaded guilty.
Improvident pleas of guilt have to be avoided because the accused may forfeit his life and liberty without having
fully understood the meaning, significance, and consequences of his plea.
Section 1(a) of Rule 116 requires that:
1. Arraignment should be made in open court by judge or by clerk of court
2. The accused be furnished a copy of complaint or information with list of witnesses stated therein
3. Reading of complaint or information in the language or dialect that is known to him (mandatory requirement)
4. Asking him what his plea is to the charge
The arraignment is an avenue for the accused to be informed of the precise nature of the accusation against him
and allows him to be able to hoist the necessary defense in rebuttal thereof. This is an integral aspect of the due process
clause. the transcript of the arraignment shows that it merely consisted of the bare reading of the five complaints. It was
reported in the transcript that: “Reading the information/complaint to the accused in Ilonggo/local dialect”.
Since it was stated in the singular, Court speculates whether all five criminal complaints were actually read,
translated or explained to Estomaca on a level within his comprehension considering his limited education. It is apparent
that there was irregularity in the arraignment because after the accused pleaded guilty to the 5 complaints, he
subsequently stated that he wasn’t guilty of the 3 cases filed against him. Conducting the mechanical process of
arraignment as outlined in Section 1 does not mean that there was the necessary degree of compliance by the court
below. Other considerations reveal how flawed the arraignment was:
1. No showing WON Estomaca or his counsel de oficio was furnished copy of each of complaint with list of
witnesses
against him, in order that he may duly prepare and comply with his responsibilities.
2. Estomaca was not warned that on his plea of guilty, he would definitely be given the death penalty under RA
7659
3. Estomaca was not advised that his plea of guilty would not affect or reduce the death sentence as he may
have believed or
have been erroneously advised.
4. The fact that complaints were supposedly read to appellant in Ilonggo/local dialect.
No statement that Estomaca understood it.
Ilonggo/Hiligaynon is a regional language. In the place where the offenses were committed and where Estomaca
was staying, the localdialect is “kinaray-a”. Such dialect is not readily understandable to those who speak Hiligaynon and
vice versa.
Since all complaints are not only in English but in technical legal language, the Court doubts whether and how
indictments were translated to Ilonggo and/or “kinaray-a” or that Estomaca was truly made aware of the consequences of
his guilty plea. Court must fully discharge duty to conduct the requisite searching inquiry to show that accused had not
only made a clear, definite, and unconditional plea, but that he did so with a well-informed understanding and full
realization of consequences. Asking accused about his educational attainment and warning him that he might have
admitted the crime because of his poor intelligence is not the logical approach in making sure that his plea of guilty is
sufficient.
No definite and concrete rule of how trial judge may go about the matter of a proper “searching inquiry”, but it is
advisable to require accused to fully narrate incident or by making him reenact manner of perpetrating crime, or by
causing him to furnish and explain to the court the missing details of significance.
Since the arraignment was void, the judgment of conviction was likewise void; and in justice to the offended party,
the case was remanded to trial court for further proceedings.
Cortez
PEOPLE v. PANGILINAN
518 SCRA 359
Jurisdictions; Settled is the rule that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary
appearance.- Appellant is mistaken. When the hearings for his petition for bail were conducted, the trial court had already
acquired jurisdiction over his person. Settled is the rule that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon
his arrest or voluntary appearance. In the case at bar, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the appellant
when he was arrested on 19
March 1997. His arrest, not his arraignment, conferred on the trial court jurisdiction over his person.
Criminal Procedure; Arraignment; Arraignment is the formal mode and manner of implementing the constitutional right of
an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. — Arraignment is the formal mode and
manner of implementing the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. The purpose of arraignment is, thus, to apprise the accused of the possible loss of freedom, even of his life,
depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him, or at the very least to inform him of why the prosecuting arm of the
State is mobilized against him.
Same; Same; His counsel’s active participation in the hearings is a clear indication that he was fully aware of the charges
against him, otherwise, his counsel would have objected and informed the court of this blunder.— Appellant’s belated
arraignment did not prejudice him. This procedural defect was cured when his counsel participated in the trial without
raising any objection that his client had yet to be arraigned. In fact, his counsel even crossexamined the prosecution
witnesses. His counsel’s active participation in the hearings is a clear indication that he was fully aware of the charges
against him; otherwise, his counsel would have objected and informed the court of this blunder. Moreover, no protest was
made when appellant was subsequently arraigned. The parties did not question the procedure undertaken by the trial
court. It is only now, after being convicted and sentenced to two death sentences, that appellant cries that his
constitutional right has been violated. It is already too late to raise this procedural defect. This Court will not allow it.
Same; Same; We held that while the arraignment of appellant was conducted after the cases had been submitted for
decision, the error is nonprejudicial and has been fully cured.— In People v. Cabale and People v. Atienza where the
same issue was raised under similar circumstances, we held that while the arraignment of appellant was conducted after
the cases had been submitted for decision, the error is nonprejudicial and has been fully cured. Since appellant’s rights
and interests were not prejudiced by this lapse in procedure, it only follows that his constitutional right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him was not violated.
Facts
Pangilinan married BBB. BBB had 4 children, one of which was AAA. On the evening of September 9, 1995, AAA,
the daughter of Pangilinan, was sleeping with her brother and 2 other sisters. Suddenly, she felt her father approach their
bed, remove her shorts and lay on top of her. AAA could not move and she struggled to move because her hands were
pinned down by her father above her head. She cried and shouted for help but her father covered her mouth. She resisted
and Pangilinan left her. The following night, he tried to his daughter again. She resisted but this time, her energy expired
and he succeeded in raping her. The next day, she suffered complications from this incident and she was continuously
molested and raped by her father until January 1997. BBB found out about the incident that happened to her daughter
and decided to leave Pangilinan. She later on filed a case for rape against him.
On October 1997 the prosecution formally offered its evidence. On April 1998, Pangilinan applied for bail but the
same was denied. On June 9, 1999 the trial court, having discovered that appellant had not yet been arraigned,
scheduled his arraignment and with the assistance of counsel de oficio, he pleaded not guilty to the charges against him.
The RTC ruled rendering Pangilinan guilty beyond reasonable doubt with the imposition of death penalty which was
appealed to the CA and the same court affirmed the decision, thus the automatic review by the SC.
Issues
1. Whether or not RTC had jurisdiction because of his arraignment
2. Whether or not Pangilinan’s rights and interests prejudiced by the fact that he was arraigned only at this stage of the
proceedings
Held
1. The RTC had jurisdiction. Pangilinan assails his conviction because he was not properly arraigned. Since he was
arraigned only after the case was submitted for decision, said irregularity, he argues, is a procedural error which is
prejudicial to him and is tantamount to denial of his constitutional right to be informed of the accusation against him. He
claims that his subsequent arraignment did not cure the defect in the trial proceedings because at the time the petition for
bail was heard, the trial court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over his person.
He is mistaken. When the hearings for his petition for bail were conducted, the trial court had already acquired
jurisdiction over his person. Settled is the rule that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest
or voluntary appearance. In the case at bar, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Pangilinan when he was arrested; his
arrest, not his arraignment, conferred on the trial court jurisdiction over his person.
Arraignment is the formal mode and manner of implementing the constitutional right of an accused to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The purpose of arraignment is, thus, to apprise the accused of the
possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him, or at the very least to
inform him of why the prosecuting arm of the State is mobilized against him.
In the case at bar, his arraignment was done before he could plea. Even if the same was done after his trial for
bail, the same was still done prior to his plea. Again, the purpose of arraignment is to apprise the accused of the possible
loss of freedom or to inform him why he is being prosecuted. Jurisdiction over him was obtained upon his arrest and upon
such arrests, he was informed of why he was being arrested. His later arraignment does not change the fact that the court
already had jurisdiction over him.
2. No, his belated arraignment was not prejudicial. This procedural defect was cured when his counsel participated in the
trial without raising any objection that his client had yet to be arraigned. In fact, his counsel even cross-examined the
prosecution witnesses. His counsel’s active participation in the hearings is a clear indication that he was fully aware of the
charges against him; otherwise, his counsel would have objected and informed the court of this blunder. Moreover, no
protest was made when he was subsequently arraigned. The parties did not question the procedure undertaken by the
trial court. It is only now, after being convicted and sentenced to two death sentences, he cries that his constitutional right
has been violated. It is already too late to raise this procedural defect. This Court will not allow it.
In People v. Cabale and People v. Atienza, where the same issue was raised under similar circumstances, we
held that while the arraignment of him was conducted after the cases had been submitted for decision, the error is nonprejudicial and has been fully cured. Since his rights and interests were not prejudiced by this lapse in procedure, it only
follows that his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him was not violated.
Diolata
JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN vs THE HON OF SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R.163972-77
March 28, 2008
Facts
Said accused, together with accused Benedicto E. Kuizon, were charged before this Court for three counts of
malversation of public funds involving the sums of P3,293.00, P1,869.00, and P13,528.00, respectively, which they
purportedly tried to conceal by falsifying the time book and payrolls for given period making it appear that some laborers
worked on the construction of the new municipal hall building of Bato, Leyte and collected their respective salaries thereon
when, in truth and in fact, they did not. Thus, in addition to the charge for malversation, the accused were also indicted
before this Court for three counts of falsification of public document by a public officer or employee.
In the falsification cases, the accused offered to withdraw their plea of not guilty and substitute the same with a
plea of guilty, provided, the mitigating circumstances of confession or plea of guilt and voluntary surrender will be
appreciated in their favor. In the alternative, if such proposal is not acceptable, said accused proposed instead to
substitute their plea of not guilty to the crime of falsification of public document by a public officer or employee with a plea
of guilty, but to the lesser crime of falsification of a public document by a private individual. On the other hand, in the
malversation cases, the accused offered to substitute their plea of not guilty thereto with a plea of guilty, but to the lesser
crime of failure of an accountable officer to render accounts.
Insofar as the falsification cases are concerned, the prosecution found as acceptable the proposal of the accused
to plead guilty to the lesser crime of falsification of public document by a private individual.
Insofar as the malversation cases are concerned, the prosecution was likewise amenable to the offer of said
accused to plead guilty to the lesser crime of failure of an accountable officer to render accounts because: x x x
JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN has already restituted the total amount of P18,860.00 as per official receipt issued by the
provincial government of Leyte dated February 26, 2002. In short, the damage caused to the government has already
been reinstituted.
The Sandiganbayan, in the herein assailed Resolution, dated March 25, 2004, denied petitioners Motion to Plea
Bargain, despite favorable recommendation by the prosecution, on the main ground that no cogent reason was presented
to justify its approval.
Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his plea bargaining
offer on the following grounds: first, petitioner is not an accountable officer and he merely affixed his signature on the
payrolls on a routinary basis, negating any criminal intent; and that the amount involved is only P18,860.00, which he
already restituted.
Issue
Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his plea bargaining?
Held
YES. Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a
mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually involves the defendant's pleading guilty to
a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that
for the graver charge.
Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court presents the basic requisites upon which plea bargaining may be made,
i.e., that it should be with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, and that the plea of guilt should be to a
lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. The rules however use word may in the second
sentence of Section 2, denoting an exercise of discretion upon the trial court on whether to allow the accused to make
such plea. Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually charged is
not supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or compromise for the convenience of the accused.
As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, as in the present case, the trial court's exercise of its
discretion should neither be arbitrary nor should it amount to a capricious and whimsical exercise of discretion. Grave
abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in
other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility;
and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law.
In the present case, the Sandiganbayan rejected petitioner's plea offer on the ground that petitioner and the
prosecution failed to demonstrate that the proposal would redound to the benefit of the public.
Section 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court states when an offense includes or is included in the other, to wit: SEC.
5. When an offense includes or is included in another. An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when
some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the
latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former
constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
In this case, the allegations in the Informations filed against petitioner are sufficient to hold petitioner liable for the
lesser offenses. Thus, in the charge for Falsification of Public Documents, petitioner may plead guilty to the lesser offense
of Falsification by Private Individuals inasmuch as it does not appear that petitioner took advantage of his official position
in allegedly falsifying the timebook and payroll of the Municipality of Bato, Leyte. Given, therefore, that some of the
essential elements of offenses charged in this case likewise constitute the lesser offenses, then petitioner may plead
guilty to such lesser offenses.
Plea of Guilty
Huerto
PEOPLE VS. JANJALANI
639 SCRA 157
Criminal Procedure; Plea of Guilty; All trial judges must refrain from accepting with alacrity an accused’s plea of
guilty, for while justice demands a speedy administration, judges are duty bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that
when an accused pleads guilty, he understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable conviction;
The requirement for a judge to conduct a searching inquiry applies more so in cases of re-arraignment.—As early as
in People v. Apduhan, 24 SCRA 798 the Supreme Court has ruled that “all trial judges … must refrain from accepting with
alacrity an accused’s plea of guilty, for while justice demands a speedy administration, judges are duty bound to be extra
solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty, he understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import
of an inevitable conviction.” Thus, trial court judges are required to observe the following procedure under Section 3, Rule
116 of the Rules of Court: SEC. 3.
Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence.—When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense,
the court shall conduct a searching inquiryinto the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of
his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also
present evidence in his behalf. The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry applies more so in cases of rearraignment. In People v. Galvez, 378 SCRA 389 (2002), the Court noted that since accused-appellant’s original plea was
“not guilty,” the trial court should have exerted careful effort in inquiring into why he changed his plea to “guilty.”
Same; Same; The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry should not be deemed satisfied in cases in which it
was the defense counsel who explained the consequences of a “guilty” plea to the accused—the conduct of a searching
inquiry remains the duty of judges, as they are mandated by the rules to satisfy themselves that the accused had not been
under coercion or duress; mistaken impressions; or a misunderstanding of the significance, effects, and consequences of
their guilty plea.—The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry should not be deemed satisfied in cases in which it was
the defense counsel who explained the consequences of a “guilty” plea to the accused, as it appears in this case.
In People v. Alborida, 359 SCRA 495 (2001), this Court found that there was still an improvident plea of guilty, even if the
accused had already signified in open court that his counsel had explained the consequences of the guilty plea; that he
understood the explanation of his counsel; that the accused understood that the penalty of death would still be meted out
to him; and that he had not been intimidated, bribed, or threatened. We have reiterated in a long line of cases that the
conduct of a searching inquiry remains the duty of judges, as they are mandated by the rules to satisfy themselves that
the accused had not been under coercion or duress; mistaken impressions; or a misunderstanding of the significance,
effects, and consequences of their guilty plea. This requirement is stringent and mandatory.
Same; Same; Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of
the judgment.—In People v. Oden, 427 SCRA 634 (2004), the Court declared that even if the requirement of conducting a
searching inquiry was not complied with, “[t]he manner by which the plea of guilt is made … loses much of great
significance where the conviction can be based on independent evidence proving the commission by the person accused
of the offense charged.” Thus, in People v. Nadera, 324 SCRA 490 (2000), the Court stated: Convictions based on an
improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of the judgment. If the trial court relied
on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused, the conviction must be sustained, because then it is
predicated not merely on the guilty plea of the accused but on evidence proving his commission of the offense charged.
Facts
Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 30 June 2008, which affirmed
the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City in Criminal Case Nos. 05-476 and 05-4777 dated 18 October 2005.
The latter Decision convicted the three accused-appellants namely, Gamal B. Baharan a.k.a. Tapay, Angelo Trinidad
a.k.a. Abu Khalil, and Rohmat Abdurrohim a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky of the complex crime of multiple murder and multiple
frustrated murder, and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection. The CA modified the sentence
to reclusion perpetua as required by Republic Act No. 9346 (Act Abolishing the Imposition of Death Penalty).
On feb 14 2005, a bus was going from Navotas to Alabang. Two men got on the bus. Both seemed suspicious
according to Elmer Andales, the conductor. The two men alighted in Ayala Ave. and the bus exploded. After the
explosion, the spokesperson for abu sayyaff announced over radio that the explosion was a valentine’s gift. Accused
Asali, member of abu sayaff, gave a television interview, confessing that he had supplied the explosive devices
for the 14 February 2005 bombing. The bus conductor identified the accused Baharan and Trinidad and
confirmed that they were the two men who had entered the RRCG bus on the evening of 14 February. Asali testified that
he had given accused Baharan and Trinidad the TNT used in the bombing incident in Makati City. Accused-appellants
Baharan and Trinidad argue that the trial court did not conduct a searching inquiry after they had changed their plea from
not guilty to guilty.
Issue
Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in accepting accused-appellants plea of guilt despite insufficiency of
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the said plea.
Held
The court ruled that the conduct of a searching inquiry remains in the duty of judges, as they are mandated by
the rules to satisfy themselves that the accused had not been under coercion or duress; mistaken impressions; or a
misunderstanding of the significance, effects, and consequences of their guilty plea. This requirement is stringent and
mandatory.
Nevertheless, we are not unmindful of the context under which the re-arraignment was conducted or of the factual
milieu surrounding the finding of guilt against the accused. The Court observes that accused Baharan and Trinidad
previously pled guilty to another charge multiple murder based on the same act relied upon in the multiple frustrated
murder charge. The Court further notes that prior to the change of plea to one of guilt, accused Baharan and Trinidad
made two other confessions of guilt one through an extrajudicial confession (exclusive television interviews, as stipulated
by both accused during pretrial), and the other via judicial admission (pretrial stipulation). Considering the foregoing
circumstances, we deem it unnecessary to rule on the sufficiency of the searching inquiry in this instance. Remanding the
case for re-arraignment is not warranted, as the accused plea of guilt was not the sole basis of the condemnatory
judgment under consideration.
Suspension of Arraignment
Falucho
ABS-CBN Corporation v. Gozon
53 SCRA 1
Criminal Procedure; Arraignment; Rule 116, Section 11(c) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure allows the suspension of
the accused’s arraignment in certain circumstances only.- Rule 116, Section 11(c) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
allows the suspension of the accused’s arraignment in certain circumstances only: SEC. 11. Suspension of arraignment.Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases: (a) The accused appears to
be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge against
him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary his
confinement for such purpose; (b) There exist a prejudicial question; and (c) A petition for review of the resolution of the
prosecutor is pending at either the Department of Justice, or the Office of the President; provided, that the period of
suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office.
In Samson v. Daway, this court acknowledged the applicability of Rule 116, Section (c) in a criminal prosecution for
infringement under the Intellectual Property Code. However, this court emphasized the limits of the order of deferment
under the Rule: While the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the provision
limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing
office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny
the motion to defer arraignment. The suspension of the arraignment should always be within the limits of the Law. The
trial court erred in failing to resume the proceedings after the designated period.
Facts
The controversy arose from GMA-7’s news coverage on the homecoming of Filipino overseas worker and
hostage victim Angelo dela Cruz. GMA Network, Inc. and ABS-CBN made their respective broadcasts and coverage of
the live event. ABS-CBN conducted live audio-video coverage and broadcasted the arrival of Angelo dela Cruz at the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport. ABS-CBN allowed Reuters Television Service to air the footages it had taken earlier
under a special embargo agreement stating that “No other Philippine subscriber of Reuters would be allowed to use ABSCBN footage without the latter’s consent”. GMA-7, to which Dela Peña-Reyes and Manalastas (Respondents) are
connected, assigned and stationed news reporters at the NAIA for its live broadcast and non-live news coverage of the
arrival of dela Cruz. GMA-7 subscribes to both Reuters and Cable News Network. It received a live video feed of the
coverage of Angelo dela Cruz’s arrival from Reuters and immediately carried the live news feed in its program Flash
Report prompting ABS-CBN’s filing of Complaint for copyright infringement of Intellectual Property Code. Assistant City
Prosecutor issued a Resolution finding probable cause indicting respondents. On January 4, 2005, respondents filed the
Petition for Review before the Department of Justice and Secretary Gonzales issued a Resolution referred to as Gonzales
Resolution favoring respondents and held that good faith may be raised as a defense in the case. Both parties moved for
reconsideration of the Gonzales Resolution. On January 19, 2005, the trial court granted the Motion to Suspend
Proceedings filed by respondents. Under Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, once a petition for
review is filed with the Department of Justice, a suspension of the criminal proceedings may be allowed by the court. On
July 29, 2010 Department of Justice Under Secretary Agra issued a Resolution referred to as Agra Resolution reversing
Gonzales Resolution.
Issue
Whether or not the suspension of arraignment/criminal proceedings be allowed.
Held
In Samson v. Daway, this court acknowledged the applicability of Rule 116, Section (c) in a criminal prosecution for
infringement under the Intellectual Property Code. However, this court emphasized the limits of the order of deferment
under the Rule: While the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the provision
limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing
office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny
the motion to defer arraignment. The suspension of the arraignment should always be within the limits of the Law. The
trial court erred in failing to resume the proceedings after the designated period.
RULE 117 – Motion to Quash
A. Motion to Quash vs. Motion to Dismiss; Grounds
B. When and How to move to quash
C. Effects when motion is granted; denied
D. Remedies against denial/grant of motion
Remedies against denial/grant of motion
Javier
PEOPLE V. LACSON
400 SCRA 267
Criminal Procedure; Provisional Dismissals; Requisites of First Paragraph, Section 8, Rule 117 ofthe Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. —Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads: Sec. 8.
Provisional dismissal.—A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and
with notice to the offended party. The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6)
years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case
having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional
dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. Having
invoked said rule before the petitioners panel of prosecutors and before the Court of Appeals, the respondent is burdened
to establish the essential requisites of the first paragraph thereof, namely: 1) the prosecution with the express conformity
of the accused or the accused moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and
the accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case; 2) the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional
dismissal of the case; 3) the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; and 4) the
public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case.
Same; Same; Time-Bar; Statutory Construction; Second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 117 should be construed to
mean that the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year or two years, as the case may be, after the
service of the order of dismissal on the public prosecutor who has control of the prosecution without the
criminal case having been revived.—Although the second paragraph of the new rule states that the order of dismissal
shall permanent one year after the issuance thereof without the case having been revived, the provision should be
construed to mean that the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after service of the order of dismissal on
the public prosecutor who has control of the prosecution without the criminal case having been revived. The public
prosecutor cannot be expected to comply with the timeline unless he is served with a copy of the order of dismissal.
Same; Same; Same; The mere inaction or silence of the accused to a motion for provisional dismissal of the case
or his failure to object to a provisional dismissal does not amount to express consent; A motion of the accused
for a provisional dismissal of a case is an express consent to such provisional dismissal; If a criminal case is
provisionally dismissed without the express consent of the accused or over his objection, the new rule would not
apply.—Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva voce or in writing. It is a positive, direct,
unequivocal consent requiring no inference or implication to supply its meaning. Where the accused writes on the motion
of a prosecutor for a provisional dismissal of the case No objection or With my conformity, the writing amounts to express
consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of the case. The mere inaction or silence of the accused to a motion for
a provisional dismissal of the case or his failure to object to a provisional dismissal does not amount to express consent. A
motion of the accused for a provisional dismissal of a case is an express consent to such provisional dismissal. If a
criminal case is be revived only within the periods provided in the new rule. On the other hand, if a criminal case is
provisionally dismissed without the express consent of the accused or over his objection, the new rule would not apply.
The case may be revived or refiled even beyond the prescribed periods subject to the right of the accused to oppose the
same on the ground of double jeopardy or that such revival or refiling is barred by the statute of limitations.
Facts
Before the court is the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the resolution dated May 23, 2002, for the determination
of several factual issues relative to the application of sec. 8 rule 117 of Revised rules of criminal procedure on the
dismissal of the two cases filed against the respondents. The respondent and his co-accused were charged with multiple
murder. The court confirmed the express consent of the respondent in the provisional dismissal of the aforementioned
cases when he filed for judicial determination. The court also ruled the need to determine whether the other facts for its
application are attendant.
Issue
Whether or not Lacson’s motion had the effect of a quashal?
Held
Yes. The dismissal by then Judge Agnir of the cases against Lacson was premised on Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. In his Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and for Examination of Witnesses filed with Judge
Agnir, Lacson prayed for the following relief:
That a judicial determination of probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article 111 of the Constitution be conducted by
this Honorable Court, and for this purpose, an order be issued directing the prosecution to present the private
complainants and their witnesses at a hearing scheduled therefor; and 2) That warrants for the accused-movants be
withheld, or, if issued, recalled in the meantime until the resolution of this incident.
Lacson’s motion had the effect of a quashal, since he clearly filed the same prior to his arraignment before Judge
Agnir’s court. Judge Agnir held that: “xxx the documents attached to the Information in support thereof have been
rendered meaningless, if not absurd, with the recantation of the principal prosecution witnesses and the desistance of
the private complainants. There is no more evidence to show that a crime has been committed and that the accused
are probably guilty thereof. xxx”. Under the circumstances then obtaining, the prosecution had to its disposal certain
remedies against the order of dismissal. Prior to its amendment, the Rules on Criminal Procedure, under Section 6,
Rule 117 provides that the quashal of the Information is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense except
when the motion was based on the extinction of criminal action or liability or on the fact that the accused has been
previously convicted or in jeopardy of being convicted, or acquitted of the offense charged.
There is no dispute that the dismissal by Judge Agnir of the information filed against Lacson does not fall under any of
the above stated exceptions. As of the time of the re-filing on June 6, 2001 of the information for murder, a little over
two years have elapsed since the original information were dismissed on March 29, 1999. If one added to that the four
years that have elapsed from the time the crime happened on May 18, 1995 until the dismissal of the cases by Judge
Agnir on March 29, 1999, then only six years would have passed since the crime happened. The period of six years is
computed without even taking into consideration the suspension of the running of the period due to the filing of the
information. This period of six years is well within the 20-year period of prescription, under Article 90 of the Revised
Penal Code, for prosecution for murder. Denying to the State the right to prosecute Lacson and his co-accused after
March 29, 2001, two years from the date the original cases were dismissed, effectively nullifies the right of the State to
prosecute the accused. This cuts short the prescriptive period for murder from 20 years to a mere six years. The filing
of the complaint or information interrupts the period of prescription of offenses, but said period shall commence to run
again after such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped
for any reason not imputable to the accused. Undeniably, the proceedings before the trial court was terminated
without Lacson being convicted or acquitted, hence the period of prescription for his offense commenced to run again
after the date of termination. However, by the time the prosecution filed new information against him, based on new
investigations conducted thereon, only six years (as computed above) have passed, which is clearly still within the
prescriptive period of the crime for which Lacson is being charged.
Remedies against denial/grant of motion
Navarroza
PANAGUITON VS. DOJ
G.R. No. 167571, November 25, 2008
Facts
This is a petition for Review of CA resolutions dismissing Luis Panaguiton, Jr. petition for certiorari and motion for
reconsideration
In 1992, Cawili borrowed money from petitioner and later issued checks as payment both signed by Cawili and his
business associate Tongson. But checks were dishonored either for insufficiency of funds or closure of account.
Panaguiton then made a formal demands to Cawili and Tongson to pay but to no avail.
So Panaguiton filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson for violating BP Blg. 22 before QC Prosecutor's
Office.
During PI, Tongson filed his counter-affidavit claiming that he had been unjustly included as party-respondent
since petitioner had lent money to Cawili in Cawili's personal capacity. He averred that he was not Cawili's business
associate and claimed that he himself has criminal cases against Cawili. Tongson also denied that he had issued
bounced checks and that his signatures on the checks had been falsified.
As cpunter, Panaguiton presented documents showing Tongson's signature which was the same as the
signatures on the checks. Panaguiton presented also an affidavit of adverse claim wherein Tongson claimed to be Cawili's
business associate.
December 1995, Prosecutor found probable cause only against Cawili and dismissed the charges against
Tongson. Panaguiton filed a partial appeal before DOJ even the case against Cawili was filed before the proper court.
Later on July 1997, after finding that Tongson was possible to co-sign the bounced checks and had altered his
signature in pleadings submitte during PI, Chief State Prosecutor directed the City Prosecutor of QC to conduct
reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and refer the signatures to NBI.
On March 1999, Asst. City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint against Tongson without referring to the NBI,
holding that the case had already prescribed pursuant to Act. No. 3326, stating that in this case the 4 year period started
on the date the checks were dishonored and that the filing of complaint in QC prosecutor's office did not interrupt the
running of the prescriptive period as the law contemplates judicial and not administrative proceedings. Four years had
elapsed and no information was filed against Tongson. And the order to refer the matter to NBI could no longer be
sanctioned under Section 3, Rule 112 of rules of criminal procedure because the initiative should come from the petitioner
himself and not from the investigating prosecutor.
Petitioner appealed to DOJ through undersecretary Teehankee but was dismissed. Petitioner then filed a motion
for reconsideration of DOJ and through undersecretary Gutierrez ruled in his favor and declared that the prescription
period was interrupted by the filing of the complaint in the Prosecutor's office.
However, in August 2004, DOJ acting on the motion for reconsideration filed by Tongson ruled the subject offense
had already prescribed and ordered the withdrawal of 3 informations for violation of BP Blg. 22 against Tongson. DOJ
explained that Act No. 3326 applies to violations of special acts that do not provide for a prescriptive period for the
offenses thereunder.
Panguiton thus filed a petition for Certiorari before CA assailing the august resolution of the DOJ, but was
dismissed by CA in view of failure to attach a proper verification and certification of non-forum shopping.
Panaguiton then filed for instant petition claiming that CA committed grave error on dismissing his petition on
technical grounds and in ruling that the petition before it was without merit and questions are too unsubstantial.
The DOJ stated that CA did not err in dismissing the petition for non-compliance with the rules of court.
Then Cawili and Tongson submitted their comment arguing that CA did not err in dismissing the petition for
certiorari, and they also claim that the offense of violation of BP Blg. 22 has prescribed and the long delay, attributable to
petitioner and the State violated their constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases. The petition is meritorious.
Issues
(1) Technical Issues
(2) Substantive Aspects
Held
1) verification is merely formal requirement intended to secure an assurance that matters which are alleged are true and
correct-the court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on them and waive strict compliance so
that the ends of justice may be served. We find that by attaching pertinent verification to his motion for reconsideration,
petitioner has sufficiently complied with the verification requirement.We also agree that CA erred in dismissing the petition
on the ground of failure to attach a certified copy or duplicate original of the 3 resolution of DOJ.
(2) This court ruled that the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office for PI suspends the running of the prescriptive
period.The delay was beyond petitioner's control but that of the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and misapplications.
Remedies against denial/grant of motion
Josue
G.R. No. 168918
March 2, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. HERMENEGILDO DUMLAO y CASTILIANO and EMILIO LA'O y
GONZALES, Respondents.
Ponente: CHICO-NAZARIO, J
Criminal Law; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (republic act No. 3019); Motion to Quash; Violation of Sec. 3 (g),
Republic Act No. 3019; elements; The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of material averments of an
information is whether the facts alleged therein, which are hypothetically admitted, would establish the essentials
elements of the crime defined by law – evidence aliunde, or matters extrinsic of the Information, are not be considered. –
The ground raised by respondent Dumlao in his Motion to Quash/Dismiss is that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense. The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the material averments of an information is whether the
facts alleged therein, which are hypothetically admitted, would establish the essentials elements of the crime defined by
law. Evidence aliunde, or matters extrinsic of the Information, are not be considered. The elements of the crime under
Sec. 3 (g) of Republic Act No. 3019 are as follows: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he entered into a
contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and (3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government. After examining the information, we find that the facts alleged therein, if
hypothetically admitted, will prove all the elements of Section 3 (g) as against respondent Dumlao.
Same; Same; Same; Insufficiency of evidence is not one of the grounds of a Motion to Quash– insufficiency of evidence is
a ground for a dismissal of action only after the prosecution rests its case. – It can be gathered from the resolution of the
Sandiganbayan that it did consider the ground invoked by Dumlao (that the facts charged do not constitute an offense);
otherwise, it could have denied respondent Dumlao’s motion. From the reasoning given by the Sandiganbayan, it is clear
that it is dismissed the case because of insufficiency of evidence. Insufficiency of evidence is not one of the grounds of a
Motion to Quash. The grounds, as enumerated in Section 3, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, are as
follows: (a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense; (b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over
the offense charged; (c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused; (d) The officer
who filed the information had no authority to do so; € That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form; (f) That
more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law; (g) That the
criminal action or liability has been extinguished; (h) that it contains averments which if true, would constitute a legal
excuse or justification; and (i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the
case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. Insufficiency of evidence is a
ground for dismissal of an action only after the prosecution rests its case.
Same; Same; Same; Where the Sandiganbayan dismissed the case against the accused for insufficiency of evidence,
even without giving the prosecution the opportunity to present its evidence, it violated the prosecution’s right to due
process. – In the case under consideration, the Sandiganbayan dismissed the case against the respondent for
insufficiency of evidence, even without giving the prosecution the opportunity to present its evidence. In so doing, it
violated the prosecution’s right to due process. It deprived the prosecution of its opportunity to prosecute its case and to
prove the accused’s culpability. It was therefore erroneous for the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the case under the
premises. Not only did it consider the ground invoked by Respondent Dumlao; it even dismissed the case on a ground not
raised by him, and not at the appropriate time. The dismissal was this without basis and untimely.
Facts
On or about May 10, 1982, or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines, Hermenegildo C.
Dumlao, Aber Canlas, Jacobo C. Clave, Roman A. Cruz, Jr., and Fabian C. Ver, being then the members of the Board of
Trustees of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) which is a government corporation and therefore all public
officers, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, while in the performance of their official
functions, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into contract of lease-purchase with Emilio G. La’o, a
private person whereby the GSIS agreed to sell to said Emilio G. La’o, a GSIS acquired property consisting of three
parcels of land with an area of 821 square meters together with a 5-storey building situated at 1203 A. Mabini St., Ermita,
Manila, known as the Government Counsel Centre for the sum of P2,000,000.00 with a down payment of P200,000.00
with the balance payable in fifteen years at 12% interest per annum and granting Emilio G. La’o the right to sub-lease the
ground floor for his own account, from which he collected yearly rentals in excess of the yearly amortization which
contract is manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government.
On 9 November 2004, respondent Dumlao pleaded "not guilty" to the offense charged.
On 21 February 2005, respondent Dumlao filed a Motion to Dismiss/Quash on the ground that the facts charged
do not constitute an offense. On 14 July 2005, the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed resolution. It ruled:
The Court finds the motion meritorious that the Board failed to approve the Lease-Purchase Agreement in
question. In order to validly pass a resolution at least a majority of four (4) members of the Board of Trustees must sign
and approve the same.
On 2 September 2005, the People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Ombudsman, thru the
Office of the Special Prosecutor, filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal and
setting aside of the Sandiganbayan Resolution dismissing the case against respondent Dumlao.
Issue
Whether the Sandiganbayan acted in accordance with law and jurisprudence when it resolved to dismiss the charge
against respondent Dumlao after the pre-trial and before the petitioner could present its witnesses and formally offer its
exhibits.
Held
Yes, It can be gathered from the resolution of the Sandiganbayan that it did consider the ground invoked by Dumlao (that
the facts charged do not constitute an offense); otherwise, it could have denied respondent Dumlao’s motion. From the
reasoning given by the Sandiganbayan, it is clear that it dismissed the case because of insufficiency of evidence.
Insufficiency of evidence is not one of the grounds of a Motion to Quash. The grounds, as enumerated in Section 3,
Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, are as follows:
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by
law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him
was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
Insufficiency of evidence is a ground for dismissal of an action only after the prosecution rests its case. Section
23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 23. Demurrer to evidence. – After the prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the action on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the opportunity to be heard or (2) upon
demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court.
In the case under consideration, the Sandiganbayan dismissed the case against respondent for insufficiency of
evidence, even without giving the prosecution the opportunity to present its evidence. In so doing, it violated the
prosecution’s right to due process. It deprived the prosecution of its opportunity to prosecute its case and to
prove the accused’s culpability.
It was therefore erroneous for the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the case under the premises. Not only did it not consider the
ground invoked by respondent Dumlao; it even dismissed the case on a ground not raised by him, and not at the
appropriate time. The dismissal was thus without basis and untimely.
Remedies against denial/grant of motion
Quiniquini
SORIANO V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 159517-18
Remedial Law; Certiorari; In its juridical sense, the term grave abuse of discretion connotes capricious, despotic,
oppressive or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.—The term grave abuse of discretion,
in its juridical sense, connotes capricious, despotic, oppressive or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction. The abuse must be of such degree as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and capricious manner by reason of
passion and hostility. The word capricious, usually used in tandem with the term arbitrary, conveys the notion of willful and
unreasoning action. Thus, when seeking the corrective hand of certiorari, a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in
the exercise of discretion is imperative.
Same; Same; A special civil action for certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an
information.—The Court has consistently held that a special civil action for certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the
denial of a motion to quash an information. The proper procedure in such a case is for the accused to enter a plea, go to
trial without prejudice on his part to present the special defenses he had invoked in his motion to quash and if after trial on
the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal there from in the manner authorized by law.
Criminal Procedure; Information; Duplicity of Offenses; Duplicity of offenses in a single information is a ground to
quash the Information under Section 3(e), Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure; Duplicity of charges is
meant a single complaint or information that charges more than one offense.—Duplicity of offenses in a single information
is a ground to quash the Information under Section 3(e), Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Rules
prohibit the filing of duplicitous information to avoid confusing the accused in preparing his defense. By duplicity of
charges is meant a single complaint or information that charges more than one offense. x x x Otherwise stated, there is
duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single Information charges more than one offense.
Same; Same; Same; A single act or incident might offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated
provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused for more than one offense.—Jurisprudence teems with
pronouncements that a single act or incident might offend two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law,
thus justifying the filing of several charges against the accused. In Loney v. People (482 SCRA 194 [2006]), this Court, in
upholding the filing of multiple charges against the accused, held: As early as the start of the last century, this Court had
ruled that a single act or incident might offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus
justifying the prosecution of the accused for more than one offense. The only limit to this rule is the Constitutional
prohibition that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for “the same offense.” In People v. Doriquez, we
held that two (or more) offenses arising from the same act are not “the same”—x x x if one provision [of law] requires
proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not, x x x. Phrased elsewise, where two different laws (or
articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other,
although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not an
essential element of the other. x x x x x x
x x x Consequently, the filing of the multiple charges against petitioners,
although based on the same incident, is consistent with settled doctrine.
Same; Same; Same; Motion to Quash; The fundamental test in considering a motion to quash anchored on Section
3(a), Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, is the sufficiency of the averments in the information; that is,
whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the offense charged as
defined by law.—The fundamental test in considering a motion to quash anchored on Section 3(a), Rule 117 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure, is the sufficiency of the averments in the information; that is, whether the facts alleged, if
hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the offense charged as defined by law. The trial court
may not consider a situation contrary to that set forth in the criminal complaint or information. Facts that constitute the
defense of the petitioners against the charge under the information must be proved by them during trial. Such facts or
circumstances do not constitute proper grounds for a motion to quash the information on the ground that the material
averments do not constitute the offense.
Facts
Soriano and Ilagan were the Presidents and General Manager, respectively, of the Rural Bank of San Miguel (Bulacan),
Inc. (RBSM). During their incumbency, petitioners indirectly owned a loads from RBSM. They falsified the loan application
and other bank records so that it made to appear that Virigilio Malang and Rogelio Maaol obtained loans worth Php 15
Million.
The State Prosecutor charged them with violation of General Banking act as amended by PD no. 1795 or Violation of the
Director, Officer Stockholder or related interest rules (DOSRI Rules). And on the same date, they were charged by estafa
thru falsification of commercial document.
Petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that: (a) more than 1 offense is charged; and (b) the facts
charged do not constitute an offense. Also, petitioners argued that the prosecutor charged more than one offense for a
single act.
RTC denied then the motion to quash. Petitioner then appealed to CA but the CA denied such motion.
Issue
W/n the duplicity of offenses in a single information is a ground to motions to quash the information.
Held
No. In this case, Soriano was faced not with one information charging more than one offense, but with more than one
information, each charging a different offense - violation of DOSRI rules in one, and estafa thru falsification of commercial
documents in the others. Ilagan, on the other hand, was charged with estafa thru falsification of commercial documents in
separate information’s. Thus, petitioners erroneously invoke duplicity of charges as a ground to quash the Information.
In the case at bar, there are differences between the two (2) offenses. A DOSRI violation consists in the failure to observe
and comply with procedural, reportorial or ceiling requirements prescribed by law in the grant of a loan to a director,
officer, stockholder and other related interests in the bank, i.e. lack of written approval of the majority of the directors of
the bank and failure to enter such approval into corporate records and to transmit a copy thereof to the BSP supervising
department. The elements of abuse of confidence, deceit, fraud or false pretenses, and damage, which are essential to
the prosecution for estafa, are not elements of a DOSRI violation. The filing of several charges against Soriano was,
therefore, proper.
Verily, there is no justification for the quashal of the Information filed against petitioners. The RTC committed no grave
abuse of discretion in denying the motions.
Remedies against denial/grant of motion
Lozada
JOSEPH CEREZO vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR No. 185230 June 1, 2011
Former Conviction or Acquittal; Double Jeopardy; Section 7, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court; When an accused
has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the
conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the
offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
Double jeopardy exists when the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the
first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. A first jeopardy
attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has
been entered; and (e) when the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent. In this case, the fifth requirement was not met as the Trial Court was found to have acted
with grave abuse of discretion in reinstating the case after dismissing it, failing to determine the merits of the case based
on his own judgment. Furthermore, the case was remanded to the said RTC.
Criminal Procedure; Discretion of the Court; It is a well-entrenched rule that once a case is filed with the Court,
any disposition of it rests on the sound discretion of the Court.
The RTC acted with abuse of discretion when it failed to assess the merits of the case independently. It is a wellentrenched rule that once a case is filed with the Court, any disposition of it rests on the sound discretion of the Court and
should then rely on his own determinations of the merits rather than solely rely on the resolutions or findings of the
prosecution.
Facts
On September 12, 2002, petitioner Cerezo filed a case of libel against private respondents Yaneza, Abunda JR., and
Afulugencia as well as Mapalo before the Quezon City Prosecutors Office (OP-QC). Finding probable cause against the
respondents, the OP-QC filed the corresponding Information before the RTC. However, on November 20, 2003, the OPQC reversed its earlier findings and recommended the dismissal of the case in its Resolution. They then filed before the
RTC a Motion to Dismiss and Withdraw Information but the respondents already were arraigned and pleaded not guilty
before such filing was done. The RTC granted the petitioners’ motion and ordered the dismissal of the criminal case.
Petitioner then moved for a Reconsideration arguing that the resolution was still subject for review before the Secretary of
Justice. RTC then deferred the action for the motion until the DOJ already presented its resolution. On June 26, 2006, the
Secretary of Justice promulgated its resolution reversing the OP-QC resolution and directed the Information for libel to be
refiled whereby the RTC granted the petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration. Respondents’ motion for Reconsideration
was denied.
The Court of Appeals, through a petition for Certiorari filed by the respondents, found that the RTC gravely abused its
discretion in reinstating the case and found that elements of double jeopardy existed
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration on the CA’s Decision was denied, hence, this appeal.
Issue
Whether or not the double jeopardy is present.
Held
The Court decided in the negative. Double jeopardy exists when the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy
attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same
offense as in the first. A first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after
arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the
case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. In this case the Court ruled that the Decision of the
court on granting the dismissal of the case and thereafter allowing the subsequent filing of it was made with grave abuse
of discretion. The Court ordered the case to be remanded to the RTC thereby not acquitting, convicting, nor dismissing
the case as required for the first jeopardy to attach.
It is a well-entrenched rule that once a case is filed before the court, it is, then, within the sound discretion of the court so
much so that the Courts should assess the merits of the case independently and should not only rely on the resolutions or
findings of the prosecution. In this case, the RTC failed to make its own decision based on its own determination on
whether or not the respondents should be in trial. It simply followed the recommendations of the prosecutors as it granted
the Motion to Dismiss and Withdrawal by the prosecution but afterwards allowed its refiling based on the resolution of the
DOJ.
Remedies against denial/grant of motion
Montilla
PEOPLE VS. DE LEON
754 SCRA 147, MARCH 23, 2015
Double jeopardy: elements of - Double jeopardy attaches if the following elements are present: (1) a valid complaint or
information; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (4) the defendant was
acquitted, or convicted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. In
case at bar, it is undisputed the presence of all the elements of double jeopardy: (1) a valid Information for robbery with
homicide was filed; (2) the Information was filed in the court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the accused pleaded not guilty
to the charge; and (4) the RTC acquitted Danilo for the crime of robbery for lack of sufficient evidence, which amounted to
an acquittal from which no appeal can be had. Indeed the conviction for murder was premised on the fact that robbery
was not proven. The RTC Decision which found accused guilty of the crime of murder and not of robbery with homicide on
the ground of insufficiency of evidence is a judgment of acquittal as to the crime of robbery alone.
Doctrine of finality of judgements: a judgment of acquital is final and unappealabe - As it stands, the acquittal on the crime
of robbery based on lack of sufficient evidence is immediately final and cannot be appealed on the ground of double
jeopardy. A judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable. In fact, the Court cannot, even an appeal based on an alleged
misappreciation of evidence, review the verdict of acquittal of the trial court due to the constitutional proscription, the
purpose of which is to afford the defendant, who has been acquitted, final repose and safeguard from government
oppression through the abuse of criminal processes. The crime of robbery was not proven during the trial. As we
discussed, the acquittal of the accused-appellant, including Danilo, is not reversible.
Facts
Accused-appellant Danilo, armed with a “sumpak,” allegedly hit Emilio with a “bakal” while accused-appellant Antonio,
who was armed with a “samurai,” hacked Emilio in the forehead and struck him with a lead pipe at the right back portion of
his legs and middle back portion of his torso. The accused were charged with robbery and homicide. The RTC did not find
the accused guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide as charged in the Information, but found all the accused guilty of
the crime of murder. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modifications the ruling of the RTC and found
all of the accused guilty of the crime of murder. However, contrary to the findings of the RTC with regard to the crime of
robbery, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the RTC and found accused Danilo guilty of the separate crime of
robbery.
Issue
Whether or not there is a ground for motion to quash in this case
Held
YES, on the ground of double jeopardy. The appellate court erred for violating the constitutional right of Danilo against
double jeopardy as enshrined in Section 21, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
Double jeopardy attaches if the following elements are present: (1) a valid complaint or information; (2) a court of
competent jurisdiction; (3) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (4) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted or
the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
In case at bar, it is undisputed the presence of all the elements of double jeopardy: (1) a valid Information for robbery with
homicide was filed; (2) the Information was filed in the court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the accused pleaded not guilty
to the charge; and (4) the RTC acquitted Danilo for the crime of robbery for lack of sufficient evidence, which amounted to
an acquittal from which no appeal can be had. Indeed the conviction for murder was premised on the fact that robbery
was not proven.
The RTC Decision which found accused guilty of the crime of murder and not of robbery with homicide on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence is a judgment of acquittal as to the crime of robbery alone. As the first jeopardy already attached,
the appellate court is precluded from ruling on the innocence or guilt of Danilo of the crime of robbery. To once again rule
on the innocence or guilt of the accused of the same crime transgresses the Constitutional prohibition not to put any
person “twice x x x in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.”
RULE 118 – Pre-Trial
A. Pre-Trial in civil cases vs. Pre-trial in criminal cases. Distinguish
B. Non-appearance at the pre-trial; effects
C. The Pre-trial Order; when and how done; effect of lack of Order
RULE 119 – Trial
A. The Speedy Trial Act/RA 8493
- the time requirement
- exclusions
- remedies
B. Order of Trial
- civil vs. criminal cases
C. Modes of Discovery in criminal cases
D. The “State-Witness” rule; requirements
E. Mistake in charging the proper offenses; effects
F. Demurrer to Evidence
G. Reopening vs. New Trial
Reopening vs. New Trial
Abrogueña
SALVANERA vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 143093. May 21, 2007.
Conspirators being a witness- Where a crime is contrived in secret, the discharge of one of the conspirators is essential
because only they have knowledge of the crime. The other prosecution witnesses are not eyewitnesses to the crime, as,
in fact, there is none. No one except the conspirators knew and witnessed the murder.
In Mapa v. Sandiganbayan, it was held:
“The decision to grant immunity from prosecution forms a constituent part of the prosecution process. It is essentially a
tactical decision to forego prosecution of a person for government to achieve a higher objective. It is a deliberate
renunciation of the right of the State to prosecute all who appear to be guilty of having committed a crime. Its justification
lies in the particular need of the State to obtain the conviction of the more guilty criminals who, otherwise, will probably
elude the long arm of the law. Whether or not the delicate power should be exercised, who should be extended the
privilege, the timing of its grant, are questions addressed solely to the sound judgment of the prosecution. The power to
prosecute includes the right to determine who shall be prosecuted and the corollary right to decide whom not to
prosecute.
It further ruled: “In reviewing the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in these areas, the jurisdiction of the respondent
court is limited. For the business of a court of justice is to be an impartial tribunal, and not to get involved with the success
or failure of the prosecution to prosecute. Every now and then, the prosecution may err in the selection of its strategies,
but such errors are not for neutral courts to rectify, any more than courts should correct the blunders of the defense. For
fairness demands that courts keep the scales of justice at equipoise between and among all litigants. Due process
demands that courts should strive to maintain the legal playing field perfectly even and perpetually level.”
Cancellation of bail bond- Lastly, the court ruled in favor of the appellate court in canceling the bail bond of Salvanera.
The grant of petitioner’s application for bail is premature. It has to await the testimony of state witnesses Abutin and
Tampelix. Their testimonies must be given their proper weight in determining whether the Salvanera is entitled to bail.
Facts
In an Information, petitioner Rimberto Salvanera, together with Feliciano Abutin, Edgardo Lungcay and Domingo
Tampelix, is charged with the murder of Ruben Parane, committed as follows:
“That on or about October 23, 1995, in the Municipality of Gen. Trias, Province of Cavite, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each
other, with treachery and evident premeditation, then armed with a firearm, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously assault, attack and shoot one RUBEN PARANE Y MAGSAMBOL, inflicting gunshot wound on his body,
resulting to his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said victim. CONTRARY TO LAW.”
Salvanera applied for bail while the prosecution moved for the discharge of accused Feliciano Abutin and
Domingo Tampelix, to serve as state witnesses.
The trial court granted petitioner’s application for bail and denied the prosecution’s motion for the discharge of
accused Abutin and Tampelix. The prosecution moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied.
The prosecution then appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals sustained the prosecution. It
discharged accused Feliciano Abutin and Domingo Tampelix from the Information to become state witnesses, and
canceled the bail bond of petitioner Salvanera.
Hence, this appeal.
Issues
1.
Whether or not the prosecution can use Abutin and Tampelix as witnesses against Salvanera.
2.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the bail of Salvanera.
Held
1.
As part of the conspiracy, Abutin and Tampelix can testify on the criminal plan of the conspirators. Where a crime is
contrived in secret, the discharge of one of the conspirators is essential because only they have knowledge of the
crime. The other prosecution witnesses are not eyewitnesses to the crime, as, in fact, there is none. No one except
the conspirators knew and witnessed the murder. The testimonies of the accused and proposed state witnesses
Abutin and Tampelix can directly link petitioner to the commission of the crime.
The prosecutor knows the evidence in his possession and the witnesses he needs to establish his case. In Mapa v.
Sandiganbayan, we held:
“The decision to grant immunity from prosecution forms a constituent part of the prosecution process. It is essentially
a tactical decision to forego prosecution of a person for government to achieve a higher objective. It is a deliberate
renunciation of the right of the State to prosecute all who appear to be guilty of having committed a crime. Its
justification lies in the particular need of the State to obtain the conviction of the more guilty criminals who, otherwise,
will probably elude the long arm of the law. Whether or not the delicate power should be exercised, who should be
extended the privilege, the timing of its grant, are questions addressed solely to the sound judgment of the
prosecution. The power to prosecute includes the right to determine who shall be prosecuted and the corollary right
to decide whom not to prosecute.
It further ruled:
“In reviewing the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in these areas, the jurisdiction of the respondent court is limited.
For the business of a court of justice is to be an impartial tribunal, and not to get involved with the success or failure
of the prosecution to prosecute. Every now and then, the prosecution may err in the selection of its strategies, but
such errors are not for neutral courts to rectify, any more than courts should correct the blunders of the defense. For
fairness demands that courts keep the scales of justice at equipoise between and among all litigants. Due process
demands that courts should strive to maintain the legal playing field perfectly even and perpetually level.”
2. Lastly, the court ruled in favor of the appellate court in canceling the bail bond of Salvanera. The grant of petitioner’s
application for bail is premature. It has to await the testimony of state witnesses Abutin and Tampelix. Their testimonies
must be given their proper weight in determining whether the Salvanera is entitled to bail.
Reopening vs. New Trial
Romero
G.R. No. 152643
August 28, 2008
CONCEPCION CUENCO VDA. DE MANGUERRA and THE HON. RAMON C. CODILLA, JR., Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 19, petitioners,
vs.
RAUL RISOS, SUSANA YONGCO, LEAH ABARQUEZ and ATTY. GAMALIEL D.B. BONJE, respondents.
CONDITIONAL EXAMINATION OF BOTH THE DEFENSE AND PROSECUTION WITNESSES;
It is basic that all witnesses shall give their testimonies at the trial of the case in the presence of the judge. This is
especially true in criminal cases in order that the accused may be afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses
pursuant to his constitutional right to confront the witnesses face to face. It also gives the parties and their counsel the
chance to propound such questions as they deem material and necessary to support their position or to test the credibility
of said witnesses. Lastly, this rule enables the judge to observe the witnesses demeanor.
This rule, however, is not absolute. As exceptions, Rules 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court provide for the different modes of
discovery that may be resorted to by a party to an action. These rules are adopted either to perpetuate the testimonies of
witnesses or as modes of discovery. In criminal proceedings, Sections 12, 13 and 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, allow the conditional examination of both the defense and
prosecution witnesses.
Facts
Respondents were charged with Estafa Through Falsification of Public Document before the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City, Branch 19. The case arose from thefalsification of a deed of real estate
mortgage
allegedly committed by respondents where they made it appear that Concepcion, the owner of the mortgaged property
known as the Gorordo property, affixed her signature to the document. Concepcion, who was a resident of Cebu City,
while on vacation in Manila, was unexpectedly confined atthe Makati Medical Center due to upper gastrointestinal bleeding; and was advised to stay in Manila for further treatment.
Respondents then filed a Motion for Suspension of the Proceedings in Criminal Case No. CBU-52248 on the ground of
prejudicial question.
They argued that Civil Case No. CEB-20359, which was an action for declaration of nullity of the mortgage, should first be
resolved. On May 11, 2000, the RTC granted the aforesaid motion. Concepcion’s motion for reconsideration was denied
on June 5, 2000. This prompted Concepcion to institute a special civil action for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals seeking the nullification of the May 11 and June 5 RTC orders. The counsel of Concepcion filed a motion to take
the latter’s deposition. He explained the need to perpetuate Concepcion’s testimony due to her weak physical condition
and old
age,
which limited
her
freedom
of
mobility.
RTC
granted
the
motion
and
ordered the taking of the deposition before the Clerk of the Makati RTC.
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals;
Court of Appeals rendered a judgment favorable to the respondents. Court of Appeals ratiocinated that the examination
of prosecution witnesses, as in the present case, is governed by Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure and not Rule 23 of the Rules of Court. The latter provision, said the appellate court, only applies to civil cases.
Pursuant to the specific provision of Section 15, Rule 119, Concepcion’s deposition should have been taken before the
judge or the court where the case is pending, which is the RTC of Cebu, and not before the Clerk of Court of Makati City;
and thus, in issuing the assailed order, the RTC clearly committed grave abuse of discretion.
Issue
Whether or not Rule 23 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure applies to the deposition of Concepcion, who was granted a
conditional examination, and may thus be applicable to criminal prosecution?
Held
The court ruled in the negative.
It is basic that all witnesses shall give their testimonies at the trial of the case in the presence of the judge. This is
especially true in criminal cases in order that the accused may be afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses
pursuant to his constitutional right to confront the witnesses face to face. It also gives the parties and their counsel the
chance to propound such questions as they deem material and necessary to support their position or to test the credibility
of said witnesses. Lastly, this rule enables the judge to observe the witnesses' demeanor.
This rule however, is not absolute. As exceptions, Rules 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court provide for different MODES OF
DISCOVERY that may be resorted to by a party to an action. These rules are adopted either to perpetuate the testimonies
of witnesses or as modes of discovery.
In
criminal
proceedings,
Sections
12,
13,
and
15
of
Rule
119, which took effect
1 December 2000, allow theconditional examination of both the defense and prosecution witnesses. In the case at bench,
in issue is the examination of a prosecution witness who according to the petitioners was too sick to travel and appear
before the trial court.
Section 15 of Rule 119 comes into play and it provides:
Section 15. Examination of witness for prosecution When it satisfactorily appears that a witness for the prosecution is too
sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or has to leave the Philippines with
no definite date of returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending. Such
examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his absence, after reasonable notice to attend the examination has
been served on him, shall be conducted in the same manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the
accused to attend the examination after notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in
behalf of or against the accused
Petition was subsequently DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution.
Reopening vs. New Trial
Naca
JIMENEZ v. PEOPLE
G.R. 209195, 209215 Sept. 17, 2014
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; The well-settled rule is that a petition for certiorari against a
court which has jurisdiction over a case will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is clear and patent.
The well-settled rule is that a petition for certiorari against a court which has jurisdiction over a case will prosper only if
grave abuse of discretion is clear and patent. The burden is on the part of the petitioner to prove not merely reversible
error, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent issuing
the impugned order. Notably, mere abuse of discretion is not enough; the abuse must be grave. Jurisprudence has
defined “grave abuse of discretion” as the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility.
Same; Same; Same; To the prosecution belongs the control of its case and the Supreme Court (SC) cannot
dictate on its choice in the discharge of a state witness, save only when the legal requirements have not been
complied with.
In the present case, not one of the accused-conspirators, except Montero, was willing to testify on the alleged murder of
Ruby Rose and their participation in her killing. Hence, the CA was correct in ruling that Judge Docena acted properly and
in accordance with jurisprudence in ruling that there was absolute necessity for the testimony of Montero. He alone is
available to provide direct evidence of the crime. That the prosecution could use the voluntary statements of Montero
without his discharge as a state witness is not an important and relevant consideration. To the prosecution belongs the
control of its case and this Court cannot dictate on its choice in the discharge of a state witness, save only when the legal
requirements have not been complied with. The prosecution’s right to prosecute gives it “a wide range of discretion — the
discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors which are
best appreciated by prosecutors.” Under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the court is
given the power to discharge a state witness only after it has already acquired jurisdiction over the crime and the accused.
Same; Same; Same; To resolve a motion to discharge under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the Rules only require that the testimony of the accused sought to be discharged be
substantially corroborated in its material points, not on all points.
We emphasize at this point that to resolve a motion to discharge under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the Rules only require that that the testimony of the accused sought to be discharged be substantially
corroborated in its material points, not on all points. This rule is based on jurisprudential line that in resolving a motion to
discharge under Section 17, Rule 119, a trial judge cannot be expected or required, at the start of the trial, to inform
himself with absolute certainty of everything that may develop in the course of the trial with respect to the guilty
participation of the accused. If that were practicable or possible, there would be little need for the formality of a trial.
Same; Same; Same; It is still the trial court that determines whether the prosecution’s preliminary assessment of
the accused-witness’ qualifications to be a state witness satisfies the procedural norms.
In the present case, the CA cited Quarto v. Marcelo, 658 SCRA 580 (2011), in ruling that the trial court must rely in large
part upon the suggestions and the information furnished by the prosecuting officer, thus: A trial judge cannot be expected
or required to inform himself with absolute certainty at the very outset of the trial as to everything which may be developed
in the course of the trial in regard to the guilty participation of the accused in the commission of the crime charged in the
complaint. If that were practicable or possible there would be little need for the formality of a trial. He must rely in large
part upon the suggestions and the information furnished by the prosecuting officer in coming to his conclusions as to the
“necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested”; as to the availability or nonavailability of other
direct or corroborative evidence; as to which of the accused is “most guilty,” and the like. We deem it important to place
this ruling in its proper context lest we create the wrong impression that the trial court is a mere “rubber stamp” of the
prosecution, in the manner that Jimenez now argues. In Quarto, we emphasized that it is still the trial court that
determines whether the prosecution’s preliminary assessment of the accused-witness’ qualifications to be a state witness
satisfies the procedural norms. This relationship is in reality a symbiotic one as the trial court, by the very nature of its role
in the administration of justice, largely exercises its prerogative based on the prosecutor’s findings and evaluation.
Facts
Manuel A. Montero confessed his participation in the killing of Ruby Rose Barrameda. On the course of such confession,
he included Manuel J. Jimenez and several others as his co-conspirators. His statements detailed where the alleged steel
casing containing the body of Ruby Rose was dumped, led to the recovery of a cadaver near the place which he pointed.
Moreover, he mentioned that Ruby Rose was made to wear a “busal” which was contended by Jimenez.
Montero filed a motion for discharge as a state witness for the prosecution. It was opposed by Jimenez. The motion to
discharge was granted by Judge Zaldy B. Docena stating that the prosecution had presented clear, satisfactory and
convincing evidence showing compliance with the requisites of granting the said motion.
Jimenez opposed Judge Docena’s ruling averring that the Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the
motion to discharge because: (1) the requirements for granting a motion were not properly complied with; (2) there is no
absolute necessity of the testimony of Montero; (3) Montero’s testimony do not corroborate with the prosecution’s
evidence; (4) and Montero is favored as a state witness though he appears to be the most guilty.
Issue
Whether or not Judge Docena gravely abused his discretion upon granting of the motion to discharge Montero as a state
witness on the ground that Montero's testimony did not satisfy the requisites in Sec 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.
Held
No. Judge Docena did not gravely abuse his discretion. His decision is in keeping with the requisites under Section 17,
Rule 19.
In the discharge of an accused in order that he may be a state witness, the following conditions must be present, namely:
(1) Two or more accused are jointly charged with the commission of an offense;
(2) The motion for discharge is filed by the prosecution before it rests its case;
(3) The prosecution is required to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a
hearing in support of the discharge;
(4) The accused gives his consent to be a state witness; and
(5) The trial court is satisfied that:
a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested;
b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except
the testimony of said accused;
c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and,
e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
Jimenez disputed the satisfaction of the conditions 3 and 5 (a) to (d).
First, the Court found that there was an absolute necessity for the testimony of Manuel. All the accused-conspirators did
not want to cooperate, except for Manuel.
Secondly, Montero's testimony can be substantially corroborated despite the alleged discrepancies for purposes of motion
to discharge. The discrepancies may be properly dealt with during the trial itself.
Moreover, Montero was not the most guilty. By jurisprudence, "most guilty" refers to the highest degree of culpability in
terms of participation in the commission of the offense and does not necessarily mean the severity of the penalty
imposed. While all the accused may be given the same penalty by reason of conspiracy, yet one may be considered to
have lesser or the least guilt taking into account his degree of participation in the commission of the offense.
Reopening vs. New Trial
Parulan
People v De Grano
Criminal Procedure; Trial in Absentia; Stages of the Trial Where the Presence of the Accused is Required.—Section
14(2), Article III of the Constitution, authorizing trials in absentia, allows the accused to be absent at the trial but not at
certain stages of the proceedings, to wit: (a) at arraignment and plea, whether of innocence or of guilt; (b) during trial,
whenever necessary for identification purposes; and (c) at the promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in
which case, the accused may appear by counsel or representative. At such stages of the proceedings, his presence is
required and cannot be waived.
Facts
An Information for murder committed against Emmanuel Mendoza was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
6, Tanauan, Batangas, against Joven de Grano (Joven), Armando de Grano (Armando), and Estanislao Lacaba
(Estanislao), together with their co-accused Leonides Landicho (Leonides), Domingo Landicho (Domingo), and Leonardo
Genil (Leonardo).
Duly arraigned, Joven, Armando, and Estanislao pleaded "not guilty" to the crime as charged; while their co-accused
Leonides, Leonardo, and Domingo remained at-large. Thereafter, respondents filed a motion for bail contending that the
prosecution’s evidence was not strong.
The prosecution then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA which was denied. They sought recourse before this Court.
the decision of the CA together with the Order of the RTC granting bail to the respondent was set aside. The RTC was
also ordered to immediately issue a warrant of arrest against the accuse. As a result, Estanislao was re-arrested, but
Joven and Armando were not.
However, upon respondents’ motion for reconsideration, this Court resolved to remand the case to the RTC. The RTC
found several accused guilty of the offense as charged. But the case as against accused Leonides Landicho and
Leonardo Genil was sent to the files or archived cases to be revived as soon as said accused are apprehended.
Only Estanislao was present at the promulgation despite due notice to the other respondents.
In its Opposition, the prosecution pointed out that while the accused jointly moved for the reconsideration of the decision,
all of them, except Estanislao, were at-large. Having opted to become fugitives and be beyond the judicial ambit, they lost
their right to file such motion for reconsideration and to ask for whatever relief from the court.
Respondents filed a Joint Motion for Reconsideration praying that the Decision be reconsidered and set aside and a new
one be entered acquitting them. The RTC issued an Order modifying its earlier decision by acquitting Joven and
Armando, and downgrading the conviction of Domingo and Estanislao from murder to homicide.
Estanislao filed a Notice of Appeal. The RTC issued an Order denying the motion and giving due course to Estanislao’s
notice of appeal.
Petitioner, filed a Petition for certiorari before the CA arguing that the private respondents, having deliberately evaded
arrest after being denied bail and deliberately failing to attend the promulgation of the Decision despite due notice, lost the
right to move for reconsideration of their conviction and that the grounds relied upon by respondent RTC in modifying its
Decision are utterly erroneous.
Respondent De Grano filed a Motion to Dismiss,arguing that the verification and certification portion of the petition was
flawed, since it was signed only by counsel and not by the aggrieved party. Also, the petition did not contain the
conformity of the Solicitor General.
Petitioner filed an Opposition to Motion to Dismiss and explained that, for lack of material time, it failed to secure the
conformity of the OSG when it filed the petition, but it would nevertheless obtain it.
Anent the verification and certification of the petition having been signed by the private prosecutor, petitioner explained
that private complainant Teresita was in fear for her life as a result of the acquittal of former Mayor Joven de Grano, but
she was willing to certify the petition should she be given ample time to travel to Manila.
However, the petition was dismissed outright by the CA on the grounds that it was not filed by the OSG and that the
assailed Orders were only photocopies and not certified true copies.
Petitioner timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Meanwhile, in its 1st Indorsement, DOJ Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez,
endorsed the petition filed by the Assistant City Prosecutor, with the assistance of the private prosecutor, to the Solicitor
General for his conformity.
On April 5, 2005, the CA issued a Resolution denying the motion.
Issue
Whether or not the accused who failed to appear without justifiable cause shall lose the remedies available in the Rules
against the judgment.
Held
Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Rules applicable at the time the Decision was
promulgated, provides:
Section 6. Promulgation of judgment. –The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of the accused and any
judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light offense the judgment may be
pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. When the judge is absent or outside the province or city, the
judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court.
If the accused is confined or detained in another province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the executive
judge of the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the place of confinement or detention upon request of the court
which rendered the judgment. The court promulgating the judgment shall have authority to accept the notice of appeal and
to approve the bail bond pending appeal; provided, that if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed
the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed and resolved by the
appellate court.
The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused, personally or through his bondsman or warden and counsel,
requiring him to be present at the promulgation of the decision. If the accused was tried in absentia because he jumped
bail or escaped from prison, the notice to him shall be served at his last known address.
In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment despite notice, the promulgation
shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last known address
or thru his counsel.
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he shall lose the
remedies available in these Rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from
promulgation of judgment however, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these
remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence was
for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice.
Thus, the accused who failed to appear without justifiable cause shall lose the remedies available in the Rules against the
judgment. However, within 15 days from promulgation of judgment, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave
of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state in his motion the reasons for his absence at the scheduled
promulgation, and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies
within 15 days from notice.
Reopening vs. New Trial
Pulido
JOCELYN ASISTIO y CONSINO, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND MONICA NEALIGA,
G.R. No. 200465, April 20, 2015
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Jurisdiction; In criminal cases, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the
averments of the complaint or information, in relation to the law prevailing at the time of the filing of the complaint or
information, and the penalty provided by law for the crime charged at the time of its commission – Section 32 of B.P. Blg.
129, as amended, provides that the MeTC has exclusive jurisdiction over offenses punishable with imprisonment not
exceeding six years, irrespective of the amount of fine: Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases – Except in cases falling within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: xxxx (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable
accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicted thereon, irrespective of
kind, nature, value, or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal
negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.
Same; Same; Same; Regional Trial Courts; Offenses punishable with imprisonment exceeding six (6) years,
irrespective of the amount of fine, fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), in
accordance with Sec. 20 of Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 129, as amended. – Section 20. Jurisdiction in criminal
cases. – Regional Trial Court shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, or body, except those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance of the latter.
Same; Same; Same; Conciliation; Mediation; Conciliation or mediation is not a prerequisite to the filing of a
criminal case for violation of Republic Act (RA) No. 6938 against petitioner, because such case is not an intra-cooperative
dispute. –On whether the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies was violated when the Cooperative filed a
criminal case against petitioner without undergoing conciliation/mediation proceedings pursuant to the Cooperative Code
and the Bylaws of the Cooperative, the Court rules in the negative. Conciliation or mediation is not a prerequisite to the
filing of a criminal case for violation of RA 6938 against petitioner, because such case is not an intra-cooperative dispute.
As aptly pointed out by the CA: Neither can the accused-appellee insist that this is an intra-cooperative dispute and
should have been resolved at the cooperative level. As aptly argued by the People, this is not an intra-cooperative
dispute. Intra-cooperative dispute is a dispute arising between or among members of the same cooperative .The instant
case is a dispute between the Cooperative and its former chairperson, the accused-appellee. The Board Resolution
authorizing the filing of the criminal complaint by the Board of Directors, for and in behalf of the Cooperative, is proof that
this is not an intra-cooperative dispute, and within the jurisdiction of the regular court.
Same; Same; Prosecution of Offense; Civil Liability; It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended
party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability, and her
role in the prosecution of the offense is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution. – In petitioner’s criminal case for
violation of Section 46 of RA 6938, the State is the real offended party, while the Cooperative and its members are mere
private complainants and witnesses whose interests are limited to the civil aspect thereof. Clearly, such criminal case can
hardly be considered an intra-cooperative dispute, as it is not one arising between or among members of the same
cooperative.
Same; Same; Double Jeopardy; On whether the remand of the criminal case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
violated her right against double jeopardy due to its earlier dismissal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the Court rules in
the negative and upholds the Court of Appeals (CA) in ruling that the dismissal having been granted upon petitioner’s
instance, double jeopardy did not attach.
Same; Same; Double Jeopardy; Requisites of – Section 7 of Rule 117 layws down the requisites in order that the
defense of double jeopardy may prosper. There is double jeopardy when the following requisites are present: (1) a first
jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy is for the same offenses as in the first. As to the first requisite,
the first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a
valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent.
Same; Same; It is basic in criminal procedure that an accused may be charged with as many crimes as defined in
our penal laws even if these arose from one incident – Since the Information filed against the petitioner were for separate
and distinct offenses as discussed above – the first against Article 172 (2) of the Revised Penal Code and the second
against Section 46 of the Cooperative Code (RA 6938) – one cannot be pleaded as a bar to the other under the rule on
double jeopardy. Besides, it is basic in criminal procedure that an accused may be charge with as many crims as defined
in our penal laws even if these arose from one incident. Thus, where a single act is directed against one person but said
act constitutes a violation of two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, or by a special law and the
Revised Penal Code, as in this case, the prosecution against one is not an obstacle to the prosecution of the other.
Facts
Jocelyn Asistio y Consino, the herein petitioner, was charged with violation of Section 46 of the Cooperative Code
of the Philippines (Republic Act No. 6938). As provided by the information filed against her, that on or about July 27, 1998,
an exclusive dealership agreement regarding the sale of Coca-Cola soft drinks at A. Mabini Elementary School was
executed between Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., and the petitioner, who is the chairperson and managing director
of A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative. This act of the petitioner was said to be in violation
of her duty as the chairperson. Despite the direction of the principal requiring the petitioner to submit financial reports
during her tenure as chairperson, the petitioner claimed that the principal had no authority to require her to submit such
documents since said reports were posted on the school bulletin board. Thereafter, an audit committee was created by
the principal, which eventually found out that the petitioner defrauded the Cooperative and its members for three (3)
years. They requested the petitioner to return the said amounts to the Cooperative, but she refused to do so. Hence, a
board resolution which authorized the filing of criminal charges against the petitioner was issued by the Cooperative.
After the prosecution presented its evidence, the petitioner moved to dismiss the case by way of
Demurrer to Evidence with leave of court and argued that the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction over the case. Thus,
the RTC dismissed the case because of lack of jurisdiction. The private prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration but
was denied by the RTC for lack of merit. The order of the dismissal of the case was appealed by the Office of the Solicitor
General which represents the People of the Philippines before the Court of Appeals. A decision reversing and setting
aside the RTC’s decision was rendered by the CA. The case was remanded to RTC for further proceedings. Thereafter,
the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court was filed by the petitioner before this Court.
Issue
Whether or not the dismissal of the charge against petitioner on demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal,
hence, final and unappealable.
Held
The Court ruled in the negative. As provided in Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, a demurrer to evidence in criminal
cases is filed after the prosecution had rested its case. When demurrer to evidence is granted, it calls for an appreciation
of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in
a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused (People vs. Sandiganbayan). Further, the
dismissal of the case cannot be appealed because it would place the accused in double jeopardy.
In the case at bar, demurrer to evidence was granted by the RTC for lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged
and not because of insufficiency of evidence. As it was stated by the CA, acquittal is always based on the merits wherein
the evidence does not show that the defendant’s guilt is beyond reasonable doubt. On the other hand, dismissal
terminates the proceedings because of lack of jurisdiction which the RTC had done in this case. Thus, the dismissal of the
case, which is only based on the lack of jurisdiction of the court and not on merits, does not amount to an acquittal and
can still be appealed.
The petition was denied, and the CA’s decision and resolution were affirmed.
Reopening vs. New Trial
Quillope
ANTONIO CABADOR v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 186001 October 2, 2009
Criminal Procedure; Demurrer to Evidence; Because some accused have in the past used the demurrer in
order to delay the proceedings in the case, the remedy now carries a caveat – when the accused files a demurrer
without leave of court, he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence and the case shall be
considered submitted for judgment. –
The trial proper in a criminal case usually has two first stages: first, the prosecution’s presentation of evidence
against the accused and, second, the accused’s presentation of evidence in his defense. If, after the prosecution has
presented its evidence, the same appears insufficient to support a conviction, te trial court may at its own initiative or on
motion of the accused dispense with the second stage and dismiss the criminal action. There is no point for the trial court
to hear the evidence of the accused in such a case since the prosecution bears the burden of proving his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. The order of dismissal amounts to an acquittal. But because some have in the past used the demurrer
in order to delay the proceedings in the case, the remedy now carries a caveat. When the accused files a demurrer
without leave of court, he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence and the case shall be considered
submitted for judgment. On occasions, this presents a problem such as when, like the situation in this case, the accused
files a motion to dismiss that, to the RTC, had the appearance of a demurrer to evidence. Cabador insists that it is not one
but the CA, like the lower court, ruled that it is.
Same; Same; Motion to Dismiss; “Demurrer to Evidence” and “Motion to Dismiss,” Distinguished;
Pleadings and Practice; to determine whether the pleading filed is a demurrer to evidence or a motion to dismiss,
the Court must consider (1) the allegations in it made in good faith; (2) the stage of the proceeding at which it is
filed; and (3) the primary objective of the party filing it. –
This Court held in Enojas, Jr. v. Commission on Elections that, to determine whether the pleading filed is a demurer to
evidence or a motion to dismiss, the Court must consider (1) the allegations in it made in good faith; (2) the stage of the
proceeding at which it is filed; and (3) the primary objective of the party filing it.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Speedy Trial; In criminal cases, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground of
denial of the accused’s right to speedy trial. –
In criminal cases, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground of denial of the accused’s right to speedy trial. This
denial is characterized by unreasonable, vexatious, and oppressive delays without fault of the accused, or by unjustified
postponements that unreasonably prolonged the trial. This was the main thrust of Cabador’s motion to dismiss and he
had the right to bring this up for a ruling by the trial court.
Cabador of course dropped a few lines in his motion to dismiss in paragraphs "11 (sic)" and 12, saying that the trial court
"has no evidence to consider," "the charge has no leg to stand on," and that "the witnesses x x x had no knowledge of any
connection with or any participation by the accused in the incident." But these were mere conclusions, highlighting what
five years of trial had accomplished.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A demurrer to evidence assumes that the prosecution has already rested its case;
where the accused filed his motion to dismiss before he could object to the prosecution’s formal offer before the
trial court could act on the offer, and before the prosecution could rest its case, it could not be said that he had
intended his motion to dismiss to serve as a demurrer to evidence. –
A demurrer to evidence assumes that the prosecution has already rested its case. Section 23, Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, reads: “Demurrer to evidence. – After the prosecution rests its case, the court may
dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the
opportunity to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to the evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court.”
(Emphasis supplied) Here, after the prosecution filed its formal offer of exhibits on August 1, 2006, the same day Cabador
filed his motion to dismiss, the trial court still needed to give him an opportunity to object to the admission of those
exhibits. It also needed to rule on the formal offer. And only after such a ruling could the prosecution be deemed to have
rested its case. Since Cabador filed his motion to dismiss before he could object to the prosecution’s formal offer, before
the trial court could act on the offer, and before the prosecution could rest its case, it could not be said that he had
intended his motion to dismiss to serve as a demurrer to evidence.
Facts
A petition for review on certiorari, assailing the CA Decision and Resolution that affirmed the Order of the RTC of
Quezon City.
The public prosecutor accused Cabador before the RTC of Quezon City of murdering, in conspiracy with others,
Atty. Jun N. Valerio. After presenting only five witnesses over five years of intermittent trial, the RTC declared at the end
the prosecution’s presentation of evidence and required the prosecution to make a written or formal offer of its
documentary evidence within 15 days from notice. But the public prosecutor asked for three extensions of time, the last of
which was to end on July 28, 2006. Still, the prosecution did not make the required written offer.
Cabador filed a motion to dismiss the case complaining of a turtle-paced proceeding in the case since his arrest
and detention in 2001 and invoking his right to a speedy trial. Further, he claimed that in the circumstances, the trial court
could not consider any evidence against him that had not been formally offered. He also pointed out that the prosecution
witnesses did not have knowledge of his alleged part in the crime charged.
The RTC issued an Order treating petitioner Cabador’s motion to dismiss as a demurrer to evidence. And, since
he filed his motion without leave of court, the RTC declared him to have waived his right to present evidence in his
defense. The trial court deemed the case submitted for decision insofar as he was concerned. Cabador filed a motion for
reconsideration of this Order but the RTC denied it. Cabador questioned the RTC’s actions before the CA but the latter
denied his petition and affirmed the lower court’s actions. With the CA’s denial of his motion for reconsideration, the
petitioner came to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari.
Issue
Whether Cabador’s motion to dismiss before the trial court was in fact a demurrer to evidence filed without leave of court.
Held
The trial proper in a criminal case usually has two stages: first, the prosecution’s presentation of evidence against
the accused and, second, the accused’s presentation of evidence in his defense. If, after the prosecution has presented
its evidence, the same appears insufficient to support a conviction, the trial court may at its own initiative or on motion of
the accused dispense with the second stage and dismiss the criminal action. There is no point for the trial court to hear
the evidence of the accused in such a case since the prosecution bears the burden of proving his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. The order of dismissal amounts to an acquittal.
But because some have in the past used the demurrer in order to delay the proceedings in the case, the remedy
now carries a caveat. When the accused files a demurrer without leave of court, he shall be deemed to have waived the
right to present evidence and the case shall be considered submitted for judgment. On occasions, this presents a problem
such as when, like the situation in this case, the accused files a motion to dismiss that, to the RTC, had the appearance of
a demurrer to evidence. Cabador insists that it is not one but the CA, like the lower court, ruled that it is.
This Court held in Enojas, Jr. v. Commission on Elections that, to determine whether the pleading filed is a
demurer to evidence or a motion to dismiss, the Court must consider (1) the allegations in it made in good faith; (2) the
stage of the proceeding at which it is filed; and (3) the primary objective of the party filing it.
In criminal cases, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground of denial of the accused’s right to speedy trial.
This denial is characterized by unreasonable, vexatious, and oppressive delays without fault of the accused, or by
unjustified postponements that unreasonably prolonged the trial. This was the main thrust of Cabador’s motion to dismiss
and he had the right to bring this up for a ruling by the trial court.
The fact is that Cabador did not even bother to do what is so fundamental in any demurrer. He did not state what
evidence the prosecution had presented against him to show in what respects such evidence failed to meet the elements
of the crime charged. His so-called "demurrer" did not touch on any particular testimony of even one witness. He cited no
documentary exhibit. Indeed, he could not because, he did not know that the prosecution finally made its formal offer of
exhibits on the same date he filed his motion to dismiss.To say that Cabador filed a demurrer to evidence is equivalent to
the proverbial blind man, touching the side of an elephant, and exclaiming that he had touched a wall.
Besides, a demurrer to evidence assumes that the prosecution has already rested its case. Section 23, Rule 119
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, reads:
Demurrer to evidence. – After the prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the action on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the opportunity to be heard or (2) upon
demurrer to the evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court.
In sum, tested against the criteria laid down in Enojas, the Court finds that petitioner Cabador filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial, not a demurrer to evidence. He cannot be declared to have
waived his right to present evidence in his defense. On a final note, a demurrer to evidence shortens the proceedings in
criminal cases. Caution must, however, be exercised in view of its pernicious consequence on the right of the accused to
present evidence in his defense, the seriousness of the crime charged, and the gravity of the penalty involved.
Reopening vs. New Trial
Ramirez
PEOPLE VS HERSON TAN
G.R. No. 117321. February 11, 1998
Criminal Procedure; Demurrer to Evidence; Grant of a demurrer to evidence operates as an acquittal and is thus
final and unappealable. - In People v. Sandiganbayan, 447 scra 291 (2004), this Court explained the general rule that
the grant of a demurrer to evidence operates as an acquittal and is, thus, final and unappealable, to wit: The demurrer to
evidence in criminal, such as the one at bar, is “ filed after the prosecution had rested its case, “ and when the same is
granted, it calls “for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction
beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused.”
Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to
place the accused in double jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends there.
Same; Same; Double Jeopardy; Elements of Double Jeopardy. - The elements of double jeopardy are (1) the
complaint or information was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the court had jurisdiction; (3) the
accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was convicted or acquitted, or the case was
dismissed without his express consent.
Same; Same; Same; The rule on double jeopardy is not without exceptions; The only instance when double
jeopardy will not attach is when the Regional Trial Court (RTC) acted with grave abuse of discretion.- The rule on double
jeopardy, however, is not without exceptions. In People v. Laguio, Jr., 518 SCRA 393 (2007), this Court stated that the
only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion.
Same; Same; Same; Prosecution denied due process of law when the trial was but a mock trial.- In Galman v.
Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43 (1986), this Court ruled that the prosecution was denied due process of law when the trial
was but a mock trial, to wit: More so does the rule against the invoking of double jeopardy hold in the case at bar where
as we have held, the sham trial was but a mock trial where the authoritarian president ordered respondents
Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan to rig the trial and closely monitored the entire proceedings to assure the predetermined
final outcome of acquittal and total absolution as innocent of all the respondents-accused. In addition, in People v. Bocar,
138 SCRA 166 (1985), this Court ruled that there is no double jeopardy when the prosecution was not allowed to
complete its presentation of evidence by the trial court.
Same; Same; Same; The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction which cannot be attributed to the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) simply because it chose not to hold in abeyance the resolution of the demurrer to evidence.- While it would have
been ideal for the RTC to hold in abeyance the resolution of the demurrer to evidence, nowhere in the rules, however, is it
mandated to do so. Furthermore, even if this Court were to consider the same as an error on the part of the RTC, the
same would merely constitute an error of procedure or of judgment and not an error of jurisdiction as persistently argued
by petitioner. Errors or irregularities, which do not render the proceedings a nullity, will not defeat a plea of antrefois
acquit. We are bound by the dictum that whatever error may have been committed effecting the dismissal of the case
cannot now be corrected because of the timely plea of double jeopardy. To reiterate, the only instance when double
jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction which cannot be attributed to the RTC simply because it chose not to hold in abeyance the resolution of the
demurrer to evidence.
Same; Same; Same; The fundamental philosophy behind the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy
is to afford defendant who has been acquitted, final repose and safeguard him from government oppression through the
abuse of criminal processes. - It bears to stress that the fundamental philosophy behind the constitutional proscription
against double jeopardy is to afford defendant who has been acquitted, final repose and safeguard him from government
oppression through the abuse of criminal processes. While petitioner insists that the RTC acted with grave abuse of
discretion, this Court finds that none can be attributed to the RTC. Consequently, the CA did not err when it affirmed the
assailed Orders of the RTC.
FACTS
That on December 5, 1988, at about 7:00 oclock p.m., tricycle driver Freddie Saavedra went to see his wife, Delfa, at Our
Lady of Angels Academy in Atimonan, Quezon, to inform her that he will drive both accused to Barangay Maligaya. It was
the last time, however, that Freddie was seen alive. He was found in Malinao, Atimonan sprawled on the ground with
fourteen stab wounds in different parts of his body.
Accused-appellant Herson Tan, along with Lito Amido, were charged with the crime of highway robbery with
murder before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, of Gumaca, Quezon Province. At the trial, Lt. Carlos, on crossexamination, testified that when he invited appellant to their headquarters, he had no warrant for his arrest. In the course
thereof, he informed the latter that he was a suspect, not only in the instant case, but also in two other robbery cases
allegedly committed in Lucena City. In the belief that they were merely conversing inside the police station, he admitted
that he did not inform appellant of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to the assistance of counsel; nor did he
reduce the supposed confession to writing. Appellant allegedly gave an explicit account of what actually transpired in the
case at bar. He narrated that he and co-accused Amido were responsible for the loss of the motorcycle and the
consequent death of Saavedra.
The RTC found Herson Tan guilty beyond reasonable doubt sentenced him to suffer an imprisonment of RECLUSION
PERPETUA and further ordered to indemnify the family of the deceased in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00). Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE
Whether or not the confession of an accused given before a police investigator upon invitation and without the benefit of
counsel be admissible in evidence against him.
HELD
NO. It is well-settled that the Constitution abhors an uncounselled confession or admission and whatever information is
derived therefrom shall be regarded as inadmissible in evidence against the confessant.
Article III, Section 12, paragraphs (1) and (3) of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his
right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot
afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
xxxxxxxxx
Sec. 12 (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible against
him.
Republic Act No. 7438 (R.A. No. 7438), reinforced the constitutional mandate protecting the rights of persons under
custodial investigation.
As used in this Act, custodial investigation shall include the practice of issuing an invitation to a person who is investigated
in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the inviting officer for
any violation of law.
Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner. The rules on custodial investigation
begin to operate as soon as the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus
a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries out a process of interrogations that tends
itself to eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins to operate.
Furthermore, not only does the fundamental law impose, as a requisite function of the investigating officer, the duty
to explain those rights to the accused but also that there must correspondingly be a meaningful communication to and
understanding thereof by the accused. A mere perfunctory reading by the constable of such rights to the accused would
thus not suffice.
Under the Constitution and existing law and jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible must satisfy the following
requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3)
it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing.
While the Constitution sanctions the waiver of the right to counsel, it must, however, be voluntary, knowing and
intelligent, and must be made in the presence and with the assistance of counsel.
Reopening vs. New Trial
Santos
NELSON IMPERIAL, ET AL. vs. MARICEL JOSON, ET AL.
G.R. Nos. 160067, 170410, 171622
November 17, 2010
Remedial Law; Certiorari; Like prohibition; the rule is settled that certiorari may be issued only for the corrections of errors
of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
–It bears emphasizing at the outset that the petitions for certiorari and prohibition petitioners filed before the CA were all
anchored on the grave abuse of discretion supposedly imputable against the RTCs of Naga, Lucena and Parañaque for
issuing the rulings therein assailed. Like prohibition, however, the rule is settled that certiorari may be issued only for the
correction of errors of jurisdiction of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Because their
function is limited to keeping inferior courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction, the writs therefor may be issued only in
cases lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In the context of said
special civil actions, it has been consistently held that grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law,
or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility.
Same; Same; A writ of certiorari cannot be exercised in order to review the judgment of the lower court as to its intrinsic
correctness, either upon the law or the facts of the case; The rule is settled that errors of judgment involving the wisdom
or legal soundness of a decision are beyond the province of a petition for certiorari.
–Consistent with its function as a remedy for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, however, the rule is settled that errors
of judgment involving the wisdom or legal soundness of a decision are beyond the province of a petition for certiorari. Not
being intended to correct every controversial interlocutory ruling, a writ of certiorari cannot be exercised in order to review
the judgment of the lower court as to its intrinsic correctness, either upon the law or the facts of the case. As long as the
trial court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged error committed in the exercise of its discretion will, therefore, amount to
nothing more than mere errors of judgments, correctible by an appeal and not by a petition for certiorari.
Same; Actions; Litis Pendentia; Factors to be considered in the determination of which court would be in a better position
to serve the interests of justice.
–Under the “interest of justice rule,” moreover, the determination of which court would be “in a better position to serve the
interests of justice” also entails the consideration of the following factors: (a) the nature of the controversy; (b) the
comparative accessibility of the court to the parties; and, (c) other similar factors. Considering the majority of the parties
live closer to the Parañaque RTC, we cannot hospitable entertain petitioners’ insistence that the abatement of the case
before said court in favor of the one they filed before the Naga RTC would promote the expeditious and inexpensive
disposition of the parties’ complaints for damages against each other which are indisputably personal in nature.
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Right to Speedy Trial; Right is considered violated only when the proceeding is
attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays; Factors to be considered in determining whether the accused
has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case and to a speedy trial.
–Designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite
time and to prevent delays in the administration of justice, said right is considered violated only when the proceeding is
attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. In the case of Corpuz vs. Sandiganbayan, 442 SCRA 294
(2004), this Court significantly ruled as follows: x x x In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to
a speedy disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason
for the delay; (c) the defendant’s assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant.” Xxxx
Same; Same; Same; In determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts are required to do more than a
mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case and to give particular
regard to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.
–Although the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure concededly mandates the commencement of the trial within 30 days
from receipt of the pre-trial order and the continuous conduct thereof for a period not exceeding 180 days, Section 3 a (1),
Rule 119 provides that delays resulting from extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders shall be excluded in
computing the time within which trial must commence. In determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, moreover,
courts are “required to do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled
hearings of the case” and to give particular regard to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.
Remedial Law; Default; Time and again, the Court has espoused a policy of liberality in setting aside orders of default
which are frowned upon.
–Inasmuch as procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases, courts have likewise been
exhorted to afford party-litigants the amplest opportunity to have their cases justly determined, free from the constraints of
technicalities. Time and again, this Court has espoused a policy of liberality in setting aside orders of default which are
frowned upon, as a case is best decided when all contending parties are able to ventilate their respective claims, present
their arguments and adduce evidence in support thereof. Thus, the issuance of the orders of default should be the
exception rather than the rule, to be allowed only in clear cases of obstinate refusal by the defendant to comply with the
orders of the trial court.
Facts
On 11 May 2001, along the National Highway in Barangay Concepcion, Sariaya, Quezon, an Isuzu ten-wheeler
truck collided with a Fuso six-wheeler truck. The Isuzu ten-wheeler truck was owned by petitioner Nelson Imperial and
was then being driven by petitioner Santos Francisco. On the other hand, the Fuso six-wheeler truck was driven by
respondent Santiago Giganto, Jr., who was, at the time, accompanied by a helper or pahinante, respondent Samuel
Cubeta. After colliding with the Fuso six-wheeler truck, the Isuzu ten-wheeler truck further rammed into a Kia Besta Van
which was driven by respondent Arnel Lazo. The Kia Besta van was owned by Noel Tagle who was then on board the
said vehicle together with 13 other passengers.
The accident resulted in the death of Noel Tagle and seven other passengers. Respondents Arnel Lazo, Evelyn
Felix, and Jasmin Galvez all suffered serious physical injuries and were immediately brought to the nearest hospital for
treatment.
A criminal complaint for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Homicide, Multiple Serious Physical Injuries
and Damage to Property was filed against petitioners Santos Francisco and Noel Imperial. Petitioners Francisco and
Imperial also filed a complaint for damages against respondents Giganto and Cubeta, the driver and pahinante of the
Fuso six-wheeler truck, respondent Leticia Pedraja, the alleged registered owner of the truck, and respondent Maricel
Joson, the alleged present owner. In turn alleging that the mishap was attributable to the negligence of the driver of the
Isuzu ten-wheeler truck, respondent Giganto joined respondent Maricel Joson and her husband, Gerard Ferdinand Joson,
in filing against petitioners Francisco and Imperial a complaint for damages.
A mandatory pre-trial conference was made by the Sariaya MTC in Criminal Case No. 01-99 after petitioner
Francisco entered a plea of not guilty at the arraignment scheduled in the case. Petitioner Francisco proposed the facts
for stipulation to Prosecutor Rodolfo Zabella, Jr., which the latter refused to stipulate. Despite said refusal, the Sariaya
MTC went on to issue a pre-trial order. As a consequence, petitioner Francisco filed a motion to compel and disqualify
Prosecutor Zabella and to correct the pre-trial order on the ground that the latter cannot refuse to stipulate on matters of
which he has personal knowledge and that the Judge’s recollection of the proposed stipulation was different from that
actually proposed.
The Sariaya MTC denied petitioner Francisco’s motion. He thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration which the
MTC also denied. The Sariaya MTC then directed that the pre-trial conference be set anew in view of the reassignment of
the case to Prosecutor Francis Sia and the appearance of a new private prosecutor in the case. Dissatisfied, petitioner
Francisco filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. Likewise contending that the nine postponements of
the pre-trial conference in Criminal Case No. 01-99 were capricious, vexatious, and oppressive, petitioner Francisco
moved for the dismissal of the case on 14 March 2004, on the ground that his constitutional right to a speedy trial had
been violated.
Issue
Whether or not the nine postponements of the pre-trial conference amounted to a violation of petitioner
Francisco’s constitutional right to a speedy trial.
Held
No. The nine postponements of the pre-trial conference did not amount to a violation of petitioner Francisco’s
constitutional right to a speedy trial. Although the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure concededly mandates
commencement of the trial within 30 days from receipt of the pre-trial order and the continuous conduct thereof for a
period not exceeding 180 days, Section 3 a (1), Rule 119 provides that delays resulting from extraordinary remedies
against interlocutory orders shall be excluded in computing the time within which trial must commence.
Moreover, in determining the right of an accused to a speedy trial, courts are required to do more than a
mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case and to give particular
regard to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. Considering the procedural antecedents in the case at bar as
well as the further reassignment of the case to Prosecutor Baligod as a consequence of Prosecutor Sia’s subsequent
transfer to another government office, the Court of Appeals (CA) correctly brushed aside petitioner Francisco's claim that
the postponements of the pre-trial conferences in the case before the Sariaya MTC were violative of his right to a speedy
trial.
In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case and to a
speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the defendant’s assertion
of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant.
The delays entailed by the postponements of the aforesaid hearings were, to a great extent, attributable to
petitioner Francisco’s own pursuit of extraordinary remedies against the interlocutory orders issued by the Sariaya MTC
and the assignment of at least three public prosecutors to the case, namely, Prosecutors Zabella, Sia, and Baligod. Thus,
due to the foregoing facts and for lack of merit, the Supreme Court affirmed the CA’s decision denying petitioner
Francisco’s motion to dismiss the case.
Reopening vs. New Trial
Abroguena
Benjamin B. Bangayan, Jr. vs. Sally Go Bangayan
G.R. No. 172792. October 19, 2011
Criminal Procedure; Appeals; In criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case against him can
only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State.—This Court leans toward Resally’s contention
that Sally Go had no personality to file the petition for certiorari before the CA. It has been consistently held that in criminal
cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case against him can only be appealed by the Solicitor General,
acting on behalf of the State. The private complainant or the offended party may question such acquittal or dismissal only
insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned.
Double Jeopardy; Well-established is the rule that the Court cannot review an order granting the demurrer to evidence
and acquitting the accused on the ground by insufficiency of evidence because to do so will place the accused in double
jeopardy.—A demurrer to evidence is filed after the prosecution has rested its case and the trial court is required to
evaluate whether the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient enough to warrant the conviction of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. If the court finds that the evidence is not sufficient and grants the demurrer to evidence, such
dismissal of the case is one on the merits, which is equivalent to the acquittal of the accused. Well-established is the rule
that the Court cannot review an order granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence because to do so will place the accused in double jeopardy.
Elements of Double Jeopardy to Attach; Jurisprudence allows for certain exceptions when the dismissal is considered
final even if it was made on motion of the accused.—Double jeopardy attaches if the following elements are present: (1) a
valid complaint or information; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (4)
the defendant was acquitted, or convicted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent. However, jurisprudence allows for certain exceptions when the dismissal is considered final even if it
was made on motion of the accused, to wit: (1) Where the dismissal is based on a demurrer to evidence filed by the
accused after the prosecution has rested, which has the effect of a judgment on the merits and operates as an acquittal.
(2) Where the dismissal is made, also on motion of the accused, because of the denial of his right to a speedy trial which
is in effect a failure to prosecute.
The only instance when the accused can be barred from invoking his right against double jeopardy is when it can be
demonstrated that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as
where the prosecution was not allowed the opportunity to make its case against the accused or where the trial was a
sham.—The only instance when the accused can be barred from invoking his right against double jeopardy is when it can
be demonstrated that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such
as where the prosecution was not allowed the opportunity to make its case against the accused or where the trial was a
sham. For instance, there is no double jeopardy (1) where the trial court prematurely terminated the presentation of the
prosecution’s evidence and forthwith dismissed the information for insufficiency of evidence; and (2) where the case was
dismissed at a time when the case was not ready for trial and adjudication.
An acquittal by virtue of a demurer to evidence is not appealable because it will place the accused in double jeopardy.—
As previously discussed, an acquittal by virtue of a demurrer to evidence is not appealable because it will place the
accused in double jeopardy. However, it may be subject to review only by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court showing that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
or a denial of due process.
The party questioning the acquittal of an accused should be able to clearly establish that the trial court blatantly abused its
discretion such that it was deprived of its authority to dispense justice.—Grave abuse of discretion has been defined as
that capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. “The abuse of discretion must
be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or
to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility.” The party questioning the acquittal of an accused should be able to clearly establish that the trial
court blatantly abused its discretion such that it was deprived of its authority to dispense justice.
Constitutional Law; Due Process; Jurisprudence dictates that in order for a decision of the trial court to be declared null
and void for lack of due process, it must be shown that a party was deprived of his opportunity to be heard.—As regards
Sally Go’s assertion that she had been denied due process, an evaluation of the records of the case proves that nothing
can be further from the truth. Jurisprudence dictates that in order for a decision of the trial court to be declared null and
void for lack of due process, it must be shown that a party was deprived of his opportunity to be heard. Sally Go cannot
deny that she was given ample opportunity to present her witnesses and her evidence against petitioners. Thus, her claim
that she was denied due process is unavailing.
FACTS
On March 7, 1982, Benjamin, Jr. married Sally Go in Pasig City. Later, Sally Go learned that Benjamin, Jr. had taken
Resally as his concubine whom he subsequently married on January 5, 2001 under the false name, “Benjamin Z.
Sojayco.” Furthermore, Sally Go discovered that on September 10, 1973, Benjamin, Jr. also married a certain Azucena
Alegre (Azucena) in Caloocan City.
The City Prosecutor of Caloocan City conducted a preliminary investigation and thereafter issued a Resolution
recommending the filing of an information for bigamy against Benjamin, Jr. and Resally for having contracted a marriage
despite knowing that he was still legally married to Sally Go. The information was duly filed on November 15, 2002.
After the arraignment, during which petitioners both pleaded not guilty to the charge against them, the prosecution
presented and offered its evidence. On September 8, 2003, Benjamin, Jr. and Resally separately filed their respective
motions for leave to file a demurrer to evidence. This was granted by the RTC in its Order dated September 29, 2003.
In its December 3, 2003 Order,the RTC dismissed the criminal case against Benjamin, Jr. and Resally for insufficiency of
evidence. It reasoned out that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Benjamin, Jr. used the
fictitious name, Benjamin Z. Sojayco Jr., in contracting his marriage with Resally. Corollarily, Resally cannot be convicted
of bigamy because the prosecution failed to establish that Resally married Benjamin, Jr.
Aggrieved, Sally Go elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari. On March 14, 2006, the CA promulgated its
Decision granting her petition and ordering the remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings.
Petitioners’ motions for reconsideration were both denied by the CA in a Resolution dated May 22, 2006.
Hence, these petitions.
ISSUE
Whether or not Sally Go had the legal standing to file a petition for certiorari before the CA despite the lack of consent of
either the Office of the Solicitor General or the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Caloocan.
HELD
No. Sally does not have a legal standing in the filing the appeal.
Only the OSG, and not the private offended party, has the authority to question the order granting the demurrer to
evidence in a criminal case.
It has been consistently held that in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case against him
can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State. The private complainant or the offended party
may question such acquittal or dismissal only insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned.28 As explained in
the case of People v. Santiago:
“It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the
private offended party is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the prosecution of the offense, the complainant’s role is limited
to that of a witness for the prosecution. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal
therefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor
General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not take
such appeal. However, the said offended party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the
accused.
In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is alleged that the trial
court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules
state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved.
A perusal of the petition for certiorari filed by Sally Go before the CA discloses that she sought reconsideration of the
criminal aspect of the case. Specifically, she prayed for the reversal of the trial court’s order granting petitioners’ demurrer
to evidence and the conduct of a full blown trial of the criminal case. Nowhere in her petition did she even briefly discuss
the civil liability of petitioners. It is apparent that her only desire was to appeal the dismissal of the criminal case against
the petitioners.
Thus, Sally Go did not have the requisite legal standing to appeal the acquittal of the petitioners.
Reopening vs. New Trial
Bobiles
G.R. No. 191015
August 6, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE C. GO, AIDA C. DELA ROSA, and FELECITAS D. NECOMEDES,** Respondents.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Demurrer to Evidence; Demurrer to evidence is “an objection by one of the
parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which is his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law,
whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. –
Demurrer to the evidence is "an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his
adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. The party
demurring challenges the sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a verdict. The court, in passing upon the sufficiency
of the evidence raised in a demurrer, is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to
sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt. x x x Sufficient evidence for purposes of frustrating a demurrer
thereto is such evidence in character, weight or amount as will legally justify the judicial or official action demanded
according to the circumstances. To be considered sufficient therefore, the evidence must prove: (a) the commission of the
crime, and (b) the precise degree of participation therein by the accused." Thus, when the accused files a demurrer, the
court must evaluate whether the prosecution evidence is sufficient enough to warrant the conviction of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt.
Same; Same; Same; The grant of a demurrer to evidence amounts to acquittal and cannot be appealed because it
would place the accused in double jeopardy.—
The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling on the matter
shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of such discretion." As to effect, "the grant of a demurrer to
evidence amounts to an acquittal and cannot be appealed because it would place the accused in double jeopardy. The
order is reviewable only by certiorari if it was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction." When grave abuse of discretion is present, an order granting a demurrer becomes null and void.
Same; Same; Same; The party questioning the acquittal of an accused should be able to clearly establish that the
trial court blatantly abused its discretion such that it was deprived of its authority to dispense justice.—
Grave abuse of discretion is defined as "that capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is tantamount to lack of
jurisdiction. ‘The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.’ The party questioning the acquittal of an accused
should be able to clearly establish that the trial court blatantly abused its discretion such that it was deprived of its
authority to dispense justice."
FACTS
Respondent Jose Go executed fictitious loans in favor of two entities – Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. – in which
two manager’s checks representing the supposed proceeds of these fictitious loans were issued but made payable to two
different entities – Philippine Recycler’s Inc. and Zeta International – without any documents issued by the supposed
borrowers Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. assigning the supposed loan proceeds tothe two payees. Thereafter,
these two manager’s checks – together with several others were encashed, and then deposited in the OCBC Savings
Account of Jose Go. Then, several automatic transfer deposits were made from Jose Go’s savings account to his OCBC
Current Account which were then used to fund Go’s previously dishonored personal checks.
Upon knowledge of the same, PDIC filed a for two (2) counts of Estafa thru Falsification of CommercialDocuments in the
Office of the City Prosecutor of the City of Manila against the private respondents . After finding probable cause, the Office
of the City Prosecutor of the City of Manila filed Informations against the private respondents.
Upon arraignment, private respondents pleaded not guilty. A pre-trial was conducted. Thereafter, trial of the cases ensued
and the prosecution presented its evidence. After the presentation of all of the prosecution’s evidence, the private
respondents filed a Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence to which was granted by the RTC.
Consequently, private respondents filed their Demurrer to Evidence. On July 2, 2007, the RTC issued an Order granting
the motion and dismissed the case.
No motion for reconsideration of the July 2, 2007 was filed by the handling public prosecutor, Only complainant Philippine
Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
On January 4, 2008, the prosecution, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed an original Petition for
Certiorari with the CA assailing the July 2, 2007 Order of the trial court. The CA denied the said petition on the ground that
the assailed July 2, 2007 Order of the trial court became final since the prosecution failed to move for the reconsideration
thereof, and thus double jeopardy attached.
The assailed Order was received by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila on July 3, 2007 and by the Private
Prosecutor on July 5, 2007. While the Private Prosecutor filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said Order, the Public
Prosecutor did not seek for the reconsideration thereof. It is the Public Prosecutor who has the authority to file a Motion
for Reconsideration of the said order and the Solicitor General who can file a petition for certiorari with respect to the
criminal aspect of the cases. The failure of the Public Prosecutor to file a Motion for Reconsideration on or before July 18,
2007 and the failure of the Solicitor General to file a Petition for Certiorarion or before September 1, 2007 made the order
of the trial court final.
The OSG moved for reconsideration, but in the assailed January 22, 2010 Resolution, the CA stood its ground. Hence,
the instant Petition was instituted.
Petitioner admitted that the public prosecution indeed filed the motion for reconsideration beyond the period allowed, begs
the Court to excuse its mistake in the name of public interest and substantial justice
ISSUE
Whether or not the Petition for Certiorary filed by the prosecution through the OSG belatedly assailing the granting by the
RTC and CA of private respondents Demurrer to Evidence be granted in the name of public interest and substantial
justice.
HELD
The Court granted the Petition.
The power of courts to grant demurrer in criminal cases should be exercised with great caution, because not only the
rights of the accused - but those of the offended party and the public interest as well - are involved. Once granted, the
accused is acquitted and the offended party may be left with no recourse. Thus, in the resolution of demurrers, judges
must act with utmost circumspection and must engage in intelligent deliberation and reflection, drawing on their
experience, the law and jurisprudence, and delicately evaluating the evidence on hand.
Demurrer to the evidence is "an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his
adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. The party
demurring challenges the sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a verdict. The court, in passing upon the sufficiency
of the evidence raised in a demurrer, is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to
sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt. x x x Sufficient evidence for purposes of frustrating a demurrer
thereto is such evidence in character, weight or amount as will legally justify the judicial or official action demanded
according to the circumstances. To be considered sufficient therefore, the evidence must prove: (a) the commission of the
crime, and (b) the precise degree of participation therein by the accused." Thus, when the accused files a demurrer, the
court must evaluate whether the prosecution evidence is sufficient enough to warrant the conviction of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt.
"The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling on the matter
shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of such discretion." As to effect, "the grant of a demurrer to
evidence amounts to an acquittal and cannot be appealed because it would place the accused in double jeopardy. The
order is reviewable only by certiorariif it was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting tolack or excess of
jurisdiction." When grave abuse of discretion is present, an order granting a demurrer becomes null and void.
As a general rule, an order granting the accused’s demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal. There are certain
exceptions, however, as when the grant thereof would not violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. For
instance, this Court ruled that when there is a finding that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court
in dismissing a criminal case by granting the accused’s demurrer to evidence,its judgment is considered void, as this
Court ruled in People v. Laguio, Jr.:
By this time, it is settled that the appellate court may review dismissal orders of trial courts granting an
accused’s demurrer to evidence. This may be done via the special civil action of certiorariunder Rule 65
based on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such
dismissal order, being considered void judgment, does not result in jeopardy. Thus, when the order of
dismissal is annulled or set aside by an appellate court in an original special civil action via certiorari, the
right of the accused against double jeopardy is not violated.
In the instant case, having affirmed the CA finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court
when it granted the accused’s demurrer to evidence, we deem its consequent order of acquittal void.
The Court declares that the CA grossly erred in affirming the trial court’s July 2, 2007 Order granting the respondent’s
demurrer, which Order was patently null and void for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion and manifest
irregularity, thus causing substantial injury to the banking industry and public interest. The Court finds that the prosecution
has presented competent evidence to sustain the indictment for the crime of estafa through falsification of commercial
documents, and that respondents appear to be the perpetrators thereof. In evaluating the evidence, the trial court
effectively failed and/or refused to weigh the prosecution’s evidence against the respondents, which it was duty-bound to
do as a trier of facts; considering that the case involved hundreds of millions of pesos of OCBC depositors’ money – not to
mention that the banking industry is impressed with public interest, the trial court should have conducted itself with
circumspection and engaged in intelligent reflection in resolving the issues.
Finally, it must be borne in mind that "[t]he granting of a demurrer to evidence should x x x be exercised with caution,
taking into consideration not only the rights of the accused, but also the right of the private offended party to be vindicated
of the wrongdoing done against him, for if it is granted, the accused is acquitted and the private complainant is generally
left with no more remedy. In such instances, although the decision of the court may be wrong, the accused can invoke his
right against double jeopardy. Thus, judges are reminded to be more diligent and circumspect in the performance of their
duties as members of the Bench xx x."
Reopening vs. New Trial
Alim
PEOPLE VS. PEPINO, 779 SCRA 170
G.R. No. 174471 | EN BANC | January 12, 2016
The illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient
complaint after a trial free form error. – It is settled that [a]ny objection to the procedure followed in the matter of the
acquisition by a court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be opportunely raised before he enters his plea;
otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. As we held in People v. Samson, 244 SCRA 146 (1995): [A]ppellant is now
estopped from questioning any defect in the manner of his arrest as he failed to move for the quashing of the information
before the trial court. Consequently, any irregularity attendant to his arrest was cured when he voluntarily submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of “not guilty” and by participating in the trial. At any rate, the
illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint
after a trial free from error. Simply put, the illegality of the warrantless arrest cannot deprive the State of its right to
prosecute the guilty when all other facts on record point to their culpability. It is much too late in the day to complain about
warrantless arrest after a valid information had been filed, the accused had been arraigned, the trial had commenced and
had been completed, and a judgment of conviction had been rendered against her.
Facts
The RTC convicted Pepino and Gomez of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code and sentenced them to suffer the death penalty.
The RTC held that Edward positively identified Pepino and Gomez as two of the persons who forcibly abducted
him at gunpoint inside Kilton Motors, and who consequently detained him somewhere in Quezon City for four (4) days
until he was released inside the UP Diliman Campus after the payment of ransom. The RTC added that Jocelyn
corroborated Edward's testimony on material points. It also pointed out that Edward identified both Pepino and Gomez at
the lineup conducted inside the NBI compound, although Jocelyn only recognized Gomez.
The RTC further ruled that the accused were already estopped from questioning the validity of their arrest after
they entered their respective pleas.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision with the modification that the amounts of moral and exemplary
damages. The CA held that Pepino and Gomez were deemed to have waived any objection to the illegality of their
arrests when they did not move to quash the information before entering their plea, and when they participated at the trial.
The CA further ruled that Pepino and Gomez conspired with each other to attain a common objective, i.e., to kidnap
Edward in exchange for ransom.
While the case was under review by the Supreme Court, Pepino filed an urgent motion to withdraw his appeal,
which the Court granted.
In her brief and supplemental brief, Gomez maintained that it was impossible for Edward to have seen her in the
front seat of the getaway car because he (Edward) was blindfolded. She also alleged that the prosecution failed to prove
that she had conspired with the other accused.
Gomez further claimed that Edward's identification of her during trial "may have been preconditioned x x x by
suggestive identification" made at the police lineup. She further argued that the death penalty imposed on her is no longer
proper due to the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346.
Issue
Whether Gomez can question the legality of her arrest after trial
Held
No. At the outset, Gomez did not question before arraignment the legality of her warrantless arrest or the
acquisition of RTC's jurisdiction over her person. Thus, Gomez is deemed to have waived any objection to her warrantless
arrest.
It is settled that any objection to the procedure followed in the matter of the acquisition by a court of jurisdiction
over the person of the accused must be opportunely raised before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed
waived.
Gomez is now estopped from questioning any defect in the manner of her arrest as she failed to move for the
quashing of the information before the trial court. Consequently, any irregularity attendant to her arrest was cured when
she voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of "not guilty" and by participating in
the trial.
At any rate, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered
upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. Simply put, the illegality of the warrantless arrest cannot deprive
the State of its right to prosecute the guilty when all other facts on record point to their culpability. It is much too late in the
day to complain about the warrantless arrest after a valid information had been filed, the accused had been arraigned, the
trial had commenced and had been completed, and a judgment of conviction had been rendered against her.
RULE 120 – Judgment
1. Nature of judgment in criminal cases vs. civil cases
2. Judgment of conviction vs. judgment of acquittal
3. Judgment for two or more offenses; accused
4. Promulgation, modification and entry of judgment
Promulgation, modification and entry of judgment
Culla
LLAMAS VS CA
601 SCRA 288
Actions; Criminal Law; Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Annulment of Judgment; Appeals; Procedural Rules and
Technicalities; The remedy of annulment of judgment cannot be availed of in criminal cases, - In People v. Bitanga (525
SCRA 623 [2007]), the Court explained that the remedy of annulment of judgment cannot be availed of in criminal cases,
tuhs – Section 1, Rule 47 of the Rules of court, limits the scope of the remedy of annulment of judgment to the following:
Section 1. Coverage.- This rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments of final orders and
resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or
other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. Te remedy cannot be resorted to
when the RTC judgment being questioned was rendered in a criminal case. The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
procedure itself does not permit such recourse, for it excluded Rule 47 from the enumeration of the provisions of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Proceduere which have suppletory application to criminal cases. Section 18, Rule 124 thereof,
provides: Sec. 18. Application of certain rules in civil procedure to criminal cases.- The provisions of rules 42, 44 to 46 and
48 to 56 relating to procedure in the Court of Appeals and in the Supreme Court in original and appealed civil cases shall
be applied to in criminal cases insofar as they are applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.
Remedial Law; Jurisdiction; Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the statute
in force at the time of the commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the court.- Jurisdiction being a matter
of substantive law, the established rule is that the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action
determines the jurisdiction of the court. In this case, at the time of the filing of the information, the applicable law was
Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, approved on August 14, 1981.
Facts
Petitioners were charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati with, as aforesaid, the crime of "other forms of
swindling". RTC rendered its Decision3 on June 30, 1994, finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 18270, affirmed the decision of the trial
court. Appellate court further denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. Since it subsequently denied petitioners’
motion for reconsideration the judgment of conviction became final and executory.
With the consequent issuance by the trial court of the Warrant of Arrest, the police arrested, on, petitioner
Carmelita C. Llamas for her to serve her 2-month jail term. The police, nevertheless, failed to arrest petitioner Francisco
R. Llamas because he was nowhere to be found. Petitioner Francisco moved for the lifting or recall of the warrant of
arrest, raising for the first time the issue that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the offense charged.
There being no action taken by the trial court on the said motion, petitioners instituted, the instant proceedings for
the annulment of the trial and the appellate courts’ decisions.
Issue
Whether the petitioner can institute the annulment of judgment upon the decision of the CA and the RTC for their inability
to act upon the said motion?
Held
No. The court held that, in People v. Bitanga,13 the Court explained that the remedy of annulment of judgment cannot be
availed of in criminal cases, thus —
Section 1, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, limits the scope of the remedy of annulment of judgment to the following:
Section 1. Coverage. — This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders and
resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or
other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.a1f
The remedy cannot be resorted to when the RTC judgment being questioned was rendered in a criminal case. The 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure itself does not permit such recourse, for it excluded Rule 47 from the enumeration of
the provisions of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which have suppletory application to criminal cases. Section
18, Rule 124 thereof, provides:
Sec. 18. Application of certain rules in civil procedure to criminal cases. – The provisions of Rules 42, 44 to 46 and 48 to
56 relating to procedure in the Court of Appeals and in the Supreme Court in original and appealed civil cases shall be
applied to criminal cases insofar as they are applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.
There is no basis in law or the rules, therefore, to extend the scope of Rule 47 to criminal cases. As we explained in
Macalalag v. Ombudsman, when there is no law or rule providing for this remedy, recourse to it cannot be allowed.
Promulgation, modification and entry of judgment
Andres
PEOPLE V. MONTECLAROS
Criminal Procedure; Appeals; Findings of the trial courts carry great weight and respect, and, generally,
appellate courts will not overturn said findings unless the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied
some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which will alter the assailed decision or affect the result of
the case.---The findings of the trial courts carry great weight and respect, and, generally, appellate courts will not overturn
said findings unless the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance which will alter the assailed decision or affect the result of the case. The rule finds an even more stringent
application where the said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals.
Same; Evidence; Circumstantial Evidence; Requisites for Circumstantial Evidence to be Sufficient for
Conviction.---Although ABC was asleep and unconscious at the time the sexual debasement was committed by
Tampus, circumstantial evidence established beyond doubt that it is Tampus who raped ABC. Circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. In
cases like the one at bar, the Court takes into consideration the events that transpired before and after the victim lost
consciousness in order to establish the commission of the act of coitus.
Same; Same; Mitigating Circumstances; Schizophrenia; Schizophrenia may be considered mitigating under
Art. 13(9) if it diminishes the exercises of the willpower of the accused. ---We have previously held that
schizophrenia may be considered mitigating under Art. 13(9) if it diminishes the exercise of the willpower of the accused.
In this case, the testimony of Dr. Costas shows that even though Ida was diagnosed with Schizophrenia, she was not
totally deprived of intelligence but her judgment was affected. Thus, on the treated for schizophrenia a few months prior to
the incident, and on the testimony of Dr. Costas, Ida’s schizophrenia could be considered to have diminished the exercise
of her willpower although it did not deprive her of the consciousness of her acts.
Same; Information; Every information must state the qualifying and the aggravating circumstances
attending the commission of the crime for them to be considered in the imposition of the penalty.---Under the
2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which should be given retroactive effect following the rule that statutes governing court
proceedings will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, every
Information must state the qualifying and the aggravating circumstances attending the commission of the crime for them
to be considered in the imposition of the penalty. Since in the case at bar, the Information in Criminal Case No. 013324-L
did not state that Ida is the mother of ABC, this circumstance could not be appreciated as a special qualifying
circumstance. Ida may only be convicted as an accomplice in the crime of simple rape, which is punishable by reclusion
perpetua.
Facts
Two informations were filed charging Bartolome Tampus of raping ABC, 13 years old, and Ida Montesclaros,
mother of ABC, for giving permission to Bartolome Tampus to rape ABC. The trial court convicted Tampus of 2 counts of
rape, as principal. Ida was found guilty as an accomplice in one of criminal cases. The trial court appreciated in Ida’s favor
the mitigating circumstance of illness which would diminish the exercise of will-power without depriving her of the
consciousness of her acts, pursuant to Article 13(9) of the RPC.
Pending resolution of the appeal before the CA, Tampus died and his appeal was dismissed. Thus, the appeal
before the CA dealt only with that of Ida. CA affirmed the trial court’s decision with modification. It appreciated the
mitigating circumstance of illness in favor of Ida, but found that Ida failed to prove that she was completely deprived of
intelligence. On the basis of the medical report and the testimony of the attending physician, Ida’s schizophrenia was
determined by both the trial court and the CA to have diminished the exercise of her will-power though it did not deprive
her of the consciousness of her acts.
Issue
Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of relationship may be appreciated although the same was not alleged in the
information.
Held
No. The undisputed fact that Ida is the mother of ABC—who was 13 years old at the time of the incident—could have
been considered as a special qualifying circumstance which would have increased the imposable penalty to death, under
Article 266-B of the RPC. Both the circumstances of the minority and the relationship of the offender to the victim, either
as the victim’s parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or
the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim, must be alleged in the information and proved during the trial in order
for them to serve as qualifying circumstances under Article 266-B of the RPC.
Although the victim's minority was alleged and established, her relationship with the accused as the latter's
daughter was not properly alleged in the Information, and even though this was proven during trial and not refuted by the
accused, it cannot be considered as a special qualifying circumstance that would serve to increase the penalty of the
offender. Under the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which should be given retroactive effect following the rule that
statutes governing court proceedings will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of
their passage, every Information must state the qualifying and the aggravating circumstances attending the commission of
the crime for them to be considered in the imposition of the penalty. Since in the case at bar, the Information did not state
that Ida is the mother of ABC, this circumstance could not be appreciated as a special qualifying circumstance. Ida may
only be convicted as an accomplice in the crime of simple rape, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua. In any event,
Republic Act No. 9346, entitled an "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines," which was
signed into law on June 24, 2006 prohibits the imposition of the death penalty.
Promulgation, modification and entry of judgment
Dequina
G.R. Nos. 174813-15
March 17, 2009
NILO HIPOS, SR. REPRESENTING DARRYL HIPOS, BENJAMIN CORSIÑO REPRESENTING JAYCEE CORSIÑO,
and ERLINDA VILLARUEL REPRESENTING ARTHUR VILLARUEL, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE RTC JUDGE TEODORO A. BAY, Presiding Judge, RTC, Hall of Justice, Quezon City, Branch
86, Respondent.
Criminal complaint is within the jurisdiction of trial court in all proceedings:
Mandamus is never available to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or
reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either.
In other words, while a judge refusing to act on a Motion to Withdraw Information can be compelled by mandamus to act
on the same, he cannot be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such Motion.
In the case at bar, Judge Bay did not refuse to act on the Motion to Withdraw Information; he had already acted on it
by denying the same.
Accordingly, mandamus is not available anymore.
In Crespo v. Mogul,:
The Court held that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case or dismissal or
acquittal or conviction of the accused rests within the exclusive jurisdiction, competence, and discretion of the trial court.
The trial court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it.
A motion to dismiss the case filed by the public prosecutor should be addressed to the court who has the option to grant
or deny the same. Contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the rule applies to a motion to withdraw the Information or
to dismiss the case even before or after arraignment of the accused.
The only qualification is that the action of the court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the
People or the private complainant to due process of law.
When the trial court grants a motion of the public prosecutor to dismiss the case, or to quash the Information, or to
withdraw the Information in compliance with the directive of the Secretary of Justice, or to deny the said motion, it does so
not out of subservience to or defiance of the directive of the Secretary of Justice but in sound exercise of its judicial
prerogative
In Marcelo vs. Court of Appeals,:
Accordingly, we rule that the trial court in a criminal case which takes cognizance of an accused's motion for review of the
resolution of the investigating prosecutor or for reinvestigation and defers the arraignment until resolution of the said
motion must act on the resolution reversing the investigating prosecutor's finding or on a motion to dismiss based thereon
only upon proof that such resolution is already final in that no appeal was taken thereon to the Department of Justice.
Facts
On 15 December 2003, two information for the crime of rape and one information for the crime of acts of
lasciviousness were filed against petitioners Darryl Hipos, Jaycee Corsiño, Arthur Villaruel and two others before Branch
86 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, acting as a Family Court, presided by respondent Judge Bay.
On 19 May 2004, petitioners filed their Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the Case[s] before the City Prosecutor.
They claimed that there was no probable cause to hold them liable for the crimes charged.
Issue
Can the hon. Supreme court compel respondent judge bay to dismiss the case through a writ of mandamus by
virtue of the resolution of the office of the city prosecutor of quezon city finding no probable cause against the accused
and subsequently filing a motion to withdraw information
Held
In Crespo v. Mogul, the Court held that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of
the case or dismissal or acquittal or conviction of the accused rests within the exclusive jurisdiction, competence, and
discretion of the trial court.
The trial court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it.
A motion to dismiss the case filed by the public prosecutor should be addressed to the court who has the option to
grant or deny the same.
Contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the rule applies to a motion to withdraw the Information or to dismiss
the case even before or after arraignment of the accused.
The only qualification is that the action of the court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the
right of the People or the private complainant to due process of law.
When the trial court grants a motion of the public prosecutor to dismiss the case, or to quash the Information, or to
withdraw the Information in compliance with the directive of the Secretary of Justice, or to deny the said motion, it does so
not out of subservience to or defiance of the directive of the Secretary of Justice but in sound exercise of its judicial
prerogative.
In the instant case, the respondent Judge granted the motion for reinvestigation and directed the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan to conduct the reinvestigation. The former was, therefore, deemed to have deferred to
the authority of the prosecution arm of the Government to consider the so-called new relevant and material evidence and
determine whether the information it had filed should stand.
The rule is settled that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition thereof, such as its
dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound discretion of the court. While the prosecutor
retains the discretion and control of the prosecution of the case, he cannot impose his opinion on the court. The court is
the best and sole judge on what to do with the case. Accordingly, a motion to dismiss the case filed by the prosecutor
before or after the arraignment, or after a reinvestigation, or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed
the records upon reinvestigation, should be addressed to the discretion of the court. The action of the court must not,
however, impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People to due process of law.
In sum, petitioners’ resort to a Petition for Mandamus to compel the trial judge to grant their Motion to Withdraw
Information is improper. While mandamus is available to compel action on matters involving judgment and discretion
when refused, it is never available to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or
reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either. The trial court, when confronted with a Motion to Withdraw an
Information on the ground of lack of probable cause, is not bound by the resolution of the prosecuting arm of the
government, but is required to make an independent assessment of the merits of such motion, a requirement satisfied by
the respondent judge in the case at bar.
Promulgation, modification and entry of judgment
Au
PEOPLE vs. LORENZO
619 SCRA 389
Criminal Procedure; Evidences; Conviction must rest on the strength of the prosecution’s evidence and not on the
weakness of the defense.
The presumption of innocence of an accused in a criminal case is a basic constitutional principle, fleshed out by
procedural rules which place on the prosecution the burden of proving that an accused is guilty of the offense charged by
proof beyond reasonable doubt. Corollary thereto, conviction must rest on the strength of the prosecution’s evidence and
not on the weakness of the defense.
Same; Same; Appeals; Factual of the trial court and its calibration of the testimonies of the witness and its conclusions
anchored on tits findings are accorded by the appellate court high respect, if not conclusive effect, more so when affirmed
by the Court of Appeals.
Consistent with the rulings of this Court, it is but a fundamental and settled rule that factual findings of the trial court and
its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its conclusions anchored on its findings are accorded by the
appellate court high respect, if not conclusive, more so when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The exception is when it is
established that the trial court ignored, overlooked, misconstrued or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances which,
if considered, will change the outcome of the case.
Facts
Two informations were filed against Paterno Lorenzo y Casas (Lorenzo). It alleged that he violated Sections 5 and
11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.
Conrado Estanislao y Javier (Estanislao) was similarly charged in a different Information. He was accused of
possessing illegal drugs in violation of the provisions of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.
On arraignment, both accused entered NOT GUILTY pleas. The 3 cases have been consolidated, joint trial on the
merits ensued.
The prosecution presented as its witness, PO1 Noel P. Pineda, who was a member of the buy-bust team.
Lorenzo and Estanislao stood before the witness stand and presented their version of the facts.
Weighing the testimonies of the prosecution and defense witnesses, as well as the other evidence presented
during trial, the trial court gave more veracity to the prosecutions version: Lorenzo was caught in flagrante delicto selling
illegal drugs to a poseur-buyer during a buy-bust operation. The trial court gave credence to the prosecutions evidence in
accordance with the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions accorded to police officers.
According to the trial court, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the identity of the buyer in the buy-bust
operation and the seller, object and consideration, including the delivery of the shabu sold by Lorenzo and the payment of
the buy-bust money.
Invoking his innocence, Lorenzo appealed his conviction questioning the procedure followed by the police
operatives in the seizure and custody of the evidence against him.
Issue
WON the guilt of Lorenzo was proven beyond reasonable doubt
Held
NO. The Court observed that the prosecution did not present the poseur-buyer who had personal knowledge of
the transaction. The lone prosecution witness was from a distance where it was impossible for him to hear the
conversation between Lorenzo and the poseur-buyer. This created doubt as to whether the sachets of shabu allegedly
seized from accused-appellant were the same ones that were released to Camp Crame and submitted for laboratory
examination. In sum, the totality of the evidence presented in the instant case failed to support accused-appellants
conviction for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II, Republic Act No. 9165, since the prosecution failed to prove
beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the offense.
The presumption of innocence of an accused in a criminal case is a basic constitutional principle, fleshed out by
procedural rules which place on the prosecution the burden of proving that an accused is guilty of the offense charged by
proof beyond reasonable doubt. Conviction must rest on the strength of the prosecution’s evidence and not on the
weakness of the defense. If the prosecution fails to meet the required quantum of evidence, the defense may logically not
even present evidence on its behalf. In which case, the presumption of innocence shall prevail. Hence, the accused shall
be acquitted. However, once the presumption of innocence is overcome, the defense bears the burden of evidence to
show reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.
Promulgation, modification and entry of judgment
Desengano
People vs. Baron
Same; Same; Criminal Procedure; Evidence; Circumstantial Evidence; Judgments; Requisites; A judgment of
conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the circumstances proved form an unbroken
chain that results to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as
the perpetrator.- There is no direct evidence proving that the appellant conspired and participated in committing the
crime. However, his complicity may be proved by circumstantial evidence, which consists of proof of collateral facts and
circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience if:
(a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been
established; (c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. A judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the circumstances proved from
an unbroken chain that results to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others,
as the perpetrator.
Facts
On June 28, 1995, at around 8:30 in the evening, Juanito Berallo (victim), who was a tricycle driver was contracted by
herein appellant Rene Baron, to take latter and his companions to a place known as hacienda caridad, wherein the former
agreed for a fee of P30.00. The next morning, Berallo was found dead with his wallet, wrist watch, ring and motorcycle
missing.
An information was then filed before the RTC, charging Rene Baron and two other accused with the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide, in which the pertinent portion of the information states that:
"On or about 9 o'clock in the evening of June 28, 1995 at Hda. Sta. Ana, Brgy. Burgos, Cadiz City, Negros
Occidental...., Rene Baron, Rey Villatama and one alias Dedong Bargo, conspiring, confederating and helping oneanother
with evident premeditation and treachery and with intent to kill, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
assualt, attack and stab to death one Juanito Berallo in order to rob and steal."
Apellant (Baron) denied any participation in the crime. He said that he was just a mere passenger riding his way home,
when the other two accused announced a hold-up. Thereafter, the driver was dragged towards the sugarfield and he no
longer knew what happened to the latter for he was threatened to stay and not to leave the tricycle. According to Baron
after dismantling the sidecar the two passengers accompanied him home and at gunpoint threatened him and his wife not
to report to the authorities. Thus, Baron claims that he was under the impulse of uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater
injury. However, the RTC and CA was not convince of appellant's defense and found the appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as a co-conspitrator. Unsatisfied with the findings of the lower courts the case was brought to the SC for
final review.
Issue
Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt, even
though there was no direct evidence proving that the appellant conspired and participated in the commission of the crime
charged?
Held
No. The trial court did not commit an error in finding Rene Baron guilty beyond reasonable doubt. According to the
Supreme Court, even though there is no direct evidence proving that Baron conspired and participated in the commission
of the crime, his complicity may be proved by circumstial evidence, which consists of proof of collateral facts and
circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience.
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the
facts from which the inferences are derived have been more than one circumstance; (c) the combination of all
circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. A judgment of conviction based on
circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the circumstances proved form an unbroken chain that results to a fair
and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the perpetratior. Here, the appellant
was present throughout all the stages of the crime; he hired the victim, he was there when the victim was killed, he rode
the motorcycle with the two other accused after the killing and all of them were together in hiding the said motorcycle.
Promulgation, modification and entry of judgment
Bartolazo
FELIXBERTO A. ABELLANA vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and Spouses SAAPIA B. ALONTO and DIAGA ALONTO
655 SCRA 683
Criminal Procedure; Judgments; It is an established rule in criminal procedure that a judgment of acquittal shall state
whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist.—It is an established rule in criminal procedure that a judgment of acquittal shall state
whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist. When the exoneration is merely due to the failure to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, the court should award the civil liability in favor of the offended party in the same criminal
action. In other words, the “extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil [liability] might arise did not
exist.”
Facts
Abellana extended a loan to spouses Alonto secured by a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over a lot located in
Cebu. Subsequently, Abellana convey the said lots and the spouses signed the Deed of Absolute Sale however it was
notarized without the spouses appearing before the notary public. Thereafter Abellana caused the transfer of title to his
name and sold the lots to third persons. An Information was filed charging Abellana with Estafa through Falsification of
Public Document and RTC found him guilty.
The CA set aside the trial court’s Decision because it convicted petitioner of an offense different from or not
included in the crime charged in the Information. However, the RTC found that the spouses Alonto actually signed the
document although they did not personally appear before the notary public for its notarization. Hence, the RTC instead
convicted petitioner of falsification of public document.
On appeal, the CA held that petitioner’s conviction cannot be sustained because it infringed on his right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The CA, however, found no reversible error on the civil
liability of petitioner as determined by the trial court and thus sustained the same.
Issue
Whether the judgement of acquittal of the crime of Falsification of a Public Document should include the act or
omission from which civil liability may arise.
Held
It is an established rule in criminal procedure that a judgment of acquittal shall state whether the evidence of the
prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.
When the exoneration is merely due to the failure to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the court
should award the civil liability in favor of the offended party in the same criminal action. In other words, the “extinction of
the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a
final judgment that the fact from which the civil [liability] might arise did not exist.”
Promulgation, modification and entry of judgment
Dizon
G.R. No. 173089
August 25, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
Hon. ENRIQUE C. ASIS, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Biliran Province, Branch 16, and JAIME ABORDO, Respondents.
Criminal Procedure; Certiorari; Finality-of-Acquittal Doctrine; A petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not appeal, is the
remedy to question a verdict of acquittal whether at the trial court or at the appellate level; In our jurisdiction, We adhere to
the finality-of-acquittal doctrine, that is, a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable; Exception. –
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not appeal, is the remedy to question a verdict of acquittal whether at the
trial court or at the appellate level. In our jurisdiction, We adhere to the finality-of-acquittal doctrine, that is, a judgment of
acquittal is final and unappealable. The rule, however, is not without exception. In several cases, the Court has
entertained petitions for certiorari questioning the acquittal of the accused in, or the dismissals of, criminal cases. Thus, in
1
People v. Louel Uy, the Court has held: Like any other rule, however, the above said rule is not absolute. By way of
exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court upon clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not
merely reversible errors of judgment but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a
denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void.
Same; Same; Same; The rule is that "while certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in
such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so
grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice." –
A review of the records, however, shows that the case need not be remanded to the CA for appropriate
proceedings. The OSG’s petition for certiorari, which forms part of the records, would not merit a favorable review even if
it would be given due course simply because it is bereft of merit. For said reason, We deem that a remand of the case
would only prolong the disposition of the case. It is not without precedent. "On many occasions, the Court, in the interest
of public service and for the expeditious administration of justice, has resolved actions on the merits, instead of remanding
them for further proceedings, as where the ends of justice would not be sub-served by the remand of the case." The rule
is that "while certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary
proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of
its very power to dispense justice." The case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan, presents an instructive exception to the rule
on double jeopardy, that is, when the prosecution has been denied due process of law. "The rationale behind this
exception is that a judgment rendered by the trial court with grave abuse of discretion was issued without jurisdiction. It is,
for this reason, void. Consequently, there is no double jeopardy."
Same; Same; Same; Double Jeopardy; Errors of judgment cannot be raised in a Rule 65 petition as a writ of certiorari can
only correct errors of jurisdiction or those involving the commission of grave abuse of discretion. –
What the OSG is questioning, therefore, are errors of judgment. This, however, cannot be resolved without
violating Abordo’s constitutionally guaranteed right against double jeopardy. An appellate court in a petition for certiorari
cannot review a trial court’s evaluation of the evidence and factual findings. Errors of judgment cannot be raised in a Rule
65 petition as a writ of certiorari can only correct errors of jurisdiction or those involving the commission of grave abuse of
discretion.
Facts
Abordo was riding his motorcycle on his way home when an altercation ensued between himand the three
offended parties Montes, Calvez, and Majait. The accused Abordo shot Majait in the leg while Calvez was hit in the
abdomen. Montes escaped unhurt.
Abordo was charged with two counts of attempted murder and one count of frustrated murder.
The RTC held Abordo liable only for Serious Physical Injuries for shooting Calvez and Less Serious Physical
Injuries with regard to Majait, when it found no treachery and evident premeditation. Four mitigating circumstances were
appreciated in favor of Abordo. Abordo was acquitted with respect to the complaint of Montes.
The OSG filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA based on the ground that Judge Asis of the
RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering its decision of acquitting
Abordo in one case, only holding him liable for Serious Physical Injuries and Less Serious Physical Injuries In the two
other cases.
The CA dismissed the petition, saying that the filing of the petition for certiorari was the wrong remedy. It said that
as the State was questioning the verdict of the acquittal and findings of lesser offenses by the trial court, the remedy
should have been an appeal.
Issue
1. Whether or not the proper remedy to question a verdict of acquittal is a petition for certiorari; and
2. Whether or not an error of judgment can be remedied by certiorari.
Held
1. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not appeal, is the remedy to question a verdict of acquittal whether at the
trial court or at the appellate level. In our jurisdiction, We adhere to the finality-of-acquittal doctrine, that is, a
judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable. The rule, however, is not without exception. In several cases, the
Court has entertained petitions for certiorari questioning the acquittal of the accused in, or the dismissals of,
criminal cases. Thus, in People v. Louel Uy, the Court has held:
Like any other rule, however, the above said rule is not absolute. By way of exception, a judgment of
acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court upon
clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible
errors of judgment but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due
process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void.
2. What the OSG is questioning, therefore, are errors of judgment. This, however, cannot be resolved without
violating Abordo’s constitutionally guaranteed right against double jeopardy. An appellate court in a petition for
certiorari cannot review a trial court’s evaluation of the evidence and factual findings. Errors of judgment cannot
be raised in a Rule 65 petition as a writ of certiorari can only correct errors of jurisdiction or those involving the
commission of grave abuse of discretion. In the case of People v. Hon. Tria-Tirona, it was written:
In such a case, any error committed in the evaluation of evidence is merely an error of judgment that
cannot be remedied by certiorari. An error of judgment is one in which the court may commit in the exercise of its
jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction and
which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors by
the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, and its conclusions anchored on the said findings
and its conclusions of law. Since no error of jurisdiction can be attributed to public respondent in her assessment
of the evidence, certiorari will not lie.
Promulgation, modification and entry of judgment
Brinez
RODOLFO BASILONIA , Petitioners, v. HON. DELANO F. VLLLARUZ Respondents
G.R. Nos. 191370-71, August 10, 2015
Criminal Procedure; Judgments; Aside from the civil indemnity arising from the crime, costs and incidental expenses of
the suit are part of the judgment and it is incumbent upon the prevailing party in whose favor they are awarded to submit
forthwith the itemized bill to the clerk of court.- Aside from the civil indemnity arising from the crime, costs and incidental
expenses of the suit are part of the judgment and it is incumbent upon the prevailing party in whose favor they are
awarded to submit forthwith the itemized bill to the clerk of court. Manifestly, the heirs of Atty. Roblete failed to do so.
Their indifference, if not negligence, is indicative of lack of interest in executing the decision rendered in their favor. To
remind, the purpose of the law in prescribing time limitations for executing judgments or orders is to prevent obligors from
sleeping on their rights. Indeed, inaction may be construed as waiver.
Same; Same; Same; It is opportune to remind judges that once a judgment of conviction becomes final and executory, the
trial court has the ministerial duty to immediately execute the penalty of imprisonment and/or pecuniary penalty (fine). A
motion to execute judgment of conviction is not necessary.- It is opportune to remind judges that once a judgment of
conviction becomes final and executory, the trial court has the ministerial duty to immediately execute the penalty of
imprisonment and/or pecuniary penalty (fine). A motion to execute judgment of conviction is not necessary. With respect
to the penalty of imprisonment, the trial court should cancel the bail bond and issue a warrant of arrest, if the accused is
not yet under detention. If the convicted accused is already under detention by virtue of the warrant of arrest issued, the
trial court should immediately issue the corresponding mittimus or commitment order for the immediate transfer of the
accused to the National Penitentiary to serve his sentence, if the penalty imposed requires the service of sentence in the
National Penitentiary. The commitment order should state that an appeal had been filed, but the same had been
withdrawn/dismissed/decided with finality.
Criminal Procedure; Judgments; In cases where the accused is a detention prisoner, i.e., those convicted of capital
offenses or convicted of noncapital offenses where bail is denied, or refused to post bail, a ed to post bail, a mittimus or
commitment order should be immediately issued after the promulgation of judgment by the trial court as long as the
penalty imposed requires the service of sentence in the National Penitentiary.- In cases where the accused is a detention
prisoner, i.e., those convicted of capital offenses or convicted of noncapital offenses where bail is denied, or refused to
post bail, a mittimus or commitment order should be immediately issued after the promulgation of judgment by the trial
court as long as the penalty imposed requires the service of sentence in the National Penitentiary. The filing of a motion
for reconsideration, motion for new trial, or notice of appeal should not stop the lower court from performing its ministerial
duty in issuing the commitment order, unless a special order has been issued by the Court in specific cases- to the effect
that the convicted accused shall remain under detention in the provincial jail or city jail while the motion is being heard or
resolved.
Facts
In this case, a decision was promulgated against petitioners for capital offenses. Thus, petitioners filed a Notice
of Appeal on July 30, 1987, which the trial court granted on August 3, 1987. On January 23, 1989, failure of petitioners to
file brief despite extensions of time given, the CA dismissed the appeal and the resolution was entered in the Book of
Entries of Judgment on September 18, 1989. Thereafter, the entire case records were remanded to the trial court on
October 4, 1989. Almost two decades passed from the entry of judgment, on May 11, 2009, private respondent Dixon C.
Roblete, claiming to be the son of the deceased victim, Atty. Roblete, filed a Motion for Execution of Judgment. He
alleged, among others, that despite his request to the City Prosecutor to file a motion for execution, the judgment has not
been enforced because said prosecutor has not acted upon his request
Issue
Whether respondent trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
granting a motion for execution which was filed almost twenty (20) years after a judgment in a criminal case became final
and executory.
Held
No, the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion. Upon the judgment, the period for prescription of
actions to demand the fulfillment of obligations declared by a judgment commences from the time the judgment became
final. These two modes of execution are available depending on the timing when the judgment creditor invoked its right to
enforce the court's judgment. Execution by motion is only available if the enforcement of the judgment was sought within
five (5) years from the date of its entry.
An action for revival of judgment is not intended to reopen any issue affecting the merits of the case or the
30
propriety or correctness of the first judgment. The purpose is not to re-examine and re-try issues already decided but to
31
revive the judgment; its cause of action is the judgment itself and not the merits of the original action. However, being a
mere right of action, the judgment sought to be revived is subject to defenses and counterclaims like matters of jurisdiction
and those arising after the finality of the first judgment or which may have arisen subsequent to the date it became
effective such as prescription, payment, or counterclaims arising out of transactions not connected with the former
controversy.
In the instant case, it is obvious that the heirs of Atty. Roblete did not file a motion for execution within the fiveyear period or an action to revive the judgment within the ten-year period. Worse, other than the bare allegation that the
judgment has not been enforced because the public prosecutor has not acted on the request to file a motion for execution,
no persuasive and compelling reason was presented to warrant the exercise of Our equity jurisdiction. Unfortunately for
private respondent Roblete, the instant case does not fall within the exceptions afore-stated. It cannot be claimed that the
43
delay in execution was entirely beyond their control or that petitioners have any hand in causing the same. As regards
the civil aspect of a criminal case is concerned, it is apt to point that — Litigants represented by counsel should not expect
that all they need to do is sit back and relax, and await the outcome of their case.
Enriquez
Morillo vs. People, 777 SCRA 207
Facts
In July, 2003, Richard Natividad, Milo Malong and Bing Nanquil, representing themselves as contractors with business in
Pamanga, bought contraction materials from Armilyn, worth P500,054.00. Per their agreement, 20% of the amount
should be paid within seven days, while the remaining 80% shall be paid within 35 days, with post-dated checks. After the
last delivery, Richard paid P20,000.00 and issued two post-dated checks drawn from Metrobank, Pampanga
branch. Upon maturity, Armilyn deposited the checks in her account with Equitable PCI Bank; they were however. When
Armilyn communicated the fact of dishonour to Richard, the latter replaced the checks with two post-dated Metrobank
checks, which again were dishonored. Despite demand, Richard and his partners failed to make good on the checks,
hence Armilyn filed a case for BP 22 against Richard and Milo Malong before the MeTC of Makati City.
After trial, the MeTC Makati City convicted Richard as charged, hence he appealed to the RTC, arguing that the MeTC of
Makati City had no jurisdiction over the case. He asserted that since the subject checks were issued, drawn, and
delivered to petitioner in Subic, the venue of the action was improperly laid for none of the elements of the offense actually
transpired in Makati City. He also assailed the absence of the public prosecutor, as the latter delegated the prosecution of
the case to the private prosecutor.
The RTC affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the lower courts. It ruled that MeTC had no
jurisdiction over the case, as all the elements of the crime of BP 22 happened in Pampanga. The checks were issued in
Richard’s office in Pampanga; the knowledge of dishonor also happened in Pampanga, when Armilyn proceeded to
Richard’s office and informed him of the dishonor of the checks; the third element of dishonor of the checks by the drawee
bank also occurred in Pampanga, where Metrobank Pampanga is located. Since all the elements of the crime happened
in Pampanga, thhe case should have been filed in Pampanga, not where Armilyn deposited the checks, in Makati City.
Aggrieved, Armilyn appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue
Whether or not the court of the place where the checks were deposited, had jurisdiction to try a case for BP 22.
Held
It is well settled that violations of BP 22 cases are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes, meaning that some acts
material and essential thereto and requisite in their consummation occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur
in another. In such cases, the court wherein any of the crime’s essential and material acts have been committed maintains
jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the other. Thus,
a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the
offense was in part committed
The OSG, relying on our ruling in Rigor v. People, concluded that “the Supreme Court regarded the place of deposit and
the place of dishonor as distinct from one another and considered the place where the check was issued, delivered and
dishonored, and not where the check was deposited, as the proper venue for the filing of a B.P. Blg. 22 case.” The Court,
however, cannot sustain such conclusion.
In said case, She accused therein obtained a loan from the Rural Bank of San Juan, Metro Manila, and in payment
thereof, he issued a check drawn against Associated Bank of Tarlac. Thereafter, Rural Bank deposited the check at PS
Bank, San Juan, but the same was returned for the reason that it had been dishonored by Associated Bank of Tarlac.
When all other efforts to demand the repayment of the loan proved futile, Rural Bank filed an action against the accused
for violation of BP 22 at the RTC of Pasig City, wherein crimes committed in. San Juan are triable. The accused, however,
contends that the RTC of Pasig had no jurisdiction thereon since no proof had been offered to show that his check was
issued, delivered, dishonored or that knowledge of beneficiency of funds occurred in the Municipality of San Juan. The
Court, however, disagreed and held that while the check was dishonored by the drawee. Associated Bank, in its Tarlac
Branch, evidence clearly showed that the accused had drawn, issued and delivered it at Rural Bank, San Juan, viz.:
Lastly, positioner contends that the Regional Trial Court of Pasig had no jurisdiction over this case since no proof has
been offered that his check was issued, delivered, dishonored or that knowledge of insufficiency of funds occurred in the
Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila.
RULE 121 – New Trial or Reconsideration
1. In civil cases vs. criminal cases
2. Grounds; effect
Grounds; effect
Corpuz
MUNIB S. ESTINO and ERNESTO G. PESCADERA vs .
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. Nos. 163957-58. April 7, 2009
Rule 121 of the Rules of Court allows the conduct of a new trial before a judgment of conviction becomes final when new
and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and
produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted would probably change the judgment. Although the documents
offered by petitioners are strictly not newly discovered, it appears to us that petitioners were mistaken in their belief that its
production during trial was unnecessary.
Facts
For review before the Court under Rule 45 are the April 16, 2004 Decision and June 14, 2004 Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan in the consolidated Criminal Case Nos. 26192 and 26193 entitled People of the Philippines v. Munib S.
Estino and Ernesto G. Pescadera. In G.R. Nos. 163957-58, petitioners Munib S. Estino and Ernesto G. Pescadera appeal
their conviction of violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act No. (RA) 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for
failure to pay the Representation and Transportation Allowance (RATA) of the provincial government employees of Sulu.
In G.R. Nos. 164009-11, petitioner Pescadera alone appeals his conviction of malversation of public funds under Article
217 of the Revised Penal Code for failure to remit the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) contributions of the
provincial government employees amounting to PhP 4,820,365.30.
In these consolidated appeals, petitioners pray for their acquittal.
Estino was elected Vice-Governor of Sulu in the May 1998 elections along with Gov. Abdusakur Tan. On June 23,
1998, this Court issued a status quo order in G.R. No. 133676, suspending the effects of the proclamation of Gov. Tan
and ordering Vice-Gov. Estino to assume the position of Governor until further orders. Thus, Estino acted as Governor of
Sulu from July 27, 1998 up to May 23, 1999 when this Court lifted the suspension order against Gov. Tan. Ernesto G.
Pescadera, on the other hand, was Provincial Treasurer of Sulu during Estino's stint as Acting Governor. Pursuant to
Commission on Audit (COA) ARMM Office Order No. 99-165 dated August 26, 1999, a special audit team was created
upon the request of the Provincial Government of Sulu. An audit of the disbursement vouchers and payrolls for the period
starting July 27, 1998 up to May 23, 1999 was then conducted by COA State Auditor II Mona U. Balabaran and her team.
The COA Special Audit Report stated that there were anomalies in the payment of salary differentials, allowances, and
benefits, among others.
The Sandiganbayan found the accused both guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A.
3019, and pursuant to Section 9 thereof. Hence, Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration and a Supplemental Motion
for Reconsideration and New Trial which were denied in the June 14, 2004 Sandiganbayan Resolution.
Issue
Whether or not a new trial is proper in the determination the guilt of the petitioners in non-payment of RATA in
violation of Sec 3(e) of RA 3019.
Held
YES. Petitioners’ defense is anchored on their payment of RATA, and for this purpose, they submitted documents
which allegedly show that they paid the RATA under the 1998 reenacted budget. They also claim that the COA Report did
not sufficiently prove that they did not pay the RATA because the alleged disbursement vouchers, which were supposed
to be annexed to the COA Report as proof of nonpayment of RATA, were not submitted with said report.
Rule 121 of the Rules of Court allows the conduct of a new trial before a judgment of conviction becomes final
when new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with reasonable diligence have
discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted would probably change the judgment. Although
the documents offered by petitioners are strictly not newly discovered, it appears to us that petitioners were mistaken in
their belief that its production during trial was unnecessary.
Grounds; effect
Huerto
BRIONES vs. PEOPLE
588 SCRA 345
Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; Words and Phrases; Probable Cause; Warrants of Arrest; There is a
distinction between the preliminary inquiry, which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest; and
the preliminary investigation proper, which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or be released.—It is
well to remember that there is a distinction between the preliminary inquiry, which determines probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest; and the preliminary investigation proper, which ascertains whether the offender should be
held for trial or be released. The determination of probable cause for purposes of issuing a warrant of arrest is made by
the judge. The preliminary investigation proper—whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is
guilty of the offense charged—is the function of the investigating prosecutor.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The task of the presiding judge when the Information is filed with the court is first and
foremost to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused; Meaning of
Probable Cause.—As enunciated in Baltazar v. People (560 SCRA 278 [2008]), the task of the presiding judge when the
Information is filed with the court is first and foremost to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for
the arrest of the accused. Probable cause is such set of facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that the offense charged in the Information or any offense included therein has been committed by
the person sought to be arrested. In determining probable cause, the average man weighs the facts and circumstances
without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common
sense. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been
committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than suspicion; it requires less than
evidence that would justify conviction.
Same; Same; Same; Purpose of the mandate of the judge to first determine probable cause for the arrest of the
accused is to insulate from the very start those falsely charged with crimes from the tribulations, expenses and anxiety of
a public trial.—The purpose of the mandate of the judge to first determine probable cause for the arrest of the accused is
to insulate from the very start those falsely charged with crimes from the tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a public
trial.
Same; Same; Same; Function of the judge to issue a warrant of arrest upon the determination of probable cause is
exclusive; The consequent implementation of a warrant of arrest cannot be deferred pending the resolution of a petition
for review by the Secretary of Justice as to the finding of probable cause.—The function of the judge to issue a warrant of
arrest upon the determination of probable cause is exclusive; thus, the consequent implementation of a warrant of arrest
cannot be deferred pending the resolution of a petition for review by the Secretary of Justice as to the finding of probable
cause, a function that is executive in nature. To defer the implementation of the warrant of arrest would be an
encroachment on the exclusive prerogative of the judge. It must be emphasized that petitioner filed with the trial court a
motion to suspend proceedings and to suspend the implementation of the warrant of arrest in pursuance of a DOJ
circular, and not a motion to quash the warrant of arrest questioning the issuance thereof. Thus, there is no contest as to
the validity or regularity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest.
Same; Same; Same; Nowhere in Section 9 of Department Circular No. 70 does it state that the court must hold the
proceedings in abeyance.—The above provision of the Department Circular is directed specifically at the appellant and
the trial prosecutor, giving them latitude in choosing a remedy to ensure that the proceedings in court are held in
abeyance. However, nowhere in the said provision does it state that the court must hold the proceedings in abeyance.
Therefore, the discretion of the court whether or not to suspend the proceedings or the implementation of the warrant of
arrest, upon the motion of the appellant or the trial prosecutor, remains unhindered. This is in consonance with the earlier
ruling of this Court that once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case as to its dismissal, or
the conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests on the sound discretion of the said court, as it is the best and sole judge of
what to do with the case before it.
Same; Same; Factual antecedents in Ledesma, Solar Team Entertainment, Inc., Dimatulac and Marcelo clearly
show that a common issue among them is whether the arraignment of an accused may be deferred pending resolution by
the Secretary of Justice of a petition for review on the finding of probable cause, to which the Court ruled in the
affirmative; Said decisions did not state that the implementation or enforcement of the warrant of arrest was also deferred
or suspended.—Petitioner has put emphasis on his argument that the suspension of the proceedings in court, including
the suspension of the implementation of a warrant of arrest pending a resolution of an appeal by the Secretary of Justice,
is in consonance with jurisprudence laid down by this Court in Marcelo v. Court of Appeals (235 SCRA 39
[1994]), Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals (254 SCRA 307 [1996]), Ledesma v. Court of Appeals (278 SCRA 656
[1997]), Dimatulac v. Villon (297 SCRA 679 [1998]), and Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. How (338 SCRA 511
[2000]). A
close
reading
of
the
factual
antecedents
in Ledesma, Solar
Team
Entertainment,
Inc.,Dimatulac and Marcelo clearly show that a common issue among them is whether the arraignment of an accused
may be deferred pending resolution by the Secretary of Justice of a petition for review on the finding of probable cause, to
which this Court ruled in the affirmative. Nowhere in the said decisions did it state that the implementation or enforcement
of the warrant of arrest was also deferred or suspended, as herein petitioner prays for.
Facts
The instant case arose from a Complaint dated August 2, 2010 filed by Virgilio C. Briones (Briones) for Nullity of Mortgage
Contract, Promissory Note, Loan Agreement, Foreclosure of Mortgage, Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 290846, and Damages against Cash Asia before the RTC. In his complaint, Briones alleged that he is the owner of a
property covered by TCT No. 160689 (subject property), and that, on July 15, 2010, his sister informed him that his
property had been foreclosed and a writ of possession had already been issued in favor of Cash Asia. Upon investigation,
Briones discovered that: (a) on December 6, 2007, he purportedly executed a promissory note, loan agreement, and deed
of real estate mortgage covering the subject property (subject contracts) in favor of Cash Asia in order to obtain a loan in
the amount of P3,500,000.00 from the latter; and (b) since the said loan was left unpaid, Cash Asia proceeded to
foreclose his property. In this relation, Briones claimed that he never contracted any loans from Cash Asia as he has been
living and working in Vietnam since October 31, 2007. He further claimed that he only went back to the Philippines on
December 28, 2007 until January 3, 2008 to spend the holidays with his family, and that during his brief stay in the
Philippines, nobody informed him of any loan agreement entered into with Cash Asia. Essentially, Briones assailed the
validity of the foregoing contracts claiming his signature to be forged. For its part, Cash Asia filed a Motion to
Dismiss dated August 25, 2010, praying for the outright dismissal of Briones’s complaint on the ground of improper
venue. In this regard, Cash Asia pointed out the venue stipulation in the subject contracts stating that "all legal actions
arising out of this notice in connection with the Real Estate Mortgage subject hereof shall only be brought in or submitted
tothe jurisdiction of the proper court of Makati City." In view thereof, it contended that all actions arising out of the subject
contracts may only be exclusively brought in the courts of Makati City, and as such, Briones’s complaint should be
dismissed for having been filed in the City of Manila. In response, Briones filed an opposition, asserting, inter alia, that he
should not be covered by the venue stipulation in the subject contracts as he was never a party therein. He also reiterated
that his signatures on the said contracts were forgeries. The RTC rendered it’s decision denying the motion to dismiss of
Cash Asia for lack of merit. Cash Asia then filed for petition for certiorari to the CA. CA annulled the RTC Orders, and
accordingly, dismissed Briones’s complaint without prejudice to the filing of the same before the proper court in Makati
City. It held that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying Cash Asia’s motion to dismiss, considering that the
subject contracts clearly provide that actions arising therefrom should be exclusively filed before the courts of Makati City
only. As such, the CA concluded that Briones’s complaint should have been dismissed outright on the ground of improper
venue, this, notwithstanding Briones’s claim of forgery.
Issue
Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in ordering the outright dismissal of Briones’s complaint on
the ground of improper venue.
Held
The court ruled that the general rule is that the venue of real actions is the court which has jurisdiction over the
area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated; while the venue of personal actions is the court
which has jurisdiction where the plaintiff or the defendant resides, at the election of the plaintiff. In this case, the venue
stipulation found in the subject contracts is indeed restrictive in nature, considering that it effectively limits the venue of the
actions arising therefrom to the courts of Makati City. However, it must be emphasized that Briones' s complaint directly
assails the validity of the subject contracts, claiming forgery in their execution. Given this circumstance, Briones cannot be
expected to comply with the aforesaid venue stipulation, as his compliance therewith would mean an implicit recognition
of their validity. Hence, pursuant to the general rules on venue, Briones properly filed his complaint before a court in the
City of Manila where the subject property is located.In conclusion, the CA patently erred and hence committed grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing Briones's complaint on the ground of improper venue.
Grounds; effect
Cortez
SALUDAGA v. SANDIGANBAYAN
619 SCRA 364
Criminal Law; AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019); Elements of the Offense under the AntiGraft and
Corrupt Practices Act.— The essential elements of the offense are as follows: 1. The accused must be a public officer
discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; 2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
inexcusable negligence; and 3. That his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving
any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.
Same; Same; There are two (2) acts or modes of committing the offense, thus: a) by causing any undue injury to any
party, including the government; or b) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference, it
does not mean that each act or mode constitutes a distinct offense.— There are two (2) acts or modes of committing the
offense, thus: a) by causing any undue injury to any party, including the
government; or b) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference, it does not mean that
each act or mode constitutes a distinct offense. An accused may be charged under either mode or under both should both
modes concur.
Criminal Procedure; Newly Discovered Evidence; Requisites for newly discovered evidence are: (a) the evidence was
discovered after trial (in this case, after investigation); (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at
the trial with reasonable diligence; and (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and is of
such weight that, if admitted, will probably change the judgment.— Under Section 2, Rule 121 of the Rules of Court, the
requisites for newly discovered evidence are: (a) the evidence was discovered after trial (in this case, after investigation);
(b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial with reasonable diligence; and (c) that it is
material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and is of such weight that, if admitted, will probably change
the judgment.
Same; Courts; Supreme Court; Ombudsman; The Court cannot interfere in the exercise by the Office of the Ombudsman
of its investigatory and prosecutory powers.— Without good and compelling reasons, the Court cannot interfere in the
exercise by the Office of the Ombudsman of its investigatory and prosecutory powers. The only ground upon which it may
entertain a review of the Office of the Ombudsman’s action is grave abuse of discretion.
Grave Abuse of Discretion; Grave abuse of discretion is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law as when the judgment rendered is not based on law and evidence but on
caprice, whim and despotism.— Grave abuse of discretion is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law as when the judgment rendered is not based on law and evidence
but on caprice, whim and despotism.
Criminal Procedure; Appeals; Certiorari; To justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari, the abuse of discretion must be
grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined, or to act at all, in contemplation of law, as to be equivalent tohaving acted without jurisdiction.— The special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is intended to correct errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The writ of certiorari is directed against a tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasijudicial function that acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion. Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction. To justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari, the abuse of discretion must be grave, as when the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all, in
contemplation of law, as to be equivalent to having acted without jurisdiction.
Facts
Herein petitioners Saludaga and Genio entered into a Pakyaw Contract for the construction of Barangay Day
Care Centers without conducting a competitive public bidding as required by law, which caused damage and prejudice to
the government. An information was filed for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 by causing undue injury to the
Government. The information was quashed for failure to prove the actual damage, hence a new information was filed,
now for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 by giving unwarranted benefit to a private person. The accused moved for a
new preliminary investigation to be conducted on the ground that there is substitution and/or substantial amendment of
the first information.
September 13, 2000 Information:
The undersigned Graft Investigation Officer of the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas, accuses QUINTIN B.
SALUDAGA and SPO2 FIEL E. GENIO, for VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(e) OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019, AS
AMENDED (THE ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT), committed as follows:
That in or about the months of November and December, 1997, at the Municipality of Lavezares, Province of
Northern Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, public officials,
being the Municipal Mayor and PNP Member of Lavezares, Northern Samar in such capacity and committing the offense
in relation to office, conniving, confederating and mutually helping with one another, and with the late Limpio Legua, a
private individual, with deliberate intent, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously enter into a Pakyaw Contract for the Construction of Barangay Day Care Centers for Barangays
Mac-arthur and Urdaneta, Lavezares, Northern Samar, each in the amount of FORTY-EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED PESOS (P48,500.00), Philippine Currency, or a total amount of NINETY-SEVEN THOUSAND PESOS
(P97,000.00), Philippine Currency, without conducting a competitive public bidding, thus depriving the government the
chance to obtain the best, if not, the most reasonable price, and thereby awarding said contracts to Olimpio Legua, a nonlicense contractor and non-accredited NGO, in violation of Sec. 356 of Republic Act No. 7160 (The Local Government
Code) and COA Circular No. 91-368, to the damage and prejudice of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
New Information:
The undersigned Prosecutor of the Office of the Special Prosecutor/Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses,
MAYOR QUINTIN B. SALUDAGA and SPO2 FIEL E. GENIO, for the violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed as follows:
That in or about the months of November and December, 1997 at the Municipality of Lavezares, Province of
Northern Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused QUINTIN B. SALUDAGA, a high
ranking public official being then the Mayor of Lavezares, Northern Samar, and committing the crime herein charged while
in the discharge of his official administrative function, conspiring and conniving with accused SPO2 FIEL B. GENIO, a
member of Lavezares Police Force (PNP) and with the late OLIMPIO LEGUA, a private individual, with deliberate intent,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally give unwarranted benefit or advantage to the late Olimpio Legua, a
non-license contractor and non-accredited NGO, through evident bad faith and manifest partiality by then and there
entering into a Pakyaw Contract with the latter for the Construction of Barangay Day Care Centers for barangays MacArthur and Urdaneta, Lavezares, Northern Samar, in the amount of FORTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
PESOS (P48,500.00) each or a total of NINETY SEVEN THOUSAND PESOS (P97,000.00) Philippine Currency, without
the benefit of a competitive public bidding to the prejudice of the Government and public interest.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
A petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was filed with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order assailing the July 14, 2008 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal, which
denied the Motion for Preliminary Investigation filed by the petitioners who were charged with a violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019. The initial information was quashed for lack of amount of actual damaged cause in the alleged
crime which is essential. The information was re-filed thus, petitioners filed a Motion for Preliminary Investigation which
was strongly opposed by the prosecution. Petitioners contend that there was a substitution of the first Information which
should have been preceded by a preliminary investigation. Further, they claim that newly discovered evidence mandates
re-examination of the finding of a prima facie cause to file the case.
The prosecutors on the other hand argues that the re-filed information did not change the nature of the offense charged,
but merely modified the mode by which accused committed the offense. The substance of such modification is not such
as to necessitate the conduct of another preliminary investigation. Moreover, no new allegations were made, nor was the
criminal liability of the accused upgraded in the re-filed information. Thus, new preliminary investigation is not in order.
Issue
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it refused to order the preliminary investigation and if so, is such a sufficient ground for new trial.
Held
The court found no merit on the petition. Petitioners insist that the offenses charged in the first and second
Information are not the same, and what transpired was a substitution of Information that required prior conduct of
preliminary investigation. Even assuming there was no substitution, substantial amendments were made in the second
Information, and that its submission should have been preceded by a new preliminary investigation.
The court ruled that the use of the disjunctive term “or” connotes that either act qualifies as a violation of Section 3
paragraph (e), as 2 different modes of committing the offense. This does not however indicate that each mode constitutes
a distinct offense, but rather, that an accused may be charged under either mode or under both which implies that there’s
no substituted information.
Preliminary investigation is applicable only when there was substantial amendment in the Information such as the
facts which was altered however; no such circumstance is obtaining in this case, because there was no modification in the
nature of the charged offense. Consequently, a new preliminary investigation is unnecessary and cannot be demanded
by the petitioners.
Finally, the newly discovered evidence mandates due re-examination of the finding of prima facie cause to file the
case, deserves scant consideration. But the court ruled that it cannot be considered as newly found evidence because it
was already in existence prior to the re-filing of the case.
Grounds; effect
Lasam
LUMANOG v. PEOPLE
642 SCRA 248
Facts
Appellants were convicted by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 103 for the ambush-slay of
Col. Rolando N. Abadilla, the former Chief of the Metropolitan Command Intelligence and Security Group of the Philippine
Constabulary, in June 13, 1996 along Katipunan Avenue, Quezon City. Their conviction was based mainly on the
testimony of the security guard Freddie Alejo who, at the time of the killing, was on duty at a building fronting the crime
scene and located only a few meters away. The accused, for their part, raised among others the defense of alibi.
Accused Lumanog filed a motion for reconsideration which assailed the inconsistencies in the declarations of
Alejo. Accused Joel de Jesus followed suit by filing a motion for a new trial, based on newly discovered evidence to
present two witnesses. Such motions, however, were denied by the RTC.
The Court of Appeals upheld the conviction of the accused-appellants based on the credible eyewitness
testimony of Alejo.
Issue
Whether or not the CA gravely erred in denying the motions for a new trial and reconsideration of the accused
based on the testimony of a sole witness.
Held
No. The testimony of a sole eyewitness is sufficient to support conviction so long as it is clear, straightforward and
worthy of credence by the trial court. The Court accords high respect, even with finality, to the evaluation made by the
lower court of the testimonies of the witnesses presented before it.
Grounds; effect
Diolata
G.R. No. 151911
July 25, 2011
EDGAR PAYUMO, ET AL vs HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, ET AL.
G.R. NO. 154535
NESTOR DOMACENA vs HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, ET AL, RESPONDENTS.
Criminal Procedure; New Trial; It must emphasized that an erroneous admission or rejection of evidence by the trial court
is not a ground for a new trial or reversal of the decision if there are other independent evidence to sustain the decision, or
if the rejected evidence, if it had been admitted, would not have changed the decision. – Granting arguendo that the First
Division erred in admitting the testimonies of the Payumos given during the first trial, which proceedings were nullified by
this Court in the Cabigao case, the same would still not justify a new trial. It must be emphasized that an erroneous
admission or rejection of evidence by the trial court is not a ground for a new trial or reversal of the decision if there are
other independent evidence to sustain the decision, or if the rejected evidence, if it had been admitted, would not have
changed that decision.
Same; Same; A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted only if the following requisites
are met; (a) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) that said evidence could not have been discovered and
produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence, (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative,
corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that the evidence is of such weight that, if admitted, would probably change the
judgment. – A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted only if the following requisites are
met; (a) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) that said evidence could not have been discovered and produced
at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or
impeaching; and (d) that the evidence is of such weight that, if admitted, would probably change the judgment. It is
essential that the offering party exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate the evidence before or during trial but
nonetheless failed to secure it.
Criminal Procedure; New Trial; It has been held that the mistakes of the attorney as the competency of a witness, the
sufficiency, relevancy, materiality or immateriality of a certain evidence, the proper defense, or the burden of proof are not
proper grounds for a new trial. – The matter of presentation of evidence for the defense if not for the trial court to decide.
Considering that the defense counsels have control over the conduct of the defense, the determination of which evidence
to present rests upon them. The Court notes that the defense presented a substantial number of witnesses and exhibits
during trial de novo to belie the accusation against the accused and to prove the defenses they interposed. It has been
held that the mistakes of the attorney as to the competency of a witness, the sufficiency, relevancy, materiality or
immateriality of a certain evidence, the proper defense, or the burden of proof are not proper grounds for a new trial.
Facts
Criminal Case No. 4219 involving a shooting incident in Sitio Aluag, Barangay Sta. Barbara, Iba, Zambales. A
composite team of Philippine Constabulary (PC) and Integrated National Police (INP) units allegedly fired at a group of
civilians instantly killing Amante Payumo and wounding Teofilo Payumo, Barangay Captain of Sta. Barbara at Cabatuhan
River; Edgar Payumo, Reynaldo Ruanto; Crisanto Ruanto; Apolinario Ruanto; and Exequiel Bonde. The following were
indicted for Murder with Multiple Frustrated and Attempted Murder before the Sandiganbayan: Domiciano Cabigao, Nestor
Domacena, Rolando Doblado, Ernesto Pampuan, Edgardo Prado, Romeo Dominico, Rodolfo Erese, Ramon Garcia and
Carlos Pacheco.
Accused Rodolfo Erese, however, died before the arraignment. When arraigned, the rest of the accused pleaded
not guilty to the offense charged. During the trial, the accused interposed the defenses of lawful performance of duty, selfdefense, mistake of fact, and alibi. They insisted that the incident was a result of a military operation, and not an ambush
as claimed by the prosecution.
The accused filed their Motion for New Trial anchored on the following grounds: (1) Error of law or irregularities
have been committed during the trial prejudicial to the substantive rights of the accused; and (2) the accused were denied
procedural due process of law.
In view of the appeal (G.R. No. 69422) before this Court, the Sandiganbayan Second Division issued a Resolution
denying accused's Motion for New Trial on the ground that it no longer had any jurisdiction over the case. Thus, Criminal
Case No. 4219 was remanded to the Sandiganbayan and was raffled to the First Division. Meanwhile, upon motion of the
accused, the Court clarified in its Resolution that the conduct of a new trial should not be limited to the mere presentation
of newly discovered evidence but "should be full and complete, taking into account the other serious allegations touching
on due process." Accordingly, the First Division received anew all the evidence of the parties, both testimonial and
documentary.
Petitioners allege that the Ombudsman and OSP negligently failed to protect their interest and that of the State
when they did not file any opposition to the Omnibus Motion to Set Aside Judgment and for New Trial and, later, a motion
for reconsideration of the challenged resolution. They claim that the Ombudsman and the OSP slept on their lawful duty to
protect their interest and that of the State.
Issue
Whether the Sandiganbayan acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it granted a new trial of Criminal Case No.
4219?
Held
YES. The Court finds and so rules that the Sandiganbayan Special Fifth Division acted in excess of its jurisdiction
when it nullified the Decision and granted a new trial for Criminal Case No. 4219. There is excess of jurisdiction where the
respondent court, being clothed with the power to determine the case, oversteps its authority as determined by law.
On the propriety of the grant by the Special Fifth Division of the motion for new trial in Criminal Case No. 4219,
the Court finds the same to be devoid of any legal and factual basis. The majority of the Special Fifth Division granted a
new trial on the following grounds: (1) serious irregularity during the trial due to the erroneous admission of the
testimonies of Teofilo and Edgar, which according to the Sandiganbayan, were tainted with irregularities of the "too
frequent rotation of Justices hearing the case" and, thus, had to be taken anew; and (2) to afford the accused the
opportunity to present in evidence the records of the JAGO relative to the incident that happened in Sitio Aluag, Brgy. Sta
Barbara, Iba, Zambales to shed light on the crucial issue as to whether the shooting incident was an ambush or the result
of a military operation.
Rule 121, Section 2 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure enumerates the grounds for a new trial, to wit: Sec.
2. Grounds for a new trial. The court shall grant a new trial on any of the following grounds: (a) That errors of law or
irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused have been committed during trial; and (b) That new and
material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and
produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted would probably change the judgment.
Granting arguendo that the First Division erred in admitting the testimonies of the Payumos given during the first
trial, which proceedings were nullified by this Court in the Cabigao case, the same would still not justify a new trial. It must
be emphasized that an erroneous admission or rejection of evidence by the trial court is not a ground for a new trial or
reversal of the decision if there are other independent evidence to sustain the decision, or if the rejected evidence, if it had
been admitted; would not have changed the decision. In the case at bench, a meticulous reading of the Decision reveals
that the combined testimonies of the other complainants, namely, Reynaldo Ruanto, Crisanto Ruanto, Apolinario Ruanto,
and Exequiel Bonde, have sufficiently established the commission of the crime charged in the information and the
participation of the accused in the said crime. Seemingly, it- would not debilitate the cause of the prosecution even if the
testimonies of the Payumos would be expunged from the records.
To begin with, the records of the JAGO relative to the incident do not meet the criteria for newly discovered
evidence that would merit a new trial. A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted only if
the following requisites are met: (a) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) that said evidence could not have
been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) that it is material, not merely
cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that the evidence is of such weight that, if admitted, would probably
change the judgment. It is essential that the offering party exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate the
evidence before or during trial but nonetheless failed to secure it. In this case, however, such records could have been
easily obtained by the accused and could have been presented during the trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence.
Hence, the JAGO records cannot be considered as newly discovered evidence. There was nothing that prevented the
accused from using these records during the trial to substantiate their position that the shooting incident was a result of a
military operation.
RULES 122-125 – Appeals
1. Appeals in Civil cases vs. appeals in criminal cases
2. Similarities and differences
Similarities and differences
Navarroza
MACAPAGAL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
717 SCRA 425
Facts
On November 25, 2008, the RTC rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime of Estafa for
misappropriating, for her own benefit, the total amount of P800,000.00, which is the value of the unreturned and unsold
pieces of jewelry. Petitioner received the decision on January 13, 2009 then she timely moved for reconsideration, but
was likewise denied in an Order dated May 20, 2009 which the petitioner allegedly received on July 31, 2009. She
.
supposedly filed a Notice of Appeal On August 3, 2009, but the same was denied on June 29, 2010 for having been filed
out of time.
Issue
Whether or not the regional trial court of manila, Branch 9 gravely erred in denying the notice of appeal filed by
the herein petitioner.
Held
The Court notes that the instant case suffers from various procedural infirmities which this Court cannot ignore
and are fatal to petitioner’s cause. It appears that petitioner assails not only the denial by the RTC of her notice of appeal
but likewise seeks the reversal of her conviction for estafa. For reasons that will be discussed below, the petition is bound
to fail, because of petitioner’s complete disregard of the procedural rules and the orders of the Court.
First, petitioner availed of the wrong mode of assailing the trial court’s denial of her notice of appeal. Sections 2
and 3, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure lay down the rules on where, how and when appeal is taken.
Second, even if we treat this petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65, it is still dismissible for violation of the
hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the RTC and the CA to issue writs of
certiorari, this should not be taken as granting parties the absolute and unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to
which an application will be directed. Direct resort to this Court is allowed only if there are special, important and
compelling reasons clearly and specifically spelled out in the petition, which are not present in this case.
Third, even if we ignore the above non-compliance and consider the petition as an appeal of the trial court’s
decision convicting her of estafa, again, we cannot do so for yet another fatal procedural shortcoming committed by
petitioner. As stated earlier, petitioner elevated to this Court not only the Order denying her notice of appeal but also the
Decision convicting her of estafa and the Order denying her motion for reconsideration. In utter disregard of the rules of
procedure, petitioner attached to the petition only the June 29, 2010 RTC Order denying her notice of appeal but she
failed to attach a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the assailed decision convicting her of estafa
and the order denying her motion for reconsideration. A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court must contain a certified true copy or duplicate original of the assailed decision, final order or judgment. Failure to
comply with such requirement shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.
Similarities and differences
Falucho
PEOPLE vs. MORALES
616 SCRA 223
Same; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; A unique nature of an appeal in a criminal case is that the appeal throws the
whole case open for review and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct, cite and appreciate errors in the appealed
judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned.-We draw attention to the unique nature of an appeal in criminal case:
the appeal throws the whole case open for review and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct, cite and appreciate
errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned. On the basis of such review, we find the
present appeal meritorious.
Same; Same; Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs; Elements.- On the other hand, in the prosecutions for
dangerous drug, it must be shown that (1) the accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be
prohibited or regulated drug, (2) such possession is not authorized by law, and (3) the accused was freely and
consciously aware of being in possession of the drug. Similarly, in this case, the evidence of the corpus delicti must be
established beyond reasonable doubt.
Prevailing jurisprudence uniformly hold that the trial courts findings of fact, especially when affirmed by the CA, are, as a
general rule, entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal. However, this rule admits of exceptions and does
not apply where facts of weight and substance with direct and material bearing on the final outcome of the case have
been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied. Evidence presented and relevant law and jurisprudence, we hold that
this case falls under the exception.
In actions involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must first be established: (1) proof that the
transaction or sale took place and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence. On the
other hand, in prosecutions for illegal possession of a dangerous drug, it must be shown that (1) the accused was in
possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug, (2) such possession is not authorized by
law, and (3) the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of the drug. In this case, the evidence
of the corpus delicti must be established beyond reasonable doubt. While this Court recognizes that non-compliance by
the buy-bust team with Section 21 of RA 9165 is not fatal as long as there is a justifiable ground therefor, for and as long
as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending team, these
conditions were not met. No explanation was offered by the testifying police officers for their failure to observe the rule.
PO1 Roy admitted that he was not a PDEA operative and the other witness, PO3 Rivera, testified that he was not aware
of the procedure involved in the conduct of anti-drug operations by the PNP. There is serious doubt whether the drug
presented in court was the same drug recovered from the appellant. Consequently, the prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the identity of the corpus delicti.
Furthermore, the evidence presented by the prosecution failed to reveal the identity of the person who had custody and
safekeeping of the drugs after its examination and pending presentation in court. Thus, the prosecution likewise failed to
establish the chain of custody which is fatal to its cause. The identity of the corpus delicti in this case was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt. There was likewise a break in the chain of custody which proves fatal to the prosecutions’
case. Since the prosecution has failed to establish the element of corpus delicti with the prescribed degree of proof
required for successful prosecution of both possession and sale of prohibited drugs, we resolve to ACQUIT Roldan
Morales.
Facts
PO1 Eduardo Roy and PO3 Armando Rivera of Quezon City Police District made a buy-bust operation and caught
Morales having two sachets of shabu together with marked money. Morales, on his part averred that two male persons in
civilian clothing who identified themselves as police officers handcuffed and frisk him without finding anything. On their
way to the police station, Roy produced a sachet of shabu from his pocket and upon reaching the station presented it as
evidence against Morales.
Quezon City RTC found Morales guilty. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision. Hence, this appeal.
Issue
Whether or not the concurring judgment of RTC and CA be disturbed on appeal to SC.
Held
Supreme Court draw attention to the unique nature of an appeal in a criminal case: the appeal throws the whole case
open for review and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct, cite and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment
whether they are assigned or unassigned. Prevailing jurisprudence uniformly hold that the trial courts findings of fact,
especially when affirmed by the CA, are, as a general rule, entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal.
However, this rule admits of exceptions and does not apply where facts of weight and substance with direct and material
bearing on the final outcome of the case have been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied. Evidence presented and
relevant law and jurisprudence, we hold that this case falls under the exception.
In actions involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must first be established: (1) proof that the
transaction or sale took place and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence. On the
other hand, in prosecutions for illegal possession of a dangerous drug, it must be shown that (1) the accused was in
possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug, (2) such possession is not authorized by
law, and (3) the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of the drug. In this case, the evidence
of the corpus delicti must be established beyond reasonable doubt. While this Court recognizes that non-compliance by
the buy-bust team with Section 21 of RA 9165 is not fatal as long as there is a justifiable ground therefor, for and as long
as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending team, these
conditions were not met. No explanation was offered by the testifying police officers for their failure to observe the rule.
PO1 Roy admitted that he was not a PDEA operative and the other witness, PO3 Rivera, testified that he was not aware
of the procedure involved in the conduct of anti-drug operations by the PNP. There is serious doubt whether the drug
presented in court was the same drug recovered from the appellant. Consequently, the prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the identity of the corpus delicti.
Furthermore, the evidence presented by the prosecution failed to reveal the identity of the person who had custody and
safekeeping of the drugs after its examination and pending presentation in court. Thus, the prosecution likewise failed to
establish the chain of custody which is fatal to its cause. The identity of the corpus delicti in this case was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt. There was likewise a break in the chain of custody which proves fatal to the prosecutions’
case. Since the prosecution has failed to establish the element of corpus delicti with the prescribed degree of proof
required for successful prosecution of both possession and sale of prohibited drugs, we resolve to ACQUIT Roldan
Morales.
Similarities and differences
Javier
ROSIE QUIDET V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
April 8, 2010
Criminal Procedure; Conspiracy; Appeals; An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect
those who did not appeal except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the
latter.—
The crime committed was attempted homicide and not frustrated homicide because the stab wounds that Andrew
sustained were not lifethreatening. Although Taban and Tubo did not appeal their conviction, this part of the appellate
court’s judgment is favorable to them, thus, they are entitled to a reduction of their prison terms. The rule is that an appeal
taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal except insofar as the judgment of the
appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.
FACTS
The petitioner together with Taban and Tubo were charged with homicide for the death of Tagarda and frustrated
homicide with the injuries sustained by Andrew. The RTC found that the stabbing of Tagarda and Andrew was previously
planned by the accused. The active participation of all three accused proved conspiracy in the commission of the crime.
The Court of Appeals disagreed with trial court’s finding that the accused are liable for frustrated homicide with respect to
the injuries of Andrew. Only the petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that there is no
conspiracy between the three of them when the stabbing incident has happened.
ISSUE
Whether or not an appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not those who did not appeal except insofar as
the judgement of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter?
HELD
No. The Supreme Court has held that the crime committed was attempted homicide and not frustrated homicide because
the stab wounds that Andrew sustained were not life threatening. Although Taban and Tubo did not appeal their
conviction, this part of the appellate court’s judgment is favorable to them, thus, they are entitled to a reduction of their
prison terms. The rule is that an appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal
except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.
Similarities and differences
Quiniquini
BALABA V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 169519
Criminal Procedure; Appeals; Jurisdiction; Sandiganbayan; Malversation of Public Funds; Upon the conviction by the
trial court of a public officer for malversation of public funds, his remedy should be an appeal to the Sandiganbayan, not to
the Court of Appeals.—Upon Balaba’s conviction by the trial court, his remedy should have been an appeal to the
Sandiganbayan. Paragraph 3, Section 4(c) of Republic Act No. 8249 (RA 8249), which further defined the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, reads: The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments,
resolutions or orders of the regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate
jurisdiction as herein provided. There is nothing in said paragraph which can conceivably justify the filing of Balaba’s
appeal before the Court of Appeals instead of the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, the Court of Appeals is bereft of any
jurisdiction to review the judgment Balaba seeks to appeal.
Same; Same; Same; Courts; Pleadings and Practice; While an error in designating the appellate court is not fatal to
the appeal, the correction in designating the proper appellate court should be made within the 15-day period to appeal.—
In Melencion v. Sandiganbayan (554 SCRA 345 [2008]), we ruled: An error in designating the appellate court is not fatal
to the appeal. However, the correction in designating the proper appellate court should be made within the 15-day period
to appeal. Once made within the said period, the designation of the correct appellate court may be allowed even if the
records of the case are forwarded to the Court of Appeals. Otherwise, the second paragraph of Section 2, Rule 50 of the
Rules of court would apply. The second paragraph of Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court reads: “An appeal
erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate court but shall be dismissed
outright.” In this case, Balaba sought the correction of the error in filing the appeal only after the expiration of the period
to appeal. The trial court promulgated its Decision on 9 December 2002. Balaba filed his notice of appeal on 14 January
2003. The Court of Appeals issued the Decision declaring its lack of jurisdiction on 15 December 2004. Balaba tried to
correct the error only on 27 January 2005, clearly beyond the 15-day period to appeal from the decision of the trial court.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not commit any error when it dismissed Balaba’s appeal because of lack of
jurisdiction.
FACTS
The decision of the CA dismissed the petitioner’s appeal and finding him guilty of Malversation of Publc Funds. The State
Auditors discovered a cash shortage of Php 56, 321.04, unaccounted cash tickets of Php 7,865.30 and an unrecorded
check of Php 50,000 payable to Balaba, or a total shortage of Php 114,186.32.
Three demand letters were sent to Balaba asking him to explain the discrepancy in the accounts. Unsatisfied with Balabas
explanation, an information for Malversation of Public funds was filed against the petitioner.
It was stated in the information that by virtue of his position, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, embezzle
and take away from said funds, in which he converted to his personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the
government.
During his arraignment, he (Balaba) entered a plea of not guilty. Then trial soon followed.
The lower court rendered decision finding Balaba guilty. Balaba filed his appeal to the CA but the same was dismissed.
The CA declared that it had no jurisdiction to act on the appeal because the Sandiganbayan has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over the case.
Hence, the petition.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing his appeal instead of certifying the case to the proper court
HELD
No. In this case, Balaba sought the correction of the error in filing the appeal only after the expiration of the period to
appeal. The trial court promulgated its Decision on 9 December 2002. Balaba filed his notice of appeal on 14 January
2003. The Court of Appeals issued the Decision declaring its lack of jurisdiction on 15 December 2004. Balaba tried to
correct the error only on 27 January 2005, clearly beyond the 15-day period to appeal from the decision of the trial
court. Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not commit any error when it dismissed Balabas appeal because of lack of
jurisdiction.
Similarities and differences
Josue
G.R. No. 177768
July 27, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. CHARMEN OLIVO y ALONG, NELSON DANDA y SAMBUTO, and
JOEY ZAFRA y REYES, Appellants.
Appeals; Evidence; The well-entrenched rule us that findings of the trial court affirmed by the appellate court are accorded
high respect, if not conclusive effect, by the Supreme Court, absent clear and convincing that the tribunals ignored,
misconstrued or misapplied facts and circumstances of substances such that, if considered, the same will warrant the
modification or reversal of the outcome of the case. – It is settled that when the issue is the evaluation of the testimony of
a witness of his credibility, this Court accords the highest respect and even finality to the findings of the trial court, absent
any showing that it committed palpable mistake, misappreciation of facts and grave abuse of discretion. It is the trial court
which has the unique advantage of observing first-hand the facial expressions, gestures and the tone of voice of a witness
while testifying. The well-entrenched rule is that findings of the trial court affirmed by the appellate court are accorded high
respect, if not conclusive effect, by this Court, absent clear and convincing evidence that the tribunals ignored,
misconstrued or misapplied facts and circumstances of substances such that, if considered, the same will warrant the
modification or reversal of the outcome o the case. Factual findings of trial court, when substantiated by the evidence on
record, command great weight and respect on appeal save only when certain material facts and circumstances were
overlooked and which, if duly considered, may vary the outcome of the case.
Criminal Procedure; Appeals; the present rule is that an appeal taken by one or more several accused shall not affect
those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favourable and applicable to the latter. –
One final note. The other accused, Joey Zafra, who is identically circumstanced as the other appellants and who was
likewise convicted on the same evidence does not appeal to have perfected an appeal from the trial court’s judgment, the
record does not show the reason therefor, Be that as it may, the present rule is that an appeal taken by one or more
several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is
favourable and applicable to the latter. Our pronouncements here with respect to the insufficiency of the prosecution
evidence to convict the appellants beyond reasonable doubt are definitely favourable and applicable to accused Joey
Zafra. He should not therefore be treated as the odd man out and should benefit from the acquittal of his co-accused. In
fact, under similar conditions and on the same ratiocination section 11 (a), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court has justified the
extension of our judgment of acquittal to the co-accused who failed to appeal from the judgment o the trial court which we
subsequently reversed.
FACTS
Olivo, Danda and Zafra were charged in an Information dated November 29, 2000 as follows:
The undersigned accuses CHARMEN OLIVO Y ALONG alias Lipay, NELSON DANDA Y SAMBUTO alias Teng, and
JOEY ZAFRA Y REYES, of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, committed as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of November 2000, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and
confederating together and helping one another, with intent to gain and by means of force, violence, and intimidation
against persons, to wit: by then and there armed with guns forcibly entered the hardware store of Mariano Constantino [y]
Zoleta located at Eagle Street, Sitio Veterans B, Bgy. Bagong Silangan, this City, then announced that it was [a] HOLDUP and ordered Maricel Permejo, storekeeper thereat, at gunpoint to give them the money of said store, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously took, rob and carry away the total amount of P35,000.00 Philippine Currency,
representing the days earnings of said hardware store, that on the occasion of and by reason of the said robbery and in
pursuance of their conspiracy, the said accused with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one MARIANO CONSTANTINO Y ZOLETA, by then and
there shooting him with a gun hitting him on the trunk and extrem[i]ties, thereby inflicting upon said Mariano Constantino
[y] Zoleta serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of said Mariano Constantino [y] Zoleta.
The arraignment was made on January 22, 2001, all of the accused pleaded not guilty.
The evidence for the prosecution consisted of the oral testimonies of Maricel Permejo, storekeeper of the victim Mariano
Constantino, Pablito Constantino, the victim’s brother, SPO2 Joseph Dino (SPO2 Dino), medico-legal officer Dr. Winston
Tan, and Emelita Constantino, the victim’s wife. The defense, for its part, presented accused-appellants Olivo and Zafra,
Dominica Bernal, who was the landlady of Olivo and Danda, and Rodel de Belen who corroborated Zafra’s testimony.
On August 24, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision convicting accused Charmen Olivo y Along, Nelson Danda y
Sambuto and Joey Zafra y Reyes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide.
The accused Olivo and Danda appealed to the Court of Appeals.
In a Decision dated November 30, 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the RTC’s decision. Hence, this petition
for review.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellants Charmen Olivo and Nelson Danda of the
crime charged despite the failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD
After review, we find that the accused-appellants should be acquitted.
The well-entrenched rule is that findings of the trial court affirmed by the appellate court are accorded high respect, if not
conclusive effect, by this Court, absent clear and convincing evidence that the tribunals ignored, misconstrued or
misapplied facts and circumstances of substances such that, if considered, the same will warrant the modification or
reversal of the outcome of the case.
In this case, the material fact and circumstance that the lone alleged eyewitness, Maricel Permejo, was not able
to identify the accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the crime, varies the outcome of this case. This
circumstance was established during the direct examination of Olivo and was not rebutted by the prosecution during
cross-examination or in its pleadings.
The fact that Permejo was not able to identify accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the crime impinges heavily on the
credibility of prosecution’s evidence. For if, indeed, the accused-appellants were the malefactors of the crime who
did not hide their faces during the robbery, the eyewitness, who had such close, traumatic encounter with them,
should automatically have recalled their faces upon seeing them. It behooves this Court to declare that she was not
able to do so positively.
Having ignored the abovementioned important circumstance, the trial court misconstrued and misapplied facts and
circumstances of the case, warranting the modification or reversal of the outcome of the case. The trial court
grievously erred when it ruled that the lone prosecution eyewitness categorically and positively identified accusedappellants as the perpetrators of the crime.
Other circumstances tend to prove that the accused-appellants were not the perpetrators of the crime.
One, they were not arrested for the crime of robbery with homicide but were arrested during a buy-bust
operation.
Two, they were brought to Camp Karingal for dubious reasons. During the direct examination, SPO2 Dino stated that
it was standard operating procedure (SOP) that when the case is murder and robbery and the amount is more than P1
million, the case will be handled by the Criminal Investigation Unit (CIU) in Camp Karingal instead of where the crime
occurred, i.e, Batasan Area. Apparently realizing his mistake that the amount taken was only P35,000.00 when asked the
same question during cross-examination, SPO2 Dino replied that it was SOP that if the case is murder or homicide and if
there is no available police investigator for that police station, then Camp Karingal will be the one to conduct the
investigation. The abovementioned testimony of SPO2 Dino makes his credibility doubtful.
Trial courts are mandated not only to look at the direct examination of witnesses but to the totality of evidence before
them. In every case, the court should review, assess and weigh the totality of the evidence presented by the parties. It
should not confine itself to oral testimony during the trial.
We cannot convict appellants for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide when the evidence relied upon by
the trial court is plainly erroneous and inadequate to prove appellants’ guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Conviction must
rest on nothing less than moral certainty, whether it proceeds from direct or circumstantial evidence.
One final note. The other accused, Joey Zafra, who is identically circumstanced as the other appellants and who was
likewise convicted on the same evidence, does not appear to have perfected an appeal from the trial court’s judgment.
Be that as it may, the present rule is that an appeal taken by one or more several accused shall not affect those
who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.
Our pronouncements here with respect to the insufficiency of the prosecution evidence to convict appellants beyond
reasonable doubt are definitely favorable and applicable to accused Joey Zafra. He should not therefore be treated as the
odd man out and should benefit from the acquittal of his co-accused. In fact, under similar conditions and on the same
ratiocination, Section 11(a), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court has justified the extension of our judgment of acquittal
to the co-accused who failed to appeal from the judgment of the trial court which we subsequently reversed.
Similarities and differences
Ramoso
Guasch vs Dela Cruz
Criminal Procedure; Judgments; Motion for Reconsideration; As a general rule, the statutory requirement that
when no motion for reconsideration is filed within the reglementary period, the decision attains finality and becomes
executory in due course must be strictly enforced; Purposes for such Statutory Requirement.—As a general rule, the
statutory requirement that when no motion for reconsideration is filed within the reglementary period, the decision attains
finality and becomes executory in due course must be strictly enforced as they are considered indispensable interdictions
against needless delays and for orderly discharge of judicial business. The purposes for such statutory requirement are
twofold: first, to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial
business, and, second, to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which are precisely why
courts exist. Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely. The rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in
suspense for an indefinite period of time.
Same; Same; Appeals; Elements to Consider for the Appeal to be Given Due Course.—In exceptional cases,
substantial justice and equity considerations warrant the giving of due course to an appeal by suspending the
enforcement of statutory and mandatory rules of procedure. Certain elements are considered for the appeal to be given
due course, such as: (1) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (2) the merits of the case, (3) a cause not
entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (4) lack of any showing
that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (5) the other party will not be unduly prejudiced thereby.
Facts
Respondent Dela Cruz filed a complaint against Guasch with the City Prosecutor of Manila. He alleged that
petitioner was his neighbor and kumadre and that on several occasions transacted with him by exchanging cash for
checks of small amounts. He alleged that petitioner gave her a check worth 3,300 PHP and assured that she will have the
funds to cover the said check. On the date of maturity and upon presentment the check was dishonored for the reason
that the account against which it was drawn was already closed. City Prosecutor recommended that an information for
estafa be filed against petitioner.
Petitioner entered a plea of not guilty and after the prosecution rested its case, petitioner filed a Motion With
Leave To Admit Demurrer to Evidence. The demurrer to evidence was granted and the case was dismissed. Respondent
filed a Motion to Amend to include a finding of civil liability of the petitioner. In the Manifestation respondents counsel
justified the failure to file the motion within the 15 day reglementary period because all postal offices in Metro Manila were
allegedly ordered closed in the afternoon due to the rally staged on Ayala Avenue.
The trial court denied the motion finding that counsel was inexcusably negligent, hence, the dismissal is now final
and executory. Respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA and was granted. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied
respondents Motion to Amend
Held:
The court affirmed the ruling of the CA. As a general rule, the statutory requirement that when no motion for
reconsideration is filed within the reglementary period, the decision attains finality and becomes executory in due course
must be strictly enforced as they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for orderly
discharge of judicial business. The purposes for such statutory requirement are twofold: first, to avoid delay in the
administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business, and, second, to put an
end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which are precisely why courts exist. Controversies cannot
drag on indefinitely. The rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time.
However, in exceptional cases, substantial justice and equity considerations warrant the giving of due course to
an appeal by suspending the enforcement of statutory and mandatory rules of procedure. Certain elements are
considered for the appeal to be given due course, such as: (1) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (2)
the merits of the case, (3) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension
of the rules, (4) lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (5) the other party will not
be unduly prejudiced thereby
Similarities and differences
Lozada
PEOPLE VS FRANCISCO TARUC
GR NO. 185202, February 18, 2009
Criminal Procedure; Accused fails to appear on the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment despite notice;
The promulgation of judgment shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a
copy thereof at his last known address or thru his counsel.
The counsel of the accused has been given the notices of his trial. In the event that he changes residence, he must inform
the Court of such change thru his counsel. In this case, the accused-appellant failed to inform his counsel of his
whereabouts.
Same; Same; Failure to appear was without justifiable cause; Accused shall be deemed to have waived his right
to avail remedies.
Under Section 6, Rule 120, the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable
cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within
fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court
to avail of these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that
his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice.
The accused-appellant has escaped and has therefore puts himself beyond the reach of the law. He then loses his
standing and unless he surrenders or submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court, his right to appeal, among other
remedies, is deemed waived.
Same; Same; Dismissal of Appeal for Abandonment or failure to Prosecute; The Court of Appeals may also,
upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or
confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal.
Under Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court the Court of Appeals may, upon motion of the appellee or motu
proprio and with notice to the appellant in either case, dismiss the appeal if the appellant fails to file his brief within the
time prescribed by this Rule, except where the appellant is represented by a counsel de officio.
The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes
from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal.
FACTS
Francisco Taruc, accused-appellant, was found guilty of the crime of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
for the death of Emelito Sualog on June 29, 2005 by the RTC of Bataan, Branch 3. As the punishment for murder was
death, the case was brought for automatic review before the Court of Appeals. Accused-appellant, through his PAO
lawyer, filed for a Motion to File Extension of Time to File Appellant Brief. The Court of Appeals issued a Notice to File
Brief to the accused-appellant but the same was later on returned with the postal notion moved out. When the warden
directed accused-appellants’ PAO lawyer to furnish it with the complete and present address, they were later informed
that the accused-appellant had escaped prison and his whereabouts were unknown. Still, the Motion for Extension was
granted but the PAO lawyer failed to file the said brief. The Court of Appeals required the PAO for an explanation why
they should not be cited for contempt and found the reasons to be valid, thus, the case was considered submitted for
decision. The CA confirmed the decision of the RTC with some modifications. Accused-appellant, through the PAO lawyer
filed for a Notice of Appeal before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE
Whether or not accused- appellant is allowed the remedy of appeal.
HELD
No. Under Rule 120, Section 6, Paragraph 4 and 5, of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, in case the accused failed to
appear on the scheduled date of the promulgation of judgment without justifiable case, he shall lose the remedies
available in the Rules, one of which is the remedy of appeal. Upon escaping, it was deemed that he had waived his right
to avail of the remedies accorded to him as he puts himself beyond the reach and application of the law.
Similarities and differences
Romero
TIU VS. CA
586 SCRA 118 GR No. 162370
Settled is the rule that only the Solicitor General may bring and defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines or represent the people or State in criminal proceedings before the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals.
At the outset, the Court finds that the petition is defective since it was not filed by the Solicitor General. Instead, it was
filed by Tiu, the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 96-413, through his counsel. Settled is the rule that only the
Solicitor General may bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or
20
State in criminal proceedings before this Court and the Court of Appeals. Tiu, the offended party in Criminal Case No.
96-413 is without legal personality to appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals before this Court. Nothing shows that the
Office of the Solicitor General represents the People in this appeal before this Court. On this ground alone, the petition
must fail.
FACTS
The case resulted from a criminal charge for slight physical injuries filed by Edgardo Postanes against Remigio Pasion
.On the other hand, David Tiu (Tiu) filed a criminal charge for grave threats against Postanes. Upon motion of Pasion, the
two criminal cases were consolidated and jointly heard before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City.
After trial, Metropolitan Trial Court rendered judgment dismissing both charges on ground of insufficiency of evidence.
Tiu filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Metropolitan Trial Court. Afterwards, Tiu, through his
counsel, filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC of Pasay City. The RTC of Pasay City rendered a decision declaring
void the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court and ordered the case to be remanded in the Metropolitan Trial Court.
Postanes moved for reconsideration, which was denied by the RTC.
Postanes filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari (with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order), challenging the decision of the RTC. The Court of Appeals reversed the
RTC Decision and affirmed the dismissal of the two cases. In annulling the RTC decision, the Court of Appeals held that
the RTC has granted upon the State, through the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the right to appeal the decision of
acquittal which right the government does not have.
ISSUE
Whether or not there was Double Jeopardy when Tiu filed a petition for certiorari questioning the acquittal of Postanes by
the Metropolitan Trial Court;
HELD
(YES) The court rules in the affirmative.
The Court finds that the petition is defective since it was not filed by the Solicitor General. Instead, it was filed by Tiu, the
private complainant, through his counsel.
General rule provides that only the Solicitor General may bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines, or represent the People or State in criminal proceedings before this Court and the Court of Appeals.
Tiu, the offended party in the criminal case is without legal personality to appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals
before the Supreme Court. Nothing shows that the Office of the Solicitor General represents the People in this appeal
before the Court. On this ground alone, the SC says the petition must not prosper.
However, the Court opted to resolve the query of double jeopardy.
The elements of double jeopardy are: (1) the complaint or information was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction; (2) the court had jurisdiction; (3) the accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was
convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without his express consent.
All the elements were present given the following: (1) the Information filed in the criminal case against Postanes was
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the Metropolitan Trial Court had jurisdiction over the criminal
case; (3) Postanes was arraigned and entered a non-guilty plea; and (4) the Metropolitan Trial Court dismissed the
Criminal Case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence amounting to an acquittal from which no appeal can be
had. Clearly, for the court to grant the petition and order the Metropolitan Trial Court to reconsider its decision, just what
the RTC ordered the Metropolitan Trial Court to do, is to transgress the Constitutional proscription not to put any person
twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.
Similarities and differences
Montilla
COLINARES VS. PEOPLE
662 SCRA 266 , DECEMBER 13, 2011
Probation Law - The Probation Law, said the Court in Francisco, requires that an accused must not have appealed his
conviction before he can avail himself of probation. This requirement "outlaws the element of speculation on the part of
the accused—to wager on the result of his appeal—that when his conviction is finally affirmed on appeal, the moment of
truth well-nigh at hand, and the service of his sentence inevitable, he now applies for probation as an ‘escape hatch’ thus
rendering nugatory the appellate court’s affirmance of his conviction."
Instances where the probation law should not be granted to the accused - On the other hand, probation should not be
granted to the accused in the following instances: 1.) When the accused is convicted by the trial court of a crime where
the penalty imposed is within the probationable period or a fine, and the accused files a notice of appeal; and 2.) When
the accused files a notice of appeal which puts the merits of his conviction in issue, even if there is an alternative prayer
for the correction of the penalty imposed by the trial court or for a conviction to a lesser crime, which is necessarily
included in the crime in which he was convicted where the penalty is within the probationable period.
FACTS
Arnel sneaked behind and struck Rufino twice on the head with a huge stone and fell unconscious. Arnel claimed selfdefense. The RTC rendered judgment, finding Arnel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide. Since the
maximum probationable imprisonment under the law was only up to six years, Arnel did not qualify for probation. Arnel
appealed to the CA, invoking self-defense and, alternatively, seeking conviction for the lesser crime of attempted homicide
with the consequent reduction of the penalty imposed on him. The CA entirely affirmed the RTC decision but deleted the
award for lost income. Arnel comes to the SC on petition for review. SC required Arnel and the Solicitor General to submit
their respective positions on whether or not, assuming Arnel committed only the lesser crime of attempted homicide with
its imposable penalty of imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of
prision correccional, as maximum, he could still apply for probation upon remand of the case to the trial court. Both
complied with Arnel taking the position that he should be entitled to apply for probation in case the Court metes out a new
penalty on him that makes his offense probationable. The language and spirit of the probation law warrants such a stand.
The Solicitor General, on the other hand, argues that under the Probation Law no application for probation can be
entertained once the accused has perfected his appeal from the judgment of conviction.
ISSUE
Whether or not he may still apply for probation on remand of the case to the trial court
HELD
YES. Ordinarily, Arnel would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he having appealed from the judgment of the
RTC convicting him for frustrated homicide. But, the Court finds Arnel guilty only of the lesser crime of attempted homicide
and holds that the maximum of the penalty imposed on him should be lowered to imprisonment of four months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of prision correccional, as maximum. With this new penalty, it would be
but fair to allow him the right to apply for probation upon remand of the case to the RTC.
The Probation Law, said the Court in Francisco, requires that an accused must not have appealed his conviction before
he can avail himself of probation. This requirement “outlaws the element of speculation on the part of the accused—to
wager on the result of his appeal—that when his conviction is finally affirmed on appeal, the moment of truth well-nigh at
hand, and the service of his sentence inevitable, he now applies for probation as an ‘escape hatch’ thus rendering
nugatory the appellate court’s affirmance of his conviction.”
The Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition.
Similarities and differences
Naca
VILLAREAL v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 151258 December 01, 2014
G.R. No. 151258
December 01, 2014
ARTEMIO VILLAREAL v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Though the Supreme Court (SC) has recognized that the acquittal
of the accused may be challenged where there has been a grave abuse of discretion, certiorari would lie if it is
convincingly established that the Court of Appeals’ (CA’s) Decision dismissing the case was attended by a
whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
Though we have recognized that the acquittal of the accused may be challenged where there has been a grave abuse of
discretion, certiorari would lie if it is convincingly established that the CA’s Decision dismissing the case was attended by
a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It must be shown that the assailed
judgment constitutes “a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation of law; an exercise of power in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility; or a blatant abuse of authority to a point so grave and so severe as to
deprive the court of its very power to dispense justice.” Thus, grave abuse of discretion cannot be attributed to a court
simply because it allegedly misappreciated the facts and the evidence.
Criminal Law; Penalties; The Revised Penal Code (RPC) has carefully delineated the imposable penalties as
regards felonies committed by means of culpa on the one hand and felonies committed by means of dolo on the
other in the context of the distinctions it has drawn between them.
Since the accused were found to have committed a felony by means of culpa, we cannot agree with the argument of the
OSG. It contends that the imposable penalty for intentional felony can also be applied to the present case on the ground
that the nature of the imprudence or negligence of the accused was so gross that the felony already amounted to malice.
The Revised Penal Code has carefully delineated the imposable penalties as regards felonies committed by means of
culpa on the one hand and felonies committed by means of dolo on the other in the context of the distinctions it has drawn
between them. The penalties provided in Article 365 (Imprudence and Negligence) are mandatorily applied if the death of
a person occurs as a result of the imprudence or negligence of another. Alternatively, the penalties outlined in Articles 246
to 261 (Destruction of Life) are automatically invoked if the death was a result of the commission of a forbidden act
accompanied by a malicious intent. These imposable penalties are statutory, mandatory, and not subject to the discretion
of the court. We have already resolved — and the OSG agrees — that the accused Dizon and Tecson, et al. had neither
animus interficendi nor animus iniuriandi in inflicting physical pain on Lenny Villa. Hence, we rule that the imposable
penalty is what is applicable to the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide as defined and penalized under
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Judgments; Finality of Judgments; Probation; Rule 120 of the Rules of Court
speaks of the finality of a criminal judgment once the accused applies for probation.
Indeed, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court speaks of the finality of a criminal judgment once the accused applies for
probation, viz.: SECTION 7. Modification of judgment.—A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be
modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a
judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or
totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation. (7a)
(Emphases supplied) Coupled with Section 7 of Rule 117 and Section 1 of Rule 122, it can be culled from the foregoing
provisions that only the accused may appeal the criminal aspect of a criminal case, especially if the relief being sought is
the correction or review of the judgment therein. This rule was instituted in order to give life to the constitutional edict
against putting a person twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. It is beyond contention that the accused
would be exposed to double jeopardy if the state appeals the criminal judgment in order to reverse an acquittal or even to
increase criminal liability. Thus, the accused’s waiver of the right to appeal — as when applying for probation — makes
the criminal judgment immediately final and executory.
Same; Same; Double Jeopardy; The rule on double jeopardy is not absolute, and that this rule is inapplicable to
cases in which the state assails the very jurisdiction of the court that issued the criminal judgment.
It must be clarified, however, that the finality of judgment evinced in Section 7 of Rule 120 does not confer blanket
invincibility on criminal judgments. We have already explained in our Decision that the rule on double jeopardy is not
absolute, and that this rule is inapplicable to cases in which the state assails the very jurisdiction of the court that issued
the criminal judgment. The reasoning behind the exception is articulated in People v. Nazareno, 595 SCRA 438 (2009),
from which we quote: In such instance, however, no review of facts and law on the merits, in the manner done in an
appeal, actually takes place; the focus of the review is on whether the judgment is per se void on jurisdictional grounds,
i.e., whether the verdict was rendered by a court that had no jurisdiction; or where the court has appropriate jurisdiction,
whether it acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In other words, the review is on
the question of whether there has been a validly rendered decision, not on the question of the decision’s error or
correctness. Under the exceptional nature of a Rule 65 petition, the burden — a very heavy one — is on the shoulders of
the party asking for the review to show the presence of a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction; or of a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation of law; or to an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion and hostility.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Jurisdiction; Any residual jurisdiction of the court of origin shall cease
including the authority to order execution pending appeal — the moment the complete records of the case are
transmitted to the appellate court.
Jurisdiction over a case is lodged with the court in which the criminal action has been properly instituted. If a party appeals
the trial court’s judgment or final order, jurisdiction is transferred to the appellate court. The execution of the decision is
thus stayed insofar as the appealing party is concerned. The court of origin then loses jurisdiction over the entire case the
moment the other party’s time to appeal has expired. Any residual jurisdiction of the court of origin shall cease —
including the authority to order execution pending appeal — the moment the complete records of the case are transmitted
to the appellate court. Consequently, it is the appellate court that shall have the authority to wield the power to hear, try,
and decide the case before it, as well as to enforce its decisions and resolutions appurtenant thereto. That power and
authority shall remain with the appellate court until it finally disposes of the case. Jurisdiction cannot be ousted by any
subsequent event, even if the nature of the incident would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first place.
Criminal Law; Probation; Words and Phrases; Probation is a special privilege granted by the state to penitent
qualified offenders who immediately admit their liability and thus renounce their right to appeal.
We find that RTC Branch 130 had no jurisdiction to act on the probation applications of Tecson, et al. It had neither the
power nor the authority to suspend their sentence, place them on probation, order their final discharge, and eventually
declare the case against them terminated. This glaring jurisdictional faux pas is a clear evidence of either gross ignorance
of the law or an underhanded one-upmanship on the part of RTC Branch 130 or Tecson, et al., or both — to which this
Court cannot give a judicial imprimatur. In any event, Tecson, et al. were ineligible to seek probation at the time they
applied for it. Probation is a special privilege granted by the state to penitent qualified offenders who immediately admit
their liability and thus renounce their right to appeal. In view of their acceptance of their fate and willingness to be
reformed, the state affords them a chance to avoid the stigma of an incarceration record by making them undergo
rehabilitation outside of prison. Some of the major purposes of the law are to help offenders to eventually develop
themselves into law-abiding and self-respecting individuals, as well as to assist them in their reintegration with the
community. It must be reiterated that probation is not a right enjoyed by the accused. Rather, it is an act of grace or
clemency conferred by the state.
Same; Same; All offenders who previously appealed their cases, regardless of their reason for appealing, are
disqualified by the law from seeking probation.
Indeed, one of the legal prerequisites of probation is that the offender must not have appealed the conviction. In the 2003
case Lagrosa v. Court of Appeals, 312 SCRA 298, this Court was faced with the issue of whether a convict may still apply
for probation even after the trial court has imposed a nonprobationable verdict, provided that the CA later on lowers the
original penalty to a sentence within the probationable limit. In that case, the trial court sentenced the accused to a
maximum term of eight years of prisión mayor, which was beyond the coverage of the Probation Law. They only became
eligible for probation after the CA reduced the maximum term of the penalty imposed to 1 year, 8 months and 21 days of
prisión correccional. In deciding the case, this Court invoked the reasoning in Francisco v. Court of Appeals, 243 SCRA
384 (1995), and ruled that the accused was ineligible for probation, since they had filed an appeal with the CA. In
Francisco, we emphasized that Section 4 of the Probation Law offers no ambiguity and does not provide for any
distinction, qualification, or exception. What is clear is that all offenders who previously appealed their cases, regardless
of their reason for appealing, are disqualified by the law from seeking probation. Accordingly, this Court enunciated in
Lagrosa that the accused are disallowed from availing themselves of the benefits of probation if they obtain a genuine
opportunity to apply for probation only on appeal as a result of the downgrading of their sentence from non-probationable
to probationable.
Same; Same; One of the hallmarks of the Probation Law is precisely to “suspend the execution of the sentence,”
and not to replace the original sentence with another.
A void judgment cannot be the source of legal rights; legally speaking, it is as if no judgment had been rendered at all.
Considering our annulment of the Orders of Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 in relation to the probation proceedings,
respondents cannot claim benefits that technically do not exist. In any event, Tecson, et al. cannot invoke Article 89 of the
Revised Penal Code, as we find it inapplicable to this case. One of the hallmarks of the Probation Law is precisely to
“suspend the execution of the sentence,” and not to replace the original sentence with another, as we pointed out in our
discussion in Baclayon v. Mutia, 129 SCRA 148 (1984): An order placing defendant on “probation” is not a “sentence” but
is rather in effect a suspension of the imposition of sentence. It is not a final judgment but is rather an “interlocutory
judgment” in the nature of a conditional order placing the convicted defendant under the supervision of the court for his
reformation, to be followed by a final judgment of discharge, if the conditions of the probation are complied with, or by a
final judgment of sentence if the conditions are violated. (Emphases supplied) Correspondingly, the criminal liability of
Tecson, et al. remains.
FACTS
Motions for Reconsideration or Clarification were filed by the People and the accused parties in this case. The following
motions were filed in connection with the case involving the death of Leonardo “Lenny” Villa due to fraternity hazing.
Some of the questions posed in this case are the following: who are eligible for probation, the validity of the prior probation
proceedings and the validity of the concomitant orders of thw lower courts.
The decision of the Court of Appeals in the said case was partially modified by the Supreme Court. Dizon and Villaruel
were held guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide. Meanwhile,Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug, Jr. were held guilty
of slight physical injuries by CA. However, the SC modified the decision and convicted them of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide.
The parties to the second case (Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug, Jr.) filed a Motion for Clarification or Reconsideration
insofar as their criminal liabilities and services of sentences are concerned. The former applied for probation after the
pronouncement of CA's decision since slight physical injuries is a probationable offense.
The accused contended that they were discharged from the criminal liability and cases against them are closed and
terminated because of the RTC's grant of probation upon their completion of the terms and conditions of the probation.
Moreover, they said that the CA decision lapsed into finality when they waived their right to appeal and applied for
probation.
ISSUE
Whether or not the finality of CA's decision barred the state from seeking the annulment of the judgment.
HELD
No. The finality of a decision of the CA will NOT BAR the state from seeking the annulment of the judgment via a Rule 65
petition.
According to Rule 122, Section 1,
Any party may appeal from judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy.
In a reading of Rule 122, Section 1 with Rule 117, Section 7 and Rule 120, Section 7 only the accused may appeal the
criminal aspect of the criminal case. Furthermore, the accused's waiver of the right to appeal (e.g. application for
probation) makes the criminal judgment final and executory. However, the application of double jeopardy in NOT
ABSOLUTE. It is not a blanket of invincibility on criminal judgments. As an exception to the foregoing rule, the State may
assail the jurisdiction of the court that issued the criminal judgment.
As an application, there was no irregularity in the SC's partial annulment of the CA decision in spite of pf finality because
judgment was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
As to the probation of the accused, the orders of RTC Branch 130 as to their probation have no legal effect. The same
were issued without jurisdiction. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it, no rights are divested.
Through it, no rights are can be attained.
Similarities and differences
Parulan
DANDY L. DUNGO and GREGORIO A. SIBAL, JR., Petitioners,
vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03, dated October 15, 2004, governs the procedure on the appeal from the Court of Appeals
(CA) to the Supreme Court (SC) when the penalty imposed is either reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.—An appeal
is a proceeding undertaken to have a decision reconsidered by bringing it to a higher court authority. The right to appeal is
neither a natural right nor is it a component of due process. It is a mere statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in
the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03, dated October 15, 2004, governs the procedure on the appeal from the CA
to the Court when the penalty imposed is either reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. According to the said provision,
“[i]n cases where the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or a lesser penalty, it shall render
and enter judgment imposing such penalty. The judgment may be appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal
filed with the Court of Appeals.”
Same; Same; Same; An accused, upon whom the penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment had been imposed
by the Court of Appeals (CA), can simply file a notice of appeal to allow him to pursue an appeal as a matter of right
before the Supreme Court (SC). An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question including
one not raised by the parties.— Hence, an accused, upon whom the penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment
had been imposed by the CA, can simply file
a notice of appeal to allow him to pursue an appeal as a matter of right before the Court. An appeal in a criminal case
opens the entire case for review on any question including one not raised by the parties. Section 13(c), Rule 124
recognizes the constitutionally conferred jurisdiction of the Court in all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is
reclusion perpetua or higher. An accused, nevertheless, is not precluded in resorting to an appeal by certiorari to the
Court via Rule 45 under the Rules of Court. An appeal to this Court by petition for review on certiorari shall raise only
questions of law. Moreover, such review is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only
when there are special and important reasons.
Facts
The Dungo and Sibal were charged of violation of RA 8049 before the RTC Branch 36, Calamba City.
Dungo filed a motion to quash for lack of probable cause, but it was denied by the trial court because the ground cited
therein was not provided by law and jurisprudence. When arraigned, the petitioners pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged. Thereafter, trial ensued. The RTC found Dungo and Sibal guilty of the crime of violating Section 4 of the AntiHazing Law and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a notice of appeal. In their brief, they contended that the prosecution failed to establish
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt for violating R.A. No. 8049. They also assailed the constitutionality of Section 4 of the
said law, which stated that mere presence in the hazing was prima facie evidence of participation therein, because it
allegedly violated the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused.
The CA ruled that the appeal of Dungo and Sibal was bereft of merit. It stated that, in finding them guilty of violating R.A.
No. 8049, the RTC properly relied on circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution. The CA painstakingly
discussed the unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence to convict Dungo and Sibal as principals in the crime of hazing.
Dungo and Sibal moved for reconsideration but their motion was denied by the CA in the assailed October 8, 2013
Resolution. The petitioners through a petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the decision of RTC
and the decion of CA.
Issue
Whether or not the Petitioners can validly appeal from the CA to SC through a petition of certiorari under Rule 45 assailing
a question of fact.
Held
An appeal is a proceeding undertaken to have a decision reconsidered by bringing it to a higher court authority. The right
to appeal is neither a natural right nor is it a component of due process. It is a mere statutory privilege, and may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law.
Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03, dated October 15,
2004, governs the procedure on the appeal from the CA to the Court when the penalty imposed is either reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment. According to the said provision, "[i]n cases where the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion
perpetua, life imprisonment or a lesser penalty, it shall render and enter judgment imposing such penalty. The judgment
may be appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal filed with the Court of Appeals."
Hence, an accused, upon whom the penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment had been imposed by the CA, can
simply file a notice of appeal to allow him to pursue an appeal as a matter of right before the Court. An appeal in a
criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question including one not raised by the parties. Section 13(c), Rule
124 recognizes the constitutionally conferred jurisdiction of the Court in all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is
reclusion perpetua or higher.
An accused, nevertheless, is not precluded in resorting to an appeal by certiorari to the Court via Rule 45 under the Rules
of Court. An appeal to this Court by petition for review on certiorari shall raise only questions of law. Moreover, such
review is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and
important reasons. In other words, when the CA imposed a penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, an accused
may: (1) file a notice of appeal under Section 13( c ), Rule 124 to avail of an appeal as a matter of right before the Court
and open the entire case for review on any question; or (2) file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 to resort to
an appeal as a matter of discretion and raise only questions of law.
In this case, the CA affirmed the R TC decision imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua upon the petitioners. The latter
opted to appeal the CA decision via a petition for certiorari under Rule 45. Consequently, they could only raise questions
of law. Oddly, the petitioners began to assail the existence of conspiracy in their reply, which is a question of fact that
would require an examination of the evidence ;presented. In the interest of justice, however, and due to the novelty of the
issue presented, the Court deems it proper to open the whole case for review.
Similarities and differences
Pulido
ADINA B. MANANSALA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 215424, December 9, 2015
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; In criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review
and the reviwing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgement, or even reverse the trial
court’s decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors – The appeal confers the appellate
court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgement appealed
from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law.
FACTS
On May 31, 1999, Marissa Bautista, who is the secretary of private complainant Kathleen Siy, former Vice
President for Finance of UMC Finance and Leasing Corporation, was asked by the latter to withdraw the amount of Php
38,000.00 from her Metrobank and Bank of the Philippine Islands bank accounts. However, Bautista got the said of
money from the petty cash custodian of UMC because the ATM was offline. On June 9, 1999, Siy was informed by UMC
Finance Manager Violeta Q. Dizon-Lacanilao regarding her cash advance of Php 38, 000.00 as provided in the petty cash
replenishment report prepared by petty cash custodian Manansala, the herein petitioner. Subsequently, Siy issued two (2)
checks to reimburse the petty cash account of UMC. After the checks were encashed, petitioner Manansala was
instructed by Lacanila to delete the entry in their subject report with regards to Siy’s cash advance. On June 11, 1999, the
incident was reported by Lacanila to UMC President Conrado Marty.
In March 2000, petitioner Manansala was instructed again by Lacanilao to retrieve the subject report and revise
the same by re-inserting the entry with regard to Siy’s alleged cash advance. This report was reprinted on scratch paper
and was repeatedly folded in order to make the paper look old. Because of this, an administrative charge was filed against
Siy for using office funds for personal use. A month after, the company terminated Siy and Lacanilao succeeded the
former in her position. Siy filed criminal charges against Marty, Lacanilao, and petitioner Manansala for falsification of
private documents. But, the criminal charge against Marty was withdrawn while an amended information was filed against
Lacanila and Manansala before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City. In the defense of herein petitioner, she
contended that she just followed the orders of her superior even though she had some suspicion over the said report. The
MTC both found that Lacanilao and Manansala are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the crime of Falsification
of Private Documents. The mitigating circumstance of acting under an impulse of uncontrollable fear was appreciated by
the Court in favor of the petitioner. Then, a motion for reconsideration was filed by Manansala but was denied. The case
was elevated to RTC through appeal, and the RTC affirmed the decision of MTC. A motion for reconsideration was filed
by Manansala but was denied. Subsequently, she elevated the matter to CA through petitioner for review however, the CA
also affirmed RTC’s ruling. A motion for reconsideration was filed again by the petitioner but was denied. Hence, this
petitioner for review on certiorari.
ISSUE
Whether or not the reviewing tribunals failed to correct the errors even though these errors are not assigned in
the appealed judgement.
HELD
YES. As provided in the Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, an appeal throws the entire case
wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgement, or even
reverse the trial court’s decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors. In the case at bar,
the RTC and CA failed to correct the mistake made by the MTC in appreciating the mitigating circumstance of acting
under an impulse of uncontrollable fear. It was said that acting under an impulse of controllable fear is an exempting
circumstance and not mitigating circumstance. Further, there was no evidence that there was real, and imminent threat,
intimidation, or coercion that would have compelled Manansala to do what she did, which could be appreciated in her
favor. Thus, the petition is DENIED, the CA’s decision was hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, sentencing
Manansala to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of indeterminate period of 6 months of arresto mayor as minimum to 2
years, 4 months, and 1 day of prison correccional, as maximum.
RULE 126 – SEARCH AND SEIZURE
1. The constitutional provision on searches and seizures
2. Search Warrant vs. Warrant of Arrest
3. When searches and seizures allowed without warrants
4. Motion to Quash
Motion to Quash
Quillope
ABRAHAM MICLAT, JR. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 176077 August 31, 2011
Criminal Law; Searches and Siezures; Arrests; Estoppel; Criminal Procedure; An accused is estoppped
from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the
information against him on his ground before arraignment. –
It is apparent that petitioner raised no objection to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment. Considering
this and his active participation in the trial of the case, jurisprudence dictates that petitioner is deemed to have submitted
11
to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest. An accused is estopped from assailing any
irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information against him on this
ground before arraignment. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed
waived.
Same; Same; Same; Warrantless Arrests; In Flagrante Delicto; Requisites. –
For the exception in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled that two (2) elements must be present: (1) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
Same; Same; Warrantless Searches and Seizures; What constitute a reasonable or unreasonable
warrantless search or seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the
circumstances involed, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable
cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of
the articles procured. –
No less than the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and consequent seizure must be carried out with a
judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable, and any evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding. The right against warrantless searches and seizure, however, is subject to legal and judicial
exceptions, namely: 1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; 2. Search of evidence in "plain view"; 3. Search of
a moving vehicle; 4. Consented warrantless search; 5. Customs search; 6. Stop and Frisk; and 7. Exigent and emergency
circumstances. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable warrantless search or seizure is purely a judicial question,
determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the
presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing
searched, and the character of the articles procured.
FACTS
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision of CA which in turn
affirmed in toto the Decision of the RTC convicting petitioner of Violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (RA) No.
9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
In an Information Miclat Jr. was charged for Violation of Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165. That on November
8, 2002, in Caloocan City, without the authority of law, did then and there willfully and feloniously have in his possession,
custody and control [Methamphetamine] Hydrochloride (SHABU) weighing 0.24 gram, knowing the same to be a
dangerous drug under the provisions of the above-cited law.
When the group of SPO4 Palting arrived at Palmera Spring II, Caloocan City at around 3:50 o’clock that same
afternoon, they were [at] once led by their informant to the house of one Alias "Abe Miclat." PO3 Antonio then positioned
himself at the perimeter of the house, while the rest of the members of the group deployed themselves nearby. Thru a
small opening in the curtain-covered window, PO3 Antonio peeped inside and there at a distance of 1½ meters, he saw
"Abe" arranging several pieces of small plastic sachets which he believed to be containing shabu. Immediately placed the
suspect under arrest and brought him and the four (4) pieces of plastic sachets.
Upon arraignment, petitioner, with the assistance of counsel pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
ISSUE
Whether peeping through a curtain-covered window is within the meaning of "plain view doctrine" for a warrantless
seizure to be lawful.
HELD
In the present case, at the time of petitioner’s arraignment, there was no objection raised as to the irregularity of
his arrest. Thereafter, he actively participated in the proceedings before the trial court. In effect, he is deemed to have
waived any perceived defect in his arrest and effectively submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court trying his case.
At any rate, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a
sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. It will not even negate the validity of the conviction of the accused.
Verily, no less than the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and consequent seizure must be carried out
with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable, and any evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding. The right against warrantless searches and seizure, however, is subject to legal and
judicial exceptions, namely:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;
2. Search of evidence in "plain view";
3. Search of a moving vehicle;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable warrantless search or seizure is purely a judicial question,
determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the
presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing
searched, and the character of the articles procured.
It is to be noted that petitioner was caught in the act of arranging the heat-sealed plastic sachets in plain sight of
PO3 Antonio and he voluntarily surrendered them to him upon learning that he is a police officer. The seizure made by
PO3 Antonio of the four plastic sachets from the petitioner was not only incidental to a lawful arrest, but it also falls within
the purview of the "plain view" doctrine.
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to have that view are subject
to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence. The "plain view" doctrine applies when
the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for
an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain
view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a
crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion
or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came
inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its
discovery inadvertent.
It is clear, therefore, that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. Since petitioner’s
arrest is among the exceptions to the rule requiring a warrant before effecting an arrest and the evidence seized from the
petitioner was the result of a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest, which incidentally was in plain view of the
arresting officer, the results of the ensuing search and seizure were admissible in evidence to prove petitioner’s guilt of
the offense charged.
Ramirez
PEOPLE VS BELEN MARIACOS, GR NO. 188611, JUNE 16, 2010
Searches and Seizures; Warrantless Searches and Seizures. - Law and jurisprudence have laid down the
instances when a warrantless search is valid. These are: (1) Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized
under Section 12 (now Section 13), Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; (2) Seizure of
evidence in “plain view”, the elements of which are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in
which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by
the police who had the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d) “plain view”
justified mere seizure of evidence without further search. (3) Search of moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the
government, the vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a
criminal activity; (4) Consented warrantless search; (5) Customs search; (6) Stop and frisk; and (8) exigent and
emergency circumstances.
Same; Same; Probable Cause; Words and Phrases; It is well to remember that in the instances recognized as
exceptions to the requirement of a judicial warrant, it is necessary that the officer effecting the arrest or seizure must have
been impelled to do so because of probable cause; Probable cause is defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to induce a cautious man to believe that a person accused
is guilty of the offense charged , and, the grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the
arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on
actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the
person to be arrested. - It is well to remember that in the instances recognized as exceptions to the requirement of a
judicial warrant, it is necessary that the officer effecting the arrest or seizure must have been impelled to do so because of
probable cause. The essential requisite of probable cause must be satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure can
be lawfully conducted. Without probable cause, the articles seized cannot be admitted in evidence against the person
arrested. Probable cause is defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong
in themselves to induce a cautious man to believe that a person accused is guilty of the offense charged. It refers to the
existence of such facts and circumstances that can lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed, and that the items, articles or objects sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure
and destruction by law are in the place to be searched. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of
actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the
offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable
cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled
with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.
Same; Same; Same; Search of Moving Vehicles; A search warrant may readily be obtained when the search is
made in a store, dwelling house or other immobile structure, but it is impractical to obtain a warrant when the search is
conducted on a mobile ship, on an aircraft, or in other motor vehicles since they can quickly be moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction where the warrant must be sought. – Over the years, the rules governing search and seizure have been
steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so
considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things, and persons to be searched must be described to
the satisfaction of the issuing judge – a requirement which borders on the impossible in instances where moving vehicle
is used to transport contraband from one place to another with impunity. This exception is easy to understand. A search
warrant may readily be obtained when the search is made in a store, dwelling house or other immobile structure. But it is
impractical to obtain a warrant when the search is conducted on a mobile ship, on an aircraft, or in other motor vehicles
since they can quickly be moved out of the locality or jurisdiction where the warrant must be sought. Given the discussion
above, it is readily apparent that the search in this case is valid. The vehicle that carried the contraband or prohibited
drugs was about to leave. PO2 Pallayoc had to make a quick decision and act fast. It would be unreasonable to require
him to procure a warrant before conducting the search under the circumstances. Time was of the essence in this case.
The searching officer had no time to obtain a warrant. Indeed, he only had enough time to board the vehicle before the
same left for its destination.
Same; Same; Same; Search Incident to Lawful Arrest; A search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest
can precede the arrest if the police has probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search. This Court has also,
time and again, upheld as valid a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. Thus, Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules
of Court provides: SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. - A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a
search warrant. For this rule to apply, it is imperative that there be a prior valid arrest. Although, generally, a warrant is
necessary for a valid arrest, the Rules of Court provides the exceptions therefor, to wit: x x x Be that as it may, we have
held that a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police has probable cause
to make the arrest at the outset of the search.
FACTS
Accused-appellant Belen Mariacos was charged in an Information of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act
[No.] 9165. During the trial, the prosecution has established the following:
On October 27, 2005, in Barangay Balbalayang, PO2 Lunes B. Pallayoc met with a secret agent of the Barangay
Intelligence Network who informed him that a baggage of marijuana had been loaded on a passenger jeepney that was
about to leave for the poblacion. The agent mentioned three (3) bags and one (1) blue plastic bag. Further, the agent
described a backpack bag with an O.K. marking. PO2 Pallayoc then boarded the said jeepney and positioned himself on
top thereof. While the vehicle was in motion, he found the black backpack with an O.K. marking and peeked inside its
contents. PO2 Pallayoc found bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspapers. He then asked the other passengers on top of
the jeepney about the owner of the bag, but no one knew.
Upon reaching the poblacion, PO2 Pallayoc alighted together with the other passengers. The said bag and three
(3) other bags, including a blue plastic bag, were already being carried away by two (2) women. He caught up with the
women and introduced himself as a policeman and that they were under arrest One was apprehended but one of the
women got away.
The RTC, Branch 29 of San Fernando, La Union found the accused guilty as charged.
Appellant appealed her conviction to the CA. She claimed that her right against unreasonable unreasonable
search was flagrantly violated by PO2 Pallayoc when the latter searched the bag, without a search warrant and without
permission from her. She averred that PO2 Pallayocs purpose for apprehending her was to verify if the bag she was
carrying was the same one he had illegally searched earlier. Moreover, appellant contended that there was no probable
cause for her arrest.
Further, appellant claimed that the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the crime. She alleged that the
apprehending police officers violated Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979, as amended by Board
Regulation No. 2, Series of 1990, which prescribes the procedure in the custody of seized prohibited and regulated drugs,
instruments, apparatuses, and articles. The said regulation directs the apprehending team having initial custody and
control of the drugs and/or paraphernalia, immediately after seizure or confiscation, to have the same physically
inventoried and photographed in the presence of appellant or her representative, who shall be required to sign copies of
the inventory. The failure to comply with this directive, appellant claimed, casts a serious doubt on the identity of the items
allegedly confiscated from her. She, likewise, averred that the prosecution failed to prove that the items allegedly
confiscated were indeed prohibited drugs, and to establish the chain of custody over the same.
The People, through the OSG, argued that the warrantless arrest of appellant and the warrantless seizure of
marijuana were valid and legal, justified as a search of a moving vehicle. It averred that PO2 Pallayoc had reasonable
ground to believe that appellant had committed the crime of delivering dangerous drugs based on reliable information
from their agent, which was confirmed when he peeked into the bags and smelled the distinctive odor of marijuana. The
OSG also argued that appellant was now estopped from questioning the illegality of her arrest since she voluntarily
entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment and participated in the trial and presented her evidence. The OSG brushed
aside appellants argument that the bricks of marijuana were not photographed and inventoried in her presence or that of
her counsel immediately after confiscation, positing that physical inventory may be done at the nearest police station or at
the nearest office of the apprehending team, whichever was practicable.
The CA dismissed appellants appeal and affirmed the RTC decision in toto. It held that the prosecution had
successfully proven that appellant carried away from the jeepney a number of bags which, when inspected by the police,
contained dangerous drugs. The CA ruled that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto of carrying and conveying the bag
that contained the illegal drugs, and thus held that appellants warrantless arrest was valid.
ISSUE
Whether or not the search was valid as well as the arrest.
HELD
Yes, the search was valid, appellants arrest based on the search was also valid.
DOCTRINES:
Article III, Section 2 of the Philippine Constitution provides:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Law and jurisprudence have laid down the instances when a warrantless search is valid. These are:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12 [now Section 13], Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence;
2. Seizure of evidence in plain view, the elements of which are:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are
legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be
where they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent[;] and;
(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility
reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly
reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.
Search of a moving vehicle is one of the doctrinally accepted exceptions to the Constitutional
mandate that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after
personally determining the existence of probable cause.
This Court has also, time and again, upheld as valid a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. Thus,
Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest.A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons
anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.
or
For this rule to apply, it is imperative that there be a prior valid arrest. Although, generally, a warrant is necessary
for a valid arrest, the Rules of Court provides the exceptions therefore, to wit:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he
is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
Be that as it may, we have held that a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the
arrest if the police has probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search.
Motion to Quash
Santos
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ESTELA TUAN y BALUDDA
[G.R. Nos. 176066
August 1, 2010]
Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Witnesses; In a prosecution for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law, the case
becomes a contest of credibility of witnesses and their testimonies.
–In a prosecution for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law, such as Criminal Case No. 17619-R, a case
becomes a contest of credibility of witnesses and their testimonies. In such a situation, this Court generally
relies upon the assessment by the trial court, which has the distinct advantage of observing the conduct or
demeanor of the witnesses while they were testifying. Hence, its factual findings are accorded respect–even
finality–absent any showing that certain facts of weight and substance bearing on the elements of the crime
have been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied.
Same; Same; Illegal Possession of Prohibited or Regulated Drugs; Elements.
–Illegal possession of prohibited or regulated drugs is committed when the following elements concur: (1) the
accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is
not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possesses the said drug.
Same; Same; Same; Witnesses; Discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses referring to
minor details, and not in actuality touching upon the central fact of the crime, do not impair their credibility–
testimonies of witnesses need only corroborate each other on important and relevant details concerning the
principal occurrence.
–These alleged inconsistencies and contradictions pertain to minor details and are so inconsequential that they
do not in any way affect the credibility of the witnesses nor detract from the established fact of illegal
possession of marijuana by accused-appellant at her house. The Court has previously held that discrepancies
and inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses referring to minor details, and not in actuality touching upon
the central fact of the crime, do not impair their credibility. Testimonies of witnesses need only corroborate
each other on important and relevant details concerning the principal occurrence. Inconsistencies as to minor
details and collateral matters do not affect the credibility of the witnesses nor the veracity or weight of their
testimonies. Such minor inconsistencies may even serve to strengthen their credibility as they negate any
suspicion that the testimonies have been rehearsed.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Informants; Non-presentation of corroborative witnesses does not constitute
suppression of evidence and is not fatal to the prosecution’s case; The presentation of an informant in an
illegal drugs case is not essential for conviction nor is it indispensable for a successful prosecution because his
testimony would be merely corroborative and cumulative.
–The prosecution has the exclusive prerogative to determine whom to present as witnesses. The prosecution
need not present each and every witness but only such as may be needed to meet the quantum of proof
necessary to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The testimonies of the other
witnesses may, therefore, be dispensed with if they are merely corroborative in nature. The Court has ruled
that the non-presentation of corroborative witnesses does not constitute suppression of evidence and is not
fatal to the prosecution’s case. Although Criminal Case No. 17619-R involves illegal possession of marijuana,
the following pronouncement of this Court in People vs. Salazar, 266 SCRA 607 (1997), relating to the illegal
sale of the same drug, still rings true: “Neither is her right to confront witnesses against her affected by the
prosecution’s failure to present the informer who pointed to her as a drug pusher. The presentation of an
informant in an illegal drugs case is not essential for conviction nor is it indispensable for a successful
prosecution because his testimony would be merely corroborative and cumulative. In a case involving
the sale of illegal drugs, what should be proven beyond reasonable doubt is the fact of the sale itself. Hence,
like the non-presentation of the marked money used in buying the contraband, the non-presentation of the
informer on the witness stand would not necessarily create a hiatus in the prosecution’s evidence.”
Searches and Seizures; Search Warrants; Requisites.
–The validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the following factors: (1) it must be issued upon
probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or
any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or
affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must
particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized.
Same; Same; Probable Cause; Words and Phrases; Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete
definition, it generally signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong
in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which
he is charged; A magistrate’s determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid
great deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that determination; Substantial
basis means that the questions of the examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances as would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and the objects in
connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the place sought to be searched.
–In People v. Aruta, 288 SCRA 626 (1998), the Court defined probable cause as follows: “Although probable
cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it generally signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported
by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. It likewise refers to the existence of such facts and
circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject to
seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched. It ought to be emphasized that in determining
probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our
rules of evidence of which his knowledge is technically nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of common sense
which all reasonable men have in abundance. The same quantum of evidence is required in determining
probable cause relative to search. Before a search warrant can be issued, it must be shown by substantial
evidence that the items sought are in fact seizable by virtue of being connected with criminal activity, and that
the items will be found in the place to be searched.” A magistrate’s determination of probable cause for the
issuance of a search warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial
basis for that determination. Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining judge brought out
such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed, and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the place
sought to be searched. Such substantial basis exists in this case.
Same; Same; Same; A designation or description that points out the place to be searched to exclusion of all
others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of
definiteness.
–A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer serving the warrant can, with reasonable
effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. A
designation or description that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry
unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness. In the case at
bar, the address and description of the place to be searched in the Search Warrant was specific enough. There
was only one house located at the stated address, which was accused-appellant’s residence, consisting of a
structure with two floors and composed of several rooms.
FACTS
On 24 January 2000, two male informants namely, Jerry Tudlong (Tudlong) and Frank Lad-ing (Lad-ing) arrived at the
th
office of the 14 Regional Criminal Investigation and Detention Group (CIDG) at DPS Compound, Marcoville, Baguio City,
and reported to SPO2 Fernandez, Chief of the Station Drug Enforcement Unit, that a certain Estela Tuan (Tuan) had been
selling marijuana at Barangay Gabriela Silang, Baguio City.
SPO2 Fernandez set out to verify the report of Tudlong and Lad-ing. On the same day, he gave Tudlong and Lad-ing
P300.00 to buy marijuana, and then accompanied the two informants to accused-appellant Tuan’s house. Tudlong and
Lad-ing entered Tuan’s house while SPO2 Fernandez waited at the adjacent house. After thirty minutes, Tudlong and
Lad-ing came out of Tuan’s house and showed SPO2 Fernandez the marijuana leaves they bought.
Thereafter, SPO2 Fernandez, together with Tudlong and Lad-ing, filed an application for a search warrant before Judge
Iluminada Cabato-Cortes (Judge Cortes) of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Baguio City. Judge Cortes
personally examined SPO2 Fernandez, Tudlong, and Lad-ing, after which, she issued a search warrant, being satisfied of
the existence of a probable cause.
Before going to Tuan’s house, SPO2 Fernandez invited barangay officials to be present when the search warrant was to
be served, but since no one was available, he requested one Eliza Pascual, Tuan’s neighbor, to come along. Even though
Tuan was not around, the CIDG team was allowed entry into the house by Magno Baludda, Tuan’s father, after he was
shown a copy of the search warrant.
The CIDG team searched the first and second floors of Tuan’s house. They saw a movable cabinet in Tuan’s room, below
which they found a brick of marijuana and a firearm. At around six o’clock that evening, Tuan arrived with her son. The
police officers asked her to open a built-in cabinet, in which they saw eight more bricks of marijuana.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Tuan guilty of illegal possession of marijuana and illegal possession of firearm.
Tuan appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), but the latter affirmed the RTC’s decision. However, the CA modified the
RTC judgment, acquitting Tuan of the charge for illegal possession of firearm, stating that the absence of a firearm license
was simply presumed by the police officers.
The case was further elevated to the Supreme Court (SC), with Tuan alleging that the search warrant issued against her
was void for the following reasons: (1) the informants, Tudlong and Lad-ing, made misrepresentation of facts in the
application for search warrant filed with the MTCC; and (2) the search warrant failed to particularly describe the place to
be searched because the house was a two-storey building composed of several rooms.
ISSUE
Whether or not the search warrant issued against Tuan was void.
HELD
No. The search warrant issued against Tuan was not void. Pursuant to Sections 2 and 3(2) of Article III of the Constitution
and Sections 4 and 5, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, the validity of the issuance of a search
warrant rests upon the following factors: (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be
determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause,
the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4)
the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized.
The second and third factors for a validly issued warrant were complied with. What is contested in the case at bar are the
first and fourth factors.
Probable cause generally signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.
The SC ruled that Judge Cortes found probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant for Tuan’s residence after
said judge’s personal examination of SPO2 Fernandez, the applicant; and Lad-ing and Tudlong, the informants. Hence,
the first factor stated above was satisfied.
Next, a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer serving the warrant can, with reasonable effort,
ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. In the case at bar, the
address and description of the place to be searched in the search warrant was specific enough. There was only one
house located at the stated address, which was Tuan’s residence, consisting of a structure with two floors and composed
of several rooms. Thus, the fourth factor has been complied with.
With the foregoing facts, the SC upheld the validity of the search warrant for Tuan’s house issued by MTCC Judge Cortes,
and any items seized as a result of the search conducted by virtue thereof, may be presented as evidence against Tuan.
Motion to Quash
Aguinaldo
Esquillo v People
629 SCRA 370
Facts:
Susan Esquillo was convicted of the violation of the Dangerous Drugs Acts. Police officers were assigned in
Malibay, Pasay to conduct surveillance on a notorious snatcher named Ryan. It was during that time the police officers
noticed the petitioner. Two police officers came to Esquillo and another person while they were transacting. They saw the
latter place inside a yellow cigarette case a plastic sachet containing a white substance. They approached the petitioner
and introduced themselves as police officer. Subsequently, they inquired regarding the sachet the petitioner placed inside
the case. The petitioner acted suspiciously and even tried to flee. The police officers prevented her from doing so. They
apprised the petitioner of her constitutional rights and then they confiscated the sachet. They marked the sachet with
initials SRE and took the petitioner to the police station.
The petitioner contends against the police officer’s statement. The petitioner said that she was resting at home
when policemen barged inside and asked her whether or not she knew a certain Ryan. She replied in the negative.
Afterwards, she was forcibly taken to the police station and was detained there. During her detention, the police officers
were claiming that there was shabu inside the wallet they seized from her Esquillo argues that the arrest was invalid and
that the officers planted evidence against her.
The lower cause said that the officers had probable cause to search Esquillo under the stop-and-frisk doctrine.
Issue:
Whether or not the warrantless arrest was valid
Held:
The issue whether the arrest was valid was waived by the petitioner when she did not quash it before
arraignment. The issue was only raised the first time during appeal on the appellate court.
The circumstances before the eventual arrest gave the police officers a reasonable belief
that a search on her was warranted. The police officer saw IN PLAIN VIEW that the petitioner was placing a plastic sachet
containing a white substance inside her cigarette case. Given the training of police officers, they would likely be drawn to
curiosity and approach her to inquire regarding such matter. The petitioner’s reaction of attempting to flee after the police
officer introduced his self gave more reason for the officer to check the petitioner.
Warrantless searches are valid in these situations: a) consented searches, b) searches incident to a lawful arrest,
c) searches of vessels and aircraft for violation of immigration, custom and drug laws, d) searches of moving vehicles, e)
searches of automobiles at borders, f) the prohibited articles are in plain view, g.) searches of buildings to enforce fire,
sanitary and other regulations, h.) stop and frisk situations
On regards her arrest, when the officer saw the white substance from a distance, the plain view doctrine was
imposed. When searched the officers followed the definition and requirements of a valid stop-and-frisk as stated in People
v. Chua - that he should properly introduce himself and make initial inquiries, approach and restrain a person who
manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check the latter’s outer clothing for possibly concealed weapons.
Motion to Quash
Bobiles
G.R. No. 158467
October 16, 2009
SPOUSES JOEL AND MARIETTA MARIMLA, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HON. OMAR T. VIOLA, RTC Judge, Branch 57, Angeles City, Respondents.
Searches and Seizure; A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC; Hierarchy of Courts; The general rule is that a party is mandated to
follow the hierarchy of courts, but, in exceptional cases, the Court, for compelling reasons or if warranted by the
nature of the issues raised, may take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it, such as one involving the
application of the rules promulgated by this Court in the exercise of its rule-making power under the
Constitution.—
The general rule is that a party is mandated to follow the hierarchy of courts. However, in exceptional cases, the Court, for
compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues raised, may take cognizance of petitions filed directly
before it. In this case, the Court opts to take cognizance of the petition, as it involves the application of the rules
promulgated by this Court in the exercise of its rule-making power under the Constitution.
At the heart of the present controversy are A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC, Clarifying the Guidelines on the Application for the
Enforceability of Search Warrants, which was enacted on January 25, 2000; and A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, specifically, Section 2, Rule 126 thereof.
Same; Same; A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC authorizes the Executive Judge and Vice Executive Judges of the Regional
Trial Courts (RTCs) of Manila and Quezon City to act on all applications for search warrants involving heinous
crimes, illegal gambling , dangerous drugs and illegal possession of firearms on application filed by the
Philippine National Police (PNP), National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task
Force (PAOC-TF), and Reaction Against Crime Task Force (REACT-TF).—
From the above, it may be seen that A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC authorizes the Executive Judge and Vice Executive Judges of
the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City to act on all applications for search warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal
gambling, dangerous drugs and illegal possession of firearms on application filed by the PNP, NBI, PAOC-TF, and
REACT-TF. On the other hand, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that the application for
search warrant shall be filed with: (a) any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed, and (b) for
compelling reasons, any court within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of
the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.
Same; Same; Administrative Law; Nothing in A.M. No. 99-09-SC prohibits the heads of the Philippine National
Police (PNP), National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOC-TF),
and Reaction Against Crime Task Force (REACT-TF) from delegating their ministerial duty of endorsing the
application for search warrant to their assistant heads. –
Nothing in A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC prohibits the heads of the PNP, NBI, PAOC-TF and REACT-TF from delegating their
ministerial duty of endorsing the application for search warrant to their assistant heads. Under Section 31, Chapter 6,
Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, an assistant head or other subordinate in every bureau may perform such
duties as may be specified by their superior or head, as long as it is not inconsistent with law. The said provision reads:
Chapter 6 – POWERS AND DUTIES OF HEADS OF BUREAUS AND OFFICES
Sec. 31. Duties of Assistant Heads and Subordinates. – (1) Assistant heads and other subordinates in every bureau or
office shall perform such duties as may be required by law or regulations, or as may be specified by their superiors not
otherwise inconsistent with law.
(2) The head of bureau or office may, in the interest of economy, designate the assistant head to act as chief of
any division or unit within the organization, in addition to his duties, without additional compensation, and
(3) In the absence of special restriction prescribed by law, nothing shall prevent a subordinate officer or employee
from being assigned additional duties by proper authority, when not inconsistent with the performance of the
duties imposed by law.
Same; Same; The guidelines in A.M. No. 99-10-SC are reiterated in A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC entitled Guidelines on their
Selection and Designation of Executive Judges and Defining their Powers, Prerogatives and Duties, which explicitly stated
that the guidelines in the issuance of search warrants in special criminal cases by the Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) of
Manila and Quezon City shall be an exception to Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. –
Petitioners also assert that the questioned Search Warrant was void ab initio. They maintain that A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC,
which was enacted on January 25, 2000, was no longer in effect when the application for search warrant was filed on
February 15, 2002. They argue that the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000,
should have been applied, being the later law. Hence, the enforcement of the search warrant in Angeles City, which was
outside the territorial jurisdiction of RTC Manila, was in violation of the law.
The petitioners’ contention lacks merit.
A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC provides that the guidelines on the enforceability of search warrants provided therein shall continue
until further orders from this Court. In fact, the guidelines in A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC are reiterated in A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC
entitled Guidelines On The Selection And Designation Of Executive Judges And Defining Their Powers, Prerogatives And
Duties, which explicitly stated that the guidelines in the issuance of search warrants in special criminal cases by the RTCs
of Manila and Quezon City shall be an exception to Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court
Facts
Special Investigator (SI) Ray C. Lagasca of the NBI Anti-Organized Crime Division filed two (2) applications for search
warrant with the RTC of Manila seeking permission to search: (1) petitioners’ house located on RD Reyes St., Brgy. Sta.
Trinidad, Angeles City and (2) the premises on Maria Aquino St., Purok V, Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Porac, Pampanga, both for
Violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425, as amended. The said applications uniformly alleged
that SI Lagasca’s request for the issuance of the search warrants was founded on his personal knowledge as well as that
of witness Roland D. Fernandez (Fernandez), obtained after a series of surveillance operations and a test buy made at
petitioners’ house.
Executive Judge Mario Guariña III (Judge Guariña III) examined in writing and under oath SI Lagasca and Fernandez, in
the form of searching questions and answers, and found that based on facts personally known to SI Lagasca and
Fernandez, petitioners had in their possession and control, inside their house located on RD Reyes St., Brgy. Sta.
Trinidad, Angeles City, an undetermined amount of as shabu and marijuana. Pursuant these findings, Judge Guariña III
issued a search warrant.
On the strength of this warrant, members of the NBI Anti-Organized Crime Division with SI Lagascain coordination with
the Philippine National Police of Angeles City, searched petitioners’ house. Therein, they were able to seize, among
others, dried marijuana leaves.
An Information for Violation of Section 8, Article II of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, was filed against
petitioners before the RTC of Angeles City, Branch 57. Subsequently, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant
and to Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized arguing, among others, that (1) the application for search warrant was filed
outside the territorial jurisdiction and judicial region of the court where the alleged crime was committed; (2) the court
which issued the questioned search warrant committed grave abuse of discretion when it issued the same because under
the law it cannot issue a search warrant outside its territorial jurisdiction; (3) the evidence illegally seized by virtue of the
questioned search warrant is therefore inadmissible in evidence.
In its Comment/Opposition to the Motion to Quash, the Office of the City Prosecutor, Angeles City claims that the
questioned search warrant does not fall within the coverage of Sec. 2 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, but under A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC, which authorizes the Executive Judges and Vice Executive Judges of the
RTCs of Manila and Quezon City to act on all applications for search warrants involving dangerous drugs, among others,
filed by the NBI, and provides that said warrants may be served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction of the RTCs of
Manila and Quezon City.
The motion to quash by petitioners was denied by the RTC Angeles. Petitioners then filed a Motion for Reconsideration
which was likewise denied.
Petitioners claiming that the search warrant was issued in violation of A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC and Section 2 of Rule 126 of
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure filed this petition.
Issue
Whether or not the Executive Judges and Vice Executive Judges of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City in all
applications for search warrants involving dangerous drugs, among others, filed by the NBI, and issue warrants to be
served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction, such as in Angeles City, of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City.
Held
At the heart of the present controversy are A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC, Clarifying the Guidelines on the Application for the
Enforceability of Search Warrants, which was enacted on January 25, 2000; and A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, specifically, Section 2, Rule 126 thereof. We quote the
pertinent portions of the two issuances below:
Administrative Matter No. 99-10-09-SC
Resolution Clarifying the Guidelines on the Application for the Enforceability of Search Warrants
In the interest of an effective administration of justice and pursuant to the powers vested in the Supreme Court
by the Constitution, the following are authorized to act on all applications for search warrants involving heinous
crimes, illegal gambling, dangerous drugs and illegal possession of firearms.
The Executive Judge and Vice Executive Judges of Regional Trial Courts, Manila and Quezon City filed by the
Philippine National Police (PNP), the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Presidential Anti-Organized
Crime Task Force (PAOC-TF) and the Reaction Against Crime Task Force (REACT-TF) with the Regional Trial
Courts of Manila and Quezon City.
The applications shall be personally endorsed by the Heads of the said agencies, for the search of places to
be particularly described therein, and the seizure of property of things as prescribed in the Rules of Court, and
to issue the warrants of arrest, if justified, which may be served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction of
said courts.
xxx
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
Rule 126
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Sec. 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. – An application for search warrant shall be
filed with the following:
(a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.
(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the crime
was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region
where the warrant shall be enforced.
However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the court where
the criminal action is pending.
From the above, it may be seen that A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC authorizes the Executive Judge and Vice Executive Judges of
the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City to act on all applications for search warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal
gambling, dangerous drugs and illegal possession of firearms on application filed by the PNP, NBI, PAOC-TF, and
REACT-TF. On the other hand, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that the application for
search warrant shall be filed with: (a) any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed, and (b) for
compelling reasons, any court within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of
the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.
Petitioners also assert that the questioned Search Warrant was void ab initio. They maintain that A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC,
which was enacted on January 25, 2000, was no longer in effect when the application for search warrant was filed on
February 15, 2002. They argue that the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000,
should have been applied, being the later law. Hence, the enforcement of the search warrant in Angeles City, which was
outside the territorial jurisdiction of RTC Manila, was in violation of the law.
The petitioners’ contention lacks merit.
A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC provides that the guidelines on the enforceability of search warrants provided therein shall continue
until further orders from this Court. In fact, the guidelines in A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC are reiterated in A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC
entitled Guidelines On The Selection And Designation Of Executive Judges And Defining Their Powers, Prerogatives And
Duties, which explicitly stated that the guidelines in the issuance of search warrants in special criminal cases by the RTCs
of Manila and Quezon City shall be an exception to Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Chapter V. Specific Powers, Prerogatives and Duties of Executive Judges in Judicial Supervision
Sec. 12. Issuance of search warrants in special criminal cases by the Regional Trial Courts of Manila and
Quezon City. – The Executive Judges and, whenever they are on official leave of absence or are not
physically present in the station, the Vice-Executive Judges of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City shall
have authority to act on applications filed by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Philippine
National Police (PNP) and the Anti-Crime Task Force (ACTAF), for search warrants involving heinous
crimes, illegal gambling, illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions as well as violations of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the Intellectual Property Code, the Anti-Money Laundering
Act of 2001, the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended, and other relevant laws that may hereafter be
enacted by Congress, and included herein by the Supreme Court.
The applications shall be personally endorsed by the heads of such agencies and shall particularly describe
therein the places to be searched and/or the property or things to be seized as prescribed in the Rules of
Court. The Executive Judges and Vice-Executive Judges concerned shall issue the warrants, if justified,
which may be served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said courts.
The Executive Judges and the authorized Judges shall keep a special docket book listing names of Judges
to whom the applications are assigned, the details of the applications and the results of the searches and
seizures made pursuant to the warrants issued.
This Section shall be an exception to Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
In sum, we cannot find any irregularity or abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Omar T. Viola for denying petitioners’
Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized. On the contrary, Judge Guariña III had
complied with the procedural and substantive requirements for issuing the questioned search warrant.
Motion to Quash
Alim
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JERRY PUNZALAN AND PATRICIA PUNZALAN
G.R. No. 199087 | November 11, 2015 | THIRD DIVISION | VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC clearly authorizes the Executive Judges and Vice Executive Judges of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila and Quezon City to issue warrants to be served in places outside their territorial
jurisdiction in special criminal cases such as those involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, illegal possession of
firearms and ammunitions as well as violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, as in this case, for
as long as the parameters under the said section have been complied with. – We find no merit in accused-appellants’
claim that the RTC of Manila, Branch 17, had no authority to issue assailed search warrant since the place to be searched
is outside territorial jurisdiction. As aforecited, Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC clearly authorizes the
Executive Judges and the Vice Executive Judges of the RTC Manila and Quezon City to issue search warrants to be
served in places outside their territorial jurisdiction in special criminal cases such as those involving heinous crimes, illegal
gambling, illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions as well as violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002, as in this case, for as long as the parameters under the said section have been complied with.
There is no exact test for the determination of probable cause in the issuance of search warrants. It is a matter wholly
dependent on the finding of trial judges in the process of exercising their judicial function. – In the issuance of a search
warrant, probable cause requires such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed and the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place to be searched.
There is no exact test for the determination of probable cause in the issuance of search warrants. It is a process of
exercising their judicial function. When a finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is made by a trial
judge, the finding is accorded respect by reviewing courts.
FACTS
Intelligence Agent 1 Liwanag Sandaan (IA1 Sandaan) and her team implemented a search warrant issued by then Manila
RTC Judge Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr. to (i) make an immediate search of the premises/house of Jerry and Patricia
Punzalan, Vima Punzalan, Jaime Punzalan, Arlene Punzalan-Razon and Felix Razon who are all residents of 704 Apelo
Cruz Compound, Barangay 175, Malibay, Pasay City; and (ii) to seize and take possession of an undetermined quantity of
assorted dangerous drugs, including the proceeds or fruits and bring said property to the court.
Since there are three houses or structures inside the compound believed to be occupied by Jerry and Patricia Punzalan, a
sketch of the compound describing the house to be searched was prepared and attached to the search warrant.
The Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) Team tasked to conduct the search was composed of IA1 Sandaan as
team leader, SI2 Esteban and IO2 Jessica Alvarado (IO2 Alvarado) as arresting officers and IO1 Pagaragan as seizing
officer. IO1 Pagaragan made lateral coordination with the Southern Police District, Tactical Operations Unit, as evidenced
by the Pre-Operation Report dated November 3, 2009 and Authority to Operate.
Before proceeding to the target area, they passed by the barangay hall to coordinate with Barangay Chairman Reynaldo
Flores, Kagawad Larry Fabella and Kagawad Edwin Razon. The team likewise brought with them a media representative
affiliated with "Sunshine Radio" to cover the operation. From the barangay hall, they walked toward the target place using
as a guide the sketch they prepared.
When they were already outside the house of the Punzalans, which is a three-storey structure, IA1 Sandaan knocked on
the door. A woman, later identified as Patricia Punzalan, slightly opened the door. When they introduced themselves as
PDEA agents and informed the occupant that they have a search warrant, Patricia immediately tried to close the door but
was not successful since the PDEA agents pushed the door open. The team was able to enter the house of Jerry and
Patricia Punzalan who were both surprised when found inside the house. IO1 Pagaragan showed and read the search
warrant infront of the Punzalans.
Inside the house, the team immediately saw plastic sachets placed on top of the table. I01 Pagaragan was able to seize
nine (9) heat-sealed plastic sachets, two (2) square-shaped transparent plastic containers and a small round plastic
container. All three (3) plastic containers contained smaller heat-sealed plastic sachets of white crystalline substance of
suspected shabu. There were also other paraphernalia, guns, money and a digital weighing scale. Accordingly, SI2
Esteban and IO2 Alvarado effected the arrest of accused-appellants Jerry and Patricia Punzalan after informing them of
their constitutional rights. I01 Pagaragan immediately marked the seized items by placing the marking "ADP". After
searching and marking the evidence found on the first floor, the team, together with the barangay officials and accusedappellants, proceeded to, and conducted the search on the second and third floors but found nothing. They went
downstairs where they conducted the inventory of recovered items. I01 Pagaragan prepared the Receipt/Inventory of
Property Seized and a Certification of Orderly Search which were later signed by the barangay officials.
After their arrest, the Punzalans were brought to the PDEA Office in Quezon City for investigation. IO1 Pagaragan
presented the seized evidence to Atty. Benjamin Gaspe, who prepared the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report, Request for
Drug Test/Physical and Medical Examination. They likewise caused the preparation of their respective affidavits.
Photographs were also taken during the actual search and inventory. Laboratory examination of the seized pieces of drug
evidence gave positive results for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu, a
dangerous drug.
Thereafter, the Punzalans were charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 for illegal possession of
40.78 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride otherwise known as shabu, a dangerous drug.
The trial court convicted the Punzalans. The trial court held that the issuance of a search warrant against the premises of
different persons named therein is valid as there is no requirement that only one search warrant for one premise to be
searched is necessary for its validity. Also, the address of the Punzalans was clearly and adequately described. A sketch
that specifically identifies the places to be searched was attached to the records and such description of the place was
unquestionably accurate that the PDEA agents were led to, and were able to successfully conduct their operation in the
premises described in the search warrant.
The trial court also ruled that the implementation of the search warrant sufficiently complied with the requirements of the
law. Despite the Punzalans' assertion that they were arrested outside their house and were made to board a van parked
along the street beside the river and were not allowed by the PDEA agents to witness the search conducted inside the
house, the trial court was convinced that the Punzalans were in fact inside their house and were physically present during
the conduct of the search.
In its findings, the trial court observed that there were actually two phases of the search done in the Punzalan house. The
first or initial search was done at the ground floor of the house, immediately after the PDEA agents gained entry and was
beyond doubt made in the presence of both accused. This is where the bulk of illegal drugs were found, confiscated and
consequently marked. The trial court further stated that it is of no moment that the barangay officials were not able to
witness the said initial search and their failure to arrive on time to witness the first or initial search at the ground floor of
the Punzalan house, or even their total absence thereat, will not render the subject search invalid and unlawful inasmuch
as their presence is not required. The trial court held that the prosecution successfully and sufficiently established that the
two accused were present during the initial search, thus, satisfying the requirement of a lawful and valid search.
The second phase of the search was conducted at the upper floors of the house after the markings on the 293 sachets of
confiscated specimens were completed by I01 Pagaragan. This was witnessed and participated in by the barangay
officials. Finally, after the search of the entire house was concluded, it is not disputed that an inventory of all the items
seized was conducted by I01 Pagaragan in compliance with the provisions of Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. In
fact, it was admitted by the barangay officials that they were requested to wait for the DOJ representative, to which they
willingly acceded.
The Punzalans filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of the Punzalans. The CA held that there was a valid search and seizure
conducted and the seized items are admissible in evidence. The prosecution was able to prove all the elements of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited
drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE
Whether the search warrant and the subsequent search were valid
HELD
Yes, the search warrant and the subsequent search were valid.
Valid search warrant
A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, entitled "Guidelines on the Selection and Appointment of Executive Judges and Defining their
Powers, Prerogatives and Duties" as approved by the Court in its Resolution of January 27, 2004, as amended, provides:
SEC. 12. Issuance of search warrants in special criminal cases by the RTC of Manila and Quezon City. - The
Executive Judges and, whenever they are on official leave of absence or are not physically present in the station,
the Vice-Executive Judges of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City shall have authority to act on applications filed
by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Anti-Crime Task Force
(ACTAF), for search warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions as well as violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the Intellectual Property
Code, the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended, and other relevant
laws that may hereafter be enacted by Congress, and included herein by the Supreme Court.
The applications shall be endorsed by the heads of such agencies or their respective duly authorized officials and shall
particularly describe therein the places to be searched and/or the property or things to be seized as prescribed in the
Rules of Court. The Executive Judges and Vice-Executive Judges concerned shall issue the warrants, if justified, which
may be served outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said courts.
The search warrant issued by the RTC of Manila, Branch 17 satisfactorily complies with the requirements for the issuance
thereof as determined by the issuing court, thus:
Pursuant to Section 2, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution, Sections 2 to 5, Rule 126 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, modified by Section 12 of Supreme Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 03-08-02-SC dated January
27, 2004, and Certification dated October 28, 2009, it appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after
personally examining under oath Agent Liwanag B. Sandaan and Agent Derween Reed both of Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency Metro Manila Regional Office, that there is probable cause, there are good and sufficient
reasons, to believe that undetermined quantity of assorted dangerous drugs, particularly shabu, including the
proceeds or fruits and those used or intended to be used by the respondents as a means of committing the
offense, you are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time in the day or night of the premises
above described and forthwith seize and take possession of the undetermined quantity of assorted dangerous
drugs including the proceeds and fruits and bring said property to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law
directs.
As aforecited, Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC clearly authorizes the Executive Judges and the ViceExecutive Judges of the RTC of Manila and Quezon City to issue search warrants to be served in places outside their
territorial jurisdiction in special criminal cases such as those involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, illegal possession
of firearms and ammunitions as well as violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, as in this case, for
as long as the parameters under the said section have been complied with.
In the issuance of a search warrant, probable cause requires such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and the objects sought in connection with that offense are in
the place to be searched. There is no exact test for the determination of probable cause in the issuance of search
warrants. It is a matter wholly dependent on the finding of trial judges in the process of exercising their judicial function.
When a finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is made by a trial judge, the finding is accorded
respect by reviewing courts.
Valid search
Section 8, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
SEC. 8. Search of house, room, or premises to be made in presence of two witnesses. - No search of a house,
room, or any other premises shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member
of his family or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same
locality.
As correctly ruled by the CA, even if the barangay officials were not present during the initial search, the search was
witnessed by the Punzalans themselves, hence, the search was valid since the rule that "two witnesses of sufficient age
and discretion residing in the same locality" must be present applies only in the absence of either the lawful occupant of
the premises or any member of his family.
RULE 127 – PROVISIONAL REMEDIES
1. Relate to Rules 57-61
2. What provisional remedies are not applicable in criminal cases
3. Is petition for relief from judgment available in criminal cases? Yes, according to Hilario vs. People, 551 SCRA 191,
April 14, 2008