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1
Introduction
The European Union’s foreign policy
“actorness and power”: foundations of and
challenges for a comparative research design
Ingo Peters
When the Libyan rebels were facing Gaddafi’s troops besieging Bengasi in
March 2011, they were using all possible communication channels and appealed
for a military intervention by foreign powers, including the European Union (EU)
and its member states. The responses coming from the EU were as pessimistic as
might have been expected; instead of a quick consultation process resulting in a
swift and decisive military action on behalf of the rebels, the EU was unable and
unwilling to respond appropriately, leaving it up to individual member states, first
and foremost France and Britain, to form a coalition of the willing in order to take
military action on behalf of the rebels, based on United Nation (UN) Resolution
1973 (BBC 2011). Once again, the EU’s political weight in world affairs and
its ability to act in times of acute crisis rose to the top of the political agenda as
empirical evidence pointed out the Union’s inability to speak with one voice and
to act in unity within the realm of its common foreign and security policy (Busse
and Sattar 2011; Koenig 2011).
But was it really only the EU suffering from the diverging policy choices of
its member states, about to betray the public search for democratic reforms in
the Arab world they have allegedly supported as part of the Euro-Mediterranean
partnership and European Neighbourhood policy for so long? What about the
most successful military alliance in history, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)? In view of the overlap of member states between the EU and
NATO, it was not surprising that the western alliance also failed to decide and act
unanimously in view of the first unilateral French and British air strikes in Libya
(Dempsey 2011). Instead, France and Britain had to be persuaded to act multilaterally through NATO, and thus the alliance could take over the coordination only
two weeks after they had started the campaign. Nevertheless, NATO’s resolve and
actions were praised and the alliance received mostly positive feedback for its
military engagement – quite contrary to the public feedback the EU got in return
for its “civilian” measures (Laity 2012; Perthes 2011; Francois 2011; Noetzel and
Schreer 2012).
And what about the United States of America, another champion of “making the
world safe for democracy”? The Obama administration joined the coalition of the
willing and able, thus participating in the campaign to protect civilians from their
own ruthless regime. However, this policy only emerged after some hesitancy
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2
Ingo Peters
due to the diverging positions of the Department of State and the Department of
Defence as well as strong criticism from Congress, resulting in a quick reduction
of US military engagement in this campaign (Fahrenthold 2011). Though all three
international actors’ (though different they may be) performances were somewhat
awkward, hardly anyone is discussing the “power” or “actorness” of NATO or the
US in the same vein as people – politicians, journalists as much as scholars – continuously seem to question the quality of the EU’s “foreign policy”.
The relevant literature often focuses on the issues of “what kind of power” or
“what kind of actor” the European Union actually is.1 It is comprised of policy
papers, conceptually and theoretically informed research, mostly drawing on
mere illustrative examples that stress the abovementioned power attributes or is
confined to specific policy fields (see for example Ginsberg 2001; Crawford 2002;
Bicci 2010; Tocci 2008). Part and parcel of this literature is, however, a more
critical stance on what and how writing about EU foreign policy is done. James
Rogers (2009, 83) asserts that most of the contributions to this debate are lacking innovation and are rather repetitive, ‘the only difference is often the names
used to describe’ the EU. Karen Smith (2005, 64–73) has repeatedly pointed to
the literature shortcomings in terms of clear and unequivocal terms and concepts
specifically regarding the distinction between “military power” and “civilian
power”. Moreover, Helene Sjursen (2006a, 240–2; see also Merlingen 2007) has
succinctly de(con-)structed Manner’s (2002) “normative power” approach, most
notably criticizing its lack of substantial discussion on ideological and political
Euro-centric connotations as well as issues of legitimacy, ultimately allowing for
just another sort of “missionary politics”, which are not substantially different
from the normative policies of the former Soviet Union or the United States.
Hence, the topic of the EU’s role in international or global affairs is thoroughly
covered by academic literature. The usual starting point is the premise that the
EU is neither a state nor an international organization, but rather a phenomenon
sui generis which requires special treatment (Øhrgaard 2004). Indeed, as Rogers
(2009, 832) asserted, a screening of the existing literature reveals that ‘almost all
of the well-known approaches seem to accept, sometimes unquestioningly, that
the Union is a sui generis international actor.’ Despite Risse-Kappen’s (1996)
as well as White’s (1999) argument in favour of comparative research and the
viability of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) to examine the EU’s foreign policy,
respectively, the broader perspective of a ‘structured and focussed comparison’
(George 1979; George and Bennett 2004) of the “power and actorness” of the EU
with that of states or international organizations, remains substantially neglected.
In view of the evolution of the EU, in terms of institutionalization as well as
actual policy-making, it may well be right to assume that the EU is neither a
nation-state nor an international organization.2 Undoubtedly, the European integration process and what has become the European Union of 28 member states
is still a unique experiment with a special history and specific structures, processes and mechanism of policy-making, categorizing the Union as a sui generis ‘self-contained regime’ (Phelan 2012, 380–2). However, at the same time,
considering the many faces of globalization, nation-states may no longer be
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Introduction 3
“nation-states” and (at least some) international organizations are no longer
“international organizations” in terms of the ideal models used for comparison to
the EU. Thus, in comparative terms of “power and actorness”, the uniqueness of
the EU ought to be questioned and should therefore be analyzed in greater detail.
The example of the Libyan incident mentioned above at least questions the presumption that there are, in principle, differences when comparing policy output,
outcomes and impact of the EU “foreign policy” with those of an international
organization like NATO or a powerful nation-state like the US.
This multifaceted problematique, which goes beyond the conceptual debate on
EU power and actorness, points towards the following research questions (RQ),
which might best be tackled by empirical research:
•
•
What is the quality of the EU’s foreign policy in terms of a) distinctive features (RQ 1) and b) of policy “effectiveness” (RQ 2) – regarding its “actorness and power” – compared to other actors in international relations and
global politics, first and foremost states and intergovernmental organizations?
What factors influence the EU’s performance in comparison to the performance of a state or international organization? (RQ 3)
To sum up, the premise of this project is that even though there might be some
truth to the argument of the EU being a special case requiring special concepts
and designs for well-founded analyses, this special quality might, in fact, be overstated. As a consequence, the large body of existing literature on this topic might
still be missing conceptual opportunities offered by foreign policy analysis and
comparative studies to put the claims and the practice of a European Foreign
Policy into perspective (Risse-Kappen 1996, 57). Notwithstanding the inherent
interconnectedness of identity and actual policy-making, Karen Smith (2005, 81)
is correct to say that it may be more important to know what the EU actually does
than what it is. At the same time, this study takes up Helene Sjursen’s (2006b,
170) pertinent argument for ‘systematic empirical investigation’. Thus, this study
attempts to make use of the aforementioned missed opportunities by designing
a comparative research project that combines evaluation with causal analysis in
terms of a comparative design, applying the basic features of a “grounded theory”
or “heuristic case study” approach.3
This investigation proceeds as follows: Section 1 will incorporate the various
concepts of “actorness” used in the pertinent literature for qualifying the EU
and will deconstruct them in comparative perspective. Second, power concepts
ascribed to the EU will also be examined in comparative perspective. Both subsections contain analytical literature reviews organized along distinct “theses”
focusing on the core problems and challenges of the debate. They will show the
problems of “fuzziness” and ambiguous terms and concepts as a major feature
of the contemporary debates on the EU’s “actorness and power”. In Section 2,
the “uniqueness” of the EU will be compared to the evolution of the nation-state
and international organizations to support the author’s claim that a comparative
research design incorporating the “foreign policy” of the EU, state actors and
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4
Ingo Peters
other non-state actors should be a promising approach. In Section 3, the findings of the first two sections will be incorporated into a reconstruction of EU
research that extends beyond narrow-minded concepts of power and actorness.
Here we will investigate some opportunities to study EU foreign policy in a
more productive way by making use of comparative studies and Foreign Policy
Analysis (FPA) to guide the case studies following in the next chapters of this
volume.
A comparative deconstruction of actor and power concepts
ascribed to EU foreign policy: a critical literature review
The Lisbon Treaty (ToL, 2009) has raised great expectations through its accentuated impetus on changes regarding the EU’s objectives in foreign policy-making
in terms of ‘unity, consistency, and effectiveness of action by the Union’ (Art. 26,
2 ToL), as well as affected its external representation through revitalizing institutions such as the upgrading of the High Representative and establishment of new
agencies and instruments like the European External Action Service (EEAS) (see
for example Dagand 2008; Biscop and Algieri 2008). Whether or not this new
treaty is once again codifying existing practices rather than facilitating a new
quality of political unity and policy coherence is still open for debate. However,
this debate opens additional research opportunities along the lines of problematizing power and actorness beyond this paper’s and project’s approach (see Héritier
2007; Caporaso 2007).
The successive subsections will discuss various distinctive arguments in order
to shed some light on the utility, as well as the conclusiveness, of available writings. However, the purpose is not to summarize or compare all possible contributions to the debate on the EU’s “actorness and power” (for other literature reviews,
see Ginsberg 1999; Manners 2002, 236–8; Toje 2008b, 203–5; Rogers 2009, 832f;
Koops 2012, 95–146). Moreover, please note that the following “theses” are not
“hypotheses” being tested later on, but are rather meant as central statements,
summarizing core problems found in the existing and reviewed body of literature,
and thus core challenges for any study that investigates the “actorness and power”
of any type of international actor.
Deconstruction of actor concepts ascribed to the EU
Thesis A1 (and P1): The debates on the EU’s actorness and power features are
indeed overlapping and intrinsically linked. The EU is an international actor and
power of varying quality across issues and time!
Going back to Sjöstedt’s groundbreaking and still noteworthy contribution
of 1977, the first challenge is to ‘separate actors from non-actors in the international system’ (Sjöstedt 1977b). Both are incorporated as “units” that constitute
‘some sort of social system’ exemplified by reference to states or international
government organizations (IGOs). Nowadays, we have to add non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) to this typology of units possibly qualifying for varying
degrees of actorness. The delineating criterion for actors/non-actors is (according
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Introduction 5
to Sjöstedt) the respective unit’s autonomy, defined in varying degrees of separateness (in terms of being ‘discernible from its external environment’), and ‘a
minimal degree of internal cohesion’ (Sjöstedt 1977b, 15). However, “autonomy”
is merely considered as a necessary but not sufficient criterion. In addition, an
actor’s possession of “actor capabilities” are, in principle, defined as ‘a measure
of the autonomous unit’s capacity to behave actively and deliberately in relations
to other actors in the international system’, which has to become part of the equation (Sjöstedt 1977b, 13–19, 15).
In his 1977 article, Sjöstedt (1977a, 26f) also suggested that the conceptualization of “power exertion” is, by definition, ‘a purposeful, deliberate action on
the part of nation A’. Hence, power is not only understood in terms of available
capabilities, but also as ‘power over outcomes’ inherently incorporating action,
where the ability to act becomes the ability to exert power. The respective quality
to act is then conclusively related to different variations of a respective “power
base” (military, economic, civilian, etc.). Hence, first, without being an actor, no
subject in IR (or “unit” according to Sjöstedt) can ever be any sort of power and
vice versa. Second, no matter what kind of power base, what magnitude of power,
what avail or what kind of impact, these qualifying dimensions do not define
this basic understanding of “actorness” which, of course, might then be qualified
along the aforementioned dimensions.4
Box 1.1 Sjöstedt’s (1977b) concept of actorness5
Definition: A
ctorness = ‘measure of a unit’s capacity to behave actively and
deliberately towards other actors in the international system’
Variance: ΔActorness = unit’s autonomy (Δseparateness +Δinternal
cohesion) + actor capabilities (Δpower base) + power exertion
© Ingo Peters 2015
This basic understanding of actorness, stripped of all possible qualifications
dominating the academic and the political debate, have brought the author to the
following conclusions: a) The EU is indeed an actor in international or global
affairs, since it purposefully and deliberately defines and pursues policies; and
b) the EU is indeed a power, no matter the actual quality of its power base, its
outreach – regional, global – has an influence on political processes and an impact
on political results. This close link between actorness and power thus renders this
argument, or “Thesis P1”, as an argument also belonging to the next section. Only
with these premises in mind, does the debate on how to qualify the actorness and
power of the EU make sense.
Thesis A2: “The ability to act” ought not to be confounded with the “ability to
act effectively”; an actor remains an actor, even if he/she/it might not be effective!
This argument focuses on the “quality of actorness” as the independent variable, and the “effectiveness of foreign policy actors” as the dependent variable.
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6
Ingo Peters
This point refers to certain contributions where authors do not simply define actor
quality as such, but insist that the existing definition of actorness incorporates the
element that any actor is only an “actor” if it “makes a difference”, that is, if an
actor has a significant impact on the course of policy processes and their respective results in terms of achieving one’s goals and resolving identified problems
and policy challenges. Along these lines of thinking, Bretherton and Vogler (1999,
249; italics added) list ‘the ability to negotiate effectively with other actors in the
international system’ as their third (out of five) requirements for actorness. They
stand by this feature in the revised version of their book, though altering their
argument slightly, changing this feature from a requirement for actorness to their
very conceptualization of actorness, which is defined as the ‘capacity to exploit
opportunity, to capitalize on its formidable presence, and thus to function effectively as a global actor’ (Bretherton and Vogler 2006, 218; italics added). Likewise,
Toje (2008b, 204) criticized Sjöstedt’s definition of actorness as ‘self-serving in
the sense that it is tailored to the strengths of the EC/EU, while omitting the ability
to affect policy’. Hence, he implicitly argues in favour of rendering ‘the ability to
affect policy’ as part of a basic “actorness” definition instead of conceptualizing
“policy effects” as another dependent variable that attains different values under
different circumstances and in different policy fields.
Thesis A3: “Effectiveness” is an ambiguous concept, which should be specified
in view of a given policy field and issue at hand. As a measure of the “quality” of
a given policy, effectiveness (i.e. performance, success) must be operationalized
in such a way that allows for a differentiated measurement.6
This thesis obviously falls somewhere between and connects theses A2 and A4.
The relationship between actorness and effectiveness as a measure of policy quality
is ‘often underspecified and systematic empirical analyses of EU effectiveness . . .
are still relatively rare’ (Groen and Niemann 2013, 2). However, policy evaluation
needs to take into account that ‘multiple actors provide for multiple realities, and
multiple yardsticks’ and thus multiple options for policy evaluation. Without a
specific conceptualization and operationalization, any assessment and evaluation
will remain futile (Jörgensen 1998; Howlett et al. 2009, 183).
Most explanations regarding the preconditions for successful/effective
policy-making, that is, possible independent variables (see thesis A4), distinguish
between factors relating to the decision-making component of generating policy
decisions (coherence, cohesion, etc.) on the one hand, and the availability and
application of the necessary means (instruments, capacities, capabilities, etc.)
conducive for a joint or coordinated policy conduct in line with the decision on
the other. Hence, in sum, the effectiveness of EU foreign policy can be evaluated parallel to the steps of a policy-cycle model: that is, into output effectiveness and outcome effectiveness, categories which were suggested by Underdal
and Young 2004 (see also Young 2002; Underdal 2008) and were originally
designed to evaluate the environmental policy realm and environmental regimes.7
The third category, impact effectiveness, refers to producing the desired aim in
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Introduction 7
terms of influencing the outside world and other international actors. This latter
dimension is dependent upon the respective performance evaluations found in
the previous steps of the policy cycle, though these “internal” preconditions for
successful problem-solving along with the aims defined at the first step (output)
are obligatory but not necessarily sufficient conditions for impact effectiveness,
as Thomas (2012) argued convincingly.8 This latter option will also serve to provide the foundations for the evaluative yardstick concerning the quality of the
EU’s actorness and power in comparative perspective and therefore guides the
case-study research gathered in this volume.
Thesis A4: As part of any definition, indicators of actorness ought to be separated
from factors which are preconditions or explanatory variables for generating varying qualities of foreign policy actors!
Here the quality of the actor – in terms of Sjöstedt’s “actors’ properties” – is
the dependent variable, that is, the one to be measured, evaluated or explained.
In various definitions of EU actorness, possible factors for explaining the different qualities of actorness are, however, also used as descriptive elements, i.e.
indicators of actorness. For example, three central contributors to the debate on
actorness illustrate this point: defining actorness as the ‘ability to act purposefully and as one’ (Hill 1993, 318), Hill originally identified the three causal factors as ‘its ability to agree, its resources and the instruments at its disposal’ (Hill
1993, 315).9 In order to take into account the significance of identity, he came to
qualify ‘true actorness’ as requiring ‘not only a clear identity and a self-contained
decision making system, but also the practical capabilities to effect policy’ (Hill
1996, 13, and also fn 27). Jupille and Caporaso (1998, 214, 220) define actorness
as the ‘capacity to act’ which is ‘a function’ of four ‘causal factors’, that refer
Independent Variable
Conditions
Dependent Variable
Foreign
policy
actorness
Independent Variable
Effects,
effectiveness
Dependent Variable
Graph 1.1 “Actorness” as dependent and independent variable
© Ingo Peters 2015
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8
Ingo Peters
to ‘its recognition by others as well as its authority, autonomy and cohesion’,
which consequently ‘form a coherent ensemble, depending on one another for
full meaning’ (see for a reformulation of that approach Groenleer and Van Schaik
2007, 971–3).10 Bretherton and Vogler (2006, 35) defined actorness as ‘an entity
that is capable of agency, of formulating and acting upon decisions’. They stress
that their approach to defining or evaluating actorness ‘comprises three elements:
opportunity, which denotes the external context, presence, which captures the
ability of the EU, by virtue of its existence, to exert influence beyond its borders
and capability, which signifies the ability to exploit opportunity and capitalize on
its presence’ (Bretherton and Vogler 2006, 24–30, 24). Moreover, these authors
suggest four ‘basic requirements’ – as features or as explanatory factors – that
define “actorness”:
1. Shared commitment to a set of overarching values;
2.Domestic legitimation of decision processes and priorities relating to
external policy;
3.The ability to identify priorities and formulate policies captured by the
concepts of consistency and coherence, where:
(a) consistency indicates the degree of congruence between the external policies of the Member States and of the EU;
(b) coherence refers to the level of internal coordination of EU policies.
4.The availability of, and capacity to utilize, policy instruments – diplomacy/
negotiation, economic tools and military means.
(Bretherton and Vogler 2006, 30)
Furthermore, these authors assert that ‘the most significant (requirement) concerns the ability to formulate and implement external policy’ (Bretherton and
Vogler 2006, 218) which also, interestingly enough, edges towards Hill’s more
parsimonious concept of actorness.
However, this does not lead the respective authors to the identification of the
same or at least similar preconditions or causal factors; the variance of which could
be used for evaluating or explaining various qualities of the Union’s actorness
across issues and time. Hill’s three causal factors all point towards the EU’s capabilities in terms of institutional features, i.e. a) decision-making procedures (‘the
ability to agree’); b) the instruments at its disposal; and c) its funding (resources).
Likewise, Jupille and Caporaso (1998, 217, 219) also include institutional features
and address them according to their concepts of autonomy (‘distinctive institutional
apparatus . . .’) and cohesion (‘value, tactical, procedural, or output cohesion’).
Bretherton and Vogler, as part of their set of ‘four requirements’ for actorness, show
some overlap with the other authors by also noting institutional factors like a) cohesion, i.e. a ‘shared commitment to a set of overarching values’); b) ‘the ability to
identify priorities and formulate policies’, which matches up with Hill’s ‘ability to
agree’ as much as Jupille and Caporaso’s factors of ‘autonomy and cohesion’; and
c) the availability and use of policy instruments. Yet another overlap can be identified
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Introduction 9
when Jupille and Caporaso posit an external factor (‘recognition by others’) and
Bretherton and Vogler, as part of their set of three elements of actorness, cite the
external context (‘opportunity’). Changes to the external environment/opportunity
structure have been facilitated accordingly and “caused” a strengthening of the
Union’s foreign policy; the end of the Cold War, the ‘failure of the Union’s exclusively civilian approach’ in Yugoslavia or deep divisions among member states
regarding the invasion of Iraq in 2006 (Bretherton and Vogler 2006, 5–6).
The remaining features of these three approaches are more distinct and independent: Hill’s inclusion of ‘resources’, Jupille and Caporaso’s reference – as a
result of their focus on pillar one activities – to a legal factor (i.e. ‘authority’), as
well as Bretherton and Vogler’s mention of ‘presence’ (i.e. ‘the ability of the EU
by virtue of its existence, to exert influence beyond its borders’), all of which can
barely be distinguished from other authors’ definitions of actor/actorness/or to act
to another, as well as their concept of ‘capability’ (signifying ‘the ability to exploit
opportunity and capitalize on its presence’). The latter, however, does not match
Hill’s understanding of ‘capabilities’ cited above.
These examples apparently show a great deal of commonality concerning the
cited authors’ respective “actor” definitions; though varying in terms of the exact
wording, in substance they do not show a lot of variation. However, it is by no
means continually unequivocally clear where the definition ends and the explication of “independent variables” begins. Addressing “causal factors”, Hill’s as
well as Jupille and Caporaso’s conceptualizations seem to be more aware of this
categorical difference than that of Bretherton and Vogler, who instead focus on the
‘basic requirements’ for actorness, leaving it up to the audience to decide whether
this is part of the definition or instead alludes to some sort of “independent variables” – even in their supposedly “constructivist” approach.
Another observed variation is the multiple usages of terms such as “coherence”, “cohesion” and “consistency” in the conceptualizations of actorness cited
above. Most authors present some type of conceptualization of these terms, but
do not bother to relate theirs to other, already existing explanations and nor do
they justify the necessity of departing from already existing conceptualizations.
The respective choice of a given concept is thus mostly forgoing any discussion
of alternatives and, in turn, the added value of the specific concept used. Thus, the
overall coherence of this research field is suffering from a more or less arbitrary
choice of concepts and a tendency “to reinvent the wheel” time and time again (see
for discussions of these concepts: Tietje 1997; Missiroli 2001b; Gebhard 2011).
The seemingly significant similarity of “actor” definitions is striking given the
fact that all of the authors refer to different dimensions of the EU’s foreign policy
or international relations. Conceptual differences can be attributed to the varying
theoretical concepts present in the authors’ respective contributions. While Hill is
relating to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP, that is, “pillar two”
of the Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice treaties), Jupille and Caporaso are explicitly concerned with ‘the first pillar under the TEU’ and Bretherton and Vogler
cover EU “external policies” regarding the Union’s outreach under pillar one, i.e.
“external relations” of Commission activities, as well as pillar two activities, i.e.
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10
Ingo Peters
intergovernmental CFSP.11 The conceptualization of actor and actorness, that is,
their definitions as much as their preconditions and causal factors and processes
generating actors, fundamentally depend on the theoretical premises to serve as
analytical starting points. Since theoretical positions may be different concerning
ontological as well as epistemological premises, concepts vary (see Bretherton
and Vogler 2006, 15–23). Hence any qualification of “European Union foreign
policy” has to be explicit in terms of its respective policy realm as well as the
respective and distinct treaty base, as much as the theoretical foundations that the
empirical investigation rest upon.
Deconstruction of power concepts attributed to the EU
Similar to the previous subsection, this one is also not meant to reiterate the manifold contributions to the discussions on “what kind of power” the EU is or should
be. Again, the distinctive theses, inferred from a thorough yet undoubtedly incomplete literature review, will propose arguments for debate and should therefore
highlight some more important inherent conceptual problems.
Thesis P2:12 In search of finding a way to define the uniqueness and extraordinary
quality of the EU’s foreign policy, experts (as well as politicians) often conflate
the analytical with the normative dimension of EU foreign policy-making. Both
dimensions should, however, be addressed distinctly and explicitly.
Accordingly, the claim made here is that arguments surrounding what are the
EU’s actual foreign policy features are sometimes fundamentally linked to normative statements on what this policy ought to be, often combined with respective policy recommendations – albeit sometimes in the form of wishful thinking.
This holds true for the original civilian power argument made by Duchêne, as
well as for Bull’s counter argument; Duchêne, against the backdrop of the heydays of East-West détente, conceived the world in terms of Keohane and Nye’s
“complex-interdependence” argument (asserting that states are not the only actors
and that military security is neither the only nor major concern, thus devaluating the significance of military power in influencing international political and
economic process), and stressed the European community’s economic power and
therefore recommended Western Europe to rely exclusively on civilian forms of
power (see Duchêne 1972, 47; Keohane and Nye 1977, 24–9).
In response, Bull (1982, 150) accused him of subscribing to a ‘return to idealist
or progressivist interpretations of international relations’ and for most of his 1982
article, he elaborates on seven distinct arguments regarding his policy recommendation in terms of ‘A Europeanist Strategic Policy’, all of which hinge upon
his assumption that Europe should be ready to take on more of the burden of its
own security and defence. Asserting that ‘Europe is not an actor in international
affairs, and does not seem likely to become one,’ he further stresses that even ‘the
countries of Western Europe need to take steps towards providing themselves
with nuclear deterrence forces’ (Bull 1982, 151; see also 157–63).
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Introduction 11
For more up-to-date accounts, Wright and Howorth serve as examples with
Wright (2011, 9f, 13), signing up in favour of the sui generis character of the
EU and also accusing Duchêne of a state-centric analysis, arguing for combining civilian and normative power approaches as ‘the most appropriate basis for
analysis’ to move ‘beyond the state-centric paradigms that currently predominate’
(Wright 2011, 8, 27f). Arguably, he shows conceptual awareness and backs up his
argument by empirical evidence in a later part of the article. However, his analysis
remains a very special mix of analytical and normative approaches, though he
completely ignores some critical literature, most notably Karen Smith’s critique
of the civilian power arguments purported by Maull and Whitman, who argues
that Maull and Whitman overstretch the definition and make ‘fuzzy interpretations’ (Smith 2005, 71–3, 72), as well as Manner’s (2006) revision of his “normative power” argument, Sjursen’s (2006a) critique thereof, also fostered by the
methodologically thorough investigation of Rogers (2009). How could any of
these contributions to the debate on EU foreign policy be neglected when they are
asserting that any meaningful frontier indicating a “militarization” of the EU has
actually already occurred some time ago?
Howorth (2010, 457–60, 459f), in contrast, sets out to define the challenges
of the EU as an international actor after Lisbon. In his analysis, he admits that
the Union is not a ‘ “world power” in any conventional sense’ and that the EU’s
ambitions ‘are constrained by an ongoing tension between the Union itself and its
Member States’. With regards to his normative dimension, he stresses the assertion that ‘what constitutes power and what constitutes influence’ is ‘radically
redefined’ and that the EU has the ‘potential to influence in a positive direction
the course that international relations and world history will likely take in the 21st
century’ (Howorth 2010, 458). The Union should therefore develop a ‘strategic
vision’, ‘a more calculated strategic approach and begin at last to think in terms of
“large ends” ’, namely a ‘multilateral global grand bargain’ as a viable foundation
for the new age of a multipolar world order (Howorth 2010, 464, 466).
Thus, while both of these articles contain analytical as well as normative
dimensions and policy recommendations, the robustness of Wright’s contribution
renders it “involuntarily” normative by neglecting counter evidence. Howorth,
in contrast, argues normatively in favour of a more strategic vision in terms of a
new grand global bargain, assuming that the EU has the right sort of and the right
amount of power at its disposal for achieving this ambitious end. Thus, the argument made here is not against the necessity of thinking about European foreign
policy in normative terms, but is rather made in favour of doing so explicitly and
distinctly instead of a “manipulative” conflation of the analytical and the normative dimensions of EU foreign policy (see for a critique of over-emphasising the
normative dimension Hill 1993, 307; Smith 2005, 79).
Thesis P3: The attributes used to characterize the EU’s power are referring to power as a resource or instrument for policy-making as well as to a
variety of policy ends; these attributes are not mutually exclusive but rather
complementary.
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12
Ingo Peters
As argued in Thesis A1, the concepts of actorness and power can be used
almost interchangeably and thus the various attributes most commonly used to
describe the EU’s “power” could also be used to categorize its “actorness”. Basically, four dimensions or categories of adjectives can be distinguished as follows:
attributes specifying A) ends and means, B) geopolitical outreach or scope, C) the
significance or size of its power capabilities, or D) meta-categories superseding
the traditional concept of the nation-state as reference point (see Table 1.1).
The variants of attributes used in the pertinent literature for characterizing the
EU’s power immediately show that “power” is not confined to a realist concept
of power in terms of military (and economic) capabilities as political instruments.
Rather, other intangible and structural sources of power are discernible as well,
such as social norms or cultural factors. Moreover, the first category may also
relate to respective political ends, for example civilian or normative aims. However, as Karen Smith (2005, 76) and Helen Sjursen (2006a) have respectively
argued, it is not always clear from the beginning whether every use of civilian
means is in fact serving civilian ends or why “a normative power Europe” could
not be as invasive as other powers, like, for example, the Soviet Union or the US
during the days of the East-West conflict. In other words, being a normative power
is neither good or nor bad per se, but depends on the context and the norm in question and is ultimately in the eye of the beholder.
Moreover, all components of Category A do not point to alternative power
resources per se but rather to complementary ends and means. Indeed all categories
can be seen as complementary, but not concerning all respective attributes. Hence,
the question becomes more salient and asks under which circumstances the EU
might be inclined to use which resource or instrument to pursue which kind of policy ends and is thus best qualified to be the respective dominant power feature; ideally this could amount to ‘smart power’, as Obama’s first Secretary of State, Hillary
Rodham Clinton, framed it (Clinton 2010; see also Nye 2007). Second, the categories that are most useful as a reference are always defined by the context in question,
in which the EU is qualified in terms of power and actorness. Thus, along these lines
of thinking, nothing is incorrect about Ian Manners’ (2002, 253) assertion when
he concludes that ‘[t]he EU is a civilian, and a military, and a normative power!’
Indeed, the EU might be categorized – rightly or wrongly – as ‘an economic giant,
but a political dwarf’ or a ‘rising superpower’. To this end, Moravcsik’s (2010) line
of argument once again shows us that against the backdrop of any multidimensional
power concept, the concept you choose (in connection with the chosen empirical
case) will significantly define the results you receive from your investigation.
Thesis P4: The close link between ends and means of EU foreign policy is mirrored by a close interconnectedness between identity and policy-making, which is
sometimes conceived as operating in terms of a questionable, yet direct causal link.
In his original argument favouring the notion of a “normative power” Europe,
Manners (2002, 252; italics added) concluded that ‘the most important factor
shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does or what it says, but
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ends and means
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
© Ingo Peters 2015
regional
global
a small power
a great power
a superpower
metrosexual superpower
a strategic power
post-modern
post-national
post-Westphalian
a military
a civilian
an economic
a normative
a soft power
a cultural power
Attributes
geopolitical outreach or scope g.
h.
C.the significance or size of
i.
its capabilities
j.
k.
l.
m.
D.meta-categories, superseding n.
‘nation-states’ as reference
o.
p.
B.
A.
Categories
a. Larsen 2002; Treacher 2004; Smith 2005; Manners 2006
b.Whitman 1998; Laursen 1991; Smith 2005; Hettne and Söderbaum 2005
(n); Wright 2011
c. Bretherton and Vogler 2006
d.Manners 2002; Diez 2005; Sjursen 2006a (n); Hyde-Price 2006 (n); Wright
2011
e. Giegerich and Wallace 2004 (n)
f. Aggestam 2008
g. Raik 2006
h. Bretherton and Vogler 2006; Zielonka 2008; Rogers 2009; Howorth 2010;
i. Toje 2008b; Toje 2011
j. Hodge 1998
k. Laursen 1991; Whitman 1998; Moravcsik 2010; Reid 2004
l. Khanna 2004
m. Rogers 2009; Howorth 2010
n. Caporaso 1996; Wallace 2004; Sörensen 1997
o. Sjursen 2004
p. Sjursen 2006a; Wunderlich 2008
Authors using respective attributes in terms of dominant feature of EU foreign
policy (‘n’ = negative)
Table 1.1 Attributes used for qualifying EU foreign policy actorness and power
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14
Ingo Peters
what it is.’ Drawing on evidence from EU documents, Manners (2002, 242–4,
esp. table 2, 243) identified five core values – peace, liberty, democracy, the rule
of law and respect for human rights – as well as four ‘minor norms’ – social
solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance.
Contrary to Manners, Karen Smith (2005, 81; italics added) argued strongly in
favour of moving beyond ‘classifying or categorizing the EU – and celebrating
its distinctiveness – to debating what it actually does and what it should do in
international relations’. Smith’s argument is further supported by Aggestam’s
plea for refocusing the debate from what the EU “is” to what it actually “does”
as part of her conceptualization of an ‘Ethical Power Europe’ (EPE) (Aggestam
2008, 3).
However, the seemingly different arguments encouraged by these three respective authors also show significant overlap, especially since Manners’ understanding of “what the EU is” finds its corollary in Smith’s distinction between
exercising and being a civilian power, that is, the difference between civilian
means and ends being part and parcel of any meaningful civilian-power concept
(Smith 2005, 64f).13
By stressing “what it is” and “its ends”, both authors also implicitly refer to
another important issue: the EU’s identity or, more specifically, its foreign policy
or international identity. According to Bretherton and Vogler (2006, 39) “identity”
can be defined as ‘shared understandings about the essential nature of an entity,
which are constructed through social interaction’ (see also Risse 2010, 19–33).
Moreover, identity formation of the EU serves to differentiate itself from others,
comprising a process of inclusion and exclusion or, more specifically, defining the
“we” and the “other”. Furthermore, their reasoning implies that the EU’s identity
includes distinct shared values and principles because the EU is not a state but a
sui generis phenomenon (Bretherton and Vogler 2006, 41, 44f). When the Maastricht Treaty entered into force in 1993, Hill (1993, 13) asserted that actorness
(and hence the EU as any kind of power) requires a ‘clear identity’, which ‘cannot
be bought off the shelf’. He attested and explained that the EC’s identity
rests upon a relatively weak sense of shared history and identity; partly
because the diverse historical experiences of its members, partly because its
institutions have lacked the influence over education or the ability to create
and manipulate symbols which national governments had themselves used
to strengthen communal identities, and partly because the forging of identity takes time, and comes through hard-won experience, including shared
failures.
(Hill 1993, 8)
Implicitly agreeing with Hill that the continuing practice of foreign policy interaction within the EPC framework might bring about a sense of shared identity,
Bretherton and Vogler posit the EU as maintaining ‘a hybrid identity associated
with inconsistencies of role and behaviour’ (Bretherton and Vogler 2006, 60; Hill
1993, 9).
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Introduction 15
But how does this go along with their premise that ‘[i]dentity does not directly
determine interests; rather they perform a mediating function’ or their assertion
that ‘[i]n the construction of actorness, identity mediates between opportunity and
action’ (Bretherton and Vogler 2006, 37, 60)? In a similarly questionable manner,
Whitman (1998, 2) claims that the EU’s identity relates to ‘the operations of the
European Union that are explicitly directed outwards from the Union [which]
can be characterized as the “international identity” of the Union.’ First of all, in
a “truly” constructivist approach, as claimed by Bretherton and Vogler, no single factor influencing policy-making can definitively “determine” something but
would rather be more likely to outline probabilities. Second, a relevant point for
both Bretherton and Vogler and Withman, is how do other factors besides “identity” influence actual policy-making more or less simultaneously?14 In his 2002
article on the normative character of the EU (i.e. what the ‘EU is’), Manners
interestingly uses an illustrative case study that focuses on the Union’s pursuit
of the abolition of the death penalty (see Manners 2002, 245–50) to evidence
the actual normative foundations of EU policy. He thus reiterates Smith’s argument and advises us to focus on what the EU does rather than what it is. But is
this methodologically sound? Note that Manners, despite his own assertion of
an evident mismatch of the concept and actual EU policy-making in 2006, still
ascribes to the normative-power approach for understanding ‘the power of ideas
in global politics’ and moreover continues to promote this concept in a normative
manner because it ‘can help the EU “remain distinctive” because “the EU needs
to be unambiguously a normative power” ’ (Manners and Whitman 2013, 196–7;
Manners 2013, 487).
Moreover, Aggestam’s (2008, 3) plea to ‘mov[e] from its [the EU’s] institutional make-up (what it “is”) to its behaviour (what it “does”)’ is not as clear
as it appears at first glance. Given the fact that it goes against her constructivist
background, one could safely assume that the “institutional make-up” does not
necessarily refer to institutions in the organizational sense, but rather refers to
intangible norms and values that compose the social structure of the EU. This
is, however, not the case. On the one hand, she does not conceive of what the
EU “is” in terms of the EU’s foundations of norms and values nor the issue of
identity, though allegedly argues that ‘ethics are intrinsic to the identity of the
EU’ (Aggestam 2008, 4). On the other hand, however, Aggestam’s (2008, 3) basic
understanding of EPE focuses ‘on the intentions and purposes behind the active
exercise of EU power’. Interestingly enough, this seems to match Smith’s understanding of the respective EU “policy ends”, i.e. what the EU “is”.
In conclusion, the obviously pertinent authors of this debate refer to the same
termini without explicitly referring to each other’s writings in order to clarify
differences in usage (see above, Thesis A4). Here, the authors’ understandings
and conceptualizations of what the EU “is” or “does” are apparently at odds.
Moreover, it appears to be advisable to clearly state one’s epistemological
stance on issues regarding the normative dimension, on the one hand, and the
policy-making dimension on the other, which begs the question: Are norms and
values, identity and ethics used “as just another variable”, or do we conceptualize
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16
Ingo Peters
these “factors” in a constitutive sense? Even when applying a soft concept of
“causality”, multi-causality seems to be a sensible idea with regards to governing social sciences, isn’t it? Hence, identity cannot be inferred directly from the
operational policies of any one actor and more specifically, not of the EU. Furthermore, as Risse has convincingly argued, identity remains a contested and
elusive concept and measuring it remains a ‘daunting task’, especially since ‘in
the real world, instrumental behaviour driven by the logic of consequentialism
and identity-based behaviour driven by the logic of appropriateness often occur
almost simultaneously’ (2010, 19, 33, 21).
Before delving into the next section of this chapter, where we will be addressing the pros and cons regarding the issues and opportunities of comparing the EU
to other actors in international relations or global politics, the following final thesis will serve as a transition by addressing the applicability of the various “power
and actorness” attributes of other types of international actors.
Thesis P5: The variety of power attributes ascribed to the European Union’s foreign policy are in no way exclusive to the Union, but could be also be applied
to other kinds of international actors, such as international organizations,
non-governmental organizations and, of course, state actors.
Part of the whole debate surrounding the actorness and power of the EU in the
EU Studies community and beyond is – as Sjursen (2006b, 172) has conclusively
noted specifically for the normative-power dimension of the discussion – ‘a claim
about the EU being a different and even novel kind of power in the international
system’ supposedly resulting in a policy pursuit based on specific norms and values, which are linked to its distinct form of organization, defining a sui generis,
post-Westphalian entity (see also Wunderlich 2008).
The actorness or power attributes listed in Table 1.1 can also be used to characterize international organizations. The UN, as a collective security institution,
is based on the overall commitment to eradicate war as a political means among
nation-states – an ethical as well as post-national dimension of its mandate. It is
therefore devoted to a mix of civilian and civilizing ends, offering a set of civilian means and mechanisms for the sake of promoting a peaceful resolution of
conflicts and peaceful change in general. However, it may ultimately mandate
coercive military action under Article 7 UNC, if – according to Article 39 of the
UNC – the Council comes to the conclusion that a given situation or incident
poses ‘a threat to international peace and stability’. This truly global IO also acts
on the regional level, whether or not its capabilities make a difference. Therefore,
whether it is considered as a small or a great power is contingent on multiple factors. The issue at hand is the structure of the problem as well as the related incentives for cooperation among actors involved, especially in the Security Council
(see for example Alexopoulos and Bourantonis 2008).
The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), another
example of a “collective security organization”, declaring itself a regional organization under Article 9 of the UNC, is considered to be an actor under its own mandate
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Introduction 17
or appointed by the United Nations. Nevertheless, the participating states –
as part of the Charta for Europe adopted in 1990 – refrained from the option of
any military enforcement operation. First of all, the OSCE is not a formal international organization under the jurisdiction of international law but rather just by
name, due to the fact that it is not based on a legal international treaty. Foregoing
the ultimate option of military enforcement actually does not make it a “collective
security” institution but rather an actor solely confined to the civilian realm when
it comes to sanctioning violations of OSCE principles and rules (Peters 2004).
NATO was founded as a military alliance and is therefore predominantly considered as a military actor and power. But with the Harmel Report of 1967 and its
political formula of “security = defence + détente”, it has also become a “security
management” institution among its members and towards the adversary as early
as the days of the East-West conflict (Wallander 2000; Wallander and Keohane
1999). With the end of the East-West conflict and in the wake of the fall of the
iron curtain in Europe in 1989/90, it significantly enhanced its scope of activities
in the politico-military realm as well as in the civilian one, by, for example, fostering civilian control of the military in the new democracies of Central and Eastern
Europe. With the “threat from the East” gone, the alliance function of NATO has
immersed itself in more important activities regarding security management and
has even become a collective security organization going far beyond its originally
military ends and means. With its out-of-area engagement, especially in Afghanistan, it also transitioned from a regional to a more global organization – albeit not
in membership (see Peters 2004, 384, 397).
Using the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe (OSCE) and NATO as comparative examples is also interesting in terms
of their normative dimension. Though characterized by different institutional
characteristics in terms of membership, security functions and policy-making
rules and procedures, all these institutions are classified as “western” institutions,
ascribing to the same set of basic norms and values, such as democratic rule,
rule of law and human rights. These international organizations are subscribing
to the same “core values” as well as “minor rules” as the EU, thus rendering the
normative dimension a not so distinct feature of the EU as, for example, Manners
initially suggested (see Manners 2002, 242–4; Peters 2011).
Likewise, the attributes listed in Table 1.1 may be used to explain the divergent
characteristics of state actors and powers. For the time being – despite the rising
importance of the BRIC countries in the economic sector – the United States is
supposedly the sole military superpower in the world. Its strategic culture may
render its security policy more prone to military action than other nations (Williams 2006). But at the same time, we should not underestimate the significant
civilian power component in US foreign policy, taking for instance its role in forging the international regime for fighting the channels of international and transnational terrorism (see Biersteker 2002; Biersteker 2004; more generally Ikenberry
2011). Iceland – for example, a state without a military – might be more prone to
be called a “civilian” power. In the short run, it has no choice but to draw on its
civilian power capacities. However, at times this apparent stereotypical civilian
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18
Ingo Peters
power ascribes to canon-boat coercive diplomacy when it used its coastguard to
fend of British trawlers from fishery grounds in the 1980s. Despite being largely
classified a civilian power (a result of necessity), this feature might become subordinate depending on what is at stake (see for example Hart 1976; Russett 1994,
chapt. 6). The US, in contrast, has the choice between going the military or the
civilian way. Washington can and – if considered appropriate – does often go with
the military option, preferring unilateral policies. All things considered, the US
remains, beyond its unique military capabilities, a very influential multilateral and
civilian power in global affairs as well (see Fehl and Thimm 2008; Pollack 2003).
As a final illustrative example, let us turn to Germany and Japan, the supposedly
most stereotypical ‘civilian powers’ (see Maull 1990; Katzenstein 1996; Berger
1996). Both of these states, as a lesson learned from their aggressive military
policy in the past and their respective defeats in World War II, do have military
means at their disposal but they are intended first and foremost for self-defence
and heavily embedded in alliances, either with NATO or the US. Despite their
strong role in promoting civilian ends and means, both are ascribing to the use
of military means for political ends beyond pure self-defence, thus posing the
question under what circumstances this is actually the case. The Japanese and the
Germans are constituents of the “coalition of the willing”, fighting the Taliban
in the fight against international terrorism in Afghanistan. Moreover, Germany
has occasionally chosen to join its partners in military campaigns (Kosovo 1999;
Afghanistan since 2001), as well as sometimes refusing to be involved (Iraq war
1991, 2003; Libya 2011) (see Mirow 2009). Hence, along the normative dimension, Japan and Germany, in their political rhetoric as well as in their operational
policies, are ascribing mostly to the Western norms and values listed by Manners,
who views them as the core values and minor norms guiding EU policy-making.
But the departure from a purist civilian concept is – in the case of the EU, as much
as of these ‘civilian’ states – apparently rather a matter of choice and circumstance
than of principle.
In sum, concerning the normative dimension as much as the actual policymaking, the attributes that are so often assigned to the EU and are meant to accentuate its specific and unique features in terms of actorness and power, can and
have been used to characterize the actorness and power of international organizations or nation-states. Hence, these features are not exclusive to the distinct character of the EU’s foreign policy, despite the fuzzy and elusive use of these terms
and concepts in the pertinent literature (see Smith 2005, 71–3).
Intermediate summary
Are there any more questions regarding the clear and unequivocal use of terms
and concepts in the discourse and debates on EU foreign policy, specifically its
“actorness and power”? If nothing else, the previous theses should convey the
major lesson to be learned: If you are not confused, you are not well informed!
The arguments presented here for a critical review of the concepts of “actorness and power” are not merely springing from a purist’s plea for unequivocally
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Introduction 19
clear terms and concepts, but also have significant implications for any research
design in this field and beyond (see Sartori 1970; Sartori 1984). For positivists, if
we make possible dependent or independent variables a part of a definition itself,
the different qualities that constitute actorness cannot be used to explain different policy outcomes or impact, as such reasoning becomes tautological. Potential
explanatory factors as part of the definition are ruled out from assuming this element as an explanatory variable in a research design, which is, to say the least,
possibly counterproductive since it limits the respective research designs from
the very beginning and thus confines otherwise available research opportunities.
For constructivist approaches (here taken as a meta-theory!), since a consensus is
likely unattainable, the understanding of what kind of constructivism is applied
here is indispensable for a coherent and conclusive academic work. This applies
especially to any investigation based on mixes of positivist epistemologies with
constructivist ontologies (see Laffey and Weldes 1997).
However, meta-theoretical considerations aside, this discussion should provide
ample evidence for the dead-end street that most of the research based on the
aggregated attributes assembled in Table 1.1 is heading towards. It is now time
to turn towards the actual criteria and indicators abundant in the field of Foreign
Policy Analysis for describing, evaluating and explaining or even understanding
the EU’s foreign policy.
Comparing EU foreign policy with that of states or
international organizations: comparing apples and oranges?
The purpose of this section is not to provide a full-fledged review of everything
that has ever been said in terms of pros and cons regarding the sui-generis character or the comparability of the EU with other types of actors. Instead, it seeks to
establish the very premise of this article as well as this project and book: Even if
the EU is a sui generis “beast”, its foreign policy can be and should be compared
to other types of international and global actors. By doing so, this section is also
setting the stage for a particular research design, one which will be elaborated on
in the final section of this introductory analysis.
Many authors, perhaps most prominently Ginsberg (1999, 432), have warned
against comparing the EU with tradition nation-states since the EU ‘is neither a
state nor a non-state actor (. . .) neither a conventional international organisation
nor an international regime’. Instead, Jupille and Caporaso (1998, 213–14) have
proposed three broad options for classifying EU actorness: 1) the EU as a collective actor based on convergent interests; 2) the EU as a polity; 3) the EU as
an evolving entity displaying varying degrees of “actorhood” across issues and
time. Interestingly enough, they settle on their third option, rendering the EU
in its external relations as ‘neither a full-blown polity nor a system of sovereign
states’. More recently, Wright (2011, 19) further rejected any state-centric view
on EU foreign policy, arguing that such an analysis follows a narrow concept of
capabilities (in terms of military capabilities) and largely neglects ‘the complex
and multi-directional set of relationships . . . at work’; neither agency-wise nor
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20
Ingo Peters
structure-wise, he concluded, does the state concept fit the EU’s characteristics
(Wright 2011, 9). However, sifting through the most relevant literature on the
“actorness and power” of the EU, many contributions to the debate, implicitly or
explicitly, confirmatively or disapprovingly, still obviously refer to the concept
of “a state” as a comparative yardstick (see for example Bull 1982; Hill 1993;
Zielonka 1998; and for a conceptual discussion Caporaso 1996). Today, most
members of the EU Studies community (and beyond) seem to take for granted the
unique, sui generis character of the EU, as Rogers (2009, 832) suspected.
But what is, according to the pertinent literature, supposedly rendering the EU
a unique, sui generis polity? Lists of marked characteristics vary widely; Manners, for example, emphasizes the pooling of sovereignty, the importance of the
transnational European Parliament, the requirements of democratic conditionality
and the pursuit of human rights as unique features (see Manners 2002). Øhrgaard
stresses the scope of EU policies, the institutional design, decision-making procedures and its supranational legal identity (see Øhrgaard 2004, 26). In Common
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), that is, the intergovernmental realm of the
EU polity, this leads to a “collective” or “shared leadership” burdened by the lack
of ‘a decision-making procedure for overcoming dissent’ (Smith 2004, 746; also
Toje 2008a, 128). Furthermore, Phelan (2012, 380) has identified the EU, through
the lens of IR theory, ‘as a self-contained regime’, imposing ‘costly adjustments on organized interests in Member States’ but rejects ‘the use of inter-state
counter-measures and reciprocity mechanisms’ as a ‘particular form of multilevel
governance’.
Beyond the specifics of EU institutionalization and its subsequent material
features, many authors have additionally identified the importance of “social
structure” originating from EU institutionalization, thus facilitating (possibly
unintentionally so) consequences beyond formal institutionalization. Springing from its specific institutional setup, “multilevel governance” of the EU is
also applicable to the CFSP/CSDP and thereby generates norms for legitimate
policy conduct inside the EU, among these the “key norm” (Smith 2004, 743,
745–6; see also Toje 2008a, 122, 130–5; Sjursen 2011, 1084–6) of “consensus
policy-making”, i.e. the practice where QMV could be applied not using a formal
veto but instead genuine efforts to find consensus, a manifestation of one form
of ‘informal governance’ (Kleine 2013). Thus it has been claimed that an aquis
politicque has emerged in the sense of ‘the very fact that CFSP has proved so
useful for its member states has transformed it into an interest in itself’ (Øhrgaard
2004, 33–5, 34).
Accordingly, in the realm of the Union’s foreign policy, formal intergovernmentalism stands against de facto cooperation practices including “transgovernmental interaction” and processes of “interpenetration” and socialization generate
informal integration mechanisms like “Brusselisation” and “Europeanization” or
the “coordination reflex” (Øhrgaard 2004, 27–31). Thus, formal intergovernmentalism becomes “transcended” by more integrated processes of policy-making.
Sjursen’s (2011, 1081–9, 1089) comparison of the four ‘constituent pillars of
intergovernmentalism’ with the reality of foreign policy-making within the Union
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Introduction 21
leads her to conclude ‘that when the EU acts, it does so on behalf of something
more than the mere sum of member states’ interests; it does more than act on the
delegated authority of the member states’.
Taking all of these features into account, it may indeed become plausible to
address the EU as a unique and sui generis “multiperspectival polity” (Lewis
1995; Ruggie 1993), since – to the best knowledge of this author – no other international organization has reached a similar degree (formally as much as informally) of integration and regional cooperation. Thus, do scholarly comparisons of
the EU’s foreign policy with that of other types of international actors (states, IOs,
NGOs) indeed mistakenly compare “apples and oranges”?
Thesis C1: Nation-states are no longer “nations states” (just as international
organizations no longer “international organizations”) in terms of their ideal
types; thus the features of different types of international actors – notwithstanding their remaining marked differences – are converging to a significant degree.
With the end of the East-West conflict, German unification and the end of the
Soviet empire as well as the newly emerging powers in global economic and
security affairs, it is commonplace that fundamental changes in the international
system and of this system’s elements have occurred. However, these changes in
the system do not merely redefine the international agenda by incorporating new
fundamental and enormous challenges to international actors, but also redefine
international organizations or non-governmental organizations, resulting in significant changes of the overall system itself (see for example Smith 1994). The
‘age of transformation’ (Zürn and Leibfried 2005, 17) of the international system
goes hand in hand with the changes made to the very fabric of the nation-state,
changes which have been going on for much longer, purported by a ‘dialectical
political process’ of fragmentation and globalization (Clark 1997, 23–30, 197–8).
After all, a core premise of interdependence theory, as most prominently formulated by Keohane and Nye (1977, 24–9) is that the state is no longer the only and
was not always the most important actor; a fundamental idea which can be traced
back to pre-World War I in the writings of Norman Angell or Leonard Woolf (see
Angell 1914; Woolf 1916).15
In his exploration of the “nature of the beast” that we call the European Union,
Risse-Kappen (1996, 57) argued in favour of redefining the research agenda of EU
Studies and asserted that comparative policy analysis and research on the meaning
of trans-governmental and transnational relations suggests the following: a) that
states are indeed no longer resembling the traditional Weberian notion of ‘the state
as a hierarchical structure of authoritative decision-making enjoying external and
internal sovereignty’; and b) these approaches ‘conceptualize state-society relations in terms of policy networks where national governments are only one actor
among others.’ Regarding the EU, he summarized that:
there is a growing convergence among international relations and comparative politics scholars conceptualizing the EU as a multilevel structure of
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22
Ingo Peters
governance where private, governmental, transnational and supranational
actors deal with each other in highly complex networks of varying density, as
well as horizontal and vertical depth.
(Risse-Kappen 1996, 57)
Moreover, against the backdrop of a well-defined, ideal “modern state” of
the OECD world (TRUDI), Zürn and Leibfried (2005, 2–3, 26) found, based on
substantial case studies, ‘that the very fabric of the state is unraveling’. Though
‘. . . no standard development for the state as such can be identified. There is no
standard “post-national constellation” in sight.’ However, they consider the EU to
be ‘the exceptional case . . . offering a post-national perspective for its member
states, an option, which does, however, not suit the whole of the OECD world’.
Complementing these findings, Leibfried and Wolf (2005, 480, 499) stress the
‘hybrid nature’ of European integration, claiming that ‘the EU is both part of, and
the result of this development.’ European integration therefore contributes to the
unravelling of the state and also stands for a new configuration of modern statehood. These authors have come to believe that the Union is best understood as
an ‘essential dimension of a genuinely novel form of public structure’. However,
what is most important for the context of Thesis C1 is their assertion that ‘European integration and the nation state are alike. With time, the EU increasingly will
be incorporated into global multilevel structures, sector by sector, without being
replaced or dissolved.’
Moreover, the EU is in fact a fragmented actor; it is marked by interlocking
politics and multilevel governance – a “mixed-actor” system (White 1999, 41,
44) – but it is not the only one around. However, these features are also discernible state features, though to different degrees depending on the institutional
setup of the state in question. After all, these features are also applicable to foreign policy-making in many decentralized states. Germany serves as the chief
example of this fragmented political system of interlocking politics, resulting in a
mixed-actor system, in which, as Risse-Kappen (1996, 58, 61, 64) argued, domestic structures ‘mediate and filter the influence of transnational relations on state
policy. . . .’ This argument is beefed up by corresponding case-study research,
providing evidence for these features and mechanisms of Germany’s, often speaking with many unclear voices on the level of EU policy-making (see Bulmer and
Paterson 1987; Bulmer et al. 2000; Bulmer et al. 2001). Likewise, studies on
Germany’s influence on EU policy-making has provided evidence that a respective power potential does not tell a lot about the respective de facto impact on the
actual policy-making process in terms of “power over outcomes”, that is, what is
decided and what is implemented regarding a specific policy issue (see Schneider
and Bailer 2002; Bailer 2004).
To recap, the traditional nation-state is losing its definitional features of sovereignty, autonomy and legitimacy, and moreover is in itself a diverse “beast”
(see state-typologies in Krasner 1999; Sörensen 2001, 72–91; Caporaso 1996),
while the EU has been gaining along these same lines. Hence, Thesis C1 is substantially supported by some major strands of IR and EU Studies literature on the
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Introduction 23
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conceptual level as much as by substantive case study research, thus rendering the
EU and traditional nation-states fairly comparable “apples”.
Thesis C2: International organizations are no longer “international organizations” in terms of the ideal type; thus the features of different types of international actors – notwithstanding their remaining marked differences – are, to a
significant degree, converging.
While earlier in this paper the issue that was discussed focused on whether the
EU policy-making has – even in foreign policy – evolved beyond intergovernmental processes and procedures, the question now is whether or not the same
can be said about intergovernmental organizations. This perspective implies the
claim of “agency” for IOs resembling the concept of actorness and power of the
respective institution.
According to the realist and neo-realist schools of thought, international organizations are epiphenomena and are therefore understood as inter-governmental
institutions that are purely instrumental for the respective member states. That
being said, IOs are not considered possible independent variables or international
actors in their own right (see as “crown witness” Mearsheimer 1995). It is natural
that this position conflicts with all kinds of variants of liberal or constructivist
theories which – though arguably based on different epistemological and ontological premises – agree on one basic premise: ‘Institutions matter!’ (Simmons
and Martin 2002, 194–9). This premise also serves as a foundation for most (if not
all) schools of thought focusing on EU studies; without this premise of “Europeanization” (no matter whether bottom-up or top-down), it does not make sense at
all (Olsen 2002; Börzel and Risse 2006).
Simmons and Martin’s (2002, 193) assertion that ‘IOs deserve attention at
least in part because they have agency, agenda-setting influence and potentially
important socializing influences’ is in line with that of the abovementioned
authors. Indeed, as quoted by these authors, empirical research has provided
ample evidence that institutions have significant effects on state behaviour.
Their significance, however, varies across issues and time as well as across the
various forms and functions of institutionalization. IOs result from cooperation
among states due to their benefits, i.e. ‘managing policy externalities, facilitating collective decision-making, resolving disputes, enhancing credibility, and
creating policy bias’ (Hawkins et al. 2006b, 13, 13–20). Formal international
organizations are constrained by their member states per se, which might, however, delegate some autonomy and authority by the respective mandates (see
Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 707–8; Hawkins et al. 2006b, 7–8). But in the
respective issue areas, IOs may acquire some ‘legitimacy of legal authority’
and ‘control over technical expertise and information supposedly empowering
IOs by their resulting capacity of classifying the world, fixing meanings and
diffusing norms’. Thus, IOs can become ‘autonomous sites of authority, independent from the state “principals” who may have created them’ (Barnett and
Finnemore 1999, 710–11). If this becomes a fact, Barnett and Finnemore (1999,
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24
Ingo Peters
716) call this a ‘pathology’ (defined as dysfunctional IO behaviour that undermines the IO’s stated objectives), since it might be an unintended consequence
of institutionalization processes. Or as Hawkins et al. (2006b, 8–9, 24, 26–31)
have asserted, the delegation of tasks and responsibility to IOs may not simply
imply benefits in terms of facilitating cooperation, but also costs, i.e. unintended
costs such as agency slack (shirking and slippage), allowing agents to use their
granted autonomy to influence the future decisions of the principals. The specific form of institutionalization also defines the respective control mechanisms
of the principals vis-à-vis their agent.
In sum, state of the art institutional research suggests that international institutions and, more specifically, IOs may become powerful actors in their own right,
as they are no longer fully controlled by their principals. Instead of formal intergovernmentalism – as is the case in the EU (see above), policy practice can (more
or less – depending on various factors) lead to various supranational features of
international organizations, internal practices and external actions (see for example Sörensen 2001; also the results of the case studies in Hawkins et al. 2006a).
Thus, in principle, convergence can be claimed if it comes to the EU, on the one
hand, and IOs, on the other hand, once again rendering them both as “apples” –
albeit different kinds of “apples”.
Thesis C3: As international actors, different types of actors are still actors and
are as such “apples”, not “oranges”! Comparing the EU’s foreign policy with
that of other kinds of international actors is thus not only legitimate and “scientifically” appropriate, but in fact necessary and advisable in order to better study
international actors in international relations and global politics.
In conclusion, following Theses C1 and C2, the EU’s distinctiveness – the main
premise of this project – is not a very convincing argument regarding the compar­
ison of the EU as one type of political system with other political systems, be they
states, international organizations (or non-governmental organizations); the various types of political actors in international relations might be different in their
institutional setup, their way of decision-making, their capabilities and instruments or their legitimacy. Thus, why should different characteristics or features of
these types of international and global actors prevent us from comparing different
polities with one other, particularly concerning their (relative) policy output, outcome or impact? Moreover, the EU’s distinctiveness as a polity cannot justify any
claims for requiring specific integration theories or against reducing EU politics
and policies solely to FPA (see Risse-Kappen 1996; Moravcsik 1993).
Comparing the EU’s actorness and power with that of states and other types of
international actors need not be “unfair” or evidence of ‘an inability or unwillingness within the scholarship to fully account for the international role played by the
EU’ (Wright 2011, 19). Doing so could only be considered unfair or inadequate
in the course of any actorness and power debate if the evaluation of findings is
politicized, normatively loaded and used for political purposes or against the significance or legitimacy of the EU or for that matter any other polity.
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Introduction 25
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Reconstructing EU-research beyond power and actorness:
policy description and evaluation, “grounded theory”
approach and case study design
The study of European integration is [sic] in its post-ontological phase is a
refreshing development. Endless debate about ‘what the EU is’ cannot be
productive unless tied to detailed, though theoretically informed, empirical
studies. Similarly, the empirical studies are unlikely to acquire their full significance unless integrated with broader conceptions of the nature and significance of the evolving European Union.
(Caporaso 1996, 49)
In contrast to a research design based on the narrow-minded assumption that the
EU is a unique sui-generis polity in international relations, the main argument
of this paper assumes that only a solid comparative research design can reveal
the specific features of EU “actorness and power” as well as its possible evolution across issues over the course of time. Hence, the research design proposed
and pursued in this project agrees with Risse-Kappen (1996), White (1999), Rogers (2009) and Caporaso (1996), as cited earlier, and argues in favour of making
use of the opportunities offered by comparative studies and FPA by conducting
a structured comparative analysis of EU foreign policy. Moreover, besides its
unique and specific features, there might also be common features and common
or different factors driving EU foreign policy-making and its actual performance.
As scholars, however, we should be interested in the options for comparative
research springing from the variety of different actors’ features and then use this
variance as a reservoir of possible variables available to help us better understand
or explain the differences in performance of international actors in specific policy
areas as well as across the board.
Based on White’s (1999, 37–8) concept, “European foreign policy” in this
study comprises the foreign policies of EU member states, the external relations
of the EU Commission, as well as the intergovernmental EU Council’s international engagement via CSFP/CSDP (see Table 1.2).
Hence, the empirical research following in respective case studies closely
resemble the project’s focal points by concentrating on three distinct research
questions (RQ):
•
•
•
What are the most salient common and dissimilar features of EU foreign
policy compared to other international actors? (RQ 1)
How effective is EU foreign policy compared to other international actors?
(RQ 2)
What causal factors possibly influence the effectiveness of the EU foreign
policy in comparison to other international actors? (RQ 3)
Addressing RQ 1 allows us to grasp the policy characteristics of the respective
actors and to identify the distinguishing features of EU foreign policy within the
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26
Ingo Peters
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Table 1.2 EU foreign policy as multi-actor and multi-level governance according to
White (1999)
Commission foreign
policy
Union foreign policy
National foreign
policy
External affairs
Common foreign
and security policy
Foreign policy of MS
Principal
actors
¬EU Commission
¬ Commissioners
¬EU Council
¬High
Representative
National governments
Available
instruments
¬Trade policy
¬Technical and
financial assistance
¬RRM
¬Common Position
¬Joint Action
¬[Common
Strategies]
¬Declarations
¬Special
Representatives
All commonly used
instruments of foreign
policy
Treaty
foundation
( Pillar I )
Lisbon Treaty,
Article 25b
( Pillar II )
Lisbon Treaty,
Articles 28a, 25b
© Ingo Peters 2015 (based on White 1999)
realm of individual case studies. Investigating RQ 2 will provide a distinct evaluation of the EU’s “effectiveness” as an actor. Finally, in a third analytical step,
RQ 3 is aimed at generating hypotheses. Thus the objective of this volume is not
to deductively test any particular theoretically informed hypothesis but rather to
identify possible explanatory factors for the distinct features and effectiveness of
the EU’s policy-making, as found under RQ 1 and RQ 2, inductively.
Each of the three main research questions have been formulated to serve distinct analytical purposes and as such, require respective methods of inquiry and
examination, which need to be addressed separately. In doing so, the findings of
the preceding literature review suggest refraining – in the descriptive as well as
in the evaluative dimension – from subscribing to any of the abundantly available
labels for qualifying EU foreign policy (see again Table 1.1). Hence, as another
premise of this project, there is no need to actually generate an ultimate conceptualization of “power” or “actorness” before conducting research as this could
prejudice the course of investigation and respective findings.
For investigating RQ 1, we require a set of criteria that allows us to compare
different international actors’ foreign policies systematically. Hence, as a first analytical step, authors will systematically describe the EU’s foreign policies in
comparison to those of other actors by using various standard FPA criteria such as
an actors’ problem definition, their respective policy goals, as well as strategies,
instruments and specific policy programmes or institutions/agencies that guide or
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Introduction 27
influence different international actors’ policy-making. Accordingly, RQ 1 aims
first and foremost at analyzing “actorness”.
To conduct foreign policy evaluation and thus answer RQ 2, further yardsticks
and criteria are required to carry out an inter-subjectively descriptive and evaluative analysis of policies and their respective features in terms of “power”, which
is either measured in terms of internal policy prerequisites or in terms of its actual
influence on the world outside of the EU, implying making an impact on individual actors as well as influencing processes in various kinds of bilateral or multilateral relations. In order to cover both elements that comprise this internal-external
nexus, this project, based on the seminal work of Underdal and Young (2004)
on the effectiveness of environmental regimes, adapts their five-step policy
cycle which allows for distinguishing output, outcome and impact performance/
effectiveness and using these steps as yardsticks to evaluate the success or failure
of any given policy actor (see Graph 1.2) (Heider et al. 2004; Heider 2009).16
Moreover, this allows us to operationalize these categories by incorporating more
specific criteria (i.e. output: defining the problem/agenda, the respective policy
aims and strategy; speaking with one voice; outcome: pursuing a joint or coordinated policy, impact achievements in terms of explicit goals, etc.). This conception allows for the differentiation of the internal and external dimensions of
the policy-making of any given international actor, with the outcome dimension
interlinking both spheres.
Plainly speaking, this evaluative dimension addresses a complex understanding of “power”, its internal foundations, as well as its exercise or influence on the
outside world, regardless of being described in terms soft or hard, or any other
kind of power concept. Hence, “output effectiveness” could be defined as the
quality of the formulation of goals and the unity of voice.17 Moreover, this “output
Various feedback processes (Europeanization, institutionalization, learning etc.)
International
challenges
INPUT
Initiative of a
state or another
actor
DECISION-MAKING
Agenda setting
problem definition
perception
conceptualization
OUTPUT
Policy formulation
decision on goals &
adequate & legitimate
policy strategies
Output-Effectiveness
Effectiveness indicators: Aims, Strategies
& Instruments defined
a) Institutions & agencies
b)‘Common positions’
c) Joint action’
OUTCOME
Policy implementation
coordinated policy implementation
or operational cooperation
Outcome-Effectiveness
internal actors:
Joint or coordinated policy
compliance (internal)
domestic consent
IMPACT
Policy results
Impact Effectiveness
external actors:
a) compliance (external)
b) change of behaviour
c) problem resolved
Graph 1.2 Categorizing effectiveness: the example of CFSP
© Heider/Kleine/Peters 2004 (based on Underdal and Young 2004)
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28
Ingo Peters
effectiveness” also entails an institutional component, raising the question: To
what degree do actors consider institutions and agencies advantageous or even
indispensable for translating decisions into actions?
“Outcome effectiveness” refers to the quality of policy implementation, as
measured here, for example, by the resonance between stated goals and actions
taken (i.e. “promises made and promises kept”). Moreover, the quality of outcome
is measured by “coherent action”. This coherence can be understood in terms of
“horizontal coherence” that is found among European institutions (e.g. Council
and Commission, Parliament), as well as in terms of “vertical coherence”, which
refers to the coordinated or common action of EU institutions and the member
states respectively (see again Tietje 1997; Missiroli 2001a; Gebhard 2011).
“Impact effectiveness” is characterized by two subcategories, the first being the
impact made on the targeted actors in another country, i.e. the respective change
in behaviour of an actor in that country in accordance with the said political goals.
The second category denotes the overall impact on resolving the problems identified in mandates and designated to be “cured” by specific policy actions taken. For
example, EU foreign policy-making might address the simple problem of governance in another country or it could be geared towards influencing multilateral
negotiations meant to manage a specific policy challenge, possibly through the
joint or coordinated action of the “international community”.
Thus, the overall setting becomes one of overlapping policy cycles linked at
the impact dimension (see Graph 1.3) with the outcome/policy implementation of
one cycle becoming one (of a possible many) input-dimension for another policy
cycle. This conceptualization allows us to once again determine the quality of the
EU’s policy impact according to the policy cycle’s steps. In pragmatic terms, if
EU policy is able to make an impact on the target’s output, it is a good start, but
when the quality of impact is more prominent and it is also able to impact the target’s policy outcome (which is necessary to achieve the maximum of impact), that
is an ideally viable, effective and legitimate solution to the challenge addressed in
the first place. Of course, in view of the respective case study, different qualities
of “impact” have to be operationalized and indicators specified in order to determine effectiveness. In addition to one’s own evaluation, any account or possible
Policy cycle of Actor B
or within multilateral negotiations
Policy cycle of
Actor A, here, the EU
Quality 1
Output
Outcome
Impact
Quality 2
Quality 3
On output
On outcome
On impact
Changes in policy
formulation
Changes in policy
implementation
Changes/Problem
solving
Graph 1.3 Impact effectiveness in overlapping policy cycles
© Ingo Peters 2015
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Introduction 29
assessments made by the EU itself, the targeted country (societal actors and government) and/or third parties like international organizations or experts from academia and think tanks should be taken into consideration.
Impact effectiveness, with its potential scope/outreach in the international community, either in terms of multilateral negotiations or policy vis-à-vis single countries, is, methodologically speaking, the most tricky category. Impact can have
different meanings, at least in terms of a) changing the immediate situation on the
ground by changing peoples’ behaviour (i.e. their policy output or outcome); and
b) a more general change of situation made possible by a viable problem solution
(i.e. the ultimate/long-terms goal, which might mostly be awkward and still pending anyway). As Daniel Thomas (2012, 472) rightly noted, such a policy cycle
might come with the problematic implicit assumption that a linear causal relationship exists, possibly assuming that once the prior steps are deemed “effective”,
the desired impact will be achieved automatically.
However, we also have to account for the inherent problem of mono-causality;
we must be aware of the ‘problem of attribution’ (Young 2002, 74; Kahl 2013,
39). Can the assumed impact actually be ascribed to the effectiveness of the EU’s
policy, that is, are the changes solely due to the EU’s sphere of influence or could
other actors and factors be at work? This problem can barely be settled completely. However, it could be (depending on an individual researcher’s decisions)
ameliorated by one of the following suggestions: a) stating this caveat explicitly;
b) avoiding evaluating “impact” effectiveness and confining research to output
and outcome effectiveness; and c) by stating this caveat explicitly and nevertheless proceeding to carefully assess respective trends and directions of change that
are in line with or at least do not run counter to EU policy aims, disregarding the
matter of whether or not it was solely due to EU influence.
The reader should note, however, that this conceptualization of policy evaluation is not claiming to be the one and only way to “heaven”. Rather, it is an offer
and a methodological choice made to guide the case studies in this volume, as
individual researchers deem appropriate in view of their own premises and cases
at hand.
Policy explanation (RQ 3), that is, explaining the commonalities and differences found across the descriptive and evaluative dimensions, will consider the
various kinds of explanatory factors found in the many options available in the
relevant Comparative Politics, FPA and IR theories and approaches as possible
hypotheses for testing, as evidenced in the empirical data of the individual case
studies. Hence, this study, though informed about and by these theories, will not
be concerned with “theory-testing”. Instead, it will be inspired in broad terms
by a “grounded-theory approach”, thus generating explanatory factors from the
actual data and information provided by the empirical “hypotheses generating” or
“heuristic” case studies (Corbin and Strauss 1990; Lijphart 1971; George 1979).
Simply put, “generating hypotheses” refers to the researchers’ task of identifying
possible explanatory factors with respect to apparent empirical evidence and data
from their respective cases. The testing of the hypotheses generated in this project
might then be useful for future research.
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30
Ingo Peters
The comparative dimension involved in all RQs will therefore be evaluated by
a systematic “structured focused comparison”, according to a case study design
(George 1979; George and Bennett 2004). This comparison will be structured in
the sense that each case will apply the same set of questions and criteria for evaluating policy performance and it will be focused on selected policy areas. While the
EU (Council, Commission, member states) is a fixed item, other actors may vary,
that is, different states or different IOs might be investigated across the various
policy fields chosen for the respective case studies. The universe of possible cases
in terms of policy fields (and world regions, etc.) comprises many options. For
this study, the policy realms of international security policy and international
economic policy are suggested as first choices, since a) both comprise the main
share of the Union’s external affairs; and b) both policy areas cover the core of the
EU’s integrated structure as well as the intergovernmental realm.
But enough about the state of the art and alternative conceptualization of the
EU’s “actorness and power”: What will the case studies reveal regarding features
of EU foreign policy and foreign policy-making.
Notes
1 For details see below, Section 1.
2 For details see below, Section 2.
3 For details see below, Section 3. Note the overlap of many of these premises with
the recent special issue of International Relations edited by Niemann and Bretherton
(2013, 262–3).
4 These and other ‘variable properties’ of actors are found in: Sjöstedt (1977b, 16–17).
They are also incorporated in his concept of ‘structural prerequisites’.
5 This author would like to emphasize the significance of Sjöstedt’s attempt to conceptualize “actorness”; this is the result of the widespread acceptance of his concept in subsequent publications. Nevertheless, his conceptualization remains somewhat puzzling and
indeed inconsistent due to the fact that he, on the one hand, defines the quality of ‘actor
capability’ by referring to the concept of autonomy and, on the other hand, reiterates
‘actor capability’ as the decisive criterion, delimiting actors from non-actors. Moreover,
operationalization of the variance apparently remains problematic (see Box 1.1).
6 Please note, “effectiveness” is not equal to “efficiency”: While the latter conventionally relates to costs and benefits of any given policy, the former refers to the match
between policy aims and policy results.
7 See also the critical discussion of the transfer of this concept from evaluating environmental regimes to analyzing foreign policy by Hyde-Price in this volume.
8 Thomas (2012) also begins with Sjöstedt’s concept of actorness (458) and argues that
“actorness” is equated with “policy coherence” and is defined and operationalized by
two dimensions, ‘policy determinacy’ and ‘policy cohesion’ (459–60). By doing so, he
implicitly refers to output and outcome effectiveness. Also note his decision to reserve
the term “effectiveness” for ‘the Union’s ability to shape the world affairs in accordance with the objectives it adopts on particular issues’ (460). Thus, he stresses the third
category of effectiveness, that is, impact effectiveness.
9 These three factors resemble Sjöstedt’s ‘conditions for the actual performance’ (Sjöstedt 1977b, 46).
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Introduction 31
10 Details on each criterion are found on pp. 215–21: “recognition” (acceptance and interaction by and with the organization, other members and third parties; 216), ‘authority’
(EU’s legal competence to act; delegated by the MS; 216–17), “autonomy” (distinctive institutional apparatus and independence in goal formation, decision-making and
implementation; 217–18) and “cohesion” (value, tactical, procedural, output cohesion;
218–19).
11 In view of the time when these articles were published, it should be clear that the pillar
metaphor related to the TEU up until the Treaty of Nice (2000).
12 Please note, that the thesis P1 was – due to the conceptual link between actorness and
power – merged with thesis A1 in the previous subsection.
13 See her ‘approximate definition’ of ‘civilian power’ as an ideal-type (68–9), specifically her text box on p. 69.
14 In his book review Sebastian Wolf (2008, 213) suggests a polite critique: ‘It appears that
the book profits from the fact that the constructivist approach is not overemphasized.’
15 Remarkably, this literature resonates – without explicit reference – with Katzenstein
(1976; 1977).
16 Note: The policy-cycle model used here is based on Underdal and Young’s (2004)
work. However, it also deviates slightly from their original model. Most importantly,
Underdal and Young list policy “implementation” under “impact” whereas both reference points in this volume are handled separately, the former being incorporated under
the category “outcome” (Underdal 2002, 6; Young 2002, 74; Underdal and Young
2004, 34).
17 Instead of “output”, Daniel Thomas (2012, 458–60) refers to ‘policy coherence’ (which
he takes as an alternative definition for “actorness”) at this stage of policy-making and
offers a valuable operationalization by introducing the concepts of “policy determinacy” and “consistency”.
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