PS 205:
Introduction to
International Politics
Liberalism
CLASSICAL LIBERALISM
Liberalism
Liberalism: Introduction
 Liberalism (Utopianism) can be thought of as the second major
traditional school of IR.
 Do not confuse the liberalism school of thought in IR with:
o
o
Liberalism in domestic U.S. politics
Liberalism in economics
 Liberalism was a perspective that was adopted by President Wilson
and was realized by the creation of the League of Nations in the
aftermath of WWI.
 However, as the League of Nations began to falter and dissolve in the
lead up to WWII Realism became more prominent due to the
perceived failings of liberal theory.
Liberalism
Prominent Liberal Theorists
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John Locke
Baron Charles-Louis de Secondat de Montesquieu
Immanuel Kant
Jeremy Bentham
U.S. President Woodrow Wilson
Liberalism
Core Assumptions: Human Nature
 Human nature is inherently good, or at least not bad.
o
The flaws in human nature result not from nature, but from history, failed
institutions, or misperceptions
 Human nature is “perfectable”
o
Humanity can be improved via education and proper government
institutions
Liberalism
Core Assumptions: Anarchy
 Liberals assume anarchy, however, it has more latitude for
cooperation among states
o
Applies in terms of human nature and the structure of the system
Liberalism
Core Assumptions: Rational Actors
 Actors can learn from and understand the international environment
Liberalism
Core Assumptions: Levels of Analysis
 Unlike realism, particularly neorealism, liberalism acknowledges the
role played at the state and individual levels of analysis.
o
o
States are no longer unitary actors.
We can look at: domestic interests/preferences; interest groups; mass
publics; etc.
Liberalism
The Evolution of Liberalism: The Enlightenment
 Montesquieu
o
o
o
Human nature is not defective.
Civil society and separate states cause our problems.
Education can solve humanity’s problems.
 Kant
o
o
A federation of sovereign republics.
Rational devils, not moral angels.
Liberalism
The Evolution of Liberalism: 19th Century
Preferences
 Cooperation results from political and economic liberalism.
o
o
In the form of democracy and free trade.
Freedom from excessive government interference.
Liberalism
The Evolution of Liberalism: Wilsonian Liberalism
 U.S. President and Ph.D. in political science.
o
Presided over WWI and the creation of the League of Nations
 Peace can be achieved via international law, treaties, institutions,
and collective security.
 Collective Security
o
An alliance wherein hostile action by one state triggers immediate
reprisals by all states in the alliance versus the aggressor.
Liberalism
• Theory in Action: Liberalism
Liberalism
Doyle – Liberalism and World Politics
 An examination of the variety of liberalisms
 Focus on Liberal Internationalism (Kantian Liberalism)
 Kant
o
Recognized the possibility of a zone of peace.
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o
Peace requires liberal states.
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A “pacific federation” or Pacific union”
As the international system gains more liberal states that chances for
cooperation and peace increase.
Kantian Liberalism
1.
2.
International Peace among liberal states
International Peace is only expected in their relationships with other liberal
states
Liberalism
Doyle – Liberalism and World Politics
 Kant – Perpetual Peace (1795)
 There is no divide between the state and the systemic levels of
analysis, both most be viewed as interacting.
 Kant’s Three Definitive Articles of Peace
1.
States must be republican and controlled by a civil constitution
a.
2.
The establishment of a pacific federation
a.
b.
3.
Juridical freedom – the equality of citizens
A mutual non-aggression pact
Grows over time and creates an “ever-expanding separate peace”
A Cosmopolitan Law of universal hospitality
a.
Equality of citizens of different states
Liberalism
Moravcsik – Taking Preferences Seriously
Core Assumptions of Liberal Theory
I.
Primacy of Societal Actors
o
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II.
Representation of State Preferences
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o
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III.
Individuals and groups are primary actors in IR
Interests are prior to politics and are derived independently from politics
Individuals behave rationally and are risk-averse
The state is a representative institution
The state is a “transmission belt” and a tool whereby individuals and groups can attain their
interests when private action is ineffectual
The state favors the preferences of certain groups over the preferences of others
Preferences are not given, nor are they static
Interdependence and the International System
o
States seek their own preferences in light of the preferences (and constraints) of other states in
the international system. Thus, state preferences are neither inherently cooperative nor
conflictual in nature, but can best be expressed as existing within the constraints and
opportunities presented in the international system
o
IV.
(3) interdependence environments affect the likelihood of cooperation or conflict (520-1)
Policy interdependence
o
describes the international constraints and opportunities described above.
Liberalism
Moravcsik – Taking Preferences Seriously
Variants of Liberal Theory
I.
Ideational
o
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Domestic identities and values are the core determinant of state preferences
Social identity (D) – “set of preferences shared by individuals concerning the proper scope and nature of
public goods provision”
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Social identity often shapes these pillars of domestic public order
Social identity can take the form of
o
o
o
II.
Commercial
o
o
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States behave based upon the market incentives presented to domestic and transnational economic actors
Looks at the market structure to see the incentives for competition or cooperation
Causes of conflict?
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III.
National
Political
Socioeconomic
Domestic distributional conflict
Global market imperfections
Republican
o
o
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Focuses on the role of domestic institutions
“capture” of institutions by privileged domestic groups and utilize them for their own private gains.
In this instance, we can think of the costs being socialized and the benefits being privatized
Liberalism
Deudney and Ikenberry - Nature and Sources of Liberal
International Order
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Structural Liberalism – a response to the explanatory failing of
neorealist and neoliberal explanations of the Western political
order.
Liberal explanation of stability in the post Cold War era.
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
Security Co-binding
Penetrated hegemony
Semi-sovereignty / Partial great powers
Economic openness
Civic identity
NEOLIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM
Neoliberal Institutionalism
Neoliberal Institutionalism (Neoliberalism)
 Institutions - a set of rules that stipulate the ways in which states
should cooperate and compete with each other
Neoliberal Institutionalism
Neoliberal Institutionalism (Neoliberalism)
 Looks at the salutary role played by international institutions.
o
o
Examples of Institutions: The United Nations; international regimes;
Anarchy
International institutions provide the means to mitigating the effects of
anarchy and cheating.
 Institutions are capable of making an impact in conjunction with the
material capabilities of states and the structure of the system
 Applicable to security and economic matters
 Looks at an iterated PD game, not a single event
Neoliberal Institutionalism
Neoliberal Institutionalism (Neoliberalism)
 Institutions help states by:
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Providing information
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Preventing the cheating problem
Reducing transaction costs
Facilitation of reciprocity
Providing focal points for policy coordination
Issue linkage
Neoliberal Institutionalism
Neoliberal Institutionalism (Neoliberalism)
 Institutions can overcome relative gains problems when
o
o
Relative gains become less important when there are more states in the
equation
When absolute gains are very large, relative gains become less important
Neoliberal Institutionalism
Assumptions
 There is a large degree of room for international cooperation.
 Denies the state-centric view of realism, other actors play a vital role:
o
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This is called “Complex interdependence”
MNCs, IGOs, NGOs, norms, etc
 Motivations for state behavior can be both high (security) and low
(domestic economic and social issues) politics.
 However, it does share many realist assumptions.
o
Difficult to discern the difference.
DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY
Democratic Peace Theory
Democratic Peace Theory
 Immanuel Kant (1795) Perpetual Peace
 Michael Doyle (1983)
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Builds on Kant’s core ideas.
 Bruce Russett – Why Democratic Peace?
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As close to a law as we have in IR.
Empirically perfect.
Logically – garbage.
Democratic Peace Theory
Cultural/Normative Model
 Democracies and autocracies have different norms, cultures,
perceptions, and practices.
 Democracies assume these norms are shared with other
democracies.
o
o
o
“tolerance and reciprocity” among democratic states
Norm of equality
Presumption of amity (friend)
 Democracies have a presumption of enmity (foe) with nondemocratic states.
 Norms take time to develop.
 Newness to democracy could lead to conflict between democracies.
Democratic Peace Theory
Structural Model
 Institutional constraints prevent wars.
o
Checks and balances, divisions of power, elections, public opinion, etc.
 Democracies require more consensus before launching a war
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o
Leaves more time for democratic states to engage in negotiations
Reduces fear of an attack by another democratic regime
 Decisionmakers develop ideas of the regimes of other countries
o
Use cues, such as past behavior and regime type
 These constraints lead to a presumption that democratic states are
less likely to be hostile.
Liberalism
Democratic Peace Theory
 If true, what are the policy Implications?
 If true, does this undermine the realist claim that anarchy causes
war?
Democratic Peace Theory
Nomadic versus Dyadic Democratic Peace
 Nomadic
o
o
o
o
Democracies are peaceful by nature.
They never want conflict.
Convincing?
Structural model of Russett.
 Dyadic
o
o
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Democracies are as warlike as other states.
However, they will not fight other democracies.
There are zones of peace (limited peace).
Cultural/Normative model of Russett.
 Which is more convincing?
Democracy
Autocracy
Democracy
Peace
War
Autocracy
War
War
Liberalism
Farber and Gowa – Polities and Peace
 A critique of democratic peace theory
o
Uses statistical modelling to test the hypotheses of DPT
 Critique of Normative Model
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“rules for conduct that provide standards by which behavior is approved
or disapproved”
Are norms internalized values? Or are they reflections of interests?
How can we measure norms?
o
Norms are not testable
 Critique of Structural Model
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Checks and balances do not stop domestic abuses, why international?
Democracies fight as much as other regimes, just not each other.
Elections and constituent accountability in either regime may matter
more.
Liberalism
Farber and Gowa – Polities and Peace
 Looks at all countries between 1816 and 1980
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What is a country?
 Polity II data set
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Autocratic, Anocratic, and Democratic regimes
 Correlates of War data set
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How is war defined?
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1,000 fatalities among all system members involved
Did not use WWI or WWII. Why? Does this impact the study?
 Looked at (5) eras: Pre WWI; WWI; Interwar Years; WWII; post-WWII
 Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs)
 (DV) War = (IV) regime type + contiguity + major-power status
Liberalism
Farber and Gowa – Polities and Peace
 Results
o
Wars
o
o
o
Democracies have wars as often as other regimes
War between democracies happens at a lower rate than other dyads
HOWEVER
o
o
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When broken into eras, the relationship is only significant in the post-WWII
era.
Why?
MIDs
o
o
o
MIDs are more likely pre-WWI for democratic regimes
MIDs less likely in WWII and post-WWII eras only
Contiguity and major power status also significant
 Whose argument is more convincing?