CHREA vs.CHR G.R. No. 155336 November 25, 2004
FACTS: Congress passed RA 8522, otherwise known as the General Appropriations
Act of 1998. It provided for Special Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices
Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. On the strength of these special provisions, the CHR
promulgated Resolution No. A98-047 adopting an upgrading and reclassification
scheme among selected positions in the Commission.
By virtue of Resolution No. A98-062, the CHR “collapsed” the vacant positions in the
body to provide additional source of funding for said staffing modification.
The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading scheme to the DBM with
a request for its approval, but the then DBM secretary denied the request.
In light of the DBM’s disapproval of the proposed personnel modification scheme, the
CSC-National Capital Region Office, through a memorandum, recommended to the
CSC-Central Office that the subject appointments be rejected owing to the DBM’s
disapproval of the plantilla reclassification.
Meanwhile, the officers of petitioner CHR-employees association (CHREA) in
representation of the rank and file employees of the CHR, requested the CSC-Central
Office to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office
The CSC-Central Office denied CHREA’s request in a Resolution and reversed the
recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office that the upgrading scheme be censured.
CHREA filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CSC-Central Office denied the same.
CHREA elevated the matter to the CA, which affirmed the pronouncement of the CSCCentral Office and upheld the validity of the upgrading, retitling, and reclassification
scheme in the CHR on the justification that such action is within the ambit of CHR’s
fiscal autonomy.
ISSUE: Can the CHR validly implement an upgrading, reclassification, creation, and
collapsing of plantilla positions in the Commission without the prior approval of the
Department of Budget and Management?
HELD: the petition is GRANTED, the Decision of the CA and its are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The ruling CSC-National Capital Region is REINSTATED. The 3 CHR
Resolutions, without the approval of the DBM are disallowed.
1. RA 6758, An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation and Position Classification
System in the Government and For Other Purposes, or the Salary Standardization
Law, provides that it is the DBM that shall establish and administer a unified
Compensation and Position Classification System.
The disputation of the CA that the CHR is exempt from the long arm of the Salary
Standardization Law is flawed considering that the coverage thereof encompasses the
entire gamut of government offices, sans qualification.
This power to “administer” is not purely ministerial in character as erroneously held
by the CA. The word to administer means to control or regulate in behalf of others; to
direct or superintend the execution, application or conduct of; and to manage or
conduct public affairs, as to administer the government of the state.
2. The regulatory power of the DBM on matters of compensation is encrypted not
only in law, but in jurisprudence as well. In the recent case of PRA v. Buñag, this Court
ruled that compensation, allowances, and other benefits received by PRA officials and
employees without the requisite approval or authority of the DBM are unauthorized
and irregular
In Victorina Cruz v. CA , we held that the DBM has the sole power and discretion to
administer the compensation and position classification system of the national
government.
In Intia, Jr. v. COA the Court held that although the charter of the PPC grants it the
power to fix the compensation and benefits of its employees and exempts PPC from
the coverage of the rules and regulations of the Compensation and Position
Classification Office, by virtue of Section 6 of P.D. No. 1597, the compensation system
established by the PPC is, nonetheless, subject to the review of the DBM.
(It should be emphasized that the review by the DBM of any PPC resolution affecting
the compensation structure of its personnel should not be interpreted to mean that
the DBM can dictate upon the PPC Board of Directors and deprive the latter of its
discretion on the matter. Rather, the DBM’s function is merely to ensure that the
action taken by the Board of Directors complies with the requirements of the law,
specifically, that PPC’s compensation system “conforms as closely as possible with
that provided for under R.A. No. 6758.” )
3. As measured by the foregoing legal and jurisprudential yardsticks, the imprimatur
of the DBM must first be sought prior to implementation of any reclassification or
upgrading of positions in government. This is consonant to the mandate of the DBM
under the RAC of 1987, Section 3, Chapter 1, Title XVII, to wit:
SEC. 3. Powers and Functions. – The Department of Budget and Management shall
assist the President in the preparation of a national resources and expenditures
budget, preparation, execution and control of the National Budget, preparation and
maintenance of accounting systems essential to the budgetary process, achievement
of more economy and efficiency in the management of government operations,
administration of compensation and position classification systems, assessment of
organizational effectiveness and review and evaluation of legislative proposals
having budgetary or organizational implications.
Irrefragably, it is within the turf of the DBM Secretary to disallow the upgrading,
reclassification, and creation of additional plantilla positions in the CHR based on its
finding that such scheme lacks legal justification.
Notably, the CHR itself recognizes the authority of the DBM to deny or approve the
proposed reclassification of positions as evidenced by its three letters to the DBM
requesting approval thereof. As such, it is now estopped from now claiming that the
nod of approval it has previously sought from the DBM is a superfluity
4. The CA incorrectly relied on the pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office that the
CHR is a constitutional commission, and as such enjoys fiscal autonomy.
Palpably, the CA’s Decision was based on the mistaken premise that the CHR belongs
to the species of constitutional commissions. But the Constitution states in no
uncertain terms that only the CSC, the COMELEC, and the COA shall be tagged as
Constitutional Commissions with the appurtenant right to fiscal autonomy.
Along the same vein, the Administrative Code, on Distribution of Powers of
Government, the constitutional commissions shall include only the CSC, the
COMELEC, and the COA, which are granted independence and fiscal autonomy. In
contrast, Chapter 5, Section 29 thereof, is silent on the grant of similar powers to the
other bodies including the CHR. Thus:
SEC. 24. Constitutional Commissions. – The Constitutional Commissions, which shall
be independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and
the Commission on Audit.
SEC. 26. Fiscal Autonomy. – The Constitutional Commissions shall enjoy fiscal
autonomy. The approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly
released.
SEC. 29. Other Bodies. – There shall be in accordance with the Constitution, an Office
of the Ombudsman, a Commission on Human Rights, and independent central
monetary authority, and a national police commission. Likewise, as provided in the
Constitution, Congress may establish an independent economic and planning agency.
From the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code, it is abundantly clear that
the CHR is not among the class of Constitutional Commissions. As expressed in the
oft-repeated maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the express mention of one
person, thing, act or consequence excludes all others. Stated otherwise, expressium
facit cessare tacitum – what is expressed puts an end to what is implied.
Nor is there any legal basis to support the contention that the CHR enjoys fiscal
autonomy. In essence, fiscal autonomy entails freedom from outside control and
limitations, other than those provided by law. It is the freedom to allocate and utilize
funds granted by law, in accordance with law, and pursuant to the wisdom and
dispatch its needs may require from time to time.22 In Blaquera v. Alcala and Bengzon
v. Drilon,23 it is understood that it is only the Judiciary, the CSC, the COA, the
COMELEC, and the Office of the Ombudsman, which enjoy fiscal autonomy.
Neither does the fact that the CHR was admitted as a member by the Constitutional
Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) ipso facto clothed it with fiscal autonomy. Fiscal
autonomy is a constitutional grant, not a tag obtainable by membership.
We note with interest that the special provision under Rep. Act No. 8522, while cited
under the heading of the CHR, did not specifically mention CHR as among those offices
to which the special provision to formulate and implement organizational structures
apply, but merely states its coverage to include Constitutional Commissions and
Offices enjoying fiscal autonomy
All told, the CHR, although admittedly a constitutional creation is, nonetheless, not
included in the genus of offices accorded fiscal autonomy by constitutional or
legislative fiat.
Even assuming en arguendo that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy, we share the stance
of the DBM that the grant of fiscal autonomy notwithstanding, all government offices
must, all the same, kowtow to the Salary Standardization Law. We are of the same
mind with the DBM on its standpoint, thusBeing a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not vest the agency with the
authority to reclassify, upgrade, and create positions without approval of the DBM.
While the members of the Group are authorized to formulate and implement the
organizational structures of their respective offices and determine the compensation
of their personnel, such authority is not absolute and must be exercised within the
parameters of the Unified Position Classification and Compensation System
established under RA 6758 more popularly known as the Compensation
Standardization Law.
5. The most lucid argument against the stand of respondent, however, is the provision
of Rep. Act No. 8522 “that the implementation hereof shall be in accordance with
salary rates, allowances and other benefits authorized under compensation
standardization laws.
OCAMPO V. ABANDO G.R. No. 176830 February 11, 2014
FACTS:
A mass graveyard was found at Sitio Sapang Daco, Barangay Kaulisihan, Inopacan,
Leyte by the43rd Infantry Brigade containing 67 skeletal remains of those believed
to be victims of “Operation Venereal Disease (VD)” by the Communist Party of the
Philippines/ New People’s Army/National Democratic Front (CPP/NPA/NPDF) of the
Philippines. This was done to purge their ranks of suspected military informers.
Members of the Scene of the Crime Operation team conducted forensic crime analysis
to identify the bodies by way of DNA sample. The initial report of the PNP Crime
Laboratory on their identities remained inconclusive, but, in a Special Report, the
Case Secretariat of the Regional and National Inter-Agency Legal Action Group came
up with ten names of possible victims after comparing the testimonies of relatives
and witnesses.
Police Chief Inspector George L. Almaden and Staff Judge Advocate Captain Allan Tiu
sent undated letters to Pros. Vivero, requesting for legal action on the twelve attached
complaint affidavits. These were from relatives of the alleged victims of Operation VD
who all swore that their relatives had been abducted or last seen with members of
the CPP/NPA/NDFP
Charging them with murder, the affidavits were directed to 71 named members of the
group, including the petitioners. Namely, the petitioners were Ocampo, Echanis,
Baylosis and Ladlad who were all pointed out to be members of the Central
Committee that ordered the campaign to be carried out in 1985.
On this basis, Pros. Vivero issued a subpoena requiring them to submit their counteraffidavits and Ocampo complied. However, Echanis and Baylosis did not do so
because allegedly they were not served the copy of a subpoena. As for Ladlad, though
his counsel made formal appearance during the preliminary investigation, he also did
not submit for the same reason as the two.
Pros. Vivero, in a resolution, directed the filing of information for 15 counts of
multiple murder against the 54 named members, including the petitioners. He also
caused some respondents to be used as state witnesses for their testimony is vital to
the prosecution. Said information was filed before RTC Hilongos, Leyte branch 18
presided by Judge Abando.
Prior to receiving the resolution, Ocampo filed an Ex Parte Motion to Set Case for
Clarificatory Hearing. Judge Obando found probable cause and ordered the issuance
of warrants of arrest against them with no recommended bail.
Ocampo went to the Supreme Court by way of special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 and asked for the abovementioned order and the
prosecutor’s resolution to be annulled. He said that a case for rebellion against him
and 44 others was then already pending before RTC Makati and so, the crime of
murder was absorbed by the rebellion in line with the political offense doctrine.
The Court ordered the Solicitor General to comment on the issue and also ordered the
parties to submit their memoranda. From the oral arguments, the Court found that
the single Information charging them all of 15 counts of murder was defective. The
prosecution moved to admit amended and new information, but Judge Abando
suspended the proceedings during the pendency of the case before the Court
Meanwhile, Echanis was arrested and he, along with Baylosis, filed a Motion for
Judicial Reinvestigation/ Determination of Probable Cause with Prayer to Dismiss the
Case Outright and Alternative Prayer to Recall/ Suspend Service of Warrant, but it
was dismissed by Judge Abando. Around this time, Ladlad filed a Motion to
Quash/Dismiss with the RTC Manila.
Echanis and Baylosis moved to reconsider but it was not acted because, as per request
of the DOJ Secretary to change the venue of the trial, the records were transmitted to
RTC Manila. Echanis and Baylosis continued to seek relief from the Supreme Court in
response to Judge Abando’s orders. Echanis also prayed for his release.
Both Ocampo and Echanis were granted provisional release by the Supreme Court
under cash bonds.
As to Ladlad’s Motion to Quash, it was denied by respondent judge and the same
happened to his Motion for Reconsideration. Ladlad sought to annul the latter’s
orders by way of special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.
As to their bail, Ladlad filed an Urgent Motion to Fix Bail whereas Baylosis filed a
Motion to Allow Petitioner to Post Bail which were granted, with no opposition from
the OSG (bec. they’re consultants of the NDFP negotiating team, then having talks with
the GRP peace panel).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners’ right to due process was violated.
HELD:
NO. Petitioners were accorded due process during preliminary investigation and in
the issuance of the warrants of arrest.
A preliminary investigation is "not a casual affair." It is conducted to protect the
innocent from the embarrassment, expense and anxiety of a public trial. While the
right to have a preliminary investigation before trial is statutory rather than
constitutional, it is a substantive right and a component of due process in the
administration of criminal justice
In the context of a preliminary investigation, the right to due process of law entails
the opportunity to be heard. It serves to accord an opportunity for the presentation
of the respondent’s side with regard to the accusation. Afterwards, the investigating
officer shall decide whether the allegations and defenses lead to a reasonable belief
that a crime has been committed, and that it was the respondent who committed it.
Otherwise, the investigating officer is bound to dismiss the complaint.
"The essence of due process is reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit
evidence in support of one's defense." What is proscribed is lack of opportunity to be
heard. Thus, one who has been afforded a chance to present one’s own side of the
story cannot claim denial of due process.
As to the claim of petitioners Echanis and Baylosis that they were denied due process,
we quote the pertinent portion of Prosecutor Vivero’s Resolution, which states:
In connection with the foregoing and pursuant to the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure[,] the respondents were issued and served with Subpoena at their last
known address for them to submit their counter-affidavits and that of their witnesses.
Majority of the respondents did not submit their counter-affidavits because they
could no longer be found in their last known address, per return of the subpoenas. On
the other hand, Saturnino Ocampo Satur, Fides Lim, Maureen Palejaro and Ruben
Manatad submitted their Counter-Affidavits. However, Vicente Ladlad and Jasmin
Jerusalem failed to submit the required Counter Affidavits in spite entry of
appearance by their respective counsels.
Section 3(d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, allows Prosecutor Vivero to resolve the
complaint based on the evidence before him if a respondent could not be subpoenaed.
As long as efforts to reach a respondent were made, and he was given an opportunity
to present countervailing evidence, the preliminary investigation remains valid. The
rule was put in place in order to foil underhanded attempts of a respondent to delay
the prosecution of offenses.In this case, the Resolution stated that efforts were
undertaken to serve subpoenas on the named respondents at their last known
addresses. This is sufficient for due process. It was only because a majority of them
could no longer be found at their last known addresses that they were not served
copies of the complaint and the attached documents or evidence.
Moreover, Petitioner Ladlad, through his counsel, had every opportunity to secure
copies of the complaint after his counsel’s formal entry of appearance and, thereafter,
to participate fully in the preliminary investigation. Instead, he refused to participate.
We have previously cautioned that "litigants represented by counsel should not
expect that all they need to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of their
case."106 Having opted to remain passive during the preliminary investigation,
petitioner Ladlad and his counsel cannot now claim a denial of due process, since
their failure to file a counter-affidavit was of their own doing
As to Ocampo’s claim that he was denied the right to file a motion for reconsideration
or to appeal the Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero due to the 19-day delay in the service
of the Resolution, it must be pointed out that the period for filing a motion for
reconsideration or an appeal to the Secretary of Justice is reckoned from the date of
receipt of the resolution of the prosecutor, not from the date of the resolution. This is
clear from Section 3 of the 2000 National Prosecution Service Rule on Appeal:
Sec. 3. Period to appeal. – The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the resolution, or of the denial of the motion for reconsideration/
reinvestigation if one has been filed within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
assailed resolution. Only one motion for reconsideration shall be allowed. (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, when petitioner Ocampo received the Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero on 12
March 2007,108 the former had until 27 March 2007 within which to file either a
motion for reconsideration before the latter or an appeal before the Secretary of
Justice. Instead, petitioner Ocampo chose to file the instant petition for certiorari
directly before this Court on 16 March 2007.
Republic vs. Sandoval 220 SCRA 124
Facts: Farmer-rallyists marched to Malacanang calling for a genuine land reform
program. There was a marchers-police confrontation which resulted in the death of
12 rallyists and scores were wounded. As a result, then Pres. Aquino issued AO 11
creating the Citizens Mendiola Commission for the purpose of conducting an
investigation. The most significant recommendation of the Commission was for the
heirs of the deceased and wounded victims to be compensated by the government.
Based on such recommendation, the victims of Mendiola massacre filed an action for
damages against the Republic and the military/police officers involved in the
incident.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not there is a valid waiver of immunity
(2) Whether or not the State is liable for damages
Held: The Court held that there was no valid waiver of immunity as claimed by the
petitioners. The recommendation made by the Commission to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased and the victims does not in any way mean that liability attaches to the
State. AO 11 merely states the purpose of the creation of the Commission and,
therefore, whatever is the finding of the Commission only serves as the basis for a
cause of action in the event any party decides to litigate the same. Thus, the
recommendation of the Commission does not in any way bind the State.
The State cannot be made liable because the military/police officers who allegedly
were responsible for the death and injuries suffered by the marchers acted beyond
the scope of their authority. It is a settled rule that the State as a person can commit
no wrong. The military and police officers who were responsible for the atrocities can
be held personally liable for damages as they exceeded their authority, hence, the acts
cannot be considered official.
ABERCA v. VER
FACTS :Task Force Makabansa (TFM) was ordered by General Fabian Ver to conduct
pre-emptive strikes against Communist- Terrorist underground houses. TFM raided
several houses, employing in most cases defectively judicial search warrants, arrested
people without warrant of arrest, denied visitation rights, and interrogated them with
the use of threats and tortures. A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants, stating
that 1) plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry about their detention because the
writ of habeas corpus was suspended; 2) defendants are immune from liability for
acts done in their official duties; 3) there was no cause of action. On Nov 8, 1983, Judge
Fortun granted the motion to dismiss, which prompted plaintiffs to file a MR on Nov
18, 1983. He later inhibited himself and was replaced Judge Lising, who denied the
MR for being filed out of time. Another MR was filed, and was only modified to include
Maj. Aguinaldo and MSgt. Balaba for officers accountable in the said complaint.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not immunity from suit may be invoked?
2. Whether petitioners have the right to question the alleged violation of their rights
in the constitution
3. Whether the superior officers who gave the orders are liable?
HELD: 1. NO, Article 32 of the Civil Code provides a sanction to rights and freedom
enshrined in the constitution. These rights cannot be violated just because of an order
given by a superior. The rule of law must prevail, or else liberty will perish. Even
though they just followed the orders of their superior, these do not authorize them to
disregard the rights of the petitioners, and therefore cannot be considered “acts done
in their official duties”. Article 32 speaks of any public officer or private individual,
and violation of these constitutional rights does not exempt them from responsibility.
2. YES, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus does not prevent petitioners from
claiming damages for the illegal arrest and detention in violation of their
constitutional rights by seeking judicial authority. What the writ suspends is merely
the right of an individual to seek release from detention as a speedy means of
obtaining liberty. It cannot suspend their rights and cause of action for injuries
suffered due to violation of their rights.
3. YES, Article 32 speaks of the liabilities of people who are in direct violation of the
rights stated, as well as people who are indirectly responsible for such acts. In the
case at hand, the superior officers are the ones who gave the order, and can be
considered indirectly responsible. It was also stated in the complaint who were the
ones who directly and indirectly participated in those acts. By filing a motion to
dismiss, they admitted all the facts stated in the complaint.
Burgos vs Esperon GR No. 178497, February 04, 2014
Doctrine:
The Court emphasize that the Court’s role in a writ of Amparo proceeding is merely
to determine whether an enforced disappearance has taken place; to determine who
is responsible or accountable; and to define and impose the appropriate remedies to
address the disappearance.
Facts:
Jeffrey Cabintoy and Elsa Agasang have witnessed on that fateful day of April 28,
2007 the forcible abduction of Jonas Burgos by a group of about seven (7) men and a
woman from the extension portion of Hapag Kainan Restaurant located in Quezon
City.
The Commission on Human Rights (CHR) submitted to the Court its Investigation
Report on the Enforced Disappearance of Jonas Burgos. The CHR finds that the
enforced disappearance of Jonas Burgos had transpired and that his constitutional
rights to life, liberty and security were violated by the Government have been fully
determined. The CHR demonstrated in its investigations resulted in the criminal
prosecution of Lt. Baliaga. Regional Trial Court found probable cause for arbitrary
detention against Lt. Baliaga and ordered his arrest in connection with Jonas’
disappearance.
Based on the finding that Jonas was a victim of enforced disappearance, the Court of
Appeals concluded that the present case falls within the ambit of the Writ of Amparo.
The respondents have not appealed to the court, as provided under Section 19 of the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo. Hence, the petitioner filed an Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex
Abundanti Cautela.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner’s motion should be granted.
Ruling:
No.
After reviewing the newly discovered evidence submitted by the petitioner and
considering all the developments of the case, including the Court of Appeal’s decision
that confirmed the validity of the issuance of the Writ of Amparo in the present case,
the Court resolve to deny the petitioner’s Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti
Cautela.
The Court note and conclude, based on the developments highlighted above, that the
beneficial purpose of the Writ of Amparo has been served in the present case. As the
Court held in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis the writ merely embodies the Court’s directives to
police agencies to undertake specified courses of action to address the enforced
disappearance of an individual. The Writ of Amparo serves both a preventive and a
curative role. It is curative as it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators
through the investigation and remedial action that it directs. The focus is on
procedural curative remedies rather than on the tracking of a specific criminal or the
resolution of administrative liabilities. The unique nature of Amparo proceedings has
led us to define terms or concepts specific to what the proceedings seek to achieve. In
Razon Jr., v. Tagitis, the Court defined what the terms “responsibility” and
“accountability” signify in an Amparo case. The Court said: Responsibility refers to
the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have
participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance,
as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file
the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper
courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that
should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced
disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of
responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the
enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry,
but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation
of the enforced disappearance.
In the present case, while Jonas remains missing, the series of calculated directives
issued by the Court outlined above and the extraordinary diligence the CHR
demonstrated in its investigations resulted in the criminal prosecution of Lt. Baliaga.
The Court take judicial notice of the fact that the Regional Trial Court has already
found probable cause for arbitrary detention against Lt. Baliaga and has ordered his
arrest in connection with Jonas’ disappearance.
The Court emphasize that the Court’s role in a writ of Amparo proceeding is merely
to determine whether an enforced disappearance has taken place; to determine who
is responsible or accountable; and to define and impose the appropriate remedies to
address the disappearance.
As shown above, the beneficial purpose of the Writ of Amparo has been served in the
present case with the CA’s final determination of the persons responsible and
accountable for the enforced disappearance of Jonas and the commencement of
criminal action against Lt. Baliaga. At this stage, criminal, investigation and
prosecution proceedings are already beyond the reach of the Writ of Amparo
proceeding now before us.