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ATTY.-JAMON'S-CONSTITUTIONAL-LAW-I-CLASS-CASE-DIGESTS

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CASE
NO.
CASE
TOPIC
1.
Francisco v. House
or Rep., G.R. No.
160261, Nov. 10,
2003
How to read the
Constitution
2.
Gonzales vs.
Comelec, 21 SCRA
774 (1968)
Proposal by
Constitutional
Convention
3.
Santiago vs.
Comelec, G.R.
127325, March 19,
1997
Proposal the
people thru
initiative
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
An impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Hilario Davide and seven Associate
Justices was filed on 2 June 2003 but was
dismissed on 22 October 2003. On 23
October 2003, Representative Gilbert
Teodoro and Felix Fuentabella filed a new
impeachment complaint against the Chief
Justice. Thus arose the instant petitions
against the House of Representatives et al,
most of which contend that the filing of the
second impeachment complaint is
unconstitutional, “no impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within the
period of one year.”
In June 1967, Republic Act 4913 was passed.
This law provided for the COMELEC to hold a
plebiscite for the proposed amendments to
the Constitution. It was provided in the said
law that the plebiscite shall be held on the
same day that the general national elections
shall be held (November 14, 1967). This was
questioned by Ramon Gonzales and other
concerned groups as they argued that this
was unlawful as there would be no proper
submission of the proposals to the people
who would be more interested in the issues
involved in the general election rather than
in the issues involving the plebiscite.
On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed
with COMELEC a “Petition to Amend the
Constitution to Lift Term Limits of elective
Officials by People’s Initiative” The
COMELEC then, upon its approval, a.) set the
RATIO DECIDENDI
Whether or not the
second
impeachment is
unconstitutional?
Yes.
The second impeachment complaint is barred under
Section 3 (5) of Article XI of the Constitution. The Court,
in determining the merits of the issues raised in a petition
before it, must necessarily turn to the Constitution itself
which employs the well-settled principles of
constitutional construction. In case of doubt, the Court
resorts to the following: (1)Verba legis, that is, wherever
possible, the words used in the Constitution must be
given their ordinary meaning except where technical
terms are employed. (2) Where there is ambiguity, ratio
legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be
interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers.
(3). Ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to
be interpreted as a whole.
Whether or not a
plebiscite may be
held simultaneously
with a general
election.
Yes.
The plebiscite may be done either through special or
general election for the Constitution does not qualify. But
ideally it should be special so as to submit it to the people
for
their approval independent of the election of public
officials.
The Congress’s power to propose amendments or
revisions
to the Constitution is a constituent power emanating
from the
People through the Constitution – as they are the very
source of all powers of government, including the
Constitution itself.
Whether or not the
proposed Delfin
petition constitutes
amendment to the
constitution?
No.
The Delfin proposal does not involve a mere amendment
to, but a revision of, the Constitution because, in the
words of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, SJ., it would involve a change
from a political philosophy that rejects unlimited tenure
to one that accepts unlimited tenure; and although the
Page 1 of 97
CASE
NO.
CASE
TOPIC
4.
Tolentino vs.
Comelec, 41 SCRA
702 (1971)
Submission
5.
In Re: Laureta and
Separation of
Maravilla, 148 SCRA Powers
382 (1987)
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
time and dates for signature gathering all
over the country, b.) caused the necessary
publication of the said petition in papers of
general circulation, and c.) instructed local
election registrars to assist petitioners and
volunteers in establishing signing stations.
On 18 Dec 1996, MD Santiago et al filed a
special civil action for prohibition against the
Delfin Petition. Santiago argues among
others that the People’s Initiative is limited
to amendments to the Constitution NOT a
revision thereof. The extension or the lifting
of the term limits of those in power
(particularly the President) constitutes
revision and is therefore beyond the power
of people’s initiative.
The Constitutional Convention of 1971
approved Organic Resolution No 1 to lower
the voting age to 18 and that the plebiscite
for partial amendment to take place with
the local elections on November 1971 in
advance, before the rest of the draft of the
Constitution then under revision has been
approved. Petitioner, Arturo Tolentino
contended that under Section 1 Article XV of
the Constitution, the proposed amendment
in question cannot be presented to the
people for ratification separately from each
and all of the other amendments to be
drafted and proposed by the Convention.
Eva Maravilla-Ilustre sent letters to Justices
of the First Division. Ilustre using
contemptuous language claimed that
members of the court rendered unjust
RATIO DECIDENDI
change might appear to be an isolated one, it can affect
other provisions, such as, on synchronization of elections
and on the State policy of guaranteeing equal access to
opportunities for public service and prohibiting political
dynasties.
The system of initiative on the Constitution under Sec. 2
of
Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory; thus,
it
requires an enabling law. Also, it is confined to
amendments
only, not revisions of the Constitution.
Whether or not the
Convention may call
for a plebiscite on
the sole
amendment
contained in Organic
Resolution 1?
No.
The use of the word “election” in the singular, according
to the Supreme Court, meant that the entire Constitution
must be submitted for ratification at one plebiscite only.
Furthermore, the people have to be given a “proper
frame of reference” in arriving at their decision. Thus,
submission for ratification of piece-meal amendments by
the Constitutional Convention (which is tasked to revise
the Constitution) was disallowed since the people had, at
that time, no idea yet of what the rest of the revised
Constitution would be.
Whether or not
Separation of
Powers was
violated?
No.
Judicial power is by no means a “display of arrogance”
but a restatement of the fundamental principle of
separation of powers and checks and balances under a
republican form of government, that the three co-equal
Page 2 of 97
CASE
NO.
6.
CASE
Demetria vs. Alba,
148 SCRA 208
(1987)
TOPIC
Separation of
Powers
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
decision on the case GR 68635. Ilustre
claimed that the Court acted unjustly when
Justice Pedro Yap failed to inhibit himself
from participating when in fact he is a lawpartner of the defense counsel Atty Sedfrey
Ordonez. On 27 October 1986, the Court en
banc reviewed the history of the case and
found no reason to take action, stating that
Justice Yap inhibited himself from the case
and was only designated as Chairman of
First Division on 14 July 1986 after the
resolution of dismissal was issued on 14 May
1986. Petitioner again addressed letters to
Justices Narvasa, Herrera and Cruz with a
warning of exposing the case to another
forum of justice, to which she made true by
filing an Affidavit-Complaint to Tanodbayan
(Ombudsman) on 16 December 1986.
Demetrio Demetria filed a petition for
prohibition with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction in the
constitutionality of the first paragraph of
Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177,
otherwise known as the “Budget Reform
Decree of 1977.” The said PD authorizes the
President to transfer any fund appropriated
for different departments to any program,
project or activity of any department. The
Solicitor General filed a rejoinder with a
motion to dismiss, stating that the nullity of
Section 16 (5) Article VIII of the 1973
Constitution by the Freedom Constitution of
March 25, 1986 has allegedly rendered the
instant petition moot and academic.
RATIO DECIDENDI
branches of the government - executive, legislative, and
judicial – are each supreme and independent within the
limits of its own sphere. Neither one can interfere with
the performance of the duties of the other.
Whether or not
Budget Reform
Decree is
unconstitutional?
No.
Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177
is declared null and void for being unconstitutional.
Where the legislature or the executive branch is acting
within the
limits of its authority, the judiciary cannot and ought not
to interfere
with the former. But where the legislature or the
executive acts
beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes
the duty
of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the
government had assumed to do, as void. This is the
essence of
judicial power conferred by the Constitution “in one
Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law”.
Page 3 of 97
CASE
NO.
CASE
TOPIC
7.
Angara vs. Electoral
Commission, 63
Phil.139 (1936)
Theory and
Justification of
Judicial Review
8.
Miranda vs.
Aguirre, G.R. No.
133064, September
16, 1999
Justiciable and
Political
Questions
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
Petitioner, Jose Angara won the election for
National Assembly for the first district of
Tayabas Province. The National Assembly
passed Resolution No 8 declaring the
deadline for filing protest on 3 December
1935.On the other hand the Electoral
Commission set the deadline on 9 December
1935. Losing candidate, Pedro Ynsua filed
before the Electoral Commission a Motion of
Protest against the election of Angara.
Angara contended in his Motion to Dismiss
the Protest that Resolution No. 8 of the
National Assembly was adopted in the
legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative to prescribe the period during
which protests against the election of its
members should be presented and that the
protest was filed out of the prescribed
period.
Republic Act No. 7720 converted the
municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an
independent component city was signed
into law. The people of Santiago ratified R.A.
No. 7720 in a plebiscite. Republic Act No.
8528 was enacted. It amended R.A. No.
7720, it changed the status of Santiago from
an independent component city to a
component city. Petitioner, Jose Miranda,
mayor of Santiago assailed the
constitutionality of RA 8528 due to lack of
ratification through plebiscite. Petitioners
also contend the petition raises a political
question over which the Court lacks
jurisdiction.
Whether or not the
Court has
jurisdiction to
review the rulings of
the Electoral
Commission
organized under the
National Assembly.
No.
Whether or not the
Court has
jurisdiction on
political question.
Yes.
RATIO DECIDENDI
The Constitution has rationally provided the Judiciary the
power to
determine the nature, scope and extent of the powers of
government. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the
other departments; it does not in reality nullify or
invalidate an act of
the Legislature, but only asserts the solemn an d sacred
obligation
assigned to it be by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims
of authority under the Constitution and to establish for
the parties in
an actual controversy the rights which that instrument
secures and
guarantees them. This is “judicial supremacy” which
properly is the
power of the judicial review under the Constitution.
The plea that the court back off from assuming
jurisdiction over the petition at bar on the ground that it
involves a political question has to be brushed aside.
Political question connotes what it means in ordinary
parlance,
namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions
which
under the Constitution are to be decided by the people
ion their
sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full
discretionary authority
has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch
of the
government.’ It is concerned with issues dependent upon
the
Page 4 of 97
CASE
NO.
CASE
TOPIC
9.
La Bugal-B’Laan v.
Ramos, G.R. No.
127882 Dec. 01,
2004
Justiciable and
Political
Questions
10.
Marbury vs
Madison
Judicial Review
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
The present petition for mandamus and
prohibition assails the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 7942, otherwise known as
the PHILIPPINE MINING ACT OF 1995, along
with the Implementing Rules and
Regulations issued pursuant thereto,
Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) Administrative Order 9640, and of the Financial and Technical
Assistance Agreement (FTAA) entered into
on March 30, 1995 by the Republic of the
Philippines and WMC (Philippines), Inc.
(WMCP), a corporation organized under
Philippine laws.
Before the inauguration of President
Jefferson, outgoing President Adams
attempted to secure Federalist control of
the judiciary by creating new judgeships and
filling them with Federalist appointees.
Included in these efforts was the nomination
by President Adams, under the Organic Act
of the District of Columbia (the District), of
42 new justices of the peace for the District,
which were confirmed by the Senate the day
before President Jefferson’s inauguration. A
few of the commissions, including
Marbury’s, were undelivered when
Whether or not the
Judiciary may
interfere with the
due exercise by coequal branches of
the government of
their official
functions?
No.
Is Marbury entitled
to mandamus from
the Supreme Court?
No.
RATIO DECIDENDI
wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
A purely justiciable issue implies a given right, legally
demandable
and enforceable, an act of omission violative of such
right, and a
remedy granted and sanctioned by aw, for said breach of
right.
The Court restrained itself from intruding into policy
matters to allow the President and Congress maximum
discretion in using the mineral resources of our country
and in securing the assistance of foreign groups to
eradicate the grinding poverty of our people and answer
their cry for viable employment opportunities in the
country. “The Judiciary is loath to interfere with the due
exercise by co-equal branches of the government of their
official functions”. Let the development of the mining
industry be the responsibility of the political branches of
government. The questioned provisions of R.A. 7942
(Philippine Mining Act of 1995) are not unconstitutional.
Case dismissed for want of jurisdiction. As the President
signed Marbury’s commission after his confirmation, the
appointment has been made, and Marbury has a right to
the commission Given that the law imposed a duty on the
office of the president to deliver Marbury’s commission,
that the Supreme Court has the power to review
executive actions when the executive acts as an officer of
the law and the nature of the writ of mandamus to direct
an officer of the government “to do a particular thing
therein specified,” mandamus is the appropriate remedy,
if available to the Supreme Court. To issue mandamus to
the Secretary of State really is to sustain an original
Page 5 of 97
CASE
NO.
CASE
TOPIC
11.
PACU vs. Secretary
of Education, 97
Phil. 806 (1955)
Actual Case or
Controversy:
Prematurity
12.
Mariano vs.
Comelec, G.R. No.
119’694 March 07,
1995
Actual Case or
Controversy:
Prematurity
13.
Montesclaros v.
Comelec, G.R. No.
152295, July 09,
2002
Actual Case or
Controversy:
Prematurity
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
President Jefferson took office. The new
president instructed Secretary of State
James Madison to withhold delivery of the
commissions. Marbury sought mandamus in
the Supreme Court, requiring James
Madison to deliver his commission.
The petitioners challenged a regulation of
the respondent requiring all private colleges
and universities to first obtain a permit from
the Department of Education before they
could open and operate. It appeared,
however, that all the petitioners had
previously obtained the required permit and
that they were questioning the regulation
only because of the possibility that such
permit might be denied them in the future
Juanito Mariano, resident of Makati filed a
petition for prohibition and declaratory
relief, assailing unconstitutional sections in
RA 7854 (“An Act Converting the
Municipality of Makati Into a Highly
Urbanized City to be known as the City of
Makati”). Petitioners contend that that the
new corporate existence of the new city will
restart the term of the present municipal
elective making it favorable to incumbent
Mayor Jejomar Binay.
The Local Government Code of 1991 limited
its membership to youths “at least 15 but no
more than 21 years of age.” On 11 March
2002 the Bicameral Committee consolidated
Senate Bill 2050 and House Bill 4456,
resetting the SK election to 15 July 2002 and
lowered the membership age to at least 15
RATIO DECIDENDI
action, which is (in this case) outside the constitutional
limits of jurisdiction imposed on the Supreme Court.
Whether or not
there is justiciable
controversy to be
settled by the
Court?
No.
Whether or not RA
7854 is
unconstitutional?
Dismiss
ed.
Whether or not the
proposed bill is
subject to judicial
review.
No.
The Supreme Court declared that the case was premature
as there was no showing at the time of any conflict of
legal rights that would justify assumption of jurisdiction
by the judiciary. The Court said that “mere apprehension
that the Secretary of Education might, under the law,
withdraw the permit of one of the petitioners does not
constitute a justiciable controversy.” A request for an
advisory opinion is not an actual case or controversy. But
an action for declaratory relief is proper for judicial
determination.
Petition was premised on a contingent events the
happening of which was uncertain (Binay is not yet sure if
will run or will win); the petitioner, thus, posed a
hypothetical issue which had not yet ripened into an
actual or controversy.
Petitioner’s prayer to prevent Congress from
enacting into law a proposed bill lowering
membership age in the SK does not present an actual
justiciable controversy. A proposed bill is not subject
to judicial review because it is not a law. A proposed
bill creates no rights and imposes no duty legally
enforceable by the Court. A proposed bill, having no
Page 6 of 97
CASE
NO.
CASE
TOPIC
14.
Atlas Fertilizer v.
Sec, DAR, G.R. No.
93100, June
19,1997
Actual Case or
Controversy:
Mootness
15.
Lacson v. Perez,
G.R. No. 147780,
May 10, 2001
Actual Case or
Controversy:
Mootness
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
but no more than 18 years of age. This was
signed by the President on 19 March 2002.
The petitioners filed prohibition and
mandamus for temporary restraining order
seeking the prevention of postponement of
the SK election and reduction of age
requirement on 11 March 2002.
Petitioner, Atlas Fertilizer engaged in the
aquaculture industry utilizing fishponds and
prawn farms. Assailed Sections 3 (b), 11, 13,
16 (d), 17 and 32 of R.A. 6657
(Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law), as
well as the implementing guidelines and
procedures contained in Administrative
Order Nos. 8 and 10 Series of 1988 issued by
public respondent Secretary of the
Department of Agrarian Reform as
unconstitutional. They contend that R.A.
6657, by including the raising of fish and
aquaculture operations including fishponds
and prawn ponds, treating them as in the
same class or classification as agriculture or
farming violates the equal protection clause
of the Constitution and therefore void.
On 01 May 2001, Gloria Arroyo, faced by an
angry and violent mob armed with deadly
weapons assaulting and attempting to break
into Malacanang, issued Proclamation No.
38 declaring that there was a state of
rebellion in the National Capital Region. She
likewise issued General Order No. 1
directing the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the Philippine National
Police to suppress the rebellion in the
RATIO DECIDENDI
legal effect, violates no constitutional right or duty.
The Court has no power to declare a proposed bill
constitutional or unconstitutional because that would
be in the nature of rendering an advisory opinion on a
proposed act of Congress.
Whether or not RA
6657 is
unconstitutional?
Dismiss
ed.
The provisions that the petitioners are refuting are now
repealed and excluded from the coverage of CARL. In
view of the foregoing, the question concerning the
constitutionality of the assailed provisions has become
moot and academic with the passage of a new law which
repealed the same.
Whether or not the
Proclamation No 38
and General Order
No 1 are
unconstitutional.
Dismiss
ed.
The instant petitions have been rendered moot and
academic as Gloria Arroyo ordered the lifting of the
declaration of a state of rebellion on 06 May 2001.
Page 7 of 97
CASE
NO.
CASE
TOPIC
16.
Sanlakas vs.
Executive
Secretary, G.R.
159085, February
03, 2004
Actual Case or
Controversy:
Exceptions to
Mootness
17.
Pimentel v. Ermita,
G.R. 164978,
October 13, 2005
Actual Case or
Controversy:
Exceptions to
Mootness
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
National Capital Region. On 06 May 2001
she ordered the lifting of the declaration of
a state of rebellion in Metro Manila.
Petitioners assail the declaration of a state
of rebellion by Gloria Arroyo and the
warrantless arrests allegedly effected by
virtue thereof, as having no basis both in
fact an in law.
Some 300 junior officers of AFP, stormed the
Oakwood in Makati demanding for the
resignation of the President, Sec of Defense
and Chief of the PNP. State of rebellion was
declared and the AFP and PNP were directed
to suppress the rebellion. The state of
rebellion was lifted. Petitions were filed
challenging the validity of Proclamation of
State of Rebellion and calling out of the AFP.
Sanlakas contend that Section 18, Article VII
of the Constitution does not require the
declaration of a state of rebellion to call out
the armed forces. Because of the cessation
of the Oakwood occupation, there exists no
sufficient factual basis for the proclamation
by the President of a state of rebellion for an
indefinite period. Solicitor General argues
that the petitions have been rendered moot
by the lifting of the declaration.
Gloria Arroyo issued appointments to
various acting secretaries on 23 August
2004. The Congress commenced regular
session on 26 July 2004 and some senators
filed petition for certiorari and prohibition
against respondents. The Senators
contended that pursuant to Section 10 (2)
RATIO DECIDENDI
Whether or not
declaring state of
rebellion is needed
to declare General
order No 4?
Dismiss
ed.
The state of rebellion has ceased to exist and has
rendered the case moot. Nevertheless, courts will decide
a question, otherwise moot, if it is capable of repetition
yet evading review. The case at bar is one such case.
The President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in
calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a
wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief
powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on
the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed
to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by
Section 23 (2), Article VI.
Whether or not the
President may
appoint in an acting
secretaries without
the consent of the
Commission on
Appointments while
Dismiss
ed.
Due to the appointment of Gloria Arroyo to the
respondents as ad interim immediately after the recess of
the Congress, the petition has become moot. However as
an exemption to the rule of mootness, courts will decide
a question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition
yet evading review.
Page 8 of 97
CASE
NO.
CASE
TOPIC
18.
Joya vs. PCGG, G.R.
96541, August 24,
1993
Proper Party
19.
Agan v. PIATCO,
G.R. No. 155001,
May 05, 2003
Proper Party
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
Book IV of EO 292 the undersecretary shall
be designated as acting secretary in case of
vacancy. Also, petitioners assert that while
Congress is in session there can be no
appointments without first obtaining
consent from Commission on Appointments.
When Congress adjourned on 22 September
2004, Gloria Arroyo issued ad interim
appointments to the same respondents.
The PCGG Chairman wrote to President
Corazon Aquino regarding the scheduled
sale between the Republic of the Philippines
and Christie’s of 82 Old Masers Painting
housed in Metropolitan Museum of Manila
and 7 boxes of antique silverware in the
custody of Central Bank. The assets subject
of auction were historical relics and had
cultural significance and thereby prohibited
by law. As Filipino citizens, taxpayers and
artists, petitioners Dean Jose Joya et al
contended that they have legal personality
to restrain respondent from acting contrary
to preserving artistic creations pursuant to
Sec 14-18 Article XIV of the Constitution.
Petitioners filed instant petitions for
prohibition seeking to prohibit the Manila
International Airport Authority (MIAA) and
the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC) and its Secretary
from implementing the various agreement
executed by the Philippine Government
through the DOTC and the MIAA and the
Philippine International Air Terminals Co.,
Inc. (PIATCO)
RATIO DECIDENDI
Congress is in
session.
Whether or not the
petitioners have
legal standing?
No.
Legal standing means a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act
that is being challenged. One having no rights or interest
to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as
party-plaintiff in an action. The courts will
exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is
brought
before by a party who has legal standing to raise the
constitutional
or legal question.
Do petitioners have
legal standing?
Yes.
Petitioners have direct and substantial interest to protect
by reason of the implementation of the PIATCO contracts.
They stand to lose their source of livelihood, a property
right which is protected by the Constitution. Subsisting
agreements between MIA and petitioners stand to be
terminated by the PIATCO contracts. The financial
prejudice brought about by the PIATCO contract to
petitioners is legitimate interests sufficient to give them
legal standing to file the petition.
Page 9 of 97
CASE
NO.
CASE
TOPIC
20.
CHR Employees
Assoc. v. CHR, G.R.
No. 155336, Nov.
25, 2004
Proper Party
21.
Automotive
Industry Workers
Alliance v. Romulo,
G.R. 157509, Jan.
18,
2005
Proper Party
22.
Tanada vs. Tuvera
136 SCRA 27 (1985)
Citizen Standing
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
Petitioner Commission on Human Rights
Employee Association challenged the CA and
Civil Service Commission’s decision affirming
the upgrading and reclassification of certain
personnel positions in the CHR despite the
disapproval of Department of Budget and
Management. The assail that the
reclassification and upgrading only
benefited select few in the upper level
resulting to demoralization on the rank and
file members.
Executive Order No. 185 dated 10 March
2003 provided supervision of NLRC reverted
to the Sec. of Labor and Employment.
Petitioners, composed of ten labor unions
assailed the constitutionality of EO 185 for
allegedly revert the set-up prior to RA 6715
which only Congress can do. Solicitor
General contend that petitioners have no
locus standi to assail the validity of E.O. No.
185, not even in their capacity as taxpayers,
considering that labor unions are exempt
from paying taxes, citing Sec. 30 of the Tax
Reform Act of 1997. Even assuming that
their individual members are taxpayers,
respondents maintain that a taxpayer suit
will not prosper as E.O. No. 185 does not
require additional appropriation for its
implementation.
Invoking the people's right to be informed
on matters of public concern, a right
recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the
1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the
principle that laws to be valid and
RATIO DECIDENDI
Whether or not
CHREA has legal
standing to file
petition for review
against CHR?
Yes.
A proper party is one who has sustained or is in
immediate danger of sustaining an injury as a result of
the act complained of. Petitioner protests that the
upgrading and collapsing of positions benefited only a
select few in the upper level positions in the
Commission.This sufficiently meet the injury test.
Whether or not the
ten labour unions
have legal standing
to assail the
constitutionality of
EO 185?
No.
For a citizen to have standing, he must establish that he
has
suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of
the
allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is
fairly
traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely
to be
redressed by a favorable action. Petitioners have not
shown that they have sustained or are in danger of
sustaining any personal injury attributable to the
enactment of E.O. No. 185.
Whether or not the
petitioners have
legal standing
Yes.
Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners
herein is a public right recognized by no less than the
fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were
not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed
be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the
Page 10 of 97
CASE
NO.
CASE
TOPIC
23.
Chavez v. PEA and
Citizen Standing
Amari, G.R. 133250,
July 09, 2002
24.
KMU Labor Center
vs. Garcia, G.R.
Associational
Standing
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
enforceable must be published in the Official
Gazette or otherwise effectively
promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public
officials to publish, and/or cause the
publication in the Official Gazette of various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions,
general orders, proclamations, executive
orders, letter of implementation and
administrative orders. The respondents,
through the Solicitor General, would have
this case dismissed outright on the ground
that petitioners have no legal personality or
standing to bring the instant petition.
The petition seeks to compel the Public
Estates Authority to disclose all facts on
PEA’s then on-going renegotiations with
Amari Coastal Bay and Development
Corporation to reclaim portions of Manila
Bay. PEA argues that petitioner has no
standing to institute mandamus proceedings
to enforce his constitutional right to
information without a showing that PEA
refused to perform an affirmative duty
imposed on PEA by the Constitution. PEA
also claims that petitioner has not shown
that he will suffer any concrete injury
because of the signing or implementation of
the Amended JVA. Thus, there is no actual
controversy requiring the exercise of the
power of judicial review.
Petition for certiorari was filed by labour
group KMU to assail the constitutionality
and validity of certain memoranda, circulars
RATIO DECIDENDI
same, considering that the Solicitor General, the
government officer generally empowered to represent
the people, has entered his appearance for respondents
in this case.
Whether or not
petitioner has legal
standing to compel
PEA to comply with
its constitutional
duties?
Yes.
The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayer’s suit
because the petition seeks to compel PEA to comply with
its constitutional duties. The right of citizens to
information on matters of public concern and the
application of a constitutional provision intended to
insure the equitable distribution of alienable lands of the
public domain among Filipino citizens are two
constitutional rights involved.
Whether or nor
KMU has legal
Yes.
The rule requires that a party must show a personal stake
in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that
can be redressed by a favorable decision so as to warrant
Page 11 of 97
CASE
NO.
CASE
TOPIC
115381, Dec. 23,
1994
25.
IBP v. Zamora, G.R.
No. 141284, August
15, 2000
Associational
Standing
26.
Executive Secretary
vs. CA, 429 SCRA
781, May 25, 2004
Associational
Standing
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
and / or orders from DOTC in relation to
increase in public transportation fares.
Respondent contend that petitioner has no
legal standing to sue and that it is within
DOTC and LTFRB’s authority to set a fare
range scheme.
standing to maintain
the suit?
President Ejercito Estrada directed the AFP
Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate
with each other for the proper deployment
and utilization of the Marines to assist the
PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or
lawless violence. The Integrated Bar of the
Philippines filed a petition seeking to declare
the deployment of the Philippine Marines
null and void and unconstitutional. Solicitor
General contend that petitioner has no legal
standing to assail.
Republic Act 8042 (Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipino Act of 1995) took effect on
15 July 1995. Prior to its effectivity, Asian
Recruitment Council Philippine CHaptr Inc
(ARCO-Phil) filed petition for declaratory
relief. They alleged that Section 6,
subsections (a) to (m) is unconstitutional
because licensed and authorized
recruitment agencies are placed on equal
footing with illegal recruiters. It contended
that while the Labor Code distinguished
between recruiters who are holders of
licenses and non-holders thereof in the
imposition of penalties, Rep. Act No. 8042
does not make any distinction. In their
Whether or not IBP
has legal standing to
assail
constitutionality of
calling the AFP to
assist PNP to
suppress lawless
violence, invasion or
rebellion?
No.
Whether or not
ARCO-Phil has legal
standing to assail RA
8042?
No.
RATIO DECIDENDI
an invocation of the court’s jurisdiction and to justify the
exercise of the court’s remedial powers in his behalf.
KMU members, who avail of the use of buses, trains and
jeepneys everyday, are directly affected by the
burdensome cost of arbitrary increase in passenger fares.
They are part of the millions of commuters who comprise
the riding public. Certainly, their rights must be
protected, not neglected nor ignored.
The IBP primarily anchors its standing o its alleged
responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the
Constitution.
Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no
other basis in support of its locus standi. The mere
invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of
law
and nothing more is not sufficient to clothe it with
standing in
the case.
An association has standing to complain of injuries of its
members. This view fuses the legal identity of an
association
with that of its members. An association has standing to
file
suit for its workers despite its lack of interest if its
members
are affected by their action. An organization has standing
to
assert the concerns of its constituents.
However, the respondent has no locus standi to file the
petition for and in behalf of unskilled workers. We note
that it even failed to implead any unskilled workers in its
petition.
Page 12 of 97
CASE
NO.
CASE
TOPIC
27.
Kilosbayan vs.
Guingona, 232
SCRA 110 (1994)
Associational
Standing
28.
Kilosbayan v.
Morato
G.R. No. 118910,
November 16, 1995
Legal Standing
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
answer to the petition, they contend that
ARCO-Phil has no legal standing, it being a
non-stock, non-profit organization; hence,
not the real party-in-interest as petitioner in
the action.
Sometime before March 1993, after learning
that the PCSO was interested in operating
an on-line lottery system, the Berjaya Group
Berhad (PGMC) became interested to offer
its services and resources to PCSO.
KILOSBAYAN submit that the PCSO cannot
validly enter into the assailed Contract of
Lease with the PGMC because it is an
arrangement wherein the PCSO would hold
and conduct the on-line lottery system in
“collaboration” or “association” with the
PGMC, in violation of Section 1(B) of R.A.
No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42.
Respondents allege that the petitioners
have no standing to maintain the instant
suit.
In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an
Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) wherein
PGMC leased online lottery equipment and
accessories to PCSO. (Rental of 4.3% of the
gross amount of ticket or at least P35,000
per terminal annually). 30% of the net
receipts is allotted to charity. Term of lease
is for 8 years. PCSO is to employ its own
Whether or not
Kilosbayan has
standing to maintain
instant suit?
Yes.
Whether or not the
petitioners have
standing?
No.
RATIO DECIDENDI
We find the instant petition to be of transcendental
importance to the public. The issues it raised are of
paramount public interest and of a category even higher
than those involved in many of the aforecited cases. The
ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the
social, economic, and moral well-being of the people
even in the remotest barangays of the country and the
counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the
envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as the
billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal standing
then of the petitioners deserves recognitio
Issue on the locus standi of the petitioners should,
indeed, be resolved in their favor. A party’s standing
before this Court is a procedural technicality which it
may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of
the importance of the issues raised. In the landmark
Emergency Powers Cases, this Court brushed aside this
technicality because “the transcendental importance to
the public of these cases demands that they be settled
promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must,
technicalities of procedure.
Petitioners do not have a legal standing to sue.
1) STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling
sustaining the standing of the petitioners is a
departure from the settled rulings on real parties in
interest because no constitutional issues were
actually involved.
2) LAW OF THE CASE (opinion delivered on a former
appeal) cannot also apply. Since the present case is
Page 13 of 97
CASE
NO.
CASE
TOPIC
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
personnel and responsible for the facilities.
Upon the expiration of lease, PCSO may
purchase the equipment for P25 million.
Feb. 21, 1995. A petition was filed to declare
ELA invalid because it is the same as the
Contract of Lease Petitioner's Contention:
ELA was same to the Contract of Lease.. It is
still violative of PCSO's charter. It is violative
of the law regarding public bidding. It
violates Sec. 2(2) of Art. 9-D of the 1987
Constitution. Standing can no longer be
questioned because it has become the law
of the case Respondent's reply: ELA is
different from the Contract of Lease. There
is no bidding required. The power to
determine if ELA is advantageous is vested in
the Board of Directors of PCSO. PCSO does
not have funds. Petitioners seek to further
their moral crusade. Petitioners do not have
a legal standing because they were not
parties to the contract
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
RATIO DECIDENDI
not the same one litigated by the parties before in
Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in
any sense be regarded as “the law of this case”. The
parties are the same but the cases are not.
RULE ON “CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT” cannot
still apply. An issue actually and directly passed upon
and determine in a former suit cannot again be drawn
in question in any future action between the same
parties involving a different cause of action. But the
rule does not apply to issues of law at least when
substantially unrelated claims are involved. When the
second proceeding involves an instrument or
transaction identical with, but in a form separable
from the one dealt with in the first proceeding, the
Court is free in the second proceeding to make an
independent examination of the legal matters at
issue.
Since ELA is a different contract, the previous decision
does not preclude determination of the petitioner’s
standing.
Standing is a concept in constitutional law and here
no constitutional question is actually involved. The
more appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are
‘real parties of interest’.
Question of contract of law: The real parties are those
who are parties to the agreement or are bound either
principally or are prejudiced in their rights with
respect to one of the contracting parties and can
show the detriment which would positively result to
them from the contract.
Petitioners do not have such present substantial
interest. Questions to the nature or validity of public
contracts maybe made before COA or before the
Ombudsman.
Page 14 of 97
CASE
NO.
CASE
TOPIC
29.
ITF v. Comelec, 420
SCRA 438, January
13, 2004
Taxpayer’s
Standing
30.
Ople v. Torres, 293
SCRA 141 (1998)
Legislative
Standing
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
Gloria Arroyo allocated php 2.5 billion fund
for the automated election system on 24
January 2003. The bidding process
commenced on the same month and out of
the 57 bidders it was awarded to MPC and
TIMC. DOST’s evaluation report states that
the two obtained a number of failed marks
in the technical evaluation. ITF protested the
matter to COMELEC Chairman Benjamin
Abalos Sr. Abalos rejected the protest,
hence the present petition.
Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate
Administrative Order No. 308
entitled"Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference
System" on two important constitutional
grounds, viz
:(1)it is a usurpation of the power of
Congress to legislate, and(2)it impermissibly
intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of
privacy. We grant the petition for the rights
sought to be vindicated by the petitioner
need stronger barriers against further
erosion. A.O. No. 308 was published in four
newspapers of general circulation on
January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On
January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant
petition against respondents, then Executive
Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the
government agencies, who as members of
the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee,
are charged with the implementation of A.O.
No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a
RATIO DECIDENDI
Whether or not ITF
has standing to file
the case?
Yes.
The case at bar is a matter of public concern and imbued
with public interest, it is of paramount public interest and
transcendental importance. Taxpayers are allowed to sue
when there is a claim of “illegal disbursement of public
funds” or if public money is being “deflected to any
improper use,” or when petitioner seek to restrain
“wasting of public funds through the enforcement of an
unconstitutional law.”
Whether or not the
petitioner has the
stand to assail the
validity of A.O. No.
308
Yes.
Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate.
As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite
standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance
of A.O.No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power.
Page 15 of 97
CASE
NO.
CASE
TOPIC
31.
Tolentino v.
Comelec, 420 SCRA
438, January 21,
2004
Voter’s Standing
32.
People v. Vera, 65
Phil 56, November
16, 1937
Governmental
Standing
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
temporary restraining order enjoining its
implementation.
Gloria Arroyo nominated Senator Teofista
Guingona as vice-president. After
confirmation as VP, Resolution 84 was
passed by the Senate calling the COMELEC
to fill the vacancy with a special election to
be held simultaneously with the 2001 May
regular election. It also provided that the
candidate garnering the 13th highest vote
will serve for the unexpired term of
Guingona. Petitioners, Arturo Tolentino and
Arturo Mojica sought to enjoin COMELEC
from proclaiming the
winner. They contend that it is without
jurisdiction because it failed to notify the
electorate of the position to be filled in
(special election) due to this the people
voted without distinction in one election for
13 seats irrespective of term.
Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of the defendants
in a criminal case where he was convicted.
Cu Unjieng appealed up to the Supreme
Court but was denied. On 27 November
1936 he filed fan application for probation
under the provisions of Act 4221 of the
defunct Philippine Legislature. Cu Unjieng
states in his petition that he is innocent of
the crime of which he was convicted, that he
has no criminal record and that he would
observe good conduct in the future. The CFI
of Manila denied the petition on18 June
1937. Thereafter, the seventh branch of CFI
of Manila, set the petition for hearing on 5
RATIO DECIDENDI
Whether or not
petitioners have
standing to maintain
suit?
No.
In questioning the validity of special election, petitioners
assert harm classified as “generalized grievance.” They
failed to establish direct injury they suffered from the
said governmental act. However, the Court relaxed the
requirement on standing and exercised its discretion to
give due course to voter’s suit involving the right of
suffrage.
Whether the People
of the Philippines,
through the Solicitor
General and Fiscal
of the City of
Manila, is a proper
party in present
case.
Yes.
The People of the Philippines, represented by the
Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a
proper party in the present proceedings. The
unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the
validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case. If Act 4221 really violates the
constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose
name the present action is brought, has a substantial
interest in having it set aside. Of greater import than the
damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds
is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law
by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the wellsettled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its
own laws.
Page 16 of 97
CASE
NO.
33.
CASE
Estrada vs.
Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 148560,
Nov. 19, 2001
TOPIC
Facial Challenge
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
April 1937. The Fiscal of the City of Manila
and the private prosecution also filed an
opposition on 5 April 1937 that Act 4221,
assuming that it has not been repealed by
section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is
nevertheless violative of section 1,
subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution
guaranteeing equal protection of the laws
for the reason that its applicability is not
uniform throughout the Islands and because
section 11 of the said Act endows the
provincial boards with the power to make
said law effective or otherwise in their
respective or otherwise in their respective
provinces
On 4 April 2001, an Information for plunder
was filed against former President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be
prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining
and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as
amended by RA 7659, assailed the said law
for being unconstitutional. He contends that
(a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b)
it dispenses with the “reasonable doubt”
standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it
abolishes the element ofmens rea in crimes
already punishable under The Revised Penal
Code, all of which are violations of
fundamental right of due process.
Whether or not the
crime of plunder is
unconstitutional for
being vague?
No.
RATIO DECIDENDI
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague
statute
and to one which is overbroad because of possible
“chilling
effect: upon protected speech. It can only be invoked
against
that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face,
i.e.,
that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or
by
construction.
-Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect
resulting
from the very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed
for
this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from
enacting laws against socially harmful l conducts. In the
area
Page 17 of 97
CASE
NO.
CASE
TOPIC
34.
Umali vs. Guingona, Earliest
305 SCRA 533
Opportunity
(1999)
35.
Arceta v.
Mangrobang, G.R.
No. 152895, June
15, 2004
Necessity of
Deciding
Constitutional
Questions
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
Osmundo Umali was appointed Regional
Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
However, a confidential memorandum
against him was sent to President Ramos
and thus forwarded to Presidential
Commission on Anti-Graft and Corruption
for investigation. Umali complied with the
pleadings and hearings set by PCAGC. Umali
and his lawyer did not raise clarficatory
questions during the hearing. PCAGC foud
prima facie evidence to support the charges
and President Ramos issued AO 152
dismissing Umali. He appealed to the Office
of the President but was denied. He
elevated it to RTC alleging that he was not
accorded due process and deprived of
security of tenure. Petition for Certiorari was
denied. CA reversed the decision and was
elevated to SC. One of Umali raised the issue
of the constitutionality of PCAGC as a
government agency.
On 16 September 1998, Ofelia Arceta issued
a check to Oscar Castro payable to cash for
the amount of Php 740k even with full
knowledge that the account has no
sufficient fund for the said amount. The
check was subsequently dishonoured by the
bank. The City Prosecutor of Metro Manila
charged Arceta of violating BP Blg 22
(Bouncing Checks Law). She did not moved
Whether or not the
contention of Umali
was raised at the
earliest
opportunity?
No.
Whether or not the
constitutionality of
BP Blg 22 is the lis
mota of the case?
No.
RATIO DECIDENDI
of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the
area of
free speech. The over breadth and vagueness doctrines
then have a special application only to free speech cases.
As regards the issue of constitutionality of PCAGC, it was
only posed by the petitioner in his motion of
reconsideration before the RTC of Makati. It was certainly
too late to raise the said issue for
the first time at such late stage of the proceedings below.
Every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality. To justify its nullification there must be
a clear and unequivocal breach of the constitution and
not one that is speculative, doubtful or argumentative.
Petitioner failed to show that BP Blg 22 by itself or by
implementation transgressed a provision of the
Constitution.
Page 18 of 97
CASE
NO.
CASE
TOPIC
36.
Macias v. Comelec,
GR No 18684 14,
September 1961
Congress:
Composition,
Qualification and
Term of Office
37.
Tan v. Comelec,
GR No 73155, 11
July 1986
Congress:
Composition,
Qualification and
Term of Office
38.
Veterans Fed. Party
v. Comelec, G.R.
136781, October
06, 2000
Congress:
Composition,
Qualification and
Term of Office
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
for the charge to be dismissed and pleaded
not guilty. She then
petitioned for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus assailing the constitutionality of
BP Blg 22 citing the Lozano doctrine.
Petitioner Lamberto Macias requests for the
prevention of implementing Act 3040 that
apportions representative districts in the
country on the ground that it apportioned
districts without regard to the number of
inhabitants of the several provinces.
Respondent COMELEC contend that they are
merely complying with the statute and that
the census submitted on November 1960
that became the basis of the bill although
“preliminary” should be considered “official
for all purposes.”
Batas Pambansa Bilang 885 was enacted
creating a new province in the Island of
Negros to be known as the province of
Negros del Norte, which took effect on 03
December 1985. Patricio Tan filed a case for
prohibition to stop COMELEC from
conducting a plebiscite and implementing
the same. Due to Christmas holiday, this was
not acted upon and the plebiscite was held
and ratified only to inhabitants of Negros del
Norte excluding the rest of Negros
Occidental province. Petitioner move to stop
the implementation of the said law.
Under the party-list system, a voter elects,
apart from the district representative, a
registered party, organization or coalition
that will be entitled to a maximum of three
RATIO DECIDENDI
Whether or not Act
3040 was
unconstitutional?
Yes.
The Constitution directs that the 120 members of the
House of Representatives shall be apportioned among
the provinces as nearly as may be according to the
member of their respective inhabitants. Act 3040 violated
this provision when it gave Cebu, Manila, Pangasinan etc
more members than Rizal, Cotabato, etc with a bigger
population. Such disproportion of representation clearly
violates the Constitutional provision.
Whether or not the
creation of the new
province, Negros del
Norte was
unconstitutional?
Yes.
The proclamation of the new province Negros del Norte
and the appointment of its officials were declared null
and void. Pursuant to Article 11 Section 3, it si imperative
to obtain approval of majority of votes in a plebiscite in
the units affected whenever a province is created,
divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of
the boundaries. The boundary of Negros Occidental
would be altered by the division of its exiting boundaries
to create the new province. There is no way to reconcile
in holding a plebiscite that eliminates the participation of
the two component political units.
Whether or not the
respondent partylists are entitled to a
party-list seat
Partially
granted.
The 20% allocation for party-list representatives
mentioned in Section 5(2), Article VI is not mandatory but
merely a ceiling. The 2% threshold and three-seat limit is
constitutional.
Page 19 of 97
CASE
NO.
39.
CASE
Banat v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 17927,
April 21, 2009
TOPIC
Congress:
Composition,
Qualification and
Term of Office
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
party-list representatives in the House of
Representatives depending on its obtaining
a required percentage of the national vote.
RA 7941 provides for the manner of
selection for the party-list representatives.
despite their failure
to get at least 2% of
the national vote in
the election?
On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to
Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List
Representatives Provided by the
Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041
(PL) before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition
because "the Chairman and the Members of
the COMELEC have recently been quoted in
the national papers that the COMELEC is
duty bound to and shall implement the
Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the
Panganiban formula in allocating party-list
seats."
BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC
Resolution No. 07-88. BANAT did not file a
motion for reconsideration of NBC
Resolution No. 07-88.
On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and
A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as
NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the
Veterans formula as stated in its NBC
Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans
formula is violative of the Constitution and
Whether or not the
20% allocation for
party-list
representatives
mandatory or a
mere ceiling.
Yes
RATIO DECIDENDI
Formula on how to determine the additional seats:
1. 20% allocation- the combined number of all party-list
representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total
membership of the HR, including those under the partylist.
2. 2% threshold- only those garnering at least 2% of the
total votes cast for party-list are qualified to have a seat.
1 Section 10, Article 10, 1987 Constitution.
3. three-seat limit – additional seats shall be computed
“in proportion to their total number of votes”.
4. proportional representation
The Court reversed its ruling in Veteran’s case.
The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely
a
ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more than
20% of
the Members of HR. The continued operation of the 2%
threshold in the distribution of the additional seats
frustrates
the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the
members of the HR shall consist of party-list
representatives.
Page 20 of 97
CASE
NO.
40.
CASE
Atong Paglaum v.
COMELEC
G.R. No. 203766,
April 2, 2013
TOPIC
Congress:
Composition,
Qualification and
Term of Office
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On
the same day, the COMELEC denied
reconsideration during the proceedings of
the NBC.
Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties
were disqualified by the Commission on
Elections in the May 2013 party-list elections
for various reasons but primarily for not
being qualified as representatives for
marginalized or underrepresented sectors.
Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for
certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave
abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC
in disqualifying them.
Whether or not the
COMELEC
committed grave
abuse of discretion
in disqualifying the
said party-lists.
No.
RATIO DECIDENDI
No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in
the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT. However,
the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the
COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new
guidelines which abandoned some principles established
in the two aforestated cases. The new guidelines are as
follows: I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the
COMELEC must use the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list
system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional
parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations. 2. National parties or organizations and
regional parties or organizations do not need to organize
along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any
“marginalized and underrepresented” sector. 3. Political
parties can participate in party-list elections provided
they register under the party-list system and do not field
candidates in legislative district elections. A political
party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in
legislative district elections can participate in party-list
elections only through its sectoral wing that can
separately register under the party-list system. The
sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party,
and is linked to a political party through a coalition. 4.
Sectoral parties or organizations may either be
“marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in “welldefined political constituencies.” It is enough that their
principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector. The sectors that are
“marginalized and underrepresented” include labor,
Page 21 of 97
CASE
NO.
41.
CASE
Bagong Bayani v.
Comelec, G.R. No.
147589, June 26,
2001
TOPIC
Congress:
Composition,
Qualification and
Term of Office
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
Petitioners challenge Omnibus Resolution
No 3785 issued by COMELEC that approved
the participation of 154 organizations and
parties in the 2001 party-list elections.
Petitioners contend that the party-list
system was intended to benefit the
marginalized and underrepresented. The
inclusion of the political parties is
objectionable. Solicitor
General argued that RA 7941 allow political
parties to participate as this is open to all
Whether or not
political parties may
participate in the
party-list elections?
Dismiss
ed.
RATIO DECIDENDI
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas
workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined political
constituencies” include professionals, the elderly,
women, and the youth. 5. A majority of the members of
sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
“marginalized and underrepresented” must belong to the
“marginalized and underrepresented” sector they
represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of
sectoral parties or organizations that lack “well-defined
political constituencies” must belong to the sector they
represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented,” or that represent those who lack
“well-defined political constituencies,” either must
belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track
record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The
nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties
or organizations. 6. National, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some
of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they
have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
Pursuant to RA 7941, respondents may not be
disqualified from participating on the ground that they
are political parties. The Constitution also provides that
members of the House of Representatives may “be
elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations.”
Page 22 of 97
CASE
NO.
CASE
TOPIC
42.
Aquino v. Comelec,
248 SCRA 400
(1995)
Congress:
Composition,
Qualification and
Term of Office
43.
Marcos vs.
Comelec, 248 SCRA
300 (1995)
Congress:
Composition,
Qualification and
Term of Office
44.
Torayno vs.
Comelec, G.R.
137329, August 09,
2000
Congress:
Composition,
Qualification and
Term of Office
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
registered national, regional and sectoral
parties or organization.
Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of
candidacy for the new 2nd district of Makati
stating that he has been residing there for
ten months. When his candidacy was
opposed he filed another certificate of
candidacy stating that he has been residing
in Makati for more than a year by virtue of a
contract of lease. COMELEC dismissed
petition for Aquino’s disqualification and
garnered majority vote on 1995 election.
Mateo Bedon filed for suspension of his
proclamation. COMELEC decided in favor of
Bedon hence the petition for certiorari.
Imelda Marcos filed her certificate of
candidacy for the 1st district of Leyte stating
that she has been residing there for seven
months. Incumbent, Cirilo Montejo filed for
motion for disqualification of Marcos for
failing the required residency. Marcos
amended her certificate of candidacy to
residing in the district since childhood.
COMELEC decided in
favor of Montejo. Marcos received the
highest number of votes and her
proclamation was suspended, hence the
petition.
Vicente Emano was provincial governor of
Misamis Oriental for three terms until 1995
election and his certificate of candidacy
showed that his residence was in Tagoloan,
Misamis Oriental. On 14 June 1997, while
still governor he executed a voter
RATIO DECIDENDI
Whether or not
Aquino failed the
constitutional
residency
requirement?
Yes.
In order for Aquino to qualify he must prove that he has
established not just residence but domicile of choice.
Clearly, the place “where a party actually or
constructively has his permanent home” where he
eventually intends to return and remain – his domicile –
is what the Constitution speaks of residence for purposes
of election law. Property ownership is not an indicia of
the right to vote or to be voted upon.
Whether or not
Marcos failed the
constitutional
residency
requirement?
No.
The essential distinction between residence and domicile
in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when
the purpose for which the resident has taken his abode
ends. If a person’s intent be to remain, it becomes his
domicile; if his intent is to leave then as soon as his
purpose is established it is residence.
Whether or not
Emano failed the
constitutional
residency
requirement?
No.
Emano was actually and physically residing in CDO while
discharging his duties as governor and even paid his
community tax certificate in the same. The residency
requirement intends to prevent the possibility of a
“stranger unacquainted with the conditions and needs of
Page 23 of 97
CASE
NO.
45.
46.
CASE
TOPIC
Aquino III and
Robredo v.
COMELEC
G.R. No. 189793,
April 7, 2010
Legislative
districts
Santiago v.
Guingona, G.R.
134577, November
18, 1998
Congress:
Election of
Officers
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
registration record in Cagayan de Oro City
which is geographically located in Misamis
Oriental, claiming 20 years of residence. He
filed candidacy for mayor in the said city and
stated that his residence for the preceding
two years and five months was in the same
city. Rogelio Torayno Sr filed petition for
disqualification of Emano fo failing to meet
the residency requirement. Emano won the
mayoral post and proclaimed winner.
Torayno filed for annulment of election of
Emano. COMELEC upheld its decision.
Petitioners contend that the
reapportionment introduced by Republic Act
No. 9716, runs afoul of the explicit
constitutional requirement under Article VI
Sec. 5 par. (1) and (3) and Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended thereto which requires
a minimum population of two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) for the creation of a
legislative district.5 The petitioners claim
that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No.
9716 of the first and second districts of
Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because
the proposed first district will end up with a
population of less than 250,000 or only
176,383.
The Senate convening on 27 July 1998,
Senator Marcelo Fernan and Francisco Tatad
were nominated for president. Fernan won
by a vote of 20 to 2 and declared President
of Senate. Senator Ople was president pro
RATIO DECIDENDI
the community from seeing an elective office to serve
that community.”
Whether or not RA
Yes.
9716 is
constitutional
Whether or not
there was an actual
violation of the
constitution in the
No.
Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a
250,000 minimum population only for a city to be
entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.
The requirement of population is not an indispensable
requirement, but is merely an alternative addition to the
indispensable income requirement. To be clear about our
judgment, we do not say that in the reapportionment of
the first and second legislative districts of Camarines Sur,
the number of inhabitants in the resulting additional
district should not be considered. Our ruling is that
population is not the only factor but is just one of several
other factors in the composition of the additional district.
Such settlement is in accord with both the text of the
Constitution and the spirit of the letter, so very clearly
given form in the Constitutional debates on the exact
issue presented by this petition. Hence petition is
dismissed.
The Supreme Court held that majority is the political
party to which most number of lawmakers belonged
(concept of plurality). The Constitution is silent as regards
the manner of electing officers other than the Senate
President and the House Speaker. Hence, it is within the
Page 24 of 97
CASE
NO.
CASE
TOPIC
47.
Avelino vs. Cuenco,
83 Phil. 17 (1949)
Congress:
Quorum
48.
Pacete vs. Comm.
On Appointments,
40 SCRA 58 (1971)
Congress: Rules
of Proceeding
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
tempore and Senator Drilon as majority
leader were likewise elected. Senator Tatad
manifested that he will assume minority
leader. This was contested by Senator
Flavier stating that their party being the
minority group will determine the holder of
the said post. Thereafter, they voted for
Senator Guingona. Hence the petition for
quo warranto by Tatad.
The petitioners, Senator Jose Avelino, in a
quo warranto proceeding, asked the court to
declare him the rightful Senate President
and oust the respondent, Mariano Cuenco.
In a session of the Senate, Tanada’s request
to deliver a speech in order to formulate
charges against then Senate President
Avelino was approved. With the leadership
of the Senate President followed by his
supporters, they deliberately tried to delay
and prevent Tanada from delivering his
speech. The SP with his supporters
employed delaying tactics, the tried to
adjourn the session then walked out. Only
12 Senators were left in the hall. The
members of the senate left continued the
session and Senator Cuenco was appointed
as the Acting President of the Senate and
was recognized the next day by the
President of the Philippines.
Feliciano Pacete was appointed by the
President as municipal judge of Pigcawayan,
Cotabato. He assumed office on 11
September 1964. His appointment was
made during recess of Congress and was
election of Senate
officers?
RATIO DECIDENDI
province of the Legislative, not the Supreme Court, as
conferred by the Constitution.
Whether or not
Resolutions 67 & 68
was validly
approved?
Yes.
The base for computing the majority of the legislative
body for the purpose of
determining the existence of a quorum should normally
be the total membership
of the body, although it will be noted that in the case
Avelino v. Cuenco the base
used was twenty-three and not twenty-four, which was
the total membership of
the Senate.
Whether or not a
motion for
consideration with
CA without being
No.
The constitutional requirement is clear; there must be
either a rejection by CA or nonaction on its part. Pacete’s
confirmation became final and irrevocable upon the
adjournment of the Fifth Congress as no rule of the
Commission as to a motion for reconsideration could
Page 25 of 97
CASE
NO.
CASE
TOPIC
49.
Arroyo vs. De
Venecia, G.R.
127255, August 14,
1997
Congress: Rules
of Proceeding
50.
Alejandrino v.
Quezon, 46 Phil. 83
(1924)
Congress:
Discipline of
Members
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
only submitted to CA in 1965 session and
was unanimously confirmed on 20 May
1965. On 07 February 1966 the Secretary of
Justice advised him to vacate his post on the
ground that his appointment was by-passed.
Pacete clarified the matter with Commission
on Appointments. CA took no action and the
Secretary of Justice still moved to Pacete to
vacate his post and withheld his salaries.
RA 8240 which amends certain provisions of
the National Internal Revenue Code by
imposing so-called ”sin taxes” on the
manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes
were challenged by Representative Joker
Arroyo. The bicameral committee after
submitting its report to the House, the
chairman of the committee proceeded to
deliver his sponsorship speech and was
interpellated. Arroyo also interrupted to
move to adjourn for lack of quorum. His
motion was defeated and put to a vote. The
interpellation of the sponsor proceeded and
the bill was approved on its third reading.
Issue:
Senator Jose Alejandrino was declared guilty
of disorderly conduct and flagrant violation
of the privileges of the Senate for having
treacherously assaulted Senator Vicente de
Vera. He was deprived of his prerogatives,
privileges and emoluments of being a
senator. He filed mandamus and injunction
against respondent Senate President
Manuel Quezon from executing the said
acted on is a new
one?
RATIO DECIDENDI
have the force and effect of defeating the constitutional
provision that an ad interim appointment is effective until
disapproved by CA or until next adjournment of the
Congress.
Whether or not
Arroyo should have
been heard for his
call to adjourn for
lack of quorum?
Dismiss
ed.
Legislative action will not be declared invalid for noncompliance with internal rules. It is unwarranted invasion
of the prerogative of a coequal department of the Court
either to set aside a legislative action as void because the
Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of
procedure or to allow those defeated in the political
arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when the
petitioners can find their remedy in their own
department.
Whether or not the
resolution
disciplining
Alejandrino is null
and void?
Dismiss
ed.
Where a member has been expelled by the legislative
body, the courts have no power, irrespective of whether
or not the expulsion was right or wrong, to issue a
mandate to compel his reinstatement.
Page 26 of 97
CASE
NO.
CASE
TOPIC
51.
Osmena vs.
Pendatun, 109 Phil.
863 (1960)
Congress:
Discipline of
Members
52.
Santiago vs.
Sandiganbayan,
G.R. 126055, April
19, 2001
Congress:
Discipline of
Members
53.
De Venecia vs.
Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 130240,
Feb. 05, 2002
Congress:
Discipline of
Members
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
resolution and to declare the said resolution
null and void.
Congressman Sergio Osmeña Jr during his
privilege speech made charges against the
Office of the President. House Resolution 59
created a Special Committee headed by
Congressman Salipada Pendatun. The
committee required him to substantiate his
allegations against President Garcia and if he
failed to do so he must show cause why the
House should not punish him. Osmeña filed
petition for declaratory relief, certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction. He
contended that the said resolution violated
his parliamentary immunity.
A group of employees of the Commission of
Immigration and Deportation (CID) filed a
complaint for violation of Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act against then CID
Commissioner Miriam Defensor-Santiago. It
was alleged that petitioner, with evident bad
faith and manifest partiality in the exercise
of her official functions, approved the
application for legalization of the stay of
several disqualified aliens. The
Sandiganbayan then issued an order for her
suspension effective for 90 days.
On 12 March 1993, an Information was filed
with the Sandiganbayan against then
Congressman Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., of
Agusan del Sur. It was for prosecution filed a
“Motion to suspend the Accused Pendente
Lite” . In its Resolution dated 6 June 1997.
The Sandiganbayan granted the motion and
RATIO DECIDENDI
Whether or not HR
59 violated
Osmeña’s
parliamentary
immunity?
No.
Parliamentary immunity guarantees the legislative
complete freedom of expression without fear of being
made responsible in criminal or civil action before any
court outside Congressional Hall. However, it does not
protect him from responsibility before the legislative
body whenever his words or conduct are considered by
the latter disorderly or unbecoming. For unparliamentary
conduct, members of Congress can be censured,
committed to prison, suspended or expelled by the votes
of their colleagues.
Whether or not the
Sandiganbayan has
authority to decree
a 90-day preventive
suspension against a
Senator of the
Republic of the
Philippines.
Yes.
The doctrine of separation of powers does not exclude
members of Congress from the mandate of R.A. 3019.
The order of suspension prescribed by RA 3019
is distinct from the powers of Congress to discipline its
own ranks under the
Constitution.
Whether or not the
Suspension
provided in the
Antigraft law is a
penalty or a
pecuniary measure.
No.
The suspension provided for in the Anti-graft law is
mandatory and is of different nature and purpose. It is
imposed by the court, not as a penalty, but as a
precautionary measure resorted to upon the filing of
valid Information. Its purpose is to prevent the accused
public officer from frustrating his prosecution by
influencing witnesses or tampering with documentary
Page 27 of 97
CASE
NO.
54.
CASE
Casco Chemical Co.
vs. Gimenez, 7
SCRA 347 (1963)
TOPIC
The Enrolled Bill
Theory
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
ordered the Speaker to suspend the
accused, but the Speaker did not comply. On
12 August 1997, the Sandiganbayan issued a
Resolution requiring him to appear before it,
to show cause why he should not be held in
contempt of court. The Speaker filed,
through counsel, a motion for
reconsideration, invo-ing the rule on
separation of powers and claiming that he
can only act as may be dictated by the
House as a body pursuant. On 29 August
1997, the Sandiganbayan rendered a
Resolution declaring Speaker Jose C. de
Venecia, Jr. in contempt of court and
ordering him to pay a fine of P10,000.00
within 10 days from notice.
RA 2609 known as the Foreign Exchange
Margin Fee Law, fixed a uniform margin fee
of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. On
November and December 1959 Casco
Philippine Chemical purchased urea and
formaldehyde, the main ingredients in
manufacturing glues, and paid
corresponding margin fees. Casco sought a
refund pursuant to Section 2 RA 2609, “shall
not be imposed… urea formaldehyde…” The
Bank Auditor of Central Bank did not honur
the vouchers for refund and was affirmed by
the Auditor General. Respondent contend
that “urea formaldehyde” is clearly a
finished product and distinctly different
from “urea” and “formaldehyde.”
RATIO DECIDENDI
evidence and from committing further acts of
malfeasance while in office. It is thus an incident to the
criminal proceedings before the court.
Whether or not
there was error in
printing of bill?
Dismiss
ed.
Since the enrolled bill is binding upon the courts, if there
has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it
was certified by Congress and approved by the Executive,
the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation not
by judicial decree.
Page 28 of 97
CASE
NO.
CASE
TOPIC
55.
United States vs.
Pons, 34 Phil. 729
(1916)
Probative Value
of the Journal
56.
Philconsa vs.
Mathay, 18 SCRA
300 (1966)
Congress:
Salaries
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
Juan Pons was charged and convicted of
bringing opium to Philippines on board
steamer Lopez Y Lopez. Pons contend that
the last day of the special session of the
Philippine Legislature for 1914 was the 28th
day of February; that Act No. 2381, under
which Pons must be punished if found guilty,
was not passed or approved on the 28th of
February but on March 1 of that year; and
that, therefore, the same is null and void.
Petitioner has filed a suit against the former
Acting Auditor General of the Philippines
and the Auditor of the Congress of the
Philippines seeking to permanently enjoin
them from authorizing or passing in audit
the payment of the increased salaries
authorized by RA 4134 to the Speaker and
members of the House of Representatives
before December 30, 1969.
The 1965-1966 Budget implemented the
increase in salary of the Speaker and
members of the House of Representatives
set by RA 4134, approved just the preceding
year 1964. Petitioner contends that such
implementation is violative of Article VI, Sec.
14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution. The
reason given being that the term of the 8
senators elected in 1963, and who took part
in the approval of RA 4134, would have
expired only on December 30, 1969; while
the term of the members of the House who
participated in the approval of said Act
expired on December 30, 1965.
RATIO DECIDENDI
Whether or not Act
2381 is valid?
Yes.
The Court could not look beyond the journal to
determine the actual date of the passage of a bill, as it is
an official act of the legislature. As such, it is superior to
the recollections or memories of witnesses. To go beyond
the journal would be to violate the letter and spirit of the
official act, to encroach upon the authority of a
coordinate and independent department, and to
interfere with the powers of the legislature.
Whether or not the
salary increase was
constitutional?
No.
The increased compensation provided by RA 4134 is not
operative until
December 30, 1969 when the full term of all members of
Congress that approved
it on June 20, 1964 will have expired.
Page 29 of 97
CASE
NO.
CASE
TOPIC
57.
Ligot vs. Mathay,
56 SCRA 823 (1974)
Congress:
Salaries
58.
People vs. Jalosjos,
G.R. 132875,
February 03, 2000
Congress:
Freedom from
Arrest
59.
Jimenez vs.
Cabangbang 17
SCRA 876 (1966)
Congress: Speech
and Debate
Clause
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
Petitioner was re-elected to a third term
(December 30, 1965 to December 30, 1969)
but was held not entitled to the salary
increase of P32,000.00 during such third
term by virtue of this Court’s unanimous
decision in Philconsa vs. Mathay. He lost his
next bid and filed for retirement claim.
House of Representative issued a treasury
warrant using the unapproved amount.
Congress Auditor did not sign the warrant.
Petitioner’s request for reconsideration was
denied, hence the petition.
The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is
a full-fledged member of Congress confined
at the national penitentiary while his
conviction for statutory rape on two counts
and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is
pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed
this motion asking that he be allowed to
fully discharge the duties of a Congressman,
including attendance at legislative sessions
and committee meetings despite his having
been convicted in the first instance of a nonbailable offense.
In November 1958, while congress was not
in session, defendant member of the House
of Representatives who was also Chairman
of its Committee on National Defense
caused the publication in several
newspapers of an open letter to the
President of the Philippines stating that
certain members of the armed Forces of the
Philippines have been preparing for a coup
and working for the presidential candidacy
RATIO DECIDENDI
Whether or not
petitioner is entitled
to retirement using
P32,000?
No.
To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress
whose terms expired on December 30, 1969 computed
on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per
annum (which they were prohibited by the Constitution
from receiving during their term of office) would be to
pay them prohibited emoluments which in effect increase
the salary beyond that which they were permitted by the
Constitution to receive during their incumbency.
Whether or not
membership in
Congress exempt an
accused from
statutes and rules
which apply to
validly incarcerated
persons in general?
No.
Immunity from arrest is not enjoyed by one who has
been convicted. Rape is punishable by more than six
years imprisonment; hence immunity from arrest cannot
be invoked.
Whether or not the
open letter is
privileged
communication and
covered by the
privilege of speech
and debate
endowed to
members of
Congress
No.
No, the open letter is not covered by the speech and
debate clause of the Constitution and thus not immune
from suit. Pursuant to the Constitution, no member shall
be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for
any speech or debate in the Congress or in any
committee thereof (Article VI, Section 15). This privilege
covers utterances made by Congressmen in the
performance of their official functions, while congress is
in session. In the case at hand the court found that the
defendant was not performing his official duty either as
Page 30 of 97
CASE
NO.
CASE
TOPIC
60.
Adaza vs. Pacana,
Jr. 135 SCRA 431
(1985)
Congress:
Disqualifications
61.
Puyat vs. De
Gusman, 113 SCRA
31 (1982)
Congress:
Disqualifications
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
of the Secretary of national defense. The
plaintiffs were named in the open letter as
being controlled by the “Planners” of the
coup, thus the case was filed to collect a
sum of damages against the defendant
alleging that the statement is libelous.
Defendant petitioned for the case to be
dismissed claiming that as a member of the
lower house he is immune from suit, that he
is covered by the privileged communication
rule and that the said letter is not even
libelous.
Petitioner Adaza and respondent Pacana
were elected governor and Vice Governor
respectively in the 1980 elections with their
terms of office set to expire in 1986. On
March 27, 1984, both filed their candidacy
for BP elections as Mambabatas Pambansa
with Adaza winning and taking office as MP.
Having lost the BP elections, Pacana
reverted to his role in the local government
and took his oath of office as governor of
Misamis Oriental and started to perform the
duties of governor on July 1984. This
petition is raised to exclude the respondent
from the governors office, with the claim
that said petitioner is still the lawful
occupant of the said office and will serve his
full term until March 1986.
On May 25, 1979, a group of directors of
International Pipe Industries filed a quo
warranto case before the SEC questioning
the election of directors held on May 15
stating that votes were not properly
RATIO DECIDENDI
member of congress or as officer thereof as Congress was
not in session at the time the letter was published. Hence
the communication is not absolutely privileged.
Whether or not a
provincial governor
who was elected as
a Mambabatas
Pambansa [MP] can
exercise and
discharge the
functions of both
offices
simultaneously.
No.
An incompatible office is a post that a member cannot
accept unless he waives or forfeits his seat in Congress.
The purpose of said provision is to prevent a member
form owing loyalty to another branch of the government
to
the detriment of the legislative. To wit, petitioner may
not exercise and discharge both functions of Legislator
and Governor as the offices are incompatible.
Whether or not
Fernandez as a
stockholder of IPI,
can appear and
intervene in the SEC
No.
By virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman
Fernandez cannot be said
to be appearing as counsel but theoretically for the
protection of hi ownership of hares in respect of the
matter in litigation. However, under the facts and
Page 31 of 97
CASE
NO.
62.
CASE
Abbas vs. SET, 166
SCRA 651 (1988)
TOPIC
Electoral
Tribunals
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
counted therein. At the SEC conferences,
Assemblyman Fernandez entered his
appearance as counsel for the complainants,
the elected directors protested arguing that
it is unconstitutional for an assemblyman to
appear as counsel before any administrative
body. Fernandez then inhibited himself from
appearing as counsel for the group and
instead on May 31 filed an Urgent Motion
for Intervention for him to intervene, not as
a counsel, but as a legal owner of IPI shares
with a legal interest in the matter in
litigation having bought 10 shares of stock
from one of the directors with the deed of
sale signed on May 15 and notarized on May
30. The SEC Commissioner subsequently
granted the motion allowing Fernandez to
intervene in the proceedings.
In October 1987, Firdausi Abbas et al filed
before the SET an election contest against
22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who
were proclaimed senators-elect in the May
11 (1987) congressional elections by the
COMELEC. The SET is composed of three (3)
Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6)
Senators. In consideration of public policy
and the norms of fair play and due process
Abbas filed for the disqualification of the 6
senator members from acting on the said
election protest as all of them are interested
parties to said case. The Tribunal’s Rules
(Section 24) requires the concurrence of five
(5) members for the adoption of resolutions
of whatever nature in relation to the
case without
violating the
constitutional
provision that an
assemblyman must
not appear as
counsel in such
courts or bodies?
Whether or not
Abbas’s proposal is
unconstitutional
RATIO DECIDENDI
circumstances immediately preceding and following his
purchase of the shares, we are constrained to find that
there has been an indirect “appearance as counsel before
an administrative body (SEC).”
Yes.
The Constitution provides for the Tribunal to be staffed
by both Justices of the Supreme Court and Members of
the Senate with the intent that both those "judicial' and
'legislative' components commonly share the duty and
authority of deciding all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of Senators. The proposed
mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would
leave the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty
that no other court or body can perform, a duty it cannot
lawfully discharge without the participation of its entire
membership of Senators.
Page 32 of 97
CASE
NO.
63.
CASE
Bondoc vs. Pineda,
201 SCRA 792
(1991)
TOPIC
Electoral
Tribunals
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
protest. Should the disqualification be
granted, Abbas suggested amendments to
said rules with a
proviso that where more than four (4)
members are disqualified, the remaining
members shall constitute a quorum, and
with a minimum of three (3) including one
(1) Justice, they may adopt resolutions by
majority vote with no abstentions. The
suggestion is tailored to the situation
hypothesized by the petition for
disqualification, which would leave the
resolution of the contest to the only three
Members who would remain, all Justices of
this Court, whose disqualification is not
sought.
Bondoc (Nationalista Party) and Pineda
(Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino) were
rivals for a Congressional seat in the
4thDistrict of Pampanga with Pineda
winning in that election. However, Bondoc
contested the result in the HRET (House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal). Bondoc
won in the protest and he was set to be
declared as the winner by the HRET.
Congressman Camasura, Jr. a representative
of the LDP to the HRET made a conscience
vote in favor of Bondoc for which he was
expelled from the LDP. The House of
Representatives through a resolution moved
to remove Camasura from the HRET for
disloyalty to the party. As the favorable
decision on his electoral protest is being
thwarted because of the issue, Bondoc
Whether or not the
removal of
Camasura from the
HRET at the request
of the dominant
party impairs the
Tribunals
prerogative to be
the sole judge of
protests.
Yes.
RATIO DECIDENDI
The court found that the resolution of the House of
Representatives removing Congressman Camasura from
the House Electoral Tribunal for disloyalty to the LDP, is a
clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the
House Electoral Tribunal to be the sole judge of the
election contest between Pineda and Bondoc. Further,
the ruling states that the decision of the House of
Representatives withdrawing the nomination and
rescinding the election of Rep. Camasura as a member of
the HRET is hereby declared null and void ab initio for
being violative
of the Constitution, and is ordered reinstated to his
position as a member of the HRET.
Page 33 of 97
CASE
NO.
64.
CASE
Codilla vs. De
Vinecia, G.R.
150605, December
10, 2002
TOPIC
Electoral
Tribunals
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
questioned such action before the Supreme
Court (SC) by filing a petition to, among
others, annul the decision of the HOR to
withdraw and rescind the nomination of
Rep. Camasura to the HRET and to issue a
writ of mandamus ordering said Rep to
immediately reassume and discharge his
functions as a member of the HRET.
At the time of the elections on May 14,
2001, the disqualification case was still
pending against the petitioner Codilla and
thus his name remained in the list of
candidates as Representative and obtained
the highest number of votes in the elections
with Locsin coming in second. His
proclamation was suspended pending the
disqualification case. Subsequently, the
COMELEC Second Division resolved in favor
of disqualification and Locsin was thus
pronounced as the duly elected
Representative and subsequently took her
oath of office. However, this decision was
reversed by the COMELEC en banc and on
Sept 12, 2001 Codilla was declared the
winner and took his oath. Locsin refused to
acknowledge the decision of the COMELEC
en banc and argued that having been
proclaimed and having taken oath as
representative of the 4th legislative district
of Leyte, any question relative to her
election and eligibility should be brought
before the HRET pursuant to section 17 of
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Whether or not the
HRET has
jurisdiction over the
validity of Locsin’s
proclamation
No.
RATIO DECIDENDI
at the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the
validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second
Division was seasonably challenged by the petitioner in
his Motion for Reconsideration. The issue was still within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to
resolve. Hence, the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over
the matter.
In Puzon vs. Cua, even the HRET ruled that the "doctrinal
ruling that once a proclamation has been made and a
candidate-elect has assumed office, it is this Tribunal that
has jurisdiction over an election contest involving
members of the House of Representatives, could not
have been immediately applicable due to the issue
regarding the validity of the very COMELEC
pronouncements themselves." This is because the HRET
has no jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of
the COMELEC, whether issued by a division or en banc.
Page 34 of 97
CASE
NO.
CASE
TOPIC
65.
Pimentel v. HRET,
G.R. No. 141489,
November 29, 2002
Electoral
Tribunals
66.
Daza v. Singson,
180 SCRA 496
(1989)
Commission on
Appointments
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
The Party-List System Act took effect on on 3
March 1995 and for the first time on May 11
1998, in accordance with said act, the
election through popular vote of party-list
groups and organizations whose nominees
would become members of the House was
held along with the national elections.
Proclaimed winners were 14 party-list
representatives from 13 organizations.
Subsequently, the House constituted its
HRET and CA contingent by electing its
representatives to these two constitutional
bodies. In practice, the procedure involves
the nomination by the political parties of
House members who are to occupy seats in
the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) and the Commission on
Appointments (CA). From available records,
it does not appear that after the 11 May
1998 elections the party-list groups in the
House nominated any of their
representatives to the HRET or the CA. As of
the date of filing of the present petitions for
prohibition and mandamus with prayer for
writ of preliminary injunction, the House
contingents to the HRET and the CA were
composed solely of district representatives
belonging to the different political parties.
The HoR proportionally apportioned its 12
seats in the CoA among several political
parties represented in that chamber in
accordance with Art. VI Sec 18. The Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized,
resulting in a political realignment in the
RATIO DECIDENDI
Whether the
present composition
of the House
Electoral Tribunal
violates the
constitutional
requirement of
proportional
representation
because there are
no party-list
representatives in
the HRET.
No.
The Constitution expressly grants to the House of
Representatives who may occupy the seats in the HRET
and CA. Under Sections 17 and 18 of Article VI, party-list
representatives must first show to the House that they
possess the required numerical strength to be entitled to
seats in HRET and CA. Only if the House fails to comply
with this directive can the party-list representatives
resort to this Court. The instant petitions are bereft of
any allegation that respondents prevented the party-list
groups in the House from participating in the election of
members of HRET and CA.
Whether or not the
HoR was within its
authority in
withdrawing the
seat of Daza based
Yes.
The House of Representatives has the authority to
change its representation in the Commission of
Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may
transpire in the political alignments of its membership.
Such changes must be permanent and must not include
Page 35 of 97
CASE
NO.
67.
CASE
Coseteng v. Mitra,
Jr. 187 SCRA 377
(1990)
TOPIC
Commission on
Appointments
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
HoR. 24 members of the Liberal Party joined
the LDP, reducing their former party to only
17 members. As a consequence of this
development, the chamber elected a new
set of representatives consisting of the
original members except the petitioner and
including therein Luis C. Singson as the
additional member from the LDP. Daza came
to the Supreme Court to challenge his
removal from the CoA and the assumption
of his seat by Singson. Petitioner argues that
he cannot be removed from the CoA
because his election thereto is permanent.
Petitioner claims that the reorganization of
the House representation in the said body is
not based on a permanent political
realignment because the LDP is not a duly
registered political party and has not yet
attained political stability.
On August 26, 1987, the House of
Representatives, upon nomination by the
Majority Floor Leader, Cong. Francisco
Sumulong, elected from the Coalesced
Majority, eleven (11) out of twelve (12)
congressmen to represent the House in the
Commission on Appointments.
On February 1, 1989, Congresswoman
Coseteng and her party, the KAIBA, filed this
Petition for Extraordinary Legal Writs (which
may be considered as a petition for quo
warranto and injunction) praying this Court
to declare as null and void the election of
respondent Ablan, Verano-Yap, Romero,
Cuenco, Mercado, Bandon, Cabochan,
on the realignment
of political parties.
Whether or not the
members of the
House in the
Commission on
Appointments were
chosen on the basis
of proportional
representation from
the political parties
as provided in
Section 18, Article VI
of the 1987
Constitution
RATIO DECIDENDI
temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving
severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation.
Yes.
There is no merit in the petitioner's contention that the
House members in the Commission on Appointments
should have been nominated and elected by their
respective political parties. The petition itself shows that
they were nominated by their respective floor leaders in
the House. They were elected by the House (not by their
party) as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the
Constitution. The validity of their election to the
Commission on Appointments — eleven (11) from the
Coalesced Majority and one from the minority — is
unassailable.
Since the total membership of the House of
Representatives was 202, to be entitled to a seat in the
Commission, a party must have 16.8 members in the
House or 3.4% of the total membership. KAIBA was
Page 36 of 97
CASE
NO.
CASE
TOPIC
68.
Guingona vs.
Gonzales, 214 SCRA
789 (1992)
Commission on
Appointments
69.
Tio vs. Videogram
Regulatory Board,
151 SCRA 208
Requirements as
to titles of bills
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
Imperial, Lobregat, Beltran, Locsin, and
Singson, as members of the Commission on
Appointments, to enjoin them from acting
as such and to enjoin also the other
respondents from recognizing them as
members of the Commission on
Appointments on the theory that their
election to that Commission violated the
constitutional mandate of proportional
representation.
To suffice the requirement that each house
must have 12 representatives in the CA, the
parties agreed to use the traditional
formula: (No. of Senators of a political party)
x 12 seats) ÷ Total No. of Senators elected.
The senate was composed of 15 LDP
senators, 5 NPC senators, 3 LAKAS-NUCD
senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator.
Applying the formula would produce 7.5
members for LDP, 2.5 members for NPC, 1.5
members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member
for LP-PDP-LABAN. Romulo, as the majority
floor leader, nominated 8 senators from
their party because he rounded off 7.5 to 8
and that Ta┼łada from LP-PDP-LABAN should
represent the same party to the CA. A
member of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed
the nominations on the basis that the
compromise is against proportional
representation.
In an effort to address the proliferation and
unregulated circulation of videograms and
its economic effects to the movie industry
PD No. 1987 entitled “An Act Creating the
RATIO DECIDENDI
obviously short of the required number even if Coseteng
had the support of members not belonging to her party.
Whether the
election of Romulo
and Tañada as
members of the CA
is in accordance
with the provision
of Section 18 of
Article VI of the
1987 Constitution.
No.
The constitutional rule on proportional representation in
the Commission on Appointments is violated when LDP
converted the fractional ½ membership into a whole. In
so doing, one other party’s fractional membership is
made greater while the other suffers diminution of its
rightful membership. The provision of Section 18 on
proportional representation is mandatory in character
and does not leave any discretion to the Senate to
disobey or disregard the rule on
proportional representation. No party can claim more
than what is entitled.
Whether or not the
PD complies with
the one title one
subject rule.
Yes.
The court found that the title of the DECREE, which is the
creation of the Videogram Regulatory Board, is
comprehensive enough to include the purposes
expressed in its Preamble and reasonably covers all its
Page 37 of 97
CASE
NO.
70.
CASE
Lidasan vs.
Comelec, 21 SCRA
479 (1967)
TOPIC
Requirements as
to titles of bills
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
Videogram Regulatory Board” was enacted
which gave broad powers to the VRB to
regulate and supervise the videogram
industry. Sections 2 and 5 of the preamble
expound on the need to properly tax the
activities of the industry in order to
rationalize the before uncontrolled
distribution of videograms and also to
compensate for the lost government
revenues as a result of the decline in movie
house sales and consequently income,
amusement and other taxes. Petitioner
questioned the constitutionality of the law
on several grounds and on Section 10
thereof, questioned the imposition of the
30% tax on gross receipts, stating that said
section is a rider and is not germane to the
subject matter of the law.
Republic Act No. 4790, entitled “An Act
Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the
Province of Lanao del Sur,” was passed.
Pursuant to this law, COMELEC proceeded to
establish precincts for voter registration in
the said territories of Dianaton. The
petitioner Lidasan questioned the fact that
the his barrio in Cotabato was now included
in the new Municipality of Dianaton thus
effectively transferred Lanao Del Sur.
Petitioner filed a case assailing the
constitutionality of the RA on the grounds
that the law did not clearly indicate in its
title that in creating Dianaton, it would be
including in its territory several barrios from
Cotabato.
RATIO DECIDENDI
provisions. The requirement that "every bill shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the
title thereof" is sufficiently complied with if the title be
comprehensive enough to include the general purpose
which a statute seeks to achieve. It is unnecessary for the
title to express every thing that the statute wishes to
accomplish so long as the parts of the statute are related,
and are germane to
the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as
they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general
subject and title then the requirement is satisfied.
Whether or not the
PD complies with
the one title one
subject rule.
No.
The court held that the title did not satisfy the one title
one subject rule by failing to inform the members of
Congress as to the full impact of the law; also, it did not
inform the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in
Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part
of their territory is being taken away from their towns
and province to be added to the adjacent Province of
Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what
towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill.
Page 38 of 97
CASE
NO.
CASE
TOPIC
71.
Cruz vs. Paras, 123
SCRA 106 (1994)
Requirements as
to titles of bills
72.
Tobias vs. Abalos,
239 SCRA 106
(1994)
Requirements as
to titles of bills
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
With the aim to exercise police power to
promote general welfare, Ord. No. 84, Ser.
of 1975 or the Prohibition and Closure
Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan was passed.
The petitioners being club and Cabaret
operators assailed the constitutionality of
said ordinance stating that it violates their
right to engage in a lawful business for the
said ordinance would close out their
business. The local ordinance was enacted
pursuant to RA 938 which reads “AN ACT
GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS
AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE
THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND
OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF
AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS”, the first
section of which says that the municipal or
city board or council of each chartered city
shall have the power to regulate, but
likewise prohibit by ordinance the
establishment, maintenance and operation
of night clubs, cabarets, dancing schools…
and the like. The lower courts ruled that the
prohibition is a valid exercise of police
power to promote general welfare, thus the
appeal to the SC.
Prior to Republic Act No., 7675 also known
as “An Act Converting the Municipality of
Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to
be known as the City of Mandaluyong”,
Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only
one legislative district. Petitioners move to
declare unconstitutional R.A. No. 7675,
RATIO DECIDENDI
Whether or not the
powers granted by
RA 938 includes
prohibition aside
from regulation
Yes.
The Court ruled that the power granted remains that of
regulation, not prohibition following the rule that "Every
bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof." The court finds that there
is no dispute as the title limits the power to regulating.
Ordinances by virtue of the general welfare clause must
be reasonable, in consonance with the laws and public
policy of the state.
Ordinances by virtue of the general welfare clause must
be reasonable, in consonance with the laws and public
policy of the state. Such sweeping exercise of lawmaking
power is unreasonable. It is a clear invasion of personal
and property rights.
Municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of
nightclubs but it can regulate such.
Whether or not the
creation of a
separate
congressional
district for
Mandaluyong under
RA 7675 complies
Yes.
The creation of a separate congressional district for
Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from
the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city
but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion
into a highly urbanized city. The title necessarily includes
and contemplates the subject treated under Section 49
regarding the creation of a separate congressional district
Page 39 of 97
CASE
NO.
CASE
TOPIC
73.
Guingona vs.
Caraque, 196 SCRA
221 (1991)
Requirements as
to Appropriation
laws
74.
Philconsa vs.
Enriquez, G.R. No.
Requirements as
to Appropriation
laws
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
specifically Article VIII, Section 49 thereof.
Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675
provides:
As a highly-urbanized city, the City of
Mandaluyong shall have its own legislative
district with the firstrepresentative to be
elected in the next national elections after
the passage of this Act. The remainderof the
former legislative district of San
Juan/Mandaluyong shall become the new
legislative district ofSan Juan with its first
representative to be elected at the same
election.
The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in
automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion
for debt service) and P155.3 Billion
appropriated under Republic Act No. 6831,
otherwise known as the General
Appropriations Act, or a total of P233.5
Billion. The petitioners are questioning the
constitutionality of the automatic
appropriation for debt service in said
budget. Automatic appropriation for debt
service is authorized by R.A. No. 4860, as
amended, Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 and
P.D. No. 1967. However, petitioners argue
that being automatic, the laws are
inconsistent with Section 24, Article VI of the
Constitution, whereby all appropriation bills
shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives.
RA 7663 or General Appropriations Act of
1994 contains a special provision that allows
any member of Congress the authority to
with the one title
one subject rule
RATIO DECIDENDI
for Mandaluyong. A liberal construction of the "one titleone subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this
court so as not to cripple or impede legislation.
Whether or not the
automatic
appropriation for
debt service in the
1990 budget
pursuant to R.A. No.
4860, as amended,
Section 31 of P.D.
No. 1177 and P.D.
No. 1967 constitute
lawful
authorizations or
appropriations
Yes.
The automatic appropriation for debt service provides
flexibility for effective debt management without need
for periodic enactment of laws. The Court finds that in
this case the questioned laws are complete in all their
essential terms and conditions and sufficient standards
are indicated therein. The purpose of these laws is to
enable the government to make prompt payment and/or
advances for all loans to protect and maintain the credit
standing of the country. Although the specific amounts to
be paid are not certain, there are legislative parameters
provided that is to pay only the principal, interest, taxes
and other normal banking charges on the loans, credits or
indebtedness, or on the bonds, debentures or security or
other evidences of indebtedness sold in international
markets incurred by virtue of the law, as and when they
shall become due.
Whether or not the
special provision in
RA 7663 allowing
No.
Only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House
have the power to realign allocations made. The member
may determine and propose the realignment but it is
Page 40 of 97
CASE
NO.
CASE
TOPIC
113105, August 19,
1994
75.
Tolentino vs. Sec.
of Finance, G.R.
115455, August 25,
1994
Requirements as
to tax laws
76.
Lung Center vs.
Q.C., G.R.No.
144104, June 29,
2004
Requirements as
to tax laws
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
realign his allocation for Operational
Expenses, provided that the total of said
allocation is not exceeded. Petitioners
question the validity of said provision
arguing that only the Senate President and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives
are authorized under the Constitution to
realign savings for the legislative branch
pursuant to Article VI Section 25 of the
Constitution.
Arturo Tolentino et al is questioning the
constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise
known as the Expanded Value Added Tax
(EVAT) Law. H.B. No. 11197 was filed in the
House of Representatives where it passed
three readings and that afterward it was
sent to the Senate where after first reading
it was referred to the Senate Ways and
Means Committee, the Senate did not pass
it on second and third readings and instead
passed its own version (S. No. 1630)
approved on May 24, 1994. The petitioners
argued that as the enrolled bill was not the
version passed by the HoR but instead was
the Senate version, therefore the bill did not
exclusively originate from the House of
Representatives and violates Section 24,
Article 6 of the Constitution.
The Lung Center of the Philippines was
assessed Real Property Taxes by the City
Assessor of Quezon City. Petitioner contends
that it is exempt from Real Property Taxes as
a Charitable institution pursuant to Article
VI, Section 28 (3) of the Constitution. The
members of
congress to realign
his allocation is valid
RATIO DECIDENDI
subject for approval of the Speaker of the house and the
Senate President pursuant to Article VI Section 25 of the
Constitution. Furthermore, two conditions must be met:
1) the funds to be realigned are actually savings, and 2)
the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the items of
expenditures to which said transfer to be made.
Whether or not the
Senate may propose
an amendment to a
House revenue bill
by enacting its own
version of a revenue
bill?
Yes.
The court finds that while Art. VI, Section 24 provides
that all appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills
authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills must "originate exclusively
in the House of Representatives," it also provides, "but
the Senate may propose or concur with amendments."
The court ruled that in the exercise of this power, the
Senate may propose an entirely new bill as a substitute
measure, furthermore, the court finds that there is also
no prohibition to the filing of a Senate Bill in anticipation
of the receipt of the Bill coming from the House, as long
as there is no further action by the Senate pending
receipt of the House Bill. To wit, what the Constitution
only requires is that the initiative must come from the
HoR on the theory that they are more sensitive to the
needs and problems of their locality.
Whether or not the
Lung Center as a
charitable
institution is exempt
from Real Property
Partially
granted.
The exemption from Real Property Taxes is partially
granted. The court ruled that only the portions of the
land occupied by the hospital and used for its patients
whether paying or nonpaying are exempt from real
property taxes while the portions of the land leased to
private entities as well as those parts of the hospital
Page 41 of 97
CASE
NO.
CASE
TOPIC
77.
Tan vs. Del Rosario,
237 SCRA 324
(2000)
Requirements as
to tax laws
78.
Garcia vs. Executive
Secretary, 211
SCRA 219 (1992)
Requirements as
to tax laws
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
hospital in its operations admits patients,
renders medical services, leases portions of
the land to private parties, and rents out
portions of the hospital to private medical
practitioners from which it derives income
to be used for operational expenses.
Taxes on the
property it occupies
The petitioners challenge the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7496,
commonly known as the Simplified Net
Income Taxation Scheme ("SNIT"), which
amends certain provisions of the National
Internal Revenue Code. RA 7496 in effect
limited the allowable deductions from gross
income of single proprietorships and
professionals in the computation of their
taxable net income. Petitioner argues that
RA No. 7496 desecrates the constitutional
requirement that taxation "shall be uniform
and equitable" in that the law would now
attempt to tax single proprietorships and
professionals differently from the manner it
imposes the tax on corporations and
partnerships.
The President issued several Executive
Orders which imposed additional duties on
importation. Petitioners questioned the
constitutionality of Executive Order Nos 475
and 478 pursant to Section 24, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution which provides that
all appropriation, revenue or tariff bills etc,
shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives. Executive Order No. 475
issued on 15 August 1991 imposed an
Whether or not
Republic Act No.
7496 complies with
the rule on
uniformity of
taxation and
therefore
constitutional.
Yes.
Whether or not the
President is acting
within his powers in
the levy of
additional duties
and in issuing laws
in the nature of
revenue generating
measures
Yes.
RATIO DECIDENDI
leased to private individuals are not exempt from such
taxes. He who claims the exemption must bear the
burden to prove, by clear and unequivocal proof, that (a)
it is a charitable institution; and (b) its real properties are
ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY and EXCLUSIVELY used for
charitable purposes the petitioner was found wanting
thus the decision.
The court ruled that RA 7496 is constitutional. Uniformity
of taxation merely requires that all subjects or objects of
taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike both in
privileges and liabilities. Classification does not violate
uniformity for as long as: (1) the standards that are used
therefor are substantial and not arbitrary, (2) the
categorization is germane to achieve the legislative
purpose, (3) the law applies, all things being equal, to
both present and future conditions, and (4) the
classification applies equally well to all those belonging to
the same class.
The court rule that the President is acting within his
powers in the issuance of EO Nos 475 and 478. Generally,
revenue laws etc shall originate from the HoR, however
there is an exception in Section 28(2) of Article VI of the
Constitution which says that the Congress may, by law,
authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and
subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may
impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonage
and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within
the framework of the national development program of
Page 42 of 97
CASE
NO.
CASE
TOPIC
79.
John Hay PAC v.
Lim, G.R. No.
119775, October
24, 2000
Requirements as
to tax laws
80.
Fabian v. Desierto,
G.R. No. 129742,
September 16,
1998
Requirements as
to Appellate
Jurisdiction of
the Supreme
Court
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
additional duty on all imported articles of
five percent (5%) ad valorem, except in the
cases of crude oil and other oil products
which shall be subject to the additional duty
of nine percent (9%) ad valorem. Executive
Order No. 478, dated 23 August 1991, levied
(in addition to the aforementioned
additional duty of nine percent (9%) ad
valorem and all other existing ad valorem
duties) a special duty of P0.95 per liter or
P151.05 per barrel of imported crude oil and
P1.00 per liter of imported oil products.
Proclamation No. 420, series of 1994, was
issued by then President Fidel Ramos
“CREATING AND DESIGNATING A PORTION
OF THE AREA COVERED BY THE FORMER
CAMP JOHN [HAY] AS THE JOHN HAY
SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE PURSUANT TO
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7227”. Petitioners allege
that Proclamation No. 420 is
unconstitutional in so far as it grants tax
exemptions merely through the president,
when such power resides with the legislative
through Article VI, Section 28 (4) of the
Constitution which provides that No law
granting any tax exemption shall be passed
without the concurrence of a majority of all
the members of Congress.
The Ombudsman granted the motion for
reconsideration of and absolved private
respondents from administrative charges for
inter alia grave misconduct committed as
then Assistant Regional Director, of the
Department of Public Works and Highways
RATIO DECIDENDI
the Government. There is thus explicit constitutional
permission to Congress to authorize the President
"subject to such limitations and restrictions is [Congress]
may impose" to fix "within specific limits" "tariff rates . . .
and other duties or imposts . . ." The delegation of tax
powers to the President must be through a law and in
this instance, the relevant congressional statute is the
Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, specifically
Sections 104 and 401 thereof.
Whether or not
Proclamation No.
420 is
unconstitutional in
providing for
national and local
tax exemption
within and granting
other economic
incentives to the
John Hay Special
Economic Zone
Yes.
Tax exemption grant is unconstitutional. Incentives under
R.A. 7227 are exclusive to the Subic Special Economic
Zone. The court ruled that it is the legislature, unless
limited by a provision of the state constitution, that has
full power to exempt any person or corporation or class
of property from taxation, its power to exempt being as
broad as its power to tax. In the case at hand, the tax
exemption would circumvent the Constitutions
requirement that a law granting any tax exemption must
have the concurrence of a majority of all the members of
Congress.
Whether or not
Section 27 of RA
6770 is valid thus
the court has
appellate
jurisdiction over
No.
Section 27 of RA 6770 which provides for appeals in
administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the
Ombudsman to the SC is not valid. Appeals from
judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are
now required to be brought to the Court of Appeals on a
verified petition for review, under the requirements and
Page 43 of 97
CASE
NO.
81.
CASE
Gonzales v.
Macaraig, G.R. No.
87636, Nov. 19,
1990
TOPIC
Procedure for
the passage of
bills
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
(DPWH). The petitioner appeals to the
Supreme Court the decision pursuant to
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770
(Ombudsman Act of 1989)i which
pertinently provides - In all administrative
disciplinary cases, orders, directives or
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman
may be appealed to the Supreme Court by
filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10)
days from receipt of the written notice of
the order, directive or decision or denial of
the motion for reconsideration in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
On 29 December 1988, the President signed
into law House Bill No. 19186, or the
General Appropriations Bill for the Fiscal
Year 1989, and declared the same to have
become Rep. Act No. 6688. In the process,
seven (7) Special Provisions and Section 55,
a "General Provision," were vetoed. On 2
February 1989, the Senate, in issuing
Resolution No. 381. expressed “that the
veto by the President of Section 55 of the
GENERAL PROVISIONS of the General
Appropriation Bill of 1989 (H.B. No. 19186) is
unconstitutional and, therefore, void and
without any force and effect; hence, the
aforesaid Section 55 remains”. The vetoed
provisions is “SEC. 55. Prohibition Against
the Restoration or Increase of
Recommended Appropriations Disapproved
and/or Reduced by Congress…” The Petition
for Prohibition/ Mandamus was filed by
administrative cases
decided by the
ombudsman.
Whether or not the
President has the
power to veto
"provisions" of an
Appropriations Bill?
RATIO DECIDENDI
conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and
adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate
procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.
Yes.
The veto power of the President is expressed in Article VI,
Section 27 of the 1987 Constitution. Explicit is the
requirement that a
provision in the Appropriations Bill should relate
specifically to some" particular appropriation" therein.
The challenged "provisions" fall short of this requirement.
Firstly, the vetoed "provisions" do not relate to any
particular or distinctive appropriation. They apply
generally to all items disapproved or reduced by Congress
in the Appropriations Bill. Secondly, the disapproved or
reduced items are nowhere to be found on the face of
the Bill. Thirdly, the vetoed Sections are more of an
expression of Congressional policy in respect of
augmentation from savings rather than a budgetary
appropriation. Consequently, Sec 55 although labelled as
"provisions," are actually inappropriate provisions that
should be treated as items for the purpose of the
President’s veto power.
Page 44 of 97
CASE
NO.
CASE
TOPIC
82.
Bengzon vs. Drilon,
208 SCRA 133
(1992)
Procedure for
the passage of
bills
83.
Miller vs. Mardo, 2
SCRA 898 (1961)
Procedure for
the passage of
bills
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
petitioners assailing mainly the
constitutionality or legality of the
Presidential veto of Section 55, and seeking
to enjoin respondents from implementing
Rep. Act No. 6688.
The issue in this petition is the
constitutionality of the veto by the President
of certain provisions in the General
Appropriations Act for FY 1992 relating to
the payment of the adjusted pensions of
retired Justices of the Supreme Court and
the Court of Appeals in order to assure
those serving in the Supreme Court, Court of
Appeals and Constitutional Commissions
receive adequate old age pensions even
during the time when the purchasing power
of the peso has been diminished
substantially by worldwide recession or
inflation. The President vetoed underlined
portions of Section 1 and the entire Section
4 the Special Provisions for the Supreme
Court of the Philippines and the Lower
Courts and the underlined portions of
Section 1 and the entire Section 2, of the
Special Provisions for the Court of Appeals
and the underlined portions of Section 1.3 of
Article XLV of the Special Provisions of the
General Fund Adjustments.
Republic Act 991 provided that the
reorganization plan drafted by Department
of Labor and Employment and submitted it
to the president for approval shall deemed
as approved by the Congress after its
adjournment unless in the meantime,
RATIO DECIDENDI
Whether or not the
veto by the
President is an item
veto in accordance
with the
constitution
No.
The President shall have the power to veto any particular
item or items in an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill
but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he
does not object. (Section 27(2), Article VI, Constitution).
However, what were vetoed were methods or systems
placed by Congress to insure that permanent and
continuing obligations to certain officials would be paid
when they fell due. An examination of the entire sections
and the underlined portions of the law which were
vetoed will readily show that portions of the item have
been chopped up into vetoed and unvetoed parts. Less
than all of an item has been vetoed. Moreover, the
vetoed portions are not items. They are provisions. The
vetoed provisions of the 1992 Appropriations Act are
declared valid and subsisting.
Whether or not
enactment of law by
legislative inaction is
valid?
No.
A proposed bill does not become a law upon legislative
inaction or adjournment of
Congress. The contemplated procedure violates the
constitutional provisions requiring positive and separate
actions of each house. It is contrary to the “settled and
well-understood parliamentary law” which requires that
Page 45 of 97
CASE
NO.
CASE
TOPIC
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
Congress by resolution disapproved the plan
and assailed its constitutionality.
84.
Armault vs.
Nazareno, 87 Phil.
29 (1950)
Legislative
investigation
85.
Armault vs.
Balagtas, 97 Phil.
358 (1955)
Legislative
investigation
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
The Senate investigated the purchase by the
government of two parcels of land, known
as Buenavista and Tambobong estates. An
intriguing question that the Senate sought
to resolve was the apparent irregularity of
the government’s payment to one Ernest
Burt, a non-resident American citizen, of the
total sum of Php1.5 million for his alleged
interest in the two estates that only
amounted to Php20,000.00, which he
seemed to have forfeited anyway long
before. The Senate sought to determine
who were responsible for and who
benefited from the transaction at the
expense of the government. Arnault was
therefore cited in contempt by the Senate
and was committed to the custody of the
Senate Sergeant-at-Arms for imprisonment
until he answers the questions. He
thereafter filed a petition for habeas corpus
directly with the Supreme Court questioning
the validity of his detention.
This was a petition for habeas corpus filed
by Jean Arnault against the Director of
Prisons, Balagtas. Arnault was incarcerated
pursuant to a resolution by the Senate
finding Arnault in contempt for refusing to
disclose the name of a person with whom he
transacted business in relation to a
government purchase of of the Buenavista
Whether or not the
Senate has the
authority to commit
petitioner for
contempt for a term
beyond its period of
legislative session.
Yes.
Whether or not the
Court of First
Instance has the
right to review the
findings of the
Senate
No.
RATIO DECIDENDI
the “two houses are to hold separate sessions for their
deliberations, and the determination of the one upon a
proposed law is to be submitted to the separate
determination of the other.”
Senate has authority to commit him for contempt for a
term beyond its period of legislative session. Senate is a
continuing body and which does not cease to exist upon
the periodical dissolution of the Congress or of the House
of Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the
Senate's power to punish for contempt in cases where
that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the
present case.
The CFI did NOT have the right to review the findings of
the Senate. The only instances when judicial intervention
may lawfully be invoke are when there has been a
violation of a constitutional inhibition, or when there has
been an arbitrary exercise of the legislative discretion.
Page 46 of 97
CASE
NO.
86.
CASE
Bengzon vs. Sen.
Blue Ribbon
Comm., 203 SCRA
767 (1991)
TOPIC
Legislative
investigation
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
and Tambobong estates. The circumstances
of Arnault's incarceration are described in
the companion case Arnault vs. Nazareno
(1950) which affirmed the Legislature's
power to hold a person in contempt for
defying or refusing to comply with an order
in a legislative inquiry. Arnault eventually
divulged that he had transacted with one
Jess D. Santos in relation to the Buenavista
and Tambobong deal. The Senate was not
satisfied with Arnault’s explanations. The
Court of First Instance ruled in favor of
Petitioner Arnault and ordered his release.
It was alleged that Benjamin Romualdez and
his wife together with the Marcoses
unlawfully and unjustly enriched themselves
at the expense of the Filipino people. That
they obtained with the help of the Bengzon
Law Office and Ricardo Lopa. Senator Juan
Ponce Enrile subsequently delivered a
privilege speech alleging that Lopa took over
various government owned corporations
which is in violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. Contained in the
speech is a motion to investigate on the
matter. The motion was referred to the
Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers or the Blue Ribbon Committee.
Enrile subsequently took advantage of the
Senate’s privilege hour upon which he
insisted to have an inquiry regarding the
matter. The SBRC rejected Lopa’s and
Bengzon’s plea. Hence this petition.
Whether or not the
inquiry that Is
sought by the
Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee should
be granted.
No.
RATIO DECIDENDI
The speech of Enrile contained no suggestion of
contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the
Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No.
3019, otherwise known as “The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.” In other words, the purpose of the inquiry
to be conducted by the Blue Ribbon Committee was to
find out whether or not the relatives of Cory, particularly
Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged
sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Kokoy to
the Lopa Group. There appears to be, therefore, no
intended legislation involved. Hence, the contemplated
inquiry by the SBRC is not really “in aid of legislation”
because it is not related to a purpose within the
jurisdiction of Congress.
Page 47 of 97
CASE
NO.
CASE
TOPIC
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
87.
Senate v. Ermita,
G.R. No. 169777,
April 20, 2006
Legislative
investigation
This case involves the project of the North
Luzon Railways Corporation with the China
National Machinery and Equipment Group.
The Senate Committees sent invitations to
various officials of the Executive Department
and AFP officials for them to appear before
the Senate on September 29, 2005. On
September 28, 2005, the President issued
EO464, effective immediately which, among
others, mandated that “all heads of
departments of the Executive Branch of the
government shall secure the consent of the
President prior to appearing before either
House of Congress.” Pursuant to this Order,
Executive Secretary Ermita communicated
to the Senate that the executive and AFP
officials would not be able to attend the
meeting since the President has not yet
given her consent. Despite the lack of
conset, Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani,
among all the AFP officials invited, attended
the investigation. Both faced court marshall
for such attendance.
Whether the
Executive Order 464
contravenes the
power of inquiry
vested in Congress.
Yes.
88.
Sabio v. Gordon,
G.R. No. 174340,
October 17, 2006
Legislative
investigation
Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago
introduced Senate Resolution No. 455
“directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on
the anomalous losses incurred by the POTC,
PHILCOMSAT, and PHC due to the alleged
Whether or not
Section 4 of EO No.1
is unconstitutional
Yes.
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
RATIO DECIDENDI
The Legislature’s power to conduct inquiry in aid of
legislation is expressly recognized in Article 6, Section 21
of the Constitution. The power of inquiry in aid of
legislation is inherent in the power to legislate but there
are exemptions to the power of inquiry, which
exemptions fall under the rubric of “executive privilege”.
This is the power of the government to withhold
information from the public, the courts, and the
Congress. This is recognized only to certain types of
information of a sensitive character. When Congress
exercise its power of inquiry, the only way for
department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by
a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the
mere fact that they are department heads. Only one
official may be exempted from this power, the President.
Section 1 of EO 464 is valid. Under Section 22 of Article
VI, the appearance of department heads in the question
hour is discretionary on their part. However,
Section 1 cannot be applied to appearances of
department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation.
Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the
refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry,
unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made,
either by the President herself or by the Executive
Secretary.
Section 2b is invalid because it enumerates persons.
Executive privilege is properly invoked in relation to
specific categories of information and not to categories of
persons.
Section 4(b) of EO No. 1 is repealed by Sec. 21 of Article
VI. The power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials
of the executive branch.
Page 48 of 97
CASE
NO.
89.
CASE
Neri vs. Senate,
G.R. No. 180643,
March 25, 2008
TOPIC
Legislative
investigation
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
improprieties in their operations by their
respective Board of Directors. Senator
Richard Gordon wrote to Chairman Camilo
Sabio of the PCGG inviting him to be one of
the resource persons in the public meeting
jointly conducted by the Committee on
Government Corporations and Public
Enterprises and Committee on Public
Services. Chairman Sabio declined the
invitation because of prior commitment. At
the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of
E.O. No. 1 “No member or staff of the
Commission shall be required to testify or
produce evidence in any judicial, legislative
or administrative proceeding concerning
matters within its official cognizance.”
Apparently, the purpose is to ensure PCGG’s
unhampered performance of its task.
Gordon’s Subpoena Ad Testificandum was
repeatedly ignored by Sabio hence he
threatened Sabio to be cited with contempt.
DOTC entered into a contract with Zhong
Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE)
for the supply of equipment and services for
the National Broadband Network (NBN)
Project. The Project was to financed by the
People’s Republic of China. The Senate
passed
various resolutions relative to the NBN deal.
On the other hand, Joe De Venecia issued a
statement that several high executive
officials and power brokers were using their
influence to push the approval of the NBN
Project by the NEDA. Neri, the head of
Whether or not the
three questions
sought by the SBRC
to be answered falls
under executive
privilege
Yes.
RATIO DECIDENDI
The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by
compulsory process only to the extent that it is
performed in pursuit of legislation. The communications
elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the
presidential communications privilege.
First, the communications relate to a “quintessential and
non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the power to
enter into an executive agreement with other countries.
This authority of the President to enter into executive
agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature
has traditionally been recognized in Philippine
jurisprudence.
Page 49 of 97
CASE
NO.
90.
CASE
Pimentel v. Joint
Com., G.R. 163783,
June 22, 2004
TOPIC
Act as board of
canvassers for
presidential
election
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
NEDA, was then invited to testify before the
Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one
hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11
hrs and during which he admitted that
Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with
P200M in exchange for his approval of the
NBN project. He further narrated that he
informed President Arroyo about the bribery
attempt and that she instructed him not to
accept the bribe. However, when probed
further on what they discussed about the
NBN Project, Neri refused to answer,
invoking the executive privilege. He refused
to answer questions from the committee. In
particular, he refused to answer the
questions on (a) whether or not President
Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b)
whether or not she directed him to prioritize
it, and (c) whether or not she directed him
to approve. He later refused to attend the
other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to
the SBRC averring that the communications
between GMA and Neri is privileged and
that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate
vs Ermita be applied. The SBRC cited Neri for
contempt.
Pimentel Jr. filed a petition for Prohibition
seeking a judgement declaring null and void
the continued existence of the Joint
committee. The petition is seeking for the
issuance of a writ of prohibition directing
the Joint Committee to cease and desist
from conducting any further proceedings
RATIO DECIDENDI
Second, the communications are “received” by a close
advisor of the President. Under the “operational
proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close
advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet.
And Lastly, there is no adequate showing of a compelling
need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and
of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority.
Whether or not the
Joint Committee
performing election
canvass even after
the termination of
congress’ session is
unconstitutional.
No.
Sec. 15. Art VI - The Congress shall convene once every
year on the fourth Monday of July for its regular session,
unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue
to be in session for such number of days as it may
determine until thirty days before the opening of its next
regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal
holidays. The President may call a special session at any
time. Contrary to petitioner's argument, however, the
Page 50 of 97
CASE
NO.
CASE
TOPIC
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
pursuant to the Rules of the Joint Public
Session of Congress on Canvassing.
The petitioner questions that the
adjournment of the regular session
terminated and expired the Congress
therefore all pending matters and
proceedings terminate upon the expiration
of the Congress.
91.
Republic v.
Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 152154,
July 15, 2003
President:
Privileges and
salary
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
The very first Executive Order issued by then
President Corazon Aquino upon her
assumption to office was EO No. 1. It
created the PCGG or the Presidential
Commission on Good Government with the
task of assisting the President in the
recovery of all the ill gotten wealth
accumulated by the Former President
Ferdinand Marcos. In all the alleged illgotten wealth cases filed by the PCGG, this
Court has seen fit to set aside technicalities
and formalities that merely serve to delay or
impede judicious resolution. This Court
Whether or not
President Marcos
committed
prohibited and
inhibited acts as a
president during his
term of office.
Yes.
RATIO DECIDENDI
term of the present Twelfth Congress did not terminate
and expire upon the adjournment of the regular session
of both Houses on June 11, 2004.Section 15, Article VI of
the Constitution cited by petitioner does not pertain to
the term of Congress, but to its regular annual legislative
sessions and the mandatory 30-day recess before the
opening of its next regular session (subject to the power
of the President to call a special session at any time). The
legislative functions of the Twelfth Congress may have
come to a close upon the final adjournment of its regular
sessions on June 11, 2004, but this does not affect its
non-legislative functions. In fact, the joint public session
of both Houses of Congress convened by express
directive of Section 4, Article VII to canvass the votes for
and to proclaim the newly elected President and VP has
not, and cannot, adjourn until it has accomplished its
constitutionally mandated tasks. For only when a board
of canvassers has completed its functions is it rendered
functus officio. Its membership may change, but it retains
its authority as a board until it has accomplished its
purposes.
The sum of $304,372.43 should be held as the only
known lawful income of respondents since they did not
file any Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SAL), as
required by law, from which their net worth could be
determined. Besides, under the 1935 Constitution,
Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could not receive any
other emolument from the Government or any of its
subdivisions and instrumentalities. Likewise, under the
1973 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President
could not receive during his tenure any other emolument
from the Government or any other source. In fact, his
management of businesses, like the administration of
foundations to accumulate funds, was expressly
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prefers to have such cases resolved on the
merits at the Sandiganbayan. But substantial
justice to the Filipino people and to all
parties concerned, not mere legalisms or
perfection of form, should now be
relentlessly and firmly pursued. Almost two
decades have passed since the government
initiated its search for and reversion of such
ill-gotten wealth. The definitive resolution of
such cases on the merits is thus long
overdue. If there is proof of
illegal acquisition, accumulation,
misappropriation, fraud or illicit conduct, let
it be brought out now. Let the ownership of
these funds and other assets be finally
determined and resolved with dispatch, free
from all the delaying technicalities and
annoying procedural sidetracks.
92.
Estrada vs. Arroyo,
G.R. No. 146738,
March 02, 2001
President:
Succession in
case of
temporary
disability
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
Former President Joseph Estrada was
succeeded by his Vice President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo. Due to the allegations
against former president Estrada, he
eventually called for a snap election. The
Supreme Court declared the seat of the
presidency vacant, saying that Estrada
constructively resigned his post. On that
same day, Gloria Arroyo took her oath of
office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA.
Later that same day, Estrada
released a letter saying that he had strong
and serious doubts about the legality and
Whether or not
petitioner Estrada
truly resigned.
Yes.
RATIO DECIDENDI
prohibited under the 1973 Constitution. Their only known
lawful income of $304,372.43 can therefore legally and
fairly serve as basis for determining the existence of a
prima facie case of forfeiture of the Swiss funds.
Respondents argue that petitioner was not able to
establish a prima facie case for the forfeiture of the Swiss
funds since it failed to prove the essential elements
under Section 3, paragraphs (c), (d) and (e) of RA 1379. As
the Act is a penal statute, its provisions are mandatory
and should thus be construed strictly against the
petitioner and liberally in favor of respondent Marcoses.
We hold that it was not for petitioner to establish the
Marcoses other lawful income or income from
legitimately acquired property for the presumption to
apply because, as between petitioner and respondents,
the latter were in a better position to know if there were
such other sources of lawful income. And if indeed there
was such other lawful income, respondents should have
specifically stated the same in their answer. Insofar as
petitioner Republic was concerned, it was enough to
specify the known lawful income of respondents.
For the president to be deemed as having resigned, there
must be an intent to resign and the intent must be
coupled by acts of relinquishment. It is important to
follow the succession of events that struck petitioner
prior his leaving the palace. Furthermore, the quoted
statements extracted from the Angara diaries, detailed
Estrada’s implied resignation On top of all these, the
press release he issued regarding is acknowledgement of
the oath-taking of Arroyo as president despite his
questioning of its legality and his emphasis on leaving the
presidential seat for the sake of peace. The Court held
that petitioner Estrada had resigned by the use of the
totality test: prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts
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93.
CLU vs. Exec.
Secretary, 194
SCRA 317 (1991)
Exceptions to
prohibition from
holding another
office
94.
Cruz v. COA, G.R.
No. 138489, Nov.
29, 2001
Exceptions to
prohibition from
holding another
office
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
constitutionality of her proclamation as
president.
President Corazon Aquino issued Executive
Order No. 284 which allowed members of
the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and
assistant secretaries to hold other
government offices or positions in addition
to their primary positions subject to
limitations set therein. The Civil Liberties
Union (CLU) assailed this EO averring that
such law is unconstitutional. The
constitutionality of EO 284 is being
challenged by CLU on the principal
submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13,
Article 7 of the Constitution. CLU avers that
by virtue of the phrase “unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution“, the only
exceptions against holding any other office
or employment in Government are those
provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The
Vice-President may be appointed as a
Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2),
Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is
an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar
Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.
The NHA Resident auditor issued a notice of
disallowance on October 23, 1997
disallowing the payment to the petitioners,
who are members of the Board of Directors
of the National Housing Authority (NHA), of
their representation allowances and per
Whether or not EO
284 is
unconstitutional
Yes.
Whether or not the
petitioners are
entitled to their
representation
allowances and per
diems as members
No.
RATIO DECIDENDI
and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance
on the issue.
It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the
President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their
deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure
multiple offices or employment in the government,
except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself
and as above clarified with respect to posts held without
additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as
provided by law and as required by the primary functions
of their office, the citation of Cabinet members (then
called Ministers) as examples during the debate and
deliberation on the general rule laid down for all
appointive officials should be considered as mere
personal opinions which cannot override the
constitution’s manifest intent and the people’s
understanding thereof. In the light of the construction
given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B
of the 1987 Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional.
Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that
Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant
secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position
to not more than 2 positions in the government and
government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to
hold multiple offices or employment in direct
contravention of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of
the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so,
unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
Officials are not allowed to receive additional
compensation for positions held ex officio capacity as
these positions are merely additional imposition of
duties. In this case, the petitioners are holding their
positions as member of the board are considered as
alternatives, the prohibition likewise applies to them.
Page 53 of 97
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CASE
NAC v. COA, G.R.
156982, September
8, 2004
TOPIC
Exceptions to
prohibition from
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
diems in the total amount of P276,000.00.
Such disallowance was pursuant to COA
Memorandum No. 97-038 issued by the
COA, directing all unit heads/auditors/team
leaders of the national government agencies
and government-owned and controlled
operations which have affected payment of
any form of additional compensation to
cabinet secretaries, their deputies and
assistants, or representatives, in violation of
the rule on multiple positions. The
petitioners appealed from the Notice of
Disallowance to the COA, claiming that the
aforementioned Supreme Court decision
applies only to members of the cabinet,
their deputies or assistants and does not
cover other appointive officials with
equivalent rank or those lower than the
position of Assistant Secretary. They added
that NHA Directors are not Secretaries,
Undersecretaries or Assistant Secretaries
and that they occupy positions lower than
the position of Assistant Secretary. The COA
issued a decision denying petitioners appeal,
stressing that the petitioners were not
sitting in the NHA Board in their own right
but as representatives of cabinet members
and who are constitutionally prohibited
from holding any other office or
employment and receive compensation
therefor, during their tenure.
Petitioner National Amnesty Commision
(NAC) is a government agency created on
March 25, 1994 by then President Fidel V.
RATIO DECIDENDI
of the NHA Board of
Directors.
Whether
representatives can
be entitled to
No.
The representatives in fact assumed their responsibilities
not by virtue of a new appointment but by mere
designation from the ex officio members who were
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holding another
office
96.
Marcos vs.
Manglapus, 178
SCRA 760 (1989)
Executive Power
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
Ramos through Proclamation No. 347. The
NAC is tasked to receive, process and review
amnesty applications. It is composed of
seven members: A Chairperson, three
regular members appointed by the
President, and the Secretaries of Jutice,
National Defense and Interior and Local
Government as ex officio members. It
appears that after personally attending the
initial NAC meetings, the three ex officio
members turned over said responsibility to
their representatives who were paid
honorari beginning December 12, 1994.
However, on October 15, 1997, NAC
resident auditor Eulalia disallowed on audit
the payment of honoraria to these
representative amounting to P255, 750 for
the period of December 12, 1994 to June 27,
1997, pursuant to COA Memorandum No.
97-038.
Former President Marcos, after his and his
family spent three year exile in Hawaii, USA,
sought to return to the Philippines. The call
is about to request of Marcos family to
order the respondents to issue travel order
to them and to enjoin the petition of the
President's decision to bar their return to
the Philippines.
payment intended
for ex-officio
members
Whether or not, in
the exercise of the
powers granted by
the Constitution,
the President may
prohibit the
Marcoses from
returning to the
Philippines.
RATIO DECIDENDI
themselves also designated as such. There is a
considerable difference between an appointment and
designation. An appointment is the selection by the
proper authority of an individual who is to exercise the
powers and functions of a given office; a designation
merely connotes an imposition of additional duties,
usually by law, upon a person already in public service by
virtue of an earlier appointment. Designation does not
entail payment of additional benefits or grant upon the
person so designation the right to claim the salary
attached to the position. Without an appointment, a
designation does not entitle the officer to receive the
salary of the position.
Yes.
According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution: "The executive power shall be vested in the
President of the Philippines." The phrase, however, does
not define what is meant by executive power although
the same article tackles on exercises of certain powers by
the President such as appointing power during recess of
the Congress (S.16), control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices (Section 17), power to
grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit
fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment
(Section 19), treaty making power (Section 21),
borrowing power (Section 20), budgetary power (Section
22), informing power (Section 23). The Constitution may
have grant powers to the President, it cannot be said to
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97.
DENR vs. DENR
Region 12
Employees, G.R.
No. 149725, August
19, 2003
Executive Power
DENR Reg 12 Employees filed a petition for
nullity of the memorandum order issued by
the Regional Exec. Director of DENR,
directing the immediate transfer of the
DENR 12 Regional Offices from Cotabato to
Koronadal City. The memorandum was
issued pursuant to DENR Executive Order
issued by the DENR Secretary.
Whether or not
Yes.
DENR Secretary has
the authority to
reorganize the DENR
Region 12 Office.
98.
Blaquera v. Alcala,
G.R. 109406,
September 11,
1998
Control of
executive
departments
On Feb. 21, 1992, then Pres. Aquino issued
AO 268 which granted each official and
employee of the government the
productivity incentive benefits in a
maximum amount equivalent to 30% of the
employee’s one month basic salary but
which amount not be less than P2, 000.00.
Whether or not AO
29 and AO 268 were
issued in the valid
exercise of
presidential control
over the executive
departments
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
Yes.
RATIO DECIDENDI
be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the
Constitution. Whatever power inherent in the
government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to
be executive.
The President possesses unstated residual powers which
are implied from the grant of executive power and which
are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the
Constitution.
The qualified political agency doctrine, all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, and the acts of the Secretaries of such
departments, performed and promulgated in the regular
course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated
by the Chief Executive, are presumptively the acts of the
Chief Executive. It is corollary to the control power of the
President as provided for under Art.
VII Sec. 17 of the 1987 Constitution: "The President shall
have control of all the executive departments, bureaus,
and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed."
In the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly
reorganize the DENR by ordering the transfer of the DENR
XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal,
South Cotabato. The exercise of this authority by the
DENR Secretary, as an alter ego, is presumed to be the
acts of the President for the latter had not expressly
repudiated the same.
The Pres. is the head of the government. Governmental
power and authority are exercised and implemented
through him. His power includes the control of executive
departments as provided under Sec. 17, Art. VII of the
Constitution. Control means the power of an officer to
alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer
had done in the performance of his duties and to
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Said AO provided that the productivity
incentive benefits shall be granted only for
the year 1991. Accordingly, all heads of
agencies, including government boards of
government-owned or controlled
corporations and financial institutions, are
strictly prohibited from granting productivity
incentive benefits for the year 1992 and
future years pending the result of a
comprehensive study being undertaken by
the Office of the Pres. The petitioners, who
are officials and employees of several
government departments and agencies,
were paid incentive benefits for the year
1992. Then, on Jan. 19, 1993, then Pres.
Ramos issued AO 29 authorizing the grant of
productivity incentive benefits for the year
1992 in the maximum amount of P1,000.00
and reiterating the prohibition under Sec. 7
of AO 268, enjoining the grant of
productivity incentive benefits without prior
approval of the President. Sec. 4 of AO 29
directed all departments, offices and
agencies which authorized payment of
productivity incentive bonus for the year
1992 in excess of P1, 000.00 to immediately
cause the refund of the excess. In
compliance therewith, the heads of the
departments or agencies of the government
concerned caused the deduction from
petitioners’ salaries or allowances of the
amounts needed to cover the alleged
overpayments.
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
RATIO DECIDENDI
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the
latter. The Pres. can, by virtue of his power of control,
review, modify,
alter or nullify any action or decision of his subordinate in
the executive departments, bureau or offices under him.
When the Pres. issued AO 29 limiting the amount of
incentive benefits,enjoining heads of government
agencies from granting incentive benefits without
approval from him and directing the refund of the excess
over the prescribed amount, the Pres. was just exercising
his power of control over executive departments. The
Pres. issued subject AOs to regulate the grant of
productivity incentive benefits and to prevent discontent,
dissatisfaction and demoralization among government
personnel by committing limited resources of
government for the equal payment of incentives and
awards. The Pres. was only exercising his power of
control by modifying the acts of the heads of the
government agencies who granted incentive benefits to
their employees without appropriate clearance from the
Office of the Pres., thereby resulting in the uneven
distribution of government resources. The President’s
duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too,
is his control of executive departments.
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99.
Hutchison Ports vs.
SBMA, G.R. No.
131367, August 31,
2000
Control of
executive
departments
In 1996, Hutchison Ports Philippines Limited
(HPPL) won a public bidding made by the
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA).
The project was to develop and operate a
modern marine container terminal within
the Subic Bay Freeport Zone. The SBMA
Board of Directors already declared HPPL as
the winner but later on, the Office of the
President reversed the decision of the Board
and ordered a rebidding. In the rebidding
however, HPPL was no longer among the
qualified bidders. Eventually, HPPL filed a
petition for injunction to enjoin SBMA from
conducting the rebidding.
Whether or not
Hutchison has the
right to file an
injunction case
against SBMA.
No.
100.
NEA vs. COA, 377
SCRA 233 (2002)
Control of
executive
departments
The President issued an executive order
entitled “Implementing the Fourth and Final
Year Salary Increases Authorized by Joint
Senate and House of Representatives
Resolution No. 01, Series of 1994.” It
directed the payment of the fourth and final
salary increases in two tranches. However,
the NEA did not implement the salary
increases in accordance with the schedule of
payment and instead implemented in one
lump sum the two tranches. In other words,
NEA accelerated the implementation of the
salary increase by paying the second tranche
along with the first tranche. Hence, the
Commission’s resident auditor in NEA issued
a notice of suspension and, consequently, a
notice of disallowance. The petitioner asked
for a reconsidered but it was, however,
denied. Hence, the petition at bar.
Did the COA commit
a grave abuse of
discretion
amounting to lack or
excess of
jurisdiction in
disallowing the
increased salaries?
In other words, is
NEA allowed to
accelerate the
implementation of
the salaries due to
availability of funds?
No.
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
RATIO DECIDENDI
As a chartered institution, the SBMA is always under the
direct control of
the Office of the President, particularly when contracts
and/or projects undertaken by the SBMA entail
substantial amounts of money. The declaration made by
the SBMA Board declaring HPPL as the winning bidder
was neither final nor unassailable. Under LOI No. 620, all
projects undertaken by the SBMA are subject to the
approval of the Office of the President. Hence, the Board
of SBMA is under the control and supervision of the
President of the Philippines. Therefore, the declaration
made by the Board did not vest any right in favor of HPPL.
Further, HPPL cannot sue in the Philippines. It is a foreign
corporation registered under the laws of the British Virgin
Islands. It did not register here in the Philippines.
The presidential power of control over the executive
branch of government extends to all executive employees
from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk.
NEA’s accelerated release of salary is not in accordance
with the law because it is still requires the approval of the
President.
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101.
KMU v. NEDA
G.R. No. 167798,
April 19, 2006
President’s
power of control
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued
Executive Order No. 420 that directs a
unified ID system among government
agencies and Government owned and
controlled corporations in order to have a
uniform ID for all government agencies.
Kilusang Mayo Uno and other respondents
assailed this executive order for being a
usurpation of legislative powers by the
president and it infringes the citizens right to
privacy.
Whether or not
Executive Order No.
420 is valid.
Yes.
102.
Pimentel vs.
Aguirre, G.R.
132988, July 19,
2000
General
supervision over
local
governments/aut
onomous regions
This is a petition for certiorari and
prohibition seeking to annul Section 1 of
Administrative Order No. 372, issued by the
President, insofar as it requires local
government units to reduce their
expenditures by 25% of their authorized
regular appropriations for non-personal
services and to enjoin respondents from
implementing Section 4 of the Order, which
withholds a portion of their internal revenue
allotments.
Whether Sections 1
and 4 of AO 372 are
valid exercises of
President’s power of
general supervision
over LGUs.
No.
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
RATIO DECIDENDI
Executive Order 420 is a proper subject of executive
issuance under the president’s constitutional power of
control over government entities in the executive
department, as well as the president’s constitutional duty
to ensure that all laws are faithfully executed, thus said
executive order is not a usurpation of legislative power.
Furthermore, it is not usurpation of legislative power
because the act of issuing ID cards and the collection of
some necessary information to imprint in them do not
require a legislation. What needs legislation is the system
of appropriation to enforce the unified ID system, when
unified ID system includes the citizens and when personal
data that are beyond of what is routinely needed is
collected for the ID.
The President only exercises supervision over local
governments and territorial and political subdivisions.
The members of the Cabinet and other executive officials
are merely alter egos. As such, they are subject to the
power of control of the President, at whose will and
behest they can be removed from office; or their actions
and decisions changed, suspended or reversed. In
contrast, the heads of political subdivisions are elected by
the people. Their sovereign powers emanate from the
electorate, to whom they are directly accountable. By
constitutional fiat, they are subject to the President’s
supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are
exercised within the sphere of their
legitimate powers. Local government units also enjoy
fiscal autonomy as well.
Section 1 of the AO does not violate local fiscal
autonomy. Local fiscal autonomy does not rule out any
manner of national government intervention by way of
supervision, in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal
and otherwise, are consistent with national goals. AO 372
Page 59 of 97
CASE
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103.
CASE
Bermudez v.
Torres, G.R. No.
131429, August 4,
1999
TOPIC
Power of
Appointment
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
Atty. Conrado Quiaoit was appointed by
Pres. Ramos for the position of Provincial
ProsecutorPetitioner Bermudez challenged
the appointment of Quiaoit primarily on the
ground that the appointment lacks the
recommendation of the Sec. Of Justice
prescribed under the Revised Administrative
Whether or not the
absence of a
recommendation of
the Secretary of
Justice to the
President can be
held fatal to the
No.
RATIO DECIDENDI
is merely directory and has been issued by the President
consistent with his powers of supervision over local
governments. A directory order cannot be characterized
as an exercise of the power of control. The AO is intended
only to advise all government agencies and
instrumentalities to undertake cost-reduction measures
that will help maintain economic stability in the country.
It does not contain any sanction in case of
noncompliance. The Local Government Code also allows
the President to interfere in local fiscal matters, provided
that certain requisites are met: (1) an unmanaged public
sector deficit of the national government; (2)
consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate
and the House of Representatives and the presidents of
the various local leagues; (3) the corresponding
recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of
Finance, Interior and Local Government, and Budget and
Management; and (4) any adjustment in the allotment
shall in no case be less than 30% of the collection of
national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year
preceding the current one. Section 4 of AO 372 cannot be
upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the
automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national
internal revenue. This is mandated by the Constitution
and the Local Government Code. Section 4 which orders
the withholding of 10% of the LGU’s IRA clearly
contravenes the Constitution and the law.
The phrase “upon recommendation of the Secretary”
found in Sec. 9, Chap. II, Title III, Book IV of the Revised
Administrative Code should be interpreted to be a mere
advice, exhortation or endorsement, which is essentially
persuasive in character and not binding or obligatory
upon the party to whom it is made. The recommendation
is here nothing really more than advisory in nature. The
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104.
Sarmiento vs.
Mison, 156 SCRA
549 (1987)
Power of
Appointment
105.
ConcepcionBautista vs.
Salonga, 172 SCRA
160 (1989)
Power of
Appointment
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
Code of 1987. Section 9, Chap. II, Title III,
Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code
provides that “all provincial and city
prosecutors and their assistants shall be
appointed by the Pres. upon the
recommendation of the Secretary.”
Respondent Salvador Mison was appointed
as the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs by then President (Corazon)
Aquino. The said appointment made by the
President is being questioned by petitioner
Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito Arcilla,
stating that the said appointment is not valid
since the appointment was not submitted to
the Commission On Appointment (COA) for
approval. Under the Constitution, the
appointments made for the "Heads of
Bureau" requires the confirmation from
COA.
appointment of
Quiaoit
Whether or not the
appointment made
by the President
without the
confirmation from
COA is valid.
Yes.
The President appointed Mary Concepcion
Bautista as the Chairman of the Commission
on Human Rights pursuant to the second
sentence in Section 16, Art. VII, without the
confirmation of the CoA because they are
among the officers of government "whom
he (the President) may be authorized by law
to appoint." Section 2(c), Executive Order
No. 163, authorizes the President to appoint
the Chairman and Members of the
Whether or not
Bautista's
appointment is
subject to CoA's
confirmation.
No.
RATIO DECIDENDI
Pres., being the head of the Executive Department, could
very well disregard or do away with the action of all
offices under the Executive.
Under the 1987 Constitution, Heads of Bureau are
removed from the list of officers that needed
confirmation from the Commission On Appointment. It
enumerated the four (4) groups whom the President shall
appoint:
1. First, the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers
of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution;
2. Second, all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
3. Third, those whom the President may be authorized by
law to appoint;
4. Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the
Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
All appointments, excluding the 1st group, necessitate
the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
The position of Chairman of CHR is not among the
positions mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16 Art 7
of the Constitution, which provides that the
appointments which are to be made with the
confirmation of CA.
Page 61 of 97
CASE
NO.
CASE
TOPIC
106.
Calderon vs. Carale,
G.R.No. 91636,
April 23, 1992
Power of
Appointment
107.
Manalo vs. Sistoza,
G.R. 107369,
August 11, 1999
Power of
Appointment
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
Commission on Human Rights. CoA
disapproved Bautista's alleged ad interim
appointment as Chairperson of the CHR in
view of her refusal to submit to the
jurisdiction of the Commission on
Appointments.
Cory assigned Carale et al as the Chairman
and the Commissioners respectively of the
NLRC, the appointment was not submitted
to the CA for its confirmation. Calderon
questioned the appointment saying that w/o
the confirmation by the CA, such an
appointment is in violation of RA 6715.
RA 6975 was enacted by Corazon Aquino,
creating DILG. Sections 26 and 31 pertain to
the Chief of PNP as well as PNP officers and
members as having to be confirmed by the
CA before assuming their duties. Executive
Secretary Drilon promoted the 15
respondent officers and appointed them to
the PNP in a permanent capacity. The
petitioners assail the legality of such
appointment because, invoking said
Whether or not
Congress may, by
law, require
confirmation by the
CA of appointments
extended by the
President to
government officers
additional to those
expressly
mentioned in the
first sentence of
Sec. 16, Art. 7 of the
Constitution whose
appointments
require
confirmation by the
CA.
Whether or not PNP
officers are akin to
the AFP, whose
positions need CA
confirmation
RATIO DECIDENDI
No.
Congress cannot, by law, require confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of appointments extended
by the President to government officers additional to
those expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec.
16, Article VII of the Constitution whose appointments
require confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.
No.
The police force is different from and independent of the
armed forces and the ranks in the military are not similar
to those in the Philippine National Police. They do not fall
under the first group of Sec. 16, Article VII.
Page 62 of 97
CASE
NO.
CASE
TOPIC
108.
Soriano vs. Lista,
G.R. No. 153881,
March 24, 2003
Power of
Appointment
109.
Pimentel vs. Ermita,
G.R. No. 164978,
October 13, 2005
Power of
Appointment
110.
In re Valenzuela,
A.M. No. 98-5-01SC, Nov. 9, 1998
Power of
Appointment
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
provisions of RA 6975, confirmation of CA is
needed.
Eight officers of the Philippine Coast Guard
(PCG) were promoted by the President to
Vice Admiral, Rear Admiral, Commodore,
Naval Captain, and they assumed office
without confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments (CA). Petitioner, as a
taxpayer, filed a petition with the Supreme
Court questioning the constitutionality of
their assumption of office, which requires
confirmation of the CA.
While Congress was in session, GMA
appointed Arthur Yap et al as secretaries of
their respective departments. Senator
Aquilino Pimentel averred that GMA cannot
make such appointment without the
consent of the Commission on Appointment.
Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita averred
that the president is empowered by Section
16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to
issue appointments in an acting capacity to
department secretaries without the consent
of the Commission on Appointments even
while Congress is in session. Further, EO 292
itself allows the president to issue
temporary designation to an officer in the
civil service provided that the temporary
designation shall not exceed one year.
Referred to the Court en banc are the
appointments signed by the President dated
March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela
and Hon. Placido Vallarta as judges of the
RTC of Bago City and Cabanatuan City,
RATIO DECIDENDI
Whether or not
assumption of office
to PCG requires CA
confirmation.
No.
Philippine Coast Guards are not within the first group of
Sec. 16, Article VII. The clause “officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain” refers to
military officers alone.
Whether or not the
appointments made
by the President is
valid.
Yes.
The argument raised by Ermita is correct. Further, EO 292
itself provided the safeguard so that such power will not
be abused hence the provision that the temporary
designation shall not exceed one year. In this case, in less
than a year after the initial appointments made by GMA,
and when the Congress was in recess, GMA issued the ad
interim appointments – this also proves that the
president was in good faith.
Whether or not,
during the period of
the ban on
appointments
imposed by Sec. 15,
No.
During the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII of the
Constitution “two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term” the
President is neither required to make appointments to
the courts nor allowed to do so; The appointments of
Page 63 of 97
CASE
NO.
CASE
TOPIC
111.
De Castro v. JBC
G.R. No. 191002,
April 20, 2010
Power of
Appointment
112.
De Rama vs. CA,
G.R. No. 131136,
February 28, 2001
Power of
Appointment
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
respectively. These appointments appear
prima facie, at least, to be expressly
prohibited by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the
Constitution. The said constitutional
provision prohibits the President from
making any appointments two months
immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term,
except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued
vacancies therein will prejudice public
service or endanger public safety.
This is a Motion for Reconsideration on the
March 17, 2010 decision of the Court. The
said decision directs the Judicial and Bar
Council to resume its proceedings for the
nomination of candidates to fill the vacancy
created by the compulsory retirement of
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17,
2010, and to prepare the short list of
nominees and submit it to the incumbent
President. Movants argue that the disputed
constitutional provision, Art. VII, Sec. 15 and
Art. VIII, Sec. 4(1), clearly intended the ban
on midnight appointments to cover the
members of the Judiciary, and they
contended that the principle of stare decisis
is controlling, and insisted that the Court
erred in disobeying or abandoning the
Valenzuela ruling.
Upon his assumption to the position of
Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, petitoner
Conrado De Rama wrote a letter to the Civil
Service Commission seeking the recall of the
Art. VII of the
Constitution, the
President is
nonetheless
required to fill
vacancies in the
judiciary, in view of
Secs. 4 (1) and 9 of
Art. VIII
RATIO DECIDENDI
Valenzuela and Vallarta were unquestionably made
during the period of the ban. They come within the
operation of the prohibition relating to appointments.
Did the
Constitutional
Commission extend
to the Judiciary the
ban on presidential
appointments
during the period
stated in Sec. 15,
Article VII?
NO.
The Constitutional Commission did not extend to the
Judiciary the ban on presidential appointments during
the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII. The deliberations
that the dissent of Justice Carpio Morales quoted from
the records of the Constitutional Commission did not
concern either Sec. 15, Art. VII or Sec. 4(1), Art. VIII, but
only Sec. 13, Art. VII, a provision on nepotism.
Election ban on appointments does not extend to the
Supreme Court. Section 9, Article VIII, exempts judicial
appointments from the prohibition of Section 15, Article
VII.
Whether or not the
appointments made
by the outgoing
Mayor are
No.
The CSC correctly ruled that the constitutional prohibition
on so-called “midnight appointments,” specifically those
made within 2 months immediately prior to the next
presidential elections applies only to the President or
Page 64 of 97
CASE
NO.
113.
CASE
Matibag vs.
Benipayo, G.R. No.
149036, April 02,
2002
TOPIC
Power of
Appointment
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
appointments of 14 municipal employees.
Petitioner justified his recall request on the
allegation that the appointments of said
employees were “midnight” appointments
of the former mayor, done in violation of
Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution. The CSC
denied petitioner’s request for the recall of
the appointments of the 14 employees for
lack of merit. The CSC dismissed petitioner’s
allegation that these were “midnight”
appointments, pointing out that the
constitutional provision relied upon by
petitioner prohibits only those
appointments made by an outgoing
President and cannot be made to apply to
local elective officials. The CSC opined that
the appointing authority can validly issue
appointments until his term has expired, as
long as the appointee meets the
qualification standards for the position.
Ma. J. Angelina Benipayo was appointed as
Acting Director IV of the Comelec’s EID by
then Comelec Chairperson Harriet
Demetriou in a temporary capacity. Alfredo
Benipayo was appointed as Comelec
Chairman together with other
commissioners in an ad interim
appointment. While on such ad interim
appointment, respondent Benipayo in his
capacity as Chairman issued a Memorandum
address transferring petitioner to the Law
Department. Petitioner requested Benipayo
to reconsider her relief as Director IV of the
EID and her reassignment to the Law
forbidden under Art.
VII, Sec. 15 of the
Constitution.
Whether or not the
assumption of office
by Benipayo, Borra
and Tuason on the
basis of the ad
interim amounts to
a temporary
appointment
prohibited by
Section 1 (2), Article
IX-C of the
Constitution.
RATIO DECIDENDI
Acting President. There is no law that prohibits local
elective officials from making appointments during the
last days of his or her tenure.
No.
No. An ad interim appointment is a permanent
appointment because it takes effect immediately and can
no longer be withdrawn by the President once the
appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is
subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments does not alter its permanent character.
The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment
permanent in character by making it effective until
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until
the next adjournment of Congress.”
Page 65 of 97
CASE
NO.
114.
CASE
Larin vs. Exec.
Secretary, G.R.
TOPIC
Power of
Appointment
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
Department. She cited Civil Service
Commission Memorandum Circular No. 7
reminding heads of government offices that
“transfer and detail of employees are
prohibited during the election period.
Benipayo denied her request for
reconsideration, citing COMELEC Resolution
No. 3300 exempting COMELEC from the
coverage of the said Memo Circular.
Petitioner appealed the denial of her
request for reconsideration to the COMELEC
en banc. She also filed an administrative and
criminal complaint against Benipayo alleging
that her reassignment violated Section 261
(h) of the Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC
Resolution No. 3258, Civil Service
Memorandum Circular No. 07, s. 001, and
other pertinent administrative and civil
service laws, rules and regulations.
During the pendency of her complaint
before the Law Department, petitioner filed
the instant petition questioning the
appointment and the right to remain in
office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as
Chairman and Commissioners of the
COMELEC,
respectively. Petitioner claims that the ad
interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra
and Tuason violate the constitutional
provisions on the independence of the
COMELEC.
Aquilino Larin was an Assistant
Commissioner in the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR). He was in charge of the office
Whether or not
No.
Larin was removed
from office properly.
RATIO DECIDENDI
Larin is a presidential appointee who belongs to the
career service of the Civil Service. Although it is a general
rule that the power to remove is inherent in the power to
Page 66 of 97
CASE
NO.
CASE
TOPIC
112745, October
16, 1997
115.
Barrioquinto vs.
Fernandez, G.R. L1278, January 21,
1949
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
of the Excise Tax Service. In 1992, the
Sandiganbayan convicted Larin for grave
misconduct. His conviction was reported to
the Office of the President, at the same
time, an administrative complaint was filed
with the same office. The President then,
based on the Sandiganbayan conviction,
created a committee to investigate Larin.
Eventually, Larin’s removal was
recommended. The President dismissed
Larin.
Executive
Clemency
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
Norberto Jimenez and Loreto Barrioquinto
were charged with the crime of murder.
Jimenez was sentenced to life imprisonment
while Barrioquinto remained at large. Before
the period for appeal had expired, Jimenez
became aware of the Proclamation No. 8,
which grants amnesty in favor of all persons
who may be charged with an act penalized
under the Revised Penal Code in furtherance
of the resistance to the enemy or against
persons aiding in the war efforts of the
enemy, and committed during the period
from December 8, 1941, to the date when
particular area of the Philippines where the
offense was actually committed was
Whether or not
admission of guilt is
necessary in
amnesty.
No.
RATIO DECIDENDI
appoint such power to remove with limitations. In the
case at bar, the limitation can be found in the fact that
Larin is a career service officer and under the
Administrative Code of 1987 such officers who fall under
career service are characterized by the existence of
security of tenure, as contra-distinguished from noncareer service whose tenure is co-terminus with that of
the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or
limited to a period specified by law or to the duration of a
particular project for which purpose the employment was
made. As a career service officer, Larin enjoys the right to
security of tenure. He can only be removed from his
office on grounds enumerated in the Administrative Code
of 1987. In the case at bar, the basis for his removal was
his conviction in the Sandiganbayan. This is not one of
those grounds enumerated in the Administrative Code.
Further, the Supreme Court notes that when Larin’s
conviction was appealed to the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court actually absolved Larin.
Amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities
who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before
or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and
sometimes after conviction. Amnesty by Proclamation of
the President with the concurrence of Congress, and it is
a public act of which the courts should take judicial
notice. In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the
Amnesty Proclamation, it is not necessary that he should,
as a condition precedent or sine qua non, admit having
committed the criminal act or offense with which he is
charged, and allege the amnesty as a defense; it is
sufficient that the evidence, either of the complainant or
the accused, shows that the offense committed comes
within the terms of said Amnesty Proclamation. Hence, it
is not correct to say that “invocation of the benefits of
Page 67 of 97
CASE
NO.
116.
CASE
Vera v. People, 7
SCRA 152 (1963)
TOPIC
Executive
Clemency
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
liberated from enemy control and
occupation. Jimenez decided to apply for
amnesty. Barrioquinto, who had then been
already apprehended, did the same. The
Amnesty Commission returned the cases of
the petitioners to the Court of
First Instance of Zamboanga without
deciding on the case saying that since the
Barrioquinto and Jimenez deny having
committed the crime. Petitioners cannot
invoke the benefits of amnesty.
Vera, Figueras, Ambas, Florido, Bayran and
92 others were charged with the complex
crime of kidnapping with murder of Amadeo
Lozanes. They invoked the benefits of the
amnesty proclamation of the president and
the case was referred to the 8th Guerilla
Amnesty Commission. None of the
petitioners admitted having committed the
crime. Vera was the only one who took the
witness stand and denied having killed
Lozanes. The Commission said it could not
take cognizance of the case because the
benefits of amnesty could only be invoked
by defendants in a criminal case who,
admitting commission of the crime, plead
that the said crime was committed in
pursuance of the resistance movement and
perpetrated against persons who aided the
enemy during the Japanese occupation.
When Vera appealed, the amnesty
commission denied it, reasoning that the
victim was a member of another guerilla
group and that the murder seemed to have
RATIO DECIDENDI
amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and
avoidance.”
Whether or not
admission of guilt is
necessary in
amnesty.
Yes
Amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime and
when the accused maintains that he has not committed a
crime, he cannot have any use for amnesty. Where an
amnesty proclamation imposes certain conditions, as in
this case, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove the
existence of such conditions. The invocation of amnesty is
in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance,
which means that the pleader admits the allegations
against him but disclaims liability therefore on account of
intervening facts which, if proved, would bring the crime
charged within the scope of the amnesty proclamation.
Page 68 of 97
CASE
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CASE
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CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
RATIO DECIDENDI
stemmed from a rivalry between the two
groups. Vera brought the case to the Court
of Appeals, asking the CA to also rule, one
way or another, of the murder case. But the
CA ruled that amnesty applies only to those
who had admitted the fact but said they
should not be punished for the crime done
was in pursuance of resistance to the
enemy. It also said it could not take
cognizance of the murder case because that
came from the amnesty commission, which
had no jurisdiction over the murder case.
The case was brought to the Court on
appeal, which cited People vs Llanita, which
said that it was inconsistent for an appellant
to justify an act or seek forgiveness for
something which he said he has not
committed.
117.
Cristobal vs.
Labarador, 71 Phil.
34 (1941)
Executive
Clemency
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
Teofilo Santos was convicted of estafa and
sentenced to 6 months of imprisonment and
to return the amount taken. Despite this,
Santos continued to be a registered elector
in Malabon, Rizal, and between 1934 and
1937 even served as Municipal President.
On August 22 1938 the Election Code was
approved, which had a provision that
disqualifies Santos from voting. Having been
declared by final judgment guilty of a crime
against property, Santos applied with the
President for an absolute pardon which was
given him on December 24 1939. His full civil
and political rights were restored except
that his right
Whether or not the
pardoning power
exercised here
would amount to an
unlawful exercise of
the President of a
legislative function.
No.
The pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled
by legislative action. It must remain where the sovereign
authority has placed it and must be exercised by the
highest authority to whom it is entrusted. An absolute
pardon not only blots out the crime committed but
removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction. In
this case, the disability is the result of the conviction
without which there would no basis for disqualification
from voting. While the pardon extended to respondent
Santos is conditional in the sense that he will be eligible
for appointment only to positions which are clerical or
manual in nature involving no money or property
responsibility, it is absolute insofar as it restores the
respondent to full civil and political rights.
The suggestion that the disqualification imposed in the
Election Code does not fall within the purview of the
Page 69 of 97
CASE
NO.
118.
CASE
Pelobello vs.
Palatino, 72 Phil.
441 (1941)
TOPIC
Executive
Clemency
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
to hold public office was limited only to
positions which involved no money or
property responsibility.
Cristobal filed a petition to have Santos
excluded from the voters’ list on the basis of
Section 94 of the Commonwealth Act no.
357. The court ruled that the pardon given
Santos excluded him from the
disqualification created by the New Election
Code. Cristobal appealed, arguing that the
pardoning power does not extend to the
enjoyment of political rights. For that would
allow the President to encroach on the
powers of the legislature; in effect
exempting some people from the effects of
the law. Cristobal said the pardoning power
of the Executive does not apply to legislative
prohibitions and would amount to an
unlawful exercise of the Executive of a
legislative function.
In 1912, Gregorio Palatino was convicted of
a crime for which he was imprisoned for 2
years, four months and one day, disqualified
from voting and being voted upon. In 1915,
he was granted a conditional pardon by the
Governor General and on 1940, an absolute
pardon by the President. Pellobello
instituted quo warranto proceedings
questioning his right to hold office as mayor
elect of Torrijos, Marinduque. It was based
on sec 94 (a) of the Election Code.
RATIO DECIDENDI
pardoning power of the Chief Executive. It would lead to
the impairment of his pardoning power not
contemplated in the Constitution and would lead
furthermore to the result that there would be no way of
restoring the political privilege in a case of this nature
except through legislative.
Whether or not the
absolute pardon
granted exempted
him from the
disqualification
incident to criminal
conviction under
paragraph a of sec
94 of the Election
Code.
Yes.
Yes. Citing Cristobal v Labrador, the court held that the
pardoning power is only subject to the limitations
imposed by the Constitution and cannot be controlled or
restricted by legislative action. Thereafter, he had
exercised the right of suffrage; elected councilor of
Torrijos, Marinduque for the period 1918 to 1921;
elected municipal president of that municipality three
times in succession (1922-1931); and finally elected
mayor of the municipality in the election for local officials
in December 1940. Under these circumstances, it is
evident that the purpose in granting him absolute pardon
was to enable him to assume the position in deference to
the popular will. The pardon was thus extended on the
date mentioned hereinabove and before the date fixed in
Page 70 of 97
CASE
NO.
CASE
TOPIC
119.
In Re Lontok, 43
Phil.293 (1923)
Executive
Clemency
120.
Torres v. Gonzales,
152 SCRA 273
(1987)
Executive
Clemency
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
Marcelino Lontok was convicted of bigamy
and sentenced to 8 years imprisonment. He
was pardoned by the Governor General on
the condition that he shall not again be
guilty of any misconduct. A case was filed by
the Attorney General to have him disbarred
because he has convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude. Lontok, however,
argued that pardon reaches the offense and
blots it out so that he may not be looked
upon as guilty of it.
In 1978, Wilfredo Torres was convicted of
estafa. In 1979, he was pardoned by the
president with the condition that he shall
not violate any penal laws again. In 1982,
Torres was charged with multiple crimes of
estafa. In 1986, then Chairman of the Board
of Paroles Neptali Gonzales petitioned for
the cancellation of Torres’ pardon. Hence,
the president cancelled the pardon. Torres
appealed the issue before the Supreme
Court averring that the Executive
Department erred in convicting him for
violating the conditions of his pardon
because the estafa charges against him were
not yet final and executory as they were still
on appeal.
Whether or not the
effect of pardon
may prevent Lontok
from disbarment.
Yes.
Whether or not a
conviction is
necessary to revoke
a conditional
pardon.
No.
RATIO DECIDENDI
section 4 of the Election Code for assuming office. We see
no reason for defeating this wholesome purpose by a
restrictive judicial interpretation of the constitutional
grant to the Chief Executive.
When proceedings to strike an attorney’s name from the
rolls are founded on, and depend alone, on a statute
making the fact of a conviction for a felony ground for
disbarment, it has been held that a pardon operates to
wipe out the conviction and is a bar to any proceeding for
the disbarment of the attorney after the pardon has been
granted.
To exclude the petitioner from the practice of law for the
offense would be to enforce a punishment for the
offense, when he has already been pardoned for it.
In proceeding against a convict who has been
conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have
breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive
Department has two options: (1) Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code, a purely executive act, not
subject to judicial scrutiny, or (2) Article 159 of the
Revised Penal Code, a judicial act consisting of trial for
and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon.
Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i)
of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial
pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is
necessary, much less conviction therefor by final
judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be
recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.
Under art. 159
of the RPC, parolee or convict who is regarded as having
violated the provisions thereof must be charged,
prosecuted and convicted by final judgment before he
can be made to suffer the penalty prescribed.
Page 71 of 97
CASE
NO.
CASE
TOPIC
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
121.
Aquino vs. Enrile,
59 SCRA 183 (1974)
Commander-inChief
Juan Ponce Enrile, then Minister of National
Defense, pursuant to the order of Marcos
issued and ordered the arrest of a number
of individuals including Benigno Aquino, Jr.
even without any charge against them.
Hence, Aquino and some others filed for
habeas corpus against Juan Ponce Enrile.
Respondent’s answer contained a common
and special affirmative defense that the
arrest is valid pursuant to Marcos’
declaration of Martial Law.
Whether or not
Aquino’s detention
is legal in
accordance to the
declaration of
Martial Law.
Yes.
122.
Olaguer vs. MC
No.4, 150 SCRA 144
(1987)
Commander-inChief
In 1979, Olaguer and some others were
detained by military personnel and they
were placed in Camp Bagong Diwa. Logauer
and his group are all civilians. They were
charged with (1) unlawful possession of
explosives and incendiary devices; (2)
conspiracy to assassinate President and Mrs.
Marcos; (3) conspiracy to assassinate
cabinet members Juan Ponce Enrile,
Francisco Tatad and Vicente Paterno; (4)
conspiracy to assassinate Messrs. Arturo
Tangco, Jose Roño and Onofre Corpus; (5)
arson of nine buildings; (6) attempted
murder of Messrs. Leonardo Perez, Teodoro
Valencia and Generals Romeo Espino and
Whether or not
military tribunals
have jurisdiction
over civilians.
No.
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
RATIO DECIDENDI
In the case at bar, President has chosen to proceed
against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the
President’s executive prerogative and is not subject to
judicial scrutiny.
The validity of a martial law proclamation and its
continuation is political and non-justiciable in character.
The test is not whether the President's decision is correct
but whether, in suspending the writ, he did or did not act
arbitrarily.
The arrest is then a valid exercise pursuant to the
President’s order. The Constitution provides that in case
of invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger
against the state, when public safety requires it, the
President may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus or place the Philippines or any part therein under
Martial Law. In the case at bar, the state of rebellion
plaguing the country has not yet disappeared, therefore,
there is a clear and imminent danger against the state.
As long as the civil courts in the land are open and
functioning, military
tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians
for offenses committed by them. Whether or not martial
law has been proclaimed throughout the country or over
a part thereof is of no moment.
Page 72 of 97
CASE
NO.
123.
CASE
Navales v. Abaya,
G.R. No. 162318,
October 25, 2004
TOPIC
Commander-inChief
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
Fabian Ver; and (7) conspiracy and proposal
to commit rebellion, and inciting to
rebellion. On August 19, 1980, the
petitioners went to the SC and filed the
instant Petition for prohibition and habeas
corpus.
On July 27, 2003, more than three hundred
junior officers and enlisted men, mostly
from the elite units of Philippine Army’s
Scout Rangers and the Philippine Navy’s
Special Warfare Group (SWAG). They quietly
entered the premises of the Ayala Center in
Makati City. They disarmed the security
guards and took over the Oakwood Premier
Apartments (Oakwood). They planted
explosives around the building and in its
vicinity. Between 4:00 to 5:00 a.m., the
soldiers were able to issue a public
statement through the ABS-CBN News (ANC)
network and claimed that they went to
Oakwood to air their grievances against the
administration of President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo. They declared their
withdrawal of support from the chain of
command and demanded the resignation of
key civilian and military leaders of the
Arroyo administration. PGMA gave them
until 5p.m. to give up their positions and
return to the barracks. At about 1:00 p.m.,
she declared the existence of a state of
rebellion and issued an order to use
reasonable force in putting down the
rebellion.
Whether or not Rep.
Act No. 7055
divested the military
courts of jurisdiction
to try cases
involving violations
of Articles 54 to 70,
Articles 72 to 92 and
Articles 95 to 97 of
the Articles of War.
No
RATIO DECIDENDI
In enacting R.A. No. 7055, lawmakers merely intended to
return to the civilian courts jurisdiction over those
offenses that have been traditionally within their
jurisdiction, but did not divest the military courts
jurisdiction over cases mandated by the Articles of War.
Thus, the RTC cannot divest the General Court Martial of
jurisdiction over those charged with violations of Art. 63
(Disrespect Toward the President), 64 (Disrespect Toward
Superior Officer), 67 (Mutiny or Sedition), 96 (Conduct
unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and 97 (General
Articles) of the Articles of War, as these are specifically
include as “service-connected offenses or crimes” under
Sec. 1, R.A. 7055.
Page 73 of 97
CASE
NO.
CASE
TOPIC
124.
Lansang vs. Garcia,
42 SCRA 448 (1971)
Commander-inChief
125.
In Re De Villa, G.R.
No. 158802,
November 17, 2004
Commander-inChief
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
President Arroyo announced that the
occupation of Oakwood was over. DOJ
charged 321 of those soldiers who took part
in the mutiny with violation of Article 134-A
(coup d'etat) of the Revised Penal Code
Due to the throwing of two hand grenades
in a Liberal Party caucus in 1971 causing the
death of 8 people, Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 889 which suspended the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Marcos urged that there is a need to curtail
the growth of Maoist groups. Subsequently,
Lansang et al were invited by the PC headed
by Garcia for interrogation and
investigation. Teodosio Lansang, Rodolfo del
Rosario, and Bayani Alcala questioned the
validity of the suspension of the writ
averring that the suspension does not meet
the constitutional requisites.
12-year old Aileen Mendoza woke up to find
Reynaldo De Villa on top of her. She was
unable to call for help because the latter
covered her mouth with a pillow and
threatened to kill her. He then proceeded to
rape her. Aileen became pregnant. Aileen
was examined by Dr. Cosidon, who
confirmed her pregnancy (she was already 8
months pregnant at that time), and found
healed lacerations in her hymen. During the
trial, De Villa pleaded not guilty because at
the time of the alleged rape, he was already
67 years old, and was incapable of an
erection. He also interposed an alibi that he
was not in the scene of the crime at the time
RATIO DECIDENDI
Whether or not the
suspension is
unconstitutional.
No.
Judicial inquiry can go no further than to satisfy the Court
not that the
President’s decision is correct,” but that “the President
did not act arbitrarily.” Thus, the standard laid down is
not correctness, but arbitrariness. The grant of power to
suspend the privilege is neither absolute nor unqualified.
For the valid suspension of the privilege of the writ:
(a) there must be "invasion, insurrection or rebellion";
and
(b) public safety must require the aforementioned
suspension.
Whether or not the
DNA result is a valid
basis for habeas
corpus, new trial,
and acquittal.
No.
As to Habeas Corpus
The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ,
therefore, is that the individual seeking such relief be
illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or placed
under some form of illegal restraint. If an individual's
liberty is restrained via some legal process, the writ of
habeas corpus is unavailing
As to new trial
A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered
evidence may be granted only if the following requisites
are met: (a) that the evidence was discovered after trial;
(b) that said evidence could not have been discovered
and produced at the trial even with the exercise of
reasonable diligence; (c) that it is material, not merely
cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that the
Page 74 of 97
CASE
NO.
126.
CASE
David vs. Arroyo,
G.R. No. 171390,
May 03, 2006
TOPIC
Commander-inChief
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
of the rape. De Villa was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt by the trial court for the
rape of Aileen Mendoza, his niece by
affinity.
Three years after the decision, June (the son
of Reynaldo) alleged that during the trial of
the case, he was unaware that there was a
scientific test that could determine whether
Reynaldo was Leahlyn’s father. They sought
for DNA testing to resolve the issue of
paternity but the same was denied. At the
petitioner’s insistence, they gathered
samples from Leahlyn, from the
grandchildren of Reynaldo, and from
Reynaldo himself and was submitted to the
DNA Laboratory. The DNA Laboratory
rendered a preliminary report showing that
there was no match between the DNA
samples.
President Arroyo issued Proclamation No.
1017 declaring a state of national
emergency. This case covers the seven
consolidated petitions for cetiorari assailing
the constitutionality of Proclamation No.
1017 and General Order No. 5 implementing
the former. It is alleged that in doing so,
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
committed grave abuse of discretion and
that respondent officials of the Government,
in their professed efforts to defend and
preserve democratic institutions are actually
trampling upon the very freedom
guaranteed and protected by the
constitution.
1. Whether or not
Proclamation No.
1017 is
unconstitutional.
2. Whether or not
General Order No. 5
is unconstitutional.
1. Yes
2. Yes,
partially
.
RATIO DECIDENDI
evidence is of such weight that, if admitted, it would
probably change the judgment. Lack of knowledge of the
existence of DNA testing speaks of negligence. In either
instance, however, this negligence is binding upon
petitioner.
As to acquittal
Even with all of the compelling and persuasive scientific
evidence presented by petitioner and his counsel, we are
not convinced that Reynaldo de Villa is entitled to
outright acquittal. As correctly pointed out by the
Solicitor General, even if it is conclusively proven that
Reynaldo de Villa is not the father of Leahlyn Mendoza,
his conviction could, in theory, still stand, with Aileen
Mendoza’s testimony and positive identification as its
bases. The Solicitor General reiterates, and correctly so,
that the pregnancy of the victim has never been an
element of the crime of rape. Therefore, the DNA
evidence has failed to conclusively prove to this Court
that Reynaldo de Villa should be discharged.
1. The assailed Proclamation 1017 is unconstitutional
insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to
promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within
the province of the Legislature, Section 1, Article VI
categorically states that "the legislative power shall be
vested in the Congress of the Philippines, which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives". To
be sure, neither martial law nor a state of rebellion nor a
state of emergency can justify President Arroyo's exercise
of legislative power by issuing decrees. It follows that
these decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be
enforced. With respect to "laws", she cannot call the
military to enforce or implement certain laws such as
customs laws, laws governing family and property
relations, laws on obligations and contracts, and the like.
Page 75 of 97
CASE
NO.
127.
CASE
Constantino vs.
Cuisia, G.R. No.
106064, October
13, 2005
TOPIC
Contracting and
guaranteeing
foreign loans
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
During the Corazon Aquino regime, her
administration came up with a scheme to
reduce the country’s external debt. The
solution resorted to was to incur foreign
debts. Three restructuring programs were
sought to initiate the program for foreign
debts. They are basically buyback programs
and bond-conversion programs. The spouses
Renato Constantino, Jr. and Lourdes
Constantino with FFDC (Freedom From Debt
Coalition) averred that the buyback and
bond-conversion schemes were onerous and
they do not constitute the loan “contract” or
“guarantee” contemplated in Sec. 20, Art.
VII of the Constitution. And assuming that
the President has such power, unlike other
powers which may be validly delegated by
the President, the power to incur foreign
debts is expressly reserved by the
Constitution in the person of the President.
Hence, the respondents herein, Central Bank
Governor Jose Cuisia, cannot incur debts for
the Philippines or such power can be
delegated to them. Constantino argue that
Whether or not the
President can validly
delegate her debt
power to the
respondents.
Yes.
RATIO DECIDENDI
She can only order the military under PP1017, to enforce
laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence.
2. As to General Order No. 5, it is constitutional since it
provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should
implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is “necessary and
appropriate actions and measures to suppress and
prevent acts of lawless violence.” Considering that “acts
of terrorism” have not yet been defined and made
punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5
is declared unconstitutional.
There is no question that the president has borrowing
powers and that the President may contract or guarantee
foreign loans in behalf of this country with prior
concurrence of the Monetary Board. It makes no
distinction whatsoever and the fact that a debt or a loan
may be onerous is irrelevant. On the other hand, the
President can delegate this power to her direct
subordinates. The evident exigency of having the
Secretary of Finance implement the decision of the
President to execute the debt-relief contracts is made
manifest by the fact that the process of establishing and
executing a strategy for managing the government’s debt
is deep within the realm of the expertise of the
Department of Finance, primed as it is to raise the
required amount of funding, achieve its risk and cost
objectives, and meet any other sovereign debt
management goals.
If the President were to personally exercise every aspect
of the foreign borrowing power, she would have to pause
from running the country long enough to focus on a
welter of time-consuming detailed activities. This sort of
constitutional interpretation would negate the very
existence of cabinet positions and the respective
expertise which the holders thereof are accorded and
Page 76 of 97
CASE
NO.
CASE
TOPIC
128.
People’s
Movement for
Press Freedom, et
al. v. Hon. Raul
Manglapus, G.R.
No. 84642, En Banc
Resolution dated
April 13, 1988
Foreign Affairs
129.
Comm. Of Customs
vs. Eastern Sea
Trading, 3 SCRA
351 (1961)
Foreign Affairs
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
the gravity by which the exercise of the
power will affect the Filipino nation requires
that the President alone must exercise this
power. They argue that the requirement of
prior concurrence of an entity specifically
named by the Constitution–the Monetary
Board–reinforces the submission that not
respondents but the President “alone and
personally” can validly bind the country.
Petitioners, consisting of members of the
mass media, were seeking information from
the President’s representatives on the state
of the then ongoing negotiations of the RPUS Military Bases Agreement. This is a
collision between governmental power over
the conduct of foreign affairs and the
citizen’s right to information.
Eastern Sea Trading (EST) was a shipping
company which imports from Japan onion
and garlic into the Philippines. In 1956, the
Commissioner of Customs ordered the
seizure and forfeiture of the import goods
because EST was not able to comply with
Central Bank Circulars 44 and 45. The said
circulars were pursuant to Executive Order
328. On the other hand, EO 328 was the
implementing law of the Trades and
Financial Agreements, an executive
agreement, entered into between the
Philippines and Japan. The said executive
RATIO DECIDENDI
would unduly hamper the President’s effectivity in
running the government.
Whether or not
information sought
by petitioners is
covered by doctrine
of executive
privilege?
Yes.
Whether or not the
Executive
Agreement is
subject to the
concurrence by the
Senate.
No.
The SC, quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp. (299 U.S. 304, 1936) ruled that “In this vast external
realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and
manifold problems, the President alone has the power to
speak or listen as a representative of the nation. He
makes treaties with the advice and consent of the
Senate; but he alone negotiates.
The necessity of such caution and secrecy was one cogent
reason for vesting the power of making treaties in the
President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, the
principle on which that body was formed confining it to a
small number of members.”
Executive Agreements are not like treaties which are
subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the members
of the Senate. Agreements concluded by the President
which fall short of treaties are commonly referred to as
executive agreements and are no less common in our
scheme of government than are the more formal
instruments — treaties and conventions. They sometimes
take the form of exchanges of notes and at other times
that of more formal documents denominated
‘agreements’ or ‘protocols’.
They cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels,
navigation dues, income tax on shipping profits, the
admission of civil aircraft, customs matters, and
Page 77 of 97
CASE
NO.
130.
CASE
Go Tek vs.
Deportation Board,
79 SCRA 17 (1977)
TOPIC
Foreign Affairs
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
agreement states, among others, that all
import transactions between Japan and the
Philippines should be invoiced in dollar. In
this case, the said items imported by EST
from Japan were not invoiced in dollar.
EST questioned the validity of the said EO
averring that the executive agreement that
the EO was implementing was never
concurred upon by the Senate. The issue
was elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals
and the latter ruled in favor of EST. The
Commissioner appealed.
Go Tek was arrested by the National Bureau
of Investigation after the search of an office
which was believed to be the headquarters
of a guerilla unit of the "Emergency
Intelligence Section, Army of the United
States". He was alleged to have with him at
the time of the arrest a fake dollar checks in
violation of Article 168 of the Revised Penal
Code and rendered himself an undesirable
alien. The prosecutor prayed that after trial
the Board should recommend to the
President of the Philippines the immediate
deportation of Go Tek as an undesirable
alien. Consequently, his presence in this
country having been, and will always be and
a menace to the peace , welfare, and
security of the community. Go Tek filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that the
complaint was premature because there
was a pending case against him in the city
fiscal's office of Manila for violation of
Article 168. He contended that the board
RATIO DECIDENDI
commercial relations generally, international claims,
postal matters, the registration of trade-marks and
copyrights, etc. Some of them were concluded not by
specific congressional
authorization but in conformity with policies declared in
acts of Congress with respect to the general subject
matter, such as tariff acts; while still others, particularly
those with respect to the settlement of claims against
foreign governments, were concluded independently of
any legislation.
Whether or not the
Deportation Board
can entertain a
deportation
proceeding based
on a ground which is
not specified in
section 37 of the
Immigration Law.
Yes.
Under the existing law, the deportation of an undesirable
alien may be effected by order of the President, after due
investigation, pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code and by the Commissioner of
Immigration upon recommendation of the Board of
Commissioners under section 37 of the Immigration Law.
The state has the inherent power to deport undesirable
aliens. That power may be exercise by the Chief
Executive "when he deems such action necessary for the
peace and domestic tranquility of the nation Justice
Johnson's is that there the Chief Executive rinds that
there are aliens whose continued in the country is
injurious to the public interest he may, even in the
absence of express law, deport them.
Page 78 of 97
CASE
NO.
131.
CASE
Beltran vs.
Macasiar, G.R.
82585, Nov. 14,
1988
TOPIC
Immunity from
suit
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
had no jurisdiction to try the case in view of
the obiter dictum in Qua Chee Gan that the
board may deport aliens only on the
grounds specified in the law. The Board, in
its resolution, denied Go Tek's motion. The
Board reasoned out that a conviction is not
a prerequisite before the State my exercise
its rights to deport an undesirable alien.
Further, the Board is only a fact finding body
whose function is to make a report and
recommendation to the President in whom
is lodged the exclusive power to deport an
alien.
President Corazon Aquino filed a criminal
complaint for libel against Luis Beltran. The
latter argues that the reasons which
necessitate presidential immunity from suit
impose a correlative disability to file suit. He
contends that if criminal proceedings ensue
by virtue of the President's filing of her
complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently
have to be a witness for the prosecution,
bringing her under the trial court's
jurisdiction. This would in an indirect way
defeat her privilege of immunity from suit as
by testifying on the witness stand. Beltran
also contends that he could not be held
liable for libel because of the privileged
character of the publication. He also says
that to allow the libel case to proceed would
produce a “chilling effect” on press freedom.
Whether or not the
President of the
Philippines, under
the Constitution,
may initiate criminal
proceedings against
the petitioners
through the filing of
a complaintaffidavit.
Yes.
RATIO DECIDENDI
This privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the
President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only
by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the
President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in
which the President is complainant cannot raise the
presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case
from proceeding against such accused. Moreover, there
is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President
from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the
President may shed the protection afforded by the
privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice
of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely
the President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be
assumed and imposed by any other person. The rationale
for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity
from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties
and functions free from any hindrance or distraction,
considering that being the Chief Executive of the
Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the
office holder's time, also demands undivided attention.
Page 79 of 97
CASE
NO.
CASE
TOPIC
132.
Gloria vs. CA, G.R.
No. 119903, August
15, 2000
Immunity from
suit
133.
MMDA v. Jancom,
G.R. 147465, April
10, 2002
Supreme Court:
Mode of Sitting
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
Private respondent Dr. Bienvenido Icasiano
was appointed as Schools Division
Superintendent of Quezon City in 1989.
Upon recommendation of DECS Secretary
Ricardo Gloria, Icasiano was reassigned as
Superintendent of the Marikina Institute of
Science and Technology (MIST) to fill up the
vacuum created by the retirement of its
Superintendent in 1994. Icasiano filed a TRO
and preliminary mandatory injunction
enjoining the implementation of his
reassignment. The Court of Appeals granted
the petition holding that the indefinite
reassignment is violative of Icasiano’s right
to security of tenure. The DECS Secretary
argued that the filing of the case is improper
because the same attacks an act of the
President, in violation of the doctrine of
presidential immunity from suit.
A Build-Operate-Transfer Contract for the
waste to energy project was signed between
JANCOM and the Philippine Government.
The BOT Contract was submitted to
President Ramos for approval but was then
too close to the end of his term that his
term expired without him signing the
contract. He, however, endorsed the same
to incoming President Estrada. With the
change in administration came changes in
policy and economic environment, thus the
BOT contract was not pursued and
implemented. JANCOM appealed to the
President for reconsideration and despite
the pendency of the appeal, MMDA caused
RATIO DECIDENDI
Whether or not the
filing of the case
violates the
“presidential
immunity from suit”
doctrine.
No.
No. Petitioners’ contention is untenable because the
petition is directed against petitioners and not against
the President. DECS Secretary is an alter ego of the
president. He cannot invoke the President’s immunity
from suit in a case filed against him because the
questioned acts are not the acts of the President but
merely those of a department secretary. Moreover,
presidential decisions may be questioned before the
courts where there is grave abuse of discretion or that
the President acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.
The questioned acts are those of petitioners and not of
the President.
Furthermore, presidential decisions may be questioned
before the courts where there is grave abuse of
discretion or that the President acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction.
Whether or not
decisions by an SC
Division may be
appealed to in the
SC en banc.
No.
The Court En Banc is not an appellate court to which
decisions or resolutions of a Division may be appealed. A
decision of a Division of the Court is a decision of the
Supreme Court.
Page 80 of 97
CASE
NO.
134.
CASE
People v. Gacott,
G.R. No. 116049,
July 13, 1995
TOPIC
Supreme Court:
Mode of Sitting
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
the publication of an invitation to prequalify and submit proposals for solid waste
management.
For failure to check the citations of the
prosecution, the order of respondent RTC
Judge Eustaquio Gacott, Jr. dismissing a
criminal case was annulled by the SC. The
respondent judge was also sanctioned with
a reprimand and a fine of P10,000.00 for
gross ignorance of the law. The judgment
was made by the Second Division of the SC.
Whether or not the
Second Division of
the Supreme Court
has the competence
to administratively
discipline
respondent judge.
Yes.
RATIO DECIDENDI
Sec. 11, Art. VIII of the Constitution clearly shows that
there are actually two situations envisaged therein. The
first clause which states that “the SC en banc shall have
the power to discipline judges of lower courts,” is a
declaration of the grant of that disciplinary power to, and
the determination of the procedure in the exercise
thereof by, the Court en banc. It was not therein
intended that all administrative disciplinary cases should
be heard and decided by the whole Court since it would
result in an absurdity.
The second clause, which refers to the second situation
contemplated therein and is intentionally separated from
the first by a comma, declares on the other hand that the
Court en banc can “order their dismissal by a vote of a
majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted
therein.” In this instance, the administrative case must be
deliberated upon and decided by the full Court itself.
Pursuant to the first clause which confers administrative
disciplinary power to the Court en banc, a decision en
banc is needed only where the penalty to be imposed is
the dismissal of a judge, officer or employee of the
Judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either the
suspension of any of them for a period of more than 1
year or a fine exceeding P10, 000.00 or both.
To require the entire Court to deliberate upon and
participate in all administrative matters or cases
regardless of the sanctions, imposable or imposed, would
result in a congested docket and undue delay in the
adjudication of cases in the Court, especially in
administrative matters, since even cases involving the
Page 81 of 97
CASE
NO.
135.
CASE
Meralco vs. Pasay
Trans. Co., 57 Phil.
600 (1932)
TOPIC
No non-judicial
work for judges
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
Section 11 of the Act no. 1446 provides:
"Whenever any franchise or right of way is
granted to any other person or corporation,
now or hereafter in existence, over portions
of the lines and tracks of the grantee herein,
the terms on which said other person or
corporation shall use such right of way, and
the compensation to be paid to the grantee
herein by such other person or corporation
for said use, shall be fixed by the members
of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of
arbitrators, the decision of a majority of
whom shall be final."
Pursuant to said Act, Meralco filed a petition
requesting the members of the Supreme
Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, to fix
the terms upon which certain transportation
companies shall be permitted to use the
Pasig bridge of the Manila Electric Company
and the compensation to be paid to the
Manila Electric Company by such
transportation companies. Copies of the
petition were directed to be sent to
transportation companies affected by the
petition. Opposition was entered to the
petition by a number of public utility
operators.
Whether or not
members of the
Supreme Court can
sit as arbitrators and
fix the terms and
compensation.
No.
RATIO DECIDENDI
penalty of reprimand would require action by the Court
en banc.
That guideline or rule in the referral to the Court en banc
of cases assigned to a division thereof rests on the same
rationale and applies with equal force to confute the
antithetical theory of respondent Judge Eustaquio Z.
Gacott, Jr.
The Supreme Court and its members should not and
cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform
any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or
connected with the administering of judicial functions.
Section 11 of Act No. 1446 contravenes the maxims
which guide the operation of a democratic government
constitutionally established, and that it would be
improper and illegal for the members of the Supreme
Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a
majority of whom shall be final, to act on the petition of
the Manila Electric Company.
Page 82 of 97
CASE
NO.
136.
CASE
Garcia vs.
Macaraig, 3-SCRA
106 (1971)
TOPIC
No non-judicial
work for judges
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
Judge Catalino Macaraig, Jr. took his oath as
Judge of the CFI of San Pablo City, Laguna on
June 29, 1970. The court, being one of the
112 newly created CFI branches,
had to be organized from scratch. From July
1, 1970 to February 28, 1971, Macaraig was
not able to assume the duties and functions
of a judge due to the fact that his Court
Room cannot be properly established due to
problems as to location and as to
appropriations to make his Court up and
running. When Macaraig realized that it
would be some time before he could
actually preside over his court, he applied
for an extended leave (during the 16 years
he had worked in the Department of Justice,
he had, due to pressure of duties, never
gone on extended leave, resulting in his
forfeiting all the leave benefits he had
earned beyond the maximum ten months
allowed by the law). The Secretary of
Justice, however, convinced Macaraig to
forego his leave and instead to assist the
Secretary, without being extended a formal
detail, whenever he was not busy attending
to the needs of his court.
Paz Garcia on the other hand filed a
complaint alleging that Macaraig is
incompetent, dishonest and has acted in
violation of his oath as a judge. Garcia said
that Macaraig has not submitted the
progress of his Courts as required by law.
And that Macaraig has received salaries as a
judge while he is fully aware that he has not
Whether or not
Macaraig has acted
with incompetence
and dishonesty as
Judge.
No.
RATIO DECIDENDI
Macaraig’s inability to perform his judicial duties under
the circumstances mentioned above does not constitute
incompetence. Macaraig was like every lawyer who gets
his first appointment to the bench, eager to assume his
judicial duties and rid himself of the stigma of being ‘a
judge without a sala’, but forces and circumstances
beyond his control prevented him from discharging his
judicial duties.
On the other hand, none of these is to be taken as
meaning that the Court looks with favor at the practice of
long standing, to be sure, of judges being detailed in the
DOJ to assist the Secretary even if it were only in
connection with his work of exercising administrative
authority over the courts. The line between what a judge
may do and what he may not do in collaborating or
working with other offices or officers under the other
great departments of the government must always be
kept clear and jealously observed, lest the principle of
separation of powers on which our government rests by
mandate of the people thru the Constitution be gradually
eroded by practices purportedly motivated by good
intentions in the interest of the public service.
Page 83 of 97
CASE
NO.
CASE
TOPIC
137.
Nitafan vs. Comm.
Of Internal
Revenue, 152 SCRA
284 (1987)
Salary
138.
In Re Gonzales, 160
SCRA 771 (1988)
Removal
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
been performing the duties of a judge. Also
questioned was the fact that a member of
the judiciary is helping the the DOJ, a
department of the executive oi charge of
prosecution of cases.
Petitioners, the duly appointed and qualified
Judges presiding over Branches 52, 19 and
53, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region, all
with stations in Manila, seek to prohibit
and/or perpetually enjoin respondents, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the
Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from
making any deduction of withholding taxes
from their salaries. In a nutshell, they submit
that "any tax withheld from their
emoluments or compensation as judicial
officers constitutes a decrease or diminution
of their salaries, contrary to the provision of
Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution mandating that "(d)uring their
continuance in office, their salary shall not
be decreased," even as it is anathema to the
Ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned
in and by said Constitution."
An anonymous letter by "Concerned
Employees of the Supreme Court" addressed
to Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez referring to
charges for disbarment brought by Mr.
Miguel Cuenco against Mr. Justice Marcelo
B. Fernan and asking Mr. Gonzalez "to do
something about this." The second
attachment is a copy of a telegram from Mr.
Miguel Cuenco addressed to Hon. Raul M.
RATIO DECIDENDI
Whether or not the
payment of income
tax violates the
constitutional
protection against
decrease of their
salaries pursuant to
Section 10, Article
VIII of the
Constitution.
No.
The Court hereby reiterates that the salaries of Justices
and Judges are properly subject to a general income tax
law applicable to all income earners and that the
payment of such income tax by Justices and Judges does
not fall within the constitutional protection against
decrease of their salaries during their continuance in
office.
Whether or not the
court is correct in
dismissing the
Motion for
reconsideration of
Mr. Cuenco.
Yes.
A Member of the Supreme Court must first be removed
from office via the constitutional route of impeachment
under Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI of the 1987
Constitution. Should the tenure of the Supreme Court
Justice be thus terminated by impeachment, he may then
be held to answer either criminally or administratively (by
disbarment proceedings) for any wrong or misbehavior
that may be proven against him in appropriate
Page 84 of 97
CASE
NO.
CASE
TOPIC
139.
Santiago vs.
Bautista, 32 SCRA
188 (1970)
Jurisdiction
140.
Felipe vs. Leuterio,
91 Phil. 482 (1952)
Jurisdiction
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
Gonzalez, where Mr. Cuenco refers to
pleadings he apparently filed on 29 February
1988 with the Supreme Court in
Administrative Case No. 3135, which, in the
opinion of Mr. Cuenco, made improper any
"intervention" by Mr. Raul Gonzalez. Mr.
Cuenco, nonetheless, encourages Mr.
Gonzalez "to file responsive pleading
Supreme Court en banc to comply with
Petition Concerned Employees Supreme
Court asking Tanodbayan's intervention.
As the school year 1964-1965 was then
about to end, the "Committee On The Rating
Of Students For Honor" was constituted by
the teachers concerned at said school for
the purpose of selecting the "honor
students" of its graduating class. Tedoro
Santiago a grade six student and
represented by his mother, filed a complaint
alleging that the committee committed
grave abuse of discretion in choosing the
honor students as Teodoro was only given
the third rank while Patricia Liñgat who was
always behind him was second in rank. The
CFI of Cotabato dismissed the case on the
ground that the complaint therein states no
cause of action, and moved for
reconsideration but the same proved to be
futile, hence, this appeal.
In an oratorical contest held in Naga,
Camarines Sur, first honor was given by the
board of five judges to Nestor Nosce, and
second honor to Emma Imperial. Six days
RATIO DECIDENDI
proceedings.The remedy of a person with a legitimate
grievance is to file impeachment proceedings.
Whether or not an
award of honors to
a student by a board
of teachers falls
under jurisdiction of
the court.
No.
Whether or not the
courts have the
authority to reverse
the award of the
No.
The said committee of teachers does not fall within the
category of the tribunal, board, or officer exercising
judicial functions contemplated by Rule 65. In order that
a special civil action of certiorari may be invoked in this
jurisdiction the following circumstances must exist:
(1) that there must be a specific controversy involving
rights of persons or property and said controversy is
brought before a tribunal, board or officer for hearing
and determination of their respective rights and
obligations.
(2) the tribunal, board or officer before whom the
controversy is brought must have the power and
authority to pronounce judgment and render a decision
on the controversy construing and applying the laws to
that end.
(3) the tribunal, board or officer must pertain to that
branch of the sovereign power which belongs to the
judiciary, or at least, which does not belong to the
legislative or executive department.
No rights to the prizes may be asserted by the
contestants, because their's was merely the privilege to
compete for the prize, and that privilege did not ripen
into a demandable right unless and until they were
Page 85 of 97
CASE
NO.
CASE
TOPIC
141.
Prudential Bank vs.
Castro, 158 SCRA
646 (1988)
Deliberations
142.
Consing vs. Court of
Appeals, 177 SCRA
14 (1989)
Deliberations
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
later, Emma asked the court of the first
instance of that province to reversed that
award, alleging that one of the judges had
fallen to error in grading her performance.
After a hearing, and over the objection of
the other four judges of the contest, the
court declared Emma Imperial winner of the
first place. Hence this special civil action
challenging the court's power to modify the
board's verdict.
board of judges of
an oratorical
competition.
Acting on the "Petition for Redress and
Exoneration and for Voluntary Inhibition"
filed by respondent Benjamin M. Grecia
himself, dated February 8, 1988, praying
that the decision of November 12,1987, and
the resolution of the denial of the motion
for reconsideration of the said decision be
set aside and a new one entered by this
Court dismissing the administrative
complaint and exonerating the respondent.
The decision was also questioned by the
respondent due to lack of certification by
the Chief Justice that the conclusions of the
Court were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to a member for the
writing of the opinion of the Court.
A criminal complaint filed by Santos against
Merlin Consing charging him with the crime
of Violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 7,
Series of 1964 of Marikina for contracting to
sell to her the two lots in question without
first securing the approval of the Municipal
Council of Marikina for his subdivision plan.
Whether or not the
decision violated
the certification
requirement under
the Constitution
No.
Whether or not the
decision rendered
by the respondent
Court of Appeals in
this case does not
comply with the
requirements of
No.
RATIO DECIDENDI
proclaimed winners of the competition by the appointed
arbiters or referees or judges. "Wrong" as used in the
aforesaid legal principle is the deprivation or violation of
a right. As stated before, a contestant has no right to the
prize unless and until he or she is declared winner by the
board of referees or judges. Granting that Imperial
suffered some loss or injury, yet in law there are
instances of "damnum absque injuria". This is one of
them. The judiciary has no power to reverse the award of
the board of judges of an oratorical contest, literary,
beauty contest and similar competitions.
The certification requirement refers to decisions in
judicial, not administrative cases. But even if such a
certification were required, it is beyond doubt that the
conclusions of the Court in its decision were arrived at
after consultation and deliberation. The signatures of the
members who actually took part in the deliberations and
voted attest to that. Besides, being a per curiam decision,
or an opinion of the Court as a whole, there is no
ponente although any member of the Court may be
assigned to write the draft. In such cases, a formal
certification is obviously not required.
The absence, however, of the certification would not
necessarily mean that the case submitted for decision
had not been reached in consultation before being
assigned to one member for the writing of the opinion of
the Court since the regular performance of official duty is
presumed [Sec. 5 (m) of Rule 131, Rules of Court]. The
lack of certification at the end of the decision would only
Page 86 of 97
CASE
NO.
143.
144.
CASE
TOPIC
Cruz v. DENR. G.R.
No. 135385, Dec.
06, 2000
Voting
Valladolid vs.
Inciong, 121 SCRA
205 (1992)
Requirements as
to decisions
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
On August 28, 1981, the CFI rendered
judgment finding that although the Consings
may have "corrected the irregularities
and/or [have] complied with the legal
requirements for the operation of their
subdivision, they cannot escape their
liability to [Santos] for having sold to her
portions of the roads or streets
denominated as right-of-way which was
affirmed by the CA.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the
following provisions of the IPRA and its
Implementing Rules on the ground that they
amount to an unlawful deprivation of the
States ownership over lands of the public
domain as well as minerals and other
natural resources therein, in violation of the
regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution.
It prayed that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57,
58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and other related
provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional
and invalid
Ricardo Valladolid, was employed by JRM in
1977 as a telephone switchboard operator.
He was subsequently transferred to the
position of clerk-collector because he gives
out information to the competitors of the
company. Valladolid filed a written request
for a vacation leave and stating therein that
he would report for work on January 5,
1979. 4 He did not report for work on
January 5 but sent a telegram from Bicol on
Article VIII, section
13, of the New
Constitution
Whether or not the
serve as evidence of failure to observe the certification
requirement and may be basis for holding the official
responsible for the omission to account therefor [See I
Record of the Constitutional Commission 460]. Such
absence of certification would not have the effect of
invalidating the decision.
No.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the
necessary majority was
not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However,
after
redeliberation, the voting remained the same.
Accordingly, pursuant to
Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the
petition is
dismissed and the law is declared constitutional.
No.
The order was not violative of Section 9, Article X of the
Constitution, which requires a statement of the facts and
the conclusions of law upon which it is based. That
prescription applies to decisions of Courts of record. The
Ministry of Labor is an administrative body with quasijudicial functions. Section 5, Rule XIII, Book V, Ibid, states
that proceedings in the NLRC shall be non-litigious and
summary in nature without regard to legal technicalities
obtaining in courts of law. Hence petition for certiorari is
denied.
provisions assailed
are
unconstitutional
Whether or not the
Minister of Labor
deprived the
petitioner of due
process by
disregarding the
procedural
requirement
RATIO DECIDENDI
Page 87 of 97
CASE
NO.
CASE
TOPIC
145.
Nunal vs. COA. 169
SCRA 356 (1989)
Requirements as
to decisions
146.
People v. Bugarin,
273 SCRA 384
(1996)
Requirements as
to decisions
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
January 8, 1979 requesting for 15 days sick
leave as he
was confined for flu at the Dr. Estrellado
Clinic. 5 Valladolid reported for work on
February 16, 1979. The Executive VicePresident, Mr. Daniel Yu, allegedly refused
to admit him and instead asked him to
resign. On February 22, 1979, Valladolid filed
a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal with
vacation and sick leave pay. The Minister or
Labor ordered his reinstatement. JRM
questioned the order and alleging that it
was deprived of due process of a hearing.
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of
the Minute Resolution of this Court of 11
May 1988 dismissing the Petition for
certiorari "for failure of the petitioner to
sufficiently show that the public respondent
had committed grave abuse of discretion in
holding, among others, that the compromise
agreement of the parties is not enforceable
against the Municipality of Isabela, the latter
not having been impleaded as an
indispensable party in the case.
The accused appellant appealed the decision
of RTC, finding him guilty of four counts of
consummated rape and one count of
attempted rape and sentencing him. He
assailed the decision of the trial court as it
does not state the facts and law upon which
it was based.
RATIO DECIDENDI
Whether or not the No.
Resolution of the
Court under date of
11 May 1988 is not
in accordance with
the Constitution
In the first place, the "Resolution" of 11 May 1988 was
not a "Decision" within the meaning of the
Constitutional requirement. This mandate is applicable
only in cases "submitted for decision," i.e., given due
course and after the filing of Briefs or Memoranda
and/or other pleadings, as the case may be. It is not
applicable to an Order or Resolution refusing due
course to a Petition for Certiorari. In the second place,
the assailed Resolution does state the legal basis for
the dismissal of the Petition and thus complies with
the Constitutional provision.
Whether or not a
court decision which
does not state the
facts and law upon
which it was based
is valid
The requirement that the decisions of courts must be in
writing and that they must set forth clearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which they are based serves
many functions. It is intended, among other things, to
inform the parties of the reason or reasons for the
decision so that if any of them appeals, he can point out
to the appellate court the findings of facts or the rulings
on points of law with which he disagrees. More than that,
the requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in
reaching judgment, the judge did so through the
No.
Page 88 of 97
CASE
NO.
147.
148.
CASE
TOPIC
Hernandez vs.
Court of Appeals,
228 SCRA 429
(1993)
Requirements as
to decisions
Yao vs. CA, G.R. No.
132428, October
24, 2000
Requirements as
to decisions
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
Petitioner was a consistent buyer of pieces
of jewelry of Remedios de Leon. He will
either pay in cash or postdated checks.
However on the latter part of business
transactions between the, the check issued
by him bounce due to insufficiency and
closed account The RTC rendered a decision
convicting him of 9 disctinct offenses which
was affirmed by the CA except the one
crime charged. According to petitioner, the
Court of Appeals did not make its own
"independent judicial opinion" by such act
of adopting the statement of facts made by
the advance party
Yao was convicted of unfair competition in
MeTC for issuing locally General electric
lamp starters which was affirmed by RTC
without saying more. On 4 October 1994,
Yao appealed to the Court of Appeals by
filing a notice of appeal. However, on 25
April 1995 the Court of Appeals promulgated
a Resolution[14] declaring that [t]he
decision rendered on July 27, 1994 by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 121, has long
become final and executory and ordering
the records of the case remanded to said
court for the proper execution of judgment.
Hence this certiorari
Whether or not the
No.
decision made by
the CA is violative
of Art. VIII, sec. 14,
par. 1 and 2 of the
Constitution
Whether or not the
decision made by
the CA is violative
of the Constitution
Yes.
RATIO DECIDENDI
processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard
against the impetuosity of the judge, preventing him
from deciding by ipse dixit.
In its decision the Court of Appeals merely stated: "The
facts of the case as summarized in the Appellee's Brief
are as follows:" and then quoted in full the statement of
facts of the Solicitor General. What the Court of Appeals,
in effect, said was that it found the facts as presented by
the Solicitor General as supported by the evidence. The
constitutional mandate only requires that the decision
should state the facts on which it is based. There is no
proscription made in the briefs or memoranda of the
parties, instead of rewriting the same in its own words.
The denial, therefore, was based on the ground that the
Court of Appeals did not find any "cogent reason that
could justify a modification or reversal of the decision
sought to be reconsidered."
Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14,
Article VIII of the Constitution is indisputably a
paramount component of due process and fair play. The
parties to a litigation should be informed of how it was
decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal
reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. More
than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties
that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the
processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard
against the impetuosity of the judge, preventing him
from deciding ipse dixit.
Thus the Court has struck down as void, decisions of
lower courts and even of the Court of Appeals whose
careless disregard of the constitutional behest exposed
their sometimes cavalier attitude not only to their
magisterial responsibilities but likewise to their avowed
fealty to the Constitution.
Page 89 of 97
CASE
NO.
CASE
TOPIC
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
149.
Dizon vs. Judge
Lopez, A.M. 961338, September
05, 1997
Requirements as
to decisions
Facts: On April 22, 1993, judgment was
rendered, convicting complainant of
falsification of private document. The
promulgation of the judgment consisted of
reading the dispositive portion of the
decision sentencing him to imprisonment,
without serving a copy of the decision on
him. When the Judge finished the decision,
she just read the dispositive portion of the
decision to the accused.
Whether or not the
failure of
respondent judge to
furnish a copy of the
decision constitutes
a violation of Art.
VIII, Sec. 14 of the
Constitution
Yes
150.
Asiavest v. CA, G.R.
No. 110263, July
20, 2001
Requirements as
to decisions
Whether or not the
No.
Tichangco v.
Enriquez, G.R. No.
Petition for
Review with
The petitioner Asiavest Merchant Bankers
(M) Berhad is a corporation organized under
the laws of Malaysia while private
respondent Philippine National Construction
Corporation is a corporation duly
incorporated and existing under Philippine
laws.
In 1983, petitioner initiated a suit for
collection against private respondent, which
was favored by the High Court of Malaysia.
But due to unsuccessful attempts to secure
payment from private respondent under the
judgment, petitioner initiated on September
5, 1988 the complaint before Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, to enforce the judgment of
the High Court of Malaya. The case was
dismissed by RTC which decision was
affirmed by the CA. Hence this petition.
The petitioners assailed the decisions of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No.
54648. The assailed Decision affirmed the
151.
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CA erred in denying
recognition and
enforcement of the
Malaysian court
judgment.
Whether or not the
CA complied with
Section 14 of Article
No.
RATIO DECIDENDI
The judgment must be read, stating the facts and the law
on which such judgment is based which is very clear in
Art. VIII, Sec 14 of the Constitution.
What respondent did in this case was to render what is
known as a sin perjuicio judgment, which is a judgment
without a statement of the facts in support of its
conclusion to be later supplemented by the final
judgment. As early as 1923, this Court already expressed
its disapproval of the practice of rendering sin perjuicio
judgments, what with
all the uncertainties entailed because of the implied
reservation that it is subject to modification when the
decision is finally rendered.[
Generally, in the absence of a special compact, no
sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a
judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country;
however, the rules of comity, utility and convenience of
nations have established a usage among civilized states
by which final judgments of foreign courts of competent
jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered
efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in
different countries.
In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered by a foreign
tribunal may be recognized insofar as the immediate
parties and the underlying cause of action are concerned
so long as it is convincingly shown that there has been an
opportunity for a full and fair hearing before a court of
competent jurisdiction. Having thus proven, through the
foregoing evidence, the existence and authenticity of the
foreign judgment enjoys presumptive validity.
In its assailed Decision, the CA affirmed the resolution of
LRA Administrator Enriquez. The appellate court
deliberated on the law and the reasons it relied upon in
Page 90 of 97
CASE
NO.
152.
CASE
TOPIC
150629, June 30,
2004
Motion for
Reconsideration
Fr. Martinez v. CA,
G.R. 123547, May
21, 2001
Petition for
Review with
Motion for
Reconsideration
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
findings of the then Land Registration
Authority (LRA) administrator, Alfredo
Enriquez, that there were no legal grounds
to initiate appropriate proceedings to nullify
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) Nos. 820
and 7477 and the subsequent titles derived
therefrom: Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
Nos. 128240 to 128249, inclusive, and TCT
No. 128270 -- all covering parcels of land in
Tondo, Manila registered in the names of
private respondents.
The Petitioners attack the validity of the
assailed CA Decision for its failure to
mention that a magnetic survey was
completed only on November 15, 1906, a
fact that they perceived to be crucial to the
determination of the case. The untenability
of such grasping at straws can easily be
demonstrated. Hence this petition for
review.
This is a petition for review on certiorari of
the decision, dated September 7, 1995, and
resolution, dated January 31, 1996, of the
Court of Appeals, which affirmed the
decisions of the Regional Trial Court,
Branches 25[1] and 28,[2] Cabanatuan City,
finding private respondents spouses
Reynaldo and Susan Veneracion owners of
the land in dispute, subject to petitioners
rights as a builder in good faith.
Petitioner contends that the resolution of
the Court of Appeals denying his motion for
reconsideration was rendered in violation of
VIII of the 1987
Constitution.
Whether or not the
resolution of the
Court of Appeals
denying petitioners
motion for
reconsideration is
contrary to the
constitutional
requirement that a
denial of a motion
for reconsideration
must state the legal
reasons on which it
is based.
RATIO DECIDENDI
its determination of the issues presented only after giving
a detailed account and assessment of the factual
antecedents found by respondent administrator.
There is sufficient compliance with the constitutional
requirement when a collegiate appellate court, after
deliberation, decides to deny a motion; states that the
questions raised are factual or have already been passed
upon; or cites some other legal basis. There is no need to
explain fully the courts denial, since the facts and the law
have already been laid out in the assailed Decision.
No.
The requirement under Article VIII, Section 14 was fully
complied with when the Court of Appeals, in denying
reconsideration of its decision, stated in its resolution
that it found no reason to change its ruling because
petitioner had not raised anything new.
Page 91 of 97
CASE
NO.
CASE
TOPIC
153.
Re: Delays in the
Sandiganbayan,
A.M. No. 00-8-05SC, Nov. 28, 2001
Periods for
deciding cases
154.
In re Demetria, AM.
No. 00-7-09-CA,
March 27, 2001
Supervision of
lower courts
155.
People v. Pilotin, 65
SCRA 635 (1975)
Order a change
of venue or place
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
the Constitution because it does not state
the legal basis thereof.
On July 31, 2000, the IBP, through its
National President, Arthur D. Lim,
transmitted to the Court a Resolution
addressing the problem of delays in cases
pending before the Sandiganbayan. It
recommended an inquiry into the causes of
delays in the resolution of incidents and
motions and in the decision of cases pending
before the Sandiganbayan. According to IBP,
the delays result to incompetence,
inefficiency, gross neglect of duty and
misconduct in office.
Whether or not Art.
VIII Sec 15(1) and (2)
of the 1987
Constitution
includes the
Sandiganbayan
No.
It was alleged that Justice Demetria
intervene in the case for the accused drug
queen Yu Yuk Lai when he called and
instructed the prosecutor to withdraw the
motion to inhibit of Judge Muro, the judge
who handle the case and was alleged to be
partial to Yu Yuk Lai.
In 2000, the national newpapers collectively
reported that Justice Demetrio G. Demetria
tried to intercede on behalf of suspected
Chinese drug queen Yu Yuk Lai, alias Sze Yuk
Lai, who went in and out of prison to play in
a Manila casino.
Whether or not
Justice Demetria
violated the Code of
Judicial Conduct and
is subject to
appropriate
disciplinary action
by the SC
Yes
Vincent Crisologo through counsel filed a
verified motion praying for the transfer to
Whether or not the
change of venue in
Yes
RATIO DECIDENDI
Article VIII, Section 15 (1) and (2), of the 1987
Constitution provision refers to regular courts of lower
collegiate level that in the present hierarchy applies only
to the Court of Appeals.
The Sandiganbayan is not a regular court but a special
one. Under Article VIII, Section 5 (5) of the Constitution
Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court.
The law creating the Sandiganbayan, P.D. No. 1606 is
clear on this issue. It provides “..that cases before the
Sandiganbayan once commenced shall be continuous
until terminated and the judgment shall be rendered
within three (3) months from the date the case was
submitted for decision”
The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an
office charged with the dispensation of justice is
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility.
Unfortunately, respondent Justice Demetrio Demetria
failed to live up to this expectation. Through his
indiscretions, Justice Demetria did not only make a
mockery of his high office, but also caused incalculable
damage to the entire Judiciary.
Hence Justice Demetrio G. Demetria is GUILTY of violating
Rule 2.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. He is ordered
DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all benefits
and with prejudice to his appointment or reappointment
to any government office, agency or instrumentality,
including any government owned or controlled
corporation or institution.
Section 5(4), Article X of the Constitution expressly
empowers this Court to "order a change of venue or
Page 92 of 97
CASE
NO.
CASE
TOPIC
of trial to avoid
miscarriage of
justice
156.
Mondiguing v.
Abad, SCRA 14
(1975)
Order a change
of venue or place
of trial to avoid
miscarriage of
justice
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
the New Bilibid Prisons or, to Camps Crame,
Aguinaldo or Olivas, of the place of trial of
Criminal Case No. 3949 of the municipal
court of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, wherein he, as
sole defendant, is charged with illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions. He
alleged that his life would be in jeopardy if
he were to be confined in the Vigan
municipal jail during the trial because there
are many political enemies of the Crisologo
family in that vicinity Provincial Fiscal of
Ilocos Sur signified his conformity to the
transfer of the venue of the trial to the New
Bilibid Prisons.
Alipio Mondiguing and Andres Dunuan are
two of the ten defendants accused of double
murder, frustrated murder and attempted
murder. In that incident they harmed
Governor Gualberto Lumauig of Ifugao.
Hence on September 4, 1975 the petitioners
filed a petition to transfer the venue of the
case to Baguio City or Quezon City. They
claimed that they could not expect a fair and
impartial trial in Lagawe, Ifugao because
Judge Francisco Men Abad of the Court of
First Instance of that province is a protege'
of Governor Lumauig and his brother,
former Congressman Romulo Lumauig, and
because their witnesses would be afraid to
testify for fear of harassment and reprisals.
The Acting Solicitor General interposed no
objection to the change of venue but Judge
Abad it is not necessary.
this case is in
conformity with the
Constitution
Whether or not
Mondiguing's plea
for a change of
venue is justified.
RATIO DECIDENDI
place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice". Here, what
is involved is not merely a miscarriage of justice but the
personal safety of movant Crisologo, the accused. It
would be absurd to compel him to undergo trial in a place
where his life would be imperilled. We find Crisologo's
motion to be meritorious. The change of venue involves
not merely the change of the place of hearing but also
the transfer of the expediente of Criminal Case No. 3949
to another court.
Yes.
This Court is invested with the prerogative of ordering "a
change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of
justice" (Sec. 5[4], Art. X of the Constitution). After a
careful consideration of the circumstances recited in
Mondiguing's petition to support his request for a change
of the place of trial, we have reached the conclusion that
his petition is meritorious. . In the interest of a fair and
impartial trial and to avoid a miscarriage of justice and
considering that his life would be in danger if he were to
be tried in Lagawe, Ifugao, he should be tried by the
Circuit Criminal Court in the City of Baguio.
Page 93 of 97
CASE
NO.
CASE
TOPIC
157.
People v. Sola, 103
SCRA 393 (1981)
Order a change
of venue or place
of trial to avoid
miscarriage of
justice
158.
Zaldivar vs.
Gonzales, 166 SCRA
316 (1988)
Admission to the
Practice of Law
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
On September 23 and October 1, 1980, the
PC provincial commander of Negros
Occidental filed seven (7) separate
complaints for murder against the accused
Pablo Sola and others. While on a temporary
release, the witnesses in the murder cases
informed the prosecution of their fears that
if the trial is held at the Court of First
Instance branch in Himamaylan which is but
10 kilometers from Kabankalan, their safety
could be jeopardized. At least two of the
accused are officials with power and
influence in Kabankalan and they have been
released on bail. Hence a petition to change
the venue.
The respondent prayed this court that the
motion for reconsideration be reviewed and
modified relating to the per curiam
Resolution of the Court dated October 7,
1988. In the per curiam Resolution (page
50), the Court concluded that "respondent
Gonzalez is guilty both of contempt of court
in facie curiae and of gross misconduct as an
officer of the court and member of the bar."
The court sought to convey that it regarded
the contumacious acts or statements (which
were made both in a pleading filed before
the Court and in statements given to the
media) and the misconduct of respondent
Gonzalez as serious acts flaunted in the face
of the Court and constituting a frontal
assault upon the integrity of the Court and,
through the Court, the entire judicial
system.
RATIO DECIDENDI
Whether or not the
change of venue or
place of trial of the
same criminal cases
to avoid a
miscarriage of
justice be
considered in this
case
Yes
The Supreme Court could order "a change of venue or
place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice. The
exercise by this Honorable Court of its above
constitutional power in this case will be appropriate. The
witnesses in the case are fearful for their lives. They are
afraid they would be killed on their way to or from
Himamaylan during any of the days of trial. Because of
fear, they may either refuse to testify or testimony falsely
to save their lives. The primordial aim and intent of the
Constitution must ever be kept in mind. In case of doubt,
it should be resolved in favor of a change of venue.
Whether or not the
court is correct in
imposing an
indefinite
suspension of
Gonzales in the
practice of law
Yes
The Court has two related powers: the inherent power to
discipline
attorneys and the contempt power. The disciplinary
authority of the
Court over members of the Bar is broader than the power
to punish
for contempt. Contempt of court may be committed both
by lawyers
and non-lawyers, both in and out of court.
The indefiniteness of the respondent's suspension is not
cruel, degrading or "inhuman. He was given a chance to
restore his rights and privileges by by acknowledging such
misconduct, exhibiting appropriate repentance and
demonstrating his willingness and capacity to live up to
the exacting standards of conduct rightly demanded from
every member of the bar and officer of the courts.
Page 94 of 97
CASE
NO.
159.
160.
CASE
In re: Cunanan, 94
Phil. 534 (1954)
TOPIC
Admission to the
Practice of Law
Aguirre vs. Rana,
Admission to the
Bar Matter No.
Practice of Law
1036, June 10, 2003
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
Republic Act No. 972, popularly known as
the "Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953 was enacted
by Congress. It provides that any bar
candidate who obtained a general average
of 70% (1946-1951); 71%(1952); 72%(1953);
73%(1954); 74%(1955) and without a
candidate obtaining a grade 50% in any
subject, shall be allowed to take and
subscribe the corresponding oath of office
as member of the Philippine Bar: Provided,
however, That for the purpose of this Act,
any exact one-half or more of a fraction,
shall be considered as one and included as
part of the next whole number.
Respondent Edwin L. Rana (respondent) was
among those who passed the 2000 Bar
Examinations. One day before the scheduled
mass oath-taking of successful bar
examinees, Donna Marie Aguirre
(complainant) filed against respondent a
Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar.
Complainant charged respondent with
unauthorized practice of law, grave
misconduct, violation of law, and grave
misrepresentation.
Complainant alleges that respondent, while
not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a
candidate in the May 2001 elections before
the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers
(MBEC) of Mandaon, Masbate.
The Court allowed respondent to take his
oath but not allowed him to sign the Roll of
Attorneys up to now pending the resolution
of the charge against him.
Whether or not RA
Yes.
Republic Act No. 972 is unconstitutional. The Constitution
has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal
responsibility concerning the admission to the practice of
law. The primary power and responsibility which the
Constitution recognizes continue to reside in this Court.
Had Congress found that this Court has not promulgated
any rule on the matter, it would have nothing over which
to exercise the power granted to it. Congress may repeal,
alter and supplement the rules promulgated by this
Court, but the authority and responsibility over the
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of
attorneys at law and their supervision remain vested in
the Supreme Court.
No.
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional
right but is
a privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral
character with
special qualifications duly ascertained and certified.
A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law
simply by
passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a
privilege that
can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar
examinations, if the person seeking admission had
practiced law
without a license
The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is
immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to
become
an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know that two
essential
requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be
performed, namely:
No. 972 is
unconstitutional
Whether or not the
respondent be
admitted to the
practice of law
RATIO DECIDENDI
Page 95 of 97
CASE
NO.
CASE
TOPIC
161.
In re: Edillon 84
SCRA 554 (1978)
Integration of the
Bar
162.
In re: IBP Elections
Bar Matter No. 491
(October 06. 1989)
Integration of the
Bar
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly
licensed practicing attorney in the
Philippines. On November 29, 1975, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for
short) Board of Governors unanimously
recommend to the Court the removal of the
name of the respondent from its Roll of
Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his
membership dues" to the IBP since the
latter's constitution notwithstanding due
notice. The respondent stated that the Court
is without power to compel him to become
a member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court
Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges on
his constitutional right of freedom to
associate.
The newly-elected officers were set to take
the their oath of office on July 4,1989,
before the Supreme Court en banc.
However, reports received that there were
intensive electioneering and overspending
by the candidates, led by the main
protagonists for the office of president of
the association, namely, Attorneys Paculdo,
Nisce, and Drilon, the alleged use of
government planes, and the officious
intervention of certain public officials to
influence the voting, all of which were done
in violation of the IBP By-Laws which
prohibit such activities. The Supreme Court
Whether or not the
non- payment of
dues is a ground for
the removal of the
name from the Roll
of Attorneys.
Yes
Whether or not the
following officers
violated Art I, Sec 4
of the IBP By- Laws.
Yes.
RATIO DECIDENDI
his lawyer’s oath to be administered by this Court and his
signature
in the Roll of Attorneys.
To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar
is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate.
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any
group of which he is not already a member. He became a
member of the Bar when he passed the Bar
examinations. The only compulsion (justified as exercise
of Police power of the state) to which he is subjected is
the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order
to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the
quality of professional legal services, may require that the
cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared
by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory
program the lawyers. Hence, Edillon is disbarred.
It is evident that the manner in which the principal
candidates for the national positions in the Integrated Bar
conducted their campaign preparatory to the elections
on June 3, 1989, violated Section 14 of the IBP By-Laws
and made a travesty of the idea of a "strictly nonpolitical" Integrated Bar enshrined in Section 4 of the ByLaws. The candidates and many of the participants in that
election not only violated the By-Laws of the IBP but also
the ethics of the legal profession which imposes on all
lawyers, as a corollary of their obligation to obey and
uphold the constitution and the laws, the duty to
"promote respect for law and legal processes" and to
abstain from 'activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
Page 96 of 97
CASE
NO.
163.
CASE
De La Llana vs.
Alba, 122 SCRA 291
(1983)
TOPIC
Lower Courts:
Tenure
Compiled by: ANTONIO T. DELGADO
CASE DIGESTS FOR ATTY. BUTCH JAMON’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I SYLLABUS
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
en banc, resolved to suspend the oathtaking of the IBP officers-elect.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled "An act
reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating
Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes” was
enacted. It includes the reorganization of
the entire Judiciary which shall embrace all
lower courts, including the Court of Appeals,
the Courts of First Instance, the City and
Municipal Courts, and all Special Courts, but
excluding the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners
contend that the abolition of the existing
inferior courts collides with the security of
tenure enjoyed by incumbent Justices and
judges under Article X, Section 7 of the
Constitution.
Whether or not the
Batas Pambansa Blg.
129 collides with
security of tenure of
Judges and Justices.
No.
RATIO DECIDENDI
lessening confidence in the legal system" (Rule 1.02,
Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility).
Congress can abolish the positions in the lower courts but
not the
Supreme Court.
The Court is empowered "to discipline judges of inferior
courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order
their dismissal." 76 Thus it possesses the competence to
remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the
President who was vested with such power. 77 Removal
is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by
virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no
tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there
is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an
office with an occupant who would thereby lose his
position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of
strict law, the question of any impairment of security of
tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of
inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation.
As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and
the abolition of the office.
Page 97 of 97
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