Israel Case Neg
This is sort of bad because I don’t know what’s in the 1AC, but T is probably the best bet
here. The allies DA is also pretty good. Please don’t go for the CP unless they drop it because
it’s bad. On case, there’s probably not a lot of specific stuff. That means you just do framing
and TURNS CASE ANALYSIS on the DA – NUKE WAR OUTWEIGHS KIDS
T- Substantial 25%
1NC
Interpretation: Substantial is 25% of arms
DFARS 19 — The Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement to the Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR), a U.S. Department of Defense regulation that contains
requirements of law, DoD-wide policies, delegations of FAR authorities, deviations from
FAR requirements, and policies/procedures that have a significant effect on the public, 2019
(“Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement,” Last Updated May 31st, Available
Online at
https://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/dars/dfars/changenotice/2019/20190531/dfars-changes20190531.pdf, Accessed 06-14-2019, p. 288)
Part 252—Solicitation Provisions and Contract Clauses
(a) x. As use in this clause—
“Major defense program” means a program that is carried out to produce or acquire a
major system (as defined in 10 U.S.C. 2302(5)).
“Substantial reduction” means a reduction of 25 percent or more in the total dollar value of
funds obligated by the contract.
Violation – Israel is suuuuuuuuuuuuper smol
Voting issue for limits and ground – they allow tiny affs that target the
country or weapon of the day which skews neg ground to the hyperspecific topic they choose
SIPRI Arms Transfer Database, 19 – Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute (Chart generated through their arms transfer database. You can generate the same
chart by going to the URL and selecting the following values: Exports from United States,
Range of years: 2014-2018, Summarize data by recipient/supplier, Output format: On
screen. Questions? Email davidheidt@gmail.com
http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values.php
2NC
Overview
Substantial is decreasing 25% of arms or more, that’s DFARS. We
include affs like whole rez, Saudi coalition, aircraft, BMD, East Asia but
exclude affs like South Korea, Honduras, Algeria, and F-35s that are so
there’s no lit base or clash
We allow for aff innovation in the topic while maintaining fair research
burdens for the negatives, this moves us to core of the topic affs and
prevents aff teams from running to the margins to find the tiniest aff.
Prefer DFARS for precision and predictability –
1. It has the attempt to define substantial AND the intent to exclude
things that aren’t – that sets the best boundaries for aff ground
2. It’s an official government definition in the context of arms sales,
that’s predictable for debaters across the country to know what is
and is not topical
AT C/I
Case by Case
1. This is a glorified reasonability argument and isn’t in the context
of arms sales, makes it impossible to be neg and the only
brightline is a numerical interpritaiton. Case by case is
fundamentally arbitrary and doesn’t solve either limits or
precision
2. They don’t meet their C/I, (aff) is small
3. Quantitative changes in arms sales should be measured by
relative percentages
Milo, 16 – Keren Yarhi-Milo is an assistant professor of politics and international affairs in
Princeton University’s Politics Department and the Woodrow Wilson School for Public and
International Affairs. Alexander Lanoszka is Lecturer in the Department of International
Politics at City, University of London. Zack Cooper is a fellow at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies.(“To Arm or to Ally?: The Patron’s Dilemma and the Strategic Logic of
Arms Transfers and Alliances”, International Security, Volume 41, Number 2, Fall 2016, pp.
90-139, Project Muse)
In an arms transfer, a state gives another state weapons to augment its military capabilities. Like alliances, arms transfers
deter and defend by shifting the local balance of power in the recipient’s favor. Yet, they differ from alliances in three ways.
First, a patron can decide to transfer arms quickly and sometimes without involving domestic legislatures, whereas alliances
often take time to negotiate and ratify. Second, a patron can modulate the magnitude and type of military assistance it
provides over time. Alliance commitments are generally more static and difficult to calibrate. Third, although alliances are
mainly an ex post indicator of a patron’s commitment to a client, arm transfers are primarily an ex ante signal of such a
commitment—the costs of which result from a patron supplying a loan or grant to its client to purchase weapons or directly
providing arms.15 Arms transfers can signal a patron’s intentions by demonstrating its interest in maintaining the security of
characteristics of arms transfers affect their signaling value. The first characteristic
is the size of the arms transfer. A large transfer can function as a sunk cost. Such costly signals cause a client and its
its client. Three
adversary to reason that only a patron with a strong interest in maintaining the security of its client would significantly
augment its arsenal. We
define the size of an arms transfer as the percentage of the patron’s total
military transfer budget devoted to a certain client relative to other regional clients.16 The second
characteristic concerns the type of weapons being transferred. Defensive weapons limit the client’s ability to conquer territory
or to launch a first strike. By contrast, offensive weapons (i.e., those that favor mobility over protection or firepower)
constitute a more costly signal.17 The adversary might even regard the patron’s willingness to supply offensive weapons as a
signal that the patron approves of a client’s offensive aims. The adversary and other outside observers are therefore more
likely to believe that the patron will come to its client’s aid in a crisis. Alternatively, whatever the patron’s intentions, an
adversary might blame the patron for providing weapons that enabled its client to undertake offensive operations, thereby
implicating the patron in the conflict and increasing the likelihood that the adversary will target the patron.18 Transferring
offensive weapons to a client thus means that the patron is accepting a higher risk of entrapment. The third characteristic of
arms transfers is institutionalization. The more institutionalized the practice of transferring arms, the stronger its signaling
value. A single arms transfer is an ambiguous signal of a client’s future commitment, because it provides limited information
about the patron’s future behavior. More institutionalized arrangements produce expectations of future weapons transfers,
increase the anticipated cost of the client’s commitment to the patron and the anticipated benefit to the client, and are much
harder to reverse. With institutionalization, the patron is more likely to suffer reputation costs if its client is defeated. At stake
is not the patron’s reputation for resolve, but rather the patron’s desire to be seen as being on the winning side.
Institutionalized arms transfers can take many forms. Patrons might commit to provide a certain amount or type of arms
within a specified time frame. Alternatively, patrons might offer some guarantee that their clients maintain a sufficient selfdefense capability. By creating expectations of future arms transfers, institutionalization provides a new focal point for
relations between the patron and its client. Thus, arms
transfers convey the most significant and costliest
signal of a patron’s support when they include the institutionalized provision of a large quantity of
offensive and defensive weapons.19 Costly arm transfers have at least two of these characteristics. When arms
transfers are ad hoc and feature small quantities of defensive weapons, we argue that the signal conveys
insignificant support.
17-8%
1. Doesn’t solve limits, it’s a linear impact, the more limited topic the
better
2. Its not about broader FMS/DCS just sales to developing countries
which means a substantial reduction should be more in the
context of all sales
3. Doesn’t solve precision, their ev is from a requested report where
ours is governmental policy this outweighs.
4. CFR agrees with us not them
CFR, 15 – Code of Federal Regulations (48 CFR § 252.249-7002 - Notification of anticipated
contract termination or reduction., https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/48/252.2497002
Notification of Anticipated Contract Termination or Reduction (OCT 2015) (a)Definitions. Major
defense program
means a program that is carried out to produce or acquire a major system (as defined in 10 U.S.C.
2302(5)) (see also DoD 5000.2-R, Mandatory Procedures for Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) and Major
Automated Information System (MAIS) Acquisition Programs). Substantial
reduction means a reduction of 25
percent or more in the total dollar value of funds obligated by the contract.
AT 2.7%
Portella is a professor without intent to define and is using the word in
the context of exports to China from EU
1. Doesn’t solve our offense if its not precise, negative preparation is
structured around the most legally precise definition in the topic
2. Doesn’t solve limits 2.7% allows for 15 country affs and endless
combinations and minute types of arms.
3. Doesn’t access clash, limits are a linear impact, more limits garner
more clash.
4. Portela’s data relies on dual-use imports which aren’t arms
Lichtenbaum 05 [Peter, former Assistant Secretary of Export Administration at the
Commerce Department, “An E-mail Exchange Between the Department of Commerce and
the Center for American Progress,” accessible online at
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/courts/news/2005/03/27/1403/an-e-mailexchange-between-the-department-of-commerce-and-the-center-for-american-progress,
published 03/27/05] // BBM
*** FYI – Portela’s citing a 2004 article by Gudrun Wacker, which is the article Lichtenbaum
is referring to. Here’s a link to that: https://www.swpberlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/SWPComment4_04_Wkrxx.pdf
I am writing with reference to your recent op-ed, entitled "US should set example on limiting arms exports." While I found the
op-ed quite interesting, I would like to take issue with one point, where you state that "there is evidence that US companies
have been indirectly selling arms to China despite the embargo. According to
Dieter Dettke of the Friedrich
Ebert Foundation, 6.7 percent of Chinese dual-use imports come from the United States while
only 2.7 percent come from Europe." It is not accurate to cite data on dual-use sales to
support a statement regarding arms sales. U.S. law, and international practice, clearly
distinguish between munitions (arms), which are controlled by the State Department, and
dual-use items, which are controlled by the Commerce Department. While there is an embargo on
U.S. arms sales to China, there is no such embargo on dual-use sales. The distinction is an important one.
5. That means that they can’t meet their counter-interpretation –
they don’t reduce 2.7% of dual use items
Aff Answers
AT Reasonability
Reasonability links back to our offense because the neg has to defend
against any aff that is somewhat reasonable
It causes judge intervention because they arbitrarily decide if the aff is
reasonable or not, and take it out of the debaters’ hands
If we win anything above on the flow, then we’ve won they aren’t
reasonable
Default to competing interpretations – it’s the only way to determine a
threshold for what is reasonable
Limits
Limits should be your filter for all skill-based impact claims –
An in-depth topic solves this, whereas the aff justifies Resolution: arms
sales, which the neg can never predict
Advantage innovation solves their offense – single payer topic proves
Neg ground outweighs – they get first and last speech, case selection,
and infinite prep
We allow for affs like whole rez, Saudi coalition, aircraft, BMD, East asia,
which make sense and have a lot of lit – no overlimiting. But
overlimiting is good – depth means that we can have debates full of clash
because both teams are prepared to debate, increases education
because no one is caught off guard. And there’s no impact to
overlimiting, prefer how awesome the topic is under our interp.
Even if they win that our case list is not enough, they allow for [how
many more affs]. That explodes limits since it quickly leads to teams
running to the margins and decimates neg prep and ground
DA- Israel Allies
1NC
U.S-Israel alliance is high now
Netanyahu 6/28/2019, Benjamin is an Israeli politician who has been Prime Minister of
Israel since 2009, having previously held the position from 1996 to 1999. Netanyahu is also
the Chairman of the Likud-National Liberal Movement. He is the longest-serving Prime
Minister in Israeli history,[2][3][4] and the first to be born in Israel after the establishment
of the state, “Benjamin Netanyahu on US-Israel Alliance: Steadfast and Stronger Than Ever”,
(https://www.algemeiner.com/2019/06/28/benjamin-netanyahu-on-us-israel-alliancesteadfast-and-stronger-than-ever/) KL
Theodor Herzl, who envisioned and paved the way for the rebirth of Israel as a nation, lent great importance to the forging of
alliances and the fostering of friendly relations between the Jewish people and the nations of the world. I am
happy and
proud that in the fabric of our ties with the nations of the world, the alliance between Israel
and the United States stands first and prominent. This alliance is steadfast and stronger
than ever, and under President Donald Trump, it has reached new heights. We remember very well
that it was the United States, led by President Harry Truman, that was the first country to recognize Israel 71 years ago. Over
time, this friendship has grown deeper, and in the past few years, it has proved itself as a close strategic alliance. We have
always shared the common democratic values of liberty and justice, as well as mutual interests. But the big change lies in the
fact that Israel is becoming a growing global force in the fields of security and technological innovation. These impressive
achievements are the result of the policies promoted by the governments under my leadership, with the aim of making Israel’s
economy free and robust, and to establish our status as a technology and cyber power. At the same time, we are investing
considerable resources in securing the superiority of our intelligence apparatus and our military might.
Our growing
strength has brought many countries closer, which attests to the deep appreciation they
have for Israel’s capabilities. Israel’s flourishing diplomatic relations with nations across the
five continents is the result of our exceptional achievements and a policy of fostering and
nurturing the strengths that are our advantages. Particularly noteworthy are the budding
ties — both overt and clandestine — between us and leading countries in the moderate
Arab and Muslim world. This is a dramatic change that is based on the recognition that
partnership with Israel contributes to the security, stability, and prosperity of the Middle
East. We lend great importance to our diplomatic relations as a whole, and we know that
our alliance with the United States is the cornerstone of these ties. Throughout all my years
as prime minister, I have endeavored to bolster these ties, even when disagreements arose
on issues such as the peace process and the Iranian issue. I thank Presidents George W.
Bush and Barack Obama for signing the memorandums of understanding that granted Israel
generous military aid. Every Israeli citizen is grateful for this vital assistance, which
enhances our qualitative advantage over those who seek our demise. The US itself benefits
from this, because a strong Israel helps maintain stability and security in our region, which
is important to both us and our friend, the United States. Over the past two and a half years,
I have been working with President Trump to achieve another goal — we are expanding our
military-intelligence collaboration and cyber capabilities so as to make our countries safer.
In addition, we have marked a series of historical decisions: President Trump, in a courageous decision, recognized Jerusalem
as Israel’s capital and moved the US embassy there. He recently made another welcome and strategically-important decision
when he recognized Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights. The president also revolutionized US policy on Iran when he
decided to withdraw from the nuclear agreement. Iran, a
rogue state that repeatedly threatens to
annihilate Israel and strives to possess nuclear weapons, is currently facing significant
American pressure, in the form of restored and exacerbated sanctions on its regime. For
over two decades, I have been tirelessly warning about Iran’s nuclear aspirations. I
remained steadfast in that even when it meant taking on the world. When I addressed the
US Congress in March 2015, I explained at length why the nuclear deal was dangerous to
Israel, to the Middle East, and to humanity as a whole. The United States, under President
Trump, offers us its unequivocal backing in our efforts to protect ourselves against Iran and
our other enemies. The US administration stands as one with Israel vis-à-vis the attempts
made by the International Criminal Court to undermine our right of self-defense, and lends
us its unwavering support in the United Nations as well. The team the administration has
assigned to the peace deal, headed by senior White House adviser Jared Kushner, special
envoy Jason Greenblatt, and US Ambassador to Israel David Friedman, has demonstrated an
unfaltering commitment to Israel’s vital interests and security needs. I look forward to
continuing working with the president to promote security, prosperity, and peace for both
our countries. The alliance between the United States and Israel is stronger than ever. To
preserve and even bolster it, we need to continue to nurture American public opinion, for all
its parts, to fight hostility toward Zionism and the new wave of antisemitism that is rearing
its head in the US, as in Europe, and to continue to enhance our economic and military
power and diplomatic standing. Today it is clearer than ever: The US has no more loyal ally
than Israel, and Israel has no more important and loyal ally than the United States.
Cutting off arms sales and FMF to Israel causes state collapse, Iran
strikes middle eastern war and new settlements that turn case
Pearl 3/5/2015, Mike Pearl is a writer for Vice and interviewed Rob Pinfold, a Neubauer
Research Associate at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) at Tel Aviv
University and a PhD Candidate in War Studies at King’s College London. His research
primarily addresses Israeli security policy and the broader theoretical question of why
states occupy and withdraw from territory, “We Asked a Military Expert What Would
Happen if the US Stopped Giving Money to Israel”,
(https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/dpwnkm/what-would-happen-if-the-us-stoppedgiving-money-to-israel-305) KL
VICE: Hi, Rob! What would happen if the US stopped sending money to Israel? Rob Pinfold: I
think it would be a mess for Israel basically. Would it be good for the US? The US would
have a lot less traction over Israel. It would be a downside for the US, and it would also be a
downside for the [Middle East]. For a long time the US has been trying to use its aid
politically to change Israel's behavior. What behaviors wouldn't the US be able to control? I
think any end to this aid would mean that Israel would be much more likely to take radical
moves that would not necessarily have the support of the international community. I think
it would be dangerous. What are the likely events in the short term? I think that the big difference you'd see
straightaway is an escalation in settlement building because the Israeli right would really be
able to unleash it. You see a lot, the Israeli government in particular, they've announced
some big settlement-building initiatives of several thousand homes in East Jerusalem over
the green line. And then the Americans say, "Na-uh, sorry, this is not happening," and then
the idea is quieted for another five years, and then it happens again, ad nauseam. But without
any American influence over Israel, especially with this aid, I think you would see a drastic exploration in settlement building.
Would they attack Hamas targets in Gaza? I think they would need to be provoked. Very, very rarely does Israel just willy-nilly
launch itself into a conflict, not just because of influence from the US but also at the end of the day, Israel is a democracy—so
actually instigating conflict has to have that legitimacy, otherwise it becomes a big issue. But what
if they were
provoked? Israel in the future would be much more unpredictable and any war would be
likely to go on for a lot longer, because there wouldn't be one big power to really exert the
pressure and squeeze both sides into a ceasefire. And how would the US react if they couldn't influence
them with money? Military action is somewhat unfeasible, in my eyes, against Israel. It just wouldn't happen. You might have
some sort of short-term sanctions against the regime by the US on Israel, and maybe on other belligerents as well. And what
would the outcome be? Israel wouldn't lose the conflict, that's for sure. They get
a lot of money from the States
in terms of support in terms of the Iron Dome anti-missile program, but at the end of the
day they have enough hardware already in the sheds to be able to thoroughly defeat any
belligerents—for example, non-state-level actors like Hamas or Hezbollah, but also statelevel actors like Iran. I don't think it would be a question of turning the tide of battle it would just be a question of how
long the war would go on, how bloody it would be, and who would get dragged in. Who would get dragged in? I think the US,
even if they really fell out with and really strongly dislike[d] Israel, would probably still work toward a cessation of hostility as
a superpower. I think that no matter what happens, we would go back to some sort of paradigm representing what we have at
the moment. But the fighting would probably be longer and bloodier, and the US would have less of an ability to stop it straight
away. Would Israel make moves
on Iran? I think the Saudis would be ready to turn a blind eye
{Ignore} to an Israeli attack [on Iran], which has been suggested before. So I think again the
probability of mass-casualty warfare and violence would be much higher if the US,
tomorrow, said, "Screw you, guys. I'm going home. This is too much effort." What kind of
warfare would we see? In terms of Iranian retaliation, Iran has a lot of medium- to longrange missiles. They're not very accurate, but they stopped firing them at the end of the
Iran-Iraq war, so they do have a very hefty stockpile that they could then fire at Israel. Israel
would inevitably retaliate with their stock. So it'd be quite hard for them to launch a
bombing campaign against Iran because they'd have to go through unfriendly territory on
the way. What might the targets of Israel's military action be? I think you'd see one Israeli strike, one very
pinpointed, strategic attack on Iranian nuclear assets. Then afterwards Israel would
basically try to hold its own, because Iran would unleash its proxies on the region, which
are primarily Hamas in the Gaza Strip and Hezbollah in Lebanon. I think we'd see fighting
very close to Israel's doorstep and I think you'd see a lot of devastation of both Gaza and
Lebanon. But on the flip side you'd also see a lot more damage to Israel's home front than
you've seen in a very long time. Would Iran have any luck? The missiles that Iran has have
overwhelmed the Iron Dome system. The Iron Dome system can shoot down the missiles
that you saw [from] Hamas [during the war this past summer]. The Iron Dome can deal with
that, but it wouldn't be able to do with the stockpiles of rockets that Iran has. Would things
escalate beyond exchanging missile attacks? If there is more damage to the Israeli home
front, the Israeli domestic scene would be more willing for the Israeli military to go all out
on flattening large parts of Lebanon and Gaza. There would be much less resistance to a
ground invasion, and much less resistance to moving troops in. Israel historically has very
quick campaigns and very decisive victories. So I think the leashes would be off, so to speak.
I think the Israeli army would be going en masse into Lebanon and into Gaza and wherever
else they'd be getting attacked from. But the fighting would be mainly restricted to the area
around Israel, unless they do some sort of massive campaign into Iran. Does Israel have the
fire power to successfully cripple {Prevent} the Iranian nuclear program? That's a tough one
because it's anyone's guess, really. I don't know exactly where and how the Iranians are
hiding all their material. They probably know. It would still be very hard for Israel. Their
planes would have to refuel in midair, in enemy territory. Their equipment is very limited.
It's not known if they actually have any bunker-busting missiles, like the Americans have,
that can penetrate deep underground. I think we'd probably have to see Israeli forces in
Iran—special forces teams, demolition teams, that kind of thing. It would have to involve some sort of
covert support from the Saudis to have a very good chance of success. It would be very, very difficult and it would end in a lot
of casualties on both the Israeli and the Iranian side. If the Israelis want to do it, there is nothing stopping them from doing it. If
they see them as a potential threat, they will go in and they will go in hard. Would the
fighting be limited to just
Iran, Lebanon, and Gaza? I think it would definitely trigger a whole powder keg in the entire
region. You look at the Middle East today, and it's the most unstable it's been in absolutely
years. You have the Islamic State operating out of both Iraq and Syria. They're making
headway in Lebanon as well. Egypt has its own problems with iihadists in the Sinai. It's very
unstable... in Libya. [And] any conflict with Iran would not just be limited to Gaza, it would
also spread to the West Bank where there are a lot of Iranian agents. But in the long-term, if
a terrible war weren't immediately sparked, how would a halt in funding from the US affect
Israel's military budget? In Israel, the military budget is very much sacrosanct. Any cut to
the military budget, and you're putting the state in existential danger. Personally I think
you'd see cuts to many other social, welfare, or educational programs within Israel before
you'd see massive, damaging cuts to the army. They'd try to keep the military budget as
steady as possible. So you'd see a damaging of Israeli society. Could Netanyahu stay in power? I
personally don't think so. If any Israeli leader were willing to seriously jeopardize their ties
[with the US], [causing] a complete cut off of all military and financial aid, I personally—and
I could be proven wrong—I don't think the government would be able to withstand the
pressure within Israel that would result from that.
Extinction
Avery 13 [John, Associate Professor @ University of Copenhagen, 11-6-2013, “An Attack
On Iran Could Escalate Into Global Nuclear War,”
http://www.countercurrents.org/avery061113.htm]
Despite the willingness of Iran's new President, Hassan Rouhani to make all reasonable concessions to US demands, Israeli
pressure groups in Washington continue to demand an attack on Iran. But such an attack might
escalate into a
global nuclear war, with catastrophic consequences. As we approach the 100th anniversary World War I, we should
remember that this colossal disaster escalated uncontrollably from what was intended to be a minor conflict.
There is a danger that an attack on Iran would escalate into a large-scale war in the Middle East, entirely
destabilizing a region that is already deep in problems. The unstable government of Pakistan might be
overthrown, and the revolutionary Pakistani government might enter the war on the side of Iran, thus
introducing nuclear weapons into the conflict. Russia and China, firm allies of Iran, might also be
drawn into a general war in the Middle East. Since much of the world's oil comes from the region, such a war would
certainly cause the price of oil to reach unheard-of heights, with catastrophic effects on the
global economy. In the dangerous situation that could potentially result from an attack on Iran, there is a risk that
nuclear weapons would be used, either intentionally, or by accident or miscalculation. Recent
research has shown that besides making large areas of the world uninhabitable through long-lasting radioactive
contamination, a nuclear war would damage global agriculture to such a extent that a global famine of
previously unknown proportions would result. Thus, nuclear war is the ultimate ecological catastrophe. It could
destroy human civilization and much of the biosphere. To risk such a war would be an unforgivable offense
against the lives and future of all the peoples of the world, US citizens included.
2NC
Uniqueness
Alliance fragile now—Anti-Semitic remarks prove
Milbank 3/26 [Award-winning author and columnist for the Washington Post,
“Netanyahu’s AIPAC speech is a knife in the heart of the U.S.-Israel alliance: To Republicans
and Benjamin Netanyahu, it’s only anti-Semitism when it comes from the left”, The
Washington Post, March 26 2019,
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=newssearch&cd=21&cad=rja
&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwjK7ef3q_jAhXHWM0KHcLXAhs4FBCpAgglKAAwAA&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.washingtonpost
.com%2Fopinions%2Fthe-republicans-chutzpah-ataipac%2F2019%2F03%2F26%2F21c12356-4fff-11e9-a3f778b7525a8d5f_story.html&usg=AOvVaw3qrMVkmnd719uFE-YqhC2-//BCH]
The gods were toying with Benjamin Netanyahu and the American Israel Public Affairs Committee. The Israeli prime minister
canceled his Tuesday appearance at the pro-Israel lobbying group's Washington conference because of violence in Israel, but
he attempted a live video address. "Mr. Prime Minister, can you hear us?" "I can hear you. I always hear you," Netanyahu
replied. Then, 11 seconds after the prime minister began, the satellite feed broke up and never completely recovered. "I
returned to deal with the [inaudible ]," Netanyahu said. "I wanted to speak to you and say two words: [ inaudible, sound of
phone ringing ]." "We've heard a lot about the rise of forces who want to pull America and Israel apart. So I can tell you one
thing: [ inaudible ]." And he closed: "May God bless America and may God bless [ inaudible ]." Audience members groaned.
Some applauded to fill the silence. Images of Netanyahu appeared on giant screens when the video failed. But whoever or
whatever disrupted the feed performed a mitzvah. Netanyahu's
speech was another knife into the heart of the
alliance. He attacked Democrats, singling out one Muslim member of Congress for
remarks that were seen as anti-Semitic, while ignoring the many anti-Semitic remarks by Republicans.
bipartisan U.S.-Israel
And he leveled the scurrilous claim that anyone who opposes AIPAC is anti-Semitic. "Take it from this Benjamin: It's not about
the Benjamins," Netanyahu said, referring to a tweet by Rep. Ilhan Omar (D-Minn.). Now that's chutzpah. On Monday, Rep. Mo
Brooks (R-Ala.) literally read from Adolf Hitler's "Mein Kampf" on the House floor and borrowed Hitler's "big lie" allegation
against Jews to use on Democrats. "Unconscionable," said the Anti-Defamation League. But Republicans, and Netanyahu, said
nothing. Tuesday was the 40th anniversary of the signing of the historic Camp David Accords. But the Israeli leader didn't
mention this, either, instead delivering division to a group that has embraced his (and Trump's) nationalist policies. Rabbi Rick
Jacobs, president of the Union for Reform Judaism, the largest branch of American Judaism, noticed that the AIPAC crowd had
"beyond a doubt" become mostly pro-Trump conservatives, not the cross section of Israel supporters that AIPAC once drew.
The rhetoric fit the room. "To
suggest anti-Semitism is part of the Democratic Party and liberal part of the
corrosive," he said. "The thing that has kept
Israel safe over the decades is rock-solid bipartisan support." Consider the hypocrisy: House
spectrum and not also part of Republican leaders' discourse . . . is
Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy (R-Calif.) issued (then deleted) a tweet targeting three wealthy Jews: "We cannot allow
[George] Soros, [Tom] Steyer and [Michael R.] Bloomberg to BUY this election! . . . #MAGA." But at AIPAC, McCarthy denounced
anti-Semitic language on the "floors of Congress" — an apparent reference to Omar — and said he'd be "lying" to say
Democrats are as opposed to anti-Semitism as Republicans. Vice President Pence once declared that "I know of no synagogues
in my district" (there were two) and, after the Pittsburgh synagogue massacre, attended a memorial with a Jews-for-Jesus
Christian rabbi. But at AIPAC, he said Democrats have "been co-opted by people who promote rank anti-Semitic rhetoric."
President Trump, of course, said there "were very fine people" among the neo-Nazis in Charlottesville, told Jews they wouldn't
support him "because I don't want your money," tweeted an image of a Star of David atop a pile of cash, used anti-Semitic
tropes in an ad with photos of prominent Jews, and often denounces "globalists" such as Soros — among many other offenses.
But he calls the Democrats "anti-Jewish." And here at AIPAC, his appointees attacked Democrats. "We will not do this for the
Benjamins," David Friedman, Trump's ambassador to Israel, said, informing the crowd that Trump "deserves" an extended
ovation. Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) tut-tutted: "I am troubled that leading Democrats seem reluctant to
plainly call out problems within their own ranks. And I am troubled that many of the declared Democrat presidential
candidates seem to be avoiding this gathering." But he didn't "call out" Republicans such as Rep. Jim Jordan (Ohio) for spelling
Steyer's name as "$teyer," or Rep. Steve King (Iowa) for championing white supremacy. Anti-Semitism is real on both the right
and left. Selectively denouncing it based on party is dangerous to Jews, to Israel and to civilized society. Mindless
tribalism seems already to have broken AIPAC, based on the changing audience over the two decades I've
attended. Tuesday's conservative crowd was cool to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's (D-Calif.) vow that "we will never allow
anyone to make Israel a wedge issue." More enthusiastic was the reception for Netanyahu, who, after singling out a Democrat's
anti-Semitism, championed a new Israeli law demoting Arabic as a national language and assigning only Jews "the right to
exercise national self-determination." Claimed Netanyahu: "We don't judge people by the color of their skin [or] their religion.
. . . No one is a second-class citizen." As the AIPAC hard-liners condone such chutzpah, cheering the
dishonest and
partisan jabs of Netanyahu and the Republicans, do they not see that this destroys the American
political consensus that has preserved the Jewish state for 70 years?
Differences in policy and demographic changes make the US-Israeli
alliance fragile, the plan breaks this and threatens progress on
counterterror and cybersecurity
Blackwell and Gordon 16 [Robert; former deputy assistant to the president, deputy
national security advisor for strategic planning, and former US Ambassador to India. H has
written multiple books about Middle East policy. He is the Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow
for the US foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. Phillip; senior fellow at the
Council on Foreign Relations. He is a former special assistant to the president from 20132015 and writes numerous books about US foreign policy, the Middle East, and
international Security, “Repairing the US-Israel Relationship”, Council on Foreign Relations,
November 2016,
https://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/CSR76_BlackwillGordon_Israel.pdf
//BCH]
The U.S. relationship with Israel is in trouble. The cause of the difficulty is not a mere lack of
personal chemistry between Barack Obama and Benjamin Netanyahu, nor can it be reduced to a single policy
disagree- ment, such as the debate over the Iran nuclear deal. Rather, serious dif- ferences on a long list of
policy issues in the Middle East and significant demographic and political changes on both
sides are pushing the two countries apart and making it harder for those who care deeply
about the relationship—as we, the authors, do—to maintain it. A growing number of
Israelis—perhaps now a majority—support policies likely to exacerbate differences with
the United States and increasingly question their ability to count on Washington, and an increasing number
of Americans—including some of Israel’s tradi- tional supporters—are concerned about Israel’s domestic and
foreign policy paths. Without a deliberate and sustained effort by policymakers and opinion leaders
in both countries, the relationship will continue to deteriorate, to the detriment of both
countries. Various forms of coop- eration between the United States and Israel will
continue, as they do with many countries in the region, but the shared strategic
perspectives, cultural affinity, mutual admiration, and common democratic values that have
underpinned the partnership are increasingly at risk. A split between the United States and
Israel is an outcome no one who cares about Israel’s security or America’s values and
interests in the Middle East should want. The sorts of tensions seen during the past few years are, of course,
hardly new in the relationship between Washington and Jerusalem; they have existed since Israel’s founding
during the administration of Harry Truman. Indeed, having served between us in every administra- tion since
Richard Nixon, we have seen up close how the two countries have clashed repeatedly, as leaders on both sides
fumed about the poli- cies of the other even while stressing their strong instinctive fidelity to 3 4 Repairing the
U.S.-Israel Relationship common values and security. But though practically every U.S. admin- istration since
Israel’s founding in 1948 has had its “crisis” with Israel— some at least as serious as the Obama administration’s
dispute over the Iran nuclear program—the factors that allowed the relationship to bend but
not break are no longer as powerful as they once were. Overlooking what is new and different,
and complacently assuming the relationship will recover this time as it always has in the past, could prove to be
a dangerous mistake. Recent trends are especially worrisome because a further split between the two countries
would be more costly than many on either side want to acknowledge. Israel prides itself on being able to “defend
itself by itself,” but the reality is that it continues to rely heavily on the United States for both military and
diplomatic support. The United States has provided Israel some $100 billion in defense assistance since the 1979
Camp David peace treaty and regularly expends an enormous amount of political capital at the United Nations
and in a wide range of other international organizations to shield Israel from criticism or sanction. Israel can
choose to shrug off concerns about growing differ- ences with Washington if it wants, but a decline in
support from the United States would only embolden Israel’s enemies and imperil its
legitimacy and security. Despite the arguments of some of Israel’s critics, the United States
profits substantially from the relationship as well. Israel is the United States’ closest
strategic partner in the world’s most unstable region and shares valuable intelligence with
Washington on terrorism, nonprolif- eration, and regional politics. The United States also
derives important military benefits from the partnership, in areas such as military technology, intelligence, joint training and exercises, and cybersecurity.1 And, despite its relatively
small population, Israel is the largest regional inves- tor in the United States, the third
largest destination for U.S. exports in the Middle East, an important research and
development partner for the U.S. high-tech sector, and a source of innovative ideas on
confront- ing twenty-first-century challenges such as renewable energy and water and food
security.2
Link
Ending MOU commitments destabilizes the alliance and erodes the
alliance
Lapid 8/23/2016, Yair is a writer for Foreign Policy, “The Invaluable U.S.-Israeli
Alliance”, (https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/23/the-invaluable-us-israeli-alliancesecurity-agreement-yair-lapid/) KL
-
Memorandum of Understanding = MOU
Israel and the United States are putting the finishing touches on an agreement that will
cement our alliance for years to come. The latest Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), set
to go into effect in 2018, will provide Israel with about $3.9 billion a year in military aid for
10 years. The real value of this agreement, however, isn’t in the dollar amount, but in the
defense technology that Israel will receive and the depth of the security cooperation
between the two countries. The first words that need to be said from the depths of our
hearts are “thank you.” This agreement is critical to Israel’s security and the safety of its
citizens. We live in the worst neighborhood in the world, surrounded by fundamentalist
Islamists who would like nothing more than to see us killed. This agreement is a crucial component of
our ability to defend ourselves. The agreement is also part of a deep and long-standing strategic alliance between Israel and
the United States. The
foundations of the alliance are emotional and moral. In the two great
struggles the West has faced since World War II — the Cold War and the war on terror —
we stood together, shoulder to shoulder. And we also share many of the same values: a deep
commitment to democracy; the protection of women’s rights, gay rights, and minority
rights; and the understanding that freedom must be protected, sometimes with blood. But
as always happens in relations between countries, the agreement also advances both
parties’ national interests. The Israeli interest is clear: Without the qualitative and
technological edge over our enemies, Israel’s existence would be at risk. On the American
side, there have been critics who have asked out loud, “What does America get from this?” On
the American side, there have been critics who have asked out loud, “What does America get from this?” The real answer isn’t
economic, of course. Former President John F. Kennedy said, “The cost of freedom is always high, but Americans have always
paid it.” The
agreement with Israel should be analyzed not through the money that is spent,
but the money that is saved. A recent Harvard University study found that the wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan will cost the U.S. taxpayer $4 trillion to $6 trillion. The MoU with Israel is
merely a fraction of that. A strong and secure Israel significantly reduces the risk that the
United States will need to be involved in another war in the Middle East, which would be
not only financially costly but also claim the lives of American soldiers. America’s
cooperation with Israel often allows it to pursue an active and influential policy in the
Middle East without putting boots on the ground. For instance, without Israel as a forward
base for the West in the Middle East, the United States would almost certainly need at least
one aircraft carrier in the Mediterranean, in addition to the two stationed in the Gulf, along
with its more than 6,500 soldiers and crew. It would likely also need to build another air
force base, like the one at Incirlik in Turkey, where dozens of nuclear warheads are stored.
Those options are far more expensive than the MoU with Israel, and far more dangerous for the United States. Critics will
argue, as they usually do, that Israel is the reason the United States needs a military presence in the Middle East. That
argument is, at best, unfounded, and, at worst, malicious. Israel has no connection to the American presence in Iraq, the
Persian Gulf, or Afghanistan. Osama bin Laden didn’t claim that Israel was the reason for the attack on the Twin Towers — and
even the Islamic State doesn’t pretend to be interested in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Were
it not for Israel, the
United States would have needed to station troops in the region as a response to the
Russian presence in Syria and the rise of the Islamic State in Sinai, and to guarantee the
stability of Jordan. Israel doesn’t deal with these issues out of the goodness of its heart, but
because it has shared interests with the United States — maintaining stability, advancing
democratic values, and fighting terror. When two countries share the same interests, it is
the definition of “ally.” In addition, there are the savings in lives and money that we will
never be able to detail. Israel is a regional intelligence superpower, and our bitter
experience has turned us into the Middle East’s leading experts in the covert fight against
terrorism. The Middle East is the major exporter of terror in the world, and Islamic
terrorism has never hidden who it believes to be the “great Satan.” The Middle East is the
major exporter of terror in the world, and Islamic terrorism has never hidden who it
believes to be the “great Satan.” The cold reality is that there are thousands of people —
maybe more — wandering America’s streets happy and carefree who will never know that
their lives were saved from a brutal terror attack on U.S. soil because of the defense and
intelligence cooperation between the United States and Israel. It is also important to note
that the vast majority of the money Israel receives as part of the MoU — and in the near
future, all of it — remains in the United States. Israel will purchase equipment from U.S.
defense industries, and the result is the creation of American jobs and a relatively cheap
way to test the most advanced arms in field conditions. Anti-missile systems that were
developed by the two countries will become part of the American and European defense
systems in the Persian Gulf. Likewise, the cooperation in cyber defense and cyber warfare is
critical to the economic and military security of the United States. Despite all this, I would
never claim that the MoU is a worthwhile deal only for the United States. I would argue it’s
not a deal at all. The MoU is an expression of the strength of the alliance. From Israel’s
perspective, it is also an expression of the fact that Lady Liberty never leaves her friends
behind.
Israel’s special relationship with the US crucial to ensure Israeli tech is
ahead of the field --- canceling arms sales both weakens Israeli intel and
discourages them from sharing it with the US
Arad 17 [Shimon Arad is a retired colonel in the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), last position
(2011–16), was Head of the Strategic Planning Unit in the Political-Military and Policy
Bureau of the Israeli Ministry of Defense, previously, he served in numerous positions in the
J2, J3 and J5, dealing with military, regional and international strategy issues, “Is America
Fueling an Arab-Israeli Arms Race?,” National Interest, June 1, 2017,
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/america-fueling-arab-israeli-arms-race-20961]
The Reversibility of Intentions Paradoxically, the ongoing buildup of advanced Arab aerial capabilities is taking place at a time
when Israel’s relations with Arab states are relatively constructive. The implications of the Iranian nuclear deal and Tehran’s
subversive regional behavior, the fight against the Sunni military extremism of ISIS and others, and concerns about a
resurgence of the Muslim Brotherhood have all created what may be an unprecedented convergence of interests between
Israel and the Sunni Arab states. Subsequently, under present circumstances,
it is difficult to imagine the
exact contours of a resurgent hostile Arab Sunni coalition against Israel. However, as the
unforeseen regional events since 2011 reaffirm, we need to be very cautious regarding our
ability to assess the directions and swiftness of future developments. Given the basic
hostility towards Israel in Arab public opinion and the absence of people-to-people
relations, the sources of stable nonbelligerence between Israel and the Arab states are
weak, and depend upon a temporary convergence of strategic interests. All the pragmatic
Arab states, including Egypt and Jordan, with which Israel has peace treaties, continue to
face significant internal and external challenges. With the Middle East continually
demonstrating a propensity for dramatic changes, the long-term stability of the current
accommodative relations between Israel and the Sunni states is far from a forgone
conclusion. A hostile change of intentions towards Israel by these states, possessing large
quantities of qualitative offensive aerial capabilities, could dramatically and rapidly increase
the threat to Israel from the air. Policy Implications The erosion of Israel’s air superiority
weakens a traditional military advantage and a prominent pillar of its deterrent posture.
While hostile intentions could develop rapidly, for example, through regime or leadership change, the time needed for Israel to
implement a counterforce buildup would be lengthy. Though presently assessed as a low-probability scenario, it would come
with very high consequences. Therefore, Israel needs a hedging and offset strategy that would better prepare it for such a
contingency. From a capabilities perspective, Israel
needs to remain the sole recipient of the fifthgeneration F-35 in the Middle East well beyond the next decade. This fifth-generation
fighter jet is a qualitative capability that can give Israel relevant advantages if it ever needs
to face the impressive array of aerial capabilities being built by the Arab Sunni countries,
and it certainly adds a deterrent value. As time goes by, it will become harder to retain Israel’s F-35 monopoly.
This given the pressures that Lockheed Martin and the Gulf countries will probably bring to bear on the U.S. administration in
the future. Even today, the UAE is signaling its dissatisfaction at the United States’ refusal to sell it the plane, and its recent
outline agreement with Russia to build a next-generation fighter is probably intended to communicate its frustration. Israel
needs to verify the United States’ commitment that it will remains the sole regional recipient of the F-35 well beyond the next
decade. Israel must find the necessary funding,
following the signing of the MOU, to increase
the number of F-35s it will purchase. This should be complemented by upgrading the radars
on its existing F-15Is. Israel should continue to invest in the development of new offset
technologies that can provide it with unique advantages to address the ongoing loss of its
traditional qualitative edge. It needs to engage and cooperate with the United States on this issue in the context of
the Pentagon’s third offset strategy effort. In addition, Israel needs to enhance its intelligence gathering
and analysis capabilities concerning developments in the Arab world, including the
operational integration of the new advanced aerial capabilities. This will help Israel
increase the lead time for an operational counterforce buildup and readiness if hostile
developments transpire in the Arab world. As we have seen, the threshold for the use of military power by the
Sunni Arab countries has lowered significantly over the last five years. Alongside military hedging, Israel needs to invest in
increasing the costs for Arab Sunni states if they change their attitude toward Israel for the negative. Foremost, Israel
must cement the United States’ commitment to using its leverage and influence to prevent
any future belligerency by countries that possess advanced U.S.-supplied military
capabilities. The continued strength of Israel’s special relationship with the United States,
and the latter’s willingness to use its leverage with Arab Sunni states, are paramount.
Additionally, Israel needs to continue to develop its relations with the Arab Sunni countries
in ways that would increase the costs if they were to negatively change their orientation
towards Israel. In this context, the export of gas to Jordan and Egypt is of strategic
consequence.
Now is the worst possible time for the plan
Burson 18 [Bradley, Haaretz correspondent, “Would Trump Save Israel in the Next
War?,” September 26, 2018, https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-wouldtrump-save-israel-in-the-next-war-1.6509295]
For Israel, one question which needs to be asked - although, for government officials, one which will not be
asked out loud – is this: Would Trump save Israel in a coming war? Would he act to prevent it? Or,
given his complex relationship with Vladimir Putin - for all that anyone knows, his debtor relationship with Putin - would
Trump even be capable of intervening in a meaningful way? Moreover, for someone as mercurial as Trump, someone so bound
to isolationist America First sloganeering, and someone as vindictive as Trump, who can translate perceived offense as
intolerable, permanently unforgivable personal disloyalty or ingratitude, can Trump be counted on to come through even for
those Israelis who lionize him? This
month, the question has taken on an abrupt urgency. For
Netanyahu, a leader obsessed with the concept and the components of military deterrence, the mistaken
downing of a Russian intelligence plane following an Israeli air strike in Syria last week, sparked a sudden and extremely
unwelcome new form of counter-deterrence. The crash of the Ilyushin 20 spy plane, shot down in error by Syrian anti-aircraft
fire, cost the lives of 15 Russian airmen. It also may have put an end, for some time at least, to Israel's effective freedom of
movement in airstrikes against Iranian arms shipments to Hezbollah in Syria, and against Iran's construction of new military
installations there. Russian condemnations of the attack – accusing Israel of "criminal negligence," callousness and
responsibility for the deaths, have been unusually public and strikingly harsh. Concern in Israel has risen dramatically amid
reports that Moscow intends to send as many as eight sophisticated S-300 air defense systems to Syria within the next two
weeks, and that Russia is already beefing up its electronic warfare systems in Syria, a process which will include technology to
prevent the activation of satellite tracking systems along Syria’s coast – in all, hampering Israel's capability to conduct
airstrikes. Netanyahu aides have long pointed to his deepening relationship with Putin as a key to a multifaceted treatment
plan for a range of security ills across Israel's northern borders. Russia's withholding supply of the S-300s to Syria has long
functioned as the marker for a balance of power favored by Israel. Now, however, in the aftermath of the downing of the
Russian spy plane, military analysts agree that the long-accepted rules of the game in Syria are no more. What are Israel's best
options at this point? "Netanyahu has no alternative but to try to enlist Trump," commentator Nadav Eyal wrote
in the Yedioth Ahronoth newspaper Tuesday. According to Eyal, Israel would ideally prefer to see a grand bargain between
Trump and Putin which would cause Iran to leave Syria. Realistically, though, Israel would like Trump to offer the Russians
something which would restore to Israel the ability to act against Iran in Syria. Eyal, noting that the Russian leader has left the
door open to negotiations, cautions that "the problem is not only Putin, but also Trump, and the unpredictable way in which he
conducts his dealings with Moscow, veering from severe crisis to sycophantic news conference, and back to severe crisis."
Does Trump, in fact, have a coherent policy on Syria? He has spoken of a full pullout of U.S. troops from Syria and American
non-involvement in Mideast wars. But in the recently published "Fear: Trump in the White House," journalist Bob Woodward
writes that Trump responded to the April 2017 chemical weapons attack on Idlib, Syria, with a demand to assassinate Syrian
President Bashar Assad, reportedly he called U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis and said "Let’s fucking kill him! Let’s go in.
Let’s kill the fucking lot of them." Still firmly open is the question of how much sway Putin may secretly hold over Trump.
Should the Russian president feel that Israel is harming his nation's interests in Syria, Putin may be able to moderate or choke
off entirely a potential response by Trump. "At the moment, more
than ever, Israel is in need of an
America which is strong in the Middle East, with respect to Russia as well," Eyal concludes, but adds, regarding
Trump's America: "It's doubtful that it's there."
Internal Link
Iran strikes – U.S guarantees prevent Israel first strikes – plan reverses
this
Farley 5/27/2019, Robert Farley, a frequent contributor to TNI, is a Visiting Professor at
the United States Army War College. The views expressed are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department
of Defense, or the U.S. Government, “Apocalypse Now: Why Israel Would Start a Nuclear
War”, (https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/apocalypse-now-why-israel-would-startnuclear-war-49292) KL
If a hostile power (let’s say Iran, for sake of discussion) appeared to be on the verge of
mating nuclear devices with the systems needed to deliver them, Israel might well consider
a preventive nuclear attack. In the case of Iran, we can imagine scenarios in which Israeli
planners would no longer deem a conventional attack sufficiently lethal to destroy or delay
the Iranian program. In such a scenario, and absent direct intervention from the United
States, Israel might well decide to undertake a limited nuclear attack against Iranian
facilities. Given that Iran lacks significant ballistic missile defenses, Israel would most likely
deliver the nuclear weapons with its Jericho III intermediate range ballistic missiles. Israel
would likely limit its attacks to targets specifically linked with the Iranian nuclear program,
and sufficiently away from civilian areas. Conceivably, since it would be breaking the
nuclear taboo anyway, Israel might target other military facilities and bases for attack, but it
is likely that the Israeli government would want to limit the precedent for using nuclear
weapons as much as possible. Would it work? Nuclear weapons would deal more damage
than most imaginable conventional attacks, and would also convey a level of seriousness
that might take even the Iranians aback. On the other hand, the active use of nuclear
weapons by Israel would probably heighten the interest of everyone in the region (and
potentially across the world) to develop their own nuclear arsenals. Nuclear Transfer One of
Israel’s biggest concerns is the idea that a nuclear power (Iran, Pakistan, or North Korea,
presumably) might give or sell a nuclear weapon to a non-governmental organization
(NGO). Hamas, Hezbollah, or some other terrorist group would be harder to deter than a
traditional nation-state. Even if a terrorist organization did not immediately use the weapon
against an Israeli target, it could potentially extract concessions that Israel would be
unwilling to make. In such a scenario, Israel might well consider using nuclear weapons in
order to forestall a transfer, or destroy the enemy nuclear device after delivery. This would
depend on access to excellent intelligence about the transfer of the device, but it is hardly
impossible that the highly professional and operationally competent Israeli intelligence
services could provide such data. Why go nuclear? The biggest reason would be to ensure
the success of the strike; both the device itself and the people handling the device would be
important targets, and a nuclear attack would ensure their destruction more effectively
than even a massive conventional strike (which might well accompany the nuclear attack).
Moreover, committing to the most extreme use forms of the use of force might well deter
both the NGO and the originating state (not to mention any states that facilitated transfer
through their borders; hello, Syria!) from attempting another transfer. However, the active
use of nuclear weapons against a non-state actor might look to the world like overkill, and
could reaffirm the interest of the source of the nuclear device in causing more problems for
Israel. Conventional Defeat The idea that Israel might lose a conventional war seems
ridiculous now, but the origins of the Israeli nuclear program lay in the fear that the Arab
states would develop a decisive military advantage that they could use to inflict battlefield
defeats. This came close to happening during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, as the Egyptian
Army seized the Suez Canal and the Syrian Arab Army advanced into the Golan Heights.
Accounts on how seriously Israel debated using nukes during that war remain murky, but
there is no question that Israel could consider using its most powerful weapons if the
conventional balance tipped decisively out of its favor. How might that happen? We can
imagine a few scenarios, most of which involve an increase in hostility between Israel and
its more tolerant neighbors. Another revolution in Egypt could easily rewrite the security
equation on Israel’s southern border; while the friendship of Saudi Arabia seems secure,
political instability could change that; even Turkish policy might shift in a negative
direction. Israel currently has overwhelming conventional military advantages, but these
advantages depend to some extent on a favorable regional strategic environment. Political
shifts could leave Israel diplomatically isolated, and vulnerable once again to conventional
attack. In such a situation, nuclear weapons would remain part of the toolkit for ensuring
the survival of the nation. Conclusion It is unlikely, but hardly impossible, that Israel could
decide to use nuclear weapons first in a future conflict. The best way to prevent this from
happening is to limit the reasons why Israel might want to use these weapons, which is to
say preventing the further proliferation of nukes. If Israel ever does use nuclear weapons in
anger, it will rewrite the diplomatic and security architecture of the Middle East, and also
the nonproliferation architecture of the world as a whole.
Impact
Israel-Iran war causes extinction--- bioweapons
Stirling 11 [Earl of Stirling, Governor & Lord Lieutenant of Canada, Lord High Admiral of
Nova Scotia, & B.Sc. in Pol. Sc. & History, M.A. in European Studies, “General Middle East
War Nears - Syrian events more dangerous than even nuclear nightmare in Japan,” March,
2011, http://europebusines.blogspot.com/2011/03/general-middle-east-war-nearssyrian.html]
Any Third Lebanon War/General Middle East War is apt to involve WMD on both side quickly as both sides know the stakes
and that the Israelis are determined to end, once and for all, any Iranian opposition to a 'Greater Israel' domination of the
entire Middle East. It
will be a case of 'use your WMD or lose them' to enemy strikes. Any massive
WMD usage against Israel will result in the usage of Israeli thermonuclear warheads against
Arab and Persian populations centers in large parts of the Middle East, with the resulting
spread of radioactive fallout over large parts of the Northern Hemisphere. However, the first
use of nukes is apt to be lower yield warheads directed against Iranian underground
facilities including both nuclear sites and governmental command and control and leadership bunkers, with some limited
strikes also likely early-on in Syrian territory. The Iranians are well prepared to launch a global Advanced
Biological Warfare terrorism based strike against not only Israel and American and allied forces
in the Middle East but also against the American, Canadian, British, French, German, Italian,
etc., homelands. This will utilize DNA recombination based genetically engineered 'super killer
viruses' that are designed to spread themselves throughout the world using humans as
vectors. There are very few defenses against such warfare, other than total quarantine of the population
until all of the different man-made viruses (and there could be dozens or even over a hundred different viruses released at the
same time) have 'burned themselves out'. This
could kill a third of the world's total population. Such a
result from an Israeli triggered war would almost certainly cause a Russian-Chinese
response that would eventually finish off what is left of Israel and begin a truly global
war/WWIII with multiple war theaters around the world. It is highly unlikely that a Third
World War, fought with 21st Century weaponry will be anything but the Biblical
Armageddon.
CP- Palestine Aid
1NC
Text: The United States federal government should
- resume financial assistance for the United Nations Relief and
Works Agency to at least $359 million annually,
- restore its financial assistance to United States Agency for
International Development programs directed at the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip,
- increase its financial assistance to Palestinian security forces in
the West Bank and Gaza,
- amend the Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act to include a waiver
that authorizes the executive branch to suspend statutory
requirements of Section 4 of the Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act,
and grant an waiver to the Palestinian Authority,
- move the its embassy from Jerusalem to Tel Aviv.
Solves the peace process and increases credibility
Phillip H. Gordon 19, the Mary and David Boies senior fellow in U.S. foreign policy at the
Council on Foreign Relations. He was special assistant to the president and White House
coordinator for the Middle East, North Africa, and the Gulf Region from 2013 to 2015. As the
most senior White House official focused on the greater Middle East, he worked closely with
the president, secretary of state, and national security advisor on issues including the
Iranian nuclear program, Middle East peace negotiations, the conflict in Syria, security in
Iraq, U.S. relations with the gulf states, the democratic transitions in North Africa, and
bilateral relations with Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and Lebanon. He chaired
numerous interagency processes, regularly engaged foreign leaders, and directed a staff of
some twenty directors and other national security specialists.. “Rethinking U.S. Policy
Toward the Palestinians", Council on Foreign Relations, 2-28-2019,
https://www.cfr.org/report/rethinking-us-policy-toward-palestinians, //sab
The logic of the Trump administration’s approach appears to be that a tougher U.S. policy
will force the Palestinians to abandon long-held but unrealistic positions and make necessary concessions to
reach peace with Israel. However, the administration’s approach makes an agreement
between Israelis and Palestinians less likely, not more. Cutting U.S. assistance for hospitals,
infrastructure, and refugees will cause additional human suffering, undermine those
Palestinians who support peace, and turn Palestinian opinion even further against the
United States. By ignoring Israeli settlement expansion and aligning itself with maximalist
Israeli policy on Jerusalem and refugees, the United States will further close the door to an
eventual two-state solution, jeopardizing Israel’s future as a democratic, secure, Jewish
state. At worst, the U.S. approach could lead to a social and political explosion on the West
Bank and Gaza that will threaten Palestinians and Israelis alike. To avoid such dire outcomes, the Trump
administration should rethink its current course. It should forego introducing a comprehensive peace plan
that, under current circumstances, has almost no chance of success and instead take steps
toward improving conditions on the ground and preserving prospects for more ambitious
agreements. These steps include restoring previous levels of financial assistance for
refugees and humanitarian projects in the West Bank and Gaza, using U.S. leverage with Israel to improve
daily life and freedom of movement for Palestinians, including by constraining settlement expansion , committing to the goal of a Palestinian
state with a capital in East Jerusalem to balance the move of the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv, amending recent congressional
legislation—the Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act (ATCA)—with a waiver so that assistance
to the PA can be preserved, and taking steps to improve Palestinian economic growth. Trump’s
Counterproductive New Approach For most of his first year in office, Trump avoided initiatives that could upset prospects for peace and
maintained a serious dialogue with the Palestinian leadership. But this generally
balanced approach changed
dramatically in December 2017 with the U.S. decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s
capital and to move the U.S. embassy there—without getting anything from Israel in return.
Trump argued that this unilateral move—one that was opposed by 128 countries in the
United Nations—took the issue of Jerusalem “off the table.” In fact, it placed the issue front
and center as an obstacle to agreement not just for Palestinians but for the Arab leaders
Trump had been counting on to support the plan. After Trump announced the move,
Palestinian leaders broke off contacts with Trump officials; those contacts have yet to
resume. The Trump administration’s next major step was to cut financial assistance to the
Palestinians. In August 2018, the administration announced plans to eliminate all fiscal year
(FY) 2017 assistance to the West Bank and Gaza, amounting to some $231 million. The
targets included U.S.-funded projects—such as schools, hospitals, and water and sewage
projects that serve thousands of Palestinians—many of which will now be abandoned. The
administration also cut $10 million in funding for reconciliation programs that bring together
individuals of different ethnic, religious, and political backgrounds from areas of conflict. As a result, the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) has
suspended projects in the West Bank and Gaza, and plans to lay off local staff. The
refugee issue cannot simply be defined away. A month later, the administration announced it would
reprogram all U.S. humanitarian contributions previously allocated to UNRWA, which
provides support to some five million Palestinian refugees and their descendants. As the
world’s leading donor to UNRWA, the United States had been providing around $359
million (roughly 25 percent of the agency’s overall 2017 budget). The Trump administration maintains that this move will save money and
force other countries to pay the bills and that denying assistance to the descendants of refugees will undermine their political claims. But the
refugee issue cannot simply be defined away, and long-term substitute funding has,
unsurprisingly, proven difficult to secure: UNRWA now needs more than $1 billion to
maintain 2018 levels of assistance, a situation its director calls “the most severe financial
challenge” in the agency’s history.
2NC
Solves Peace Process
Trump’s cuts to aid threaten to implode the region---only restoring aid
funds can lower violence levels and ensure long-term peace.
Zilber, journalist and analyst on Middle East politics and culture and an adjunct fellow of
the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 8/29/18
(Neri, “Trump Wants to Help Israel by Cutting Aid to Palestinians. Why are Some Israelis
Worried?”, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/29/unrwa-israel-palestine-trumpzilber/)//GA
TEL AVIV, Israel–In early 2014, workers
for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), the sevenWest Bank and
decade-old body that provides basic services for Palestinian refugees, went on strike in the
Gaza Strip. The cause was an internal battle between management and teaching staff over budget cuts and layoffs. For two
months, across the refugee camps of the Palestinian territories, UNRWA schools shut down,
garbage piled up in the streets, and health care clinics remained closed. Officials on all sides
expressed concern about the strike, but none more stridently than Israeli military officers.
“This is a security interest for all of us,” one senior officer from the military unit that runs the West Bank told me
at the time. “We don’t want kids to be bored, and to start throwing rocks.” Now, the Trump administration seems
determined to end all U.S. funding to UNRWA and cut other aid to the Palestinians. Some of
Trump’s closest advisors, including his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, believe the refugee agency undermines
Israeli interests and stokes the refugees’ hopes for repatriation in Israel. As with Trump’s decision
last year to move the U.S. Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, the withholding of aid money is seen as one more
way that the U.S. government, the historic peace process mediator, is aligning itself with hard-line
elements within Israel. But while Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu basks in the unmitigated support he gets
from Trump, top Israeli security officials are worried. Some of them told the Israeli Cabinet that
the move could backfire badly on Israel, “setting fire to the ground,” according to a report on Israeli
television this past weekend. Others are cautioning that the void created by any decline in UNRWA services
would be filled by the Islamist Hamas group. The reasons for the concern are not difficult to discern. As an
international diplomat in Jerusalem once told me, UNRWA is effectively a “quasi-government” in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip, providing education, health, and other essential services to some 2
million people. In the West Bank alone, nearly 800,000 Palestinians are registered as refugees, many
residing in the 19 refugee camps scattered across the territory (camps is a misnomer; these days they
are urban concrete slums usually connected to major Palestinian cities). Almost 50,000 pupils study at the 96
schools UNRWA operates, with the agency responsible for an additional 43 health care centers, 15 community
rehabilitation centers, two vocational training centers, and 19 women’s program centers. The situation in Gaza is
even more acute. One million Palestinians, half the population of the blockaded coastal enclave, depend on
UNRWA for food aid; a quarter million refugees study at the agency’s 267 schools; some 21 health centers dispense
care to a war-ravaged population. In a territory with a 40 percent unemployment rate, the highest in the world, UNRWA
employs almost 13,000 staff–many of them registered refugees themselves. The U.S. government, historically UNRWA’s
biggest donor, provides more than a quarter of the agency’s budget. Its
plan to eliminate $350 million in
funding will leave UNRWA with a massive shortfall and has already forced layoffs. The school
year is set to start on time, but officials at the agency can’t guarantee that it will extend past the end of September. Gaza in
particular is of utmost concern, with the territory already on the brink of a humanitarian
catastrophe and Israel and Hamas teetering on the edge of war. Israeli security officials have
consistently described Gaza as a “ticking bomb”–one that Israel and Hamas (which rules the Strip) are now trying to defuse via
indirect talks. Washington also seems bent on stripping millions of Palestinians across the region of their status as refugees–a
highly evocative issue tied to the Palestinian “right of return” demand. Critics contend that this refugee status (imparted as
well on descendants of those Palestinians who fled during Israel’s creation in the 1948 war) artificially perpetuates the
conflict, impelling refugees to believe they may someday return to their homes inside Israel. “This relates to the core of the
Palestinian narrative,” Lt. Col. Alon Eviatar, a retired Israeli intelligence officer with long experience in Palestinian affairs, told
me. “It could have even more dramatic implications than the budget cuts.” The Trump administration, though, hasn’t just
stopped with UNRWA. Late last week, the State Department announced that it was cutting $200
million in aid to
Palestinians in the West Bank, primarily development and infrastructure projects run
through USAID. Beyond the larger damage to the Palestinian economy of stopping these initiatives–roads, sewage,
electrical transmission, water and the like–there is a more personal and immediate problem. All told, tens
of thousands of West Bank Palestinians benefit, whether directly or via extended family
circles, from employment in these projects. “In terms of work, there aren’t alternatives for all these people,”
Eviatar said. “If you cut one hand then you have to make sure the other hand feeds [them],” he said, alluding to the wider
danger of a political vacuum. Tellingly, the United States refrained from slashing direct aid ($60 million) to the Palestinian
Authority security forces, a sign that Washington does value their work, especially the tight cooperation with their Israeli
counterparts. Yet even if continuing this funding were politically tenable for the Palestinians–an open question given the
tattered state of their relations with the Trump administration–this is arguably a limited understanding of security. For more
than two years, the
Israeli military has aggressively promoted a policy of economic development
in the West Bank, in an effort to disincentive violence against Israel and allow Palestinians
to live reasonable, undisrupted lives. As one senior Israeli security official told me last year, “I very much
value the civilian and economic component … it was the reason why there wasn’t a Third
Intifada.” In two fell swoops, the Trump administration may undo much of this hard-won stability,
potentially putting untold numbers of Palestinian workers, students, and refugees out onto the
streets.
Case
Advantage
They don’t reduce all military aid – that means their impacts still
happen BUT it doesn’t take out the DA because the link is specific to
arms sales
Freilich 18 [Charles D. (Chuck) Freilich, a former deputy national security adviser in Israel,
is a senior fellow at Harvard’s Belfer Center, “Has Israel Grown Too Dependent on the
United States?,” Feb 5 2018, https://mosaicmagazine.com/essay/israelzionism/2018/02/has-israel-grown-too-dependent-on-the-united-states/]
Israel’s relationship with the United States is a fundamental pillar of its national security. Militarily, diplomatically, and
economically, American support has for decades been a vital strategic enabler. For consultations on emerging events,
Washington is usually Israel’s first and often sole port of call, almost always the foremost one, and inevitably the primary
address when planning how to respond to such events. Indeed, Israel’s
reliance on the United States is so
great today that the country’s very survival is at least partly dependent on it—with, as we
shall see, a variety of consequences not all of which are salutary. I. The Origins and Growth of a
“Special Relationship” First, some historical background. Contemporary readers may be surprised to learn that, until the late
1960s, the Israel-U.S. relationship was actually quite limited and even cool. Only in the aftermath of the Six-Day War (1967)
and especially the Yom Kippur War (1973) did it begin to evolve into a more classic patron-client setup, and not until the
1980s did it start to become the institutionalized and strategic “special relationship” we know today. And it truly is a special
relationship: a largely unprecedented arrangement for the U.S. and a critical one for Israel, encompassing ties in all spheres of
national life—military, political, economic, diplomatic, and cultural. Even through
episodes of government-togovernment disagreement and discord, not to mention the continual criticism of various Israeli polices by
American elites of one stripe or another, popular support for Israel remains high in the U.S.,
by some measures higher today than ever, and the security relationship itself remains not
only fundamentally strong but extraordinarily close. Let’s count the ways. Economically, the United States
is Israel’s single biggest trading partner (only the EU taken as a whole is larger), with bilateral trade in 2016 running at
approximately $35.5 billion. The two countries signed a free-trade agreement in 1986, the first such bilateral deal ever
concluded by the U.S. Over the years Washington has, in addition, provided emergency economic assistance and loan
guarantees. Militarily, total American assistance to Israel, from 1949 to 2016, amounts to a whopping $124 billion, making
Israel the largest beneficiary of American military aid in the post-World War II era. In 2007, the two countries concluded a tenyear, $30-billion package, thereby providing the IDF with the fixed financial basis it badly needed for purposes of planning its
force structure; a second ten-year package, for $38 billion, was signed in 2016. The import of
this aid can be
measured not just in the absolute dollar amount but in the way it is disbursed. Since 1981, all
assistance to Israel has been in the form of grants, not loans, and each annual sum arrives in
its entirety at the beginning of the year rather than in installments. Israel is also the only recipient
that for decades was allowed to spend part of this assistance for procurement in Israel itself rather than in the United States—
although that concession is now being phased out. Moreover, the
annual aid package, large as it is, does not
include a variety of special programs like the rocket-and-missile-defense systems (Iron Dome,
Arrow, and others) that have significantly added to the total level of U.S. aid. (For the record, it should be
noted that, since Israel has always been required to spend the major part of the funds in the U.S., the aid functions
simultaneously as a giant subsidy to American arms manufacturers—and that the U.S. military greatly benefits from letting
Israel test and improve new technologies, Iron Dome being a prime example.) Some
constraints were once
applied to U.S. arms sales to Israel, but these have mostly been lifted over the years, and
Israel generally has access to the latest American technologies. In 2005, for example, Washington
supplied Israel with “bunker-busting” bombs that had never been sold to any other country, and then accelerated the delivery
of more such weapons during the 2006 Lebanon war. Israel
was also the first foreign country to purchase
F-35s, the most advanced American fighter. In practice, the United States is almost Israel’s sole foreign source
of sophisticated weapons, some of them co-developed and co-produced in Israel. Beyond and behind the aid is a
policy, a set of agreements, and a web of strategic activities. Since the 1980s, the United States has been
committed to preserving an Israeli qualitative military edge (QME) over any possible combination of hostile Arab armies, an
arrangement enshrined in a number of executive and congressional initiatives. When it comes
to strategic
consultation, it is hard to imagine two countries engaged in closer or more intensive
bilateral exchange at all levels. Not only do Israeli prime ministers meet on a regular basis
with the American president, senior officials, and congressional leaders, but the nationalsecurity establishments of the two countries enjoy intensive and ongoing contact, including
an endless array of visiting delegations and professional teams as well as working groups
that convene regularly and often.
Israel says no to the peace process and nobody from the Muslim world is
impressed --- Trump lacks any credibility
Gordon and Kumar 18 [Philip Gordon is the Mary and David Boies Senior Fellow in U.S.
Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, was special assistant to the president
and White House coordinator for the Middle East, North Africa, and the Gulf Region under
President Obama, and Prem Kumar was the senior director for the Middle East and North
Africa and the director for Israeli and Palestinian Affairs at the White House from 2009 to
2015, served as a U.S. diplomat in Jerusalem from 2002 to 2004, is a principal at Albright
Stonebridge, “Jared Kushner’s Middle East Fantasy,” The Atlantic, June 25, 2018,
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/06/kushner-israeli-palestinianpeace-plan/563606/]
Finally, there
is the problem that Israelis under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will
almost certainly never agree to the sort of deal that would be necessary to make Palestinian
or Arab acceptance even remotely feasible. In the past few years, Netanyahu has stopped even talking about
support for the two-state solution, which he first accepted in a highly caveated way in a 2009 speech at Bar Ilan University. A
majority of members of the current Israeli cabinet do not even support the creation of a Palestinian state, much less the
concessions Israel would need to make to achieve it. And with Netanyahu and his wife the subject of several serious corruption
inquiries, the prime minister likely sees his only hope as to keeping that hardline cabinet together to stave off or delay
potential indictments. It is
far from clear that the Israeli people themselves are prepared to make
the major compromises required for peace, including the evacuation of hundreds of
thousands of settlers from the West Bank. But it is quite clear that the current Israeli
government is not ready to do so. In his interview, Kushner questions whether Abbas has the ability or the
willingness to “lean into finishing a deal.” But neither does Netanyahu, and the fact that Kushner only calls out one side is
telling. It is itself part of the problem. After 18 months of conversations, assisted by the able Jason Greenblatt, who has
consulted a wide variety of experts and officials from all countries, Kushner must know all this. So is he naive or something
else? Why would he move forward with
a plan with such poor prospects of success? It could be
only
thing worse than not advancing the peace process is raising hopes and expectations only to
deflate them soon thereafter. We’ve seen this dynamic play out too many times in the past, from the Camp David
he is operating on the notion that it’s always better to try and fail than not to try at all. But this is also misguided. The
summit of 2000 to the Olmert-Abbas talks of 2008 to the Kerry process in 2013-2014, with each failure soon followed by
violence. Luckily for Kushner, in this case expectations could not be much lower. But introducing yet
another peace
plan only to have it pronounced dead on arrival just emboldens opponents of compromise,
and even supporters of violence, on both sides. Another reason to proceed would be to blame the
Palestinians, rather than the difficult context and Trump’s mistakes, for failure to make “the ultimate deal.” If past is prologue,
we can expect the Israeli side to say “yes, but” (while meaning “no way”) and that the Palestinians will fall into the trap of
rejecting a U.S. plan or not engaging at all. This would please parts of Trump’s base and may get the administration off the
hook for trying, but it would only further divide the Israelis and Palestinians, while exacerbating partisan divides on Israel in
the United States as well. Kushner might think Palestinian rejection will slow support for efforts to censure Israel
internationally. But this is also wrong. Trump’s
total lack of credibility on this issue, after the decisions
on Jerusalem and UNRWA in particular, mean that most in Europe and elsewhere will
conclude that the Palestinians rejected the plan because it was unfair and not because they
are opposed to peace. The lopsided UN vote against Trump’s decision to move the embassy to Jerusalem shows that it
is the United States, and not the Palestinians, who are isolated. In fact, the cancellation of a recent soccer match
between Israel and Argentina in part because Netanyahu’s government insisted on the
political symbolism of holding it in Jerusalem may signal an acceleration in the Boycott,
Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) campaign against Israel. After all, supporters of BDS may say,
if the U.S. supports only one side in the conflict, what else is there left to do? Solidifying this
view by introducing a dead-on-arrival peace plan will not do Israel or anyone else any
favors. We have devoted many years to working on this issue and worry about the
consequences of the status quo, both for Israel’s future as a secure, democratic, and Jewish
state and for the future of some 6 million Palestinians. We have seen, and participated in, our share of illfated and even ill-advised peace efforts. But the reality is that under present circumstances, with the current Israeli and
Palestinian governments, at this point the two-state solution is itself a fantasy. Neither
the Palestinian nor Israeli
people, nor their leaders, are currently prepared for the compromises required for a deal,
and accentuating this reality will only make things worse. In diplomacy, as in medicine, the Hippocratic
Oath to “do no harm” can be a worthy principle. Jared Kushner would do well to consider it now.
Golan Heights thumps --- plan can’t overwhelm
Wittes and Goldenberg 19 [Tamara Cofman Wittes is a senior fellow in the Center for
Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, Ilan Goldenberg is director of the Middle
East Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, previously worked at the
Pentagon, State Department and Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Trump’s Golan
Fiasco,” Politico, March 22, 2019
,https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/03/22/trumps-golan-fiasco-226102]
Trump’s move raises the question of whether the U.S. stands by those terms of reference, the foundations of Arab-Israeli
rapprochement and of U.S. sponsorship and leadership of Arab-Israeli peacemaking. There’s some contention over whether
UNSCR 242 applies to the Golan Heights, where neither Syria nor Israel ever had internationally recognized borders. But
there’s no question that key Arab governments will read Trump’s move as undermining the
U.S. commitment to 242. Given the president’s action, how likely are other Arab states to
take on faith any U.S. commitments made on behalf of Jared’s peace plan? How likely are
Arab governments to invest in a U.S.-sponsored peace plan now, when Trump has just
undermined four decades of U.S.-sponsored Arab-Israeli diplomacy? This announcement
also hurts the Palestinians. In the past two years, Trump “took Jerusalem off the table,” as he
put it, closed the Palestinians’ mission in Washington and America’s mission to the
Palestinians in Jerusalem, and cut off aid to Palestinian civil society and humanitarian needs. The Golan action
now sends a stark new message to Palestinians: Give up on peace. Members of Netanyahu’s party,
which Trump is brazenly boosting to re-election, are increasingly speaking about passing a law to annex Area C of the West
Bank, which makes up 60 percent of the territory and is currently controlled by the Israel Defense Forces. Such
a move
would mean an effective end of the two-state solution, but Trump’s actions on the Golan
signal he might be preparing to support it. Finally, the Trump administration’s view on the Golan Heights
contravenes not only U.N. resolutions on the Arab-Israeli conflict, but the United Nations Charter itself -- specifically, Article
2’s principles regarding the peaceful resolution of diplomatic disputes and the rejection of threats to the territorial integrity of
member states. In conflict zones
around the world, U.S. diplomacy has relied on these core
principles to press other states to negotiate instead of fight, and to end wars that have cost
lives and destabilized regions. So the fallout from Trump’s abandonment of these principles will extend well
beyond the Golan Heights. Take American opposition to Moscow’s annexation of Crimea—Trump now has no leg to stand on.
Moscow can likewise call out American hypocrisy in its refusal to recognize the Russian-sponsored “independence” of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia from the Republic of Georgia. Morocco and Algeria can now dismiss the U.N. mediator for the
Western Sahara, whose work Trump’s administration has sought to bolster. Or what if
Saudi Arabia waltzes into
Qatar? If Washington stops upholding the core international principle opposing the
acquisition of territory by force, we should expect more states to seize territory they covet
from their neighbors. This dark prospect also suggests that any future American president will face an
enormous challenge in seeking to restore U.S. strength and project U.S. power in a postTrump era. Republican or Democrat, his successor will need to cooperate with multilateral institutions and like-minded
governments. By overturning decades of U.S. investment in multilateral tools as instruments for peace, Trump has just made
that work much harder.
Framing
1NC
Existential threats outweigh
GPP 17 (Global Priorities Project, Future of Humanity Institute
at the University of Oxford, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of
Finland, “Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance,” Global
Priorities Project, 2017, https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wpcontent/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf
1.2. THE ETHICS OF EXISTENTIAL RISK In his book Reasons and Persons, Oxford philosopher Derek Parfit advanced an
influential argument about the importance of avoiding extinction: I believe that if we destroy mankind, as we now can,
Compare three outcomes: (1) Peace.
(2) A nuclear war that kills 99% of the world’s existing
population. (3) A nuclear war that kills 100%. (2) would be worse than (1), and
(3) would be worse than (2). Which is the greater of these two differences? Most people believe
that the greater difference is between (1) and (2). I believe
that the difference between (2) and (3) is very much greater. ...
The Earth will remain habitable for at least another billion
years. Civilization began only a few thousand years ago. If we do
not destroy mankind, these few thousand years may be only a tiny
fraction of the whole of civilized human history. The difference
between (2) and (3) may thus be the difference between this tiny
fraction and all of the rest of this history. If we compare this
possible history to a day, what has occurred so far is only a
fraction of a second.65 In this argument, it seems that Parfit is assuming that the survivors of a
this outcome will be much worse than most people think.
nuclear war that kills 99% of the population would eventually be able to recover civilisation without long-term effect.
As we have seen, this may not be a safe assumption – but for the purposes of this thought experiment, the point stands.
What makes existential catastrophes especially bad is that they
would “destroy the future,” as another Oxford philosopher, Nick Bostrom, puts
it.66 This future could potentially be extremely long and full of
flourishing, and would therefore have extremely large value. In
standard risk analysis, when working out how to respond to risk, we work out the expected value of risk reduction, by
Because
the value of preventing existential catastrophe is so vast, even
a tiny probability of prevention has huge expected value.67 Of course,
weighing the probability that an action will prevent an adverse event against the severity of the event.
there is persisting reasonable disagreement about ethics and there are a number of ways one might resist this
In some
areas, government policy does give significant weight to future
generations. For example, in assessing the risks of nuclear waste storage, governments have considered
conclusion.68 Therefore, it would be unjustified to be overconfident in Parfit and Bostrom’s argument.
timeframes of thousands, hundreds of thousands, and even a million years.69 Justifications for this policy usually
appeal to principles of intergenerational equity according to which future generations ought to get as much protection
as current generations.70 Similarly, widely accepted norms of sustainable development require development that meets
the needs of the current generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.71
However, when it comes to existential risk, it would seem that we
fail to live up to principles of intergenerational equity.
Existential catastrophe would not only give future generations
less than the current generations; it would give them nothing.
Indeed, reducing existential risk plausibly has a quite low cost for
us in comparison with the huge expected value it has for future
generations. In spite of this, relatively little is done to reduce existential risk. Unless we
give up on norms of intergenerational equity, they give us a
strong case for significantly increasing our efforts to reduce
existential risks. 1.3. WHY EXISTENTIAL RISKS MAY BE
SYSTEMATICALLY UNDERINVESTED IN, AND THE ROLE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY In spite of the importance of existential
risk reduction, it probably receives less attention than is
warranted. As a result, concerted international cooperation is required if we are to receive adequate
protection from existential risks. 1.3.1. Why existential risks are likely to be underinvested in There are
several reasons why existential risk reduction is likely to be
underinvested in. Firstly, it is a global public good. Economic
theory predicts that such goods tend to be underprovided. The
benefits of existential risk reduction are widely and indivisibly
dispersed around the globe from the countries responsible for
taking action. Consequently, a country which reduces existential risk gains only a small portion of the
benefits but bears the full brunt of the costs. Countries thus have strong incentives to free ride, receiving the
benefits of risk reduction without contributing. As a result, too few do what is in the common interest.
Secondly, as already suggested above, existential risk reduction is an
intergenerational public good: most of the benefits are enjoyed
by future generations who have no say in the political process.
For these goods, the problem is temporal free riding: the current
generation enjoys the benefits of inaction while future
generations bear the costs. Thirdly, many existential risks, such as machine
superintelligence, engineered pandemics, and solar geoengineering, pose an unprecedented and
uncertain future threat. Consequently, it is hard to develop a satisfactory governance regime for
them: there are few existing governance instruments which can be applied to these risks, and it is unclear what shape
new instruments should take. In this way, our position with regard to these emerging risks is comparable to the one we
Cognitive biases also lead people to
underestimate existential risks. Since there have not been any
catastrophes of this magnitude, these risks are not salient to
politicians and the public.72 This is an example of the
misapplication of the availability heuristic, a mental shortcut
which assumes that something is important only if it can be
readily recalled. Another cognitive bias affecting perceptions of
existential risk is scope neglect. In a seminal 1992 study, three groups were asked how
faced when nuclear weapons first became available.
much they would be willing to pay to save 2,000, 20,000 or 200,000 birds from drowning in uncovered oil ponds. The
groups answered $80, $78, and $88, respectively.73 In this case, the size of the benefits had little effect on the
People become numbed to the effect of saving
lives when the numbers get too large. 74 Scope neglect is a
particularly acute problem for existential risk because the
numbers at stake are so large. Due to scope neglect, decisionmakers are prone to treat existential risks in a similar way to
problems which are less severe by many orders of magnitude. A wide
scale of the preferred response.
range of other cognitive biases are likely to affect the evaluation of existential risks.75
Nuclear war triggers their impact – targeting procedures cause
minorities in inner-cities to feel the impacts of war the hardest – their
rejection of these impacts whitewashes nuclear war
Nicole Akoukou Thompson 18. Chicago-based creative writer. 4-6-2018. "Why I will not
allow the fear of a nuclear attack to be white-washed." RaceBaitR.
http://racebaitr.com/2018/04/06/2087/#
I couldn’t spare empathy for a white woman whose biggest fear was something that hadn’t
happened yet and might not. Meanwhile, my most significant fears were in motion: women
and men dying in cells after being wrongly imprisoned, choked out for peddling cigarettes, or shot to
death during ‘routine’ traffic stops. I twitch when my partner is late, worried that a cantankerous cop has brutalized or shot
him because he wouldn’t prostrate himself. As a woman of color, I am aware of the multiple types of
violence that threaten me currently—not theoretically. Street harassment, excessively affecting me
as a Black woman, has blindsided me since I was eleven. A premature body meant being catcalled before I’d discussed the
birds and the bees. It meant being followed, whistled at, or groped. As an adult, while navigating through
neighborhoods with extinguished street lights, I noticed the correlation between women’s safety and street lighting—as well
as the fact that Black and brown neighborhoods were never as brightly lit as those with a more significant white population. I
move quickly through those unlit spaces, never comforted by the inevitable whirl of red and blue sirens. In fact, it’s always
been the contrary. Ever so often, cops approach me in their vehicle’s encouraging me
to “Hurry along,” “Stay on the
sidewalk,” or “Have a good night.” My spine stiffening, I never believed they endorsed my safety. Instead, I worried that I’d be
accused of an unnamed accusation, corned by a cop who preys on Black women, or worse. A majority of my 50-minute bus ride
from the southside of Chicago to the north to join these women for the birthday celebration was spent reading articles about
citywide shootings. I began with a Chicago Tribute piece titled “33 people shot, seven fatally, in 13 hours,” then toppled into a
barrage of RIP posts on Facebook and ended with angry posts about police brutality on Tumblr. You might guess, by the time I
arrived to dinner I wasn’t in the mood for the “I can’t believe we’re all going to die because Trump is an idiot” shit. I shook my
head, willing the meal to be over, and was grateful when the check arrived just as someone was asking me about my hair. My
thinking wasn’t all too different from Michael Harriot’s ‘Why Black America Isn’t Worried About the Upcoming Nuclear
Holocaust.” While the meal was partly pleasant, I
departed thinking, “fear of nuclear demolition is just
some white shit.” Sadly, that thought would not last long. I still vibe with Harriot’s statement, “Black
people have lived under the specter of having our existence erased on a white man’s whim
since we stepped onto the shore at Jamestown Landing.” However, a friend—a Black friend—ignited my nuclear
paranoia by sharing theories about when it might happen and who faced the greatest threat. In an attempt to ease my friend’s
fear, I leaned in to listen but accidentally toppled down the rabbit hole too. I forked through curated news feeds. I sifted
through “fake news,” “actual news,” and foreign news sources. Suddenly, an idea took root: nuclear strike would
disproportionately impact Black people, brown people, and low-income individuals. North
Korea won’t target the plain sight racists of Portland, Oregon, the violently microaggressive
liberals of the rural Northwest,
or the white-hooded klansmen of Diamondhead, Mississippi. No, under the instruction of the
supreme leader Kim Jong-un, North Korea will likely strike densely populated urban areas,
such as Los Angeles, Chicago, Washington D.C., and New York City. These locations stand-out as targets for a
nuclear strike because they are densely populated U.S. population centers. Attacking the heart of
the nation or populous cities would translate to more casualties. With that in mind, it’s not lost on me
that the most populous cities in the United States boast sizeable diverse populations, or more
plainly put: Black populations. This shit stresses me out! There’s a creeping chill that follows me, a silent alarm that
rings each time my Google alert chimes letting me know that Donald Trump has yet again provoked Kim Jong-Un, a man who
allegedly killed his very own uncle. I’ve grown so pressed by the idea of nuclear holocaust that my partner and I started
gathering non-perishables, candlesticks, a hand-crank radio, and other must-buy items that can be banked in a shopping cart.
The practice of preparing for a nuclear holocaust sometimes feels comical, particularly
when acknowledging that there has long been a war on Black people in this country. Blackness
is bittersweet in flavor. We are blessed with the melanized skin, the MacGyver-like inventiveness of our foremothers, and our
blinding brightness—but the anti-blackness that we experience is also blinding as well as stifling. We
are stuck by
rigged systems, punished with the prison industrial complex, housing discrimination, pay
discrimination, and worse. We get side-eyes from strangers when we’re “loitering,” and the police
will pull us over for driving “too fast” in a residential neighborhood. We get murdered for holding
cell phones while standing in our grandmother’s backyard. The racism that strung up our ancestors, kept
them sequestered to the back of the bus and kept them in separate and unequal schools still
lives. It lives, and it’s more palpable than dormant. To me, this means one thing: Trump’s America
isn’t an unfortunate circumstance, it’s a homecoming event that’s hundreds of years in the making, no
matter how many times my white friends’ say, “He’s not my president.” In light of this
homecoming, we now flirt with a new, larger fear of a Black genocide. America has always
worked towards Black eradication through a steady stream of life-threatening inequality,
but nuclear war on American soil would be swift. And for this reason I’ve grown tired of
whiteness being at the center of the nuclear conversation. The race-neutral approach to the
dialogue, and a tendency to continue to promote the idea that missiles will land in suburban
and rural backyards, instead of inner-city playgrounds, is false. “The Day After,” the iconic, highestrated television film in history, aired November 20, 1983. More than 100 million people tuned in to watch a film postulating a
war between the Soviet Union and the United States. The film, which would go on to affect President Ronald Reagan and
policymakers’ nuclear intentions, shows the “true effects of nuclear war on average American citizens.” The Soviet-targeted
areas featured in the film include Higginsville, Kansas City, Sedalia, Missouri, as well as El Dorado Springs, Missouri. They
depict the destruction of the central United States, and viewers watch as full-scale nuclear war transforms middle America into
a burned wasteland. Yet unsurprisingly, the devastation from
the attack is completely white-washed,
leaving out the more likely victims which are the more densely populated (Black) areas.
Death tolls would be high for white populations, yes, but large-scale losses of Black and
brown folks would outpace that number, due to placement and poverty. That number would
be pushed higher by limited access to premium health care, wealth, and resources. The
effects of radiation sickness, burns, compounded injuries, and malnutrition would throttle
Black and brown communities and would mark us for generations. It’s for that reason that
we have to do more to foster disaster preparedness among Black people where we can. Black
people deserve the space to explore nuclear unease, even if we have competing threats,
anxieties, and worries. Jacqui Patterson, Director of the Environmental and Climate Justice Initiative, once stated:
African American communities are disproportionately vulnerable to and impacted by
natural (and unnatural) catastrophes. Our socio-economic vulnerability is based on multiple
factors including our lack of wealth to cushion us, our disproportionate representation in
lower quality housing stock, and our relative lack of mobility, etc.