1. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ALFREDO
BON, appellant.
G.R. No. 166401
October 30, 2006
RTC found him guilty of murder with qualifying circumstance of
treachery.
Issue:
1.
Facts: Eight (8) Informations were filed within the period from 21
August 2000 to 23 February 2001 by the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor of Gumaca, Quezon against Alfredo Bon, charging
him with the rape of his two nieces, the daughters of his older
brother.
2.
HELD:
1.
Appellant was convicted by the trial court of eight counts of
rape. The trial court considered the qualifying circumstances
of minority of the victims and appellant’s relationship with
them, being the former's relative by consanguinity within the
third degree (uncle), and imposed upon Bon eight death
sentences.
Upon automatic review, the Court of Appeals downgraded
the convictions in two of the cases to attempted rape. It
held that the prosecution failed to demonstrate beyond
reasonable doubt that Bon’s penis reached the labia of the
victim’s vagina. Accordingly, it reduced the penalties
attached to the two counts of rape from death for
consummated qualified rape to an indeterminate penalty of
ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen
(17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, for attempted rape.
Subsequently, Republic Act No. 9346, titled “An Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the
Philippines,” was enacted. Section 2 of the said law
mandates that, in lieu of the death penalty, the penalty of
reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. Correspondingly, the
Court can no longer uphold the death sentences imposed by
lower courts, but must, if the guilt of the accused is affirmed,
impose instead the penalty of reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment when appropriate.
Issue: Whether or not Bon’s penalty for attempted qualified
rape (note that Bon committed 6 counts of consummated
rape, and 2 counts of attempted rape which is the issue here),
which under the penal law should be two degrees lower than
that of consummated qualified rape, should be computed
from death or reclusion perpetua.
Held:
RECLUSION PERPETUA. "Death," as utilized in Article 71 of
the Revised Penal Code, shall no longer form part in the
graduation of penalties. In the case of appellant, the
determination of his penalty for attempted rape shall be
reckoned not from two degrees lower than death, but two
degrees lower than reclusion perpetua. Hence, the maximum
term of his penalty shall no longer be reclusion temporal, as
ruled by the Court of Appeals, but instead, prision mayor.
By reason of Rep. Act No. 9346, he is spared the death
sentence, and entitled to the corresponding reduction of his
penalty as a consequence of the downgrading of his offense
from two (2) counts consummated rape to two (2) counts of
attempted rape. For the six (6) counts of rape, we downgrade
the penalty of death to reclusion perpetua with no eligibility
for parole, pursuant to Rep. Act No. 9346. For each of the
two (2) counts of attempted rape, we downgrade by one
degree lower the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals.
We hold that there being no mitigating or aggravating
circumstances, the penalty of prision mayor should be
imposed in it medium period. Consequently, we impose the
new penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.
2. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. DANNY
DELOS SANTOS Y FERNANDEZ, appellant.
G.R. No. 135919
May 9, 2003
Facts: November 6, 1997 in San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan, Rod Flores
was in drinking spree with Narciso Salvador, Marvin Tablate and
Jayvee Rainier, when suddenly, appellant, Danny Delos Santos
emerged from the back of Flores and stabbed him to death with knife.
Fearful for their lives after witnessing the gruesome killing, witnesses
De Leon and Tablate only testified two months after the incident
happened.
WON the testimonies of the witnesses are credible even
after two month period
WON proof of motive to kill is indispensable for
conviction
2.
Yes. The court ruled that the two-month delay is hardly an
indicium of a concocted story. It is but natural for witnesses
to avoid being involved in a criminal proceeding particularly
when the crime committed is gruesome showing the cruelty
of the perpetrator. The fear of retaliation can have a
paralyzing effect to the witnesses. Thus, the initial reluctance
of witnesses to volunteer information about a criminal case is
of common knowledge and has been judicially declared as
insufficient to affect credibility, especially when a valid
reason exists for such hesitance.
No. Proof of motive is not indispensable for a conviction,
particularly where the accused is positively identified by an
eyewitness and his participation is adequately established. In
the crime of murder, motive is not an element of the offense,
it becomes material only when the evidence is circumstantial
or inconclusive and there is some doubt on whether the
accused had committed it.
3. RODOLFO C. VELASCO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
G.R. NO. 166479, February 28, 2006
FACTS:
On April 19, 1998 at about 7:30 o’clock in the morning,
private complainant Frederick Maramba was cleaning and washing
his owner type jeep in front of his house at Lasip Grande, Dagupan
City when a motorized tricycle stopped near him. Accused Rodolfo
Velasco dashed out of the tricycle, approached the complainant and
fired at him several times with a .45 pistol. The accused missed with
his first shot but the second one hit the complainant at the upper arm,
causing him to stumble on the ground. The complainant stood up and
ran, while the accused continued firing at him but missed.
The incident was reported by the Brgy. Captain Dacasin
describing that the suspect was wearing “chaleco”. The police caught
up the suspect and recovered in him were firearm and ammunitions.
The police also recovered 7 spent ammunitions in the crime scene.
Private complainant was hospitalized but still identified the
accused as his assailant and who shot him on the morning of 19 April
1998. Another witness, Armando Maramba, the driver of the tricycle
where the accused rode, also testified the events of the crime.
The accused interposed the defense of alibi, that on April 18,
1998, he went to a friend’s house in Pangasinan and spent the night
there.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Velasco was guilty of attempted homicide.
RULING:
The petition is DENIED affirming the decisions of RTC and CA. The
witness and the complainant was able to positively identify that
Velasco was the shooter. Thus, it outweighs the alibi of the accused.
4. EMMIE RESAYO Y CRUZ, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
G.R. NO. 154502, April 27, 2007
FACTS:
At around 1:30 p.m. of 5 February 1989, the group of Braga
had a few drinks and were joking about a certain Bogac. At 4:00 to
4:30 p.m., Bogac’s brothers, Larry, Cris, and Reyes, and their brotherin-law Rey arrived at the party to confront the group but a fight did
not ensue. While the group of Braga was on their way home, Larry
headed towards them and tried to stab Aguinaldo but was able to
parry the blow. It instead hit Braga on the left side of his body.
Aguinaldo ran after Larry but was suddenly stabbed by Resayo in the
chest. Then, Esteban saw Reyes stab Braga for the second time below
the right nipple. Aguinaldo's stab wound resulted to his death. Braga
sustained mortal wounds that would have caused his death if it were
not for the immediate medical attention. Both of the accused denied
the charges against them and interposed the defense of alibi.
In the case at bar, the third element of premeditation is lacking. The
span of 30 minutes or half an hour from the time appellant shot
Ramon could not have afforded them full opportunity for meditation
and reflection on the consequences of the crime they committed. The
court held that the lapse of 30 minutes between the determination to
commit a crime and the execution is insufficient for a full meditation
on the consequences of the act.
ISSUE:
6. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plainti-appellee, vs.
ENRICO A. VALLEDOR, accused-appellant.
1)
2)
3)
4)
Whether or not the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
credible
Whether or not there was conspiracy;
Whether or not the alibis of the accused are recognized;
Whether or not Resayo’s accession to the police's invitation is
a sign of innocence
RULINGS:
1. Yes. We find untenable Resayo's argument that Victoria,
being a friend of both Aguinaldo and Braga, would naturally
testify in favor of the victims. Instead, Victoria instinctively
seeks justice for the senseless death of Aguinaldo. Her
testimony must be given full faith and credit.
2.
3.
4.
No. There is no evidence that both Resayo and Reyes were at
the crime scene at the same time or if they had acted in a
common intent of killing Aguinaldo and Braga. There is also
doubt on whether Resayo was among those who confronted
Braga's group. Since there is no conspiracy in this case, the
act of one is not the act of all. Consequently, each of the
accused should be held liable for his individual criminal act.
Resayo should be guilty of homicide for fatally stabbing
Aguinaldo while Reyes should only be convicted of frustrated
homicide for seriously wounding Braga.
No. Alibi is the weakest defense because it is unreliable and is
easy to fabricate. Accused failed to prove that it was
physically impossible for them to be present at the crime
scene, which was just along the street near their respective
residences.
No. Such behavior does not sufficiently rebut the eyewitness'
testimony nor is it conclusive proof of his innocence.
The accused is convicted of murder.
G.R. No. 129291 July 3, 2002
Facts:
On March 6, 1991, at around 1:45 in the afternoon, Roger
Cabiguen was in his house at Burgos Street, Barangay Tagumpay,
Puerto Princesa City together with his cousin Elsa Rodriguez, and his
friends, Simplicio Yayen and Antonio Magbanua. All of a sudden,
Enrico A. Valledor entered the room, uttered Roger's nickname ("Jer")
and immediately attacked him with a knife, inflicting a wound on his
right forearm. Accused-appellant then stabbed Elsa Rodriguez on the
chest and said, “I had my revenge, Elsa”. On their way out, Antonio
learned from by-standers that Ricardo Maglalang was likewise
stabbed by accused- appellant. Elsa was declared dead on arrival in
the hospital.
Accused-appellant's defense of insanity was anchored on the following
facts:
Pacita Valledor, mother of the accused, attested that prior to the
incident, accused was diagnosed with “psychosis with schizophrenia.”
On the morning of March 6, 1991, the accused was witnessed
swimming across a river, crying and uttering words to the effect that
his family will be killed, and jumped off a jeepney. On trial, the
defense offered in evidence that the accused was found to be suffering
from Psychosis or Insanity classified under Schizophrenia and
Psychoactive Substance Use Disorder, Alcohol abuse. Dr. Oscar
Magtang, a psychiatrist assigned at the Medical Service of the PNP,
Puerto Princesa City was likewise presented by the defense to
interpret the aforecited findings of Dr. Melendres.
The Regional Trial Court convicted Valledor.
Issue:
5. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.
ANGELO ZETA, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 178541
March 27, 2008
Whether or not Enrico Valledor was sane at the time of the
commission of the crime and is therefore liable for murder, frustrated
murder and attempted murder
FACTS:
Ruling:
On or about the 28th day of October 1995 in Quezon City, Angelo Zeta
and his wife Petronilla Zeta were found conspiring together,
confederating with and helping one another, with intent to kill,
attacked, assaulted and employed personal violence to Ramon Garcia
by shooting the latter with a .45 caliber pistol hitting him on the
different parts of his body which ultimately caused his death.
The Regional Trial Court ruled that Ramon’s killing was attended by
the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and
nocturnity.
23
In People v. Estrada, it was held that:
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation in the commission of the crime.
HELD:
No, the court held that the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation cannot be appreciated. Evident premeditation qualifies
the killing of a person to murder if the following evidence are present:
(a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (b)an
act manifestly indicating that the culprit clung to his resolve; and (c) a
sufficient interval of the time between the determination or
conception and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon
the consequence of his act and to allow his conscience to overcome the
resolution of his will if he desired to hearken to its warning.
In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a
complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act.
The accused must be "so insane as to be incapable of
entertaining a criminal intent." He must be deprived of
reason and act without the least discernment because there is
a complete absence of the power to discern or a total
deprivation of freedom of the will.
Since the presumption is always in favor of sanity, he who
invokes insanity as an exempting circumstance must prove it
by clear and positive evidence. And the evidence on this point
must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or
to the very moment of its execution.
In the case at bar, accused-appellant failed to discharge the burden of
overcoming the presumption of sanity at the time of the commission
of the crime. The following circumstances clearly and unmistakably
show that accused-appellant was not legally insane when he
perpetrated the acts for which he was charged: 1) Simplicio Yayen was
positioned nearest to accused-appellant but the latter chose to stab
Roger and Elsa; 2) Accused-appellant called out the nickname of
Roger before stabbing him; 3) Simplicio Yayen and Antonio
Magbanua who were likewise inside the room were left unharmed; 4)
Accused-appellant, a spurned suitor of Elsa, uttered the words, "Ako
akabales den, Elsa." (I had my revenge, Elsa) after stabbing her; and
5) Accused-appellant hurriedly left the room after stabbing the
victims.
Judging from his acts, accused-appellant was clearly aware and in
control of what he was doing as he in fact purposely chose to stab only
the two victims. His obvious motive of revenge against the victims was
accentuated by calling out their names and uttering the words, "I had
my revenge" after stabbing them. Finally, his act of immediately
fleeing from the scene after the incident indicates that he was aware of
the wrong he has done and the consequence thereof. Accusedappellant's acts prior to the stabbing incident to wit: crying;
swimming in the river with his clothes on; and jumping off the
jeepney; were not sufficient to prove that he was indeed insane at the
time of the commission of the crime.
Accused is convicted for murder and two counts of attempted murder.
7. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.
ARMANDO CABALLERO, RICARDO CABALLERO,
MARCIANO CABALLERO, JR., and ROBITO
CABALLERO, accused.
ARMANDO CABALLERO, RICARDO CABALLERO, and
MARCIANO CABALLERO, JR., appellants.
GR 149028-30. April 2, 2003
Facts: In the afternoon of August 3, 1994, Armando, Robito, and
Marciano, Jr., all surnamed Caballero, were having a drinking spree in
the house of their brother Ricardo in the Mondragon Compound. As
Eugene was walking by the gate of the Mondragon Compound, he was
suddenly assaulted by the Caballero brothers. Two were armed with
knives while one was hitting Eugene with a wooden pole. In the
process, Eugene was stabbed three times. Eugene’s sister saw the
Caballero brothers assaulting Eugene so she shouted for help. Wilma,
who witnessed the whole incident, was shocked to immobility at the
sudden turn of events. Arnold rushed to the scene but was ganged up
by the Caballero brothers and was stabbed on his forearm. Arnold fled
for his life and hid under the house of a neighbor. Leonilo Broce
rushed to where the commotion was but was stabbed on the chest by
Robito, one of the Caballero brothers. Wounded, Leonilo retreated.
The commotion stopped only upon the arrival of Teresito Mondragon
who was able to pacify the Caballero brothers. They all returned to the
compound. Eugene and Leonilo eventually died from the stab wounds
they sustained. Arnold would have died because of the stab wound on
his chest, were it not for the timely medical intervention.
The trial court found Armando, Ricardo, and Marciano, Jr.
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offenses charged them as
principal.
1.
2.
3.
(CC No. RTC-1217) For the murder of Leonilo, with
the attendant aggravating circumstances of
treachery and abuse of superior strength, the
maximum penalty of death + indemnity;
(CC No. RTC-1218) For the murder of Eugene, with
the attendant aggravating circumstances of
treachery and abuse of superior strength, the
maximum penalty of death + indemnity;
(CC No. RTC-1219) For frustrated murder, for
having seriously inflicted injuries upon the person
of Arnold which nearly resulted to his death, an
imprisonment of 12 years, as minimum, to 17 years,
four months, and one day.
In their appeal, the appellants contended the trial court’s
appreciation of the aggravating circumstances of treachery and abuse
of superior strength.
Issue
Whether or not treachery and abuse of superior strength
were attendant in the crimes committed.
Ruling
The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that all the
appellants conspired to kill Eugene and assault Arnold; hence, they
are criminally liable for the death of Eugene and for the injuries
sustained by Arnold.
Article 8 of the RPC provides that there is conspiracy when
two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it.
Conspiracy must be proved with the same quantum of evidence as the
crime itself, that is, by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Direct proof of
a person in agreement to commit a crime is not necessary. It is enough
that at the time of the commission of a crime, all the malefactors had
the same purpose and were united in their execution. Once
established, all the conspirators are criminally liable as co-principals
regardless of the degree of participation of each of them for in
contemplation of the law. The act of one is the act of all.
In this case, all the appellants by their simultaneous
collective acts before and after the commission of the crimes were
united in one common objective, i.e., to kill Eugene and cause injuries
to Arnold for trying to intervene and prevent bloodshed. Hence, all the
appellants are criminally liable for the death of Eugene and for the
injuries of Arnold. It does not matter who among the appellants
stabbed Eugene or inflicted injuries on Arnold. The act of one is the
act of the others.
However, for the death of Leonilo (Criminal Case No.
RTC-1217), the appellants are not criminally liable. The prosecution
failed to adduce evidence that the appellants and the accused Robito
conspired to kill Leonilo. There was no evidence presented by the
prosecution to prove that all the appellants assisted the accused
Robito in killing Leonilo. As held in People v Flora, for acts done
outside the contemplation of the conspirators, only the actual
perpetrators are liable.
In Criminal Case No. RTC-1218, the appellants are guilty
as co-principals by direct participation of murder, qualified by
treachery. For treachery to be considered as a qualifying circumstance,
the prosecution is burdened to prove that (1) the employment of
means of execution that give the person attacked no opportunity to
defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) the means of execution was
deliberately or consciously adopted.
Even a frontal attack is treacherous if it is sudden and the
victim is unarmed. The essence of treachery is a swift and unexpected
attack on the unarmed victim. In this case, Eugene was unarmed. He
had no inkling that he would be waylaid as he sauntered on his way to
his girlfriend Susana’s house. On the other hand, appellant Armando
was armed with a wooden pole, while appellant Ricardo and accused
Robito were armed with knives. The attack on the hapless Eugene was
swift and unannounced. Undeniably, the appellants killed Eugene
with treachery.
In Criminal Case No. RTC-1219, the appellants are guilty
of frustrated murder. It cannot be denied that the appellants had the
intention to kill Arnold. The appellants performed all the acts of
execution but the crime was not consummated because of the timely
medical intervention. Treachery attended the stabbing of
Arnold because he was unarmed and the attack on him was swift and
sudden. He had no means and there was no time for him to defend
himself. In sum, the appellants are guilty of frustrated murder.
The Supreme Court agrees with the Solicitor General that
the abuse of superior strength was absorbed by treachery;
hence should not be considered as a separate aggravating
circumstance in the imposition of the penalty on the appellants. Abuse
of superior strength concurring with treachery is absorbed by
treachery.
8. RUJJERIC Z. PALAGANAS,1 petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
G.R. No. 165483
September 12, 2006
FACTS:
On January 16, 1998, brothers Servillano, Melton, and
Michael, all surnamed Ferrer, were having a drinking spree and
decided to proceed to Tidbits Videoke Bar. At 10:30 in the evening,
Jaime Palaganas along with his nephew Ferdinand (Apo) and friend
Virgilio Bautista arrived at the bar and occupied a table near that of
the Ferrers'. When Jaime Palaganas was singing, Melton Ferrer sang
along with him. Jaime resented this and went near the table of the
Ferrer brothers. A fight ensued between the two groups. Virgilio
Bautista did not join the fight, whereas Jaime was mauled and
Ferdinand was chased outside of the bar by Michael. Ferdinand then
ran towards the house of the appellant Rujjeric Palaganas, his brother,
and sought for his help. They went to the bar and were stoned by the
Ferrer brothers. Rujjeric then grabbed the gun from Ferdinand, faced
the Ferrer brothers and fired one shot in the air to force the brothers
to retreat. The Ferrer brothers continued throwing stones, so Rujjeric
shot them. Melton was killed, Servillano was fatally wounded, and
Michael was shot in his right shoulder. The RTC declared the
petitioner guilty of the crimes of Homicide and two (2) counts of
Frustrated Homicide. The Court of Appeals affirmed with
modifications to the penalty.
ISSUE:
1.
2.
3.
Whether or not Rujjeric Palaganas is guilty of the crimes of
homicide and 2 counts of frustrated murder.
Whether or not accused-appellant is acquitted on the ground
of lawful self-defense.
Whether or not the use of the unlicensed firearm is a special
aggravating circumstance which should be appreciated by the
court at the case at bar.
RULING:
1. SC affirms the decision of the RTC and CA. However, they do not
concur in their ruling that petitioner is guilty of the crime of
Frustrated Homicide as regards to Michael. SC holds that petitioner
therein is guilty only of the crime of Attempted Homicide since the
gunshot wound sustained by Michael in his right shoulder was not
fatal or mortal and was discharged from the hospital on the same day
he was admitted therein.
2. No. Petitioner’s contention of self-defense fails.
ART. 11 of RPC. Justifying circumstances. - The following do
not incur any criminal liability: Anyone who acts in defense
of his person or rights, provided that the following
circumstances concur; (1) Unlawful aggression; (2)
Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel it; (3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself.
Petitioner was not in a state of actual or imminent danger considering
the wide distance (4-5 meters) and was not cornered nor trapped in a
specific area such that he had no way out, nor was his back against the
wall. He was still capable of avoiding the stones by running away or by
taking cover. He could have also called or proceeded to the proper
authorities for help. Also, petitioner's act of shooting the Ferrer
brothers was not a reasonable and necessary means of repelling the
aggression allegedly initiated by the Ferrer brothers. The petitioner's
gun was far deadlier compared to the stones thrown by the Ferrer
brothers.
3. There is an aggravating circumstance provided for under Republic
Act No. 8294. Its provision states: “If homicide or murder is
committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an
unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance.” Thus, the award of exemplary damages for both the
attempted and frustrated homicide shall be P25,000.00 for each.
On October 31, 1998 at about 2:30 p.m., both the families of
Noel Andres (complainant) and that of Inocencio Gonzalez, Jr.
(accused-appellant) were on their way to the exit of the Loyola
Memorial Park. Gonzalez was driving a white Isuzu Esteem with his
grandson and three housemaids, while Andres was driving a maroon
Toyota FX with his pregnant wife, Feliber Andres; his two-year-old
son, Kenneth; his nephew, Kevin; and his sister-in-law, Francar
Valdez. At an intersection, their two vehicles almost collided. Andres
got out of his vehicle and knocked on Gonzalez's car window. An
altercation between the two then ensued. Dino, the appellant’s son
who rode in another vehicle, then arrived at the scene and confronted
Andres. Feeling that his son was threatened, Gonzalez reached for a
gun (black Gluck 9 mm) and got out of his car ready to shoot. When he
saw that Andres did not have a weapon, he put down his hand holding
the gun. This is when the appellant's daughter, Trisha, who was riding
in Dino's car, arrived at the scene, walked past Dino and Andres, and
pushed the appellant away. She hugged her father, and in the process,
held his hand holding the gun. Gonzalez tried to free his hand but lost
his balance and the gun accidentally fired. The single bullet fired hit
the last window on the left side of Andres’s heavily tinted vehicle,
hitting complainant’s wife, Feliber, on the forehead near the temporal
region above the left eye, which caused her death, as well as Kenneth
and Kevin with metallic fragments of the bullet on their faces. Of note
is that the trial court took judicial notice on the feature of the
automatic pistol used in the case. The stages before an automatic gun
would be capable of firing demonstrates that a gun will not fire even if
the bullet is loaded in its chamber if the hammer is uncocked; or even
if cocked if the safety pin is engaged; or even if the safety pin is
disengaged if the trigger will not be pressed. However, even if the gun
is fired if it is not aimed and leveled to the target, the purpose of firing
it shall not be achieved. If all the acts of execution had been effectively
done without risk on the part of the offender arising from any defense
coming from the offended party, treachery results. On June 25, 1999,
the trial court rendered judgement finding that the shooting was
attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery. Gonzalez was
found guilty of the complex crime of murder (for the death of Feliber
Andres) with double frustrated murder (for the injuries sustained by
Kenneth Andres and Kevin Valdez) and attempted murder, and
sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of death by lethal injection.
Issue
Whether or not the shooting was attended by treachery and,
accordingly, the crime committed is murder.
Ruling
Treachery (Par. 16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code) is
defined as the deliberate employment of means, methods, or forms in
the execution of a crime against persons, which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution without risk to the offender arising
from the defense which the intended victim might raise.
For treachery to be appreciated, two elements must concur:
1)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 30 September 2004 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS:
2)
(1) The petitioner is found guilty of attempted homicide of Michael
Ferrer with a penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of arresto
mayor as minimum period to six (6) years of prision correccional as
maximum period with costs to damages.
(2) The petitioner is found guilty of frustrated homicide of Sevillano
Ferrer with a penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional as
minimum period to twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum
period with costs to damages.
(3) The petitioner is found guilty of homicide of Melton Ferrer with a
penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum period to
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum period with
costs to damages.
The Supreme Court ruled that the shooting was not
attended by treachery and, accordingly, the crime
committed for the death of Feliber Andres is homicide and
not murder.
1.
The intent to kill is absent in this case. It is clear that the shot
was fired away from Noel Andres. Had Gonzalez intended to
kill Andres, he could have shot directly at him, as he was just
a few steps away and Andres was visible from the outside
because his window was partially open.
2.
The fact that the appellant fired his gun from behind the
victim does not by itself amount to treachery. There is no
evidence on record that Gonzalez deliberately positioned
himself behind the victim to gain advantage over him when
he fired the shot.
3.
The trial court's finding that the loading of the gun, the
cocking of the hammer, and, finally, the pulling of the trigger
constitute a deliberate effort on the part of Gonzalez to use
9. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
INOCENCIO GONZALEZ, JR., accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 139542
Facts
the employment of means of execution that would
insure the safety of the accused from retaliatory acts
of the intended victim and leaving the latter without
an opportunity to defend himself; and
the means employed (mode of attack) were
deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender.
June 21, 2001
the gun as a means of a treacherous attack is patently
erroneous. A single and continuous attack cannot be divided
into stages to make it appear that treachery was involved.
The entire incident happened in a matter of minutes. There
was no time for Gonzalez to reflect on the mode of attack
since he just picked up his gun and alighted from his car and
shot at the FX a few seconds after Dino and Andres started
shouting at each other.
The means employed for the commission of the crime or the
mode of attack must be shown to have been consciously or
deliberately adopted by the accused to insure the
consummation of the crime and at the same time eliminate
or reduce the risk of retaliation from the intended victim.
Accordingly, it has been consistently held by this court that
chance encounters, impulse killing or crimes committed at
the spur of the moment or that were preceded by heated
altercations are generally not attended by treachery for
lack of opportunity of the accused to deliberately employ a
treacherous mode of attack.
4.
The kind of weapon used against an unarmed victim is not
taken into consideration in determining the attendance of
treachery; it is the mode of attack employed by the accused
under the particular circumstances of a case that determines
its attendance in the commission of a crime.
PENALTY:
(1) People vs Bon
It should be understood that the debarring of the death penalty
through R.A. 9346 did not correspondingly declassify those crimes
previously catalogued as heinous. The amendatory effects of R.A. 9346
extend only to the application of the death penalty but not to the
definition or classification of crimes. True, the penalties for heinous
crimes have been downgraded under the aegis of the new law. Still,
what remains extant is the recognition by law that such crimes, by
their abhorrent nature, constitute a special category by themselves.
Accordingly, R.A. 9346 does not serve as basis for the reduction of
civil indemnity and other damages that adhere to heinous crimes.
CONSPIRACY:
(7) People vs Caballero
Article 8 of the RPC provides that there is conspiracy when two or
more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it.
Conspiracy is always predominantly mental in composition because it
consists primarily of a meeting of minds and intent. Conspiracy must
be proved with the same quantum of evidence as the crime itself, that
is, by proof beyond reasonable doubt. However, direct proof is not
required. Conspiracy may be proved by circumstantial evidence.
(4) Resayo vs People
There is doubt of conspiracy when no evidence that both Resayo and
Reyes were at the crime scene at the same time. The manner by which
both accused attacked the victims does not clearly and convincingly
show that Resayo and Reyes were motivated by a common intent of
killing Aguinaldo and Braga. Since there is no conspiracy in this case,
the act of one is not the act of all. Consequently, each of the accused
should be held liable for his individual criminal act.
(5) People vs Zeta
Evident premeditation qualifies the killing of a person to murder if the
following elements are present: (1) the time when the offender
determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that
the culprit clung to his resolve; and (3) a sufficient interval of time
between the determination or conception and the execution of the
crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequence of his act and to
allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will if he
desired to hearken to its warning.
(8) Palaganas vs People
The unlicensed firearm is a special aggravating circumstance. An
aggravating circumstance was provided for under P.D. No. 1866 as
amended by R.A. 8294 which is a special law that was passed stating
that: if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed
firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an
aggravating circumstance cannot be offset by an ordinary mitigating
circumstance.
(9) People vs Gonzales
It has been consistently held by this court that chance encounters,
impulse killing or crimes committed at the spur of the moment or that
were preceded by heated altercations are generally not attended by
treachery for lack of opportunity of the accused to deliberately employ
a treacherous mode of attack.
(7) People vs Caballero
For treachery to be considered as a qualifying circumstance, the
prosecution is burdened to prove that (1) the employment of means of
execution that give the person attacked no opportunity to defend
himself or to retaliate; and (2) the means of execution was deliberately
or consciously adopted. Even a frontal attack is treacherous if it is
sudden and the victim is unarmed. Abuse of superior strength
concurring with treachery is absorbed by treachery. Hence should not
be considered as a separate aggravating circumstance in the
imposition of the penalty on the appellants.
EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE:
(6) People vs Valledor
Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the act. The accused must be "so insane as to be incapable
of entertaining a criminal intent." Since the presumption is always in
favor of sanity, he who invokes insanity as an exempting circumstance
must prove it by clear and positive evidence. And the evidence on this
point must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to
the very moment of its execution
MOTIVE
(2) People vs Delos Santos
Proof of motive is not indispensable for a conviction, particularly
where the accused is positively identified by an eyewitness and his
participation s adequately established. In the crime of murder, motive
is not an element of the offense, it becomes material only when the
evidence is circumstantial or inconclusive and there is some doubt on
whether the accused had committed it.
ALIBI
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE:
(4) Resayo vs People
(2) People vs Delos Santos
Alibi is the weakest defense because it is unreliable and is easy to
fabricate. Accused failed to prove that it was physically impossible for
them to be present at the crime scene, which was just along the street
near their respective residences.
This rule may be given retroactive effect in the light of the wellestablished rule that statutes regulating the procedure of the courts
will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined
at the time of their passage. The aggravating circumstance of cruelty,
not having been alleged in the information, may not be appreciated to
enhance the liability of appellant.
(3) Velasco vs People
There is treachery when the following essential elements are present:
(1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend
himself; and (2) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the
particular means, methods or forms of attack employed by him. The
essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected attack on an unarmed
victim without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim.
SELF-DEFENSE
(8) Palaganas vs People
ART. 11 of RPC. Justifying circumstances. - The following do not
incur any criminal liability: Anyone who acts in defense of his person
or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur; (1)
Unlawful aggression; (2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed
to prevent or repel it; (3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
the person defending himself.