G.R. No. L-8578 November 17, 1913
US vs. DIRIS
Facts: Fulgencio Seal, who lived in the pueblo of Calauag, Province of Tayabas, received from the railroad company, more than P400 in payment of certain land expropriated by that company, and that the defendant Tomas Olea, a nephew of Fugencio Seal, was present when the money was counted and paid over to his uncle. Thereafter, after Fulgencio Seal left the house leaving his wife in charge of their tienda, the three defendants appeared at the tienda and Eustaquio Siaga engaged the woman in conversation while the other two defendants went upstairs, broke open the trunk, and took the money, amounting to P353, and a receipt for P100. After the discovery of the commission of the crime, The nephew when found admitted the theft of the money and promised that if the uncle would not make any trouble about it he would try and recover it from the other defendants.
At the trial the defendants denied that they were the authors of the crime; Olea and Diris denied that they were present at the house on the morning in question. However, they were convicted for the crime of robbery. On appeal, defendant Eustaquio Siaga, who remained below in the tienda and engaged the woman in conversation while the other defendants went up into the house, should only be held as a complice (accessary before the fact) as defined in the Penal Code, and not as a principal.
Issue: Whether or not defendant Eustaquio Siaga should only be held liable as accomplice?
Held: The defendant Siaga acted concurrently with the other defendants, and must be held to have been present with them aiding and abetting them in the commission of the crime by remaining below and talking with the woman in order to distract her attention from what was going on upstairs. In doing so he was evidently serving as a guard to warn his companions in case there should arise any necessity for giving an alarm. When the other defendants came down out of the house he went away with them.
This court has repeatedly held that one who shares the guilty purpose and aids and abets the commission of a crime by his presence at the time of its perpetration, even though he may not have taken an active part in its material execution, is guilty as a principal. We have also held that one who stands as guard near the place where a crime is committed to keep others away or to warn his companions and fellow conspirators of danger of discovery, takes a direct part in the commission of the crime and is therefore guilty as a principal under article 13 of the Penal Code
People v. Dela Cerna
Facts: Six separate complaints were filed against accused-appellant charging him with rape committed on five separate instances. Irene Dela Cerna recalled that one afternoon when she was only seven years old, her father, appellant herein, beckoned her to come inside the room. Appellant undressed her and made her lie down. Appellant then played with her private parts and touched her vagina with his penis.
Appellant did the same act to Irene many times. After raping her on separate occasions, appellant cautioned Irene not to report to anybody what happened.
Irene eventually revealed the rapes to her two best friends in school, Cheryl and Bernadette.
Bernadette, in turn, told her own mother what Irene divulged. Bernadette’s mother brought her to the
DSWD. Irene subsequently executed an affidavit of desistance and explained that she decided to forgive her father for the sake of her mother and her younger siblings who are dependent upon their father for

support. It was stated therein that it was not her voluntary acts as she was only influenced and forced by the people who came to intercede in her action.
On November 29, 1998, the trial court rendered judgment finding dela Cerna guilty of six counts of rape.
The accused-appellant assails said decision due to insufficiency of evidence. Accused-appellant cannot capitalize on Irene’s affidavit of desistance. Such an affidavit, by and of itself, does not mean that what
Irene previously said was false or the recitals of the affidavit itself are true. On the contrary, the Court has invariably regarded such affidavits as exceedingly unreliable. The reason is because affidavits of retraction can all too easily be secured from poor and ignorant witnesses, usually through intimidation or monetary consideration.
Held
1. We affirm the trial court’s conviction of accused-appellant for the six counts of rape committed
Certain facets of this case, however, need to be carefully threshed out in order to fully administer justice to all parties concerned:
2. Two of the six instances of rape - on January 15, 1989 and December 26, 1993 — occurred before the effectivity of RA 7659 (Death Penalty Law) which took effect only on December 31, 1993. As correctly held by the trial court, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua for each of these two crimes of rape.
3. However, with respect to the four other incidents of rape which were committed after the effectivity of RA 7659, the trial court imposed the extreme penalty of death.
4. Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code was already the pertinent statutory provision prevailing at the time of the latter four rape incidents. It categorized as a “heinous” offense punishable by death the rape of a minor by her own father.
5. Said provision reads: “Art. 335. The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: 1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.”
6. Both circumstances of minority and relationship were alleged in the informations. However, jurisprudence requires that the victim’s minority must not only be specifically alleged in the information but must likewise be established beyond reasonable doubt during trial. The proof of the victim’s age must be indubitable in order to justify the imposition of the death penalty.
7. In this case, the prosecution utterly failed to discharge its burden of proving the minority of the victim beyond reasonable doubt. No single independent proof was offered in court to establish the fact that complainant was below 18 years old at the time of the incidents. Irene merely stated during her direct examination that she was born on August 26, 1982. We find Irene’s casual testimony as to her age insufficient.

8. In sum, the Court affirmed the decision convicting accused-appellant of the crime of rape in the latter four instances but must reduce the penalty of death to reclusion perpetua on account of the prosecution’s failure to satisfactorily prove the qualifying circumstance of minority of the victim.
People vs Pelagio
Pancho Pelagio, Oscar Caymo and Jose Guico... to death for the crime of robbery with homicide Jose
Guico, an ex-convict, and Evelyn Villanueva lived in common law relationship Pancho Pelagio Pancho
Pelagio came to see the spouses Guico and Villanueva. Pelagio's wife had just delivered a child and he wanted to borrow money for the hospital expenses.
Armando Manalang, taking advantage of the said visit, informed Pancho Pelagio of a robbery he,
Manalang, was planning with some other friends who later were revealed by Manalang to be Jose
Guico, Oscar Caymo and Arcadio Balmeo.
Jose Guico's participation in the first meeting is unclear... arch 24, 1955, Pancho Pelagio, Oscar Caymo,
Armando Manalang and Arcadio Balmeo set out for the execution of their... plan Aling Nena's residence
Caymo ordered Manalang to hail and hold a taxi which the latter... did At the gate, however, they failed to find Pancho Pelagio. they found Armando Manalang waiting for them in a taxi. Caymo and Balmeo then rode on it.
When the stranger was very near the taxi already,... Manalang instructed Caymo to shoot at the man as the latter was a police officer. Patrolman Francisco Trinidad of the Pasay Police Department, fell dead. aymo and Balmeo proceeded to a house in Blumentritt where they met Pancho Pelagio... he latter... explained that he had to scamper away before Caymo and Balmeo had gone down because he, Pelagio, saw someone slip out of the house apparently to summon the police.
Issue: WON, Appellant Pancho Pelagio... he should only be convicted for simple robbery and not for robbery with homicide.
Appellant Jose Guico... he cannot justly be convicted for the crime charged.
Held: In summary then, this Court finds appellant Oscar Caymo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of then crime of robbery with homicide attended by the aggravating circumstances, all recited in theinformation and proven at the trial, of nocturnity and use of a motor vehicle without anycompensating mitigating circumstances. On the other hand, appellant Pancho Pelagio is herebydetermined to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple robbery under Article 294, paragraph 5of the Revised Penal Code, attended by the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and recidivism,having been at the time of the trial, as recited in the information and proven at the trial, previouslyconvicted for robbery. There is no mitigating circumstance appreciable in his favor. For bothappellants, therefore, the penalties prescribed by law should be imposed in their maximum period,although appellant Pancho Pelagio is still qualified to avail of the benefits of the IndeterminateSentence Law. For the reasons given above, appellant Jose
Guico should be, as he is herebyacquitted.

People vs Frederico
The accused-appellant was charged with murder Rogelio Fernando, a tricycle driver, and Francisco
Mediona, a metro aide, had an altercation. They appeared to have settled their differences before the
Barangay Chairman.However, a month later, Francisco along with his cousins accused-appellant
Federico Mediona and Ruben Mediona, attacked Fernando in a bakery. Francisco, armed with a knife, proceeded towards the bakery where Rogelio Fernando was. Ruben
(1) Is the accusedappellant a coconspirator in the frustrated murder of Fernando?
1) Yes. The actions of the accused-appellant in arming himself with a sling and darts which he aimed towards the bakery where Fernando and the others were and in blocking the path of Fernando when the latter tried to run away from Francisco establish his concurrence in the criminal purpose of
Francisco, the actual assailant of Fernando.(2) No. The prosecution only established conspiracy to kill only as to Fernando, and not Escala. Conspiracy, just like the crime itself, must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. And the rule has always been that co-conspirators are liable only for acts done pursuant to the conspiracy; for other acts done outside the contemplation of the co-conspirators or which are not the necessary and logical consequence of the intended crime, only Mediona and appellant RodolfoFederico, who both stayed behind, pulled out from their pockets slings with darts and aimed the same towards the bakery, where Rogelio Fernando's group was. Francisco Mediona suddenly stabbed Rogelio Fernando on the left side of the body. Fernando ran away but his path was blocked by
Ruben Mediona and appellant, who aimed their slings and darts at him. Fernando survived as he was timely brought to the hospital after escaping the group. Meanwhile, immediately after he stabbed
Rogelio Fernando, Francisco Mediona instantly turned to Pastor Escala, a companion of Fernando in the bakery, and stabbed him.
(2) Is accusedappellant Federico a co-conspirator in the killing of Escala? the actual perpetrators are liable. In such a case, the dictum that the act of one is the act of all does not hold true anymore. No reason, motive, or intent on the part of Francisco was shown or proved why he would stab Escala. And there is no convincing evidence that the killing of Escala was part of the conspiracy to kill Rogelio Fernando. Neither is there any indication that the accused-appellant was aware that Francisco would attack Escala.
People vs Aguilos
Facts: Edmar Aguilos, Odilon Lagliba y Abregon and appellant Rene Gayot Pilola were charged, together with one Ronnie Diamante , with the murder of Joselito Capa y Rulloda. The information charged the accused of hacking and stabbing the victim while armed with double-bladed knives and a bolo, the accused acting in conspiracy and with treachery and taking advantage of superior strength.
Edmar Aguilos remains at large. Odilon Lagliba was convicted in the lower court and the decision has become final and executory. Ronnie Diamante has died. The lone appellant is Rene Gayot Pilola who pleaded not guilty to the charge.
The fatal incident occurred at around 11:30 p.m at the store of one Elisa Rolan where the victim Joselito and Julian Azul, Jr. were drinking beer. Two of the accused, Edmar Aguilos and Odilon Lagliba, arrived at the store and were invited by Joselito and Julian to join in the drinking spree. An altercation between

Edmar and Julian ensued. Elisa pacified the protagonists and advised them to go home. Joselito and
Julian were about to leave when Edmar and Odilon blocked their way. Edmar took off his eyeglasses and punched Julian in the face. Edmar and Julian ignored her and traded fist blows until they reached Aling
Sotera's store at the end of the street. Joselito tried to placate the protagonists to no avail. Joselito's intervention apparently did not sit well with Odilon. He pulled out his knife with his right hand and stepped down from his perch. He placed his left arm around Joselito's neck, and stabbed the latter.
Ronnie and the appellant Pilola, who were across the street, saw their gangmate
ISSUE : WON Pilola is guilty of murder RULING : Yes. Pilola is GUILTY of murder. • The identity of the person who hit the victim with a hollow block is of de minimis importance. The perceived inconsistency in Elisa's account of events is a minor and collateral detail that does not affect the substance of her testimony, as it even served to strengthen rather than destroy her credibility. No showing of any improper motive on the part of a witness to testify falsely against the accused or to falsely implicate the latter in the commission of the crime - the testimony is worthy of full faith and credence
Minor inconsistencies in the testimony does not impair but even strengthens witness credibility
1. Pilola avers that Elisa is not a credible witness as she contradicted herself when she testified on direct examination that Ronnie struck the head of the victim with a hollow block. However, on crossexamination, she stated that it was Edmar who struck the victim.
2. The identity of the person who hit the victim with a hollow block is of de minimis importance. The victim died because of multiple wounds. The appellant is charged with murder for the killing of the victim with a knife, in conspiracy with the other accused. On this point, Elisa has been consistent in her testimony that Pilola was one of the men who stabbed the victim, the others being Ronnie and Odilon.
3. Moreover, the perceived inconsistency in Elisa's account of events is a minor and collateral detail that does not affect the substance of her testimony, as it even serves to strengthen rather than destroy her credibility.
4. When there is no showing of any improper motive on the part of a witness to testify falsely against the accused or to falsely implicate the latter in the commission of the crime, as in the case at bar, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists, and that the testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.
5. The trial court gave credence and full probative weight to Elisa's testimony. Case law has it that the trial court's calibration of the testimonial evidence of the parties, its assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the probative weight thereof is given high respect, if not conclusive effect, by the appellate court.
Conspiracy may exist even if an offender does not know the identities of the other offenders, and even though he is not aware of all the details of the plan or was not in on the scheme from the beginning

6. There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it.
Conspiracy as a mode of incurring criminal liability must be proved separately from and with the same quantum of proof as the crime itself.
7. Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence. After all, secrecy and concealment are essential features of a successful conspiracy. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a common purpose and design. Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent of each other, were, in fact, connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment.
Odilon stabbing the victim and decided to join the fray. They pulled out their knives, rushed to the scene and stabbed Joselito. Joselito fell in the canal. Odilon and the Pilola fled, while Ronnie went after
Julian and tried to stab him. Julian ran and when he noticed that Ronnie was no longer running after him, Julian stopped and looked back. He saw Ronnie pick up a piece of hollow block and with it bashed
Joselito's head. Not content, Ronnie got a piece of broken bottle and struck Joselito once more. Ronnie then fled from the scene. Joselito died on the spot. Elisa rushed to Joselito's house and informed his wife and brother of the incident.
Appellant Pilola denied stabbing the victim and interposed the defense of alibi. He claimed that at
11pm, he was in the house of his cousin, Julian. He heard a commotion coming from outside and Julian rushed out of the house to find out what was going on. Pilola remained inside the house because he was suffering from ulcer. The following morning, he learned from their neighbor, Elisa Rolan, that Joselito had been stabbed to death.
The trial court found Pilola guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the murder of Joselito and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, the present appeal.
On main, Pilola argues that the prosecution failed to prove that he conspired with Ronnie and Odilon in stabbing the victim to death. He contends that for one to be a conspirator, his participation in the criminal resolution of another must either precede or be concurrent with the criminal acts. He asserts that even if it were true that he was present at the situs criminis and that he stabbed the victim, it was
Odilon who had already decided, and in fact fatally stabbed the victim. He could not have conspired with
Odilon as the incident was only a chance encounter between the victim, the appellant and his coaccused. In the absence of a conspiracy, the appellant cannot be held liable as a principal by direct participation. Elisa could not categorically and positively assert as to what part of the victim's body was hit by whom, and how many times the victim was stabbed by the appellant. He asserts that he is merely an accomplice and not a principal by direct participation.
8. There may be conspiracy even if an offender does not know the identities of the other offenders, and even though he is not aware of all the details of the plan of operation or was not in on the scheme from the beginning. One need only to knowingly contribute his efforts in furtherance of it. One who joins a criminal conspiracy in effect adopts as his own the criminal designs of his co-conspirators.

9. Conspiracy to exist does not require an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the occurrence.
From the legal standpoint, conspiracy exists if, at the time of the commission of the offense, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution. As a rule, the concurrence of wills, which is the essence of conspiracy, may be deduced from the evidence of facts and circumstances, which taken together, indicate that the parties cooperated and labored to the same end
If conspiracy is established, all the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the manner and extent of their participation
10. If conspiracy is established, all the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the manner and extent of their participation since in contemplation of law, the act of one would be the act of all.
Each of the conspirators is the agent of all the others.
11. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the conspiracy.
12. The mere presence of an accused at the situs of the crime will not suffice; mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act without cooperation or agreement to cooperate on the part of the accused is not enough to make him a party to a conspiracy. There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.
Liability as an accomplice
15. Absent conspiracy between two or more offenders, they may be guilty of homicide or murder for the death of the victim, one as a principal by direct participation, and the other as an accomplice, under
Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code:
Art. 18. Accomplices. - Accomplices are the persons who, not being included in Article 17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.
16. To hold a person liable as an accomplice, two elements must concur: (a) the community of criminal design, that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose;
(b) the performance of previous or simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the commission of the crime.
17. Accomplices come to know about the criminal resolution of the principal by direct participation after the principal has reached the decision to commit the felony and only then does the accomplice agree to cooperate in its execution. Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be committed; they merely assent to the plan of the principal by direct participation and cooperate in its accomplishment. However, where one cooperates in the commission of the crime by performing overt

acts which by themselves are acts of execution, he is a principal by direct participation, and not merely an accomplice.
People vs Ong Chiat Lay
Facts: Appellant, Ong Ban Hua and Kua Sing were charged by the provincial fiscal of Zamboanga with having feloniously burned a building in which was located a store belonging to the applicant. They entered a plea of not guilty. Ong Ban Ha and Kua Sing were acquitted while appellant was found guilty of the crime of arson and sentenced to imprisonment and to pay damages.
Issues on Appeal: 1. The lower court erred in holding that the evidence presented against the accused s sufficient to establish the corpus delicti, namely, that the crime of arson had been committed. 2. The lower court erred in holding that the evidence presented against the accused is sufficient to establish his guilt of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.
Held: Appeal granted. Appellant acquitted. In the instant case, it is not claimed that the appellant had taken a direct part in the burning of the building. He was prosecuted on the theory that he induced his said codefendants to set fire to the building. Hence, the three were charged jointly on an information alleging conspiracy among them. This allegation however has been negative by the acquittal of appellant‘s codefendants. The same may be said with regard to the theory that the appellant induced his codefendants to commit the crime for it seems clear that one cannot be held guilty of inducing the commission of the crime without showing that the crime was indeed done by another. A conviction for the crime could not be had unless corpus delicti is first established. It may be proved by circumstantial evidence. There must be from all the circumstances a combination of evidence which in the ordinary and natural course of things, leaves no room for reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused. The acquittal of his codefendants is not only consistent with the hypothesis that the appellant is innocent but is inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is guilty
US vs Indanan
An appeal from a judgment convicting the appellant of the crime of murder and sentencing him to be hanged.
Pangfa Indanan, accused is the headman of Parang. On Mar. 24, 1912, Indanan ordered the killing of
Sariol to his men Akiran,Kalyakan & Suhuri in the Chinese Cemetery asserting that Indanan had an order to that effect from the governor. The CFI found Indanan guilty of the crime of murder & sentencing him to be hanged
Issue: WON Indanan is guilty of murder by inducement?
Held: YES. Art13(2), of the Penal Code declares those to be principals in a crime "who directly force or induce others to commit it."
Commenting upon this paragraph, Viada says:
They force another to commit a crime who physically by actual force or grave fear, for example, with a pistol in hand or by any other threatening means, oblige another to commit the crime. In our commentary on par. 9 of A8 (page 28),we have already said that he who suffers violence acts w/o will & against his will, is no more than an instrument, & therefore is guilty of no wrong. The real culprits in

such case, the only guilty persons, are those who use the violence, those who force the other to commit the crime.
One is induced directly to commit a crime either by command, or for a consideration, or by any other similar act w/c constitutes the real & moving cause of the crime & w/c was done for the purpose of inducing such criminal act & was sufficient for that purpose. We’ve already seen in our commentary on par. 12 of A8 that the 1 who physically commits the crime may escape criminal responsibility by showing that he acted w/ due obedience to an order; in such case the criminal responsibility falls entirely upon the 1 who orders, i.e., upon him who by his commands has directly induced the other to commit the act.
But in case the obedience of the inferior isn’t due to the superior & thus not necessary, & doesn’t, thus, exempt him from criminal responsibility as the physical author of the crime, he who thus, by his command, directly induced him to the criminal act is considered by the law also as principal in the crime.
The pacto by virtue of w/c 1 purchases for a consideration the hand w/commits the crime makes him who gives, promises, or offers the consideration the principal in the crime by direct inducement, because w/o such offer or promise the criminal act would never have been committed. But this doesn’t mean that the1 who actually commits the crime by reason of such promise, remuneration or reward is exempted from criminal responsibility; on the contrary, such circumstance constitutes an aggravation of his crime.
We have heretofore said that in addition to the precepto & the pacto there are similar means by w/c another may be induced to commit a crime w/c also make the 1 who offers the inducement the principal in the crime by virtue of the provisions of A13(2). But it must be borne in mind that these acts of inducement do not consist in simple advice or counsel given before the act is committed, or in simple words uttered at the time the act was committed. Such advice & such words constitute undoubtedly an evil act, an inducement condemned by the moral law; but in order that, under the provisions of the
Code, such act can be considered direct inducement, it is necessary that such advice or such words have a great dominance & great influence over the person who acts; it is necessary that they beas direct, as efficacious, as powerful as physical or moral coercion or as violence itself.
People vs Kiichi Omine
Facts: Defendants appeal from a decision of the CFI finding them guilty of frust rated homicide, w/ the
AC that advantage was taken of their superior strength,& sentencing them each to suffer an IS from 6 yrs of prision correccional to 12 yrs of prision mayor. Defendants Eduardo Autor, Luis Ladion and
Agapito Cortesano were working under co-defendant Kiichi Omine, the overseer or manager of the hemp plantation owned by Angel Pulido. The 4 defendants lived together in a house on the plantation.
Kiichi Omine asked Angel Pulido permission to open a new
Issue : WON Kiichi Omine is guilty of murder by inducement?
Held: Although it is alleged that Kiichi Omine uttered words of inducement to Eduardo Autor, it would be i nsufficient to make him a principal by induction. Eduardo Autor though working under the direction of Omine was still being paid by Pulido. Moreover, it is necessary that inducement be made directly w/ the intentionof procuring the commission of the crime and that such inducement be thedetermining cause of the commission of the crime. It must be precede the act induced and must be so influential in producing the criminal act that w/o it the act wouldn’t have been performed. Moreover, as words of

direct inducement, it is essential that such advice or words have great dominance and great influence over the person who acts, that they be as direct, as efficacious, as powerful as physical or moral coercion or as violence itself. Hence, the 3 road through the plantation. Acdg to Omine, Pulido did give his permission that’s why he began working on the new road. But acdg to Pulido, he refused to grant this request because there was already an unfinished road. As Pulido and his son along w/ 2 others were returning home from a cockpit, they noticed that a considerable number of hemp plants were destroyed by the construction of the new road. Angered by this, they went to the defendants’ house and there happened a violent altercation resulting to the owner Pulido’s death from a wound by a bolo struck in his breast. co-defendants of Autor are not responsible for the injury inflicted by him on Angel Pulido. Judging from the nature of the wound, w/c was abt 11 inches in length, it is probable that it was caused by the point of the bolo on a downward stroke. It was not a stab wound, and was probably given during a commotion and w/o being aimed at any particular part of the body. Moreover, as Autor struck the offended only once, it is indicative that it was not his intention to take the offended party’s life.
Wherefore, Eduardo Autor is guilty of lesiones graves w/ a sentence of 1yr 8 mos & 21 days of prision correccional, since the offended party was incapacitated for the performance of his usual work for a period of more than 90 days, and not of frustrated homicide. The rest of the co-defendants are acquitted.
US vs Lim Buanco
Facts: Luciano de los Reyes was employed as bookkeeper and check registry clerk in Banco Espa n ol-
Filipino. It is his duty to inspect checks and to determine if it has sufficient balance. He was also required to indorse upon each check, if it was entitled to payment, the words "Corriente, P.O. Luciano de los
Reyes." While Lim Buanco is a client of the said bank and drew large sums of money therefrom. A conspiracy existed between the two for the withdrawal of funds by Lim Buanco regardless whether he had any funds in his account. De los Reyes manipulated the books of the bank to show that Lim Buanco had no apparent credit balance where in fact indebted a large amount of money. The two accused were charged and convicted of the crime of estafa.
Issue: Whether or not there the accused was a principal by indispensable cooperation?
Ruling:Yes. Even if it were true that the defendants had been charged and convicted of conspiracy, the plea of former jeopardy would not be good as against a prosecution for one of several crimes, each distinct from the other, committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. Where several acts are done in pursuance of a conspiracy, each act being distinct from the other, the fact that they are in fact done in pursuance of a conspiracy does not make one act the "same offense" as the other.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court.

People vs Madali
Facts:
• An appeal from the decision of the RTC Branch 81 of Romblon, Romblon finding accused-appellants guilty of the murder of Reynaldo M. Abrenica and sentencing each of them to reclusion perpetua. The body of Reynaldo was found by his wife on the landing of the stairs of their house. An autopsy conducted by Dr. Villaseñor of the PNP Crime Laboratory yielded to the conclusion that the cause of death is intracranial hemorrhage as a result of traumatic head injury.
• Three years after Reynaldo’s death, the case was filed after an alleged eyewitness, Mercy Villamor, surfaced and implicated the accused-appellants. Based on the testimony of this witness, the accusedappellants were found guilty in the aforementioned decision.
• The accused-appellants, in their appeal, alleged that the trial court erred in failing to resolve doubts and discrepancies in its findings of fact in favor of the accused and that the court erred in finding credible the testimonies of Mercy Villamor and Dr. Villaseñor.
• The complainant filed a Motion for Time to File Brief separate from that which the OSG would file, by way of an answer to the brief of accused-appellants. This motion was denied. The OSG subsequently filed a Manifestation recommending the acquittal of accused-appellants. In view of the position taken by the OSG, complainant filed a Memorandum for the Private Complainant (after filing a Manifestation and
Motion to File Brief) which was noted by the Court.
Issue: Whether or not there the accused was a principal by indispensable cooperation?
Held: Miaka messenger
People vs Nierra
Facts: Accused: Felicisimo Doblen, Vicente Rojas, the spouses Paciano Nierra and Gaudencia Nierra and he deceased Julianna Nierra. The two were competitors in the businesses of launch transportation and the sale of soft drinks. Paciano sold Pepsi and Juliana sold cocacola; Paciano was the owner of two launches, Sylvania I and II, while Juliana was the owner of Elsa I & II. who escaped from Davao Penal Colony, to Paciano. front of Gaudencia Nierra and was confirmed by her as well. his friend Vicente Rojas to act as lookout on the night of the killing the scene of the crime o Gaudencia was stationed near the house of Maning Desinorio, 18 steps away from the scene o Paciano was near the house of Juanito Desinorio, 27 steps away from the scene
(houses of Desinorios were separated from the house of Juliana by an alley) o Misa was near a

warehouse about 5steps from the scene of the crime near the back of Juliana‘s house where, as Misa observed some nights before, she used to answer the call of nature o Between 7 to 8 that night, Juliana went to the beach where she was accustomed to void and when she squatted, Misa unexpectedly appeared behind her, held her hair, thus tilting her face, and while in that position he inserted the pistol into her mouth and fired it o Paciano and Gaudencia witnessed the actual killing sion admitting the killing of Juliana Nierra and implicating the other accused. He also testified at the preliminary investigation
Yes. Doblen and Rojas were convicted a
Nierra and delivering the murder weapon to Misa. He was not present at the scene of the crime. ourt situations, having community of design with the principal does not prevent a malefactor from being regarded as an accomplice if his role in the perpetration of the homicide or murder was, relatively speaking, of a minor character
People vs Doble
FACTS: Late in the night of June 13, 1966, 10 men, almost all heavily armed w/ pistols, carbines and thompsons, left the shores of Manila in a motor banca & proceeded to Navotas,Rizal to rob the beachbank Prudential Bank & Trust Co. Said bank wad an unusual banking hours, open from midnight till
8AM. Once docked in Navotas and taking advantage of the darkness of the night, 8 men disembarked from the banca and proceeded to their mission. Once inside, they started firing at the bank‘s ceiling, walls & door of the vault. The 8 men then returned to the waiting motor banca w/ about P10.5K & sped away. As a result of the shooting, many people got killed & injured. Among those who got killed were agents of the law. Only 5 of the 10 men were brought to trial, the rest still remain at large. 2 of the 5 accused were acquitted. It is only Cresencio Doble, Simeon Doble and Antonio Romaquin appealing in the charge of bank robbery committed in band, w/ multiple homicide, multiple frustrated homicide and assault upon agents of persons in authority.
Issue: WON the accused is liable for accomplices
Held: An accomplice is one who, not being principal as defined in Art 17 RPC, cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts. There must be a community of unlawful purpose between the principal and accomplice and assistance knowingly and intentionally given to supply material and moral aid in the consummation of the offense. In this case, the appellants‘ cooperation is like that of a driver of a car used for abduction w/c makes the driver a mere accomplice.
But it isn‘t established by evidence that in the mtg held in the house of Simeon that they all agreed to kill and not just rob. The finding that appellants are liable as mere accomplices may appear too lenient but evidence fails to establish their conspiracy w/ the real malefactors who actually robbed the bank and killed several people. Wherefore, Doble & Romaquin are guilty beyond reasonable doubt as accomplices for the crime of robbery in band. The penalty imposable upon appellants is prision mayor min. The commission of the crime was aggr by nighttime & the use of a motorized banca. There being

no MC, both appellants should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of prision correccional from 5 yrs, 4 mos, 21 days to 8 yrs of prision mayor as maximum.
People vs Doctolero
FACTS:
• Accused­appellants Ludovico Doctolero and his brothers, Conrado and Virgilio Doctolero, charged with and convicted of the crime of multiple murder and unspecified physical injuries. Ludovico
Doctolero guilty as principal, and his co­accused Conrado Doctolero and Virgilio Doctolero guilty as accomplices.
• Ludovico Doctolero is sentenced to suffer the penalty of three (3) LIFE IMPRISONMENTS
• (CADENA PERPETUA) and the additional penalty of 4 Months and 1 Day to 6 Months of arresto mayor, for inflicting slight physical injury.
• Conrado and Virgilio are sentenced to suffer the penalty of 10 years and 1 Day of prision mayor to 17 Years and 4 months of reclusion temporal, for the death of Epifania Escosio; the penalty
• of 10 Years and 1 Day of prision mayor to 17 Years and 4 Months of reclusion temporal, for the death of Lolita de Guzman Oviedo: the penalty of 10 Years and 1 Day of prision mayor to 17 Years and 4
Months of reclusion temporal, for the death of Marcelo Doctolero; and the additional penalty of 2
• Months and 1 Day to 4 Months of arresto mayor for the slight physical injury .
• According to Marcial Sagun (witness), at about 6:30 in the evening of November 8, 1970, Marcial
Sagun, Maria Sagun(wife), Lolita Oviedo and Antonio Oviedo (Maria’s brother) met the accused Ludovico
Doctolero at the crossing of the road in Barrio Bindo while on their way home. Ludovico Doctolero, without warning and without cause or reason, held the left shoulder of Marcial Sagun with his left hand and struck Marcial Sagun with a bolo. Marcial evaded the blow and wrestled with Ludovico Doctolero for the possession of bolo.
• According to Pacienca Diamoy (Marcial Sagun’s sister, witness), she saw Conrado Doctolero and
Virgilio Doctolero throw stones at Marcial Sagun’s house. Meanwhile, Ludovico Doctolero shouted for the man in the house to come out. At about that time, Marcelo Doctolero, uncle of the three accused
(their father’s half-brother), told the three accused to be patient and to forget but the accused replied,
“VULVA of your mother, we will also kill you.” They struck Marcelo Doctolero several times with their bolos. Antionio Doctolero, the father of the accused, arrived. He also struck Marcelo Doctolero with a bolo on the head. Marcelo Doctolero fell and the accused ran away.
• According to Ludovico Doctolero, while he was at the crossing of the road, Antonio Oviedo struck him first with bolo which he was able to evade. Marcial Sagun and Ludovico Doctolero also unsheathed their bolos. Lolita Oviedo and Maria Sagun hit Ludovico Doctolero’s back. Realizing the he could not fight both Marcial Sagun and Antonio Oviedo, Ludovico tried to escape by boloing Maria
Oviedo who he hit at the back. He reported the incident to his father and asked his father to look after his children and left. He intended to go to his house but he passed by Marcial Sagun’s house. His blood boiled. When he learned that Marcial Sagun was not home, he went upstairs to Ask Epifania Escosio

who informed him that Marcial Sagun went towards South. When he was about to leave, Epifania
Escosio hit him at the back of his neck causing him to see darkness and boloed her several times.
Ludovico Doctolero went downstairs and waited for Marcial Sagun. However, Marcelo Doctolero arrived and hit him in the shoulder but because Ludovico tried to evade, he was hit at his back. Ludovico
Doctolero thern boloed him several times.
• him.
It was alleged that in doing these crimes, Ludovico’s brothers (Conrado and Virgilio) were with
• While this petition was pending, Ludovico Doctolero withdre his appeal on May 17, 1976. Also, co-accused Virgilio Doctolero died on October 22, 1983.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the trial court erred in finding Conrado Doctolero as an accomplice in the commission of crime charged. (YES)
HOLDING:
1. YES, the trial court correctly found that the appellant Conrado Doctolero participated as an accomplice.
It was alleged in the testimony of the witness that Conrado together with Virgilio were also in the crime scene watching their brother Ludovico Doctolero do the crimes. The SC held that where one goes with the principal, the former supplied the criminals with material and moral aid making him guilty as accomplice. It held further that one can be an accomplice even if he did not know of the actual crime intended by the principal provided that he was aware that it was an illicit act.
In US v. De Jesus, accomplices therein consented to help in the commission of forcible abduction, and they were responsible for the resulting homicide even if the purpose of the principal to commit homicide was unknown to the accomplices.
Nonetheless, there being a doubt exist, the court should favor the milder form of liability or responsibility which is that of being mere accomplices and not conspirators.
People vs Watima
People vs Talingdan
Facts:
Teresa Domogma was the supposed wife of the deceased Bernardo Bagabag No certificate or any other proof of their marriage could be presented by the prosecution They lived with their children in Sobosob,
Salapadan, Abra Their relationship had been strained and beset with troubles for Teresa had deserted her family home a couple of times and each time Bernardo took time out to look for her
On 2 different occasions, appellant Nemesis Talingdan has visited Teresa in their house while Bernardo was out at work, and during those visits Teresa had made Corazon, their then 12-year old daughter to go down the house and leave them Bernardo had gotten wind that an illicit relationship was going on

between Talingdan and Teresa About a month before Bernardo was killed, Teresa had again left their house and did not come back for a period of more than 3 weeks, and Bernardo came to know later that she and Talingdan were seen together in the town of Tayum Abra during that time Just two days before
Bernardo was killed (Thursday), Bernardo and Theresa had a violent quarrel; Bernardo slapped Theresa several times, resulting in Theresa seeking the help of the police
Accused Talingdan, a policeman, came armed to the vicinity of Bernardo's house and called him to come down; Bernardo ignored him; Talingdan instead left and warned Bernardo that someday he would kill him On Saturday, June 24, 1967, Bernardo was gunned down in his house The defendants' and
Corazon's accounts of what happened had variations
Issue: Whether or not Teresa Domogma is an accessory to Bernardo's murder
Held: Yes. She is an accessory to Bernardo's murder.
Ratio: The court believed Corazon's testimony.
It is true that proof of her direct participation in the conspiracy is not beyond reasonable doubt; she cannot have the same liability as her co-appellants. She had no hand in the actual shooting. It is also not clear if she helped directly in the planning and preparation thereof. But the court is convinced that she knew it was going to be done and did not object.
There is in the record morally convincing proof that she is at the very least an accessory to the offense committed.
She did not only order her daughter not to reveal what she knew to anyone, she also claimed to have no suspects in mind when the peace officers came into their house later to investigate
Whereas before the actual shooting she was more or less passive in her attitude regarding the conspiracy, after Bernardo was killed, she became active in her cooperation with her co-appellants
These acts constitute "concealing or assisting in the escape of the principal in the crime"
Facts:
The accused Cirilo Saludes slept in the house of his compadre accused Jorge Taer at Datag, Garcia-
Hernandez, Bohol, whereat he was benighted. At about 2:00 o'clock dawn, December 6, 1981, accused
Emilio Namocatcat and Mario Cago arrived at Taer's house with two (2) male carabaos owned by and which Namocatcat wanted Taer to tend. The said carabaos were left at Taer's place.
Thereafter, Tirso Dalde and Eladio Palaca of Lantang, Valencia Bohol discovered that their respective male carabaos, 3 to 4 years old, were missing. After searching in vain, they found their missing carabaos tied to a bamboo thicket near the house accused Taer.
Thereafter, a case was filed against the Jorge Taer, Cirilo Saludes and Mario Cago for conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping with each other, with the intent of gain and without the consent of the owner thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and lead away two (2) male carabaos with the total value of FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (P4,000.00), Philippine
Currency, belonging to and owned by Tirso Dalde and Eladio Palaca. A judgment was rendered against

the the said accused. On appeal, Taer contended that the extent of his participation did not go beyond the participation of the original defendants Cirilo Saludes and Mario Cago.
Issue: Whether or not Taer is an accessory
Held: Yes. Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code states:
Accessories are those who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime, and without having participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission in any of the following manners:
1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime; 11 xxx xxx xxx
Person who received any property from another, and used it, knowing that the same property had been stolen is guilty as an accessory because he is profiting by the effects of the crime." By employing the two carabaos in his farm, Taer was profiting by the objects of the theft.
Dizon-Pamintuan vs People
Tan vs People
Enrile vs Salazar
On February 27, 1990, Senator Enrile was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued on the same day by
Judge Salazar charging Enrile, together with the spouses Panlilio (the only reason they are included is because they served food at the Enrile household!) and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila, without bail, none having been recommended in the information and none fixed in the arrest warrant. Hence, Senator Enrile filed a petition for habeas corpus.
The prosecution alleges that Enrile‘s case does not fall within the Hernandez ruling because: 1. the information in Hernandez charged murders and other common crimes committed as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion, whereas the information against Sen. Enrile et al. charged murder and frustrated murder committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, of rebellion 2. there is a distinction between the complex crime ("delito complejo") arising from an offense being a necessary means for committing another, which is referred to in the second clause of Article 48, RPC, and is the subject of the Hernandez ruling, and the compound crime ("delito compuesto") arising from a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave offenses referred to in the first clause of the same paragraph, with which Hernandez was not concerned and to which, therefore, it should not apply
ISSUES: 1. Is the Hernandez ruling still good law? YES. 2.
RATIO: First Issue In the view of the majority, the ruling remains good law, its substantive and logical bases have withstood all subsequent challenges and no new ones are presented here persuasive enough to warrant a complete reversal. Two other options were presented (and rejected): 1. abandon the
Hernandez ruling 2. hold Hernandez applicable only to offenses committed in furtherance, or as a

necessary means for the commission, of rebellion, but not to acts committed in the course of a rebellion which also constitute "common" crimes of grave or less grave character
This view is reinforced by the fact that not too long ago, President Aquino, exercising her powers under the 1986 Freedom Constitution, saw fit to repeal, Presidential Decree No. 942 of the former regime which precisely sought to nullify or neutralize Hernandez by enacting a new provision (Art. 142-A) into the Revised Penal Code. The President in effect by legislative fiat reinstated Hernandez as binding doctrine with the effect of law.
Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.
Read in the context of Hernandez, the information does indeed charge the petitioner with a crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion. The information filed against the petitioner does in fact charge an offense. Disregarding the objectionable phrasing that would complex rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, that indictment is to be read as charging simple rebellion.
HELD: The Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People v. Hernandez, the questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda
Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence said petitioners are entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right. The proceedings are remanded to respondent judge to fix the amount of bail.
Napolis vs CA
People vs Salvilla
FACTS: Accused: Bienvenido Salvilla, Reynaldo, Ronaldo and Simplicio (all Canasares) Victims: Severino
Choco, owner of New Iloilo Lumber Yard, his daughters Mary and Mimie (minor, 15 years old), Rodita
Habiero, employee
On April 12, 1986, noon time, the four accused staged a robbery at New Iloilo Lumber Yard. They met
Rodita, announced the holdup, and made her go back to the office. In the office, Salvilla threatens Choco and his daughters with a gun, asking for money. Choco then instructs his daughter Mary to get a paper bag, where he place P 20,000 cash, handing it to Salvilla. As Salvilla pleaded the robbers now leave,
Canasares took his wallet and wristwatch.
At 2:00 PM, hostages were allowed to eat. Salvilla told Choco to produce P 100,000. Choco answered he could not do so because it was a Saturday and banks were closed. In the meantime, police and military had surrounded the place. Major Melquiades B. Sequio, Station Commander of the INP of Iloilo, negotiated release using a loudspeaker. With the refusal of accused, OIC Mayor Rosa Caram arrives at the scene and in negotiations lasting four hours, she offered them P 50,000 instead of the P 100,000 and coaster, with raincoats, asked for by the accused. The accused agreed to exchange Rodita, accompanied by Mary, for the P 50,000. The exchange took place but Mary was herded back into the office.

After ultimatums were given and accused wouldn‘t budge, police and military moved in an offensive assault, which resulted in the rescue of the hostages and arrest of the four robbers. Mimie and Mary were injured though, with Mary suffering a ―macerated right lower extremity just below the knee,‖ which later on had to be amputated.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is liable for complex crimes.
HELD: Yes. The Court affirms the decision of the RTC, the accused are guilty of Robbery with Serious
Physical Injuries and Serious Illegal Detention.
Salvilla et al are guilty of a complex crime because the Illegal Detention facilitated in the Robbery and was a deliberate means of extortion for an additional amount. Unlike Astor, wherein hostages were held merely to forestall their capture by the police.
Lastly, Salvilla‘s ―surrender‖ is not a mitigating circumstance but an act of desperation since the police were already closing in.
People vs Valdez
Accused-appellant Rolando Valdez seeks reversal of the judgment of conviction promulgated by the
Regional Trial Court sentencing him to death for the complex crime of Multiple Murder with Double
Frustrated Murder, and likewise separately sentencing him to suffer the prison term of reclusion perpetua for the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition (Presidential Decree No. 1866).
The information alleges that the accused shot Ramon Garcia, Jr., Jean Marie Garcia, Willy Acosta and
Sandra Montano, which caused their deaths, and seriously injured William Montano and Randy Tibule.
The trial court convicted the accused of the crimes charged.
ISSUE: Whether or not the the Accused is liable for complex crimes
Ruling: Yes. The use of an unlicensed firearm in the case at bar cannot be considered as a special aggravating circumstance in Criminal Case No. U-8747 (for Complex Crime of Multiple Murder), also under review herein, because it will unduly raise the penalty for the four counts of murder from four reclusion perpetua to that of four-fold death. Insofar as this particular provision of Republic Act No.
8294 is not beneficial to accused-appellant because it unduly aggravates the crime, this new law will not be given retroactive application, lest it might acquire the character of an ex-post facto law.
Ivler vs Modesto-San Pedro
People vs Garcia
Facts: According to the prosecution, during the afternoon of Jan. 06, 2000, the 5 yr old niece of the accused, while playing with some friends outside their house was called by the former and brought in to the house. They went to the room of the accused and the latter removed the clothes of the child. After the accused removed his clothes and inserted his penis into the child’s vagina. The latter was unable to cry because she was threatened by the accused. On the same day, the grandmother noticed something wrong when she tried to bathe the child but the latter refused to be touched on her private part because it was painful. The grandmother suspected that the child was abused, brought the latter to the

house of her sister-in-law where the child confessed what happened. The child was later on subjected for examination but the results showed that her hymen was not broken and that there were no signs of extragenital injuries. On the other hand, the accused interposed the defense of alibi hereby saying that he was fixing a water pump during the alleged time of the event. RTC convicted the accused for the crime of rape. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC which led the accused to file an appeal interposing that the courts erred in convicting him despite the fact that the medico-legal shows there were no swelling on the victim’s private part and the hymen was not broken.
Issue: Whether the crime of rape has been sufficiently proven to convict the accused?
Ruling: The court ruled in the affirmative. The Court stated that the lack of lacerated wounds does not negate sexual intercourse. A freshly broken hymen is not an essential element of rape. Even the fact that the hymen of the victim is still intact does not rule out rape since research show that the hymen may not be torn despite repeated coitus. In any case, for rape to be consummated, full penetration is not necessary. It suffices that there is proof of the entrance of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum of the female organ.
The court gave credence to the testimony of the victim. It stated that a rape victim who testifies in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner, and remains consistent, is a credible witness.
People vs Alfeche
Batulanon vs People
Batulanon is guilty of 3 counts of Falsification of Private Document and Estafa. Medallos testimony is credible as he is familiar with the handwriting of Batulanon. Under Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code, the acts that may constitute falsification are the following:1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature, or rubric;2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate; 3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them;4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts; 5. Altering true dates; 6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning;7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original document when no such original exists, or including in such copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original; or;8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry, or official book. In Criminal case falsifying
Dennis Batulanon signature fall within the elements of conversion or misappropriation under Art 315
Estafa . The essence of falsification is the act of making untruthful or false statements, which is not attendant in this case
ISSUE: Whether or not batulanon is liable for common elements
APPLICATION: Complainant Polomolok Credit Cooperative Incorporated (PCCI) employed Batulanon as its Cashier and in charge of receiving deposits from and releasing loans to the member of the cooperative. During an audit conducted in December 1982, certain irregularities concerning the release of loans were discovered. Records shows Omadlao, Oroacion and Arroyo made it appear that they obtained a loan and received its proceeds when they did not in fact secure said loan nor receive the amounts reflected in the cash voucher in addition, some Dennis Butalanon received a load, in fact that it

was her 3 year old son for reason that she is no longer qualified for another loan and under company policy no minor shall be allowed to apply for the load.
People vs De Leon
Facts: In the morning of December 21, 1925 Vicente De Leon entered the yard of Vicente Magat‘s house on Domingo Santiago St., Manila and took two game roosters. One belonged to Diego Magat and other to Ignacio Nicolas. The Municipal court charged him with two counts of theft, one for the theft of
Magat‘s rooster and another for the theft of Nicolas‘ rooster. When the case was elevated at the CFI of
Manila, he was convicted of just one count of theft. The SC upheld the CFI‘s holding.
Issue: WON appellant is guilty of one count of theft or two separate counts of theft
Held: Guilty of one count of theft. ―The act of taking the roosters at the same place and at the same occasion cannot give rise to two crimes having an independent existence of their own, because there are not two distinct appropriations nor two intentions that characterize the separate crimes.‖
There being only one criminal purpose in the taking of the two roosters, only one crime was committed.
The fact that two roosters belonged to two different persons was merely accidental.
Santiago vs Garchitorena
FACTS:Petitioner Miriam Defensor-Santiago, the then the Commission of Immigration and Deportation
(CID) Commissioner, was charged in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan with violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, allegedly committed by her favoring "unqualified" aliens with the benefits of the Alien Legalization
Program wherein Santiago, approved the application for legalization of the stay of about 32 aliens who arrived in the Philippines in violation of Executive Order No. 324 which does not allow the legalization of the same, thereby causing undue injury to the government and giving unwarranted benefits and advantages to said aliens in the discharge of the official and administrative functions of said accused.
She filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with
Criminal Case No. 16698 on the ground that said case was intended solely to harass her as she was then a presidential candidate. She also moved to inhibit Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Garchitorena from the case and to defer her arraignment pending action on her motion to inhibit. Her motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan.
Santiago filed a motion for a bill of particulars stating that while the information alleged that she had approved the application for legalization of "aliens" and gave them indirect benefits and advantages it lacked a list of the favored aliens. According to her, unless she was furnished with the names and identities of the aliens, she could not properly plead and prepare for trial.
She contended in this case that the public prosecutors filed 32 Amended Informations against her, after manifesting to the Sandiganbayan that they would only file one amended information. She also questioned in her opposition to the motion to admit the 32 Amended Informations, the splitting of the original information.
She even claimed that the Amended Informations filed against her did not charge any offense punishable under Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 because the official acts complained of therein were

authorized under EO 324 and that the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Investigation adopted the policy of approving applications for legalization of spouses and unmarried, minor children of
"qualified aliens" even though they had arrived in the Philippines after December 31, 1983. She concludes that the Sandiganbayan erred in not granting her motion to quash the informations.
ISSUE:Whether or not accused id liable for continued crime? (No)
RULING:Technically, there was only one crime that was committed in petitioner Santiago's case, and hence, there should only be one information to be filed against her.
The 32 Amended Informations charge what is known as delito continuado or "continued crime" and sometimes referred to as "continuous crime."
Where only one single criminal act of approving the application for legalization of 32 aliens was committed on the same period of time, the 32 informations should be consolidated into only one. Under the following circumstances, the 32 informations filed by the prosecution should be consolidated into only one information. In the case at bench, the original information charged petitioner Santiago with performing a single criminal act — that of her approving the application for legalization of aliens not qualified under the law to enjoy such privilege. The original information also averred that the criminal act: (i) committed by petitioner was in violation of a law—Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988,
(ii) caused an undue injury to one offended party, the Government, and (iii) was done on a single day, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988. The 32 Amended Informations reproduced verbatim the allegation of the original information, except that instead of the word “aliens” in the original information each amended information states the name of the individual whose stay was legalized.
The 32 Amended Informations aver that the offenses were committed on the same period of time, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988. The strong probability even exists that the approval of the application for the legalization of the stay of the 32 aliens was done by a single stroke of the pen, as when the approval was embodied in the same document.
For delito continuado to exist there should be a plurality of acts performed during a period of time; unity of penal provision violated; and unity of criminal intent or purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same penal provisions are united in one and the same intent or resolution leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim. A delito continuado consists of several crimes but in reality there is only one crime in the mind of the perpetrator.
The concept of delito continuado, although an outcrop of the Spanish Penal Code, has been applied to crimes penalized under special laws. Under Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, the Code shall be supplementary to special laws, unless the latter provide the contrary. Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws.
The question surrounding the concept of delito continuado is that whether a series of criminal acts over a period of time creates a single offense or separate offenses.
At the hearing of the motion for a bill of particulars, the public prosecutors manifested that they would file only one amended information embodying the legalization of stay of the 32 aliens.

Hence, in this case, the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman is directed to consolidate the 32 Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371 to 18402) into one information charging only one offense under the original case number, i.e., No. 16698.
People vs Ducosin
Facts: Valeriano Ducosin was convicted of the crime of frustrated murder of Rafael Yanguas, punishable by one degree lower than the prescribed penalty for murder, which is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death (lowered to prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in medium period). The plea of guilty was appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, which lowered the penalty to its minimum period. Therefore the range of the penalty was ten years and one day to twelve years of imprisonment, leaving to the discretion of the court the precise time to be served within range.
The Supreme Court shall revise the penalty by applying Act 4103, the Indeterminate Sentence Law, which will prescribe a minimum and maximum penalty.
Issue: Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, what should be the penalty? In other words, what should be the maximum and the minimum?
Held: The maximum penalty imposed was ten years and one day to twelve years and the minimum was seven years. After serving the minimum sentence, the Board of Indeterminate Sentence should consider giving him parole.
Ratio: According to section 1 of Act 4103, ―the Court shall order the accused to be imprisoned… to such a maximum as may, in view of attending circumstances, be properly imposed under the present rules of the said [Revised Penal] Code, to a minimum term which shall not be less than the minimum imprisonment period of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the code for the said offense. Given that frustrated murder, with the extenuating circumstance of guilty plea, should be punished by one degree lower than murder, and in its minimum period, the maximum imprisonment period should be within the range of that penalty (prision mayor in its maximum period or years and one day to twelve years). The minimum period should be within the range of the penalty immediately lower than prision mayor in its maximum period (prision mayor in its medium period, four years, two months and one day to ten years.
People vs Formigones
Facts: In the month of Nov. 1946, Abelardo was living on his farm in Camarines Sur w/ his wife, Julia
Agricola & their 5 children. From there they transferred in the house of his half-brother, Zacarias
Formigones in the same municipality to find employment as harvesters of palay. After a month, Julia was sitting at the head of the stairs of the house when Abelardo, w/o previous quarrel or provocation whatsoever, took his bolo from the wall of the house & stabbed his wife Julia, in the back, the blade penetrating the right lung & causing a severe hemorrhage resulting in her death. Abelardo then took his dead wife & laid her on the floor of the living room & then lay down beside her. In this position, he was found by the people who came in response to the shouts made by his eldest daughter, Irene
Formigones. The motive was admittedly that of jealousy because according to his statement, he used to have quarrels with his wife for reason that he often saw her in the company of his brother, Zacarias; that he suspected the 2 were maintaining illicit relations because he noticed that his wife had become indifferent to him. During the preliminary investigation, the accused pleaded guilty. At the case in the

CFI, he also pleaded guilty but didn‘t testify. His counsel presented the testimony of 2 guards of the provincial jail where Abelardo was confined to the effect that his conduct was rather strange & that he behaved like an insane person, at times he would remain silent, walk around stark naked, refuse to take a bath & wash his clothes etc... The appeal is based merely on the theory that the appellant is an
IMBECILE & therefore exempt from criminal liability under RPC A12.
Issue: WON Abelardo is an imbecile at the time of the commission of the crime, thus exempted from criminal liability
Held: No. He is not an imbecile. According Dr. Francisco Gomes, although he was feebleminded, he is not an imbecile as he could still distinguish between right & wrong & even feel remorse. In order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile w/in the meaning of RPC A12 so as to be exempt from criminal liability, he must be deprived completely of reason or discernment & freedom of will at the time of committing the crime. (Note that definition is same as insanity) As to the strange behavior of the accused during his confinement, assuming it was not feigned to stimulate insanity, it may be attributed either to his being feebleminded or eccentric, or to a morbid mental condition produced by remorse at having killed his wife. A man who could feel the pangs of jealousy & take violent measures to the extent of killing his wife who he suspected of being unfaithful to him, in the belief that in doing so, he was vindicating his honor, could hardly be regarded as an imbecile. WON the suspicions were justified, is of little or no importance. The fact is that he believed her faithless. Furthermore, in his written statement, he readily admitted that he killed his wife, & at the trial he made no effort to deny of repudiate said written statements, thus saving the government all the trouble & expense of catching him & securing his conviction. But 2 mitigating circumstances are present: passion or obfuscation (having killed his wife in a jealous rage) & feeblemindedness. Judgment: In conclusion, appellant is found guilty of parricide & the lower court‘s judgment is hereby affirmed w/ the modification that appellant will be credited with half of any preventive imprisonment he has undergone (because of the 2 mitigating circumstances) -
People vs Simon
Facts: Oct. 22, 1988, Pampanga. Martin Simon was convicted of violating RA 6425 AII §4 (Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972) through a NARCOM poser-buyer. It was appealed for reversal alleging it was a frameup (testimonies & evidence proved otherwise) & evidence was inadmissible (held, because there was no counsel).
Issue: WON correct penalty applied?
Held: No. Conviction modified. There was overlapping error in the law thus the SC had to harmonize conflicting provisions by providing for degrees of graduation. Rule: degrees applied depending on quantity then apply mitigating or aggravating circumstance. Least penalty should be prision correccional so as not to depreciate seriousness of crime. Justified in applying RPC provisions because law adopted penalties under RPC in their technical terms thus significations and effects will also apply. It rules in people v. Tsang Hin Wai that when special law grants discretion to SC to apply penalties, Code won‘t be held. Otherwise, SC should be guided by rules in RPC that being the expert in criminal law administration. -

People vs Bon
FACTS: Eight (8) Informations were filed within the period 21 August 2000 to 23 February 2001 by the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Gumaca, Quezon against Alfredo Bon (appellant), charging him with the rape of AAA and BBB, the daughters of his older brother. All these cases were consolidated for trial.
The rapes were alleged to have been committed in several instances over a span of six (6) years. Both
AAA and BBB testified against appellant, their uncle, and both identified him as the man who had raped them.
The RTC convicted appellant on all eight (8) counts of rape. It further considered the qualifying circumstances of minority of the victims and the relationship of the victims and appellant, the latter being the former's relative by consanguinity within the third degree.
The Court of Appeals downgraded the convictions in Criminal Case Nos. 6906 and 6908 to attempted rape. The sentence was prescribed by the appellate court prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 9346 which ended the imposition of death penalty. The proximate concern as to the appellant is whether his penalty for attempted qualified rape which under the penal law should be two degrees lower than that of consummated rape, should be computed from death or reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE: Whether or not the proper penalty for the crime is Death Penalty?
HELD: The sentence of death imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals can no longer be affirmed in view of Rep. Act No. 9346, Section 2 of which mandates that in lieu of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. Correspondingly, the Court can no longer uphold the death sentences imposed by lower courts, but must, if the guilt of the accused is affirmed, impose instead the penalty of reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment when appropriate.
Upon the other hand, Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code establishes that the penalty to be imposed upon the principals of an attempted felony must be a penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principals in an attempt to commit a felony.
The penalty "lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law" for attempted rape is the prescribed penalty for the consummated rape of a victim duly proven to have been under eighteen years of age and to have been raped by her uncle, is death under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. The determination of the penalty two degrees lower than the death penalty entails the application of
Articles 61 and 71 of the Revised Penal Code. Following the scale prescribed in Article 71, the penalty two degrees lower than death is reclusion temporal, which was the maximum penalty imposed by the
Court of Appeals on appellant for attempted rape.
Hence, the Court of Appeals sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty for attempted rape, with a maximum penalty within the range of reclusion temporal, and a minimum penalty within the range of the penalty next lower, or prision mayor. If Rep. Act No. 9346 had not been enacted, the Court would have affirmed such sentence without complication. However, the enactment of the law has given rise to the problem concerning the imposable penalty. Appellant was sentenced to a maximum term within reclusion temporal since that is the penalty two degrees lower than death. With the elimination of death as a penalty, does it follow that appellant should now be sentenced to a penalty two degrees

lower than reclusion perpetua, the highest remaining penalty with the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9346?
If it so followed, appellant would be sentenced to prision mayor in lieu of reclusion temporal.
The consummated felony previously punishable by death would now be punishable by reclusion perpetua. At the same time, the same felony in its frustrated stage would, under the foregoing premise in this section, be penalized one degree lower from death, or also reclusion perpetua. It does not seem right, of course, that the same penalty of reclusion perpetua would be imposed on both the consummated and frustrated felony.
Thus, RA 9346 should be construed as having downgraded those penalties attached to death by reason of the graduated scale under Article 71. Only in that manner will a clear and consistent rule emerge as to the application of penalties for frustrated and attempted felonies, and for accessories and accomplices.
In the case of appellant, the determination of his penalty for attempted rape shall be reckoned not from two degrees lower than death, but two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua. Hence, the maximum term of his penalty shall no longer be reclusion temporal, as ruled by the Court of Appeals, but instead, prision mayor.
Llamado vs CAA
Bala vs Martinez (PDF)
Salgado vs CA
Francisco vs CA
FACTS:Petitioner Pablo Francisco was accused of multiple grave oral defamation in five (5) separate
Informations instituted by five (5) of his employees, each Information charging him with gravely maligning them on four different days.
Petitioner’s woes started when as President and General Manager of ASPAC Trans. Company he failed to control his outburst and blurted —“You employees in this office are all tanga, son of a bitches (sic), bullshit. Puro kayo walang utak . . . . Mga anak ng puta . . . . Magkano ba kayo . . . God damn you all.”
After nearly ten (10) years, Makati MeTC found petitioner guilty of grave oral defamation in four (4) of the five (5) cases filed against him, and sentenced him to a prison term of one (1) year and one (l) day to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional “in each crime committed on each date of each case, as alleqed in the information(s),” ordered him to indemnify each of the offended parties, Victoria
Gatchalian, Rowena Ruiz, Linda Marie Ayala Pigar and Marie Solis, P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P5,000.00 for attorney’s fees, plus costs of suit. He was acquitted in the other information for persistent failure of the offended party, Edgar Colindres, to appear and testify.
Not satisfied with the Decision of the MeTC, and insisting on his innocence, petitioner elevated his case to the Regional Trial Court, which affirmed his conviction. Accordingly, petitioner was sentenced “in each case to a STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS imprisonment . . . . “
After he failed to interpose an appeal therefrom the decision of the RTC became final.
The case was then set for execution of judgment by the MeTC which, as a consequence, issued a warrant of arrest. But before he could be arrested petitioner filed an application for probation which the
MeTC denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is still qualified to avail of probation even after appealing his conviction to the RTC which affirmed the MeTC except with regard to the duration of the penalties imposed.
RULING: Petitioner is no longer eligible for probation.
Section 4 of the Probation Law, as amended, clearly mandates that “no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction,”
Thus, his appeal now precludes him from applying for probation.
Lagrosa vs CA
People vs Patriarca
Doctrine: The Court takes judicial notice of the grant of amnesty upon accused-appellant Jose N.
Patriarca, Jr. Once granted, it is binding and effective. While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.
FACTS:
On August 16, 1990, an information for murder was filed against Jose Patriarca, Jr., alias "Ka Django,"
"Carlos Narra", "Ka Jessie," et al., charging them of murder.
Accused-appellant Jose Patriarca, Jr. was also charged with Murder for the killing of one Rudy de Borja and a certain Elmer Cadag .
The defense presented accused Jose Patriarca, Jr. and Francisco Derla who admitted that accused is a member of the NPA operating in Donsol, Sorsogon, but denied ever abducting the victims in the three criminal cases filed against him.
Accused-appellant applied for amnesty under Proclamation No. 724 amending Proclamation No. 347, dated March 25, 1994, entitled "Granting Amnesty to Rebels, Insurgents, and All Other Persons Who
Have or May Have Committed Crimes Against Public Order, Other Crimes Committed in Furtherance of
Political Ends, and Violations of the Article of War, and Creating a National Amnesty Commission." His application was favorably granted by the National Amnesty Board. Attached to appellant's brief is the
Notice of Resolution of the National Amnesty Commission (NAC).
ISSUE:Whether Patriarca is liable for pardon and amnesty
HELD: No. Accused-appellant Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of murder.
Accused-appellant Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. was granted amnesty under Proclamation No. 724 dated May
17, 1996. It amended Proclamation No. 347 dated March 25, 1994.
Section 1 of Proclamation No. 724 reads thus:
"Section 1. Grant of Amnesty. - Amnesty is hereby granted to all persons who shall apply therefor and who have or may have committed crimes, on or before June 1, 1995, in pursuit of their political beliefs,

whether punishable under the Revised Penal Code or special laws, including but not limited to the following: rebellion or insurrection; coup d'etat; conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, insurrection, or coup d'etat; disloyalty of public officers or employees; inciting to rebellion or insurrection; sedition; conspiracy to commit sedition; inciting to sedition; illegal assembly; illegal association; direct assault; indirect assault; resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or agents of such person; tumults and other disturbances of public order; unlawful use of means of publication and unlawful utterances; alarms and scandals; illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions, and explosives, committed in furtherance of, incident to, or in connection with the crimes of rebellion and insurrection; and violations of Articles 59 (desertion), 62 (absence without leave), 67 (mutiny or sedition), 68 (failure to suppress mutiny or sedition), 94 (various crimes), 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman), and 97 (general article) of the Articles of War; Provided, That the amnesty shall not cover crimes against chastity and other crimes for personal ends."
Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high political offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the subjects of another, who have offended, by some breach, the law of nations. Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.
Paragraph 3 of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects.
In the case of People vs. Casido, the difference between pardon and amnesty is given:
"Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by
Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does 'not work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon,' and it 'in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence' (Article 36, Revised Penal Code). While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense."
This Court takes judicial notice of the grant of amnesty upon accused-appellant Jose N. Patriarca, Jr.
Once granted, it is binding and effective. It serves to put an end to the appeal.

Domingo vs Sandiganbayan
People vs PAcificador
Sermonia vs CA
SUMMARY:
In 1992, petitioner was charged with bigamy before the RTC-Pasig for contracting marriage with Ma.
Lourdes Unson on February 15, 1975 while his prior marriage to Virginia C. Nievera remained valid and subsisting. Petitioner contends that the 15-years prescriptive period for prosecuting bigamy should be counted from the date it was registered with the Civil Registrar (1975) and not from the time the 2nd marriage was discovered (1991). Thus, the case should have been filed on or before 1990. The RTC, CA and Supreme Court all disagreed with the petitioner.
DOCTRINES:
Were we to put our imprimatur to the theory advanced by petitioner, in all likelihood we would be playing right into the hands of philanderers. For we would be equating the contract of marriage with ordinary deeds of conveyance and other similar documents without due regard for the stability of marriage as an inviolable social institution, the preservation of which is a primary concern of our society.
FACTS:
In 1992, petitioner was charged with bigamy before the RTC-Pasig for contracting marriage with Ma.
Lourdes Unson on February 15, 1975 while his prior marriage to Virginia C. Nievera remained valid and subsisting.
Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that his criminal liability for bigamy has been extinguished by prescription.
Respondent judge denied the motion to quash. He likewise denied the motion to reconsider his order of denial.
Petitioner challenged the above orders before the Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari and prohibition. The CA dismissed his petition for lack of merit.
Petitioner avers that since the second marriage contract was duly registered with the Office of the Civil
Registrar in 1975, such fact of registration makes it a matter of public record and thus constitutes notice to the whole world.
The offended party therefore is considered to have had constructive notice of the subsequent marriage as of 1975; hence, prescription commenced to run on the day the marriage contract was registered.
For this reason, the corresponding information for bigamy should have been filed on or before 1990 (15years prescriptive period for offenses punishable by prision mayor) and not in 1991 when the first wife discovered the second marriage.
ISSUE:WON the 15-year prescriptive period for bigamy should be counted from the registration of the
2nd marriage with the Civil Registrar. (NO, from discovery)

RATIO:
While we concede the point that the rule on constructive notice in civil cases may be applied in criminal actions if the factual and legal circumstances so warrant, we agree with the CA that it cannot apply in the crime of bigamy notwithstanding the possibility of its being more favorable to the accused.
The rule on constructive notice will make de rigueur the routinary inspection or verification of the marriages listed in the National Census Office and in various local civil registries all over the country to make certain that no second or even third marriage has been contracted without the knowledge of the legitimate spouse.
More importantly, while Sec. 52 of P.D. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) provides for constructive notice to all persons of every entry made in the office of the Register of Deeds there is no counterpart provision either in Act No. 3753 (Act to Establish a Civil Register) or in Arts. 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, which leads us to the conclusion that there is no legal basis for applying the constructive notice rule to the documents registered in the Civil Register.
Were we to put our imprimatur to the theory advanced by petitioner, in all likelihood we would be playing right into the hands of philanderers.
For we would be equating the contract of marriage with ordinary deeds of conveyance and other similar documents without due regard for the stability of marriage as an inviolable social institution, the preservation of which is a primary concern of our society.
Romualdez vs CA
Barilao vs CA
DOCTRINE: There are two instances when the existence of an employer-employee relationship of an accused driver and the alleged vehicle owner may be determined. One during the criminal proceeding, and the other, during the proceeding for the execution of the judgment. In both instances, petitioner should be given the opportunity to be heard, which is the essence of due process.
FACTS:
Simplicio Pronebo was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with double homicide and double physical injuries. The court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Reckless Imrpudence resulting in the death of Danilo Advincula. Pertinently, the trial court found that at the time of the vehicular accident accused Simplicio Pronebo was employed as the driver of the dump truck owned by petitioner Luisito Basilio. Petitioner Luisito Basilio filed with the trial court a Motion for Reconsideration praying that the judgment be reconsidered and set aside insofar as it affected him and subjected him to a subsidiary liability for the civil aspect of the criminal case. The motion was denied for lack of merit.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court with the
Court of Appeals, alleging that respondent judge acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Before the appellate court, petitioner claimed he was not afforded due process when he was found subsidiarily liable for the civil liability of the accused Pronebo in the criminal case. The Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition.

ISSUE:Whether or not petitioner was afforded with due process
HELD:
Yes. The statutory basis for an employer’s subsidiary liability is found in Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code. This liability is enforceable in the same criminal proceeding where the award is made. However, before execution against an employer ensues, there must be a determination, in a hearing set for the purpose of 1) the existence of an employer-employee relationship; 2) that the employer is engaged in some kind of industry; 3) that the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties; 4) that said employee is insolvent.
There are two instances when the existence of an employer-employee relationship of an accused driver and the alleged vehicle owner may be determined. One during the criminal proceeding, and the other, during the proceeding for the execution of the judgment. In both instances, petitioner should be given the opportunity to be heard, which is the essence of due process.
In the instant case, petitioner knew of the criminal case that was filed against accused because it was his truck that was involved in the incident. Further, it was the insurance company, with which his truck was insured, that provided the counsel for the accused, pursuant to the stipulations in their contract.
Petitioner did not intervene in the criminal proceedings, despite knowledge, through counsel, that the prosecution adduced evidence to show employer-employee relationship. With the convict’s application for probation, the trial court’s judgment became final and executory. All told, it is our view that the lower court did not err when it found that petitioner was not denied due process.
Petitioner was also given the opportunity during the proceedings for the enforcement of judgment. Even assuming that he was not properly notified of the hearing on the motion for execution of subsidiary liability, he was asked by the trial court to make an opposition thereto, which he did where he properly alleged that there was no employer-employee relationship between him and accused and that the latter was not discharging any function in relation to his work at the time of the incident.
PRBL vs Mangawang
Doctrine:
While the subsidiary liability provided for by Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code may render the employer a party in substance and, in effect, it is not, for this reason, entitled to be furnished a copy of the decision of the RTC, as well as the resolution and decision of the CA.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) convicting the accused Ernesto Ancheta of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
Ernesto Ancheta was employed by the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBLI) as driver of one of its passenger buses. On July 23, 1993, an Information was filed with the RTC of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66, charging Ancheta with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The accused was assisted by Atty.
Crispiniano Lamorena, Jr., whom the PRBLI assigned as counsel de parte. Atty. Andres Pangilinan entered his appearance as private prosecutor.

The trial court rendered judgment convicting the accused of the crime charged. The accused appealed the decision to the CA. CA dismissed the appeal due Ancheta’s failure to file his brief as accusedappellant. The resolution of the CA dismissing the appeal became final and executor.
The PRBLI, as Ancheta’s employer, filed a Notice of Appeal of the decision of the RTC claiming among others that the decision of the trial court convicting the employee is binding and conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the civil liability but also, with regard to its amount," should not apply in the case because they are not served with a copy of the decision of the RTC; hence, could not have appealed the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not PRBLI can be held subsidiarily liable for the offenses committed by the employee
HELD: Yes. The petitioner, as the employer of the said accused, had no right to appeal from the said decision because, in the first place, it was not a party in the said case. While the subsidiary liability provided for by Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code may render the petitioner a party in substance and, in effect, it is not, for this reason, entitled to be furnished a copy of the decision of the
RTC, as well as the resolution and decision of the CA.
It is true that an employer, strictly speaking, is not a party to the criminal case instituted against his employee but in substance and, in effect, he is considering the subsidiary liability imposed upon him by law. It is his concern, as well as of his employee, to see to it that his interest be protected in the criminal case by taking virtual participation in the defense of his employee. He cannot leave him to his own fate because his failure is also his. And if because of his indifference or inaction the employee is convicted and damages are awarded against him, he cannot later be heard to complain, if brought to court for the enforcement of his subsidiary liability, that he was not given his day in court.
Supplemental notes:
In Ozoa v. Vda. de Madula, the Court explained the effect of a judgment of conviction against the employee on the subsidiary liability of the employer, as follows:
To be sure, the correctness of the legal principles cited by the Court a quo cannot be gainsaid. A person criminally liable is also civilly liable; and upon the institution of the criminal action, the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the crime is also impliedly instituted unless waived, or the filing of a separate action therefor is reserved. The employer is subsidiarily answerable for the adjudicated civil liability ex delicto of his employee in the event of the latter’s insolvency; and the judgment in the criminal action pronouncing the employee to be also civilly liable is conclusive on the employer not only as to the actuality of that liability but also as to its amount.
Carpio vs Doroja
Doctrine:
In an action under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code, once all the requisites are met, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable, without needof a separate action.
Facts:Accused Edwin Ramirez is the driver of a passenger jeepney owned and operated by one Eduardo
Toribio. While driving said vehicle, Ramirez bumped into DionisioCarpio while the latter was crossing the street. This caused him to suffer a fractured left clavicle requiring medical attention for 3 months.

Accused was convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in less serious physical injuries after the accused pleaded guilty to said lesser offense.
After issuance of a writ of execution for the civil liabilities, the same was returned unsatisfied due to the fact that accused was an indigent. Herein petitioner moved for the issuance of a subsidiary writ of execution against the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator. This was denied by the trial court on the following grounds: one, the decision did not mention of the subsidiary liability of one Eduardo Toribio; two, the nature of the accident is one of culpa aquiliana and not culpa-contractual.
Issue:Whether or not the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator may be enforced in the same criminal proceeding against the driver where the award was given, or in a separate civil action.
Held:The Court ruled that a separate civil action is unnecessary.
The Court ruled that the subsidiary liability of an employer arises after conviction of the employee in a civil action, and that the following were proved during trial: (1) that the employer, etc. is engaged in any kind of industry, (2) that the employee committed the offense in the discharge of his duties and (3) that the employee is insolvent. Once all requisites are met, which was so in this case, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable without need of a separate action.
The case at hand is not one where the operator-owner is being sued for primary liability under the Civil
Code. The operator-owners liability is incident and dependent upon the employee’s criminal liability.
The subsidiary liability in Art. 103 should be distinguished from the primary liability of employers, which is quasi-delictual in character as provided in Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code. Under Art. 103, the liability emanated from a delict. On the other hand, the liability under Art. 2180 is founded on culpa-aquiliana.
The present case is neither an action for culpa-contractual nor for culpa-aquiliana. This is basically an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code.
Heirs of Raymundo Castro vs Bustos
DOCTRINE: When the commission of a crime results in death, the civil obligations arising therefrom are governed by the penal laws. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least twelve thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances and should include loss of earning capacity of the deceased and moral damages.
FACTS: Trial court found Bustos guilty only of homicide and, crediting him with two mitigating circumstances, namely, passion or obfuscation and voluntary surrender, and ordered him to indemnify the petitioners six thousand pesos. Court of appeals modified the judgment and awarded to the heirs of the deceased moral damages in the amount of P6,000 plus P13,380.00 to compensate for the loss of earning of the decedent at the annual salary of P2,676.00, which they later eliminated upon motion for reconsideration of the respondent. Petitioner appealed that the previous decision of the Court of
Appeals be reinstated in toto.
ISSUE: Whether appellant are entitled to moral damages and compensation for loss of earning capacity.
HELD: YES. Art. 2206 provides that defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court; as well as for moral damages for mental anguish caused to the heirs of the deceased. Even if compensation for loss of earning capacity is not pleaded in the complaint,

such may be awarded as it is deemed included the prayer for "actual damages" and for other "just and equitable reliefs", especially if taken in the light of Art. 2206, in connection with Art. 1764, of the Civil
Code
People vs Bayotas
FACTS:
A criminal case for rape was filed against the accused Rogelio Bayotas. He was also convicted by the trial court. However, pending appeal of his conviction he died at the National Bilibid Hospital due to
Cardiorespiratory arrest secondary to Hepatic Encephalopathy secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. The solicitor general, in his comment, contends that death of the accused did not extinguished his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. Counsel for the accused on the otherhand, argued that the death of the accused extinguishes both his criminal and civil liability.
ISSUE:
Whether the civil liability of the accused is extinguished by reason of his death pending appeal of judgment of conviction.
HELD:
Yes. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based soley thereon. The claim for civil liability on the other hand, survives notwithstanding the death of the accused if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than the delict (law, contracts, quasi- contracts and quasi- delicts). In this case, the death of the accused Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based soley on the act complained of which is rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification.