DOMINGO NEYPES, ET AL. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 141524 (September 14, 2005)
N.B. I AM ACTUALLY SICK RIGHT NOW AND THIS CASE IS QUITE DIFFICULT TO DIGEST. I
RESEARCHED AND FOUND A GOOD DIGEST (BUT STILL
STILL DIFFICULT TO INTERNALIZE
INTERNALIZE ‘COZ IT
INCLUDEs DATES, PERIODS ETC.). BUT I RESEARCHED ON SOME NOTES ON “NEYPES RULE”
WHICH IS AT THE END OF THIS DIGEST. KINDLY READ THAT FIRST SO THAT YOU WILL
UNDERSTAND THE CONCEPT OF NEYPES RULE BEFORE READING THIS CASE, JUST A
SUGGESTION.- NAOMI
FACTS:
Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance
and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the RTC against the private respondents.
Later, in an order, the trial court dismissed petitioners’ complaint on the ground that the action
had already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March
3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for
reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for
reconsideration which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998,
petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.
On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight
days late. This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998. Via a petition for
certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of
appeal before the CA. In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed
their notice of appeal. They argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run
only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received the final order of the trial court
denying their motion for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27,
1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well within the reglementary period for appeal.
On September 16, 1999, the CA dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal
should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998
order dismissing their complaint. According to the appellate court, the order was the “final
order” appealable under the Rules.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not receipt of a final order triggers the start of the 15-day reglmentary period to
appeal, the February 12, 1998 order dismissing the complaint or the July 1, 1998 order
dismissing the Motion for Reconsideration.
(2) Whether or not petitioners file t heir notice of appeal on time.
HELD:
(1) The July 1, 1998 order dismissing the motion for reconsideration should be deemed as the
final order. In the case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., the trial court declared petitioner
non-suited and accordingly dismissed his complaint. Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, he
filed an omnibus motion to set it aside. When the omnibus motion was filed, 12 days of the 15day period to appeal the order had lapsed. He later on received another order, this time
dismissing his omnibus motion. He then filed his notice of appeal. But this was likewise
dismissed ― for having been filed out of time. The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have
appealed within 15 days after the dismissal of his complaint since this was the final order that
was appealable under the Rules. The SC reversed the trial court and declared that it was the
denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint which
constituted the final order as it was what ended the issues raised there. This pronouncement
was reiterated in the more recent case of Apuyan v. Haldeman et al. where the SC again
considered the order denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration as the final order which
finally disposed of the issues involved in the case. Based on the aforementioned cases, the SC
sustained petitioners’ view that the order dated July 1, 1998 denying their motion for
reconsideration was the final order contemplated in the Rules.
(2) YES. To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days
within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing
a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. Henceforth, t his “fresh period rule” shall
also apply to Rule 40, Rule 42, Rule 43 and Rule 45. The new rule aims to regiment or make the
appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new
trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.
The SC thus held that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period
of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for
reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules
which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order
appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word “or” signifies disassociati on and independence
of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily
implies. Hence, the use of “or” in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be
filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the “final
order,” which we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a
new trial or reconsideration.
Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which shortened the
appeal period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of cases. The original period of
appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the requirement for strict compliance still
applies. The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion
for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court which rendered the
assailed decision is given another opportunity to review the case and, in the process, minimize
and/or rectify any error of judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have
judgments of courts become final at some definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice
fairly.
To recapitulate, a party litigant may e ither file his notice of appeal w ithin 15 days from receipt of
the RTC’s decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the “final order”) denying
his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be
availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory
after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3. Petitioners here filed
their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of the order denying their
motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appeal was well within the
fresh
appeal
period
of
15
days,
as
already
discussed.
IMPORTANT NOTES:
The “FRESH PERIOD RULE” do not apply to Rule 64 (Review of Judgments and Final Orders or
Resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit) because Rule 64 is
derived from the Constitution. It is likewise doubtful whether it will apply to criminal cases.
SOURCE: http://mclaw08.wordpress.com/2009/10/01/neypes-vs-court-of-appeals/
IMPORTANT NOTES:
The Neypes Rule
STATEMENT OF THE RULE
The "Neypes Rule," otherwise known as the “Fresh Period Rule,” states that “a party
litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial
Court’s decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the "final order") denying his
motion for new trial or motion for re consideration.” (Domingo Neypes versus Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 141524 September 14, 2005 )
PURPOSE OF THE RULE
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity
to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within
which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from re ceipt of the order
dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. (supra)
The raison d’être for the "fresh period rule" is to standardize the appeal period provided in the
Rules and do away with the confusion as to w hen the 15-day appeal period should be counted.
Thus, the 15-day period to appeal is no longe r interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial
or motion for reconsideration; litigants today need not concern themselves with counting the
balance of the 15-day period to appeal since the 15-day period is now counted from r eceipt of
the order dismissing a motion for new tr ial or motion for reconsideration or any final order or
resolution. (Judith Yu versus Hon. Rosa Samson-Tatad, G.R. No. 170979, 09 Feb. 2011)
THE RULE PRIOR TO NEYPES
Before the Supreme Court prmulgated Neypes, the rules mandate that t he filing of a motion for
reconsideration interrupts the running of the period to appeal; and that an appeal should be
taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed from. While the
period to file an appeal is counted from the denial of the motion for reconsideration, the
appellant does not have the full fifteen (15) days. The appellant only has the remaining time of
the 15-day appeal period to file the notice of appeal. Thus, some rules on appeals are:
Sec. 39. [B.P. 129] Appeals. – The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards,
judgments, or decisions of any court in all these cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from
the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from. Provided,
however, that in habeas corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be (48) forty-eight hours from
the notice of judgment appealed from. x x x
SEC. 3. [Rule 41] Period of ordinary appeal. - The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days
from the notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is
required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days
from the notice of judgment or final order.
The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No
motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
SEC. 6. [Rule 122] When appeal to be taken. — An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days
from promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from. This period
for perfecting an appeal shall be suspended from the time a motion for new trial or
reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion has been served upon the
accused or his counsel at which time the balance of the period begins to run.
IN WHAT CASES APPLICABLE
`Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the
Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the
Regional Trial Courts to the Court o f Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies31
to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court.32
The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt
of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or
partial) or any final order or resolution. (Neypes, supra)
Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if e ither motion is filed; otherwise, the
decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in
Rule 41, Section 3. (Neypes, supra)
The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion for ne w
trial or motion for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed
decision is given another opportunity to review the case and, in the process, minimize and/or
rectify any error of judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have
judgments of courts become final at some definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice
fairly. (Neypes, supra)
APPLICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES
While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Co urt’s pronouncement of a "fresh
period" to appeal should equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6
of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, for the following reasons:
First, BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on which the Rules of Court is based, makes no
distinction between the periods to appeal in a civil case and in a criminal case. Section 39 of BP
129 categorically states that "[t]he period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards,
judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the
notice of the final order, resolution, awar d, judgment, or decision appealed from." Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. When the law makes no distinction, we (this Court) also
17
ought not to recognize any distinction.
Second, the provisions of Section 3 of R ule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 6
of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, though differently worded, mean ex actly
the same. There is no substantial difference between the two provisions insofar as legal results
are concerned – the appeal period stops running upon the filing of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration and starts to run again upon receipt of the order denying said motion for new
trial or reconsideration. It was this situation that Neypes addressed in civil cases. No reason
exists why this situation in criminal cases cannot be similarly addressed.
Third, while the Court did not consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal period in criminal cases
under Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure since it involved a purely
civil case, it did include Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure o n petitions for review from
the RTCs to the Court of Appeals (CA), and Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
governing appeals by certiorari to this Court, both of which also apply to appeals in criminal
cases, as provided by Section 3 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules o f Criminal Procedure, thus:
SEC. 3. How appeal taken. — x x x x
(b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review under Rule 42.
xxxx
Except as provided in the last paragraph of section 13, Rule 124, all other appeals to the
Supreme Court shall be by petition for r eview on certiorari under Rule 45.
Clearly, if the modes of appeal to the CA (in cases where the RTC exercised its appellate
jurisdiction) and to this Court in civil and criminal cases are the same, no cogent reason exists
why the periods to appeal from the RTC (in the exercise of its original jurisdiction) to the CA in
civil and criminal cases under Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and
Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be treated differently.
Were we to strictly interpret the "fresh period rule" in Neypes and make it applicable only to the
period to appeal in civil cases, we shall effectively foster and encourage an absurd situation
where a litigant in a civil case will have a better right to appeal than an accused in a criminal
case – a situation that gives undue favor to c ivil litigants and unjustly discriminates against the
accused-appellants. It suggests a double standard of treatment when we favor a situation where
property interests are at stake, as against a situation where liberty stands to be prejudiced. We
must emphatically reject this double and unequal standard for being contrary to reason. Over
time, courts have recognized with almost pedantic adherence that what is contrary to reason is
not allowed in law – Quod est inconveniens, aut contra rationem non permissum est in
18
lege. (Judith Yu versus Hon. Rosa Samson-Tatad, G.R. No. 170979, 09 Feb. 2011 )
RETROACTIVE EFFECT
The determinative issue is whether the "fresh period" rule announced in Neypes could
retroactively apply in cases where the period for appeal had lapsed prior to 14 September 2005
when Neypes was promulgated. That question may be answered with the guidance of the
general rule that procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage, there being no vested rights in the rules of
17
procedure. Amendments to procedural rules are procedural or remedial in character as they
do not create new or remove vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or
18
confirmation of rights already existing.
Sps. De los Santos reaffirms these principles and categorically warrants that Neypes bears the
quested retroactive effect, to wit:
Procedural law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and forms of procedure in
order that courts may be able to administer justice. Procedural laws do not come within the
legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of
statues ― they may be given retroactive effect on actions pending and undetermined at the
time of their passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is
adversely affected, insomuch as there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.
The "fresh period rule" is a procedural law as it prescribes a fresh period of 15 days within which
an appeal may be made in the event that the motion for reconsideration is denied by the lower
court. Following the rule on retroactivity of procedural laws, the "fresh period rule" should be
applied to pending actions, such as the present c ase.
Also, to deny herein petitioners the benefit of the "fresh period rule" will amount to injustice, if
not absurdity, since the subject notice of judgment and final order were issued two years later
or in the year 2000, as compared to the notice of judgment and final order in Neypes which
were issued in 1998. It will be incongruous and illogical that parties receiving notices of
judgment and final orders issued in the year 1998 will enjoy the benefit of the "fresh period
19
rule" while those later rulings of the lower courts such as in the instant case, will not.
Notably, the subject incidents in Sps. De los Santos occurred in August 2000, at the same month
as the relevant incidents at bar. There is no reason to adopt herein a rule that is divergent from
that in Sps. De los Santos. (Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. versus Hon. Marietta Homena J. Valencia,
G.R. No. 173942, 25 June 2008 )
NOT INCONSISTENT WITH RULES OF COURT
This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states t hat
the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from.
The use of the disjunctive word "or" signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from
another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies.33 Hence,
the use of "or" in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15
days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the "final order," which we
already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or
reconsideration. (Neypes, supra)
NEYPES RULE NOT APPLIED
Petitioner was charged with and found guilty of perjury. He was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of 4 months and 1 day to 1 year, a period which is considered as a correctional
penalty. Under Article 9 of the Revised Penal Code, light felonies are those infractions of law for
the commission of which the penalty of arresto menor (one to thirty days of imprisonment) or a
fine not exceeding two hundred pesos (P200), or both are imposable. Thus, perjury is not a light
felony or offense contemplated by Rule 120, Sec. 6. It was therefore mandatory for petitioner to
be present at the promulgation of the judgment.
To recall, despite notice, petitioner was absent when the MTCC promulgated its judgment on 25
August 2009. Pursuant to Rule 120, Sec. 6, it is only when the accused is convicted of a light
offense that a promulgation may be pronounced in the prese nce of his counsel or
representative. In case the accused failed to appear on the scheduled date of promulgation
despite notice, and the failure to appear was without justifiable cause, the accused shall lose all
the remedies available in the Rules against the j udgment. One such remedy was the Motion for
Reconsideration of the judgment of the MTCC filed by petitioner on 28 August 2009. Absent a
motion for leave to avail of the remedies against the judgment, the MTCC should not have
entertained petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. Thus, petitioner had only 15 days from 2 5
August 2009 or until 9 September 2009 to file his Motion for Probation. The MTCC thus
committed grave abuse of discretion when it entertained the motion instead of immediately
denying it. xxx
Petitioner, however, did not file a motion for leave to avail himself of the remedies prior to filing
his Motion for Reconsideration. The hearing on the motion for leave would have been the
proper opportunity for the parties to allege and contest whatever cause prevented petitioner
from appearing on 25 August 2009, and whet her that cause was indeed justifiable. If granted,
petitioner would have been allowed to avail himself of other rem edies under the Rules of Court,
including a motion for reconsideration. xxx
As a final point, while we held in Yu v. Samson-Tatad that the rule in Neypes is also applicable to
criminal cases regarding appeals from convictions in criminal cases under Rule 122 of the Rules
of Court, nevertheless, the doctrine is not applicable to this case, considering that petitioner’s
Motion for Probation was filed out of time. (Anselmo de Leon Cuyo versus People of the Phils.,
G.R.
No.
192164
October
12,
2011 )
SOURCE: http://winlawdesigntemplate.blogspot.com/2012/11/the-neypes-rule.html