G.R. No. 92163 June 5, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner
vs.
JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR (Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City [Br. 103], SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR AURELIO TRAMPE, PROSECUTOR
FERDINAND R. ABESAMIS, AND CITY ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR EULOGIO MANANQUIL, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION DIRECTOR ALFREDO LIM, BRIG.
GEN. EDGAR DULA TORRES (Superintendent of the Northern Police District) AND/ OR ANY AND ALL PERSONS WHO MAY HAVE ACTUAL CUSTODY OVER THE PERSON
OF JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.
G.R. No. 92164 June 5, 1990
SPS. REBECCO E. PANLILIO AND ERLINDA E. PANLILIO, petitioners,
vs.
PROSECUTORS FERNANDO DE LEON, AURELIO C. TRAMPE, FFRDINAND R. ABESAMIS, AND EULOGIO C. MANANQUIL, and HON. JAIME W. SALAZAR, JR., in his capacity
as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 103, respondents.
NARVASA, J.:
Thirty-four years after it wrote history into our criminal jurisprudence, People vs. Hernandez 1 once more takes center stage as the focus of a confrontation at law that would re-examine, if
not the validity of its doctrine, the limits of its applicability. To be sure, the intervening period saw a number of similar cases 2 that took issue with the ruling-all with a marked lack of
success-but none, it would Beem, where season and circumstance had more effectively conspired to attract wide public attention and excite impassioned debate, even among laymen;
none, certainly, which has seen quite the kind and range of arguments that are now brought to bear on the same question.
The facts are not in dispute. In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim
of the National Bureau of Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case No. 9010941.
The warrant had issued on an information signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of prosecutors composed of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor Ferdinand
R. Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion
with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile was taken to and
held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila, without bail, none having been recommended in the information and none fixed in the arrest warrant. The following
morning, February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City where he was given over to the custody of the Superintendent of the Northern Police District, Brig.
Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres.3
On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition for habeas corpus herein (which was followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2,
1990), alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights in being, or having been:
(a) held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist in the statute books;
(b) charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint was initially filed or preliminary investigation was conducted, hence was denied due
process;
(c) denied his right to bail; and
(d) arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued without the judge who issued it first having personally determined the existence of probable
cause. 4
The Court issued the writ prayed for, returnable March 5, 1990 and set the plea for hearing on March 6, 1990. 5 On March 5, 1990, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated return 6 for
the respondents in this case and in G.R. No. 92164 7 Which had been contemporaneously but separately filed by two of Senator Enrile's co-accused, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda
Panlilio, and raised similar questions. Said return urged that the petitioners' case does not fall within the Hernandez ruling because-and this is putting it very simply-the information
in Hernandez charged murders and other common crimes committed as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion, whereas the information against Sen. Enrile et al. charged
murder and frustrated murder committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, of rebellion. Stated otherwise, the Solicitor General would distinguish between the complex crime ("delito
complejo") arising from an offense being a necessary means for committing another, which is referred to in the second clause of Article 48, Revised Penal Code, and is the subject of
the Hernandez ruling, and the compound crime ("delito compuesto") arising from a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave offenses referred to in the first clause of the
same paragraph, with which Hernandez was not concerned and to which, therefore, it should not apply.
The parties were heard in oral argument, as scheduled, on March 6, 1990, after which the Court issued its Resolution of the same date 8 granting Senator Enrile and the Panlilio spouses
provisional liberty conditioned upon their filing, within 24 hours from notice, cash or surety bonds of P100,000.00 (for Senator Enrile) and P200,000.00 (for the Panlilios), respectively. The
Resolution stated that it was issued without prejudice to a more extended resolution on the matter of the provisional liberty of the petitioners and stressed that it was not passing upon the
legal issues raised in both cases. Four Members of the Court 9 voted against granting bail to Senator Enrile, and two 10 against granting bail to the Panlilios.
The Court now addresses those issues insofar as they are raised and litigated in Senator Enrile's petition, G.R. No. 92163.
The parties' oral and written pleas presented the Court with the following options:
(a) abandon Hernandez and adopt the minority view expressed in the main dissent of Justice Montemayor in said case that rebellion cannot absorb more serious
crimes, and that under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code rebellion may properly be complexed with common offenses, so-called; this option was suggested
by the Solicitor General in oral argument although it is not offered in his written pleadings;
(b) hold Hernandez applicable only to offenses committed in furtherance, or as a necessary means for the commission, of rebellion, but not to acts committed in
the course of a rebellion which also constitute "common" crimes of grave or less grave character;
(c) maintain Hernandez as applying to make rebellion absorb all other offenses committed in its course, whether or not necessary to its commission or in
furtherance thereof.
On the first option, eleven (11) Members of the Court voted against abandoning Hernandez. Two (2) Members felt that the doctrine should be re-examined. 10-A In the view of the
majority, the ruling remains good law, its substantive and logical bases have withstood all subsequent challenges and no new ones are presented here persuasive enough to warrant a
complete reversal. This view is reinforced by the fact that not too long ago, the incumbent President, exercising her powers under the 1986 Freedom Constitution, saw fit to repeal, among
others, Presidential Decree No. 942 of the former regime which precisely sought to nullify or neutralize Hernandez by enacting a new provision (Art. 142-A) into the Revised Penal Code
to the effect that "(w)hen by reason, or on the occasion, of any of the crimes penalized in this Chapter (Chapter I of Title 3, which includes rebellion), acts which constitute offenses upon
which graver penalties are imposed by law are committed, the penalty for the most serious offense in its maximum period shall be imposed upon the offender."' 11 In thus acting, the
President in effect by legislative flat reinstated Hernandez as binding doctrine with the effect of law. The Court can do no less than accord it the same recognition, absent any sufficiently
powerful reason against so doing.
On the second option, the Court unanimously voted to reject the theory that Hernandez is, or should be, limited in its application to offenses committed as a necessary means for the
commission of rebellion and that the ruling should not be interpreted as prohibiting the complexing of rebellion with other common crimes committed on the occasion, but not in
furtherance, thereof. While four Members of the Court felt that the proponents' arguments were not entirely devoid of merit, the consensus was that they were not sufficient to overcome
what appears to be the real thrust of Hernandez to rule out the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed in its course under either of the aforecited clauses of Article 48,
as is made clear by the following excerpt from the majority opinion in that case:
There is one other reason-and a fundamental one at that-why Article 48 of our Penal Code cannot be applied in the case at bar. If murder were not complexed
with rebellion, and the two crimes were punished separately (assuming that this could be done), the following penalties would be imposable upon the movant,
namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in the corresponding period, depending upon the modifying circumstances
present, but never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and (2) for the crime of murder, reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, depending upon the
modifying circumstances present. in other words, in the absence of aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him. However,
under Article 48 said penalty would have to be meted out to him, even in the absence of a single aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in
conformity with the theory of the prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant.
Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted for the purpose of favoring the culprit, not of sentencing him to a penalty more severe than that which would be
proper if the several acts performed by him were punished separately. In the words of Rodriguez Navarro:
La unificacion de penas en los casos de concurso de delitos a que hace referencia este articulo (75 del Codigo de 1932), esta basado
francamente en el principio pro reo.' (II Doctrina Penal del Tribunal Supremo de Espana, p. 2168.)
We are aware of the fact that this observation refers to Article 71 (later 75) of the Spanish Penal Code (the counterpart of our Article 48), as amended in 1908
and then in 1932, reading:
Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables en el caso de que un solo hecho constituya dos o mas delitos, o cuando el uno
de ellos sea medio necesario para cometer el otro.
En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al delito mas grave en su grado maximo, hasta el limite que represents la
suma de las que pudieran imponerse, penando separadamente los delitos.
Cuando la pena asi computada exceda de este limite, se sancionaran los delitos por separado. (Rodriguez Navarro, Doctrina Penal del
Tribunal Supremo, Vol. II, p. 2163)
and that our Article 48 does not contain the qualification inserted in said amendment, restricting the imposition of the penalty for the graver offense in its
maximum period to the case when it does not exceed the sum total of the penalties imposable if the acts charged were dealt with separately. The absence of
said limitation in our Penal Code does not, to our mind, affect substantially the spirit of said Article 48. Indeed, if one act constitutes two or more offenses, there
can be no reason to inflict a punishment graver than that prescribed for each one of said offenses put together. In directing that the penalty for the graver offense
be, in such case, imposed in its maximum period, Article 48 could have had no other purpose than to prescribe a penalty lower than the aggregate of the
penalties for each offense, if imposed separately. The reason for this benevolent spirit of article 48 is readily discernible. When two or more crimes are the result
of a single act, the offender is deemed less perverse than when he commits said crimes thru separate and distinct acts. Instead of sentencing him for each crime
independently from the other, he must suffer the maximum of the penalty for the more serious one, on the assumption that it is less grave than the sum total of
the separate penalties for each offense. 12
The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court, which is that Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion
with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.
This, however, does not write finis to the case. Petitioner's guilt or innocence is not here inquired into, much less adjudged. That is for the trial court to do at the proper time. The Court's
ruling merely provides a take-off point for the disposition of other questions relevant to the petitioner's complaints about the denial of his rights and to the propriety of the recourse he has
taken.
The Court rules further (by a vote of 11 to 3) that the information filed against the petitioner does in fact charge an offense. Disregarding the objectionable phrasing that would complex
rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, that indictment is to be read as charging simple rebellion. Thus, in Hernandez, the Court said:
In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the amended information against defendant-appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the murders, arsons and
robberies described therein are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly committed by said defendants, as means "necessary" (4) for the perpetration
of said offense of rebellion; that the crime charged in the aforementioned amended information is, therefore, simple rebellion, not the complex crime of rebellion
with multiple murder, arsons and robberies; that the maximum penalty imposable under such charge cannot exceed twelve (12) years of prision mayor and a fine
of P2H,HHH; and that, in conformity with the policy of this court in dealing with accused persons amenable to a similar punishment, said defendant may be
allowed bail. 13
The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in the statute books, while technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be
complexed with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore be dismissed as a mere flight of rhetoric. Read in the context of Hernandez, the information does
indeed charge the petitioner with a crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion.
Was the petitioner charged without a complaint having been initially filed and/or preliminary investigation conducted? The record shows otherwise, that a complaint against petitioner for
simple rebellion was filed by the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, and that on the strength of said complaint a preliminary investigation was conducted by the respondent
prosecutors, culminating in the filing of the questioned information. 14 There is nothing inherently irregular or contrary to law in filing against a respondent an indictment for an offense
different from what is charged in the initiatory complaint, if warranted by the evidence developed during the preliminary investigation.
It is also contended that the respondent Judge issued the warrant for petitioner's arrest without first personally determining the existence of probable cause by examining under oath or
affirmation the complainant and his witnesses, in violation of Art. III, sec. 2, of the Constitution. 15 This Court has already ruled, however, that it is not the unavoidable duty of the judge to
make such a personal examination, it being sufficient that he follows established procedure by personally evaluating the report and the supporting documents submitted by the
prosecutor.16 Petitioner claims that the warrant of arrest issued barely one hour and twenty minutes after the case was raffled off to the respondent Judge, which hardly gave the latter
sufficient time to personally go over the voluminous records of the preliminary investigation. 17 Merely because said respondent had what some might consider only a relatively brief
period within which to comply with that duty, gives no reason to assume that he had not, or could not have, so complied; nor does that single circumstance suffice to overcome the legal
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.
Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the Court's reaffirmation of Hernandez as applicable to petitioner's case, and of the logical and necessary
corollary that the information against him should be considered as charging only the crime of simple rebellion, which is bailable before conviction, that must now be accepted as a correct
proposition. But the question remains: Given the facts from which this case arose, was a petition for habeas corpus in this Court the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or
vindicating its denial?
The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the petitioner's right to have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The original jurisdiction to
grant or deny bail rested with said respondent. The correct course was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se by
reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. Only after that remedy was denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and even then,
not without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there.
Even acceptance of petitioner's premise that going by the Hernandez ruling, the information charges a non-existent crime or, contrarily, theorizing on the same basis that it charges more
than one offense, would not excuse or justify his improper choice of remedies. Under either hypothesis, the obvious recourse would have been a motion to quash brought in the criminal
action before the respondent Judge. 18
There thus seems to be no question that All the grounds upon which petitioner has founded the present petition, whether these went into the substance of what is charged in the
information or imputed error or omission on the part of the prosecuting panel or of the respondent Judge in dealing with the charges against him, were originally justiciable in the criminal
case before said Judge and should have been brought up there instead of directly to this Court.
There was and is no reason to assume that the resolution of any of these questions was beyond the ability or competence of the respondent Judge-indeed such an assumption would be
demeaning and less than fair to our trial courts; none whatever to hold them to be of such complexity or transcendental importance as to disqualify every court, except this Court, from
deciding them; none, in short that would justify by passing established judicial processes designed to orderly move litigation through the hierarchy of our courts. Parenthentically, this is
the reason behind the vote of four Members of the Court against the grant of bail to petitioner: the view that the trial court should not thus be precipitately ousted of its original jurisdiction
to grant or deny bail, and if it erred in that matter, denied an opportunity to correct its error. It makes no difference that the respondent Judge here issued a warrant of arrest fixing no bail.
Immemorial practice sanctions simply following the prosecutor's recommendation regarding bail, though it may be perceived as the better course for the judge motu proprio to set a bail
hearing where a capital offense is charged.19 It is, in any event, incumbent on the accused as to whom no bail has been recommended or fixed to claim the right to a bail hearing and
thereby put to proof the strength or weakness of the evidence against him.
It is apropos to point out that the present petition has triggered a rush to this Court of other parties in a similar situation, all apparently taking their cue from it, distrustful or contemptuous
of the efficacy of seeking recourse in the regular manner just outlined. The proliferation of such pleas has only contributed to the delay that the petitioner may have hoped to avoid by
coming directly to this Court.
Not only because popular interest seems focused on the outcome of the present petition, but also because to wash the Court's hand off it on jurisdictional grounds would only compound
the delay that it has already gone through, the Court now decides the same on the merits. But in so doing, the Court cannot express too strongly the view that said petition interdicted the
ordered and orderly progression of proceedings that should have started with the trial court and reached this Court only if the relief appealed for was denied by the former and, in a proper
case, by the Court of Appeals on review.
Let it be made very clear that hereafter the Court will no longer countenance, but will give short shrift to, pleas like the present, that clearly short-circuit the judicial process and burden it
with the resolution of issues properly within the original competence of the lower courts. What has thus far been stated is equally applicable to and decisive of the petition of the Panlilio
spouses (G.R. No. 92164) which is virtually Identical to that of petitioner Enrile in factual milieu and is therefore determinable on the same principles already set forth. Said spouses have
uncontestedly pleaded 20 that warrants of arrest issued against them as co-accused of petitioner Enrile in Criminal Case No. 90-10941, that when they appeared before NBI Director
Alfredo Lim in the afternoon of March 1, 1990, they were taken into custody and detained without bail on the strength of said warrants in violation-they claim-of their constitutional rights.
It may be that in the light of contemporary events, the act of rebellion has lost that quitessentiany quixotic quality that justifies the relative leniency with which it is regarded and punished
by law, that present-day rebels are less impelled by love of country than by lust for power and have become no better than mere terrorists to whom nothing, not even the sanctity of
human life, is allowed to stand in the way of their ambitions. Nothing so underscores this aberration as the rash of seemingly senseless killings, bombings, kidnappings and assorted
mayhem so much in the news these days, as often perpetrated against innocent civilians as against the military, but by and large attributable to, or even claimed by so-called rebels to be
part of, an ongoing rebellion.
It is enough to give anyone pause-and the Court is no exception-that not even the crowded streets of our capital City seem safe from such unsettling violence that is disruptive of the
public peace and stymies every effort at national economic recovery. There is an apparent need to restructure the law on rebellion, either to raise the penalty therefor or to clearly define
and delimit the other offenses to be considered as absorbed thereby, so that it cannot be conveniently utilized as the umbrella for every sort of illegal activity undertaken in its name. The
Court has no power to effect such change, for it can only interpret the law as it stands at any given time, and what is needed lies beyond interpretation. Hopefully, Congress will perceive
the need for promptly seizing the initiative in this matter, which is properly within its province.
WHEREFORE, the Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the
spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence said petitioners are entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's
earlier grant of bail to petitioners being merely provisional in character, the proceedings in both cases are ordered REMANDED to the respondent Judge to fix the amount of bail to be
posted by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed by said respondent for any of the petitioners, the corresponding bail bond flied with this Court shall become functus oficio. No pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 81567 July 9, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO DURAL and RENATO VILLANUEVA. MANOLITA O. UMIL, and NICANOR P.
DURAL, FELICITAS V. SESE, petitioners,
vs.
FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 84581-82 July 9, 1990
AMELIA ROQUE and WILFREDO BUENAOBRA, petitioners,
vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA and GEN. RAMON MONTANO, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 84583-84 July 9, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ATTY. DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE. DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON
CASIPLE, petitioners,
vs.
HON. FIDEL V. RAMOS, GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, COL. EVARISTO CARINO, LT. COL. REX D. PIAD, T/SGT. CONRADO DE TORRES, S/SGT. ARNOLD DURIAN, and
Commanding Officer, PC-INP Detention Center, Camp Crame, Quezon City, respondents.
G.R. No. 83162 July 9, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF VICKY A. OCAYA AND DANNY RIVERA. VIRGILIO A. OCAYA, petitioner,
vs.
BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, COL. HERCULES CATALUNA, COL. NESTOR MARIANO, respondents.
G.R. No. 85727 July 9, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF: DEOGRACIAS ESPIRITU, petitioner,
vs.
BRIG. GEN. ALFREDO S. LIM, COL. RICARDO REYES, respondents.
G.R. No. 86332 July 9, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF NARCISO B. NAZARENO. ALFREDO NAZARENO, petitioner,
vs.
THE STATION COMMANDER OF THE MUNTINGLUPA POLICE STATION, Muntinglupa, Metro Manila, P/SGT. JACINTO MEDINA, P/SGT. ELADIO TAGLE, P/SGT. LEVI
SOLEDAD, and P/SGT. MAURO AROJADO, respondents.
Efren H. Mercado for petitioners in G.R. No. 81567.
Ricardo C. Valmonte for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84581-82.
Ramon S. Esguerra, Barbara Anne C. Migallos and Agripino G. Morga for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84583-84.
Efren H. Mercado for petitioner in G.R. No. 83162.
Banzuela, Flores, Miralles, Raneses, Sy, Taquio & Association for petitioner in G.R. No. 85727.
Josefina G. Campbell-Castillo for petitioners in G.R. No. 86332.
The Solicitor General for the respondents.
PER CURIAM:
The are eight (8) petitioners for habeas corpus filed before the Court, which have been consolidated because of the similarity of issues raised, praying for the issuance of the writ
of habeas corpus, ordering the respective respondents to produce the bodies of the persons named therein and to explain why they should not be set at liberty without further delay.
In their respective Returns, the respondents uniformly assert that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not available to the petitioners as they have been legally arrested and are
detained by virtue of valid informations filed in court against them.
The petitioners counter that their detention is unlawful as their arrests were made without warrant and, that no preliminary investigation was first conducted, so that the informations filed
against them are null and void.
The Court has carefully reviewed the contentions of the parties in their respective pleadings, and it finds that the persons detained have not been illegally arrested nor arbitrarily deprived
of their constitutional right to liberty, and that the circumstances attending these cases do not warrant their release on habeas corpus.
The arrest of a person without a warrant of arrest or previous complaint is recognized in law. The occasions or instances when such an arrest may be effected are clearly spelled out in
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended, which provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he
shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
An arrest without a warrant of arrest, under Section 5 paragraphs (a) and (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is justified when the person arrested is caught in flagranti
delicto, viz., in the act of committing an offense; or when an offense has just been committed and the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the
person arrested has committed it. The rationale behind lawful arrests, without warrant, was stated by this Court in the case of People vs. Kagui Malasugui 1 thus:
To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be to leave society, to a
large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert, and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances.
The record of the instant cases would show that the persons in whose behalf these petitions for habeas corpus have been filed, had freshly committed or were actually committing an
offense, when apprehended, so that their arrests without a warrant were clearly justified, and that they are, further, detained by virtue of valid informations filed against them in court.
A brief narration of the facts and events surrounding each of the eight (8) petitions is in order.
I
In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil vs. Ramos), the record shows that, on 1 February 1988, the Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital Command (RIOU-CAPCOM) received
confidential information about a member of the NPA Sparrow Unit (liquidation squad) being treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes Hospital in Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City.
Upon verification, it was found that the wounded person, who was listed in the hospital records as Ronnie Javelon, is actually Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA liquidation squad,
responsible for the killing of two (2) CAPCOM soldiers the day before, or on 31 January 1988, in Macanining Street, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. In view of this verification, Rolando
Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined thereat, or on 4 February 1988, Rolando Dural was positively identified by
eyewitnesses as the gunman who went on top of the hood of the CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and fired at the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers seated inside the car identified as T/Sgt. Carlos
Pabon and CIC Renato Manligot.
As a consequence of this positive identification, Rolando Dural was referred to the Caloocan City Fiscal who conducted an inquest and thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City an information charging Rolando Dural alias Ronnie Javelon with the crime of "Double Murder with Assault Upon Agents of Persons in Authority." The case was docketed
therein as Criminal Case No. C-30112 and no bail was recommended. On 15 February 1988, the information was amended to include, as defendant, Bernardo Itucal, Jr. who, at the filing
of the original information, was still unidentified.
Meanwhile, on 6 February 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural, and Renato Villanueva. The Court issued the writ
of habeas corpus on 9 February 1988 and the respondents filed a Return of the Writ on 12 February 1988. Thereafter, the parties were heard on 15 February 1988.
On 26 February 1988, however, Roberto Umil and Renato Villanueva posted bail before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City where charges for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act had
been filed against them, and they were accordingly released. The petition for habeas corpus, insofar as Umil and Villanueva are concerned, is now moot and academic and is accordingly
dismissed, since the writ of habeas corpus does not lie in favor of an accused in a criminal case who has been released on bail. 2
As to Rolando Dural, it clearly appears that he was not arrested while in the act of shooting the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers aforementioned. Nor was he arrested just after the commission
of the said offense for his arrest came a day after the said shooting incident. Seemingly, his arrest without warrant is unjustified.
However, Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of
Rolando Dural without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense when arrested. The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such
crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State and are in the nature of continuing crimes. As
stated by the Court in an earlier case:
From the facts as above-narrated, the claim of the petitioners that they were initially arrested illegally is, therefore, without basis in law and in fact. The crimes of
insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance, on the occasion
thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart
from the common offenses, aside from their essentially involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide magnitude. Clearly then, the arrest of the herein detainees
was well within the bounds of the law and existing jurisprudence in our jurisdiction.
2. The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is
more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a
statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a judge of the
existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a
judicial warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against government forces, or any other milder acts but
equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is thus impelled by the exigencies of the situation that involves the very survival of society
and its government and duly constituted authorities. If killing and other acts of violence against the rebels find justification in the exigencies of armed hostilities
which is of the essence of waging a rebellion or insurrection, most assuredly so in case of invasion, merely seizing their persons and detaining them while any of
these contingencies continues cannot be less justified. . . . 3
The record, moreover, shows that the criminal case filed against Rolando Dural and Bernardo Itucal, Jr. for "Double Murder, etc." was tried in the court below and at the conclusion
thereof, or on 17 August 1988, Rolando Dural and Bernardo Itucal, Jr. were found guilty of the charge and sentenced accordingly. Rolando Dural is now serving the sentence imposed
upon him by the trial court. Thus, the writ of habeas corpus is no longer available to him. For, as held in the early case of U.S. vs. Wilson: 4
In this case, whatever may be said about the manner of his arrest, the fact remains that the defendant was actually in court in the custody of the law on March
29, when a complaint sufficient in form and substance was read to him. To this he pleaded not guilty. The trial followed, in which, and in the judgment of guilty
pronounced by the court, we find no error. Whether, if there were irregularities in bringing him personally before the court, he could have been released on a writ
of habeas corpus or now has a civil action for damages against the person who arrested him we need not inquire. It is enough to say that such irregularities are
not sufficient to set aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint and after a trial free from error.
II
In G.R. Nos. 84581-82 (Roque vs. De Villa), the arrest of Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra, without warrant, is also justified. When apprehended at the house of Renato
Constantino in Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila, Wilfredo Buenaobra admitted that he was an NPA courier and he had with him letters to Renato Constantino and other members
of the rebel group. Amelia Roque, upon the other hand, was a member of the National United Front Commission, in charge of finance, and admitted ownership of subversive documents
found in the house of her sister in Caloocan City. She was also in possession of ammunition and a fragmentation grenade for which she had no permit or authority to possess.
The record of these two (2) cases shows that on 27 June 1988, one Rogelio Ramos y Ibanes, a member of the NPA, who had surrendered to the military authorities, told military agents
about the operations of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the New Peoples Army (NPA) in Metro Manila. He identified some of his former comrades as "Ka Mong", a staff
member of the Communications and Transportation Bureau; "Ka Nelia", a staff member in charge of finance; "Ka Miller", an NPA courier from Sorsogon and Lopez, Quezon; "Ka Ted",
and "Ka Totoy". He also pointed to a certain house occupied by Renato Constantino located in the Villaluz Compound, Molave St., Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila, which is
used as a safehouse of the National United Front Commission (NUFC) of the CPP-NPA.
In view of these revelations, the Constantino house was placed under military surveillance and on 12 August 1988, pursuant to a search warrant issued by Judge Eutropio Migrino of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig, a search of the house was conducted at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, by a combined team of the Criminal Investigation Service, National Capital
District (CIS-NCD) and the Constabulary Security Group (CSG). In the course of the search, the following articles were found and taken under proper receipt:
a) One (1) Colt M16A1 long rifle with defaced serial number;
b) One (1) Cal. .380 ACT/9mm Model PPK/8 SN: 260577 & 2605778;
c) Two (2) fragmentation hand grenades;
d) Fifty-six (56) live ammunition for Cal. 5.56 mm;
e) Five (5) live ammunition for Cal. .380;
f) One (1) ICOM VHF FM Radio Transciever SN: 14903
g) One (1) Regulated power supply 220V AC;
h) One (1) Antennae (adjustable);
i) One (1) Speaker with cord ALEXAR;
j) Voluminous Subversive documents.
When confronted, Renato Constatino could not produce any permit or authority to possess the firearms, ammunition, radio and other communications equipment. Hence, he was brought
to the CIS Headquarters for investigation. When questioned, he refused to give a written statement, although he admitted that he was a staff member of the executive committee of the
NUFC and a ranking member of the International Department of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP).
At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day (12 August 1988), Wilfredo Buenaobra arrived at the house of Renato Constantino in the Villaluz Compound. When accosted, he
readily admitted to the military agents that he is a regular member of the CPP/NPA and that he went to the place to deliver letters to "Ka Mong", referring to Renato Constatino, and other
members of the rebel group. On further questioning, he also admitted that he is known as "Ka Miller" and that he was from Barangay San Pedro, Lopez, Quezon. Among the items taken
from him were the following:
(1) Handwritten letter addressed to "Ka Bing & Co. from A & Co." dated August 11, 1988;
(2) Handwritten letter addressed to "ROD from VIC (Schell datre)" dated August 11, 1988;
(3) Handwritten letter addressed to "Suzie" from "Vic", dated August 11, 1988.
Also found Buenaobra's possession was a piece of paper containing a written but jumbled telephone number of Florida M. Roque, sister of Amelia Roque alias "Ka Nelia", at 69 Geronimo
St., Caloocan City. Acting on the lead provided as to the whereabouts of Amelia Roque, the military agents went to the given address the next day (13 August 1988). They arrived at the
place at about 11:00 o'clock in the morning. After identifying themselves as military agents and after seeking permission to search the place, which was granted, the military agents
conducted a search in the presence of the occupants of the house and the barangay captain of the place, one Jesus D. Olba.
The military agents found the place to be another safehouse of the NUFC/CPP. They found ledgers, journals, vouchers, bank deposit books, folders, computer diskettes, and subversive
documents as well as live ammunition for a .38 SPL Winchester, 11 rounds of live ammunition for a cal. .45, 19 rounds of live ammunition for an M16 Rifle, and a fragmentation grenade.
As a result, Amelia Roque and the other occupants of the house were brought to the PC-CIS Headquarters at Camp Crame, Quezon City, for investigation. Amelia Roque admitted to the
investigators that the voluminous documents belonged to her and that the other occupants of the house had no knowledge of them. As a result, the said other occupants of the house
were released from custody.
On 15 August 1988, Amelia Roque was brought to the Caloocan City Fiscal for inquest after which an information charging her with violation of PD 1866 was filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City. The case is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. C-1196. Another information for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against Amelia Roque before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City, which is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. C-150458.
An information for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against Wilfredo Buenaobra before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Marikina, Metro Manila. The case is docketed therein as
Criminal Case No. 23715. Bail was set at P4,000.00.
On 24 August 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed before this Court on behalf of Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra. At the hearing of the case, however, Wilfredo Buenaobra
manifested his desire to stay in the PC-INP Stockade at Camp Crame, Quezon City. According, the petition for habeas corpus filed on his behalf is now moot and academic. Only the
petition of Amelia Roque remains for resolution.
The contention of respondents that petitioners Roque and Buenaobra are officers and/or members of the National United Front Commission (NUFC) of the CPP was not controverted or
traversed by said petitioners. The contention must be deemed admitted. 5 As officers and/or members of the NUFC-CPP, their arrest, without warrant, was justified for the same reasons
earlier stated vis-a-vis Rolando Dural. The arrest without warrant of Roque was additionally justified as she was, at the time of apprehension, in possession of ammunitions without
license to possess them.
III
In G.R. Nos. 84583-84 (Anonuevo vs. Ramos), the arrest of Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, without warrant, is also justified under the rules. Both are admittedly members of the
standing committee of the NUFC and, when apprehended in the house of Renato Constatino, they had a bag containing subversive materials, and both carried firearms and ammunition
for which they had no license to possess or carry.
The record of these two (2) cases shows that at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening of 13 August 1988, Domingo T. Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple arrived at the house of Renato
Constatino at Marikina Heights, Marikina, which was still under surveillance by military agents. The military agents noticed bulging objects on their waist lines. When frisked, the agents
found them to be loaded guns. Anonuevo and Casiple were asked to show their permit or license to possess or carry firearms and ammunition, but they could not produce any. Hence,
they were brought to PC Headquarters for investigation. Found in their possession were the following articles:
a) Voluminous subversive documents
b) One (1) Cal. 7.65 MOD 83 2C Pistol SN: 001412 with one (1) magazine for Cal. 7.65 containing ten (10) live ammunition of same caliber;
c) One (1) Cal. 7.65 Pietro Barreta SN; A18868 last digit tampered with one (1) magazine containing five (5) live ammunition of same caliber.
At the PC Stockade, Domingo Anonuevo was identified as "Ka Ted", and Ramon Casiple as "Ka Totoy" of the CPP, by their comrades who had previously surrendered to the military.
On 15 August 1988, the record of the investigation and other documentary evidence were forwarded to the Provincial Fiscal at Pasig, Metro Manila, who conducted an inquest, after
which Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple were charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila. The cases are
docketed therein as Criminal Cases Nos. 74386 ad 74387, respectively. No bail was recommended.
On 24 August 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, alleging that the said Anonuevo and Casiple were
unlawfully arrested without a warrant and that the informations filed against them are null and void for having been filed without prior hearing and preliminary investigation. On 30 August
1988, the Court issued the writ of habeas corpus, and after the respondents had filed a Return of the Writ, the parties were heard.
The petitioners' (Anonuevo and Casiple) claim that they were unlawfully arrested because there was no previous warrant of arrest, is without merit The record shows that Domingo
Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple were carrying unlicensed firearms and ammunition in their person when they were apprehended.
There is also no merit in the contention that the informations filed against them are null and void for want of a preliminary investigation. The filing of an information, without a preliminary
investigation having been first conducted, is sanctioned by the Rules. Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, as amended, reads:
Sec. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without a warrant. — When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial
Court the complaint or information may be filed by the offended party, peace officer or fiscal without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, on
the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person.
However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation by a proper officer in accordance with this
Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with the assistance of a lawyer and in case of nonavailability of a lawyer, a responsible person of his choice. Notwithstanding such waiver, he may apply for bail as provided in the corresponding rule and the
investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.
If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, the accused may within five (5) days from the time he learns of
the filing of the information, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduced evidence in his favor in the manner prescribed in this Rule.
The petitioners Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, however, refused to sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. In the informations
filed against them, the prosecutor made identical certifications, as follows:
This is to certify that the accused has been charged in accordance with Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, that no preliminary
investigation was conducted because the accused has not made and signed a waiver of the provisions of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; that
based on the evidence presented, there is reasonable ground to believe that the crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.
Nor did petitioners ask for a preliminary investigation after the informations had been filed against them in court. Petitioners cannot now claim that they have been deprived of their
constitutional right to due process.
IV
In G.R. No. 83162 (Ocaya vs. Aguirre), the arrest without warrant, of Vicky Ocaya is justified under the Rules, since she had with her unlicensed ammunition when she was arrested. The
record of this case shows that on 12 May 1988, agents of the PC Intelligence and Investigation of the Rizal PC-INP Command, armed with a search warrant issued by Judge Eutropio
Migrino of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, conducted a search of a house located at Block 19, Phase II, Marikina Green Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila, believed to be
occupied by Benito Tiamson, head of the CPP-NPA. In the course of the search, Vicky Ocaya arrived in a car driven by Danny Rivera. Subversive documents and several rounds of
ammunition for a .45 cal. pistol were found in the car of Vicky Ocaya. As a result, Vicky Ocaya and Danny Rivera were brought to the PC Headquarters for investigation. When Vicky
Ocaya could not produce any permit or authorization to possess the ammunition, an information charging her with violation of PD 1866 was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
Metro Manila. The case is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 73447. Danny Rivera, on the other hand, was released from custody.
On 17 May 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed, with this Court on behalf of Vicky Ocaya and Danny Rivera. It was alleged therein that Vicky Ocaya was illegally arrested and
detained, and denied the right to a preliminary investigation.
It would appear, however, that Vicky Ocaya was arrested in flagranti delicto so that her arrest without a warrant is justified. No preliminary investigation was conducted because she was
arrested without a warrant and she refused to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the Rule of Court, as amended.
V
The petitioners Vicky Ocaya, Domingo Anonuevo, Ramon Casiple, and Amelia Roque claim that the firearms, ammunition and subversive documents alleged to have been found in their
possession when they were arrested, did not belong to them, but were "planted" by the military agents to justify their illegal arrest.
The petitioners, however, have not introduced any evidence to support their aforesaid claim. On the other hand, no evil motive or ill-will on the part of the arresting officers that would
cause the said arresting officers in these cases to accuse the petitioners falsely, has been shown. Besides, the arresting officers in these cases do not appear to be seekers of glory and
bounty hunters for, as counsel for the petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple say, "there is absolutely nothing in the evidence submitted during the inquest that petitioners are on the 'AFP
Order of Battle with a reward of P150,000.00 each on their heads.'" 6 On the other hand, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, the arrest of the petitioners is not a product of a witch
hunt or a fishing expedition, but the result of an in-depth surveillance of NPA safehouses pointed to by no less than former comrades of the petitioners in the rebel movement.
The Solicitor General, in his Consolidated Memorandum, aptly observes:
. . . . To reiterate, the focal point in the case of petitioners Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo and Casiple, was the lawful search and seizure conducted by the
military at the residence of Renato Constantino at Villaluz Compound, Molave St., Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila. The raid at Constantino's residence,
was not a witch hunting or fishing expedition on the part of the military. It was a result of an in-depth military surveillance coupled with the leads provided by
former members of the underground subversive organizations. That raid produced positive results. to date, nobody has disputed the fact that the residence of
Constantino when raided yielded communication equipment, firearms and ammunitions, as well as subversive documents.
The military agents working on the information provided by Constantino that other members of his group were coming to his place, reasonably conducted a
"stake-out" operation whereby some members of the raiding team were left behind the place. True enough, barely two hours after the raid and Constantino's
arrest, petitioner Buenaobra arrived at Constantino's residence. He acted suspiciously and when frisked and searched by the military authorities, found in his
person were letters. They are no ordinary letters, as even a cursory reading would show. Not only that, Buenaobra admitted that he is a NPA courier and was
there to deliver the letters to Constantino.
Subsequently, less than twenty four hours after the arrest of Constantino and Buenaobra, petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple arrived at Constantino's place.
Would it be unreasonable for the military agents to believe that petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple are among those expected to visit Constantino's residence
considering that Constatino's information was true, in that Buenaobra did come to that place? Was it unreasonable under the circumstances, on the part of the
military agents, not to frisk and search anyone who should visit the residence of Constantino, such as petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple? Must this Honorable
Court yield to Anonuevo and Casiple's flimsy and bare assertion that they went to visit Constantino, who was to leave for Saudi Arabia on the day they were
arrested thereat?
As to petitioner Roque, was it unreasonable for the military authorities to effect her arrest without warrant considering that it was Buenaobra who provided the
leads on her identity? It cannot be denied that Buenaobra had connection with Roque. Because the former has the phone number of the latter. Why the necessity
of jumbling Roque's telephone number as written on a piece of paper taken from Buenaobra's possession? Petitioners Roque and Buenaobra have not offered
any plausible reason so far.
In all the above incidents, respondents maintain that they acted reasonably, under the time, place and circumstances of the events in question, especially
considering that at the time of petitioner's arrest, incriminatory evidence, i.e, firearms, ammunitions and/or subversive documents were found in their possession.
Petitioners, when arrested, were neither taking their snacks nor innocently visiting a camp, but were arrested in such time, place and circumstances, from which
one can reasonably conclude tat they were up to a sinister plot, involving utmost secrecy and comprehensive conspiracy.
IV
In. G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the release on habeas corpus of the petitioner Deogracias Espiritu, who is detained by virtue of an Information for Violation of Article 142 of the
Revised Penal Code (Inciting to Sedition) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, is similarly not warranted.
The record of the case shows that the said petitioner is the General Secretary of the Pinagkaisahang Samahan ng Tsuper at Operators Nationwide (PISTON), an association of drivers
and operators of public service vehicles in the Philippines, organized for their mutual aid and protection.
Petitioner claims that at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 23 November 1988, while he was sleeping in his home located at 363 Valencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, he was awakened by
his sister Maria Paz Lalic who told him that a group of persons wanted to hire his jeepney. When he went down to talk to them, he was immediately put under arrest. When he asked for
the warrant of arrest, the men, headed by Col. Ricardo Reyes, bodily lifted him and placed him in their owner-type jeepney. He demanded that his sister, Maria Paz Lalic, be allowed to
accompany him, but the men did not accede to his request and hurriedly sped away.
He was brought to Police Station No. 8 of the Western Police District at Blumentritt, Manila where he was interrogated and detained. Then, at about 9:00 o'clock of the same morning, he
was brought before the respondent Lim and, there and then, the said respondent ordered his arrest and detention. He was thereafter brought to the General Assignment Section,
Investigation Division of the Western Police District under Police Capt. Cresenciano A. Cabasal where he was detained, restrained and deprived of his liberty. 7
The respondents claim however, that the detention of the petitioner is justified in view of the Information filed against him before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed therein as
Criminal Case No. 88-683-85, charging him with violation of Art. 142 of the Revised Penal Code (Inciting to Sedition).
The respondents also claim that the petitioner was lawfully arrested without a judicial warrant of arrest since petitioner when arrested had in fact just committed an offense in that in the
afternoon of 22 November 1988, during a press conference at the National Press Club.
Deogracias Espiritu through tri-media was heard urging all drivers and operators to go on nationwide strike on November 23, 1988, to force the government to
give into their demands to lower the prices of spare parts, commodities, water and the immediate release from detention of the president of the PISTON (Pinagisang Samahan ng Tsuper Operators Nationwide). Further, we heard Deogracias Espiritu taking the place of PISTON president Medardo Roda and also
announced the formation of the Alliance Drivers Association to go on nationwide strike on November 23, 1988. 8
Policemen waited for petitioner outside the National Pres Club in order to investigate him, but he gave the lawmen the slip. 9 He was next seen at about 5:00 o'clock that afternoon at a
gathering of drivers and symphatizers at the corner of Magsaysay Blvd. and Valencia Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila where he was heard to say:
Bukas tuloy ang welga natin, sumagot na ang Cebu at Bicol na kasali sila, at hindi tayo titigil hanggang hindi binibigay ng gobyerno ni Cory ang gusto nating
pagbaba ng halaga ng spare parts, bilihin at and pagpapalaya sa ating pinuno na si Ka Roda hanggang sa magkagulo na. 10 (emphasis supplied)
The police finally caught up with the petitioner on 23 November 1988. He was invited for questioning and brought to police headquarters after which an Information for violation of Art. 142
of the Revised Penal Code was filed against him before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. 11
Since the arrest of the petitioner without a warrant was in accordance with the provisions of Rule 113, Sec. 5(b) of the Rules of Court and that the petitioner is detained by virtue of a valid
information filed with the competent court, he may not be released on habeas corpus. He may, however be released upon posting bail as recommended. However, we find the amount of
the recommended bail (P60,000.00) excessive and we reduce it to P10,000.00 only.
VII
In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno vs. Station Commander), we also find no merit in the submission of Narciso Nazareno that he was illegally arrested and is unlawfully detained. The record
of this case shows that at about 8:30 o'clock in the morning of 14 December 1988, one Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men near the corner of T. Molina and Mendiola Streets in
Alabang, Muntinglupa, Metro Manila. One of the suspects in the killing was Ramil Regal who was arrested by the police on 28 December 1988. Upon questioning, Regal pointed to
Narciso Nazareno as on of his companions in the killing of the said Romulo Bunye II. In view thereof, the police officers, without warrant, picked up Narciso Nazareno and brought him to
the police headquarters for questioning. Obviously, the evidence of petitioner's guilt is strong because on 3 January 1989, an information charging Narciso Nazareno, Ramil Regala, and
two (2) others, with the killing of Romulo Bunye II was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila. The case is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 731.
On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail, but the motion was denied by the trial court in an order dated 10 January 1989, even as the motion to post bail, earlier
filed by his co-accused, Manuel Laureaga, was granted by the same trial court.
On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of Narciso Nazareno and on 13 January 1989, the Court issued the writ of habeas corpus, returnable
to the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna, Branch 24, ordering said court to hear the case on 30 January 1989 and thereafter resolve the petition.
At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February 1989, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna issued a resolution denying the petition for habeas corpus, it
appearing that the said Narciso Nazareno is in the custody of the respondents by reason of an information filed against him with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila which
had taken cognizance of said case and had, in fact, denied the motion for bail filed by said Narciso Nazareno (presumably because of the strength of the evidence against him).
The findings of the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna are based upon the facts and the law. Consequently, we will not disturb the same. Evidently, the arrest of
Nazareno was effected by the police without warrant pursuant to Sec. 5(b), Rule 113, Rules of Court after he was positively implicated by his co-accused Ramil Regala in the killing of
Romulo Bunye
II; and after investigation by the police authorities. As held in People vs. Ancheta: 12
The obligation of an agent of authority to make an arrest by reason of a crime, does not presuppose as a necessary requisite for the fulfillment thereof, the
indubitable existence of a crime. For the detention to be perfectly legal, it is sufficient that the agent or person in authority making the arrest has reasonably
sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an act having the characteristics of a crime and that the same grounds exist to believe that the person sought to be
detained participated therein.
VIII
It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here considered, criminal charges have been filed in the proper courts against the petitioners. The rule is, that if a person alleged to be restrained
of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order, of if such person is
charged before any court, the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed. Section 4, Rule 102, Rules of Court, as amended is quite explicit in providing that:
Sec. 4. When writ is allowed or discharge authorized. — If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render
the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason
of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with a
convicted of an offense in the Philippines or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment. (emphasis supplied)
At this point, we refer to petitioner's plea for the Court of re-examine and, thereafter, abandon its pronouncement in Ilagan vs. Enrile, 13 that a writ of habeas corpus is no longer available
after an information is filed against the person detained and a warrant of arrest or an order of commitment, is issued by the court where said information has been filed. 14 The petitioners
claim that the said ruling, which was handed down during the past dictatorial regime to enforce and strengthen said regime, has no place under the present democratic dispensation and
collides with the basic, fundamental, and constitutional rights of the people. Petitioners point out that the said doctrine makes possible the arrest and detention of innocent persons
despite lack of evidence against them, and, most often, it is only after a petition for habeas corpus is filed before the court that the military authorities file the criminal information in the
courts of law to be able to hide behind the protective mantle of the said doctrine. This, petitioners assert, stands as an obstacle to the freedom and liberty of the people and permits
lawless and arbitrary State action.
We find, however, no compelling reason to abandon the said doctrine. It is based upon express provision of the Rules of Court and the exigencies served by the law. The fears expressed
by the petitioners are not really unremediable. As the Court sees it, re-examination or reappraisal, with a view to its abandonment, of the Ilagan case doctrine is not the answer. The
answer and the better practice would be, not to limit the function of the habeas corpus to a mere inquiry as to whether or not the court which issued the process, judgment or order of
commitment or before whom the detained person is charged, had jurisdiction or not to issue the process, judgment or order or to take cognizance of the case, but rather, as the Court
itself states in Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile, 15 "in all petitions for habeas corpus the court must inquire into every phase and aspect of petitioner's detention-from the moment petition was taken
into custody up to the moment the court passes upon the merits of the petition;" and "only after such a scrutiny can the court satisfy itself that the due process clause of our Constitution
has in fact been satisfied." This is exactly what the Court has done in the petitions at bar. This is what should henceforth be done in all future cases of habeas corpus. In Short, all cases
involving deprivation of individual liberty should be promptly brought to the courts for their immediate scrutiny and disposition.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except that in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the bail bond for petitioner's provisional liberty is hereby ordered reduced from
P60,000.00 to P10,000.00. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan C.J., Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
DIGEST:
UMIL V. RAMOS
G.R. No. 81567 October 3, 1991
FACTS:
l Military agents received confidential information that a certain man, Ronnie Javellon, believed to be one of the five NPA sparrows who recently murdered two Capcom mobile patrols was being
treated in St. Agnes Hospital, for having gunshot wounds.
l Later on, it was found out that Ronnie Javellon is a fictitious name and that his real name is Rolando Dural (verified as one of the sparrows of the NPA).
l Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for security reasons.
l Meanwhile, he was positively identified by the eyewitnesses as the one who murdered the 2 CAPCOM mobile patrols.
l In this 8 consolidated cases, it assails the validity of the arrests and searches made by the military on the petitioners; that a mere suspicion that one is Communist Party or New People's Army
member is a valid ground for his arrest without warrant.
ISSUE:
WON the warrantless arrest is valid
HELD:
YES. The arrest without warrant is justified because it is within the contemplation of Section 5 Rule 113, Dural was committing an offense, when arrested because he was arrested for
being a member of the New People's Army, an outlawed organization, where membership penalized and for subversion which, like rebellion is, under the doctrine of Garcia vs. Enrile, a
continuing offense.
Given the ideological content of membership in the CPP/NPA which includes armed struggle for the overthrow of organized government, Dural did not cease to be or became less of a
subversive, FOR PURPOSES OF ARREST, simply because he was, at the time of arrest, confined in the St. Agnes Hospital.
Dural was identified as one of several persons who the day before his arrest, without a warrant, at the St. Agnes Hospital, had shot two (2) CAPCOM policemen in their patrol car. That
Dural had shot the two (2) policemen in Caloocan City as part of his mission as a "sparrow" (NPA member) did not end there and then.
Dural, given another opportunity, would have shot or would shoot other policemen anywhere as agents or representatives of the organized government. It is in this sense that subversion
like rebellion (or insurrection) is perceived here as a continuing offense. Unlike other so-called "common" offenses, i.e. adultery, murder, arson, etc., which generally end upon their
commission, subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base which compels the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and violence until the overriding objective of
overthrowing an organized government is attained.
Nor can it be said that Dural's arrest was grounded on mere suspicion by the arresting officers of his membership in the CPP/NPA. His arrest was based on "probable cause," as
supported by actual facts mentioned in this case.
With all these facts and circumstances existing before, during and after the arrest of the afore-named persons (Dural, Buenaobra, Roque, Anonuevo, Casiple, and Ocaya), no prudent
man can say that it would have been better for the military agents not to have acted at all and made any arrest. That would have been an unpardonable neglect of official duty and a
cause for disciplinary action against the peace officers involved.
For, one of the duties of law enforcers is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place them in the hands of executive and judicial authorities upon whom devolves the duty to investigate the
acts constituting the alleged violation of the law and to prosecute and secure the punishment therefor. 21 An arrest is therefore in the nature of an administrative measure. The power to
arrest without warrant is without limitation as long as the requirements of Section 5, Rule 113 are met. This rule is founded on an overwhelming public interest in peace and order in our
communities.
In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant is conducted in accordance with the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, this Court determines not whether the persons arrested
are indeed guilty of committing the crime for which they were arrested. Not evidence of guilt, but "probable cause" is the reason that can validly compel the peace officers, in the
performance of their duties and in the interest of public order, to conduct an arrest without warrant.
The courts should not expect of law-enforcers more than what the law requires of them. Under the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, particularly paragraph (b) thereof, even if
the arrested persons are later found to be innocent and acquitted, the arresting officers are not liable. But if they do not strictly comply with the said conditions, the arresting officers can
be held liable for the crime of arbitrary detention, for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code 26 and/or for other administrative sanctions
UMIL V. RAMOS
G.R. No. 81567 October 3, 1991
DIGEST:
Facts: On 1 February 1988, military agents were dispatched to the St. Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a confidential information which was received by their
office, about a "sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been admitted to the said hospital with a gunshot wound. That the wounded man in the said hospital was among the five (5) male
"sparrows" who murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols the day before, or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock noon, before a road hump along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio,
Caloocan City. The wounded man's name was listed by the hospital management as "Ronnie Javellon," twenty-two (22) years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Biñan, Laguna
however it was disclosed later that the true name of the wounded man was Rolando Dural. In view of this verification, Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Servicesof
the CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined thereat, he was positively identified by the eyewitnesses as the one who murdered the 2 CAPCOM mobile patrols.
Issue: Whether
or
Not
Rolando
was
lawfully
arrested.
Held: Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA, an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest without warrant is justified as it
can be said that he was committing as offense when arrested. The crimes rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in
furtherance therefore in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the state and are in the nature of continuing crimes.