CIVIL PROCEDURE
CASE DIGEST
ALINDO, JALLILAH L.
CASE NO. 1
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner
VS HON. JOSE D. AZARRAGA, public respondent
and JOHN REY PREVENDIDO, private respondent
G.R. NO. 187117 & 187172, October 12, 2011
FACTS:
On 7 February 2009, petitioner filed two (2) Informations before RTC of Iloilo City against
private respondent Prevendido for violation of R.A. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002. The cases were raffled to Branch 36, a designated special court pursuant
to R.A. 9165, presided by Judge Victor E. Gelvezon but the latter inhibited himself from trying
the case as Judge Galvezon had close family ties with Coreen Gemarino, the PDEA operative
who conducted the entrapment operation against private respondent.
The cases were then reassigned to the other special court, Branch 25, presided by Judge
Evelyn E. Salao, who also inhibited herself for the reason that Coreen Gemarino was a cousin;
thus, the cases were endorsed to the Office of the Executive Judge for reassignment.
Citing Chap. V, Sec. 9 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, Executive Judge Antonio M. Natino ordered the
Clerk of Court to forward the entire records of the cases to Branch 37 presided over by public
respondent, the pairing judge of Branch 36, which was the special court that originally handled
the cases.
However, as soon as public respondent proceeded with the cases, Prosecutor Kenneth John
Amamanglon filed a Motion to Transfer Case to a Branch of Competent Jurisdiction, questioning
the jurisdiction of public respondent to hear the cases, citing Sec. 90 of R.A. 9165
Issue: Did the Supreme Court violate Sec. 90 of RA 9165 when it issued AM 03-8-02-SC,
particularly Ch. 5, Sec. 9, which prescribes the manner in which the executive judge reassigns
cases in instances of inhibition or disqualification of judges sitting in special courts?
Contentions:
Prosecutor Amamanglon: The trial court needed a special designation from the Supreme Court
in order to have jurisdiction over the case. Thus, the absent of special designation, respondent
court should remand the cases to the Office of the Executive Judge for re-raffling to another
court specially designated pursuant R.A. 9165.
Respondent Judge: A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC should be deemed to have modified the designation
of special courts for drug cases. Under the circumstances enumerated in A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC,
Branch 37 itself became a special court.
Ruling: No.
The Supreme Court did not commit any violation of R.A. 9165 when it issued the assailed
guidelines. Rather, it merely obeyed Article VIII, Sec. 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution, which
mandates that the rules promulgated by the SC should provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, in conformity with the right of all persons to a
speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
Under R.A. 9165, Congress empowered the Supreme Court with the full discretion to designate
special courts to hear, try and decide drug cases. It was precisely in the exercise of this
discretionary power that the powers of the executive judge were included in Chap. V, Sec.9 of
A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC vis-à-vis Sec. 5(5) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
Thus, in cases of inhibition or disqualification, the executive judge is mandated to assign the
drug case to a regular court in the following order: first, to the pairing judge of the special court
where the case was originally assigned; and, second, if the pairing judge is likewise disqualified
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or has inhibited himself, then to another regular court through a raffle. Under these exceptional
circumstances, the SC designated the regular court, ipso facto, as a special court – but only for
that case.
Being a “designated special court,” it is likewise bound to follow the relevant rules in trying and
deciding the drug case pursuant to R.A. 9165.
CASE NO. 2
ATTY. TOMAS ONG CABILI, Complainant
VS JUDGE RASAD G. BALINDONG, Acting Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 8, Marawi
City, Respondent
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2225, September 6, 2011
FACTS:
Atty. Tomas Ong Cabili (Atty. Cabili) was counsel of the Heirs of Jesus Ledesma in the latters
action for damages against the Mindanao State University (MSU) and others arising from the
death of the late Jesus Ledesma in Civil Case 06-254 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iligan
City, Branch 6. The RTC rendered judgment against the defendants, including MSU, ordering
them to pay damages to the Heirs. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC
decision which became final and executory. Eventually, on motion of the Heirs, on March 6,
2009 the RTC Branch 6 caused the issuance of a writ of execution against the defendants. The
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) belatedly filed an opposition to the issuance of the writ,
resulting in its denial on the ground of mootness of the motion. Meantime, the Sheriff of Branch
6, Sheriff Gerard Peter Gaje, served a notice of garnishment on MSUs funds with the Land
Bank of the Philippines Marawi City Branch by reason of MSUs failure to obey the writ.
On April 1, 2009, to prevent seizure of its Land Bank deposits that it needed for operations,
MSU filed a special civil action of prohibition and mandamus with application for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and, subsequently, a preliminary injunction before the
RTC Branch 8, presided over by respondent acting presiding judge, Judge Rasad G. Balindong,
against Land Bank and Sheriff Gaje.
In its petition, MSU averred that it is a state university, funded by appropriations law enacted
by Congress; that despite OSG opposition to the issuance of a writ of execution against it, such
writ was issued and Sheriff Gaje garnished upon MSUs deposits with Land Bank, who in turn
gave notice to MSU that it was putting on hold the sum of P2,726,189.90 on its deposit in
Account 2002-0000-35; that, this money being government funds, Sheriff Gaje was executing
on the same in violation of Commission on Audit (COA) Circular 2001-002 dated July 31, 2001
and SC Administrative Circular 10-2000; and that unless restrained, the garnishment of
government fund would disrupt
MSUs operations.
After due hearing, Judge Balindong issued a TRO, enjoining Land Bank and Sheriff Gaje from
proceeding with the garnishment of the MSU deposit with Land Bank. To determine whether
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction was warranted, Judge Balindong heard the
parties and required them to submit memoranda. Instead of submitting a memorandum, Sheriff
Gaje filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that RTC Branch 8 had no jurisdiction to issue an
injunction order against another court of equal rank. Finding merit, on April 28, 2009 Judge
Balindong issued an Order, dismissing the petition.
For having initially taken cognizance of the case and issuing a TRO, Atty. Cabili filed the present
administrative action Judge Balindong for gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority,
abuse of discretion and/or grave misconduct prejudicial to the interest of the judicial service.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found ground to hold Judge Balindong guilty of
gross ignorance of the law for interfering with the judgment of a co-equal court. It recommended
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the imposition of a fine of P40,000.00 on Judge Balindong with a stern warning against a future
offense.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Balindong acted with gross ignorance of the law when he issued the
TRO, pending hearing on the application for preliminary injunction that enjoined Sheriff Gaje
from garnishing MSUs Congress-appropriated operating funds for the satisfaction of the
judgment of RTC Branch 6.
RULING: Yes.
The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of a
co-equal court is an elementary principle in the administration of justice: no court can interfere
by injunction with the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the
power to grant the relief sought by the injunction. The rationale for the rule is founded on the
concept of jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment
therein has jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its
execution and over all its incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of
ministerial officers acting in connection with this judgment.
Judge Balindong clearly ignored the principle of judicial stability by issuing a TRO to temporarily
restrain Sheriff Gaje from enforcing the writ of execution issued by a co-equal court, Branch 6
of the Iligan City RTC, and from pursuing the garnishment of the amount of P2,726,189.90 from
MSUs account with the LBP, Marawi City Branch. The respondent Judge was aware that he
was acting on matters pertaining to the execution phase of a final decision of a co-equal and
coordinate court since he even quoted MSUs allegations in his April 8, 2009 Order. The
respondent Judge should have refrained from acting on the petition because Branch 6 of the
Iligan City RTC retains jurisdiction to rule on any question on the enforcement of the writ of
execution.
CASE NO. 3
JAPRL DEVELOPMENT CORP., PETER RAFAEL C. LIMSON AND JOSE UY AROLLADO,
petitioners, VS. SECURITY BANK CORPORATION, respondent
G.R. No. 190107, June 06, 2011
FACTS:
In 1996, JAPRL Development Corporation applied for and was granted a credit facility (Letter
of Credit/ Trust Receipt) in the amount of P50,000.00 with Security Bank Corporation (SBC).
In 2001, petitioners Peter Rafael C. Limson (Limson) and Jose Uy Arollado (Arollado), JAPRL
Chairman and President, respectively, executed a Continuing Suretyship Agreement (CSA)2 in
favor of SBC wherein they guaranteed the due and full payment and performance of JAPRL’s
guaranteed obligations under the credit facility.3
In 2002, on JAPRL’s proposal, SBC extended the period of settlement of his obligations.
In 2003, JAPRL’s financial adviser, MRM Management Incorporated (MRM), convened
JAPRL’s creditors, SBC included, for the purpose of restructuring JAPRL’s existing loan
obligations.
SBC soon discovered material inconsistencies in the financial statements given by MRM vis-àvis those submitted by JAPRL when it applied for a credit facility, drawing SBC to conclude that
JAPRL committed misrepresentation. Thus, SBC sent a formal letter of demand 6 dated August
20, 2003 to petitioners JAPRL, Limson and Arollado for the immediate payment of Forty Three
Million Nine Hundred Twenty Six Thousand and Twenty One Pesos and 41/100
(₱43,926,021.41) representing JAPRL’s outstanding obligations.
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Petitioners failed to comply with SBC’s demand, hence, SBC filed on September 1, 2003 a
complaint for sum of money with application for issuance of writ of preliminary attachment 7 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City against JAPRL, Limson and Arollado.
During the hearing on the prayer for the issuance of writ of preliminary attachment on September 16, 2003, SBC’s counsel manifested that it received a copy of a Stay Order dated September 8, 2003 issued by the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 90 wherein JAPRL’s petition for rehabilitation was lodged.
The Makati RTC at once ordered in open court the archiving of SBC’s complaint for sum of
money until disposition by the Quezon City RTC of JAPRL’s petition for rehabilitation. When
the Makati RTC reduced to writing its open court Order of September 16, 2003, however, it
instead declared the dismissal of SBC’s complaint. SBC filed a Motion for Reconsideration, and
moved to clarify the Makati RTC Order positing that the suspension of the proceedings should
only be with respect to JAPRL, but not with respect to Limson and Arollado.
However, RTC Makati maintained its order archiving complaint against all petitioners.
Meanwhile the proposed rehabilitation plan before RTC Quezon City was disapproved.
On Motion, RTC Makati thus reinstated SBC’s complaint.
Later, petitioners filed a manifestation informing that a Stay Order was issued, this time by RTC
Calamba, in a new petition for rehabilitation filed by JAPRL. Again, RTC Makati archived SBC’s
complaint against petitioners. SBC moved for reconsiderations averring that its complaint
should not have been archived with respect to sureties Limson and Arollado.
ISSUE: Whether or not SBC can pursue its claim against Limson and Arollado, as sureties,
despite the pendency of JAPRL’s petition for rehabilitation?
RULING: Yes.
For, by the CSA in favor of SBC, it is the obligation of the sureties, who are therein stated to be
solidary with JAPRL, to see to it that JAPRL’s debt is fully paid.
On a trial court’s suspension of proceedings against a surety of a corporation in the process of
rehabilitation, Banco de Oro EPCi, Inc. vs. JAPRL, Development Corporation holds that a creditor can demand payment from the surety solidarily liable with the corporation seeking rehabilitation not included in the list of stayed claims.
Indeed, Section 6(b) of the Interim Rules of Procedure of Corporate rehabilitation provides that
a stay order does not apply to sureties who are solidarily liable with the debtor. In Limson and
arollado’s case, their solidary liability with JAPRL is documented.
Limson and Arollado, as sureties, whose liability is solidary cannot, therefore, claim protection
from the rehabilitation court, they not being the financially distressed corporation that may be
restored, not to mention that the rehabilitation court has no jurisdiction over them.
As expressly stated in Rule 14, Section 20 of the Rules of Court, the defendant's voluntary
appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. It is well settled that any
form of appearance in court, by the defendant, by his agent authorized to do so, or by attorney,
is equivalent to service except where such appearance is precisely to object to the jurisdiction
of the court over the person of the defendant.
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CASE NO. 4
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Regional Executive Director of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Regional Office No.
3, Petitioner, vs. ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, Respondent.
G.R. No. 192975, November 12, 2012
FACTS:
On January 30, 2007, petitioner Republic filed a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 62-M2007 before the RTC of Malolos City, Bulacan, for cancellation of titles and reversion against
respondent RCAM and several others.6 The complaint alleged, inter alia, that RCAM appears
as the registered owner of eight (8) parcels of land,
In 1934, RCAM sold the said eight (8) parcels of land to the other named defendants in the
complaint resulting in the cancellation of OCT No.588 and issuance of transfer certificates of
title in the names of the corresponding transferees. Subsequently, the Lands Management
Bureau conducted an investigation and ascertained that the subject lots are identical to Lot No.
2077, Cad-302-D and Lot Nos. 1293, 1306 and 1320, Cad-302-D with a total area of 22,703
square meters. These parcels of land were certified by the Bureau of Forest Development on
January 17, 1983 as falling within the unclassified lands of the public domain and it was only
on May 8, 1984 that they were declared alienable and disposable per Forestry Administrative
Order No. 4-1776, with no public land application/ land patent.
On April 16, 2007, petitioner Republic received a copy of a motion for leave to intervene and to
admit complaint-in-intervention filed by the Samahang Kabuhayang San Lorenzo KKK, Inc.
(KKK), occupants of the subject property, which was subsequently granted by the RTC.
Thenceforth, answers and various other pleadings were filed by the appropriate parties.
During the course of the pre-trial, RCAM filed a motion to dismiss assailing the jurisdiction of
the RTC over the complaint. It alleged that the action for reversion of title was essentially one
for annulment of judgment of the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Bulacan, acting as a Land
Registration Court, hence, beyond the competence of the RTC to act upon.
Ruling of the Trial Court:
In its Order dated January 27, 2009,12 the RTC denied RCAM's motion to dismiss for
being premature. RCAM's motion for reconsideration having been denied, the matter
was elevated to the CA on certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
RTC.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals:
In its assailed Decision, the CA held that while reversion suits are allowed under the law,
the same should be instituted before the CA because the RTC cannot nullify a decision
rendered by a co-equal land registration court. The CA further applied equitable estoppel
against the State and considered it barred from filing a reversion suit. It explained that
the lots were already alienated to innocent purchasers for value and the State failed to
take action to contest the title for an unreasonable length of time. Hence, the CA ordered
the RTC to grant RCAM's motion to dismiss.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the action filed by the Republic.
RULING: Yes.
It is axiomatic that the nature of an action and whether the tribunal has jurisdiction over such
action are to be determined from the material allegations of the complaint, the law in force at
the time the complaint is filed, and the character of the relief sought irrespective of whether the
plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims averred.20 Jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas
or the theories set up by defendant in an answer to the complaint or a motion to dismiss the
same.
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In the present case, the material averments, as well as the character of the relief prayed for by
petitioners in the complaint before the RTC, show that their action is one for cancellation of
titles and reversion, not for annulment of judgment of the RTC. The complaint alleged that Lot
Nos. 43 to 50, the parcels of land subject matter of the action, were not the subject of the CFI’s
judgment in the relevant prior land registration case. Hence, petitioners pray that the certificates
of title of RCAM be cancelled which will not necessitate the annulment of said judgment.
Clearly, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court on annulment of judgment finds no application in the
instant case.
The RTC may properly take cognizance of reversion suits which do not call for an annulment
of judgment of the RTC acting as a Land Registration Court. Actions for cancellation of title and
reversion, like the present case, belong to the class of cases that "involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein" and where the assessed value of the property
exceeds P20, 000.00, fall under the jurisdiction of the RTC. Consequently, no grave abuse of
discretion excess of jurisdiction can be attributed to the RTC in denying RCAM’s motion to
dismiss.
CASE NO. 5
ROSITO BAGUNU, Petitioner,
vs. SPOUSES FRANCISCO AGGABAO & ROSENDA ACERIT, Respondents.
G.R. No. 186487, August 15, 2011
FACTS:
Spouses Aggabao filed a protest against the petitioner’s’ free patent application over a parcel
of unregistered land located in Caniogan, Sto. Tomas, Isabela, pending before the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources, Region II, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan.
The subject land was previously owned by Marcos Binag, who later sold it (first sale) to
Felicisimo Bautista. In 1959, Bautista, in turn, sold the subject land (second sale) to Atty.
Samson Binag.
On December 12, 1961, Atty. Binag applied for a free patent over the subject land with the
Bureau of Lands. On November 24, 1987, Atty. Binag sold the subject land (third sale) to
the petitioner, who substituted for Atty. Binag as the free patent applicant. The parties deed
of sale states that the land sold to the petitioner is the same lot subject of Atty. Binags
pending free patent application.
On December 28, 1992, the respondents filed a protest against the petitioner’s free patent
application. The respondents asserted ownership over Lot 322 based on the Deeds of
Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale, dated June 23, 1971 and April 15, 1979, executed in
their favor by the heirs of one Rafael Bautista.
On July 10, 1998, the DENR Regional Office ruled that the petitioner wrongfully included
Lot 322 in his free patent application since this lot belongs to the respondents.
The petitioner moved for reconsideration. The DENR Regional Office denied the motion ruling
that in determining the identity of a lot, the boundaries and not the lot number assigned to it are controlling. Since the boundaries indicated in the deed of sale in the petitioners favor
correspond to the boundaries of Lot 258, what the petitioner acquired was Lot 258,
notwithstanding the erroneous description of the lot sold as Lot 322.
On appeal, the DENR Secretary affirmed the ruling of the DENR Regional Office. After noting
the differences in the boundaries stated in the parties respective Deeds of Sale, the DENR
Secretary concluded that the land claimed by the petitioner is, in fact, distinct from that claimed
by the respondents.
The DENR Secretary ruled that based on the parties respective deeds of sale, the Subdivision
Plan of the lot sold to the petitioner and Atty. Binags affidavit - claiming that the designation
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of Lot 322 in the Deed of Sale in the petitioners favor is erroneous - what the petitioner
really acquired was Lot 258 and not Lot 322. The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.
CA affirmed DENR Secretary Decision applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The CA
ruled that since questions on the identity of a land require a technical determination by the
appropriate administrative body, the findings of fact of the DENR Regional Office, as affirmed
by the DENR Secretary, are entitled to great respect, if not finality.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA is wrong in applying the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction.
HELD: No.
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts must refrain from determining a
controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal
prior to its resolution by the latter, where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts,
and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues
which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an
administrative body, in such case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of
such issues to the administrative body for its view.
The resolution of conflicting claims of ownership over real property is within the regular
courts area of competence and, concededly, this issue is judicial in character.
However, regular courts would have no power to conclusively resolve this issue of ownership
given the public character of the land, since under C.A. No. 141, in relation to Executive
Order No. 192, the disposition and management of public lands fall within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Director of Lands, subject to review by the DENR Secretary.
While the powers given to the DENR, through the Bureau of Lands, to alienate and dispose of
public land do not divest regular courts of jurisdiction over possessory actions instituted by occupants or applicants (to protect their respective possessions and occupations),41 the respondents’ complaint-in-intervention does not simply raise the issue of possession – whether de
jure or de facto – but likewise raised the issue of ownership as basis to recover possession.
Particularly, the respondents prayed for declaration of ownership of Lot 322. Ineluctably, the
RTC would have to defer its ruling on the respondents’ reivindicatory action pending final determination by the DENR, through the Lands Management Bureau, of the respondents’ entitlement to a free patent, following the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
Undoubtedly, the DENR Secretary’s exclusion of Lot 322 from the petitioner’s free patent application and his consequent directive for the respondents to apply for the same lot are within
the DENR Secretary’s exercise of sound administrative discretion. In the oft-cited case of Vicente Villaflor, etc. v. CA, et al,42 which involves the decisions of the Director of Lands and the
then Minister of Natural Resources, we stressed that the rationale underlying the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction applies to questions on the identity of the disputed public land since this
matter requires a technical determination by the Bureau of Lands. Since this issue precludes
prior judicial determination, the courts must stand aside even when they apparently have statutory power to proceed, in recognition of the primary jurisdiction of the administrative agency.
CASE NO. 6
JOSE E. ARUEGO, JR., SIMEONA SAN JUAN ARUEGO, MA. IMMACULADA T. ALANON,
ROBERTO A. TORRES, CRISTINA A. TORRES, JUSTO JOSE TORRES and AGUSTIN
TORRES, petitioners vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THIRTEENTH DIVISION and
ANTONIA ARUEGO, respondents.
G.R. No. 112193, March 13, 1996
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FACTS:
On March 7, 1983, a complaint for compulsory recognitionand enforcement of successional
rights was filed before RTC Manila by the minors Antonia Aruego and alleged the sister Evelyn
Aruego represented by their mother Luz Fabian.
The complaint was opposed by the legitimate children of Jose Aruego, who died on March 30,
1982. Their claim there is open and continuous possession of status of illegitimate children
of Jose who had an amorous relationship with their mother Luz Fabian until the time of
his death.
The court declared that Antonia Aruego is an illegitimate daughter of the deceased with Luz
Fabian while Evelyn is not. Antonia Aruego was declared entitled to a share equal to 1/2 portion
of share of the legitimate children of Jose Aruego. Petitioners, on the other hand, submit that
with the advent of the New Family Code on August 3, 1988, the trial court lost jurisdiction over
the complaint of private respondent on the ground of prescription, considering that under Article
175, paragraph 2, in relation to Article 172 of the New Family Code, it is provided that an action
for compulsory recognition of illegitimate filiation, if based on the “open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child,” must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged
parent without any exception, otherwise the action will be barred by prescription.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Family Code may be given a retroactive effect so as to deprive private respondent of her right to institute the case for compulsory recognition.
RULING: No.
The action brought by private respondent Antonia Aruego for compulsory recognition and enforcement of successional rights which was filed prior to the advent of the Family Code, must
be governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code and not by Article 175, paragraph 2 of the Family
Code.
The present law cannot be given retroactive effect insofar as the instant case is concerned, as
its application will prejudice the vested right of private respondent to have her case decided
under Article 285 of the Civil Code.
The right was vested to her by the fact that she filed her action under the regime of the
Civil Code. Presiding from this, the conclusion then ought to be that the action was not
yet barred, notwithstanding the fact that it was brought when the putative father was already deceased, since private respondent was then still a minor when it was filed, an exception to
the general rule provided under Article 285 of the Civil Code.
Hence, the trial court, which acquired jurisdiction over the case by the filing of the complaint,
never lost jurisdiction over the same despite the passage of E.O. No. 209, also known as
the Family Code of the Philippines.
The ruling of the Court reinforces the principle that the jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal
or civil cases, once attached cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events, although
of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance, and
it retains jurisdiction until it finally disposes of the case.
Petitioner’s contentions:
In the case at bench, petitioners point out that, since the complaint of private respondent and
her alleged sister was filed on March 7, 1983, or almost one (1) year after the death of their
presumed father on March 30, 1982, the action has clearly prescribed under the new rule as
provided in the Family Code. Petitioners, further, maintain that even if the action was filed prior
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to the effectivity of the Family Code, this new law must be applied to the instant case pursuant
to Article 256 of the Family Code which provides:
This Code shall, have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested of
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC of Manila has jurisdiction.
HELD: YES
Tayag vs. Court of Appeals
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we hold that the right of action of the
minor child has been vested by the filing of the complaint in court under the regime of the Civil
Code and prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. We herein adopt our ruling in the recent
case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et. al. 7 where we held that the fact of
filing of the petition already vested in the petitioner her right to file it and to have the same
proceed to final adjudication in accordance with the law in force at the time, and such right can
no longer be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.
Tayag applies four-square with the case at bench. The action brought by private respondent
Antonia Aruego for compulsory recognition and enforcement of successional rights which was
filed prior to the advent of the Family Code, must be governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code
and not by Article 175, paragraph 2 of the Family Code. The present law cannot be given retroactive effect insofar as the instant case is concerned, as its application will prejudice the
vested right of private respondent to have her case decided under Article 285 of the Civil Code.
The right was vested to her by the fact that she filed her action under the regime of the Civil
Code. Prescinding from this, the conclusion then ought to be that the action was not yet barred,
notwithstanding the fact that it was brought when the putative father was already deceased,
since private respondent was then still a minor when it was filed, an exception to the general
rule provided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. Hence, the trial court, which acquired jurisdiction over the case by the filing of the complaint, never lost jurisdiction over the same despite
the passage of E.O. No. 209, also known as the Family Code of the Philippines.
DOCTRINE OF ADHERANCE OF JURISDICTION/CONTINUITY JURISDICTION
Our ruling herein reinforces the principle that the jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or
civil cases, once attached cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events, although of
a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance, and it
retains jurisdiction until it finally disposes of the case.
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