Statement of Facts: Mr. Regala got married on February 8, 2013. Subsequently, he claimed for a paternity leave. However, the newborn referred therein is already the 7th child in the family. He did not claim the paternity benefit for his first 6 children because he was not yet legally married at that time. Attachments: Application for Leave, Certificate of Marriage Issue: Determining if a paternity benefit can be availed for a newborn if the claimant already had more than four children before he was legally married (to the same woman who is the mother of the aforementioned newborn) STAND: With regards to this matter, we deem that granting Mr. Regala a paternity leave would be the appropriate action as it in accordance with Republic Act 8187 otherwise known as Paternity Leave Act of 1996. To resort to such action is not in any way disadvantageous to the employer as it only serves to comply with the law and therefore does not pose any harm to the interests of the employer. As a legal basis, we look into Section 2 of RA 8187 which stipulates that “the Paternity leave shall be paid in full, equivalent to seven (7) days, up to the first four deliveries of the legitimate spouse with whom he is cohabiting. Furthermore, entitlement to the paternity leave is subject to the following conditions: (1) the claimant, a married male employee, is employed at the time of delivery of his child; (2) he is cohabiting with his spouse at the time she gives birth or suffers a miscarriage; (3) he has applied for paternity leave; and (4) the wife has given birth or has suffered miscarriage. Thus, wife herein is the lawful wife or woman legally married to male employee concerned.” RA 8187 puts emphasis on the condition that the claimant must be legally married to be granted of a paternity leave. It is also stated that the mother of the newborn must be the lawful wife of the claimant. This implies the legitimate status of the child referred in the conditions for entitlement. It should be noted that Mr. Regala had not availed of a paternity leave for the six (6) children born prior to his marriage. We assume that this is because of his awareness that he is not qualified to claim the paternity leave without being lawfully married to the mother of his children. Now that he is married, his 7th child has acquired legitimate status. This is where the “first four deliveries of the legitimate spouse” referred to in Section 2 will begin to apply. The Labor Code also adheres to the doctrine of liberal interpretation of the law which states that in case of doubt, the conflict should be resolved in favor of labor. In the midst of confusion, we look into the social justice policy to which we must grant the exercise of the rights of the employee. The Paternity Leave is indicated in the law and must therefore be complied with to avoid any legal conflict that may lead to more harm for the employer. Related Jurisprudence: In the case of Continental Steel Manufacturing Corp. versus Hon. Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Allan Montaño et al., G.R. No. 182836, Hortillano who was an employee of Continental Steel claimed for paternity leave, bereavement leave, and other death benefits after the death of his unborn child. Continental Steel granted a paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave and other death benefits. A part of the decision discusses one of the common qualifications for being granted of the benefits for newly born children which is to be a legitimate dependent. We relate this to the issue at hand, whether the condition of the first four deliveries already applies to the children born prior to Mr. Regala’s marriage. Thus, we differentiate children born out of wedlock and children born after the lawful marriage of the parents. The term legitimate merely addresses the dependent child’s status in relation to his/her parents. In Angeles v. Maglaya,[27] we have expounded on who is a legitimate child, viz: A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove the element of lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and child. Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter: “Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.” (Emphasis ours.) Conversely, in Briones v. Miguel,[28] we identified an illegitimate child to be as follows: The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have been eliminated in the Family Code. Now, there are only two classes of children -- legitimate (and those who, like the legally adopted, have the rights of legitimate children) and illegitimate. All children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself gives them legitimate status. (Emphasis ours.) In this case, Hortillano was granted a paternity leave because he was legally married to the mother of the child, thus making the latter acquire a legitimate status. This is to be distinguished to the six children of Mr. Regala who were born before he was legally married to the mother. Finally, petitioner misinterprets the declaration of the Labor Arbiter in the assailed decision that "when the pendulum of judgment swings to and fro and the forces are equal on both sides, the same must be stilled in favor of labor." While petitioner acknowledges that all doubts in the interpretation of the Labor Code shall be resolved in favor of labor, it insists that what is involved-here is the amended CBA which is essentially a contract between private persons. What petitioner has lost sight of is the avowed policy of the State, enshrined in our Constitution, to accord utmost protection and justice to labor, a policy, we are, likewise, sworn to uphold. In Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation v. NLRC [183 SCRA 451 (1990)], we categorically stated that: When conflicting interests of labor and capital are to be weighed on the scales of social justice, the heavier influence of the latter should be counter-balanced by sympathy and compassion the law must accord the underprivileged worker. Likewise, in Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation v. NLRC [199 SCRA 265 (1991)], we declared: Any doubt concerning the rights of labor should be resolved in its favor pursuant to the social justice policy. In the case of the Supreme Steel Corporation versus Nagkakaisang Manggagawa Ng Supreme Independent Union (Nms-Ind-Apl) Denial of paternity leave benefit to two employees Article XV, Section 2 of the CBA provides: Section 2. Paternity Leave. As per law[,] [t]he Company shall, as much as possible, pay paternity leave within 2 weeks from submission of documents.[30] Petitioner admitted that it denied this benefit to the claimants for failure to observe the requirement provided in the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 8187 (Paternity Leave Act of 1995), that is, to notify the employer of the pregnancy of their wives and the expected date of delivery.[31] Respondent argued that petitioner is relying on technicalities by insisting that the denial was due to the two employees’ failure to notify it of the pregnancy of their respective spouses. It maintained that the notification requirement runs counter to the spirit of the law. Respondent averred that, on grounds of social justice, the oversight to notify petitioner should not be dealt with severely by denying the two claimants this benefit.[32]