President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the
heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of
the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether
voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproved by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
Pobre vs. Mendieta [G.R. No. 106677, July 23, 1993]
FACTS: These consolidated petitions under Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of Court were filed by Her
genes Pobre to set aside the court’s decision and writ of prohibitory injunction, issued by Judge
Corona Ibay-Somera, annulling the appointment extended by President Corazon C. Aquino to the
petitioner, Hermogenes Pobre, as Commissioner/Chairman of the Professional Regulation
Commission mo (PRC) and enjoining him from discharging the duties and functions of that office.
The controversy began on January 2, 1992, when the term of office of Honorable Julio B. Francia as
PRC Commissioner/Chairman expired. At that time, Mariano A. Mendieta was the senior Associate
Commissioner and Hermogenes P. Pobre was the second Associate Commissioner of the PRC.
The Executive Secretary wanted to know whether the President may appoint as
Commissioner/Chairman of the PRC another Associate Commissioner or any person other than the
Senior Associate Commissioner.
In a Memorandum, Acting Secretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello, III answered the queries as follows:
Based on the foregoing premises, it is our view that Section 2 of P.D. No. 223 does not limit or restrict
the appointing power of the President. It has been said that "those matters which the Constitution
specifically confides to the executive, the legislative cannot directly or indirectly take from his control"
Pobre opposed the issuance of a restraining order because President Aquino had already appointed
him PRC Chairman and he had, in fact, already taken his oath of office on February 17, 1992. Judge
Somera denied the prayer for a restraining order as well as the petition for declaratory relief for being
moot and academic.
Consequently, Mendieta filed a petition for quo warranto contesting Pobre's appointment as
chairman of the PRC because he (Mendieta) allegedly succeeded Francia as PRC Chairman by
operation of law. Pobre disputed Mendieta's claim on the ground that only the President of the
Philippines, in whom the appointing power is vested by law and the Constitution, may name the
successor of retired PRC Commissioner/Chairman Francia upon the expiration of the latter's term of
office.
The petition raises an issue regarding the proper construction of the provision in Section 2 of P.D. No.
223 that: ". . . any vacancy in the Commission shall be filled for the unexpired term only with the most
Senior of the Associate Commissioners succeeding the Commissioner at the expiration of his term,
resignation or removal," whereby the legality of Pobre's appointment as PRC Chairman may be
determined.
In interpreting this section of P.D. No. 223, consideration should be accorded the provision of the
Constitution vesting the power of appointment in the President of the Philippines.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of Pobre as Commissioner/Chairman of the Professional
Regulation Commission by the President is lawful.
RULING: THE POWER OF APPOINTMENT CANNOT BE RESTRICTED TO THE POINT THAT THE
OFFICER LOSES THE DISCRETION. The Court finds unacceptable the view that every vacancy in the
Commission (except the position of "junior" Associate Commissioner) shall be filled by "succession" or
by "operation of law" for that would deprive the President of his power to appoint a new PRC
Commissioner and Associate Commissioners — "all to be appointed by the President" under P.D. No.
223. The absurd result would be that the only occasion for the President to exercise his appointing
power would be when the position of junior (or second) Associate Commissioner becomes vacant. We
may not presume that when the President issued P.D. No. 223, he deliberately clipped his prerogative
to choose and appoint the head of the PRC and limited himself to the selection and appointment of only
the associate commissioner occupying the lowest rung of the ladder in that agency. Since such an
absurdity may not be presumed, the Court should so construe the law as to avoid it.
"The duty devolves on the court to ascertain the true meaning where the language of a statute is of
doubtful meaning, or where an adherence to the strict letter would lead to injustice, absurdity, or
contradictory provisions, since an ambiguity calling for construction may arise when the consequence
of a literal interpretation of the language is an unjust, absurd, unreasonable, or mischievous result, or
one at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole; and the real meaning of the statute is to
be ascertained and declared, even though it seems to conflict with the words of the statute." (82 CJS
589-590; Emphasis supplied.)
G.R. No. 140335
GAMINDE vs. COA
G.R. No. 140335, December 13, 2000
Facts: Thelma Gaminde was appointed by the President of the Philippines as Commissioner of the
Civil Service Commission, ad interim and assumed office on June 22, 1993 after oath of office. The
Commission on Appointments (COA) and the Congress of the Philippines confirmed the appointment
on September 7, 1993. Gaminde, on February 24, 1998, sought the Office of the President for
clarification on the expiry date of her term of office. In response to her request, the Chief Presidential
Legal Counsel opined that her term office will expire on February 2, 2000 instead of February 2, 1999.
Relying on said advisory opinion, Gaminde remained in office after February 2, 1999. However, on
February 4, 1999, Chairman Corazon Alma de Leon wrote COA requesting opinion whether or not
Gaminde and her co-terminus staff may be paid their salaries notwithstanding the expiration of their
appointments on February 2, 1999. The General Counsel of COA issued an opinion on February 18,
1999 that “the term of Commissioner Gaminde has expired on February 2, 1999 as stated in her
appointment conformably with the constitutional intent.” Consequently, on March 24, 1999, CSC
Resident Auditor Flovitas Felipe issued a Notice of Disallowance, disallowing in audit the salaries and
emoluments of Gaminde and her co-terminus staff effective February 2, 1999. Gaminde appealed
COA’s disallowance but it was dismissed, and affirmed the propriety of the disallowance; and held
that the issue of Gaminde’s office term may be properly addressed by mere reference to her
appointment paper which set the expiration date of February 2, 1999, and that the Commission was
bereft of power to recognize an extension of her term, not even with the implied acquiescence of the
Office of the President. Gaminde moved for reconsideration, but was denied by COA.
Issue: Whether the term of office of Thelma Gaminde, as Commissioner, Civil Service Commission,
to which she was appointed on June 11, 1993, expired on February 2, 1999, as stated in the
appointment paper, or on February 2, 2000, as claimed by her.
Held: The term of office of Thelma P. Gaminde as the CSC Commissioner, as appointed by President
Fidel V. Ramos, expired on February 2, 1999. However, she served as de-facto officer in good faith
until February 2, 2000. The term of office of the Chairman and members of the Civil Service
Commission is prescribed in the 1987 Constitution under Article IX-D, Section 1 (2):
“The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President withthe consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first
appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, a Commissioner for five years, and another
Commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for
the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity.”
Therefore, COA erred in disallowing in audit such salary and other emoluments. Gaminde and her coterminus staff are entitled to receive their salary and other emoluments for actual service rendered.
FUNA VS. VILLAR
DENNIS A. B. FUNA, PETITIONER, VS. THE CHAIRMAN, COA, REYNALDO A. VILLAR
G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012
FACTS: Funa challenges the constitutionality of the appointment of Reynaldo A. Villar as Chairman
of the COA.
Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 and during the fourth year of Villar as COA
Commissioner, Villar was designated as Acting Chairman of COA from February 4, 2008 to April 14,
2008. Subsequently, on April 18, 2008, Villar was nominated and appointed as Chairman of the COA.
Shortly thereafter, on June 11, 2008, the Commission on Appointments confirmed his appointment.
He was to serve as Chairman of COA, as expressly indicated in the appointment papers, until the
expiration of the original term of his office as COA Commissioner or on February 2, 2011. Challenged
in this recourse, Villar, in an obvious bid to lend color of title to his hold on the chairmanship, insists
that his appointment as COA Chairman accorded him a fresh term of 7 years which is yet to lapse. He
would argue, in fine, that his term of office, as such chairman, is up to February 2, 2015, or 7 years
reckoned from February 2, 2008 when he was appointed to that position.
Before the Court could resolve this petition, Villar, via a letter dated February 22, 2011 addressed to
President Benigno S. Aquino III, signified his intention to step down from office upon the
appointment of his replacement. True to his word, Villar vacated his position when President Benigno
Simeon Aquino III named Ma. Gracia Pulido-Tan (Chairman Tan) COA Chairman. This development
has rendered this petition and the main issue tendered therein moot and academic.
Although deemed moot due to the intervening appointment of Chairman Tan and the resignation of
Villar, We consider the instant case as falling within the requirements for review of a moot and
academic case, since it asserts at least four exceptions to the mootness rule discussed in David vs
Macapagal Arroyo namely:
a. There is a grave violation of the Constitution;
b. The case involves a situation of exceptional character and is of paramount public interest;
c. The constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench,
the bar and the public;
d. The case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
The procedural aspect comes down to the question of whether or not the following requisites for the
exercise of judicial review of an executive act obtain in this petition, viz:
a. There must be an actual case or justiciable controversy before the court
b. The question before it must be ripe for adjudication;
c. The person challenging the act must be a proper party; and
d. The issue of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity and must be the very litis
mota of the case
ISSUES:
a. WON the petitioner has Locus Standi to bring the case to court
b. WON Villar’s appointment as COA Chairman, while sitting in that body and after having served for
four (4) years of his seven (7) year term as COA commissioner, is valid in light of the term limitations
imposed under, and the circumscribing concepts tucked in, Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution
HELD:
Issue of Locus Standi: This case before us is of transcendental importance, since it obviously has “farreaching implications,” and there is a need to promulgate rules that will guide the bench, bar, and the
public in future analogous cases. We, thus, assume a liberal stance and allow petitioner to institute
the instant petition.
In David vs Macapagal Arroyo, the Court laid out the bare minimum norm before the so-called “nontraditional suitors” may be extended standing to sue, thusly:
a. For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure
is unconstitutional;
b. For voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question
c. For concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental
importance which must be settled early; and
d. For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes their
prerogatives as legislators.
On the substantive issue:
Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution provides that:
(2) The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed by the President with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first
appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, one commissioner for five years, and the
other commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be
only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. In no case shall any member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Petitioner now asseverates the view that Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the 1987 Constitution proscribes
reappointment of any kind within the commission, the point being that a second appointment, be it
for the same position (commissioner to another position of commissioner) or upgraded position
(commissioner to chairperson) is a prohibited reappointment and is a nullity ab initio.
The Court finds petitioner’s position bereft of merit. The flaw lies in regarding the word
“reappointment” as, in context, embracing any and all species of appointment. The rule is that if a
statute or constitutional provision is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.
The first sentence is unequivocal enough. The COA Chairman shall be appointed by the President for
a term of seven years, and if he has served the full term, then he can no longer be reappointed or
extended another appointment. In the same vein, a Commissioner who was appointed for a term of
seven years who likewise served the full term is barred from being reappointed. In short, once the
Chairman or Commissioner shall have served the full term of seven years, then he can no longer be
reappointed to either the position of Chairman or Commissioner. The obvious intent of the framers is
to prevent the president from “dominating” the Commission by allowing him to appoint an additional
or two more commissioners.
On the other hand, the provision, on its face, does not prohibit a promotional appointment from
commissioner to chairman as long as the commissioner has not served the full term of seven years,
further qualified by the third sentence of Sec. 1(2), Article IX (D) that “the appointment to any
vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor.” In addition, such
promotional appointment to the position of Chairman must conform to the rotational plan or the
staggering of terms in the commission membership such that the aggregate of the service of the
Commissioner in said position and the term to which he will be appointed to the position of Chairman
must not exceed seven years so as not to disrupt the rotational system in the commission prescribed
by Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).
In conclusion, there is nothing in Sec. 1(2), Article IX(D) that explicitly precludes a promotional
appointment from Commissioner to Chairman, provided it is made under the aforestated
circumstances or conditions.
The Court is likewise unable to sustain Villar’s proposition that his promotional appointment as COA
Chairman gave him a completely fresh 7- year term––from February 2008 to February 2015––given
his four (4)-year tenure as COA commissioner devalues all the past pronouncements made by this
Court. While there had been divergence of opinion as to the import of the word “reappointment,”
there has been unanimity on the dictum that in no case can one be a COA member, either as chairman
or commissioner, or a mix of both positions, for an aggregate term of more than 7 years. A contrary
view would allow a circumvention of the aggregate 7-year service limitation and would be
constitutionally offensive as it would wreak havoc to the spirit of the rotational system of succession.
In net effect, then President Macapagal-Arroyo could not have had, under any circumstance, validly
appointed Villar as COA Chairman, for a full 7- year appointment, as the Constitution decrees, was
not legally feasible in light of the 7-year aggregate rule. Villar had already served 4 years of his 7-year
term as COA Commissioner. A shorter term, however, to comply with said rule would also be invalid
as the corresponding appointment would effectively breach the clear purpose of the Constitution of
giving to every appointee so appointed subsequent to the first set of commissioners, a fixed term of
office of 7 years. To recapitulate, a COA commissioner like respondent Villar who serves for a period
less than seven (7) years cannot be appointed as chairman when such position became vacant as a
result of the expiration of the 7-year term of the predecessor (Carague). Such appointment to a full
term is not valid and constitutional, as the appointee will be allowed to serve more than seven (7)
years under the constitutional ban.
To sum up, the Court restates its ruling on Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution, viz:
1. The appointment of members of any of the three constitutional commissions, after the expiration of
the uneven terms of office of the first set of commissioners, shall always be for a fixed term of seven
(7) years; an appointment for a lesser period is void and unconstitutional. The appointing authority
cannot validly shorten the full term of seven (7) years in case of the expiration of the term as this will
result in the distortion of the rotational system prescribed by the Constitution.
2. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death, resignation, disability or
impeachment) shall only be for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor, but such
appointments cannot be less than the unexpired portion as this will likewise disrupt the staggering of
terms laid down under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).
3. Members of the Commission, e.g. COA, COMELEC or CSC, who were appointed for a full term of
seven years and who served the entire period, are barred from reappointment to any position in the
Commission. Corollarily, the first appointees in the Commission under the Constitution are also
covered by the prohibition against reappointment.
4. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven years is eligible for
an appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term of the departing
chairman. Such appointment is not covered by the ban on reappointment, provided that the aggregate
period of the length of service as commissioner and the unexpired period of the term of the
predecessor will not exceed seven (7) years and provided further that the vacancy in the position of
Chairman resulted from death, resignation, disability or removal by impeachment. The Court clarifies
that “reappointment” found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a movement to one and the same office
(Commissioner to Commissioner or Chairman to Chairman). On the other hand, an appointment
involving a movement to a different position or office (Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute a
new appointment and, hence, not, in the strict legal sense, a reappointment barred under the
Constitution.
5. Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity.
Power of Removal
CASE TITLE: CITY OF ILIGAN, plaintiff-appellant, vs. DIRECTOR OF LANDS, THE
DISTRICT LAND OFFICER OF LANAO DEL NORTE, and MARCELO STEEL
CORPORATION, defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-30852 February 26, 1988
PONENTE: Justice GANCAYCO
FACTS:
1.
President issued Proclamation 335:
a. Withdrawing certain parcels of public land in Iligan from sale or settlement and
b. Reserving such for the use of NPC (Nat’l Power Corporation)
2.
By virtue of said proclamation, NPC constructed a fertilizer plant named “Maria Cristina”
3.
Later, NPC:
a. Sold the fertilizer plant to “Marcelo Tire and Rubber Corp” with all the machineries, right of
occupancy, and use of land
b. Covenanted to collaborate with DANR in facilitating sale and right to lease for at least 25 years,
the lands where plant is erected
4.
Proclamation 20 and 198 were issued:
a. Proc. 20 – excluding from operation of Proc. 335 certain areas occupied by “Ma. Cristina” and
Employees Housing and declaring such lands for OPEN DISPOSITION
b. Proc. 198 – changing the technical description of said areas (6 lots)
5.
“Marcelo Steel” and “Ma. Cristina” filed a Msc. Sales Application with the Bureau of Lands
a. “Marcelo Tire” and “Ma. Cristina” are sister corporations.
b. Purchaser was “Marcelo Tire” but another sister corp. “Marcelo Steel” operated said plant
6.
In the notice of sale issued in Manila, Director of Lands advised that Bureau will sell in an auction
said lands of “Marcelo Steel”
7.
President then issued Proc. 469 – excluding from the reservation made in favor to NPC certain
lands in Iligan (Lot 1, 1-a, 3, and 4) and DONATING said lands in favor of Iligan City.
8.
Mayor of Iligan wrote to Director of Lands informing him that City is the owner of said lands and
foreshores in auction.
9.
BUT no action was taken on said request for exclusion and so City filed a complaint for injunction
in CFI against Director. Injunction temporarily issued.
10.
Pending case, President Marcos issued Proc. 94 – excluding from the donation in Proc. 469
certain lands (Lot 1-a, 2-a, and 3) and declaring same for open disposition.
11.
CFI dismissed the complaint of City and dissolved injunction. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE/s: WON President has the authority to grant a portion of public domain to any government
like the City of Iligan.
RULING: YES
1.
Section 60 of Public Land Act states that tracts of land can be disposed of by grant, donationor
transfer made to a province, municipality, branch, or subdivision of government for purposes conducive
to public interest.
a. Who has authority to donate? Secretary of Agriculture and National Resources through Director
of Lands (Sec 60)
2.
Can President donate instead of Secretary and Director? YES
a. Director has direct executive control of lands (e.g. lease, sale, concession, disposition of land of
public domain)
b. Director SUBJECT to control of Secretary of Agriculture.
c. Secretary’s control is SUBJECT to control of PRESIDENT
d. Under Art VII Sec 17: President shall control ALL executive departments, bureaus, and offices.
e. Hence, President has the same authority to dispose of portions of public domain as his
subordinates.
f. Such authority to dispose is also granted to the President under Section 69 of the Public Land
Act.
3.
Since, President has the authority to donate lands of public domain for residential, commercial,
& industrial purposes. Questioned Proclamation469 is VALIDand binding:
a. Ownership of lands now vested in City of Iligan.
b. Mayor of City upon proclamation immediately had the lots surveyed and entered into
negotiation with National Investment and Development Corp. and those interested in developing the
Coco-Chemical Plant in order to accelerate economic expansion in the City.
4.
Proclamation 94 is NULL and VOID as said parcels had been segregated and had become
property of Iligan.
5.
Decision of CFI REVERSED.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Iligan
dated April 13, 1967 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another judgment is hereby rendered
declaring that the parcels of land in question are the properties of and belong to the plaintiff Iligan City
by virtue of Proclamation No. 469 of October 4, 1965. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod ng mga Magtitinda ng Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng
Muntinlupa, Inc. v. Dominguez
G.R. No. 85439 January 13, 1992
Davide, Jr., J.
Facts:
Petitioners question the validity of the order of then Secretary of Agriculture Hon. Carlos G.
Dominguez which ordered: (1) the take-over by the Department of Agriculture of the management of
the petitioner Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod Ng Mga Magtitinda ng Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng
Muntilupa, Inc. (KBMBPM) pursuant to the Department’s regulatory and supervisory powers under
Section 8 of P.D. No. 175, as amended, and Section 4 of Executive Order No. 13, (2) the creation of a
Management Committee which shall assume the management of KBMBPM upon receipt of the order,
(3) the disbandment of the Board of Directors, and (4) the turn over of all assets, properties and records
of the KBMBPM the Management Committee.
The exordium of said Order unerringly indicates that its basis is the alleged petition of the
general membership of the KBMBPM requesting the Department for assistance in the removal of the
members of the Board of Directors who were not elected by the general membership” of the cooperative
and that the ongoing financial and management audit of the Department of Agriculture auditors shows
that the management of the KBMBPM is not operating that cooperative in accordance with P.D. 175,
LOI 23, the Circulars issued by DA/BACOD and the provisions and by-laws of KBMBPM. It is also
professed therein that the Order was issued by the Department “in the exercise of its regulatory and
supervisory powers under Section 8 of P.D. 175, as amended, and Section 4 of Executive Order No. 113.
Issue:
whether or not the Order issued by the Secretary of Agriculture is illegal
Held:
Regulation 34 of Letter of Implementation No. 23 (implementing P.D. No. 175) provides the
procedure for the removal of directors or officers of cooperatives, thus:
An elected officer, director or committee member may be removed by a vote of majority of the members
entitled to vote at an annual or special general assembly. The person involved shall have an opportunity
to be heard.
A substantially identical provision, found in Section 17, Article III of the KBMBPM’s by-laws,
reads:
Sec. 17. Removal of Directors and Committee Members. — Any elected director or committee member
may be removed from office for cause by a majority vote of the members in good standing present at
the annual or special general assembly called for the purpose after having been given the opportunity
to be heard at the assembly.
Under the same article are found the requirements for the holding of both the annual general
assembly and a special general assembly.
Indubitably then, there is an established procedure for the removal of directors and officers of
cooperatives. It is likewise manifest that the right to due process is respected by the express provision
on the opportunity to be heard. But even without said provision, petitioners cannot be deprived of that
right.
The procedure was not followed in this case. Respondent Secretary of Agriculture arrogated unto
himself the power of the members of the KBMBPM who are authorized to vote to remove the petitioning
directors and officers. He cannot take refuge under Section 8 of P.D. No. 175 which grants him authority
to supervise and regulate all cooperatives. This section does not give him that right.
An administrative officer has only such powers as are expressly granted to him and those necessarily
implied in the exercise thereof. These powers should not be extended by implication beyond what may
to necessary for their just and reasonable execution.
Supervision and control include only the authority to: (a) act directly whenever a specific
function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; (b) direct the performance
of duty; restrain the commission of acts; (c) review, approve, reverse or modify acts and
decisions of subordinate officials or units; (d) determine priorities in the execution of
plans and programs; and (e) prescribe standards, guidelines, plans and programs.
Specifically, administrative supervision is limited to the authority of the department or
its equivalent to: (1) generally oversee the operations of such agencies and insure that
they are managed effectively, efficiently and economically but without interference with
day-to-day activities; (2) require the submission of reports and cause the conduct of
management audit, performance evaluation and inspection to determine compliance
with policies, standards and guidelines of the department; (3) take such action as may be
necessary for the proper performance of official functions, including rectification of
violations, abuses and other forms of mal-administration; (4) review and pass upon
budget proposals of such agencies but may not increase or add to them.
The power to summarily disband the board of directors may not be inferred from any of the
foregoing as both P.D. No. 175 and the by-laws of the KBMBPM explicitly mandate the manner by which
directors and officers are to be removed. The Secretary should have known better than to disregard
these procedures and rely on a mere petition by the general membership of the KBMBPM and an ongoing audit by Department of Agriculture auditors in exercising a power which he does not have,
expressly or impliedly. We cannot concede to the proposition of the Office of the Solicitor General that
the Secretary’s power under paragraph (d), Section 8 of P.D. No. 175 above quoted to suspend the
operation or cancel the registration of any cooperative includes the “milder authority of suspending
officers and calling for the election of new officers.” Firstly, neither suspension nor cancellation includes
the take-over and ouster of incumbent directors and officers, otherwise the law itself would have
expressly so stated. Secondly, even granting that the law intended such as postulated, there is
the requirement of a hearing. None was conducted
ANG-ANGCO VS. CASTILLO
GR no. 17169, No 30,1963
FACTS:
The Pepsi-Cola Far East Trade requested for special permit to withdraw Pepsi Cola
concentrates from the customs house. Petitioner Collector of Customs Isidro Ang-angco advised the
counsel for Pepsi-Cola to try to secure the necessary release certificate from the No-dollar Import
Office. Aquiles Lopez of said office wrote petitioner, stating that it could not take action on the
request, as the same is not within the jurisdiction of the Office. Following Secretary of Finance
Hernandez’s approval of the release, petitioner authorized release of the concentrates.
When Customs Commissioner Manahan learned of said release, he ordered the seizure of the
goods but only a portion thereof remained in the warehouse. Thus, he filed an administrative suit
against petitioner.
After an investigation, respondent Executive Secretary Natalio Castillo found petitioner guilty
of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and considering him resigned, with prejudice
to reinstatement in the Bureau of Customs. Petitioner wrote Pres. Garcia, asserting that the action
taken by respondent had the effect of depriving him of his statutory right to have his case originally
decided by the CSC, as well as of his right or appeal to the Civil Service Board of Appeals, whose
decision under RA 2260 is final. By authority of the President, respondent denied reconsideration, as
well as the appeal. Hence, this present petition.
ISSUE: Whether the President has the power to make direct action on the case of petitioner even if
he belongs to the classified service in spite of the provision now in the Civil Service Act of 1959.
HELD:
The action taken by respondent executive Secretary, even with the authority of the President in
taking direct action on the administrative case, petitioner, without submitting the same to the
Commission of Civil Service is contrary to law and should be set aside.
The following are the reasons:
1. Under sec 16 of the Civil Service Act of 1959, it is the Commissioner of Civil Service who has
original and exclusive jurisdiction to decide administrative cases of all officers and employees in the
classified service. The only limitation to this power is the decision of the Commissioner may be
appealed to the Civil service Board of Appeals, in which case said Board shall decide the appeal within
a period of 90 days after the same has been submitted for decision, whose decision in such cases shall
be final. It is therefore clear that under the present provision of the Civil Service act of 1959, the case
of petitioner comes under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service, and having
been deprived of the procedure and down therein in connection with the investigation and disposition
of this case, it may be said that he has been deprived of due process guaranteed by said law.
2. Let us now take up the power of control given to the President by the Constitution over all
offices and employees in the executive department which is not invoked by respondents as
justification to override the specific provision of the Civil Service Act. The power merely applies to the
exercise of control over the acts of the subordinate and not over the actor or agent himself of the act.
It only means that the President may set aside the judgment of action taken by the subordinate in the
performance of duties.
3. Not the strongest argument against the theory of respondents is that it would entirely nullify
and set aside at naught the beneficent purpose of the whole Civil Service system as implanted in this
jurisdiction which is to give stability to the tenure of office of those who belong to the classified
service, in derogation of the provision of our Constitution which provides the “No officer or employee
in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law.” The power of
control of the President may extend to the power to investigate, suspend or remove officers and
employees who belong to the executive department if they are presidential appointee or do not belong
to the classified service for to them that inherent power cannot be exercised. This is in line with the
provision of our constitutional which says; “The
Congress may by law vest the appointment of the inferior officers in the
President alone in the courts or in the heads of department” and with regards to these officers
provided by law for a procedure for their removal precisely in view of this constitutional authority.
One such law is the Civil Service Act of 159.
Namarco vs Arca
Gr no. 25743 / Sept 30, 1969
Facts:
Juan Arrive was Manager at the Storage Department of NAMARCO. He was investigated for violation
of memorandum order regarding the improper release of shipment. The investigating committee
found him GUILTY and the general manager of Namarco, including the Board of Directors, dismissed
him.
Arrive appealed to the President. The Exec Secretary (acting for the President) set aside the Namarco
ruling, and REINSTATED ARIVE. Namarco now assails the actions of the ES and contended that the
President had no jurisdiction to reverse its decision. The constitution provides that the President has
control over bureaus and offices. Namarco claims that the word “OFFICES” should refer only to
offices performing governmental functions, those without separate juridical personality. Namarco
claims that GOCC’s like Namarco, should not be included in the term “Offices.” Namarco further
claims that the Namarco Charter grants only the General Manager and the Board of Directors the
power to remove employees.
Issue:
Whether the President of the Philippines had authority to reverse the decision of the Board of
Directors of the NAMARCO and to order the reinstatement of Juan T. Arive
Held:
The President of the Philippines’ authority to review and reverse the decision of the NAMARCO
Board of Directors dismissing Juan T. Arive from his position in the NAMARCO and to order his
reinstatement falls within the constitutional power of the President over all executive departments,
bureaus and offices. Under our governmental set-up, corporations owned or controlled by the
government, such as the NAMARCO, partake of the nature of government bureaus or offices, which are
administratively supervised by the Administrator of the Office of Economic Coordination, “whose
compensation and rank shall be that of a head of an Executive Department” and who “shall be
responsible to the President of the Philippines under whose control his functions ... shall be exercised.”
(Executive Order No. 386 of December 22, 1950, section 1, issued under the Reorganization Act of
1950).
The fact that section 13(d) of Republic Act No. 1345 (the NAMARCO Charter and likewise section
11(d) of the Uniform Charter for Government Owned or Controlled Corporations (Ex. Order No. 399 of
January 5, 1951) which authorize the general manager of such corporations, with the approval of the
Board of Directors, to remove for cause any subordinate employee of the Corporation do not provide
for an appeal from the general manager’s decision of removal to any superior officer, body or agency,
does not mean that no appeal lies from such decision to the President.
The right to appeal to the President reposes upon the President’s power of control over the
executive departments. And control simply means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify
or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for the latter.
Drilon v. Lim
G.R. No. 112497, August 4, 1994
Cruz, J.
Facts:
The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the Local Government
1
Code . The Secretary of Justice (on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer) declared
Ordinance No. 7794 (Manila Revenue Code) null and void for non-compliance with the procedure in
the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy.
The RTC revoked the Secretary’s resolution and sustained the ordinance. It declared Sec 187 of
the LGC as unconstitutional because it vests on the Secretary the power of control over LGUs in
violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution. The Secretary argues that the
annulled Section 187 is constitutional and that the procedural requirements for the enactment of tax
ordinances as specified in the Local Government Code had indeed not been observed. (Petition
originally dismissed by the Court due to failure to submit certified true copy of the decision, but
reinstated it anyway.)
Issue:
WON the lower court has jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of Sec 187 of the LGC
Held:
Yes. BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all civil cases in which the subject
of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Moreover, Article X, Section 5(2), of the
Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower
courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question.
In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the utmost
circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of a declaration of unconstitutionality upon the
stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of separation of powers. It is also emphasized that every
court, including this Court, is charged with the duty of a purposeful hesitation before declaring a law
unconstitutional, on the theory that the measure was first carefully studied by the executive and the
legislative departments and determined by them to be in accordance with the fundamental law before
it was finally approved. To doubt is to sustain. The presumption of constitutionality can be overcome
only by the clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution.
Issue:
WON Section 187 of the LGC is unconstitutional
Held:
Yes. Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality
of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters
or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for
Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and revenue
measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof; Provided,
further, That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof
to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the effect
of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of
the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of
competent jurisdiction.
1
the judgment of the local government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the
Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code should be.. What
he found only was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure was determine if the
petitioners were performing their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed
procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government under
the Local Government Code. As we see it, that was an act not of control but of mere supervision.
An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he may,
in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it
himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it
that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion
to modify or replace them.
Significantly, a rule similar to Section 187 appeared in the Local Autonomy Act. That section
allowed the Secretary of Finance to suspend the effectivity of a tax ordinance if, in his opinion, the tax
or fee levied was unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. Determination of these flaws would
involve the exercise of judgment or discretion and not merely an examination of whether or not the
requirements or limitations of the law had been observed; hence, it would smack of control rather than
mere supervision. That power was never questioned before this Court but, at any rate, the Secretary of
Justice is not given the same latitude under Section 187. All he is permitted to do is ascertain the
constitutionality or legality of the tax measure, without the right to declare that, in his opinion, it is
unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. He has no discretion on this matter. In fact, Secretary
Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue Code only on two grounds, to with, the inclusion therein of certain
ultra vires provisions and non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in its enactment. These
grounds affected the legality, not the wisdom or reasonableness, of the tax measure.
The issue of non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of the Manila
Revenue Code is another matter. (allegations: No written notices of public hearing, no publication of
the ordinance, no minutes of public hearing, no posting, no translation into Tagalog)
Judge Palattao however found that all the procedural requirements had been observed in the
enactment of the Manila Revenue Code and that the City of Manila had not been able to prove such
compliance before the Secretary only because he had given it only five days within which to gather and
present to him all the evidence (consisting of 25 exhibits) later submitted to the trial court. We agree
with the trial court that the procedural requirements have indeed been observed. Notices of the public
hearings were sent to interested parties as evidenced. The minutes of the hearings are found in Exhibits
M, M-1, M-2, and M-3. Exhibits B and C show that the proposed ordinances were published in the Balita
and the Manila Standard on April 21 and 25, 1993, respectively, and the approved ordinance was
published in the July 3, 4, 5, 1993 issues of the Manila Standard and in the July 6, 1993 issue of Balita,
as shown by Exhibits Q, Q-1, Q-2, and Q-3.
The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as approved but this omission does not
affect its validity, considering that its publication in three successive issues of a newspaper of general
circulation will satisfy due process. It has also not been shown that the text of the ordinance has been
translated and disseminated, but this requirement applies to the approval of local development plans
and public investment programs of the local government unit and not to tax ordinances.
Carpio vs Executive Secretary
GR No. 96409, Feb 14,1992


power of administrative control
power of executive control
FACTS:
Petitioner Antonio Carpio as citizen, taxpayer and member of the Philippine Bar, filed this petition,
questioning the constitutionality of RA 6975 with a prayer for TRO.
RA 6875, entitled “AN ACT ESTABLISHIGN THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A
REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES,” allegedly contravened Art. XVI, sec. 6 of the 1986 Constitution: “The State shall
establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in character, to
be administered and controlled by a national police commission. The authority of local executives
over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law.”
ISSUEs:


Whether or not RA 6975 is contrary to the Constitution
Whether or not Sec. 12 RA 6975 constitutes an “encroachment upon, interference with, and an
abdication by the President of, executive control and commander-in-chief powers”
HELD:
Power of Administrative Control
NAPOLCOM is under the Office of the President.
SC held that the President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. This
presidential power of control over the executive branch of government extends over all executive
officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk. In the landmark case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, the
power of control means “the power of the President to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former with that of the latter.” It is said to be at the very “heart of the meaning of Chief Executive.”
As a corollary rule to the control powers of the President is the “Doctrine of Qualified Political
Agency.” As the President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and
in person, he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members.
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, “all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various
executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the
Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the
situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of
the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the
Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, are presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
Thus, “the President’s power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet
who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their respective
jurisdictions in the executive department.”
The placing of NAPOLCOM and PNP under the reorganized DILG is merely an administrative
realignment that would bolster a system of coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local
executives and the integrated law enforcement agencies and public safety agencies.
Power of Executive Control
Sec. 12 does not constitute abdication of commander-in-chief powers. It simply provides for the
transition period or process during which the national police would gradually assume the civilian
function of safeguarding the internal security of the State. Under this instance, the President, to
repeat, abdicates nothing of his war powers. It would bear to here state, in reiteration of the
preponderant view, that the President, as Commander-in-Chief, is not a member of the Armed Forces.
He remains a civilian whose duties under the Commander-in-Chief provision “represent only a part of
the organic duties imposed upon him. All his other functions are clearly civil in nature.” His position
as a civilian Commander-in-Chief is consistent with, and a testament to, the constitutional principle
that “civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military