CRISOSTOMO B. AQUINO, Petitioner, v. MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY, AKLAN, REPRESENTED BY HON.
MAYOR JOHN P. YAP, SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MALAY, AKLAN, REPRESENTED BY HON. EZEL
FLORES, DANTE PASUGUIRON, ROWEN AGUIRRE, WILBEC GELITO, JUPITER GALLENERO, OFFICE
OF THE MUNICIPAL ENGINEER, OFFICE OF THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER, BORACAY PNP CHIEF,
BORACAY FOUNDATION, INC., REPRESENTED BY NENETTE GRAF, MUNICIPAL AUXILIARY POLICE,
AND JOHN AND JANE DOES, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO JR., J.:
Nature of the Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari challenging the Decision1 and the Resolution of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 120042 dated August 13, 2013 and February 3, 2014, respectively.
The assailed rulings denied Crisostomo Aquino’s Petition for Certiorari for not being the proper remedy to
question the issuance and implementation of Executive Order No. 10, Series of 2011 (EO 10), ordering the
demolition of his hotel establishment.
The Facts
Petitioner is the president and chief executive officer of Boracay Island West Cove Management Philippines,
Inc. (Boracay West Cove). On January 7, 2010, the company applied for a zoning compliance with the
municipal government of Malay, Aklan.2 While the company was already operating a resort in the area, the
application sought the issuance of a building permit covering the construction of a three-storey hotel over a
parcel of land measuring 998 sqm. located in Sitio Diniwid, Barangay Balagab, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan,
which is covered by a Forest Land Use Agreement for Tourism Purposes (FLAgT) issued by the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in favor of Boracay West Cove.
Through a Decision on Zoning dated January 20, 2010, the Municipal Zoning Administrator denied
petitioner’s application on the ground that the proposed construction site was within the “no build zone”
demarcated in Municipal Ordinance 2000-131 (Ordinance).3 As provided in the Ordinance:
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SECTION 2. – Definition of Terms. As used in this Ordinance, the following words, terms and phrases shall
mean as follows:
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(b) No Build Zone – the space twenty-five (25) meters from the edge of the mean high water mark
measured inland;
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SECTION 3. – No building or structure of any kind whether temporary or permanent shall be allowed to be
set up, erected or constructed on the beaches around the Island of Boracay and in its offshore waters.
During the conduct of special activities or special events, the Sangguniang Bayan may, through a
Resolution, authorize the Office of the Mayor to issue Special Permits for construction of temporary
structures on the beach for the duration of the special activity as embodied in the Resolution.
In due time, petitioner appealed the denial action to the Office of the Mayor on February 1, 2010.
On May 13, 2010, petitioner followed up his appeal through a letter but no action was ever taken by the
respondent mayor. On April 5, 2011, however, a Notice of Assessment was sent to petitioner asking for the
settlement of Boracay West Cove’s unpaid taxes and other liabilities under pain of a recommendation for
closure in view of its continuous commercial operation since 2009 sans the necessary zoning clearance,
building permit, and business and mayor’s permit. In reply, petitioner expressed willingness to settle the
company’s obligations, but the municipal treasurer refused to accept the tendered payment. Meanwhile,
petitioner continued with the construction, expansion, and operation of the resort hotel.
Subsequently, on March 28, 2011, a Cease and Desist Order was issued by the municipal government,
enjoining the expansion of the resort, and on June 7, 2011, the Office of the Mayor of Malay, Aklan issued
the assailed EO 10, ordering the closure and demolition of Boracay West Cove’s hotel.
EO 10 was partially implemented on June 10, 2011. Thereafter, two more instances followed wherein
respondents demolished the improvements introduced by Boracay West Cove, the most recent of which was
made in February 2014.
Alleging that the order was issued and executed with grave abuse of discretion, petitioner filed a Petition for
Certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief with the CA. He argued that judicial proceedings should first be
conducted before the respondent mayor could order the demolition of the company’s establishment; that
Boracay West Cove was granted a FLAgT by the DENR, which bestowed the company the right to construct
permanent improvements on the area in question; that since the area is a forestland, it is the DENR—and
not the municipality of Malay, or any other local government unit for that matter—that has primary
jurisdiction over the area, and that the Regional Executive Director of DENR-Region 6 had officially issued an
opinion regarding the legal issues involved in the present case; that the Ordinance admits of exceptions;
and lastly, that it is the mayor who should be blamed for not issuing the necessary clearances in the
company’s favor.
In rebuttal, respondents contended that the FLAgT does not excuse the company from complying with the
Ordinance and Presidential Decree No. 1096 (PD 1096), otherwise known as the National Building Code of
the Philippines. Respondents also argued that the demolition needed no court order because the municipal
mayor has the express power under the Local Government Code (LGC) to order the removal of illegally
constructed buildings.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its assailed Decision dated August 13, 2013, the CA dismissed the petition solely on procedural ground,
i.e., the special writ of certiorari can only be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions and since the issuance of EO 10 was done in the exercise of executive functions,
and not of judicial or quasi-judicial functions, certiorari will not lie. Instead, the proper remedy for the
petitioner, according to the CA, is to file a petition for declaratory relief with the Regional Trial Court.
Petitioner sought reconsideration but this was denied by the CA on February 3, 2014 through the challenged
Resolution. Hence, the instant petition raising arguments on both procedure and substance.
The Issues
Stripped to the essentials, the pivotal issues in the extant case are as follows:
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The propriety under the premises of the filing of a petition for certiorari instead of a petition for
declaratory relief;
a.
Whether or not declaratory relief is still available to petitioner;
b.
Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the respondent mayor was performing neither a judicial
nor quasi-judicial function when he ordered the closure and demolition of Boracay West Cove’s
hotel;
Whether or not respondent mayor committed grave abuse of discretion when he issued EO 10;
a.
Whether or not petitioner’s right to due process was violated when the respondent mayor ordered
the closure and demolition of Boracay West Cove’s hotel without first conducting judicial
proceedings;
b.
Whether or not the LGU’s refusal to issue petitioner the necessary building permit and clearances
was justified;
c.
Whether or not petitioner’s rights under the FLAgT prevail over the municipal ordinance providing
for a no-build zone; and
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d.
Whether or not the DENR has primary jurisdiction over the controversy, not the LGU.
The Court’s Ruling
We deny the petition.
Certiorari, not declaratory relief, is the proper remedy
a. Declaratory relief no longer viable
Resolving first the procedural aspect of the case, We find merit in petitioner’s contention that the special writ
of certiorari , and not declaratory relief, is the proper remedy for assailing EO 10. As provided under Sec. 1,
Rule 63 of the Rules of Court:
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SECTION 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance or any other
governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate
Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his
rights or duties, thereunder. x x x (emphasis added)
An action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments
involved or of the rights arising thereunder. Since the purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to secure
an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, or contract for
their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an
alleged breach thereof, it may be entertained before the breach or violation of the statute, deed or contract
to which it refers. A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical remedy for ending controversies that
have not reached the state where another relief is immediately available; and supplies the need for a form
of action that will set controversies at rest before they lead to a repudiation of obligations, an invasion of
rights, and a commission of wrongs.4
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In the case at bar, the petition for declaratory relief became unavailable by EO 10’s enforcement and
implementation. The closure and demolition of the hotel rendered futile any possible guidelines that may be
issued by the trial court for carrying out the directives in the challenged EO 10. Indubitably, the CA erred
when it ruled that declaratory relief is the proper remedy given such a situation.
b. Petitioner correctly resorted to certiorari
On the propriety of filing a petition for certiorari , Sec. 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides:
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Section 1. Petition for certiorari . — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may
require. x x x
For certiorari to prosper, the petitioner must establish the concurrence of the following requisites,
namely:
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1.
The writ is directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
2.
Such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
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3.
There is no appeal or any plain speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.5
Guilty of reiteration, the CA immediately dismissed the Petition for Certiorari upon determining that the first
element is wanting—that respondent mayor was allegedly not exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions
when he issued EO 10.
We are not persuaded.
The CA fell into a trap when it ruled that a mayor, an officer from the executive department, exercises an
executive function whenever he issues an Executive Order. This is tad too presumptive for it is the nature of
the act to be performed, rather than of the office, board, or body which performs it, that determines
whether or not a particular act is a discharge of judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The first requirement
for certiorari is satisfied if the officers act judicially in making their decision, whatever may be their public
character.6
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It is not essential that the challenged proceedings should be strictly and technically judicial, in the sense in
which that word is used when applied to courts of justice, but it is sufficient if they are quasi-judicial.7 To
contrast, a party is said to be exercising a judicial function where he has the power to determine what the
law is and what legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine these questions and
adjudicate upon the rights of the parties, whereas quasi-judicial function is “a term which applies to the
actions, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies x x x required to investigate facts or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official
action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.”8
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In the case at bench, the assailed EO 10 was issued upon the respondent mayor’s finding that Boracay West
Cove’s construction, expansion, and operation of its hotel in Malay, Aklan is illegal. Such a finding of
illegality required the respondent mayor’s exercise of quasi-judicial functions, against which the special writ
of certiorari may lie. Apropos hereto is Our ruling in City Engineer of Baguio v. Baniqued:9
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There is no gainsaying that a city mayor is an executive official nor is the matter of issuing demolition
notices or orders not a ministerial one. In determining whether or not a structure is illegal or it should be
demolished, property rights are involved thereby needing notices and opportunity to be heard as provided
for in the constitutionally guaranteed right of due process. In pursuit of these functions, the city mayor has
to exercise quasi-judicial powers.
With the foregoing discussion, the CA erred in ruling that the respondent mayor was merely exercising his
executive functions, for clearly, the first requisite for the special writ has been satisfied.
Aside from the first requisite, We likewise hold that the third element, i.e., the unavailability of a plain,
speedy, or adequate remedy, is also present herein. While it may be argued that, under the LGC, Executive
Orders issued by mayors are subject to review by provincial governors,10 this cannot be considered as an
adequate remedy given the exigencies of petitioner’s predicament.
In a litany of cases, We have held that it is inadequacy, not the mere absence of all other legal remedies
and the danger of failure of justice without the writ, that must usually determine the propriety of certiorari .
A remedy is plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of
the judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or agency. It is understood, then, that a litigant need
not mark time by resorting to the less speedy remedy of appeal in order to have an order annulled and set
aside for being patently void for failure of the trial court to comply with the Rules of Court.11
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Before applying this doctrine, it must first be borne in mind that respondents in this case have already taken
measures towards implementing EO 10. In fact, substantial segments of the hotel have already been
demolished pursuant to the mayor’s directive. It is then understandable why petitioner prayed for the
issuance of an injunctive writ––a provisional remedy that would otherwise have been unavailable had he
sought a reversal from the office of the provincial governor of Aklan. Evidently, petitioner correctly saw the
urgent need for judicial intervention via certiorari .
In light of the foregoing, the CA should have proceeded to grab the bull by its horns and determine the
existence of the second element of certiorari ––whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the
part of respondents.
Upon Our finding that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the appropriate remedy, We will proceed to
resolve the core issues in view of the urgency of the reliefs prayed for in the petition.
Respondents did not commit grave abuse of discretion
a. The hotel’s classification as a nuisance
Article 694 of the Civil Code defines “nuisance” as any act, omission, establishment, business, condition or
property, or anything else that (1) injures or endangers the health or safety of others; (2) annoys or offends
the senses; (3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; (4) obstructs or interferes with the free
passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or (5) hinders or impairs the use of
property.12
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In establishing a no build zone through local legislation, the LGU effectively made a determination that
constructions therein, without first securing exemptions from the local council, qualify as nuisances for they
pose a threat to public safety. No build zones are intended for the protection of the public because the
stability of the ground’s foundation is adversely affected by the nearby body of water. The ever present
threat of high rising storm surges also justifies the ban on permanent constructions near the shoreline.
Indeed, the area’s exposure to potential geo-hazards cannot be ignored and ample protection to the
residents of Malay, Aklan should be afforded.
Challenging the validity of the public respondents’ actuations, petitioner posits that the hotel cannot
summarily be abated because it is not a nuisance per se, given the hundred million peso-worth of capital
infused in the venture. Citing Asilo, Jr. v. People,13 petitioner also argues that respondents should have first
secured a court order before proceeding with the demolition.
Preliminarily, We agree with petitioner’s posture that the property involved cannot be classified as a
nuisance per se, but not for the reason he so offers. Property valuation, after all, is not the litmus test for
such a determination. More controlling is the property’s nature and conditions, which should be evaluated to
see if it qualifies as a nuisance as defined under the law.
As jurisprudence elucidates, nuisances are of two kinds: nuisance per se and nuisance per accidens. The first
is recognized as a nuisance under any and all circumstances, because it constitutes a direct menace to
public health or safety, and, for that reason, may be abated summarily under the undefined law of
necessity. The second is that which depends upon certain conditions and circumstances, and its existence
being a question of fact, it cannot be abated without due hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to decide
whether such a thing does in law constitute a nuisance.14
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In the case at bar, the hotel, in itself, cannot be considered as a nuisance per se since this type of nuisance
is generally defined as an act, occupation, or structure, which is a nuisance at all times and under any
circumstances, regardless of location or surrounding.15 Here, it is merely the hotel’s particular incident––
its location––and not its inherent qualities that rendered it a nuisance. Otherwise stated, had it not been
constructed in the no build zone, Boracay West Cove could have secured the necessary permits without
issue. As such, petitioner is correct that the hotel is not a nuisance per se, but to Our mind, it is still a
nuisance per accidens.
b.
Respondent mayor has the power to order the demolition of illegal constructions
Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a particular thing as a nuisance unless such a thing is a
nuisance per se.16 So it was held in AC Enterprises v. Frabelle Properties Corp:17
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We agree with petitioner’s contention that, under Section 447(a)(3)(i) of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as
the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang Panglungsod is empowered to enact ordinances declaring,
preventing or abating noise and other forms of nuisance. It bears stressing, however, that the Sangguniang
Bayan cannot declare a particular thing as a nuisance per se and order its condemnation. It does not have
the power to find, as a fact, that a particular thing is a nuisance when such thing is not a
nuisance per se; nor can it authorize the extrajudicial condemnation and destruction of that as a
nuisance which in its nature, situation or use is not such. Those things must be determined and
resolved in the ordinary courts of law. If a thing, be in fact, a nuisance due to the manner of its
operation, that question cannot be determined by a mere resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan. (emphasis
supplied)
Despite the hotel’s classification as a nuisance per accidens, however, We still find in this case that the LGU
may nevertheless properly order the hotel’s demolition. This is because, in the exercise of police power and
the general welfare clause,18 property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in
order to fulfill the objectives of the government. Otherwise stated, the government may enact legislation
that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the general
welfare.19
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One such piece of legislation is the LGC, which authorizes city and municipal governments, acting through
their local chief executives, to issue demolition orders. Under existing laws, the office of the mayor is given
powers not only relative to its function as the executive official of the town; it has also been endowed with
authority to hear issues involving property rights of individuals and to come out with an effective order or
resolution thereon.20 Pertinent herein is Sec. 444 (b)(3)(vi) of the LGC, which empowered the mayor to
order the closure and removal of illegally constructed establishments for failing to secure the necessary
permits, to wit:
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Section 444. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. –
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(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general welfare of the
municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the municipal mayor shall:
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(3) Initiate and maximize the generation of resources and revenues, and apply the same to the
implementation of development plans, program objectives and priorities as provided for under Section 18 of
this Code, particularly those resources and revenues programmed for agro-industrial development and
country-wide growth and progress, and relative thereto, shall:
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(vi) Require owners of illegally constructed houses, buildings or other structures to obtain the
necessary permit, subject to such fines and penalties as may be imposed by law or ordinance, or
to make necessary changes in the construction of the same when said construction violates any
law or ordinance, or to order the demolition or removal of said house, building or structure
within the period prescribed by law or ordinance. (emphasis supplied)
c. Requirements for the exercise of the power are present
i. Illegality of structures
In the case at bar, petitioner admittedly failed to secure the necessary permits, clearances, and exemptions
before the construction, expansion, and operation of Boracay Wet Cove’s hotel in Malay, Aklan. To recall,
petitioner declared that the application for zoning compliance was still pending with the office of the mayor
even though construction and operation were already ongoing at the same time. As such, it could no longer
be denied that petitioner openly violated Municipal Ordinance 2000-131, which provides:
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SECTION 9. – Permits and Clearances.
(a) No building or structure shall be allowed to start construction
unless a Building Permit therefore has been duly issued by the
Office of the Municipal Engineer. Once issued, the building owner or
any person in charge of the construction shall display on the lot or on
the building undergoing construction a placard containing the Building
Permit Number and the date of its issue. The office of the Municipal
Engineer shall not issue any building permit unless:
1. The proposed construction has been duly issued a Zoning
Clearance by the Office of the Municipal Zoning Officer;
2. The proposed construction has been duly endorsed by the
Sangguniang Bayan through a Letter of Endorsement.
(b) Only buildings/structures which has complied with all the requirements
for its construction as verified to by the Building Inspector and the
Sangguniang Bayan shall be issued a Certificate of Occupancy by the
Office of the Municipal Engineer.
(c) No Business or Mayor’s Permit shall be issued to businesses
being undertaken on buildings or structures which were not
issued a certificate of Occupancy beginning January 2001 and
thereafter.
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SECTION 10. – Penalties.
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(e) Any building, structure, or contraption erected in any public place within the Municipality of Malay such
as but not limited to streets, thoroughfares, sidewalks, plazas, beaches or in any other public place are
hereby declared as nuisance and illegal structure. Such building structure or contraption shall be
demolished by the owner thereof or any of his authorized representative within ten (10) days
from receipt of the notice to demolish. Failure or refusal on the part of the owner or any of his
authorized representative to demolish the illegal structure within the period herein above
specified shall automatically authorize the government of the Municipality of Malay to demolish
the same, gather and keep the construction materials of the demolished structure. (emphasis
supplied)
Petitioner cannot justify his position by passing the blame onto the respondent mayor and the latter’s failure
to act on his appeal for this does not, in any way, imply that petitioner can proceed with his infrastructure
projects. On the contrary, this only means that the decision of the zoning administrator denying the
application still stands and that petitioner acquired no right to construct on the no build zone.
The illegality of the construction cannot be cured by merely tendering payment for the necessary fees and
permits since the LGU’s refusal rests on valid grounds.
Instead of taking the law into his own hands, petitioner could have filed, as an alternative, a petition for
mandamus to compel the respondent mayor to exercise discretion and resolve the controversy pending
before his office. There is indeed an exception to the rule that matters involving judgment and discretion are
beyond the reach of a writ of mandamus, for such writ may be issued to compel action in those matters,
when refused. Whether or not the decision would be for or against petitioner would be for the respondent
mayor to decide, for while mandamus may be invoked to compel the exercise of discretion, it cannot compel
such discretion to be exercised in a particular way.21 What would have been important was for the
respondent mayor to immediately resolve the case for petitioner to be able to go through the motions that
the zoning clearance application process entailed.
Alas, petitioner opted to defy the zoning administrator’s ruling. He consciously chose to violate not only the
Ordinance but also Sec. 301 of PD 1096, laying down the requirement of building permits, which
provides:
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Section 301. Building Permits. No person, firm or corporation, including any agency or instrumentality of the
government shall erect, construct, alter, repair, move, convert or demolish any building or structure or
cause the same to be done without first obtaining a building permit therefor from the Building Official
assigned in the place where the subject building is located or the building work is to be done.
This twin violation of law and ordinance warranted the LGU’s invocation of Sec. 444 (b)(3)(vi) of the LGC,
which power is separate and distinct from the power to summarily abate nuisances per se. Under the law,
insofar as illegal constructions are concerned, the mayor can, after satisfying the requirement of due notice
and hearing, order their closure and demolition.
ii. Observance of procedural due process rights
In the case at bench, the due process requirement is deemed to have been sufficiently complied
with. First, basic is the rule that public officers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of
their duties.22 The burden is on the petitioner herein to prove that Boracay West Cove was deprived of the
opportunity to be heard before EO 10 was issued. Regrettably, copies of the Cease and Desist Order issued
by the LGU and of the assailed EO 10 itself were never attached to the petition before this Court, which
documents could have readily shed light on whether or not petitioner has been accorded the 10-day grace
period provided in Section 10 of the Ordinance. In view of this fact, the presumption of regularity must be
sustained. Second, as quoted by petitioner in his petition before the CA, the assailed EO 10 states that
petitioner received notices from the municipality government on March 7 and 28, 2011, requiring Boracay
West Cove to comply with the zoning ordinance and yet it failed to do so.23 If such was the case, the grace
period can be deemed observed and the establishment was already ripe for closure and demolition by the
time EO 10 was issued in June. Third, the observance of the 10-day allowance for the owner to demolish the
hotel was never questioned by petitioner so there is no need to discuss the same. Verily, the only grounds
invoked by petitioner in crying due process violation are (1) the absence of a court order prior to demolition
and (2) the municipal government’s exercise of jurisdiction over the controversy instead of the DENR.
Therefore, it can no longer be belatedly argued that the 10-day grace period was not observed because to
entertain the same would result in the violation of the respondents’ own due process rights.
Given the presence of the requirements under Sec. 444 (b)(3)(vi) of the LGC, whether the building
constituted a nuisance per se or a nuisance per accidens becomes immaterial. The hotel was demolished not
exactly because it is a nuisance but because it failed to comply with the legal requirements prior to
construction. It just so happened that, in the case at bar, the hotel’s incident that qualified it as a
nuisance per accidens––its being constructed within the no build zone––further resulted in the non-issuance
of the necessary permits and clearances, which is a ground for demolition under the LGC. Under the
premises, a court order that is required under normal circumstances is hereby dispensed with.
d.
The FLAgT cannot prevail over the municipal ordinance and PD 1096
Petitioner next directs our attention to the following FLAgT provision:
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VII. The SECOND PARTY may construct permanent and/or temporary improvements or infrastructure in the
FLAgT Area necessary and appropriate for its development for tourism purposes pursuant to the approved
SMP. “Permanent Improvements” refer to access roads, and buildings or structures which adhere to the
ground in a fixed and permanent manner. On the other hand, “Temporary Improvements” include those
which are detachable from the foundation or the ground introduced by the SECOND PARTY in the FLAgT
Area and which the SECOND PARTY may remove or dismantle upon expiration or cancellation of this
AGREEMENT x x x.24
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Taken in conjunction with the exceptions laid down in Sections 6 and 8 of the Ordinance, petitioner argues
that Boracay West Cove is exempted from securing permits from the LGU. Said exceptions read:
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SECTION 6. – No building or structure shall be allowed to be constructed on a slope Twenty Five Percent
(25%) or higher unless provided with soil erosion protective structures and authorized by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources.
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SECTION 8. – No building or structure shall be allowed to be constructed on a swamp or other waterclogged areas unless authorized by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
According to petitioner, the fact that it was issued a FLAgT constitutes sufficient authorization from the
DENR to proceed with the construction of the three-storey hotel.
The argument does not persuade.
The rights granted to petitioner under the FLAgT are not unbridled. Forestlands, although under the
management of the DENR, are not exempt from the territorial application of municipal laws, for local
government units legitimately exercise their powers of government over their defined territorial jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the conditions set forth in the FLAgT and the limitations circumscribed in the ordinance are not
mutually exclusive and are, in fact, cumulative. As sourced from Sec. 447 (a)(5)(i) of the LGC:
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Section 447. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. –
(a) The sangguniang bayan, as the legislative body of the municipality, shall enact ordinances, approve
resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to
Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the municipality as provided
for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:
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(5) Approve ordinances which shall ensure the efficient and effective delivery of the basic services and
facilities as provided for under Section 17 of this Code, and in addition to said services and facilities,
shall:
(i) Provide for the establishment, maintenance, protection, and conservation of communal
forests and watersheds, tree parks, greenbelts, mangroves, and other similar forest development
projects x x x. (emphasis added)
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Thus, aside from complying with the provisions in the FLAgT granted by the DENR, it was incumbent on
petitioner to likewise comply with the no build zone restriction under Municipal Ordinance 2000-131, which
was already in force even before the FLAgT was entered into. On this point, it is well to stress that Sections
6 and 8 of the Ordinance do not exempt petitioner from complying with the restrictions since these
provisions adverted to grant exemptions from the ban on constructions on slopes and swamps, not on the
no build zone.
Additionally, the FLAgT does not excuse petitioner from complying with PD 1096. As correctly pointed out by
respondents, the agreement cannot and will not amend or change the law because a legislative act cannot
be altered by mere contractual agreement. Hence, petitioner has no valid reason for its failure to secure a
building permit pursuant to Sec. 301 of the National Building Code.
e. The DENR does not have primary jurisdiction over the controversy
Lastly, in ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent mayor, petitioner argued that the
hotel site is a forestland under the primary jurisdiction of the DENR. As such, the merits of the case should
have been passed upon by the agency and not by the LGU. In the alternative, petitioner explains that even
if jurisdiction over the matter has been devolved in favor of the LGU, the DENR still has the power of review
and supervision over the former’s rulings. As cited by the petitioner, the LGC reads:
chanR oblesvi rtual Lawl ibra ry
Section 17. Basic Services and Facilities. –
xxxx
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, the following:
xxxx
c hanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
(2) For a Municipality:
xxxx
chan roble svirtuallaw lib rary
(ii) Pursuant to national policies and subject to supervision, control and review of the DENR, implementation
of community-based forestry projects which include integrated social forestry programs and similar projects;
management and control of communal forests with an area not exceeding fifty (50) square kilometers;
establishment of tree parks, greenbelts, and similar forest development projects. (emphasis added)
Petitioner has made much of the fact that in line with this provision, the DENR Region 6 had issued an
opinion favourable to petitioner.25 To petitioner, the adverted opinion effectively reversed the findings of the
respondent mayor that the structure introduced was illegally constructed.
We disagree.
In alleging that the case concerns the development and the proper use of the country’s environment and
natural resources, petitioner is skirting the principal issue, which is Boracay West Cove’s non-compliance
with the permit, clearance, and zoning requirements for building constructions under national and municipal
laws. He downplays Boracay West Cove’s omission in a bid to justify ousting the LGU of jurisdiction over the
case and transferring the same to the DENR. He attempts to blow the issue out of proportion when it all
boils down to whether or not the construction of the three-storey hotel was supported by the necessary
documentary requirements.
Based on law and jurisprudence, the office of the mayor has quasi-judicial powers to order the closing and
demolition of establishments. This power granted by the LGC, as earlier explained, We believe, is not the
same power devolved in favor of the LGU under Sec. 17 (b)(2)(ii), as above-quoted, which is subject to
review by the DENR. The fact that the building to be demolished is located within a forestland under the
administration of the DENR is of no moment, for what is involved herein, strictly speaking, is not an issue on
environmental protection, conservation of natural resources, and the maintenance of ecological balance, but
the legality or illegality of the structure. Rather than treating this as an environmental issue then, focus
should not be diverted from the root cause of this debacle––compliance.
Ultimately, the purported power of review by a regional office of the DENR over respondents’ actions
exercised through an instrumentality of an ex-parte opinion, in this case, finds no sufficient basis. At best,
the legal opinion rendered, though perhaps informative, is not conclusive on the courts and should be taken
with a grain of salt.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision and
the Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 120042 dated August 13, 2013 and February 3,
2014, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED.
JOSE J. FERRER, JR., Petitioner, v. CITY MAYOR HERBERT BAUTISTA, CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON
CITY, CITY TREASURER OF QUEZON CITY, AND CITY ASSESSOR OF QUEZON CITY, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order (TRO) seeking to declare unconstitutional and illegal Ordinance Nos. SP2095, S-2011 and SP-2235, S-2013 on the Socialized Housing Tax and Garbage Fee, respectively, which are
being imposed by the respondents.
The Case
On October 17, 2011,1 respondent Quezon City Council enacted Ordinance No. SP-2095, S-2011,2 or
the Socialized Housing Tax of Quezon City, Section 3 of which provides:
SECTION 3. IMPOSITION. A special assessment equivalent to one-half percent (0.5%) on the assessed value
of land in excess of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php100,000.00) shall be collected by the City Treasurer
which shall accrue to the Socialized Housing Programs of the Quezon City Government. The special
assessment shall accrue to the General Fund under a special account to be established for the purpose.
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Effective for five (5) years, the Socialized Housing Tax (SHT) shall be utilized by the Quezon City
Government for the following projects: (a) land purchase/land banking; (b) improvement of current/existing
socialized housing facilities; (c) land development; (d) construction of core houses, sanitary cores, mediumrise buildings and other similar structures; and (e) financing of public-private partnership agreement of the
Quezon City Government and National Housing Authority (NHA) with the private sector.3 Under certain
conditions, a tax credit shall be enjoyed by taxpayers regularly paying the special assessment:
SECTION 7. TAX CREDIT. Taxpayers dutifully paying the special assessment tax as imposed by this
ordinance shall enjoy a tax credit. The tax credit may be availed of only after five (5) years of continue[d]
payment. Further, the taxpayer availing this tax credit must be a taxpayer in good standing as certified by
the City Treasurer and City Assessor.
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The tax credit to be granted shall be equivalent to the total amount of the special assessment paid by the
property owner, which shall be given as follows:
1. 6th year - 20%
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2. 7th year -
20%
3. 8th year -
20%
4. 9th year -
20%
5. 10th year chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
20%
Furthermore, only the registered owners may avail of the tax credit and may not be continued by the
subsequent property owners even if they are buyers in good faith, heirs or possessor of a right in whatever
legal capacity over the subject property.4
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On the other hand, Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-20135 was enacted on December 16, 2013 and took effect
ten days after when it was approved by respondent City Mayor.6 The proceeds collected from the garbage
fees on residential properties shall be deposited solely and exclusively in an earmarked special account
under the general fund to be utilized for garbage collections.7 Section 1 of the Ordinance set forth the
schedule and manner for the collection of garbage fees:
SECTION 1. The City Government of Quezon City in conformity with and in relation to Republic Act No.
7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991 HEREBY IMPOSES THE FOLLOWING
SCHEDULE AND MANNER FOR THE ANNUAL COLLECTION OF GARBAGE FEES, AS FOLLOWS:
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On all domestic households in Quezon City;
LAND AREA
Less than 200 sq. m.
201 sq. m. – 500 sq. m.
501 sq. m. – 1,000 sq. m.
1,001 sq. m. – 1,500 sq. m.
1,501 sq. m. – 2,000 sq. m. or more
IMPOSABLE FEE
PHP 100.00
PHP 200.00
PHP 300.00
PHP 400.00
PHP 500.00
On all condominium unit and socialized housing projects/units in Quezon City;
FLOOR AREA
Less than 40 sq. m.
41 sq. m. – 60 sq. m.
61 sq. m. – 100 sq. m.
101 sq. m. – 150 sq. m.
151 sq. m. – 200 sq. [m.] or more
IMPOSABLE FEE
PHP25.00
PHP50.00
PHP75.00
PHP100.00
PHP200.00
On high-rise Condominium Units
a) High-rise Condominium – The Homeowners Association of high- rise
condominiums shall pay the annual garbage fee on the total size of the
entire condominium and socialized Housing Unit and an additional
garbage fee shall be collected based on area occupied for every unit
already sold or being amortized.
b) High-rise apartment units – Owners of high-rise apartment units shall
pay the annual garbage fee on the total lot size of the entire apartment
and an additional garbage fee based on the schedule prescribed herein
for every unit occupied.
The collection of the garbage fee shall accrue on the first day of January and shall be paid simultaneously
with the payment of the real property tax, but not later than the first quarter installment.8 In case a
household owner refuses to pay, a penalty of 25% of the garbage fee due, plus an interest of 2% per month
or a fraction thereof, shall be charged.9
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Petitioner alleges that he is a registered co-owner of a 371-square-meter residential property in Quezon City
which is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 216288, and that, on January 7, 2014, he paid his
realty tax which already included the garbage fee in the sum of Php100.00.10
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The instant petition was filed on January 17, 2014. We issued a TRO on February 5, 2014, which enjoined
the enforcement of Ordinance Nos. SP-2095 and SP-2235 and required respondents to comment on the
petition without necessarily giving due course thereto.11
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Respondents filed their Comment12 with urgent motion to dissolve the TRO on February 17, 2014.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a Reply and a Memorandum on March 3, 2014 and September 8, 2014,
respectively.
Procedural Matters
A. Propriety of a Petition for Certiorari
Respondents are of the view that this petition for certiorari is improper since they are not tribunals, boards
or officers exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Petitioner, however, counters that in enacting
Ordinance Nos. SP-2095 and SP-2235, the Quezon City Council exercised quasi-judicial function because the
ordinances ruled against the property owners who must pay the SHT and the garbage fee, exacting from
them funds for basic essential public services that they should not be held liable. Even if a Rule 65 petition is
improper, petitioner still asserts that this Court, in a number of cases like in Rosario v. Court of
Appeals,13 has taken cognizance of an improper remedy in the interest of justice.
We agree that respondents neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor arrogated unto
themselves any judicial or quasi-judicial prerogatives.
A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function where he has the power to determine what the law is
and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine these questions and
adjudicate upon the rights of the parties.
Quasi-judicial function, on the other hand, is “a term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc., of public
administrative officers or bodies … required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a
judicial nature.”
Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a
law that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights
are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought before a tribunal, board, or officer clothed with
power and authority to determine the law and adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties.14
chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
For a writ of certiorari to issue, the following requisites must concur: (1) it must be directed against a
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer
must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. The enactment by the Quezon City Council of the assailed ordinances was done in the
exercise of its legislative, not judicial or quasi-judicial, function. Under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, or
the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC), local legislative power shall be exercised by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod for the city.15 Said law likewise is specific in providing that the power to impose a tax, fee, or
charge, or to generate revenue shall be exercised by the sanggunian of the local government unit concerned
through an appropriate ordinance.16
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Also, although the instant petition is styled as a petition for certiorari, it essentially seeks to declare the
unconstitutionality and illegality of the questioned ordinances. It, thus, partakes of the nature of a petition
for declaratory relief over which this Court has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction.17
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Despite these, a petition for declaratory relief may be treated as one for prohibition or mandamus, over
which We exercise original jurisdiction, in cases with far-reaching implications or one which raises
transcendental issues or questions that need to be resolved for the public good.18 The judicial policy is that
this Court will entertain direct resort to it when the redress sought cannot be obtained in the proper courts
or when exceptional and compelling circumstances warrant availment of a remedy within and calling for the
exercise of Our primary jurisdiction.19
ChanRoble sVirt ualawli bra ry
Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court lay down under what circumstances a petition for prohibition may be
filed:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or
his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further proceeding in the action or matter
specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
In a petition for prohibition against any tribunal, corporation, board, or person – whether exercising judicial,
quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions – who has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion, the petitioner prays that judgment be rendered, commanding the respondents to desist
from further proceeding in the action or matter specified in the petition. In this case, petitioner's primary
intention is to prevent respondents from implementing Ordinance Nos. SP-2095 and SP-2235. Obviously,
the writ being sought is in the nature of a prohibition, commanding desistance.
We consider that respondents City Mayor, City Treasurer, and City Assessor are
performing ministerialfunctions. A ministerial function is one that an officer or tribunal performs in the
context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard for the exercise of his or its own
judgment, upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.20 Respondent Mayor, as chief executive of the
city government, exercises such powers and performs such duties and functions as provided for by the LGC
and other laws.21 Particularly, he has the duty to ensure that all taxes and other revenues of the city are
collected, and that city funds are applied to the payment of expenses and settlement of obligations of the
city, in accordance with law or ordinance.22 On the other hand, under the LGC, all local taxes, fees, and
charges shall be collected by the provincial, city, municipal, or barangay treasurer, or their duly-authorized
deputies, while the assessor shall take charge, among others, of ensuring that all laws and policies
governing the appraisal and assessment of real properties for taxation purposes are properly
executed.23Anent the SHT, the Department of Finance (DOF) Local Finance Circular No. 1-97, dated April 16,
1997, is more specific:
6.3 The Assessor’s office of the Id.ntified LGU shall:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
a.
immediately undertake an inventory of lands within its jurisdiction which shall be subject to
the levy of the Social Housing Tax (SHT) by the local sanggunian concerned;
b.
inform the affected registered owners of the effectivity of the SHT; a list of the lands and
registered owners shall also be posted in 3 conspicuous places in the city/municipality;
c.
furnish the Treasurer’s office and the local sanggunian concerned of the list of lands
affected;
6.4 The Treasurer’s office shall:
a.
collect the Social Housing Tax on top of the Real Property Tax, SEF Tax and other special
assessments;
b.
report to the DOF, thru the Bureau of Local Government Finance, and the Mayor’s office the
monthly collections on Social Housing Tax (SHT). An annual report should likewise be
submitted to the HUDCC on the total revenues raised during the year pursuant to Sec. 43,
R.A. 7279 and the manner in which the same was disbursed.
Petitioner has adduced special and important reasons as to why direct recourse to Us should be allowed.
Aside from presenting a novel question of law, this case calls for immediate resolution since the challenged
ordinances adversely affect the property interests of all paying constituents of Quezon City. As well, this
petition serves as a test case for the guidance of other local government units (LGUs). Indeed, the petition
at bar is of transcendental importance warranting a relaxation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
In Social Justice Society (SJS) Officers, et al. v. Lim,24 the Court cited the case of Senator Jaworski v. Phil.
Amusement & Gaming Corp.,25 where We ratiocinated:
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the
transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the
technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. x x x This is in accordance
with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be eschewed.26
chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
B. Locus Standi of Petitioner
Respondents challenge petitioner’s legal standing to file this case on the ground that, in relation to Section 3
of Ordinance No. SP-2095, petitioner failed to allege his ownership of a property that has an assessed value
of more than Php100,000.00 and, with respect to Ordinance No. SP-2335, by what standing or personality
he filed the case to nullify the same. According to respondents, the petition is not a class suit, and that, for
not having specifically alleged that petitioner filed the case as a taxpayer, it could only be surmised whether
he is a party-in-interest who stands to be directly benefited or injured by the judgment in this case.
It is a general rule that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-ininterest, who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails
of the suit.
Jurisprudence defines interest as "material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as
distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. By real interest is
meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent,
subordinate, or consequential interest." "To qualify a person to be a real party-in-interest in whose name an
action must be prosecuted, he must appear to be the present real owner of the right sought to be
enforced."27
chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
“Legal standing” or locus standi calls for more than just a generalized grievance.28 The concept has been
defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged.29 The gist of the question of
standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.30
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A party challenging the constitutionality of a law, act, or statute must show “not only that the law is invalid,
but also that he has sustained or is in immediate, or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a
result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way.” It must be shown
that he has been, or is about to be, denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled, or that he
is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute complained of.31
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Tested by the foregoing, petitioner in this case clearly has legal standing to file the petition. He is a real
party-in-interest to assail the constitutionality and legality of Ordinance Nos. SP-2095 and SP-2235 because
respondents did not dispute that he is a registered co-owner of a residential property in Quezon City and
that he paid property tax which already included the SHT and the garbage fee. He has substantial right to
seek a refund of the payments he made and to stop future imposition. While he is a lone petitioner, his
cause of action to declare the validity of the subject ordinances is substantial and of paramount interest to
similarly situated property owners in Quezon City.
C. Litis Pendentia
Respondents move for the dismissal of this petition on the ground of litis pendentia. They claim that, as
early as February 22, 2012, a case entitled Alliance of Quezon City Homeowners, Inc., et al., v. Hon. Herbert
Bautista, et al., docketed as Civil Case No. Q-12-7-820, has been pending in the Quezon City Regional Trial
Court, Branch 104, which assails the legality of Ordinance No. SP-2095. Relying on City of Makati, et al. v.
Municipality (now City) of Taguig, et al.,32 respondents assert that there is substantial identity of parties
between the two cases because petitioner herein and plaintiffs in the civil case filed their respective cases as
taxpayers of Quezon City.
For petitioner, however, respondents’ contention is untenable since he is not a party in Alliance and does not
even have the remotest identity or association with the plaintiffs in said civil case. Moreover, respondents’
arguments would deprive this Court of its jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of laws under
Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.33
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Litis pendentia is a Latin term which literally means “a pending suit” and is variously referred to in some
decisions as lis pendens and auter action pendant.34 While it is normally connected with the control which
the court has on a property involved in a suit during the continuance proceedings, it is more interposed as a
ground for the dismissal of a civil action pending in court.35 In Film Development Council of the Philippines v.
SM Prime Holdings, Inc.,36 We elucidated:
Litis pendentia, as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, refers to a situation where two actions are
pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, so that one of them becomes unnecessary
and vexatious. It is based on the policy against multiplicity of suit and authorizes a court to dismiss a
case motu proprio.
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xxxx
The requisites in order that an action may be dismissed on the ground of litis pendentiaare: (a) the identity
of parties, or at least such as representing the same interest in both actions; (b) the identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and (c) the identity of the two
cases such that judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in
the other.
xxxx
The underlying principle of litis pendentia is the theory that a party is not allowed to vex another more than
once regarding the same subject matter and for the same cause of action. This theory is founded on the
public policy that the same subject matter should not be the subject of controversy in courts more than
once, in order that possible conflicting judgments may be avoided for the sake of the stability of the rights
and status of persons, and also to avoid the costs and expenses incident to numerous suits.
Among the several tests resorted to in ascertaining whether two suits relate to a single or common cause of
action are: (1) whether the same evidence would support and sustain both the first and second causes of
action; and (2) whether the defenses in one case may be used to substantiate the complaint in the other.
The determination of whether there is an identity of causes of action for purposes of litis pendentia is
inextricably linked with that of res judicata, each constituting an element of the other. In either case, both
relate to the sound practice of including, in a single litigation, the disposition of all issues relating to a cause
of action that is before a court.37
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There is substantial identity of the parties when there is a community of interest between a party in the first
case and a party in the second case albeit the latter was not impleaded in the first case.38 Moreover, the fact
that the positions of the parties are reversed, i.e., the plaintiffs in the first case are the defendants in the
second case or vice-versa, does not negate the identity of parties for purposes of determining whether the
case is dismissible on the ground of litis pendentia.39
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In this case, it is notable that respondents failed to attach any pleading connected with the alleged civil case
pending before the Quezon City trial court. Granting that there is substantial identity of parties between said
case and this petition, dismissal on the ground of litis pendentia still cannot be had in view of the absence of
the second and third requisites. There is no way for Us to determine whether both cases are based on the
same set of facts that require the presentation of the same evidence. Even if founded on the same set of
facts, the rights asserted and reliefs prayed for could be different. Moreover, there is no basis to rule that
the two cases are intimately related and/or intertwined with one another such that the judgment that may
be rendered in one, regardless of which party would be successful, would amount to res judicata in the
other.
D. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
Respondents contend that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies for his non-compliance with
Section 187 of the LGC, which mandates:
Section 187. Procedure for Approval and Effectivity of Tax Ordinances and Revenue Measures; Mandatory
Public Hearings. – The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in
accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted for the
purpose prior to the enactment thereof: Provided, further, That any question on the constitutionality or
legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the
effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the
date of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of suspending
the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein:
Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period
without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate
proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction.
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chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
The provision, the constitutionality of which was sustained in Drilon v. Lim,40 has been construed as
mandatory41 considering that –
A municipal tax ordinance empowers a local government unit to impose taxes. The power to tax is the most
effective instrument to raise needed revenues to finance and support the myriad activities of local
government units for the delivery of basic services essential to the promotion of the general welfare and
enhancement of peace, progress, and prosperity of the people. Consequently, any delay in implementing tax
measures would be to the detriment of the public. It is for this reason that protests over tax ordinances are
required to be done within certain time frames. x x x.42
chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
The obligatory nature of Section 187 was underscored in Hagonoy Market Vendor Asso. v. Municipality of
Hagonoy:43
x x x [T]he timeframe fixed by law for parties to avail of their legal remedies before competent courts is not
a “mere technicality” that can be easily brushed aside. The periods stated in Section 187 of the Local
Government Code are mandatory. x x x Being its lifeblood, collection of revenues by the government is of
paramount importance. The funds for the operation of its agencies and provision of basic services to its
inhabitants are largely derived from its revenues and collections. Thus, it is essential that the validity of
revenue measures is not left uncertain for a considerable length of time. Hence, the law provided a time
limit for an aggrieved party to assail the legality of revenue measures and tax ordinances.”44
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chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
Despite these cases, the Court, in Ongsuco, et al. v. Hon. Malones,45 held that there was no need for
petitioners therein to exhaust administrative remedies before resorting to the courts, considering that there
was only a pure question of law, the parties did not dispute any factual matter on which they had to present
evidence. Likewise, in Cagayan Electric Power and Light Co., Inc. v. City of Cagayan de Oro,46We relaxed the
application of the rules in view of the more substantive matters. For the same reasons, this petition is an
exception to the general rule.
Substantive Issues
Petitioner asserts that the protection of real properties from informal settlers and the collection of garbage
are basic and essential duties and functions of the Quezon City Government. By imposing the SHT and the
garbage fee, the latter has shown a penchant and pattern to collect taxes to pay for public services that
could be covered by its revenues from taxes imposed on property, idle land, business, transfer,
amusement, etc., as well as the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) from the National Government. For
petitioner, it is noteworthy that respondents did not raise the issue that the Quezon City Government is in
dire financial state and desperately needs money to fund housing for informal settlers and to pay for
garbage collection. In fact, it has not denied that its revenue collection in 2012 is in the sum of P13.69
billion.
Moreover, the imposition of the SHT and the garbage fee cannot be justified by the Quezon City Government
as an exercise of its power to create sources of income under Section 5, Article X of the 1987
Constitution.47 According to petitioner, the constitutional provision is not a carte blanche for the LGU to tax
everything under its territorial and political jurisdiction as the provision itself admits of guidelines and
limitations.
Petitioner further claims that the annual property tax is an ad valorem tax, a percentage of the assessed
value of the property, which is subject to revision every three (3) years in order to reflect an increase in the
market value of the property. The SHT and the garbage fee are actually increases in the property tax which
are not based on the assessed value of the property or its reassessment every three years; hence, in
violation of Sections 232 and 233 of the LGC.48
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For their part, respondents relied on the presumption in favor of the constitutionality of Ordinance Nos. SP2095 and SP-2235, invoking Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Victorias, etc.,49People v. Siton, et
al.,50 and Hon. Ermita v. Hon. Aldecoa-Delorino.51 They argue that the burden of establishing the invalidity
of an ordinance rests heavily upon the party challenging its constitutionality. They insist that the questioned
ordinances are proper exercises of police power similar to Telecom. & Broadcast Attys. of the Phils., Inc. v.
COMELEC52 and Social Justice Society (SJS), et al. v. Hon. Atienza, Jr.53 and that their enactment finds basis
in the social justice principle enshrined in Section 9,54 Article II of the 1987 Constitution.
As to the issue of publication, respondents argue that where the law provides for its own effectivity,
publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary so long as it is not punitive in character, citing Balbuna, et
al. v. Hon. Secretary of Education, et al.55 and Askay v. Cosalan.56 Thus, Ordinance No. SP-2095 took effect
after its publication, while Ordinance No. SP-2235 became effective after its approval on December 26,
2013.
Additionally, the parties articulate the following positions:
On the Socialized Housing Tax
Respondents emphasize that the SHT is pursuant to the social justice principle found in Sections 1 and 2,
Article XIII57 of the 1987 Constitution and Sections 2 (a)58 and 4359 of R.A. No. 7279, or the “Urban
Development and Housing Act of 1992 (UDHA).
Relying on Manila Race Horse Trainers Assn., Inc. v. De La Fuente,60 and Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v.
Municipality of Victorias, etc.,61 respondents assert that Ordinance No. SP-2095 applies equally to all real
property owners without discrimination. There is no way that the ordinance could violate the equal
protection clause because real property owners and informal settlers do not belong to the same class.
Ordinance No. SP-2095 is also not oppressive since the tax rate being imposed is consistent with the UDHA.
While the law authorizes LGUs to collect SHT on properties with an assessed value of more than P50,000.00,
the questioned ordinance only covers properties with an assessed value exceeding P100,000.00. As well, the
ordinance provides for a tax credit equivalent to the total amount of the special assessment paid by the
property owner beginning in the sixth (6th) year of the effectivity of the ordinance.
On the contrary, petitioner claims that the collection of the SHT is tantamount to a penalty imposed on real
property owners due to the failure of respondent Quezon City Mayor and Council to perform their duty to
secure and protect real property owners from informal settlers, thereby burdening them with the expenses
to provide funds for housing. For petitioner, the SHT cannot be viewed as a “charity” from real property
owners since it is forced, not voluntary.
Also, petitioner argues that the collection of the SHT is a kind of class legislation that violates the right of
property owners to equal protection of the laws since it favors informal settlers who occupy property not
their own and pay no taxes over law-abiding real property owners who pay income and realty taxes.
Petitioner further contends that respondents’ characterization of the SHT as “nothing more than an advance
payment on the real property tax” has no statutory basis. Allegedly, property tax cannot be collected before
it is due because, under the LGC, chartered cities are authorized to impose property tax based on the
assessed value and the general revision of assessment that is made every three (3) years.
As to the rationale of SHT stated in Ordinance No. SP-2095, which, in turn, was based on Section 43 of the
UDHA, petitioner asserts that there is no specific provision in the 1987 Constitution stating that the
ownership and enjoyment of property bear a social function. And even if there is, it is seriously doubtful and
far-fetched that the principle means that property owners should provide funds for the housing of informal
settlers and for home site development. Social justice and police power, petitioner believes, does not mean
imposing a tax on one, or that one has to give up something, for the benefit of another. At best, the
principle that property ownership and enjoyment bear a social function is but a reiteration of the Civil Law
principle that property should not be enjoyed and abused to the injury of other properties and the
community, and that the use of the property may be restricted by police power, the exercise of which is not
involved in this case.
Finally, petitioner alleges that 6 Bistekvilles will be constructed out of the SHT collected. Bistek is the
monicker of respondent City Mayor. The Bistekvilles makes it clear, therefore, that politicians will take the
credit for the tax imposed on real property owners.
On the Garbage Fee
Respondents claim that Ordinance No. S-2235, which is an exercise of police power, collects on the average
from every household a garbage fee in the meager amount of thirty-three (33) centavos per day compared
with the sum of P1,659.83 that the Quezon City Government annually spends for every household for
garbage collection and waste management.62
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In addition, there is no double taxation because the ordinance involves a fee. Even assuming that the
garbage fee is a tax, the same cannot be a direct duplicate tax as it is imposed on a different subject matter
and is of a different kind or character. Based on Villanueva, et al. v. City of Iloilo63 and Victorias Milling Co.,
Inc. v. Municipality of Victorias, etc.,64 there is no “taxing twice” because the real property tax is imposed on
ownership based on its assessed value, while the garbage fee is required on the domestic household. The
only reference to the property is the determination of the applicable rate and the facility of collection.
Petitioner argues, however, that Ordinance No. S-2235 cannot be justified as an exercise of police power.
The cases of Calalang v. Williams,65Patalinghug v. Court of Appeals,66 and Social Justice Society (SJS), et al.
v. Hon. Atienza, Jr.,67 which were cited by respondents, are inapplicable since the assailed ordinance is a
revenue measure and does not regulate the disposal or other aspect of garbage.
The subject ordinance, for petitioner, is discriminatory as it collects garbage fee only from domestic
households and not from restaurants, food courts, fast food chains, and other commercial dining places that
spew garbage much more than residential property owners.
Petitioner likewise contends that the imposition of garbage fee is tantamount to double taxation because
garbage collection is a basic and essential public service that should be paid out from property tax, business
tax, transfer tax, amusement tax, community tax certificate, other taxes, and the IRA of the Quezon City
Government. To bolster the claim, he states that the revenue collection of the Quezon City Government
reached Php13.69 billion in 2012. A small portion of said amount could be spent for garbage collection and
other essential services.
It is further noted that the Quezon City Government already collects garbage fee under Section 4768 of R.A.
No. 9003, or the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000, which authorizes LGUs to impose fees in
amounts sufficient to pay the costs of preparing, adopting, and implementing a solid waste management
plan, and that LGUs have access to the Solid Waste Management (SWM) Fund created under Section 4669 of
the same law. Also, according to petitioner, it is evident that Ordinance No. S-2235 is inconsistent with R.A.
No. 9003 for while the law encourages segregation, composting, and recycling of waste, the ordinance only
emphasizes the collection and payment of garbage fee; while the law calls for an active involvement of the
barangay in the collection, segregation, and recycling of garbage, the ordinance skips such mandate.
Lastly, in challenging the ordinance, petitioner avers that the garbage fee was collected even if the required
publication of its approval had not yet elapsed. He notes that on January 7, 2014, he paid his realty tax
which already included the garbage fee.
The Court’s Ruling
Respondents correctly argued that an ordinance, as in every law, is presumed valid.
An ordinance carries with it the presumption of validity. The question of reasonableness though is open to
judicial inquiry. Much should be left thus to the discretion of municipal authorities. Courts will go slow in
writing off an ordinance as unreasonable unless the amount is so excessive as to be prohibitive, arbitrary,
unreasonable, oppressive, or confiscatory. A rule which has gained acceptance is that factors relevant to
such an inquiry are the municipal conditions as a whole and the nature of the business made subject to
imposition.70
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For an ordinance to be valid though, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the LGU to enact and
must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it should also conform to the following
requirements: (1) not contrary to the Constitution or any statute; (2) not unfair or oppressive; (3) not
partial or discriminatory; (4) not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) general and consistent with public
policy; and (6) not unreasonable.71 As jurisprudence indicates, the tests are divided into the formal (i.e.,
whether the ordinance was enacted within the corporate powers of the LGU and whether it was passed in
accordance with the procedure prescribed by law), and the substantive (i.e., involving inherent merit, like
the conformity of the ordinance with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with
the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy).72
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An ordinance must pass muster under the test of constitutionality and the test of consistency with the
prevailing laws.73 If not, it is void.74 Ordinance should uphold the principle of the supremacy of the
Constitution.75 As to conformity with existing statutes, Batangas CATV, Inc. v. Court of Appeals76 has this to
say:
It is a fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of
the state. An ordinance in conflict with a state law of general character and statewide application is
universally held to be invalid. The principle is frequently expressed in the declaration that municipal
authorities, under a general grant of power, cannot adopt ordinances which infringe the spirit of a state law
or repugnant to the general policy of the state. In every power to pass ordinances given to a municipality,
there is an implied restriction that the ordinances shall be consistent with the general law. In the language
of Justice Isagani Cruz (ret.), this Court, in Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., ruled that:
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The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious. Municipal
governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative
powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to
the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local
government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first
place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.
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Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from the legislature. It
breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As it
may destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless there is some constitutional limitation on the right, the
legislature might, by a single act, and if we can suppose it capable of so great a folly and so great a wrong,
sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations in the State, and the corporation could not prevent it.
We know of no limitation on the right so far as to the corporation themselves are concerned. They are, so to
phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature.
This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been
enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without
meaning to detract from that policy, we here confirm that Congress retains control of the local government
units although in significantly reduced degree now than under our previous Constitutions. The power to
create still includes the power to destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to withhold or recall.
True, there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local
government units of the power to tax, which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large,
however, the national legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will
or modify or violate it.77
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LGUs must be reminded that they merely form part of the whole; that the policy of ensuring the autonomy
of local governments was never intended by the drafters of the 1987 Constitution to create an imperium in
imperio and install an intra-sovereign political subdivision independent of a single sovereign
state.78 “[M]unicipal corporations are bodies politic and corporate, created not only as local units of local
self-government, but as governmental agencies of the state. The legislature, by establishing a municipal
corporation, does not divest the State of any of its sovereignty; absolve itself from its right and duty to
administer the public affairs of the entire state; or divest itself of any power over the inhabitants of the
district which it possesses before the charter was granted.”79
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LGUs are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national
legislature; they are mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation.80“Congress
enacted the LGC as the implementing law for the delegation to the various LGUs of the State’s great powers,
namely: the police power, the power of eminent domain, and the power of taxation. The LGC was fashioned
to delineate the specific parameters and limitations to be complied with by each LGU in the exercise of these
delegated powers with the view of making each LGU a fully functioning subdivision of the State subject to
the constitutional and statutory limitations.”81
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Specifically, with regard to the power of taxation, it is indubitably the most effective instrument to raise
needed revenues in financing and supporting myriad activities of the LGUs for the delivery of basic services
essential to the promotion of the general welfare and the enhancement of peace, progress, and prosperity of
the people.82 As this Court opined in National Power Corp. v. City of Cabanatuan:83
In recent years, the increasing social challenges of the times expanded the scope of state activity, and
taxation has become a tool to realize social justice and the equitable distribution of wealth, economic
progress and the protection of local industries as well as public welfare and similar objectives. Taxation
assumes even greater significance with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Thenceforth, the power to
tax is no longer vested exclusively on Congress; local legislative bodies are now given direct authority to
levy taxes, fees and other charges pursuant to Article X, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
“Section 5. Each Local Government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenue, to levy
taxes, fees and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent
with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local
governments.”
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This paradigm shift results from the realization that genuine development can be achieved only by
strengthening local autonomy and promoting decentralization of governance. For a long time, the country’s
highly centralized government structure has bred a culture of dependence among local government leaders
upon the national leadership. It has also “dampened the spirit of initiative, innovation and imaginative
resilience in matters of local development on the part of local government leaders.” The only way to shatter
this culture of dependence is to give the LGUs a wider role in the delivery of basic services, and confer them
sufficient powers to generate their own sources for the purpose. To achieve this goal, Section 3 of Article X
of the 1987 Constitution mandates Congress to enact a local government code that will, consistent with the
basic policy of local autonomy, set the guidelines and limitations to this grant of taxing powers x x x84
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Fairly recently, We also stated in Pelizloy Realty Corporation v. Province of Benguet85 that:
The rule governing the taxing power of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays is summarized
in Icard v. City Council of Baguio:
It is settled that a municipal corporation unlike a sovereign state is clothed with no inherent power of
taxation. The charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power or the municipality, cannot
assume it. And the power when granted is to be construed in strictissimi juris. Any doubt or ambiguity
arising out of the term used in granting that power must be resolved against the municipality. Inferences,
implications, deductions – all these – have no place in the interpretation of the taxing power of a municipal
corporation. [Underscoring supplied]
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Per Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, “the power to tax is no longer vested exclusively on
Congress; local legislative bodies are now given direct authority to levy taxes, fees and other charges.”
Nevertheless, such authority is “subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide.”
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In conformity with Section 3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991. Book II of the LGC governs local taxation and
fiscal matters.86
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Indeed, LGUs have no inherent power to tax except to the extent that such power might be delegated to
them either by the basic law or by the statute.87 “Under the now prevailing Constitution, where there is
neither a grant nor a prohibition by statute, the tax power must be deemed to exist although Congress may
provide statutory limitations and guidelines. The basic rationale for the current rule is to safeguard the
viability and self-sufficiency of local government units by directly granting them general and broad tax
powers. Nevertheless, the fundamental law did not intend the delegation to be absolute and unconditional;
the constitutional objective obviously is to ensure that, while the local government units are being
strengthened and made more autonomous, the legislature must still see to it that (a) the taxpayer will not
be over-burdened or saddled with multiple and unreasonable impositions; (b) each local government unit
will have its fair share of available resources; (c) the resources of the national government will not be
unduly disturbed; and (d) local taxation will be fair, uniform, and just.”88
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Subject to the provisions of the LGC and consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy, every LGU is
now empowered and authorized to create its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and charges
which shall accrue exclusively to the local government unit as well as to apply its resources and assets for
productive, developmental, or welfare purposes, in the exercise or furtherance of their governmental or
proprietary powers and functions.89 The relevant provisions of the LGC which establish the parameters of the
taxing power of the LGUs are as follows:
SECTION 130. Fundamental Principles. – The following fundamental principles shall govern the exercise of
the taxing and other revenue-raising powers of local government units:
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(a) Taxation shall be uniform in each local government unit;
(b) Taxes, fees, charges and other impositions shall:
(1) be equitable and based as far as practicable on the taxpayer’s ability to pay;
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(2) be levied and collected only for public purposes;
(3) not be unjust, excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory;
(4) not be contrary to law, public policy, national economic policy, or in restraint of trade;
(c) The collection of local taxes, fees, charges and other impositions shall in no case be let to any private
person;
(d) The revenue collected pursuant to the provisions of this Code shall inure solely to the benefit of, and be
subject to the disposition by, the local government unit levying the tax, fee, charge or other imposition
unless otherwise specifically provided herein; and,
(e) Each local government unit shall, as far as practicable, evolve a progressive system of taxation.
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SECTION 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units. – Unless otherwise
provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays shall
not extend to the levy of the following:
(a) Income tax, except when levied on banks and other financial institutions;
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(b) Documentary stamp tax;
(c) Taxes on estates, inheritance, gifts, legacies and other acquisitions mortis causa, except as otherwise
provided herein;
(d) Customs duties, registration fees of vessel and wharfage on wharves, tonnage dues, and all other kinds
of customs fees, charges and dues except wharfage on wharves constructed and maintained by the local
government unit concerned;
(e) Taxes, fees, and charges and other impositions upon goods carried into or out of, or passing through,
the territorial jurisdictions of local government units in the guise of charges for wharfage, tolls for bridges or
otherwise, or other taxes, fees, or charges in any form whatsoever upon such goods or merchandise;
(f) Taxes, fees or charges on agricultural and aquatic products when sold by marginal farmers or fishermen;
(g) Taxes on business enterprises certified to by the Board of Investments as pioneer or non-pioneer for a
period of six (6) and four (4) years, respectively from the date of registration;
(h) Excise taxes on articles enumerated under the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, and taxes,
fees or charges on petroleum products;
(i) Percentage or value-added tax (VAT) on sales, barters or exchanges or similar transactions on goods or
services except as otherwise provided herein;
(j) Taxes on the gross receipts of transportation contractors and persons engaged in the transportation of
passengers or freight by hire and common carriers by air, land or water, except as provided in this Code;
(k) Taxes on premiums paid by way of reinsurance or retrocession;
(l) Taxes, fees or charges for the registration of motor vehicles and for the issuance of all kinds of licenses
or permits for the driving thereof, except tricycles;
(m) Taxes, fees, or other charges on Philippine products actually exported, except as otherwise provided
herein;
(n) Taxes, fees, or charges, on Countryside and Barangay Business Enterprises and cooperatives duly
registered under R.A. No. 6810 and Republic Act Numbered Sixty-nine hundred thirty-eight (R.A. No. 6938)
otherwise known as the “Cooperative Code of the Philippines” respectively; and
(o) Taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and
local government units.
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SECTION 151. Scope of Taxing Powers. – Except as otherwise provided in this Code, the city, may levy the
taxes, fees, and charges which the province or municipality may impose: Provided, however, That the taxes,
fees and charges levied and collected by highly urbanized and independent component cities shall accrue to
them and distributed in accordance with the provisions of this Code.
The rates of taxes that the city may levy may exceed the maximum rates allowed for the province or
municipality by not more than fifty percent (50%) except the rates of professional and amusement taxes.
SECTION 186. Power To Levy Other Taxes, Fees or Charges. – Local government units may exercise the
power to levy taxes, fees or charges on any base or subject not otherwise specifically enumerated herein or
taxed under the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, or other applicable laws:
Provided, That the taxes, fees, or charges shall not be unjust, excessive, oppressive, confiscatory or
contrary to declared national policy: Provided, further, That the ordinance levying such taxes, fees or
charges shall not be enacted without any prior public hearing conducted for the purpose.
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On the Socialized Housing Tax
Contrary to petitioner’s submission, the 1987 Constitution explicitly espouses the view that the use of
property bears a social function and that all economic agents shall contribute to the common good.90 The
Court already recognized this in Social Justice Society (SJS), et al. v. Hon. Atienza, Jr.:91
Property has not only an individual function, insofar as it has to provide for the needs of the owner, but also
a social function insofar as it has to provide for the needs of the other members of society. The principle is
this:
Police power proceeds from the principle that every holder of property, however absolute and unqualified
may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it shall not be injurious to the equal
enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the right of
the community. Rights of property, like all other social and conventional rights, are subject to reasonable
limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious, and to such reasonable restraints
and regulations established by law as the legislature, under the governing and controlling power vested in
them by the constitution, may think necessary and expedient.92
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Police power, which flows from the recognition that salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the people is
the supreme law), is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes and ordinances to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the
people.93 Property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the
objectives of the government in the exercise of police power. 94 In this jurisdiction, it is well-entrenched that
taxation may be made the implement of the state’s police power.95
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Ordinance No. SP-2095 imposes a Socialized Housing Tax equivalent to 0.5% on the assessed value of land
in excess of Php100,000.00. This special assessment is the same tax referred to in R.A. No. 7279 or the
UDHA.96 The SHT is one of the sources of funds for urban development and housing program.97Section 43 of
the law provides:
Sec. 43. Socialized Housing Tax. – Consistent with the constitutional principle that the ownership and
enjoyment of property bear a social function and to raise funds for the Program, all local government units
are hereby authorized to impose an additional one-half percent (0.5%) tax on the assessed value of all
lands in urban areas in excess of Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00).
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The rationale of the SHT is found in the preambular clauses of the subject ordinance, to wit:
WHEREAS, the imposition of additional tax is intended to provide the City Government with sufficient funds
to initiate, implement and undertake Socialized Housing Projects and other related preliminary activities;
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WHEREAS, the imposition of 0.5% tax will benefit the Socialized Housing Programs and Projects of the City
Government, specifically the marginalized sector through the acquisition of properties for human
settlements;
WHEREAS, the removal of the urban blight will definitely increase fair market value of properties in the
city[.]
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The above-quoted are consistent with the UDHA, which the LGUs are charged to implement in their
respective localities in coordination with the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council, the
national housing agencies, the Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor, the private sector, and other
non-government organizations.98 It is the declared policy of the State to undertake a comprehensive and
continuing urban development and housing program that shall, among others, uplift the conditions of the
underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban areas and in resettlement areas, and provide for the rational
use and development of urban land in order to bring about, among others, reduction in urban dysfunctions,
particularly those that adversely affect public health, safety and ecology, and access to land and housing by
the underprivileged and homeless citizens.99 Urban renewal and resettlement shall include the rehabilitation
and development of blighted and slum areas100 and the resettlement of program beneficiaries in accordance
with the provisions of the UDHA.101
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Under the UDHA, socialized housing102 shall be the primary strategy in providing shelter for the
underprivileged and homeless.103 The LGU or the NHA, in cooperation with the private developers and
concerned agencies, shall provide socialized housing or resettlement areas with basic services and facilities
such as potable water, power and electricity, and an adequate power distribution system, sewerage
facilities, and an efficient and adequate solid waste disposal system; and access to primary roads and
transportation facilities.104 The provisions for health, education, communications, security, recreation, relief
and welfare shall also be planned and be given priority for implementation by the LGU and concerned
agencies in cooperation with the private sector and the beneficiaries themselves.105
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Moreover, within two years from the effectivity of the UDHA, the LGUs, in coordination with the NHA, are
directed to implement the relocation and resettlement of persons living in danger areas such as esteros,
railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places like sidewalks,
roads, parks, and playgrounds.106 In coordination with the NHA, the LGUs shall provide relocation or
resettlement sites with basic services and facilities and access to employment and livelihood opportunities
sufficient to meet the basic needs of the affected families.107
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Clearly, the SHT charged by the Quezon City Government is a tax which is within its power to impose. Aside
from the specific authority vested by Section 43 of the UDHA, cities are allowed to exercise such other
powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental
to efficient and effective provision of the basic services and facilities which include, among others, programs
and projects for low-cost housing and other mass dwellings.108 The collections made accrue to its socialized
housing programs and projects. The tax is not a pure exercise of taxing power or merely to raise revenue; it
is levied with a regulatory purpose. The levy is primarily in the exercise of the police power for the general
welfare of the entire city. It is greatly imbued with public interest. Removing slum areas in Quezon City is
not only beneficial to the underprivileged and homeless constituents but advantageous to the real property
owners as well. The situation will improve the value of the their property investments, fully enjoying the
same in view of an orderly, secure, and safe community, and will enhance the quality of life of the poor,
making them law-abiding constituents and better consumers of business products.
Though broad and far-reaching, police power is subordinate to constitutional limitations and is subject to the
requirement that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public good.109 In the words of City of Manila v.
Hon. Laguio, Jr.:110
The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with utmost observance of the
rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the law. Such power cannot be exercised
whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically as its exercise is subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction
demanded by the respect and regard due to the prescription of the fundamental law, particularly those
forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual rights, it bears emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the
extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. Due
process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty
and property.
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To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance, and
to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights,
but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals. It must be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of
the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes
of the police measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of
protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted
to be arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary
intrusion into private rights – a violation of the due process clause.111
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As with the State, LGUs may be considered as having properly exercised their police power only if there is a
lawful subject and a lawful method or, to be precise, if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of
the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise and (2) the means
employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals.112
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In this case, petitioner argues that the SHT is a penalty imposed on real property owners because it burdens
them with expenses to provide funds for the housing of informal settlers, and that it is a class legislation
since it favors the latter who occupy properties which is not their own and pay no taxes.
We disagree.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.113 The guarantee means that no person or class of persons
shall be denied the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like
circumstances.114 Similar subjects should not be treated differently so as to give undue favor to some and
unjustly discriminate against others.115 The law may, therefore, treat and regulate one class differently from
another class provided there are real and substantial differences to distinguish one class from another.116
ChanRobles Virtualawl ibra ry
An ordinance based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional guaranty of the equal
protection of the law. The requirements for a valid and reasonable classification are: (1) it must rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class.117
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For the purpose of undertaking a comprehensive and continuing urban development and housing program,
the disparities between a real property owner and an informal settler as two distinct classes are too obvious
and need not be discussed at length. The differentiation conforms to the practical dictates of justice and
equity and is not discriminatory within the meaning of the Constitution. Notably, the public purpose of a tax
may legally exist even if the motive which impelled the legislature to impose the tax was to favor one over
another.118 It is inherent in the power to tax that a State is free to select the subjects of
taxation.119 Inequities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation or exemption
infringe no constitutional limitation.120
ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary
Further, the reasonableness of Ordinance No. SP-2095 cannot be disputed. It is not confiscatory or
oppressive since the tax being imposed therein is below what the UDHA actually allows. As pointed out by
respondents, while the law authorizes LGUs to collect SHT on lands with an assessed value of more than
P50,000.00, the questioned ordinance only covers lands with an assessed value exceeding P100,000.00.
Even better, on certain conditions, the ordinance grants a tax credit equivalent to the total amount of the
special assessment paid beginning in the sixth (6th) year of its effectivity. Far from being obnoxious, the
provisions of the subject ordinance are fair and just.
On the Garbage Fee
In the United States of America, it has been held that the authority of a municipality to regulate garbage
falls within its police power to protect public health, safety, and welfare.121 As opined, the purposes and
policy underpinnings of the police power to regulate the collection and disposal of solid waste are: (1) to
preserve and protect the public health and welfare as well as the environment by minimizing or eliminating a
source of disease and preventing and abating nuisances; and (2) to defray costs and ensure financial
stability of the system for the benefit of the entire community, with the sum of all charges marshalled and
designed to pay for the expense of a systemic refuse disposal scheme.122
ChanRobles Vi rtualawl ib rary
Ordinances regulating waste removal carry a strong presumption of validity.123 Not surprisingly, the
overwhelming majority of U.S. cases addressing a city's authority to impose mandatory garbage service and
fees have upheld the ordinances against constitutional and statutory challenges.124
ChanRoble sVirt ua lawlibra ry
A municipality has an affirmative duty to supervise and control the collection of garbage within its corporate
limits.125 The LGC specifically assigns the responsibility of regulation and oversight of solid waste to local
governing bodies because the Legislature determined that such bodies were in the best position to develop
efficient waste management programs.126 To impose on local governments the responsibility to regulate
solid waste but not grant them the authority necessary to fulfill the same would lead to an absurd
result.”127 As held in one U.S. case:
x x x When a municipality has general authority to regulate a particular subject matter, the manner and
means of exercising those powers, where not specifically prescribed by the legislature, are left to the
discretion of the municipal authorities. x x x Leaving the manner of exercising municipal powers to the
discretion of municipal authorities "implies a range of reasonableness within which a municipality's exercise
of discretion will not be interfered with or upset by the judiciary."128
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
In this jurisdiction, pursuant to Section 16 of the LGC and in the proper exercise of its corporate powers
under Section 22 of the same, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Quezon City, like other local legislative
bodies, is empowered to enact ordinances, approve resolutions, and appropriate funds for the general
welfare of the city and its inhabitants.129 Section 16 of the LGC provides:
SECTION 16. General Welfare. – Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted,
those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient
and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within
their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other
things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the
people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant
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scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social
justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the
comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
The general welfare clause is the delegation in statutory form of the police power of the State to
LGUs.130 The provisions related thereto are liberally interpreted to give more powers to LGUs in accelerating
economic development and upgrading the quality of life for the people in the community.131Wide discretion
is vested on the legislative authority to determine not only what the interests of the public require but also
what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests since the Sanggunian is in the best
position to determine the needs of its constituents.132
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One of the operative principles of decentralization is that, subject to the provisions of the LGC and national
policies, the LGUs shall share with the national government the responsibility in the management and
maintenance of ecological balance within their territorial jurisdiction.133 In this regard, cities are allowed to
exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary,
appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic services and facilities which include,
among others, solid waste disposal system or environmental management system and services or facilities
related to general hygiene and sanitation.134 R.A. No. 9003, or the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act
of 2000,135 affirms this authority as it expresses that the LGUs shall be primarily responsible for the
implementation and enforcement of its provisions within their respective jurisdictions while establishing a
cooperative effort among the national government, other local government units, non-government
organizations, and the private sector.136
ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary
Necessarily, LGUs are statutorily sanctioned to impose and collect such reasonable fees and charges for
services rendered.137 “Charges” refer to pecuniary liability, as rents or fees against persons or property,
while “Fee” means a charge fixed by law or ordinance for the regulation or inspection of a business or
activity.138
ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary
The fee imposed for garbage collections under Ordinance No. SP-2235 is a charge fixed for the regulation of
an activity. The basis for this could be discerned from the foreword of said Ordinance, to wit:
WHEREAS, Quezon City being the largest and premiere city in the Philippines in terms of population and
urban geographical areas, apart from being competent and efficient in the delivery of public service,
apparently requires a big budgetary allocation in order to address the problems relative and connected to
the prompt and efficient delivery of basic services such as the effective system of waste management, public
information programs on proper garbage and proper waste disposal, including the imposition of waste
regulatory measures;
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
WHEREAS, to help augment the funds to be spent for the city’s waste management system, the City
Government through the Sangguniang Panlungsod deems it necessary to impose a schedule of reasonable
fees or charges for the garbage collection services for residential (domestic household) that it renders to the
public.
chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
Certainly, as opposed to petitioner’s opinion, the garbage fee is not a tax. In Smart Communications, Inc. v.
Municipality of Malvar, Batangas,139 the Court had the occasion to distinguish these two concepts:
In Progressive Development Corporation v. Quezon City, the Court declared that “if the generating of
revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if regulation
is the primary purpose, the fact that incidentally revenue is also obtained does not make the imposition a
tax.”
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
In Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Victorias, the Court reiterated that the purpose and effect of
the imposition determine whether it is a tax or a fee, and that the lack of any standards for such imposition
gives the presumption that the same is a tax.
We accordingly say that the designation given by the municipal authorities does not decide whether the
imposition is properly a license tax or a license fee. The determining factors are the purpose and effect of
the imposition as may be apparent from the provisions of the ordinance. Thus, “[w]hen no police inspection,
supervision, or regulation is provided, nor any standard set for the applicant to establish, or that he agrees
to attain or maintain, but any and all persons engaged in the business designated, without qualification or
hindrance, may come, and a license on payment of the stipulated sum will issue, to do business, subject to
no prescribed rule of conduct and under no guardian eye, but according to the unrestrained judgment or
fancy of the applicant and licensee, the presumption is strong that the power of taxation, and not the police
power, is being exercised.”
chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
In Georgia, U.S.A., assessments for garbage collection services have been consistently treated as a fee and
not a tax.140 In another U.S. case,141 the garbage fee was considered as a "service charge" rather than a tax
as it was actually a fee for a service given by the city which had previously been provided at no cost to its
citizens.
Hence, not being a tax, the contention that the garbage fee under Ordinance No. SP-2235 violates the rule
on double taxation142 must necessarily fail.
Nonetheless, although a special charge, tax, or assessment may be imposed by a municipal corporation, it
must be reasonably commensurate to the cost of providing the garbage service.143 To pass judicial scrutiny,
a regulatory fee must not produce revenue in excess of the cost of the regulation because such fee will be
construed as an illegal tax when the revenue generated by the regulation exceeds the cost of the
regulation.144
ChanRoble sVirtualawl ibra ry
Petitioner argues that the Quezon City Government already collects garbage fee under Section 47 of R.A.
No. 9003, which authorizes LGUs to impose fees in amounts sufficient to pay the costs of preparing,
adopting, and implementing a solid waste management plan, and that it has access to the SWM Fund under
Section 46 of the same law. Moreover, Ordinance No. S-2235 is inconsistent with R.A. No. 9003, because
the ordinance emphasizes the collection and payment of garbage fee with no concern for segregation,
composting and recycling of wastes. It also skips the mandate of the law calling for the active involvement
of the barangay in the collection, segregation, and recycling of garbage.
We now turn to the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 9003.
Under R.A. No. 9003, it is the declared policy of the State to adopt a systematic, comprehensive and
ecological solid waste management program which shall, among others, ensure the proper segregation,
collection, transport, storage, treatment and disposal of solid waste through the formulation and adoption of
the best environmental practices in ecological waste management.145 The law provides that segregation and
collection of solid waste shall be conducted at the barangay level, specifically for biodegradable,
compostable and reusable wastes, while the collection of non-recyclable materials and special wastes shall
be the responsibility of the municipality or city.146 Mandatory segregation of solid wastes shall primarily be
conducted at the source, to include household, institutional, industrial, commercial and agricultural
sources.147Segregation at source refers to a solid waste management practice of separating, at the point of
origin, different materials found in solid waste in order to promote recycling and re-use of resources and to
reduce the volume of waste for collection and disposal.148 Based on Rule XVII of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative Order No. 2001-34, Series of 2001,149 which is
the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9003, barangays shall be responsible for the
collection, segregation, and recycling of biodegradable, recyclable, compostable and reusable wastes.150 For
the purpose, a Materials Recovery Facility (MRF), which shall receive biodegradable wastes for composting
and mixed non-biodegradable wastes for final segregation, re-use and recycling, is to be established in
every barangay or cluster of barangays.151
ChanRobles Virtualawl ibra ry
According to R.A. 9003, an LGU, through its local solid waste management board, is mandated by law to
prepare a 10-year solid waste management plan consistent with the National Solid Waste Management
Framework.152 The plan shall be for the re-use, recycling and composting of wastes generated in its
jurisdiction; ensure the efficient management of solid waste generated within its jurisdiction; and place
primary emphasis on implementation of all feasible re-use, recycling, and composting programs while
identifying the amount of landfill and transformation capacity that will be needed for solid waste which
cannot be re-used, recycled, or composted.153 One of the components of the solid waste management plan
is source reduction:
(e) Source reduction – The source reduction component shall include a program and implementation
schedule which shows the methods by which the LGU will, in combination with the recycling and composting
components, reduce a sufficient amount of solid waste disposed of in accordance with the diversion
requirements of Section 20.
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The source reduction component shall describe the following:
(1) strategies in reducing the volume of solid waste generated at source;
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(2) measures for implementing such strategies and the resources necessary to carry out such activities;
(3) other appropriate waste reduction technologies that may also be considered, provided that such
technologies conform with the standards set pursuant to this Act;
(4) the types of wastes to be reduced pursuant to Section 15 of this Act;
(5) the methods that the LGU will use to determine the categories of solid wastes to be diverted from
disposal at a disposal facility through re-use, recycling and composting; and
(6) new facilities and of expansion of existing facilities which will be needed to implement re-use, recycling
and composting.
chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
The LGU source reduction component shall include the evaluation and identification of rate structures and
fees for the purpose of reducing the amount of waste generated, and other source reduction strategies,
including but not limited to, programs and economic incentives provided under Sec. 45 of this Act to reduce
the use of non-recyclable materials, replace disposable materials and products with reusable materials and
products, reduce packaging, and increase the efficiency of the use of paper, cardboard, glass, metal, and
other materials. The waste reduction activities of the community shall also take into account, among others,
local capability, economic viability, technical requirements, social concerns, disposition of residual waste and
environmental impact: Provided, That, projection of future facilities needed and estimated cost shall be
incorporated in the plan. x x x154
chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
The solid waste management plan shall also include an implementation schedule for solid waste diversion:
SEC. 20. Establishing Mandatory Solid Waste Diversion. – Each LGU plan shall include an implementation
schedule which shows that within five (5) years after the effectivity of this Act, the LGU shall divert at least
25% of all solid waste from waste disposal facilities through re-use, recycling, and composting activities and
other resource recovery activities: Provided, That the waste diversion goals shall be increased every three
(3) years thereafter: Provided, further, That nothing in this Section prohibits a local government unit from
implementing re-use, recycling, and composting activities designed to exceed the goal.
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
The baseline for the twenty-five percent (25%) shall be derived from the waste characterization result155that
each LGU is mandated to undertake.156
ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary
In accordance with Section 46 of R.A. No. 9003, the LGUs are entitled to avail of the SWM Fund on the basis
of their approved solid waste management plan. Aside from this, they may also impose SWM Fees under
Section 47 of the law, which states:
SEC. 47. Authority to Collect Solid Waste Management Fees – The local government unit shall impose fees in
amounts sufficient to pay the costs of preparing, adopting, and implementing a solid waste management
plan prepared pursuant to this Act. The fees shall be based on the following minimum factors:
(a) types of solid waste;
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
(b) amount/volume of waste; and
(c) distance of the transfer station to the waste management facility.
chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
The fees shall be used to pay the actual costs incurred by the LGU in collecting the local fees. In determining
the amounts of the fees, an LGU shall include only those costs directly related to the adoption and
implementation of the plan and the setting and collection of the local fees.
chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
Rule XVII of the IRR of R.A. No. 9003 sets forth the details:
Section 1. Power to Collect Solid Waste Management Fees. – The Local SWM Board/Local SWM Cluster Board
shall impose fees on the SWM services provided for by the LGU and/or any authorized organization or unit.
In determining the amounts of the fees, a Local SWM Board/Local SWM Cluster Board shall include only
those costs directly related to the adoption and implementation of the SWM Plan and the setting and
collection of the local fees. This power to impose fees may be ceded to the private sector and civil society
groups which have been duly accredited by the Local SWM Board/Local SWM Cluster Board; provided, the
SWM fees shall be covered by a Contract or Memorandum of Agreement between the respective board and
the private sector or civil society group.
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The fees shall pay for the costs of preparing, adopting and implementing a SWM Plan prepared pursuant to
the Act. Further, the fees shall also be used to pay the actual costs incurred in collecting the local fees and
for project sustainability.
Section 2. Basis of SWM Service Fees
Reasonable SWM service fees shall be computed based on but not limited to the following minimum factors:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
a) Types of solid waste to include special waste
b) amount/volume of waste
c) distance of the transfer station to the waste management facility
d) capacity or type of LGU constituency
e) cost of construction
f) cost of management
g) type of technology
chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
Section 3. Collection of Fees. – Fees may be collected corresponding to the following levels:
a) Barangay – The Barangay may impose fees for collection and segregation of biodegradable, compostable
and reusable wastes from households, commerce, other sources of domestic wastes, and for the use of
Barangay MRFs. The computation of the fees shall be established by the respective SWM boards. The
manner of collection of the fees shall be dependent on the style of administration of respective Barangay
Councils. However, all transactions shall follow the Commission on Audit rules on collection of fees.
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b) Municipality – The municipal and city councils may impose fees on the barangay MRFs for the collection
and transport of non-recyclable and special wastes and for the disposal of these into the sanitary landfill.
The level and procedure for exacting fees shall be defined by the Local SWM Board/Local SWM Cluster Board
and supported by LGU ordinances, however, payments shall be consistent with the accounting system of
government.
c) Private Sector/Civil Society Group – On the basis of the stipulations of contract or Memorandum of
Agreement, the private sector or civil society group shall impose fees for collection, transport and tipping in
their SLFs. Receipts and invoices shall be issued to the paying public or to the government.
chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
From the afore-quoted provisions, it is clear that the authority of a municipality or city to impose fees is
limited to the collection and transport of non-recyclable and special wastes and for the disposal of these
into the sanitary landfill. Barangays, on the other hand, have the authority to impose fees for the collection
and segregation of biodegradable, compostable and reusable wastes from households, commerce,
other sources of domestic wastes, and for the use of barangay MRFs. This is but consistent with Section 10
of R.A. No. 9003 directing that segregation and collection of biodegradable, compostable and reusable
wastes shall be conducted at the barangay level, while the collection of non-recyclable materials and special
wastes shall be the responsibility of the municipality or city.
In this case, the alleged bases of Ordinance No. S-2235 in imposing the garbage fee is the volume of waste
currently generated by each person in Quezon City, which purportedly stands at 0.66 kilogram per day, and
the increasing trend of waste generation for the past three years.157 Respondents did not elaborate any
further. The figure presented does not reflect the specific types of wastes generated – whether residential,
market, commercial, industrial, construction/demolition, street waste, agricultural, agro-industrial,
institutional, etc. It is reasonable, therefore, for the Court to presume that such amount pertains to the
totality of wastes, without any distinction, generated by Quezon City constituents. To reiterate, however, the
authority of a municipality or city to impose fees extends only to those related to the collection and
transport of non-recyclable and special wastes.
Granting, for the sake of argument, that the 0.66 kilogram of solid waste per day refers only to nonrecyclable and special wastes, still, We cannot sustain the validity of Ordinance No. S-2235. It violates the
equal protection clause of the Constitution and the provisions of the LGC that an ordinance must be
equitable and based as far as practicable on the taxpayer’s ability to pay, and not unjust, excessive,
oppressive, confiscatory.158
ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary
In the subject ordinance, the rates of the imposable fee depend on land or floor area and whether the payee
is an occupant of a lot, condominium, social housing project or apartment. For easy reference, the relevant
provision is again quoted below:
On all domestic households in Quezon City;
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LAND AREA
IMPOSABLE FEE
Less than 200 sq. m.
201 sq. m. – 500 sq. m.
501 sq. m. – 1,000 sq. m.
1,001 sq. m. – 1,500 sq. m.
1,501 sq. m. – 2,000 sq. m.
or more
PHP
PHP
PHP
PHP
100.00
200.00
300.00
400.00
PHP 500.00
On all condominium unit and socialized housing projects/units in Quezon City;
FLOOR AREA
Less than 40 sq. m.
41 sq. m. – 60 sq. m.
61 sq. m. – 100 sq. m.
101 sq. m. – 150 sq. m.
151 sq. m. – 200 sq. [m.] or
more
IMPOSABLE FEE
PHP25.00
PHP50.00
PHP75.00
PHP100.00
PHP200.00
On high-rise Condominium Units
a) High-rise Condominium – The Homeowners Association of high rise
condominiums shall pay the annual garbage fee on the total size of the
entire condominium and socialized Housing Unit and an additional
garbage fee shall be collected based on area occupied for every unit
already sold or being amortized.
b) High-rise apartment units – Owners of high-rise apartment units shall
pay the annual garbage fee on the total lot size of the entire apartment
and an additional garbage fee based on the schedule prescribed herein
for every unit occupied.
For the purpose of garbage collection, there is, in fact, no substantial distinction between an occupant of a
lot, on one hand, and an occupant of a unit in a condominium, socialized housing project or apartment, on
the other hand. Most likely, garbage output produced by these types of occupants is uniform and does not
vary to a large degree; thus, a similar schedule of fee is both just and equitable.159
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The rates being charged by the ordinance are unjust and inequitable: a resident of a 200 sq. m. unit in a
condominium or socialized housing project has to pay twice the amount than a resident of a lot similar in
size; unlike unit occupants, all occupants of a lot with an area of 200 sq. m. and less have to pay a fixed
rate of Php100.00; and the same amount of garbage fee is imposed regardless of whether the resident is
from a condominium or from a socialized housing project.
Indeed, the classifications under Ordinance No. S-2235 are not germane to its declared purpose of
“promoting shared responsibility with the residents to attack their common mindless attitude in overconsuming the present resources and in generating waste.”160 Instead of simplistically categorizing the
payee into land or floor occupant of a lot or unit of a condominium, socialized housing project or apartment,
respondent City Council should have considered factors that could truly measure the amount of wastes
generated and the appropriate fee for its collection. Factors include, among others, household age and size,
accessibility to waste collection, population density of the barangay or district, capacity to pay, and actual
occupancy of the property. R.A. No. 9003 may also be looked into for guidance. Under said law, SWM
service fees may be computed based on minimum factors such as types of solid waste to include special
waste, amount/volume of waste, distance of the transfer station to the waste management facility, capacity
or type of LGU constituency, cost of construction, cost of management, and type of technology. With respect
to utility rates set by municipalities, a municipality has the right to classify consumers under reasonable
classifications based upon factors such as the cost of service, the purpose for which the service or the
product is received, the quantity or the amount received, the different character of the service furnished, the
time of its use or any other matter which presents a substantial difference as a ground of distinction.161
c ralawlawli bra ry
[A] lack of uniformity in the rate charged is not necessarily unlawful discrimination. The establishment of
classifications and the charging of different rates for the several classes is not unreasonable and does not
violate the requirements of equality and uniformity. Discrimination to be unlawful must draw an unfair line
or strike an unfair balance between those in like circumstances having equal rights and privileges.
Discrimination with respect to rates charged does not vitiate unless it is arbitrary and without a reasonable
fact basis or justification.162
chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
On top of an unreasonable classification, the penalty clause of Ordinance No. SP-2235, which states:
SECTION 3. Penalty Clause – A penalty of 25% of the garbage fee due plus an interest of 2% per month or a
fraction thereof (interest) shall be charged against a household owner who refuses to pay the garbage fee
herein imposed.
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chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
lacks the limitation required by Section 168 of the LGC, which provides:
SECTION 168. Surcharges and Penalties on Unpaid Taxes, Fees, or Charges. – The sanggunian may impose
a surcharge not exceeding twenty-five (25%) of the amount of taxes, fees or charges not paid on time and
an interest at the rate not exceeding two percent (2%) per month of the unpaid taxes, fees or charges
including surcharges, until such amount is fully paid but in no case shall the total interest on the
unpaid amount or portion thereof exceed thirty-six (36) months. (Emphasis supplied)
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
Finally, on the issue of publication of the two challenged ordinances.
Petitioner argues that the garbage fee was collected even if the required publication of its approval had not
yet elapsed. He notes that he paid his realty tax on January 7, 2014 which already included the garbage fee.
Respondents counter that if the law provides for its own effectivity, publication in the Official Gazette is not
necessary so long as it is not penal in nature. Allegedly, Ordinance No. SP-2095 took effect after its
publication while Ordinance No. SP-2235 became effective after its approval on December 26, 2013.
The pertinent provisions of the LGC state:
SECTION 59. Effectivity of Ordinances or Resolutions. – (a) Unless otherwise stated in the ordinance or
the resolution approving the local development plan and public investment program, the same shall take
effect after ten (10) days from the date a copy thereof is posted in a bulletin board at the entrance of
the provincial capitol or city, municipal, or barangay hall, as the case may be, and in at least two (2) other
conspicuous places in the local government unit concerned.
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(b) The secretary to the sanggunian concerned shall cause the posting of an ordinance or resolution in the
bulletin board at the entrance of the provincial capitol and the city, municipal, or barangay hall in at least
two (2) conspicuous places in the local government unit concerned not later than five (5) days after
approval thereof.
The text of the ordinance or resolution shall be disseminated and posted in Filipino or English and in the
language or dialect understood by the majority of the people in the local government unit concerned, and
the secretary to the sanggunian shall record such fact in a book kept for the purpose, stating the dates of
approval and posting.
(c) The gist of all ordinances with penal sanctions shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation
within the province where the local legislative body concerned belongs. In the absence of any newspaper of
general circulation within the province, posting of such ordinances shall be made in all municipalities and
cities of the province where the sanggunian of origin is situated.
(d) In the case of highly urbanized and independent component cities, the main features of the ordinance or
resolution duly enacted or adopted shall, in addition to being posted, be published once in a local
newspaper of general circulation within the city: Provided, That in the absence thereof the
ordinance or resolution shall be published in any newspaper of general circulation.
SECTION 188. Publication of Tax Ordinances and Revenue Measures. – Within ten (10) days after their
approval, certified true copies of all provincial, city, and municipal tax ordinances or revenue measures
shall be published in full for three (3) consecutive days in a newspaper of local circulation:
Provided, however, That in provinces, cities and municipalities where there are no newspapers of local
circulation, the same may be posted in at least two (2) conspicuous and publicly accessible places.
(Emphasis supplied)
chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
On October 17, 2011, respondent Quezon City Council enacted Ordinance No. SP-2095, which provides that
it would take effect after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.163 On the other hand,
Ordinance No. SP-2235, which was passed by the City Council on December 16, 2013, provides that it would
be effective upon its approval.164 Ten (10) days after its enactment, or on December 26, 2013, respondent
City Mayor approved the same.165
ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary
The case records are bereft of any evidence to prove petitioner’s negative allegation that respondents did
not comply with the posting and publication requirements of the law. Thus, We are constrained not to give
credit to his unsupported claim.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The constitutionality and legality of Ordinance No.
SP-2095, S-2011, or the “Socialized Housing Tax of Quezon City,” is SUSTAINED for being consistent with
Section 43 of Republic Act No. 7279. On the other hand, Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-2013, which collects an
annual garbage fee on all domestic households in Quezon City, is hereby declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL
AND ILLEGAL. Respondents are DIRECTED to REFUND with reasonable dispatch the sums of money
collected relative to its enforcement.
The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on February 5, 2014 is LIFTED with respect to
Ordinance No. SP-2095. In contrast, respondents are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from taking any further
action to enforce Ordinance No. SP. 2235.
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., respondent.
PUNO, J.:
Not infrequently, the government is tempted to take legal shortcuts solve urgent problems of the
people. But even when government is armed with the best of intention, we cannot allow it to run
roughshod over the rule of law. Again, we let the hammer fall and fall hard on the illegal attempt of
the MMDA to open for public use a private road in a private subdivision. While we hold that the
general welfare should be promoted, we stress that it should not be achieved at the expense of the
rule of law.
Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila.
Respondent Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA) is a non-stock, non-profit corporation whose
members are homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private subdivision in Makati City. Respondent BAVA
is the registered owner of Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village.
On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner, through its Chairman, a notice dated
December 22, 1995 requesting respondent to open Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting
January 2, 1996. The notice reads:
SUBJECT: NOTICE of the Opening of Neptune Street to Traffic.
Dear President Lindo,
Please be informed that pursuant to the mandate of the MMDA law or Republic Act No. 7924
which requires the Authority to rationalize the use of roads and/or thoroughfares for the safe
and convenient movement of persons, Neptune Street shall be opened to vehicular traffic
effective January 2, 1996.
In view whereof, the undersigned requests you to voluntarily open the points of entry and exit
on said street.
Thank you for your cooperation and whatever assistance that may be extended by your
association to the MMDA personnel who will be directing traffic in the area.
Finally, we are furnishing you with a copy of the handwritten instruction of the President on
the matter.
Very truly yours,
PROSPERO I. ORETA
Chairman 1
On the same day, respondent was apprised that the perimeter wall separating the
subdivision from the adjacent Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.
On January 2, 1996, respondent instituted against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court, Branch
136, Makati City, Civil Case No. 96-001 for injunction. Respondent prayed for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and
prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order
the following day.
On January 23, 1996, after due hearing, the trial court denied issuance of a preliminary
injunction. 2 Respondent questioned the denial before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
39549. The appellate court conducted an ocular inspection of Neptune Street 3 and on February 13,
1996, it issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation of the MMDA's proposed
action. 4
On January 28, 1997, the appellate court rendered a Decision on the merits of the case finding that
the MMDA has no authority to order the opening of Neptune Street, a private subdivision road and
cause the demolition of its perimeter walls. It held that the authority is lodged in the City Council of
Makati by ordinance. The decision disposed of as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the challenged Order dated January 23, 1995, in
Civil Case No. 96-001, is SET ASIDE and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued on
February 13, 1996 is hereby made permanent.
For want of sustainable substantiation, the Motion to Cite Roberto L. del Rosario in contempt
is denied. 5
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 6
The Motion for Reconsideration of the decision was denied on September 28, 1998. Hence, this
recourse.
Petitioner MMDA raises the following questions:
I
HAS THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (MMDA) THE
MANDATE TO OPEN NEPTUNE STREET TO PUBLIC TRAFFIC PURSUANT TO ITS
REGULATORY AND POLICE POWERS?
II
IS THE PASSAGE OF AN ORDINANCE A CONDITION PRECEDENT BEFORE THE
MMDA MAY ORDER THE OPENING OF SUBDIVISION ROADS TO PUBLIC TRAFFIC?
III
IS RESPONDENT BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC. ESTOPPED FROM DENYING
OR ASSAILING THE AUTHORITY OF THE MMDA TO OPEN THE SUBJECT STREET?
IV
WAS RESPONDENT DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS DESPITE THE SEVERAL
MEETINGS HELD BETWEEN MMDA AND THE AFFECTED EEL-AIR RESIDENTS AND
BAVA OFFICERS?
V
HAS RESPONDENT COME TO COURT WITH UNCLEAN HANDS?7
Neptune Street is owned by respondent BAVA. It is a private road inside Bel-Air Village, a private
residential subdivision in the heart of the financial and commercial district of Makati City. It runs
parallel to Kalayaan Avenue, a national road open to the general public. Dividing the two (2) streets
is a concrete perimeter wall approximately fifteen (15) feet high. The western end of Neptune Street
intersects Nicanor Garcia, formerly Reposo Street, a subdivision road open to public vehicular traffic,
while its eastern end intersects Makati Avenue, a national road. Both ends of Neptune Street are
guarded by iron gates.
Petitioner MMDA claims that it has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic because it is
an agent of the state endowed with police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila.
One of these basic services is traffic management which involves the regulation of the use of
thoroughfares to insure the safety, convenience and welfare of the general public. It is alleged that
the police power of MMDA was affirmed by this Court in the consolidated cases of Sangalang
v. Intermediate Appellate Court. 8 From the premise that it has police power, it is now urged that there
is no need for the City of Makati to enact an ordinance opening Neptune street to the public. 9
Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the power vested by the
Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and
reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the
Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the
subjects of the same. 10 The power is plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and
justifying measures for public health, public safety, public morals, and the general welfare. 11
It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature. 12 It cannot be
exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. 13 The National
Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the President and administrative boards as well as
the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units. 14 Once delegated, the
agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national
lawmaking body. 15
A local government is a "political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has
substantial control of local affairs." 16 The Local Government Code of 1991 defines a local
government unit as a "body politic and corporate." 17 — one endowed with powers as a political
subdivision of the National Government and as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its
territory. 18 Local government units are the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. 19 They are
also the territorial and political subdivisions of the state. 20
Our Congress delegated police power to the local government units in the Local Government Code
of 1991. This delegation is found in Section 16 of the same Code, known as the general welfare
clause, viz:
Sec. 16. General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise the powers
expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary,
appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are
essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial
jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the
preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the
people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and
self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance
economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents,
maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants. 21
Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies. The
legislative body of the provincial government is the sangguniang panlalawigan, that of the city
government is the sangguniang panlungsod, that of the municipal government is the sangguniang
bayan, and that of the barangay is the sangguniang barangay. The Local Government Code of 1991
empowers the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod and sangguniang bayan to
"enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
[province, city or municipality, as the case may be], and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of the
Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the [province, city municipality] provided
under the Code . . . " 22 The same Code gives the sangguniang barangay the power to "enact
ordinances as may be necessary to discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law or
ordinance and to promote the general welfare of the inhabitants thereon." 23
Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government units — i.e., twelve
(12) cities and five (5) municipalities, namely, the cities of Caloocan, Manila, Mandaluyong, Makati,
Pasay, Pasig, Quezon, Muntinlupa, Las Pinas, Marikina, Paranaque and Valenzuela, and the
municipalities of Malabon, Navotas, Pateros, San Juan and Taguig. With the passage of Republic
Act (R. A.) No. 7924 24 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special development and
administrative region" and the Administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the region
placed under "a development authority" referred to as the MMDA. 25
"Metro-wide services" are those "services which have metro-wide impact and transcend local
political boundaries or entail huge expenditures such that it would not be viable for said services to
be provided by the individual local government units comprising Metro Manila." 26 There are seven (7)
basic metro-wide services and the scope of these services cover the following: (1) development
planning; (2) transport and traffic management; (3) solid waste disposal and management; (4) flood
control and sewerage management; (5) urban renewal, zoning and land use planning, and shelter
services; (6) health and sanitation, urban protection and pollution control; and (7) public safety. The
basic service of transport and traffic management includes the following:
(b) Transport and traffic management which include the formulation, coordination, and
monitoring of policies, standards, programs and projects to rationalize the existing transport
operations, infrastructure requirements,the use of thoroughfares, and promotion of safe and
convenient movement of persons and goods; provision for the mass transport system and
the institution of a system to regulate road users; administration and implementation of all
traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education
programs, including the institution of a single ticketing system in Metropolitan Manila;" 27
In the delivery of the seven (7) basic services, the MMDA has the following powers and functions:
Sec. 5. Functions and powers of the Metro Manila Development Authority. — The MMDA
shall:
(a) Formulate, coordinate and regulate the implementation of medium and long-term plans
and programs for the delivery of metro-wide services, land use and physical development
within Metropolitan Manila, consistent with national development objectives and priorities;
(b) Prepare, coordinate and regulate the implementation of medium-term investment
programs for metro-wide services which shall indicate sources and uses of funds for priority
programs and projects, and which shall include the packaging of projects and presentation to
funding institutions;
(c) Undertake and manage on its own metro-wide programs and projects for the delivery of
specific services under its jurisdiction, subject to the approval of the Council. For this
purpose, MMDA can create appropriate project management offices;
(d) Coordinate and monitor the implementation of such plans, programs and projects in
Metro Manila; identify bottlenecks and adopt solutions to problems of implementation;
(e) The MMDA shall set the policies concerning traffic in Metro Manila, and shall coordinate
and regulate the implementation of all programs and projects concerning traffic
management, specifically pertaining to enforcement, engineering and education. Upon
request, it shall be extended assistance and cooperation, including but not limited
to, assignment of personnel, by all other government agencies and offices concerned;
(f) Install and administer a single ticketing system, fix, impose and collect fines and penalties
for all kinds of violations of traffic rules and regulations, whether moving or non-moving in
nature, and confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers' licenses in the enforcement of such
traffic laws and regulations, the provisions of RA 4136 and PD 1605 to the contrary
notwithstanding. For this purpose, the Authority shall impose all traffic laws and regulations
in Metro Manila, through its traffic operation center, and may deputize members of the
PNP, traffic enforcers of local government units, duly licensed security guards, or members
of non-governmental organizations to whom may be delegated certain authority, subject to
such conditions and requirements as the Authority may impose; and
(g) Perform other related functions required to achieve the objectives of the MMDA, including
the undertaking of delivery of basic services to the local government units, when deemed
necessary subject to prior coordination with and consent of the local government unit
concerned.
The implementation of the MMDA's plans, programs and projects is undertaken by the local
government units, national government agencies, accredited people's organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector as well as by the MMDA itself. For this purpose,
the MMDA has the power to enter into contracts, memoranda of agreement and other arrangements
with these bodies for the delivery of the required services Metro Manila. 28
The governing board of the MMDA is the Metro Manila Council. The Council is composed of the
mayors of the component 12 cities and 5 municipalities, the president of the Metro Manila ViceMayors' League and the president of the Metro Manila Councilors' League. 29 The Council is headed
by Chairman who is appointed by the President and vested with the rank of cabinet member. As the
policy-making body of the MMDA, the Metro Manila Council approves metro-wide plans, programs
and projects, and issues the necessary rules and regulations for the implementation of said plans; it
approves the annual budget of the MMDA and promulgate the rules and regulations for the delivery
of basic services, collection of service and regulatory fees, fines and penalties. These functions are
particularly enumerated as follows:
Sec. 6. Functions of the Metro Manila Council. —
(a) The Council shall be the policy-making body of the MMDA;
(b) It shall approve metro-wide plans, programs and projects and issue rules and regulations
deemed necessary by the MMDA to carry out the purposes of this Act;
(c) It may increase the rate of allowances and per diems of the members of the Council to be
effective during the term of the succeeding Council. It shall fix the compensation of the
officers and personnel of the MMDA, and approve the annual budget thereof for submission
to the Department of Budget and Management (DBM);
(d) It shall promulgate rules and regulations and set policies and standards for metro-wide
application governing the delivery of basic services, prescribe and collect service and
regulatory fees, and impose and collect fines and penalties.
Clearly, the scope of the MMDA's function is limited to the delivery of the seven (7) basic services.
One of these is transport and traffic management which includes the formulation and monitoring of
policies, standards and projects to rationalize the existing transport operations, infrastructure
requirements, the use of thoroughfares and promotion of the safe movement of persons and goods.
It also covers the mass transport system and the institution of a system of road regulation, the
administration of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education
programs, including the institution of a single ticketing system in Metro Manila for traffic violations.
Under the service, the MMDA is expressly authorized "to set the policies concerning traffic" and
"coordinate and regulate the implementation of all traffic management programs." In addition, the
MMDA may "install and administer a single ticketing system," fix, impose and collect fines and
penalties for all traffic violations.
It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation,
coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies,
installation of a system and administration. There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the
MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been
delegated any legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is
no provision in R.A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances, approve
resolutions appropriate funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA
is, as termed in the charter itself, "development authority." 30 It is an agency created for the purpose
of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, people's
organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and
expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are
administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the charter itself, viz:
Sec. 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. — . . . .
The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the process
exercise regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services within
Metro Manila, without diminution of the autonomy of the local government units concerning
purely local matters. 31
Petitioner cannot seek refuge in the cases of Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court 32 where we
upheld a zoning ordinance issued by the Metro Manila Commission (MMC), the predecessor of the
MMDA, as an exercise of police power. The first Sangalang decision was on the merits of the
petition, 33 while the second decision denied reconsideration of the first case and in addition
discussed the case of Yabut v. Court of Appeals. 34
Sangalang v. IAC involved five (5) consolidated petitions filed by respondent BAVA and three
residents of Bel-Air Village against other residents of the Village and the Ayala Corporation, formerly
the Makati Development Corporation, as the developer of the subdivision. The petitioners sought to
enforce certain restrictive easements in the deeds of sale over their respective lots in the
subdivision. These were the prohibition on the setting up of commercial and advertising signs on the
lots, and the condition that the lots be used only for residential purposes. Petitioners alleged that
respondents, who were residents along Jupiter Street of the subdivision, converted their residences
into commercial establishments in violation of the "deed restrictions," and that respondent Ayala
Corporation ushered in the full commercialization" of Jupiter Street by tearing down the perimeter
wall that separated the commercial from the residential section of the village. 35
The petitions were dismissed based on Ordinance No. 81 of the Municipal Council of Makati and
Ordinance No. 81-01 of the Metro Manila Commission (MMC). Municipal Ordinance No. 81 classified
Bel-Air Village as a Class A Residential Zone, with its boundary in the south extending to the center
line of Jupiter Street. The Municipal Ordinance was adopted by the MMC under the Comprehensive
Zoning Ordinance for the National Capital Region and promulgated as MMC Ordinance No. 81-01.
Bel-Air Village was indicated therein as bounded by Jupiter Street and the block adjacent thereto
was classified as a High Intensity Commercial Zone. 36
We ruled that since both Ordinances recognized Jupiter Street as the boundary between Bel-Air
Village and the commercial district, Jupiter Street was not for the exclusive benefit of Bel-Air
residents. We also held that the perimeter wall on said street was constructed not to separate the
residential from the commercial blocks but simply for security reasons, hence, in tearing down said
wall, Ayala Corporation did not violate the "deed restrictions" in the deeds of sale.
We upheld the ordinances, specifically MMC Ordinance No. 81-01, as a legitimate exercise of police
power. 37 The power of the MMC and the Makati Municipal Council to enact zoning ordinances for the
general welfare prevailed over the "deed restrictions".
In the second Sangalang/Yabut decision, we held that the opening of Jupiter Street was warranted
by the demands of the common good in terms of "traffic decongestion and public convenience."
Jupiter was opened by the Municipal Mayor to alleviate traffic congestion along the public streets
adjacent to the Village. 38 The same reason was given for the opening to public vehicular traffic of
Orbit Street, a road inside the same village. The destruction of the gate in Orbit Street was also
made under the police power of the municipal government. The gate, like the perimeter wall along
Jupiter, was a public nuisance because it hindered and impaired the use of property, hence, its
summary abatement by the mayor was proper and legal. 39
Contrary to petitioner's claim, the two Sangalang cases do not apply to the case at bar. Firstly, both
involved zoning ordinances passed by the municipal council of Makati and the MMC. In the instant
case, the basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street is contained in the notice of December
22, 1995 sent by petitioner to respondent BAVA, through its president. The notice does not cite any
ordinance or law, either by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City or by the MMDA, as the
legal basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street. Petitioner MMDA simply relied on its
authority under its charter "to rationalize the use of roads and/or thoroughfares for the safe and
convenient movement of persons." Rationalizing the use of roads and thoroughfares is one of the
acts that fall within the scope of transport and traffic management. By no stretch of the imagination,
however, can this be interpreted as an express or implied grant of ordinance-making power, much
less police power.
Secondly, the MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC in Sangalang. Although the MMC is the
forerunner of the present MMDA, an examination of Presidential Decree (P. D.) No. 824, the charter
of the MMC, shows that the latter possessed greater powers which were not bestowed on the
present MMDA.
Metropolitan Manila was first created in 1975 by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 824. It comprised the
Greater Manila Area composed of the contiguous four (4) cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay and
Caloocan, and the thirteen (13) municipalities of Makati, Mandaluyong, San Juan, Las Pinas,
Malabon, Navotas, Pasig, Pateros, Paranaque, Marikina, Muntinlupa and Taguig in the province of
Rizal, and Valenzuela in the province of Bulacan. 40 Metropolitan Manila was created as a response
to the finding that the rapid growth of population and the increase of social and economic
requirements in these areas demand a call for simultaneous and unified development; that the public
services rendered by the respective local governments could be administered more efficiently and
economically if integrated under a system of central planning; and this coordination, "especially in
the maintenance of peace and order and the eradication of social and economic ills that fanned the
flames of rebellion and discontent [were] part of reform measures under Martial Law essential to the
safety and security of the State." 41
Metropolitan Manila was established as a "public corporation" with the following powers:
Sec. 1. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila. — There is hereby created a public corporation,
to be known as the Metropolitan Manila, vested with powers and attributes of a corporation
including the power to make contracts, sue and be
sued, acquire, purchase, expropriate, hold, transfer and dispose of property and such other
powers as are necessary to carry out its purposes. The Corporation shall be administered by
a Commission created under this Decree. 42
The administration of Metropolitan Manila was placed under the Metro Manila Commission (MMC)
vested with the following powers:
Sec. 4. Powers and Functions of the Commission. — The Commission shall have the following
powers and functions:
1. To act as a central government to establish and administer programs and provide services
common to the area;
2. To levy and collect taxes and special assessments, borrow and expend money and issue
bonds, revenue certificates, and other obligations of indebtedness. Existing tax measures
should, however, continue to be operative until otherwise modified or repealed by the
Commission;
3. To charge and collect fees for the use of public service facilities;
4. To appropriate money for the operation of the metropolitan government and review
appropriations for the city and municipal units within its jurisdiction with authority to
disapprove the same if found to be not in accordance with the established policies of the
Commission, without prejudice to any contractual obligation of the local government units
involved existing at the time of approval of this Decree;
5. To review, amend, revise or repeal all ordinances, resolutions and acts of cities and
municipalities within Metropolitan Manila;
6. To enact or approve ordinances, resolutions and to fix penalties for any violation thereof
which shall not exceed a fine of P10,000.00 or imprisonment of six years or both such fine
and imprisonment for a single offense;
7. To perform general administrative, executive and policy-making functions;
8. To establish a fire control operation center, which shall direct the fire services of the city
and municipal governments in the metropolitan area;
9. To establish a garbage disposal operation center, which shall direct garbage collection
and disposal in the metropolitan area;
10. To establish and operate a transport and traffic center, which shall direct traffic activities;
11. To coordinate and monitor governmental and private activities pertaining to essential
services such as transportation, flood control and drainage, water supply and sewerage,
social, health and environmental services, housing, park development, and others;
12. To insure and monitor the undertaking of a comprehensive social, economic and physical
planning and development of the area;
13. To study the feasibility of increasing barangay participation in the affairs of their
respective local governments and to propose to the President of the Philippines definite
programs and policies for implementation;
14. To submit within thirty (30) days after the close of each fiscal year an annual report to the
President of the Philippines and to submit a periodic report whenever deemed necessary;
and
15. To perform such other tasks as may be assigned or directed by the President of the
Philippines.
The MMC was the "central government" of Metro Manila for the purpose of establishing and
administering programs providing services common to the area. As a "central government" it had the
power to levy and collect taxes and special assessments, the power to charge and collect fees; the
power to appropriate money for its operation, and at the same time, review appropriations for the city
and municipal units within its jurisdiction. It was bestowed the power to enact or approve ordinances,
resolutions and fix penalties for violation of such ordinances and resolutions. It also had the power to
review, amend, revise or repeal all ordinances, resolutions and acts of any of the four (4) cities and
thirteen (13) municipalities comprising Metro Manila.
P.D. No. 824 further provided:
Sec. 9. Until otherwise provided, the governments of the four cities and thirteen
municipalities in the Metropolitan Manila shall continue to exist in their present form except
as may be inconsistent with this Decree. The members of the existing city and municipal
councils in Metropolitan Manila shall, upon promulgation of this Decree, and until December
31, 1975, become members of the Sangguniang Bayan which is hereby created for every
city and municipality of Metropolitan Manila.
In addition, the Sangguniang Bayan shall be composed of as many barangay captains as
may be determined and chosen by the Commission, and such number of representatives
from other sectors of the society as may be appointed by the President upon
recommendation of the Commission.
xxx
xxx
xxx
The Sangguniang Bayan may recommend to the Commission ordinances, resolutions or
such measures as it may adopt; Provided, that no such ordinance, resolution or measure
shall become effective, until after its approval by the Commission; and Provided further, that
the power to impose taxes and other levies, the power to appropriate money and the power
to pass ordinances or resolutions with penal sanctions shall be vested exclusively in the
Commission.
The creation of the MMC also carried with it the creation of the Sangguniang Bayan. This was
composed of the members of the component city and municipal councils, barangay captains chosen
by the MMC and sectoral representatives appointed by the President. The Sangguniang Bayan had
the power to recommend to the MMC the adoption of ordinances, resolutions or measures. It was
the MMC itself, however, that possessed legislative powers. All ordinances, resolutions and
measures recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan were subject to the MMC's approval. Moreover,
the power to impose taxes and other levies, the power to appropriate money, and the power to pass
ordinances or resolutions with penal sanctions were vested exclusively in the MMC.
Thus, Metropolitan Manila had a "central government," i.e., the MMC which fully possessed
legislative police powers. Whatever legislative powers the component cities and municipalities had
were all subject to review and approval by the MMC.
After President Corazon Aquino assumed power, there was a clamor to restore the autonomy of the
local government units in Metro Manila. Hence, Sections 1 and 2 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution
provided:
Sec. 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as herein provided.
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
The Constitution, however, recognized the necessity of creating metropolitan regions not only in the
existing National Capital Region but also in potential equivalents in the Visayas and
Mindanao. 43 Section 11 of the same Article X thus provided:
Sec. 11. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan political subdivisions,
subject to a plebiscite as set forth in Section 10 hereof. The component cities and
municipalities shall retain their basic autonomy and shall be entitled to their own local
executives and legislative assemblies. The jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that will
thereby be created shall be limited to basic services requiring coordination.
Constitution itself expressly provides that Congress may, by law, create "special metropolitan
political subdivisions" which shall be subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
in the political units directly affected; the jurisdiction of this subdivision shall be limited to basic
services requiring coordination; and the cities and municipalities comprising this subdivision shall
retain their basic services requiring coordination; and the cities and municipalities comprising this
subdivision shall retain their basic autonomy and their own local executive and legislative
assemblies. 44 Pending enactment of this law, the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution gave the
President of the Philippines the power to constitute the Metropolitan Authority, viz:
Sec. 8. Until otherwise provided by Congress, the President may constitute the Metropolitan
Authority to be composed of the heads of all local government units comprising the
Metropolitan Manila area. 45
In 1990, President Aquino issued Executive Order (E. O.) No. 392 and constituted the Metropolitan
Manila Authority (MMA). The powers and functions of the MMC were devolved to the MMA. 46 It ought
to be stressed, however, that not all powers and functions of the MMC were passed to the MMA.
The MMA's power was limited to the "delivery of basic urban services requiring coordination in
Metropolitan Manila." 47 The MMA's governing body, the Metropolitan Manila Council, although
composed of the mayors of the component cities and municipalities, was merely given power of: (1)
formulation of policies on the delivery of basic services requiring coordination and consolidation; and
(2) promulgation resolutions and other issuances, approval of a code of basic services and the
exercise of its rule-making power. 48
Under the 1987 Constitution, the local government units became primarily responsible for the
governance of their respective political subdivisions. The MMA's jurisdiction was limited to
addressing common problems involving basic services that transcended local boundaries. It did not
have legislative power. Its power was merely to provide the local government units technical
assistance in the preparation of local development plans. Any semblance of legislative power it had
was confined to a "review [of] legislation proposed by the local legislative assemblies to ensure
consistency among local governments and with the comprehensive development plan of Metro
Manila," and to "advise the local governments accordingly." 49
When R.A. No. 7924 took effect, Metropolitan Manila became a "special development and
administrative region" and the MMDA a "special development authority" whose functions were
"without prejudice to the autonomy of the affected local government units." The character of the
MMDA was clearly defined in the legislative debates enacting its charter.
R.A. No. 7924 originated as House Bill No. 14170/11116 and was introduced by several legislators
led by Dante Tinga, Roilo Golez and Feliciano Belmonte. It was presented to the House of
Representatives by the Committee on Local Governments chaired by Congressman Ciriaco R.
Alfelor. The bill was a product of Committee consultations with the local government units in the
National Capital Region (NCR), with former Chairmen of the MMC and MMA, 50 and career officials of
said agencies. When the bill was first taken up by the Committee on Local Governments, the
following debate took place:
THE CHAIRMAN [Hon. Ciriaco Alfelor]: Okay, Let me explain. This has been debated a long
time ago, you know. It's a special . . . we can create a special metropolitan political
subdivision.
Actually, there are only six (6) political subdivisions provided for in the Constitution:
barangay, municipality, city, province, and we have the Autonomous Region of Mindanao
and we have the Cordillera. So we have 6. Now. . . . .
HON. [Elias] LOPEZ: May I interrupt, Mr. Chairman. In the case of the Autonomous Region,
that is also specifically mandated by the Constitution.
THE CHAIRMAN: That's correct. But it is considered to be a political subdivision. What is the
meaning of a political subdivision? Meaning to say, that it has its own government, it has its
own political personality, it has the power to tax, and all governmental powers: police power
and everything. All right. Authority is different; because it does not have its own government.
It is only a council, it is an organization of political subdivision, powers, "no, which is not
imbued with any political power.
If you go over Section 6, where the powers and functions of the Metro Manila Development
Authority, it is purely coordinative. And it provides here that the council is policy-making. All
right.
Under the Constitution is a Metropolitan Authority with coordinative power. Meaning to say, it
coordinates all of the different basic services which have to be delivered to the constituency.
All right.
There is now a problem. Each local government unit is given its respective . . . as a political
subdivision. Kalookan has its powers, as provided for and protected and guaranteed by the
Constitution. All right, the exercise. However, in the exercise of that power, it might be
deleterious and disadvantageous to other local government units. So, we are forming an
authority where all of these will be members and then set up a policy in order that the basic
services can be effectively coordinated. All right.
Of course, we cannot deny that the MMDA has to survive. We have to provide some funds,
resources. But it does not possess any political power. We do not elect the Governor. We do
not have the power to tax. As a matter of fact, I was trying to intimate to the author that it
must have the power to sue and be sued because it coordinates. All right. It coordinates
practically all these basic services so that the flow and the distribution of the basic services
will be continuous. Like traffic, we cannot deny that. It's before our eyes. Sewerage, flood
control, water system, peace and order, we cannot deny these. It's right on our face. We
have to look for a solution. What would be the right solution? All right, we envision that there
should be a coordinating agency and it is called an authority. All right, if you do not want to
call it an authority, it's alright. We may call it a council or maybe a management agency.
xxx
xxx
x x x 51
Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to the MMDA is that
given to the Metro Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the
implementation of the MMDA's functions. There is no grant of authority to enact ordinances and
regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis. This was explicitly stated in
the last Committee deliberations prior to the bill's presentation to Congress. Thus:
THE CHAIRMAN: Yeah, but we have to go over the suggested revision. I think this was
already approved before, but it was reconsidered in view of the proposals, set-up, to make
the MMDA stronger. Okay, so if there is no objection to paragraph "f". . . And then next is
paragraph "b," under Section 6. "It shall approve metro-wide plans, programs and projects
and issue ordinances or resolutions deemed necessary by the MMDA to carry out the
purposes of this Act." Do you have the powers? Does the MMDA... because that takes the
form of a local government unit, a political subdivision.
HON. [Feliciano] BELMONTE: Yes, I believe so, your Honor. When we say that it has the
policies, it's very clear that those policies must be followed. Otherwise, what's the use of
empowering it to come out with policies. Now, the policies may be in the form of a resolution
or it may be in the form of a ordinance. The term "ordinance" in this case really gives it more
teeth, your honor. Otherwise, we are going to see a situation where you have the power to
adopt the policy but you cannot really make it stick as in the case now, and I think here is
Chairman Bunye. I think he will agree that that is the case now. You've got the power to set a
policy, the body wants to follow your policy, then we say let's call it an ordinance and see if
they will not follow it.
THE CHAIRMAN: That's very nice. I like that. However, there is a constitutional
impediment. You are making this MMDA a political subdivision. The creation of the MMDA
would be subject to a plebiscite. That is what I'm trying to avoid. I've been trying to avoid this
kind of predicament. Under the Constitution it states: if it is a political subdivision, once it is
created it has to be subject to a plebiscite. I'm trying to make this as administrative. That's
why we place the Chairman as a cabinet rank.
1âw phi 1
HON. BELMONTE: All right, Mr. Chairman, okay, what you are saying there is . . . . .
THE CHAIRMAN: In setting up ordinances, it is a political exercise, Believe me.
HON. [Elias] LOPEZ: Mr. Chairman, it can be changed into issuances of rules and
regulations. That would be . . . it shall also be enforced.
HON. BELMONTE: Okay, I will . . . .
HON. LOPEZ: And you can also say that violation of such rule, you impose a sanction. But
you know, ordinance has a different legal connotation.
HON. BELMONTE: All right, I defer to that opinion, your Honor.
THE CHAIRMAN: So instead of ordinances, say rules and regulations.
HON. BELMONTE: Or resolutions. Actually, they are actually considering resolutions now.
THE CHAIRMAN: Rules and resolutions.
HON. BELMONTE: Rules, regulations and resolutions. 52
The draft of H. B. No. 14170/11116 was presented by the Committee to the House of
Representatives. The explanatory note to the bill stated that the proposed MMDA is a "development
authority" which is a "national agency, not a political government unit." 53 The explanatory note was
adopted as the sponsorship speech of the Committee on Local Governments. No interpellations or
debates were made on the floor and no amendments introduced. The bill was approved on second
reading on the same day it was presented. 54
When the bill was forwarded to the Senate, several amendments were made. These amendments,
however, did not affect the nature of the MMDA as originally conceived in the House of
Representatives. 55
1âwphi1
It is thus beyond doubt that the MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation
endowed with legislative power. It is not even a "special metropolitan political subdivision" as
contemplated in Section 11, Article X of the Constitution. The creation of a "special metropolitan
political subdivision" requires the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected." 56 R. A. No. 7924 was not submitted to the inhabitants of Metro Manila
in a plebiscite. The Chairman of the MMDA is not an official elected by the people, but appointed by
the President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet member. In fact, part of his function is to
perform such other duties as may be assigned to him by the President, 57 whereas in local
government units, the President merely exercises supervisory authority. This emphasizes the
administrative character of the MMDA.
Clearly then, the MMC under P.D. No. 824 is not the same entity as the MMDA under R.A. No. 7924.
Unlike the MMC, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is
the local government units, acting through their respective legislative councils, that possess
legislative power and police power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City
did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its
proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal and the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in
so ruling. We desist from ruling on the other issues as they are unnecessary.
We stress that this decision does not make light of the MMDA's noble efforts to solve the chaotic
traffic condition in Metro Manila. Everyday, traffic jams and traffic bottlenecks plague the metropolis.
Even our once sprawling boulevards and avenues are now crammed with cars while city streets are
clogged with motorists and pedestrians. Traffic has become a social malaise affecting our people's
productivity and the efficient delivery of goods and services in the country. The MMDA was created
to put some order in the metropolitan transportation system but unfortunately the powers granted by
its charter are limited. Its good intentions cannot justify the opening for public use of a private street
in a private subdivision without any legal warrant. The promotion of the general welfare is not
antithetical to the preservation of the rule of law.
1âwphi1.nêt
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 39549 are affirmed.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAÑAGA alias "PACO"; JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN alias
"WESLEY"; ALBERTO CAÑO alias "ALLAN PAHAK"; ARIEL BALANSAG, DAVIDSON
VALIENTE RUSIA alias "TISOY TAGALOG"; JAMES ANTHONY UY alias "WANGWANG"; and
JAMES ANDREW UY alias "MM", Accused-Appellants.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
At bar are four (4) motions for reconsideration separately filed by appellants (1) Francisco Juan
Larrañaga, (2)Josman Aznar, (3) Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Caño and Ariel Balansag, and (4) James
Anthony Uy and James Andrew Uy, assailing our Decision dated February 3, 2004 convicting them
of the crimes of (a) special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention and (b) simple
kidnapping and serious illegal detention, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Cebu City in Criminal Cases
Nos. CBU-45303 and 45304 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, appellants FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAÑAGA alias
‘PACO;’ JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN alias ‘WESLEY;’ ALBERTO CAÑO alias ‘ALLAN
PAHAK;’ ARIEL BALANSAG; and JAMES ANDREW UY alias ‘MM,’ are found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with
homicide and rape and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH by lethal injection;
(2) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, appellants FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAÑAGA alias
‘PACO;’ JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN alias ‘WESLEY;’ ALBERTO CAÑO alias ‘ALLAN
PAHAK;’ ARIEL BALANSAG; and JAMES ANDREW UY alias ‘MM,’ are found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention and are sentenced
to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA;
(3) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, appellant JAMES ANTHONY UY, who was a minor at the time
the crime was committed, is likewise found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex
crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA; in Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, he is declared
guilty of simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
TWELVE (12) years of prision mayor in its maximum period, as MINIMUM, to seventeen (17) years
of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as MAXIMUM;
(4) Appellants are ordered to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Marijoy and Jacqueline, in each
case, the amounts of (a) ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity, (b) ₱25,000.00 as temperate
damages, (c) ₱150,000.00 as moral damages, and (d) ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Three (3) Justices of the Court maintain their position that RA 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it
prescribes the death penalty; nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is
constitutional and the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.
In accordance with Article 83 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of RA No.
7659, upon the finality of this Decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the
Office of the President for the possible exercise of Her Excellency’s pardoning power.
SO ORDERED."
Appellants anchor their motions on the following grounds:
A. LARRAÑAGA
"I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN BARRING LARRAÑAGA AND THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION (NBI) REGIONAL DIRECTOR FLORENCIO VILLARIN FROM TESTIFYING;
II
THE POLICE PLANTED EVIDENCE ON APPELLANTS;
III
LARRAÑAGA SUFFICIENTLY PROVED HIS ALIBI;
IV
THE TRIAL COURT PREVENTED THE INTRODUCTION OF KEY DEFENSE EVIDENCE;
V
THE CORPSE FOUND IN THE RAVINE WAS NOT THAT OF MARIJOY; AND
VI
PROSECUTION WITNESS RUSIA WAS A COACHED WITNESS." 1
B. AZNAR
"I
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT VIOLATE
THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN (A) DISCHARGING DAVID RUSSIA AS STATE WITNESS;
AND (B) CONVICTING THE APPELLANTS MAINLY ON THE BASIS OF THE TESTIMONY OF
RUSIA.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN REJECTING THE DEFENSE OF APPELLANT AZNAR.
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY ON THE
APPELLANTS."2
C. ADLAWAN, BALANSAG, CAÑO
"I
PROSECUTION WITNESS RUSIA IS NOT QUALIFIED TO BE A STATE WITNESS UNDER
PARAGRAPHS (D) AND (E), SECTION 17 OF THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE.
II
RUSIA’S TESTIMONY AND THAT OF THE OTHER PROSECUTION WITNESSES WERE
INCREDIBLE, INCONSISTENT, AND UNWORTHY OF BELIEF.
III
BIAS AND PREJUDICE AGAINST THE DEFENSE WERE GLARINGLY DISPLAYED BY THE
COURT A QUO WHICH GREATLY AFFECTED THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE.
IV
THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS FOR THE CRIME CHARGED HAS NOT BEEN
PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT."3
D. JAMES ANDREW AND JAMES ANTHONY UY
"I
ACCUSED JAMES ANDREW S. UY WAS, LIKE HIS YOUNGER BROTHER JAMES ANTHONY S.
UY, A MINOR AT THE TIME THE OFFENSES AT BAR ALLEGEDLY HAPPENED LAST JULY 16,
1997;
II
THE IDENTITY OF THE DEAD BODY OF THE WOMAN FOUND IN TAN-AWAN, CARCAR, CEBU
LAST JULY 18, 1997 WAS NEVER CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHED THUS THE NEED FOR ITS
EXHUMATION FOR DNA TESTING;"4
In his supplemental motion for reconsideration dated March 25, 2004, Larrañaga submitted a
separate study of Dr. Racquel Del Rosario-Fortun, Forensic Pathologist, to show that the
examination conducted by the prosecution expert witnesses on the body found in Tan-awan, Carcar
is inadequate.
In a similar supplemental motion for reconsideration5, Aznar submitted to this Court the Affidavit
dated February 27, 2004 of Atty. Florencio Villarin, Regional Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation, Central Visayas, to show that: (1) the police investigation of this case was
flawed; (2) he (Aznar) was arrested in 1997 not because of his involvement in this case but because
he had in his possession a pack of shabu and firearms; and (3) David Rusia is not a credible
witness.
On July 15, 2004, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated comment6 praying that the four (4)
motions for reconsideration be denied with finality, there being no new argument raised. He
responded to appellants’ assignments of errors by exhaustively quoting portions of our challenged
Decision.
In his consolidated comment7 to Aznar’s supplemental motion for reconsideration, the Solicitor
General enumerated the grounds why Atty. Villarin’s Affidavit should not be given consideration. On
February 15, 2005, Aznar filed a reply alleging that the Solicitor General "read out of context" certain
portions of the Affidavit. He argued that the
Affidavit only exposes the flawed investigation of the Chiong case and that, at the time of his arrest,
there was no evidence against him. On March 4, 2005, the Solicitor General filed a rejoinder stating
that Aznar’s reply "actually supports the undersigned counsel’s (Solicitor General’s) position that
Atty. Villarin’s Affidavit is utterly inadequate to prove his innocence or at least even acquit them on
reasonable doubt," thus, "it would be useless to call for new trial on the basis of such Affidavit." On
March 29, 2005, Aznar filed a sur-rejoinder insisting that the Affidavit should be given due
consideration.
Except for the motion filed by appellants Uy brothers with respect to James Andrew’s alleged
minority, we find all the motions bereft of merit.
At the inception, let it be emphasized that the filing of a motion for reconsideration does not impose
on us the obligation to discuss and rule again on the grounds relied upon by the movant which are
mere reiteration of the issues previously raised and thoroughly determined and evaluated in our
Decision being questioned. In Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership vs. Velasco,8 we ruled that,
"this would be a useless formality of ritual invariably involving merely a reiteration of the reasons
already set forth in the judgment or final order for rejecting the arguments advanced by the movant."
The foregoing principle applies squarely to the motions filed by appellants Larrañaga, Aznar,
Adlawan, Caño and Balansag, it being apparent that the points raised therein are not neoteric
matters demanding new judicial determination. They are mere rehash of the arguments set forth in
their respective briefs which we already considered, weighed and resolved before we rendered the
Decision sought to be reconsidered.
However, in view of the severity of the penalties for the crimes charged, we deem it necessary to
stress once more our basis in convicting appellants.
The following is a précis of the issues submitted by appellants in their motions:
This Court erred –
first, in according credence to Rusia’s testimony;
second, in rejecting appellants’ alibi;
third, in holding that the trial court did not violate their right to due process when it excluded the
testimony of other defense witnesses; and
fourth, in holding that the body found in Tan-awan, Carcar was not that of Marijoy.
In deciding a criminal case, the policy of the courts is always to look at the case in its entirety. The
totality of the evidence presented by both the prosecution and the defense are weighed, thus,
averting general conclusions from isolated pieces of evidence. This means that an appeal of a
criminal case opens its entire records for review.9
I
Appellants vigorously contend that we should not have sustained Rusia’s testimony hook, line and
sinker, owing to his tainted record and reputation. However, it must be stressed that Rusia’s
testimony was not viewed in isolation. In giving credence to Rusia’s testimony, the trial court took
into consideration the physical evidence and the corroborative testimonies of other witnesses.
Thus, we find no reason why we should not uphold the trial court’s findings.
We reiterate our pronouncement in our Decision that what makes Rusia’s testimony worthy of belief
is its striking compatibility with the physical evidence. Physical evidence is one of the highest
degrees of proof. It speaks more eloquently than all witnesses put together.10 The presence of
Marijoy’s ravished body in a deep ravine at Tan-awan, Carcar with tape on her mouth and
handcuffs on her wrists certainly
bolstered Rusia’s testimony on what actually took place from Ayala Center to Tanawan. Indeed, the details he supplied to the trial court are of such nature and quality that only a
witness who actually saw the commission of the crimes could furnish. Reinforcing his testimony is its
corroboration by several other witnesses who saw incidents of what he narrated. Rolando Dacillo
and Mario Minoza witnessed Jacqueline’s two failed attempts to escape from appellants near Ayala
Center. Benjamin Molina and Miguel Vergara recognized Rowen as the person who inquired from
them where he could find a vehicle for hire on the evening of July 16, 1997. Alfredo Duarte saw
Rowen when he bought barbeque and Tanduay at Nene’s Store while the white van, driven by
Caño, was waiting on the side of the road and he heard voices of "quarreling male and female"
emanating from the van. And lastly, Manuel Camingao and Rosendo Rio testified on the presence
of Larrañaga and Josman at Tan-awan, Carcar at dawn of July 17, 1997. All these bits and pieces of
story form part of Rusia’s narration. Now, with such strong anchorage on the physical evidence and
the testimonies of disinterested witnesses, why should we not accord credence to Rusia’s
testimony? Even assuming that his testimony standing alone might indeed be unworthy of belief in
view of his character, it is not so when considered with the other evidence presented by the
prosecution.
II
Appellants likewise claimed that we should have not sustained the trial court’s rejection of their alibi.
Settled is the rule that the defense of alibi is inherently weak and crumbles in the light of positive
declarations of truthful witnesses who testified on affirmative matters.11 Being evidence that is
negative in nature and self-serving, it cannot attain more credibility than the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses who testify on clear and positive evidence.12 On top of its inherent
weakness, alibi becomes less plausible as a defense when it is corroborated only by relatives or
close friends of the accused.13
This case presents to us a balance scale whereby perched on one end is appellants’ alibi supported
by witnesses who were either their relatives, friends or classmates, while on the other end is the
positive identification of the herein appellants by the prosecution witnesses who were not, in any
way, related to the victims. With the above jurisprudence as guide, we are certain that the balance
must tilt in favor of the latter.
Besides, a thorough examination of the evidence for the prosecution shows that the appellants failed
to meet the requirements of alibi, i.e., the requirements of time and place.14 They failed to establish
by clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for them to be at the Ayala
Center, Cebu City when the Chiong sisters were abducted. What is clear from the evidence is that
Rowen, Josman, Ariel, Alberto, James Anthony and James Andrew were all within the vicinity of
Cebu City on July 16, 1997.
Not even Larrañaga who claimed to be in Quezon City satisfied the required proof of physical
impossibility. During the hearing, it was shown that it takes only one (1) hour to travel by plane from
Manila to Cebu and that there are four (4) airline companies plying the route. One of the defense
witnesses admitted that there are several flights from Manila to Cebu each morning, afternoon and
evening. Indeed, Larrañaga’s presence in Cebu City on July 16, 1997 was proved to be not
only a possibility but a reality. Four (4) witnesses identified Larrañaga as one of the two men
talking to Marijoy and Jacqueline on the night of July 16, 1997. Shiela Singson testified that on July
16, 1997, at around 7:20 in the evening, she saw Larrañaga approach Marijoy and Jacqueline
at the West Entry of Ayala Center. The incident reminded her of Jacqueline’s prior story that he
was Marijoy’s admirer. Shiela confirmed that she knows Larrañaga since she had seen him on five
(5) occasions. Analie Konahap also testified that on the same evening of July 16, 1997, at about
8:00 o’clock, she saw Marijoy and Jacqueline talking to two (2) men at the West Entry of
Ayala Center. She recognized the two (2) men as Larrañaga and Josman, having seen them
several times at Glicos, a game zone, located across her office at the third level of Ayala
Center. Williard Redobles, the security guard then assigned at Ayala Center, corroborated the
foregoing testimonies of Shiela and Analie. In addition, Rosendo Rio, a businessman from Cogon,
Carcar, declared that he saw Larrañaga at Tan-awan at about 3:30 in the morning of July 17, 1997.
The latter was leaning against the hood of a white van.15And over and above all, Rusia categorically
identified Larrañaga as one of the participes criminis.
Taking the individual testimonies of the above witnesses in relation with that of Rusia, we are
convinced that Larrañaga was indeed in Cebu City at the time of the commission of the crimes and
was one of the principal perpetrators thereof.
At this juncture, it bears mentioning that this case is not the first time that Larrañaga was charged
with or complained of pruriently assaulting young female students in Cebu. Months before the
abduction of Marijoy and Jackie, the parents of a certain Rochelle Virtucio, complained about
Larrañaga’s attempt to snatch their young daughter and drag her in a black, stylish Honda Civic. It
happened just near the gate of Rochelle’s school, thus, showing his impudence. We quote a portion
of the transcript of stenographic notes dated September 23, 1998, thus:
"ATTY. HERMOSISIMA:
Your Honor please, this is a …. Inspector Era handed to this representation a copy of a Letter
dated September 25, 1996, addressed to the Student Affairs Office, University of San Carlos,P. del
Rosario Street, Cebu City, and this is signed by Leo Abayan and Alexander Virtucio and noted
by Mrs. Aurora Pacho, Principal, University of San Carlos, Girls High School, and for the
record, I will read the content:
TO WHOM THIS MAY CONCERN:
We the parents and guardians of Rochelle Virtucio, a first year high school student of your
University of San Carlos-Girls High School, are writing your good office about an untoward
incident involving our daughter and another student of your school.
xxxxxx
That last Monday at around 5:00 PM, Rochelle and other classmates, Michelle Amadar and
Keizaneth Mondejar, while on their way to get a ride home near the school campus, a black
Honda Civic with five young male teenagers including the driver, suddenly stopped beside
them, and simultaneously one of them, which was later identified as FRANCISCO JUAN
LARRANAGA, a BSHRM I student of your school, grabbed Rochelle by her hand to try to get
Rochelle to their vehicle. She resisted and got away from him. Sensing some people were
watching what they were doing, they hurriedly sped away.
We are very concerned about Rochelle’s safety. Still now, she is suffering the shock and
tension that she is not supposed to experience in her young life. It is very hard for us parents
to think about what she’d been through."16
The presence of such complaint in the record of this case certainly does not enhance Larrañaga’s
chance of securing an acquittal.
III
Larrañaga and Aznar bewail our refusal to overturn the trial court’s exclusion of Professor Jerome
Bailen and Atty. Florencio Villarin, NBI, Regional Director, as defense witnesses. Professor Bailen
was properly excluded. First, he is not a finger-print expert but an archaeologist. And second, his
report consists merely of the results of his visual inspection of the exhibits already several months
old. Anent Atty. Villarin’s failure to testify before the trial court, suffice it to say that his belated
Affidavit, which Aznar submitted via his supplemental motion for reconsideration dated May 5, 2004,
raises nothing to change our findings and conclusions. What clearly appears in said Affidavit is a
man trying to impress people that he was the one responsible for solving the Chiong case and for
that, he deserves a promotion. The trial court, at the onset, must have seen such immateriality in his
intended testimony. Indeed, we agree with the Solicitor General’s observation that such Affidavit "is
neither helpful nor encouraging to Aznar’s cause." We quote his keen reflection on the matter:
"xxxxxx
Third. Atty. Villarin’s affidavit, in paragraphs 19 and 20 thereof, acknowledged that the body found in
the Carcar ravine was that of Marijoy. This assertion immediately conflicts with accused-appellant
Aznar’s claim in his Motion for Reconsideration that the corpse was not Marijoy’s. Surely, something
is amiss in accused-appellant Aznar’s recollection of his defense.
Fourth. Atty. Villarin confirmed in paragraph 24 of his affidavit that accused-appellant Francisco
Larranaga was a suspect in the subject crimes. Evidently, this statement completely supports this
Honorable Court’s findings in its Decision dated February 3, 2004.
Fifth. In paragraph 30 of Atty. Villarin’s affidavit, he stated that: ‘The arrest of Juzman Aznar was
the major breakthrough in the investigation of the case because witnesses came out and
identified Juzman Aznar as one of those allegedly seen talking to the victims on the night
they disappeared.’ Hence, accused-appellant Aznar was in the beginning already a first-grade
suspect in the Chiong sisters’ celebrated abduction and killing.
Sixth. Atty. Villarin admitted in paragraph 36 of his affidavit that: ‘x x x I did not take this against
[Supt. Labra] for preempting our next move to get Juzman Aznar as we were already placing
him under surveillance because I knew [Supt. Labra] did it in his honest desire to help solve
the crime x x x.’ Clearly, this statement is not an indictment of the investigation that the police
undertook in the subject crimes.
Seventh. Paragraphs 37 to 40 are nothing but personal tirades against alleged influence peddling by
Mrs. Thelma Chiong, mother of the victims, and the purportedly undue promotions of the lawyers
and police officers who unearthed the evidence against accused-appellants and successfully
prosecuted the latter. In executing the affidavit, it appears that Atty. Villarin would want to
impress that he, rather than those promoted, deserved the promotion.
Eighth. Atty. Villarin’s inability to testify in the criminal cases was not due solely to the prosecution’s
action. Whether he ought to testify or not was an argument openly discussed in court. Hence, for the
resulting inability, Atty. Villarin has no one to blame but the defense lawyers who did everything to
make a mockery of the criminal proceedings.
And lastly, there is nothing in Atty. Villarin’s affidavit of the quality of a "smoking gun" that would
acquit accused-appellants of the crimes they have been convicted. For he did not finish the police
investigation of the subject crimes; this is the long and short of his miniscule role in the instant
case. Indeed, judging by the substance of his affidavit, he would not be testifying in case a
new trial is held on anything that has not been said and rejected heretofore, except his own
unsubstantiated opinions (i.e. not facts as required by evidentiary rules), his selfcongratulatory remarks, and his unmitigated frustration over failing to get a promotion when
almost everyone else did."17
Neither can we entertain at this late stage Dr. Fortun’s separate study to show that the examination
conducted on the body found in Tan-awan, Carcar is inadequate. Such study cannot be classified as
newly-discovered evidence warranting belated reception. Obviously, Larrañaga could have produced
it during trial had he wished to.
IV
Knowing that the prosecution’s theory highly rests on the truth of Rusia’ testimony, appellants
endeavor to destroy it by claiming that the body found at the foot of a deep ravine in Tan-awan,
Carcar was not that of Marijoy. We must reiterate the reasons why we cannot give our assent to
such argument. First, Inspector Edgardo Lenizo,18 a fingerprint expert, testified that the fingerprints of
the corpse match those of Marijoy.19 Second, the packaging tape and the handcuff found on the
dead body were the same items placed on Marijoy and Jacqueline while they were being
detained.20 Third, the body had the same clothes worn by Marijoy on the day she was
abducted.21 And fourth, the members of the Chiong family personally identified the corpse to be that
of Marijoy22 which they eventually buried. They erected commemorative markers at the ravine,
cemetery and every place which mattered to Marijoy. As a matter of fact, at this very moment,
appellants still fail to bring to the attention of this Court any person laying a claim on the said body.
Surely, if the body was not that of Marijoy, other families who had lost someone of similar age and
gender as Marijoy would have surfaced and claimed the body. The above circumstances only bolster
Rusia’s narration that Rowen and Ariel pushed Marijoy into the deep ravine, following Josman’s
instruction "to get rid" of her.
On the issue raised by appellants Uy brothers that James Andrew was only seventeen (17) years
and two hundred sixty two (262) days old at the time the crimes were committed, the records bear
that on March 1, 1999, James Andrew’s birth certificate was submitted to the trial court as part of
the Formal Offer of Additional Evidence,23with the statement that he was eighteen (18) years old.
On March 18, 1999, appellants filed a Manifestation of Erratum correcting in part the Formal Offer of
Additional Evidence by alleging that James Andrew was only seventeen (17) years old.24
Now, James Andrew begs leave and prays that this Court admits at this stage of the proceedings
his (1) Certificate of Live Birth issued by the National Statistics Office, and (2) Baptismal Certificate.
He prays that his penalty be reduced, as in the case of his brother James Anthony.
The entry of James Andrew’s birth in the Birth Certificate is not legible, thus it is extremely difficult for
us to determine the veracity of his claim. However, considering that minority is a significant factor in
the imposition of penalty, we find it proper to require the Solicitor General (a) to secure from the
Local Civil Registrar of Cotobato City, as well as the National Statistics Office, a clear and legible
copy of James Andrew’s Birth Certificate, and thereafter, (b) to file an extensive comment on the
motion for reconsideration filed by James Andrew and James Anthony Uy, solely on James
Andrews’ claim of minority.
Insofar as James Anthony is concerned, we maintain his conviction and penalty, there being nothing
in his motion which warrants a reconsideration of our Decision.
In resolving the instant motions, we have embarked on this painstaking task of evaluating every
piece and specie of evidence presented before the trial court in response to appellants’ plea for the
reversal of their conviction. But, even the element of reasonable doubt so seriously sought by
appellants is an ignis fatuus which has eluded any intelligent ratiocination of their submissions.
Verily, our conscience can rest easy on our affirmance of the verdict of the trial court, in light of
appellants’ clear culpability which demands retribution.
WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration filed by appellants Francisco Juan Larrañaga,
Josman Aznar, Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Caño and Ariel Balansag are hereby DENIED. The Solicitor
General is DIRECTED (a) to secure from the Local Civil Registrar of Cotobato City, as well as the
National Statistics Office, a clear and legible copy of James Andrew’s Birth Certificate, and (b) within
ten (10) days therefrom, to file an extensive comment on the motion for reconsideration filed by
James Andrew and James Anthony Uy, solely on James Andrews’ claim of minority. The motion is
likewise DENIED insofar as James Anthony Uy is concerned.
TRANS MIDDLE EAST (PHILS.), Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN (5th Division) PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), The Board of Directors of Equitable PCI Bank,
represented by its Chairman, CORAZON DELA PAZ and SABINO ACUT, JR. (in his capacity as
Corporate Secretary of Equitable PCI Bank), Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The integrity of the judicial system is founded on the soundness and rationality of the judgments emanating
from it. Decisions which are blatantly erroneous or founded on oblique reasoning inevitably foment doubt
within the dispirited public as to the impartiality and judiciousness of the magistrates concerned. A critical
eye must especially be cast on rulings which are not only wrong, haphazardly grounded and obtusely onesided, but fortuitously timed to engender the most advantage to the victor and damage to the loser.
This Petition for Certiorari was filed by petitioner Trans Middle East (Phil.) Equities Inc. (TMEE), the
registered owners of erstwhile sequestered shares in Equitable-PCI Bank (EPCIB) assailing a
Resolution1promulgated by the Sandiganbayan on 22 May 2006. The Resolution declared that a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) initially issued 14 years ago by this Court in cases that were closed and terminated
ten years ago, remained in effect, thus disqualifying TMEE from voting on its shares. The annual
stockholders meeting of EPCIB was scheduled on 23 May 2006, or the day after the Resolution was
promulgated, leaving questions as to the timing of the promulgation. In any event, the Resolution is rooted
in dubious and erroneous legal premises. The writ of certiorari lies.
A narration of the relevant antecedents ensues.
TMEE is the registered owner of 6,119,067 common shares of stock in the then PCBank, now Equitable-PCI
Bank. On 15 April 1986, these shares were sequestered by the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) on the theory that as they actually belong to Benjamin Romualdez they constitute
illegally acquired wealth. Thereafter, a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 0035, was filed against
Romualdez by the PCGG before the Sandiganbayan for the recovery of these shares. Upon motion, TMEE
was allowed to intervene by the Sandiganbayan, and it sought to enjoin the PCGG from voting these shares.
In 1991, the Sandiganbayan, upon motion of TMEE, issued resolutions that enjoined the PCGG from voting
the shares of TMEE and authorized TMEE in exercising its voting rights. These resolutions were challenged
before the Supreme Court, through petitions docketed as G.R. NOS. 105808 and 105809. The Court then
issued a TRO enjoining the implementation of the Sandiganbayan resolutions. Subsequently, G.R. NOS.
105808 and 105809 were consolidated with several other cases, which were collectively resolved the Court
in a 23 January 1995 consolidated decision entitled Republic v. Sandiganbayan.2 The Court resolved to
maintain the TRO it issued enjoining the implementation of the 1991 orders of the Sandiganbayan,
decreeing as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
xxxx
B. CONFIRMING AND MAINTAINING the temporary restraining orders issued in G.R. NOS. 104883, 105170,
105206, 105808, 105809, 107233, and 107908, which shall continue in force and effect during the
continuation of the proceedings in the corresponding civil actions in the Sandiganbayan, subject to the
latter's power to modify or terminate the same in the exercise of its sound discretion in light of such
evidence as may subsequently be adduced.3 (Emphasis supplied)
cra lawlib rary
In a subsequent Resolution dated 22 July 1997, concerning pending motions for contempt against PCI Bank
and TMEE, the Court found it necessary to render the following rulings:
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved:
xxxx
II. To DIRECT the Sandiganbayan, in reiteration of this Court's prior directives, promptly to adjudicate after
due trial and proper proceedings the ultimate factual issue of whether or not the movant's are the
legitimate, bona fide owners of the sequestered shares of stock (or the same constitute ill-gotten wealth
which should revert to and be forefeited in favor of the Republic, represented by the PCGG); and pending
such adjudication, resolve, with all deliberate dispatch but not later than sixty (60) days from notice of this
Resolution, the preliminary questions of whether there is prima faciefactual foundation for the sequestration
of said stock, and for reasonable ground for apprehension of dissipation, loss or wastage of assets if the
holders of the sequestered stock are permitted to vote them;
III. To COMMAND TMEE and the PCGG forthwith to formally request the Sandiganbayan to set Civil Case No.
0035 for hearing so that the issues set out in the immediately preceding paragraph hereof may be
determined with all deliberate dispatch; and
cralawlib rary
IV. To PROHIBIT from this date and until completion by the Sandiganbayan of its determination of the
preliminary questions set out in paragraph II hereof, the exercise of the right to vote pertaining to the
sequestered PCIB shares of stock in question by either the PCGG or TMEE at any meeting of the PCIB.4
Meanwhile, in January and February of 1997, TMEE filed two motions before the Sandiganbayan, both urging
the nullification or lifting of the writ of sequestration. It contended that no valid writ of sequestration was
ever issued, the sequestration having been effected through a letter dated 15 April 1986 addressed to EPCIB
signed by only one PCGG commissioner, in violation of the PCGG Rules and Regulations promulgated on 11
April 1986 that required writs of sequestration to be issued by at least two commissioners. While TMEE
argued that it was entitled to the actual custody and control of the shares, it nonetheless manifested that it
was willing to deposit these shares in escrow to allay any fear of dissipation, loss or wastage of the subject
shares, as well as on all future cash and stock dividends to be declared on the said shares.
In April of 1998, PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion for Issuance of Restraining Order, seeking to
enjoin the holding of the EPCIB stockholders meeting on 30 April 1998, on the ground that since the 1997
Supreme Court Resolution enjoined both the PCGG and TMEE from voting the sequestered stocks, these
shares stood to be diluted considering a proposal in the agenda to increase the authorized capital stock of
EPCIB, among others.
In a Resolution dated 29 April 1998, the Sandiganbayan dismissed these fears of the PCGG as unfounded.
Moreover, in the same Resolution the Sandiganbayan acknowledged that this Court had granted it the power
to modify or terminate this Court's temporary restraining order in the exercise of its sound discretion in the
light of subsequent evidence. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan proceeded to recognize the right of TMEE to
vote the shares of stock registered in its name, and to allow it to vote at the stockholders meeting of 30
April 1998. The Sandiganbayan justified such recognition based on the following premises: (a) that the
PCGG which bore the burden of proof to show prima faciefoundation for the sequestration of TMEE shares
had failed to timely do so; (b) that no damage or dissipation of the sequestered shares would result should
TMEE be allowed to vote them; and (c) that on its face, the writ of sequestration was issued only by one
PCGG Commissioner, in violation of the PCGG's rules and regulations promulgated on 11 April 1986. Thus,
the Sandiganbayan ruled:
UNDER THE PREMISES:
(2) Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank's (PCIB) Chairman of the meeting and the secretary thereof
are directed to acknowledge the right of intervenor Trans Middle East (Phil.) Equities, Inc. (TMEE) to vote
the shares of stocks registered in its name and allow it to vote at the Stockholders' Meeting scheduled on
April 30, 1998 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning or at any other time to which said stockholders' meeting may
be continued or reset. TMEE shall post a bond of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND (P150,000.00) PESOS to
answer for any undue damage that the plaintiff PCGG or the PCIB shall suffer by reason of the sequestered
shares of stock having been voted by and for said intervenor.5
The pending motion for nullification of the writ of sequestration was left unresolved then. On 10 January
2003, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution on the motions filed by TMEE in 1997 assailing the
sequestration order. The Sandiganbayan granted the motion to nullify the writ of sequestration of TMEE
shares, ruling that the sequestration order null and void as it was issued only by one PCGG Commissioner. It
cited the decision of this Court in Republic v. Sandiganbayan6 wherein it was ruled that a writ of
sequestration signed by only one PCGG commissioner was an obvious transgression of the PCGG rules.7 At
the same time, based on TMEE's manifestation that it was willing to deposit the subject shares in escrow to
allay any fear of dissipation, loss or wastage of the subject shares, the Sandiganbayan ordered that the
shares be deposited in escrow with the Land Bank of the Philippines.
The Resolution decreed:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing:
1) The "URGENT MOTION TO NULLIFY WRIT OF SEQUESTRATION" dated January 28, 1997 filed by movant
Trans Middle East (Phils.) Equities, Inc., is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, Sequestration Order No. 86-0056
dated April 15, 1986 is hereby declared null and void for having been issued by one PCGG Commissioner
only in direct contravention of Section 3 of the PCGG's own Rules and Regulations. Conformably, however,
with the manifestation of the movant trans Middle East (Phils.) Equities, Inc. itself, the Court will not order
the return of its shares of stocks sequestered per Sequestration Order No. 86-0056 dated April 15, 1986,
but orders that the same, including the interests earned thereon, to be deposited with the Land Bank of the
Philippines in escrow for the persons, natural or judicial, who shall eventually be adjudged lawfully entitled
thereto.8 (emphasis supplied)
PCGG filed motions for the reconsideration of both the 1998 and 2003 resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.
These motions have not yet been resolved to date. In the meantime, TMEE alleged that it has voted the
subject shares from 1998 up to 2005.9
On 2 May 2006, the PCGG filed a Motion for Execution of this Court's Decision in G.R. NOS. 105808 and
105809, which was promulgated on 23 January 1995, or more than ten (10) years earlier. It was argued
therein that the 1995 Decision became final and executory by virtue of an entry of judgment dated 2 April
1996 which was allegedly received by the PCGG only on 2 March 2006.10 The purported receipt then only of
the entry of judgment came one (1) day after the EPCIB's proxy validation deadline with closure of the
Record Book of EPCIB. Desiring to "exercise its voting rights as upheld by the Supreme Court", the PCGG
prayed of the Sandiganbayan to issue the appropriate order permitting it to vote the sequestered shares or,
in the alternative, to order "re-enforced and/or reissued" the TRO affirmed by the Supreme Court in the
1995 Decision, which enjoined TMEE from voting the sequestered shares.
The Motion for Execution was heard on 5 May 2006, with TMEE making no appearance therein. The
Sandiganbayan ordered TMEE to comment on the said motion within ten (10) days.
Then on May 9, 2006, the PCGG filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Reinforce/Re-issue TRO, praying that the
Sandiganbayan issue an order re-enforcing and/or re-issuing the TRO issued by this Court in G.R. NOS.
105808 and 105809 and to execute the TRO under the Decision of the Supreme Court dated January 13,
1995. The PCGG argued that due to the fact that the stockholders meeting of EPCIB was scheduled on 23
May 2006, there was an urgent need for the re-enforcement or reissuance of the TRO affirmed by the
Supreme Court in its 1995 Decision. The PCGG also alleged that they had received reports that "the
Romualdezes are bent on disposing of their shares in EPCIB," and that should they "gain control of the bank
of (sic) electing themselves and/or their dummies/nominees to the helm of the bank, there is a danger that
the sequestered Equitable-PCI Bank shares might dissipate or be disposed of."11
On 22 May 2006, the Sandiganbayan issued the Resolution now assailed before the Court. The
Sandiganbayan acknowledged that the 1998 and 2003 Resolutions it earlier issued had indeed modified the
TRO issued by this Court, and that it had the authority, as granted by the Court, to modify or terminate such
TRO. Nevertheless, the Sandiganbayan ruled that both resolutions had not yet attained finality since it itself
still had to resolve the motions for reconsideration respectively related thereto filed by the PCGG in 1998
and 2003. The Sandiganbayan opined that it could not re-issue the TRO since it was this Court which issued
the same. Still, the Sandiganbayan ruled that it could state that the two resolutions modifying this Court's
TRO "have not attained finality as the motions for reconsiderations thereto have not been resolved by [the
Sandiganbayan]." The dispositive portion of the Resolution read:
WHEREFORE, pertinent to the instant motion, this Court hereby declares that considering that two
resolutions modifying the Supreme Court's TRO have not attained finality as the motions for
reconsiderations filed thereto have not been resolved by this Court, the TRO, which was issued by the
Supreme Court disqualifying both the PCGG nominees, TMEE, PAH and PAR, from voting the sequestered
shares in the Equitable PCI Bank and Benguet Corporation, respectively is still existing and in full force and
effect.12
On the following day, 23 May 2003, TMEE filed the instant petition with this Court, with a prayer for the
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction "to preserve and maintain the
status quo wherein TMEE [was] allowed to vote the shares registered in its name and restraining the
respondents from enforcing the [22 May 2003 Sandiganbayan] Resolution granting the motion to reenforce/re-issue TRO, until the final resolution" of this Court.
In the absence of an injunctive order restraining the holding of the stockholders' meeting on 23 May 2006,
the meeting was held. Over the objections of TMEE, the election of a new Board of Directors of EPCIB was
held. Since TMEE was not allowed to vote its shares, it was unable to elect any representative to the Board
of Directors despite the fact that it maintained enough shares to be entitled to at least one board seat. Thus,
in its Supplemental Petition attached to a Motion for Leave of Court to File Supplemental Petition, TMEE
prayed for the issuance of a resolution directing the maintenance of the status quo prior to the disputed
election of directors; restraining the new Board and the officers elected by them from further performing
their functions; and directing the Chairman and Corporate Secretary to recognize and allow the old Board
and officers to serve in a hold-over capacity until further orders from this Court.13
In the course of deliberating the matter of provisional relief sought by TMEE, the self-evident nature of the
correct resolution on the points of law emerged, and a consensus developed within the Court that the
petition be resolved immediately. The challenged Resolution is ostensibly grounded on an earlier decision of
this Court, yet is ultimately oblivious to the full import of that decision and other juridical precedents as well.
The Sandiganbayan in its Resolution likewise sub silencio contradicts earlier rulings it had previously
rendered in connection with the same issues, yet takes refuge from its inconsistency on its very own
inaction on two still pending motions for reconsideration filed eight and three years ago, respectively.
Considering that all the respondents have duly filed their respective comments, there is no impediment to
the immediate resolution of the case on the merits. We are compelled to act promptly in light of the highly
disturbing circumstances attending this case. This Court cannot countenance unabashed trifling with the
judicial process, turn a blind eye on a patent simulacrum of judicial adjudication and allow a glaring travesty
of justice to go unchecked in time.
The assailed Resolution in this case, promulgated by the Sandiganbayan on 22 May 2006, has been used to
maximum benefit by the respondents, all connected with EPCIB, in an obvious corporate squabble which saw
its apotheosis in the long scheduled annual stockholders meeting on 23 May 2006 wherein TMEE was
deprived of its right to vote its shares despite the fact that it would have been able to elect at least one (1)
seat on the Board of Directors. The Court is also impelled by the recognition that the annulment of the
Sandiganbayan resolution would have a pronounced consequent effect on the financial community, if not the
banking public at large. Hence, the need to resolve this matter promptly.
We now accordingly adjudicate.
The Court first dispenses with procedural issues raised that are ultimately minor. The petition is
denominated as one for certiorari with prayer preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order,
under the ambit of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Respondent Board of Directors of EPCIB argue that the
failure of TMEE to file a motion for reconsideration with the Sandiganbayan precluded the immediate resort
to the special civil action of certiorari . As a general rule, certiorari as a special civil action does not lie unless
a motion for reconsideration is first filed before the respondent court. However, this rule does not apply
when special circumstances warrant immediate or more direct action.14 It is well-settled that the availability
of appeal does not foreclose recourse to the extraordinary remedies of certiorari or prohibition where appeal
is not adequate, or equally beneficial,
speedy and sufficient.15 Where the exigencies of the case are such that the ordinary methods of appeal may
not prove adequate either in point of promptness or completeness, so that a partial if not a total failure of
justice could result a writ of certiorari may still be issued.16
It cannot evade notice that the assailed Sandiganbayan Resolution was promulgated one (1) day before the
scheduled stockholders meeting of EPCIB. Evidently, TMEE could no longer have relied on the
Sandiganbayan to reverse itself literally overnight, in time for the meeting. The filing of a motion for
reconsideration would not have been an adequate or speedy remedy for TMEE. Hence, resort to the special
civil action of certiorari without filing a motion for reconsideration is justified under the circumstances.
The more consequential procedural objection lies in the failure of TMEE in its petition to pray for the
annulment of the 22 May 2006 Sandiganbayan Resolution despite the denomination of the petition as one
for certiorari, and the arguments therein that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in
rendering the Resolution. On this failure, the respondents in their respective comments argue that the
petition, which was accompanied by a prayer for writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO, is effectively an
original action for injunction beyond the jurisdiction of this Court.
TMEE, in its Supplemental Petition filed seven (7) days after the filing of the petition, did subsequently pray
for the nullification of the Sandiganbayan resolution on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. TMEE
deserves some blame for failing to include such prayer in its original petition, yet given the attendant
circumstances, it would be an act of triviality to dismiss the petition on that ground alone. For one, even
assuming that the petition is indeed an original action for injunction, it was ruled in Del Mar v. Pagcor17 that
"this Court has the discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition at bar if compelling reasons, or the
nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant the immediate exercise of its jurisdiction."18 Indeed,
such compelling reasons, as adverted to before, are present in this case.
More fundamentally, it is evident from the allegations in the petition, replete with imputations of grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan when it promulgated its resolution, that the nature of
the petition is one for certiorari, with injunction sought only as an ancillary relief. The nature of an action, as
well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the material allegations
contained in the petition.19 Any doubts as to whether TMEE seeks the annulment of the Sandiganbayan
resolution are cleared by the Supplemental Petition, which expressly seeks such relief.
The Court is also inclined to view this defect with liberality, considering that TMEE had only one (1) calendar
day to prepare the petition, which sought to vindicate the exercise of its voting rights in the EPCIB
stockholders meeting, which was enjoined by the Sandiganbayan resolution promulgated just the day before
such election. The forced haste under which the petition was prepared cannot be attributed to the fault of
TMEE, and any resulting errors in the petition that are of the non-fatal variety can be overlooked.
Respondents, particularly the EPCIB Board of Directors, ascribe a few other procedural errors on the part of
the petitioner, but these are so minor that they do not merit the attention of the Court. Suffice it to say,
they do not adduce a compulsory rule that would mandate the dismissal of the petition contrary to the
discretion of the Court to do otherwise.
We now turn to the merits of the case.
The assailed Sandiganbayan resolution was occasioned by an "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Reinforce/Re-issue
TRO" filed by the PCGG, which prayed for the issuance of an order re-enforcing and/or re-issuing the TRO
issued by this Court in G.R. NOS. 105808 and 105809. The sort of relief sought is unconventional to say the
least. No such remedy is provided for under the rules of procedure, although it is not expressly barred. The
uniqueness of the relief sought should nonetheless be cause for skepticism on the part of the court hearing
the claim. Procedural rules exist to provide a methodical system that would facilitate the judicious
disposition of cases. A recourse that finds no authorization or support under the rules could in fact be aimed
to subvert orderly procedure, an end that runs contrary to the interest of justice.
The judicial duty, when confronted with such a pleading as the "motion for the reinforcement/reissuance" of
the PCGG, is to look beyond the verbiage and ascertain the real nature of the action on which the prayer is
founded. In this case, it is ineluctable that what the PCGG sought through its motion was injunctive relief
that would refrain TMEE from exercising its voting rights in the 2004 EPCIB stockholders' meeting, or other
meetings for that matter. While the legal basis for such prayer is suggested on the continued recognition of
a provisional remedy granted a long time ago, the ultimate goal of the motion is to secure injunctive relief.
As such, the rules on injunction must apply.
The relevant antecedent facts actually point to three successive recourses to injunctive relief which were
availed of in this case. The first was the 1986 order of sequestration, sequestration being in itself a form of a
provisional remedy, an extraordinary measure intended to prevent the destruction, concealment or
dissipation of sequestered properties and, thereby, to conserve and preserve them, pending the judicial
determination in the appropriate proceeding of whether the property was in truth ill-gotten.20
The second injunctive relief involved in this case came in the form of the TRO issued by this Court in 1992 in
G.R. NOS. 105808 and 105809, restraining the implementation of the 1992 Sandiganbayan order allowing
TMEE to vote its shares. The right to the TRO is grounded on the subsistence of the sequestration order.
The same TRO issued in G.R. NOS. 105808 and 105809 was reaffirmed in the 1995 Supreme Court Decision
in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, an unusual step in itself considering that normally, a provisional injunctive
order survives only as long as the case wherein it was issued. But since the said TRO related to pending
incidents in Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan, the Court ceded control over the TRO to the
anti-graft court, with a specific grant of authority on the latter to "to modify or terminate the same in the
exercise of its sound discretion in light of such evidence as may subsequently be adduced". The
Sandiganbayan did just that through its 1998 and 2003 Resolutions which respectively recognized TMEE's
rights to vote the shares and nullified the writ of sequestration.
The third mode of injunctive relief involved herein was the PCGG's motion for the "re-enforcement or
reissuance" of the earlier Supreme Court TRO. Palpably, this motion prayed for the reaffirmation of the TRO
granted by the Supreme Court in G.R. NOS. 105808 & 105809, cases which were closed and terminated
nearly 10 years ago; but at the same time effectively sought to enjoin the 1998 and 2003 Sandiganbayan
Resolutions, praying as the PCGG did that TMEE be denied the right to vote its shares notwithstanding the
two Sandiganbayan resolutions.
For injunctive relief to avail to the PCGG, it must be able to demonstrate the existence of a clear legal right
to be entitled to such relief.21 In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive relief
constitutes grave abuse of discretion.22 There could only be two putative sources of such legal right of the
PCGG - the 1986 sequestration order and the 1995 Decision of this Court which affirmed the 1992 TRO
issued by the Supreme Court. Yet closer scrutiny of either reveals no foundational recognition of a clear
legal right of the PCGG.
It is settled that as a general rule, the registered owner of the shares of a corporation, even if they are
sequestered by the government through the PCGG, exercises the right and the privilege of voting on
them.23 The PCGG as a mere conservator cannot, as a rule, exercise acts of dominion by voting these
shares.24 The registered owner of sequestered shares may only be deprived of these voting rights, and the
PCGG authorized to exercise the same, only if it is able to establish that (1) there is prima facieevidence
showing that the said shares are ill-gotten and thus belong to the State; and (2) there is an imminent
danger of dissipation, thus necessitating the continued sequestration of the shares and authority to vote
thereupon by the PCGG while the main issue is pending before the Sandiganbayan.25
Clearly, the existence of the writ of sequestration alone would not legally justify barring TMEE from voting
its shares. Such preclusion may only occur if there is prima facie evidence showing that the said shares are
ill-gotten and there is an imminent danger of dissipation. The Sandiganbayan or any other court has yet to
pronounce any findings to those effects. In fact, the Sandiganbayan, in its 1998 Resolution, instead declared
that TMEE possessed "a prima facie right" as owner of the registered owner of the sequestered shares, and
that there appeared to be "no strong grounds for apprehension of dissipation or loss of assets of
TMEE."26 Concerns over dissipation have likewise been assuaged that the shares have been deposited in
escrow with the Land Bank of the Philippines on the initiative of TMEE itself. In any event, the nullification in
2003 of the very writ of sequestration by the Sandiganbayan further militates against any recognition that
the sequestration order established a clear legal right that entitled the PCGG to injunctive relief.
We now examine whether the legal consequences of the 1995 Decision of the Court provide a clear legal
right to injunctive relief to the PCGG.
An examination of the dispositive portion of the 1995 Decision insofar as it pertains to TMEE puts in doubt
whether its "execution" should have resulted in barring TMEE from voting its shares in the 2006 stockholders
meeting. While the 1995 Decision maintained the earlier TRO barring TMEE from voting its shares, it also
authorized the Sandiganbayan "to modify or terminate the same in the exercise of its sound discretion in
light of such evidence as may subsequently be adduced."
In that sense, the 1995 Decision consisted of two (2) phases. The first phase consists of the affirmation of
the TRO, a stance that subsisted as a matter of default. The second phase, however, consists of either the
modification or termination of the TRO by the Sandiganbayan in light of the evidence subsequently adduced.
Should the condition set in the second phase - modification or termination by the Sandiganbayan - then the
first phase is ended, and the affirmation of the TRO can no longer be acknowledged as the default action.
There is no question that the Sandiganbayan did modify the TRO by virtue of its 1998 and 2003 Resolutions.
The 1998 Resolution "acknowledge[d] the right of intervenor Trans Middle East (Phil.) Equities, Inc. (TMEE)
to vote the shares of stocks registered in its name." The 2003 Resolution went even further in
declaring null and void the 1986 sequestration order. Both resolutions thoroughly explained the
reasons for granting favorable reliefs to TMEE.27 The 1998 Resolution even specifically invoked the 1995
Decision of this Court that categorically declared that the Sandiganbayan had the power to modify or
terminate the restraining order in the exercise of its sound discretion in the light of such evidence as may be
subsequently adduced.28
Respondent Board of Directors contest the argument that the 1998 Resolution either lifted or terminated the
1992 TRO, alleging that the dispositive portion therein29 merely allowed TMEE to votes it shares for the
stockholders meeting on 30 April 1998, and not at other stockholders' meetings held in previous years. This
claim is belied by a close look at the dispositive portion of the 1998 Resolution, which directed the then PCI
Bank to "xxx acknowledge the right of [TMEE] to vote the shares of stocks registered in its name and allow
it to vote at the Stockholders' Meeting scheduled on April 30, 1998".30
As evidenced by the use of the conjunctive "and", there were two directives contained in that order, namely:
that the right of TMEE to vote the shares of stocks registered in its name; and to allow TMEE to vote at the
1998 stockholders' meeting. The first directive, mandating the recognition of TMEE's right to vote its shares,
is not subjected to any limitation as to time or particular circumstance. Neither did the Sandiganbayan's
discussion in the body of the 1998 Resolution support the view that the right of TMEE to vote the shares was
limited to the 1998 stockholders meeting.
Respondents are generally silent as to the effect of the 2003 Resolution nullifying the writ of sequestration.
Yet the import of that ruling is equally important to this case.
The 2003 Resolution nullifying the sequestration order over TMEE's shares was based on the fact, of which
there appears to be no serious contest, that the said order, dated 15 April 1986, was signed by only one
PCGG commissioner in violation of the PCGG Rules and Regulations promulgated on 11 April 1986.31 The
2003 Resolution particularly cited the Court's 1998 Decision in Republic v.
Sandiganbayan,32 penned by Chief Justice Panganiban, which categorically ruled that "the writ [of
sequestration] must bear the signatures of two commissioners, because their signatures are the best
evidence of their approval thereof."33 The Court also noted that the PCGG Rules took effect on 11 April 1986,
and that "the signing of sequestration orders by two commissioners had already been encouraged after April
11, 1986."34
The binding effect of the same provision of the PCGG Rules on the PCGG after 11 April 1986 was also
affirmed in the 1996 ruling in Republic v. Sandiganbayan,35 also penned by Chief Justice Panganiban.
Quoting the same provision requiring that the writ of sequestration may be issued upon the authority of at
least two commissioners, the Court said that the provision was "couched in clear and simple language [and]
leaves no room for interpretation".
The finding of the Sandiganbayan that the writ of sequestration was null and void was material to the
determination whether the PCGG had the right to the injunctive relief it sought. This point is especially
relevant, since if the sequestration order against TMEE is declared null and void, the earlier TRO will
become functus officio. The TRO cannot continue to exist if the sequestration order is null and void from the
beginning. Based on the 2003 Sandiganbayan Resolution, the sequestration order against TMEE is deemed
void as of 15 April 1986, or more than 20 years ago. Not only the clarity, but the very existence of the legal
right on which the PCGG grounds its right to relief became controverted as a result of the 2003 Resolution.
These twin resolutions of the Sandiganbayan pose a critical impediment to a determination that the PCGG
had a clear legal right to protect that would justify injunctive relief in its favor. At the very least, these
resolutions, issued within the bounds of authority granted by this Court to the Sandiganbayan, becloud the
continued efficacy to this day of the 1992 TRO; at most, they confirm that the 1992 TRO no longer subsists.
The Court is inclined towards the latter view. Clearly, it would be proper to assert that the 1998 and 2003
Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan were issued not only in compliance with but in execution and
implementation of the 1995 Decision of the Court. Considering that the Sandiganbayan had already modified
or terminated the restraining order, pursuant to the authority granted it by this Court, it may be very well
be that there is nothing left in the 1995 Decision to execute. At bare minimum, considering the
accomplished modification and virtual termination of the restraining order as of 2003, execution of the 1995
Decision in 2006 cannot possibly contemplate the revival of the TRO.
Obviously, the Sandiganbayan failed to consider these points when it rendered the assailed Resolution. It
does not even appear that the Sandiganbayan evaluated the PCGG's motion within the frame of mind that a
clear legal right must exist to entitle the PCGG's prayer. Instead, it engaged in a mechanical application of
technicalities in a manner that failed to consider the more crucial issues at hand.
There is an admitted convenience in simply pronouncing, as the Sandiganbayan did, that since the motions
for reconsideration to the 1998 and 2003 Resolutions had not been resolved, the efficacy of those
resolutions cannot yet be recognized. It cannot be denied though that the two resolutions are properly
characterized as interlocutory orders, as they do not finally dispose of Civil Case No. 0035. In Valarao v.
Pascual,36 the Court contended with the question of whether respondents therein were bound to respect the
authority of a special administrator on the ground that the interlocutory order appointing such administrator
was not yet final and executory because of a pending motion for reconsideration. The Court held:
[R]espondents cannot disobey the reasonable exercise of the authority of a special administrator on the
dubious ground that the order appointing petitioner Valarao as special administratrix had not in the
meantime become final and executory because of a pending motion for reconsideration filed by them. The
fallacy of this reasoning is apparent, for an interlocutory order is not instantly appealable and therefore
there is no period nor action to suspend or interrupt by a motion for reconsideration; it is even well settled
that a special civil action for certiorari does not suspend the immediate enforceability of an interlocutory
order absent a temporary restraining order or an injunction. In the same manner, the appointment of a
special administrator being an interlocutory order is not interrupted by a motion for reconsideration and thus
must be obeyed as the proceedings in the probate court progress.37
The same characteristics of the interlocutory order in Valarao apply in this case. Since the orders recognizing
TMEE to vote its shares and nullifying the writ of sequestration are both unappealable, they can only be
assailed through a special civil action for certiorari, the filing of which however does not ipso facto inhibit the
effectivity of the assailed order unless specifically enjoined. For this reason, it cannot be said that the 1998
and 2003 Resolutions, interlocutory as they are in character, are not yet susceptible to enforcement during
the motions for reconsideration therefor.
It also bears notice that from the time the 1998 Resolution recognized the right of TMEE to vote its shares
until eight (8) years later, no serious challenges were posed against the right of TMEE to vote those shares
by reason of the pending motion for reconsideration. There is some dispute as to whether during the last
eight years of EPCIB stockholder meetings, TMEE was actually able to formally vote its shares38 or merely
consented to a common slate of nominees previously agreed upon to negate the need to conduct an actual
meeting.39 Yet whatever the fact may be, these stockholders meetings and election of the Board of Directors
were conducted to the satisfaction of TMEE, which was able to successfully elect at least one nominee to the
Board. Those circumstances do not bear the mark of TMEE being deprived of the right to vote its shares in
the stockholders meetings from 1998 to 2005, when the contrary should have resulted if the position of the
respondents were to be believed.
For all intents and purposes, the 1998 and 2003 Resolutions had been respected prior to the current year by
the Sandiganbayan and the parties. Given the pending motions for reconsideration, theoretically it is still
within the power of the Sandiganbayan to reverse or modify the 1998 and 2003 resolutions. Yet if the
Sandiganbayan were so minded to modify or reverse the two earlier resolutions, it should do so directly and
explicitly, not only tangentially or by implication as it actually did, and at that based on premises which
contradict the predicates on which its 1998 and 2003 Resolutions are anchored. In other words, it may
reverse its earlier rulings only on the evidentiary foundations prescribed by this Court in its 1995 Decision
which have to pertain to the existence of a valid basis for sequestration or the danger of dissipation of the
sequestered shares.
Until and unless it reconsiders the 1998 and 2003 Resolutions in that fashion and on that basis, the
Sandiganbayan is bound to respect them, moreso because they are its own rulings. It is thus precluded from
performing any act or promulgate any issuance inconsistent with the letter, tenor and disposition of those
previous rulings which remain extant. It cannot re-enforce the TRO against TMEE or recognizing the
continued legal effects of the nullified sequestration order, as it did through the challenged resolutions. It
can only do so by reconsidering the 1998 and 2003 resolutions.
Thus, it can be appreciated why the Sandiganbayan in the challenged Resolution merely opted to declare the
TRO confirmed in this Court's 1995 Decision is "is still existing and in full force and effect," desisting as it did
from ordering the execution of the 1995 Decision. Such declaration, however, is not wholly correct as it is
incomplete. It did not include the fact that the TRO had already been modified by the 1998 and 2003
Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan. Moreover, it failed to consider the well-established doctrine that the
registered owner of sequestered shares is generally entitled to vote the shares.40
The Court thus rules, with considerable ease, that the 22 May 2006 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan was
issued with grave abuse of discretion, and must be annulled.
The Court finds the actions of the PCGG in this case distressing. Its actions and resort to unconventional
modes of relief towards the end of depriving TMEE the right to vote its shares, notwithstanding two
Sandiganbayan rulings recognizing such right are tantamount to abuse of the judicial process.
For one, concerning the Motion for Execution of Judgment it had filed on 2 May 2006, it appears highly
suspect that the PCGG would await more than ten years before it would move to execute or enforce the
1995 Decision of the Supreme Court. Entry of Judgment on that Decision was dated 2 April 1996. Under
Article 1144 of the Civil Code, an action based upon a judgment must be brought within ten years from the
time the right of action accrues, or within ten years counted from the time the judgment became
final.41 Under Section 2, Rule 37, the date of finality of the judgment or final order shall be deemed to be
the date of its entry.
Notably, nothing in the rules of procedure provides that the entry of judgment be served on the parties, or
reckons the date of finality of the judgment from the moment the entry of judgment is received by the
parties. Hence, the fact that PCGG allegedly was served the Entry of Judgment only on 2 March 2006 does
not detract from the fact that any action to execute or enforce the 1995 Decision of the Supreme Court was
barred by prescription after 2 April 2006. The filing of the two motions by the PCGG before the
Sandiganbayan was made only in May of 2006.
In its motion to reinforce/reissue TRO before the Sandiganbayan, the PCGG adverted to reports that the
sequestered shares were in danger of dissipation and diminution as the Romualdezes "were bent on
disposing their shares in Equitable-PCI Bank."42 The shares of EPCIB, including the interests earned thereon,
are deposited in escrow with the Land Bank of the Philippines, on order of the Sandiganbayan in its 2003
Resolution, at the instance of no less than TMEE. Unless otherwise ordered by the Sandiganbayan, these
shares would remain in escrow until Civil Case No. 0035 is finally resolved by the Sandiganbayan. As such,
these shares have been apparently insulated from dissipation and diminution. They cannot be simply be
disposed of, conveyed or encumbered by TMEE, even if the sequestration order were voided or the TRO
lifted.
This being the situation, the only way by which these shares under escrow may be diminished or dissipated
would be through radical corporate changes within EPCIB, such as through the increase of capital stock, or
even through the dissolution or merger of the bank itself. However, it remains highly dubious that TMEE
could, by exercising its right to vote the shares, effect such changes that would diminish or dissipate those
stocks that it could not dispose of. The shares of TMEE comprise only 7.13% of the outstanding capital stock
of EPCIB,43 and would entitle TMEE to only one (1) seat in the 15-person Board of Directors.44 TMEE is very
much a minority stockholder in Equitable-PCI Bank, and on its own, incapable of imposing its will on the
bank.
It is not beyond the realm of possibility that these shares of TMEE in EPCIB, minimal as they may be, could
somehow accord TMEE a significant degree of influence in the policies and decisions of the bank. At the
same time, considering the limited number of shares TMEE holds, this prospect should be considered, on its
face, highly unlikely. Yet the PCGG staked its motion before the Sandiganbayan on the claim that the
allowance of TMEE to vote its shares could somehow diminish or dissipate those shares deposited in escrow,
a highly facile claim considering the circumstances. Still, the Sandiganbayan refused to subject such claim to
any scrutiny at all, and worse, granted the relief sought on the dubious premises.
Our attention is also called to the letter dated 22 May 2006, written by PCGG Commissioner William Dichoso,
and addressed to the Board of Directors of EPCIB.45 The letter, captioned "TRO Issued by the Sandiganbayan
in Civil Case No. 0035 (Republic of the Philippines v. Benjamin Romualdez)", bluntly states that the
Sandiganbayan "has issued a Temporary Restraining Order restraining xxx [TMEE] from voting in the
stockholders meeting of [EPCIB]," and advises that "Copy of the Temporary Restraining Order will follow."46
No such temporary restraining order was issued by the Sandiganbayan. Certainly, the challenged Resolution
does not contain any directive for the issuance of a separate temporary restraining order. All the challenged
Resolution affirms is the supposed continuing force of the TRO as affirmed by 1995 Decision of the Court.
But as earlier discussed, while the 1995 Decision affirmed the earlier TRO issued by the Court, it also
affirmed the right of the Sandiganbayan to modify or terminate such TRO if the evidence so warranted. The
Sandiganbayan has exercised such right and has chosen not to disavow such exercise. Neither has the
modification or termination of the TRO been reversed or set aside by a higher court.
The impression left by the PCGG letter to EPCIB was that the bank had no choice outside of violating a
judicial order but to disallow TMEE from voting its shares. Yet even with the assailed Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan, such a conclusion is not so evident. At the very least, the PCGG letter conveyed the
message that the Sandiganbayan had enjoined the voting of TMEE shares in the 23 May 2006 stockholders
meeting when in fact the anti-graft court did not provide for an injunctive relief in such manner.
Still, ultimate blame must be foisted on the Sandiganbayan. Wittingly or unwittingly, it became complicit in
the denial of justice to TMEE when it issued the assailed Resolution, despite the lack of ample basis to
support it. Had it ruled judiciously on the motion, the resultant farce would not have been staged. More to
the point, had it resolved the pending motions for reconsideration in a timely manner, this entire
controversy could have been avoided.
Finally, we consider the consequences of the annulment of the assailed Resolution on the subsequently held
stockholders' meeting and election of the Board of Directors of EPCIB. It appears that there is no serious
dispute that TMEE would have been entitled to one seat on the Board had it been able to vote its shares.
TMEE asserts that it has 51,827,640 EPCIB shares,47 equivalent to 7.13% of the outstanding capital stock of
the bank. Respondent Board of Directors admits that the shares of TMEE constitute 7.13% of the
outstanding capital stock of the bank.48 Since Section 24 of the Corporation Code allows a stockholder such
as TMEE to cumulate all of his shares in the voting for directors, a 7.13 % stock interest in the outstanding
capital stock is sufficient to elect one seat in the 15-seat EPCIB Board of Directors.49However, relying on the
null and void Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, respondents Board of Directors and Corporate Secretary
prevented TMEE from voting its shares and electing its nominee or representative to the Board of Directors.
Clearly, TMEE is entitled to one seat on the Board of Directors of EPCIB. There is the option of annulling the
entire election, but such step would be too drastic in light of the fact that only one of the 15 seats should be
necessarily affected upon the seating of TMEE's nominee to the Board of Directors. The more prudent step
on the part of the Court is to declare that one nominee or representative of TMEE is entitled to be seated
immediately on the Board of Directors, and to direct the respondents EPCIB Board and Board Corporate
Secretary to admit and recognize said nominee or representative of TMEE to the Board of Directors in place
of the person who was elected to the Board at the 23 May 2006 annual stockholders' meeting had TMEE not
been disallowed to vote its shares.
The Court, as far back as 1998, already admonished the PCGG and the Sandiganbayan to speedily proceed
with the hearings and resolutions of the main cases for recovery and reconveyance of alleged ill-gotten
wealth.50 In ordinary times, what the Court should be resolving right now in the exercise of judicial review
should be the final decisions of the Sandiganbayan on the recovery of sequestered assets, and not
preliminary matters like those now before us. It is this unconscionable delay that has precisely allowed this
unwanted circus to march into this Court. The protracted delay serves no end except to foster mockery of
the judicial system.
WHEREFORE, the PETITION is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated 22 May 2006 is
declared NULL and VOID.
The election at the 23 May 2006 annual stockholders' meeting of the person to the seat in the Equitable-PCI
Bank Board of Directors to which petitioner Trans Middle East (Phils.), Inc. is entitled is likewise declared
NULL and VOID.
PENDING FINALITY OF THIS DECISION AND IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT HEREOF, respondents Board of
Directors of Equitable-PCI Bank and Corporate Secretary Sabino E. Acut, Jr. are DIRECTED NOT TO
RECOGNIZE said person whose election to the Board of Directors is set aside and nullified herein and TO
RECOGNIZE the nominee or representative of TMEE as a duly elected member of the Board of Directors,
with all the rights and privileges appertaining to the position.
ELPIDIO S. UY, petitioner,
vs.
FIRST METRO INTEGRATED STEEL CORP. and HON. ANTONIO I. DE CASTRO, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 3,
Manila, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81046 dated August 27, 2004 dismissing petitioner Elpidio S. Uy's
petition for certiorari and its Resolution2dated February 22, 2005 denying the motion for
reconsideration.
The facts show that on July 5, 1999, private respondent First Metro Integrated Steel Corporation
(FMISC) filed a complaint for sum of money with prayer for writ of preliminary attachment against
Robert Juan Uy (Robert), Midland Integrated Construction Company (MICC) and herein petitioner
Elpidio Uy, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 99-94408
and raffled to Branch 3.3
It is alleged that on June 3, 5 and 6, 1998, FMISC delivered to MICC, Robert and petitioner
deformed steel bars valued at P695,811.00. On June 9, 1998, Robert allegedly delivered to FMISC
Metrobank Check No. 042892 in the amount of P695,811.00 issued by petitioner as payment.
However, the check was dishonored upon presentment and despite demands, MICC, Robert and
petitioner refused to pay, hence the complaint.
In their Answer with Counterclaim and Crossclaim, Robert and MICC alleged that they are strangers
to the contract between FMISC and petitioner; that Robert merely referred petitioner to FMISC; that
petitioner left his check in Robert's office which was picked up by FMISC's collector; and that the
deformed steel bars were delivered to and received by petitioner's representatives as certified to by
Paul Eldrich V. Uy, petitioner's son.4
Petitioner filed his Answer with Counterclaim5 claiming that he had no business transaction with
FMISC; that he issued the check in favor of FMISC in the amount of P695,811,00 but since it was
not intended as payment to FMISC, he stopped the payment thereof.
Hearings were thereafter conducted for the reception of evidence of FMISC, Robert and MICC. The
initial reception of petitioner's evidence was set on February 28, 20016 but it was cancelled because
petitioner had influenza. The hearing was reset to April 26, 2001 and May 10, 20017 but was again
cancelled and moved to October 25, 2001 and December 13, 2001.
During the October 25, 2001 hearing, petitioner was represented by Atty. Lucas C. Carpio, Jr. who
appeared as Atty. Molina's collaborating counsel.8 The hearing was cancelled and rescheduled to
December 13, 2001. However, on December 10, 2001, Atty. Molina withdrew his appearance as
petitioner's counsel with the latter's consent.9 On December 13, 2001, Atty. Danilo Bañares entered
his appearance and requested for a resetting on February 14 and 28, 200210 which was granted by
the trial court. On February 14, 2002, Atty. Bañares appeared but instead of presenting evidence for
the petitioner, he requested for a postponement and resetting of the hearing.11
During the scheduled hearing on February 28, 2002, Atty. Bañares arrived late. Upon motion of
FMISC, the trial court ordered that petitioner's right to present evidence is deemed waived and the
parties were directed to file their respective memorandum.12 The case was deemed submitted for
decision on November 18, 2002.13
Atty. Bañares withdrew his appearance on January 8, 2003 with petitioner's conformity.14
On March 7, 2003, the trial court rendered judgment,15 the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff ordering defendant Elpidio
Uy to pay the former:
a) the sum of P690,000 with interest thereon at 12% per annum from July 1998 until
fully paid;
b) the sum of P110,000.00 as attorney's fees which is 16% of the principal amount;
and
c) the costs of suit.
Defendant Robert Uy's cross-claim is denied as it is now academic. The counterclaims of
both defendants herein against plaintiff and against each other are denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.16
On April 4, 2003, petitioner received a copy of the Decision.
On April 21, 2003, petitioner through Atty. Lucas C. Carpio, Jr. filed a Motion for New Trial17 on the
ground of gross negligence of petitioner's counsel in failing to attend the hearing for the reception of
evidence, thus impairing his rights to due process.
The trial court denied the motion for new trial in an Order18 dated October 1, 2003.
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari which dismissed the
petition in its assailed Decision dated August 27, 2004. It held that the trial court correctly denied the
motion for new trial because it was filed out of time and that a petition for certiorari is not the proper
remedy for the denial of a motion for new trial.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied, hence, this recourse on the grounds that –
1. The Seventeenth (17th) Division of the Court of Appeals gravely erred in denying due
course to the Petition for Certiorari on technical grounds, that is, for the purported failure of
the Petitioner to file with the Court a Quo his Motion for New Trial within the reglementary
period to appeal and that the only remedy for the denial of the latter motion is by appealing
from the Judgment or Final order and not through a Special Civil Action for Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.19
2. The former Seventeenth (17th) Division of the Court of Appeals gravely erred in not finding
that the Public Respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when he issued the assailed Order dated October 1, 2003 denying
Petitioner's Motion for New Trial.20
A scrutiny of the records discloses that while the Motion for New Trial was received by the trial court
on April 28, 2003, the date on the Registry Receipt attached to the Affidavit of Service21 as well as
that stamped on the envelope22 which contained the copy of the motion, reveals that it was filed and
served by registered mail on April 21, 2003, a Monday, because April 19, 2003, the last day for filing
the same was a Saturday. Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court states in no uncertain terms that
if the last day of the period thus computed falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the
place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day. Thus, the motion was
actually filed on time it having been filed on April 21, 2003, the next working day, following the last
day for filing which fell on a Saturday.
Section 9, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court which provides that the remedy to an order denying a
motion for new trial is to appeal the judgment or final order, must be read in conjunction with Section
1, Rule 41 which provides that:
SEC. 1. Subject of appeal. – An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these
rules to be appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
(a) An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration;
xxxx
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appeasable, the
aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, the filing by the petitioner of a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals from the denial of
the motion for new trial by the trial court is proper.
Notwthstanding the foregoing, we find that the trial court correctly denied petitioner's motion for new
trial.
Section 1, Rule 37 provides that a motion for new trial may be filed within the period for taking an
appeal based on the following grounds:
(a) Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which ordinary prudence could not
have guarded against and by reason of which such aggrieved party has probably been
impaired in his rights; or
xxxx
Negligence to be excusable must be one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have
guarded against.23
In the instant case, we find the negligence of petitioner's counsel in failing to attend the hearings for
the reception of evidence inexcusable. The trial court scheduled the hearing for the reception of
petitioner's evidence seven times. The initial hearing set on February 28, 2001 was cancelled
because petitioner allegedly had influenza. The hearings scheduled on April 26, 2001 and May 10,
2001 were cancelled and moved to October 25, 2001 and December 13, 2001. Petitioner was
represented by Atty. Carpio, Jr. as collaborating counsel during the hearing on October 25, 2001 but
no evidence was presented. Instead, the hearing was cancelled. On December 13, 2001, Atty.
Bañares, petitioner's new counsel, appeared but he requested for a resetting. On February 14, 2002,
Atty. Bañares moved to postpone the hearing to February 28, 2002 as previously scheduled. On
February 28, 2002, Atty. Bañares arrived late.
Scrutiny of the records disclose that the hearings were postponed or cancelled without any
justification. However, the trial court accommodated the requests for postponement or resetting in
order to accord petitioner due process. Under the circumstances, we find petitioner's counsel's
failure to attend the seven scheduled hearings without justifiable reason tantamount to inexcusable
neglect. As such, it cannot be a ground for new trial.
In addition, the Rule requires that motions for new trial founded on fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence must be accompanied by affidavits of merits, i.e., affidavits showing the facts
(not mere conclusions or opinions) constituting the valid cause of action or defense which the
movant may prove in case a new trial is granted, because a new trial would serve no purpose and
would just waste the time of the court as well as the parties if the complaint is after all groundless or
the defense is nil or ineffective.24
Under the Rules, the moving party must show that he has a meritorious defense. The facts
constituting the movant's good and substantial defense, which he may prove if the petition were
granted, must be shown in the affidavit which should accompany the motion for a new trial.25 We
examined petitioner's Affidavit of Merit and find that it did not contain clear statements of the facts
constituting a good and valid defense which he might prove if given the chance to introduce
evidence. The allegations that he has a "meritorious defense"26 and a "good cause"27 are mere
conclusions which did not provide the court with any basis for determining the nature and merit of
the case. An affidavit of merit should state facts, and not mere opinion or conclusions of
law.28 Petitioner's motion for new trial and affidavit of merit did not mention the evidence which he
was prevented from introducing, nor did it allege that such evidence would change the outcome of
the case.
Petitioner's argument that his counsel's negligence was so gross that he was deprived of due
process fails to impress. Gross negligence is not one of the grounds for a motion for a new trial. We
cannot declare his counsel's negligence as gross as to liberate him from the effects of his failure to
present countervailing evidence.29 In Air Philippines Corporation v. International Business Aviation
Services, Phils., Inc.,30 we did not consider as gross negligence the counsel's resort to dilatory
schemes, such as (1) the filing of at least three motions to extend the filing of petitioner's Answer; (2)
his nonappearance during the scheduled pretrials; and (3) the failure to file petitioner's pretrial Brief,
even after the filing of several Motions to extend the date for filing.
Besides, we find that petitioner's and his counsel's negligence are concurrent. During the initial
hearing for the reception of his evidence, petitioner was absent allegedly due to influenza. During the
succeeding scheduled hearings, petitioner was absent but his lawyer, Atty. Molina, was present but
did not present any evidence. Instead, motions for postponement or resetting were made. In one
occasion, Atty. Molina was absent but Atty. Carpio, Jr. appeared as collaborating counsel. Still, no
evidence was presented but a resetting was again requested.
On December 13, 2001, petitioner hired Atty. Bañares as his new counsel, and the hearings were
set on February 14 and 28, 2002. For petitioner, thus, to feign and insist upon a lack of awareness of
the progress of the case is to unmask a penchant for the ludicrous.31 When he hired the services of
Atty. Bañares, it is highly improbable that he was unaware of the stage of the proceedings. In
keeping with the normal cause of events, he should have made the proper inquiries from his former
counsel as to the status of the case.
Incidentally, we find it interesting that Atty. Lucas C. Carpio, Jr. who assisted petitioner in the
preparation of the motion for new trial, wherein he claimed that his former counsel was grossly
negligent in defending his case, was petitioner's collaborating counsel and who appeared in his
behalf during the October 25, 2001 hearing but likewise presented no evidence for the petitioner.
Finally, petitioner's counsel's inexcusable neglect did not amount to petitioner's deprivation of due
process of law. The right to due process safeguards the opportunity to be heard and to submit any
evidence one may have in support of his claim or defense. In the instant case, petitioner was given
several opportunities to be heard and to submit evidence but he squandered them. Indeed, from
lethargy is misfortune born.32
Blunders and mistakes in the conduct of the proceedings in the trial court as a result of the
ignorance, inexperience or incompetence of counsel do not qualify as a ground for new trial. If such
were to be admitted as valid reasons for re-opening cases, there would never be an end to litigation
so long as a new counsel could be employed to allege and show that the prior counsel had not been
sufficiently diligent, experienced or learned. This will put a premium on the willful and intentional
commission of errors by counsel, with a view to securing new trials in the event of conviction,33 or an
adverse decision, as in the instant case.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
peo