RENE RONULO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 182438
July 2, 2014
FACTS
Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry each other on March 29,
2003 at the Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish Church of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. However, on
the day of the wedding, the supposed officiating priest, Fr. Mario Ragaza, refused to
solemnize the marriage upon learning that the couple failed to secure a marriage license.
As a recourse, Joey, who was then dressed in barong tagalong, and Claire, clad in a
wedding gown, together with their parents, sponsors and guests, proceeded to the
Independent Church of Filipino Christians, also known as the Aglipayan Church. They
requested the petitioner, an Aglipayan priest, to perform a ceremony to which the latter
agreed despite having been informed by the couple that they had no marriage certificate.
The petitioner prepared his choir and scheduled a mass for the couple on the same date.
He conducted the ceremony in the presence of the groom, the bride, their parents, the
principal and secondary sponsors and the rest of their invited guests.
An information for violation of Article 352 of the RPC, was filed against the petitioner
before the MTC of Batac, Ilocos Norte for allegedly performing an illegal marriage
ceremony. The petitioner pleaded “not guilty” and while he conducted a ceremony (which
he admitted that he has the authority to solemnize a marriage), he denied that his act of
“blessing” the couple was tantamount to a solemnization of the marriage as contemplated
by law. A few testified on the incidents of the ceremony including the mother of Joey,
Florida, who heard the couple declare each other as husband and wife during the
ceremony. The MTC found petitioner guilty of violating Art. 352 of the Revised Penal Code
for conducting an illegal marriage ceremony. The RTC affirmed as did the Court of
Appeals.
ISSUE
WON the petitioner was guilty of violating Article 352 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
for allegedly performing an illegal marriage ceremony.
RULING
Yes. The petitioner was guilty of violating Article 352 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
for allegedly performing an illegal marriage ceremony (which shall be punished in
accordance to the provisions of the Marriage Law). Article 3 of the Family Code provides
the formal requisites of a marriage. Article 6 of the Family Code provides that while there
is no prescribed form or religious rite, the minimum requirements constituting a marriage
are first, personal appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer;
and second, their declaration in the presence of not less than two witnesses (of legal
age) that they take each other as husband and wife. In this case, the authority was
established when the petitioner admitted to conduct the marriage ceremony despite the
knowledge that requirements of marriage set by law is lacking (not in good faith). Through
the testimony of Florida, the contracting parties indeed personally declared that they take
each other as husband and wife. It is clear that the petitioner conducted a marriage
ceremony and not just a mere blessing. The marriage ceremony, therefore, is illegal.
Important Laws Related To the Case
Art. 3 of the Family Code. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing
officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than
two witnesses of legal age.
Art. 6 of the Family Code. No prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall
be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in
the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife. This declaration
shall be contained in the marriage certificate which shall be signed by the contracting parties and their witnesses and
attested by the solemnizing officer.
Art. 352 of the RPC. Performance of illegal marriage ceremony. — Priests or ministers of any religious
denomination or sect, or civil authorities who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall be punished
in accordance with the provisions of the Marriage Law.
Section 39 of Marriage Law (Act no. 3613). Illegal Solemnization of Marriage. — Any priest or minister solemnizing
marriage without being authorized by the Director of the Philippine National Library or who, upon solemnizing marriage,
refuses to exhibit his authorization in force when called upon to do so by the parties or parents, grandparents, guardians,
or persons having charge; and any bishop or officer, priest, or minister of any church, religion or sect the regulations
and practices whereof require banns or publications previous to the solemnization of a marriage in accordance with
section ten, who authorizes the immediate solemnization of a marriage that is subsequently declared illegal; or any
officer, priest or minister solemnizing marriage in violation of the provisions of this act, shall be punished by
imprisonment for not less than one month nor more than two years, or by a fine of not less than two hundred
pesos nor more than two thousand pesos.
Section 44 of Marriage Law (Act no. 3613). General Penal Clause. — Any violation of any provision of this Act not
specifically penalized, or of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities, shall be punished by a fine of
not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not more than one month, or both, in the discretion of the
court.
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.
G.R. No. 97336
February 19, 1993
FACTS
Petitioner (Baksh) was a 29 year old Iranian exchange student from Lyceum
Northwestern College taking a medical course. Private respondent was 22 years old and
a former waitress. The two are alleged lovers. Baksh declared his love and proposed
marriage. Petitioner accepted because of the promise of marriage which they agreed to
do so at the end of the school semester. Baksh visited the Respondent’s parents to secure
the approval of the same marriage.
Respondent was a virgin prior to living with Baksh (he forced her to live with him). A week
prior to filing her complaint, Baksh attitude started to change; he maltreated and
threatened to kill her. She sustained injuries. During a confrontation with a barangay
captain representative, Baksh denied the marriage agreement saying that he was already
married to someone in Bacolod. A case was filed in the RTC of Pangasinan. Respondent
asked Baksh to pay for damages and reimbursements. He refused and denied every
allegations including his proposal of marriage. The decision was held in favor of the
Respondent. Baksh claimed that the judgement was an error because he did not know
that custom of the Filipinos and that his acts were done according to his own customs.
He appealed to the Court of Appeals. The decision of the RTC was affirmed in toto by the
CA. Hence, Baksh, the petitioner, filed an appeal to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE
WON petitioner is liable for damages (on the basis of Art. 21 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines)
RULING
Yes. The Petitioner is liable for damages although not because of the breach of the
promise to marry but the violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The
existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong.
However, when a man promises to marry for a woman to accept his love which in turn
would allow herself to consent to his sexual desires when in fact he had no reasons to
pursue the wedding justifies the award of damages as stated in Art. 21. It is essential,
however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy. In the instant case, Baksh deceived the Respondent with
his declaration of love and promise to marry which made her surrender her virtue and
womanhood and live with him ((which is a cherished possession of every Filipina not
because of lust but because of moral seduction) He even go to the lengths of asking the
Respondent’s parents which made them prepare for the wedding.
Important Laws Related To the Case
Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties,
is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
EDWIN A. ACEBEDO, Petitioner, vs. EDDIE P. ARQUERO, Respondent.
A.M. No. P-94-1054
March 11, 2003
FACTS
Edwin Acebedo accused Eddie P. Arquero, Process Server of Brooke’s Point Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) for immorality alleging that the respondent and his wife, Dedje Irader
Acebedo, a former stenographer of the Brooke’s Point MTC unlawfully and scandalously
cohabited as husband and wife as a result of which a girl, Desiree May Irader Arquero
was born (Baptismal Certificate has Arquero and Irader as parents). Arquero claimed that
the illicit relationship between him and the petitioner’s wife can be explained by the
notarized written agreement (Kasunduan) of the petitioner and his wife stating that they
would sever their marriage ties and allow themselves to live with other possible partner
and that no one would go to court to institute any action against the other. By respondent's
own admission, however, he said he indeed had an illicit relationship with complainant's
wife for about eight to nine months.
ISSUES
1. WON the respondent is guilty of immorality.
2. WON the Kasunduan dissolved the marriage between the complainant and his
wife.
RULING
1. Yes. The respondent is guilty of immorality. Respondent's act of having illicit
relations with complainant's wife is, within the purview of Section 46 (5) of Subtitle
A, Title I, Book V of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987, a disgraceful and immoral conduct. The respondent
also personally admitted having an affair with the wife of the complainant for about
eight to nine months also played into part. He is SUSPENDED for six (6) months
and one (1) day without pay with a STERN WARNING that commission of the
same or similar acts shall be dealt with severely.
2. No. Article 1 of the Family Code provides that marriage is “an inviolable social
institution whose nature and consequences, and incidents are governed by
law and not subject to stipulation.” That respondent’s justification fails, being an
employee of the judiciary, respondent ought to have known that the Kasunduan
had absolutely no force and effect on the validity of the marriage between
complainant and his wife. It is an institution of public order and policy, governed by
rules established by law which cannot be made inoperative by stipulation of the
parties.
Important Laws Related To the Case
Article 1 of the Family Code. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman
entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family
and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject
to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits
provided by this Code. (52a)
Section 46 of the Administrative Code (EO No. 292) of 1987. Discipline: General Provisions.— (a) No officer or
employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law and after due
process.(b) The following shall be grounds for disciplinary action: (5) Disgraceful and immoral conduct;
Section 4 of RA No. 6713. Norms of Conduct of Public Officials and Employees. - (A) Every public official and
employee shall observe the following as standards of personal conduct in the discharge and execution of official
duties: (c) Justness and sincerity. - Public officials and employees shall remain true to the people at all times. They
must act with justness and sincerity and shall not discriminate against anyone, especially the poor and the
underprivileged. They shall at all times respect the rights of others, and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to law,
good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public interest. They shall not dispense or
extend undue favors on account of their office to their relatives whether by consanguinity or affinity except with
respect to appointments of such relatives to positions considered strictly confidential or as members of their personal
staff whose terms are coterminous with theirs.
Rule IV, Section 52A (15) of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service - An
immoral conduct is classified as a grave offense which calls for a penalty of suspension for six (6) months and one (1)
day to one (1) year for the first offense, and dismissal is imposed for the second offense. Since the present charge of
immorality against respondent constitutes his first offense, his suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day is in
order.
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
G.R. No. 174689
October 22, 2007
FACTS
In 2002, Petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his
first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. He alleged
that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a
female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. He underwent
psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation and even sex
reassignment surgery. From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged
to be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from
"Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female. During trial in the RTC
in 2003, no opposition to the petition was made. Therefore, TC rendered a decision in his
favor; thus, ordering the Civil Registrar of Manila to change the entries appearing in the
Certificate of Birth of petitioner, specifically his first name from "Rommel" to "Mely" and
his gender from Male to Female. The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the
OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. It alleged that there is no law
allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration. The Court
of Appeals reversed the RTC decision holding that there is no law allowing the change of
entries of either name or sex in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES
WON petitioner is entitled to change his sex in his birth certificate.
RULING
No. He is not entitled to change his sex in his birth certificate. Article 408 of the Civil Code
provides the entries correctible under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Article 413 also
allows matters with regard to the registration of civil status be governed by special laws.
However, there is no law that impliedly or expressly, allows anyone to change the entry
in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment. Thus, the petition is
denied.
Important Laws Related To the Case
Section 2 of Clerical Error Law (RA 9048). Definition of Terms (3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake
committed in the performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that
is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes
or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or records:
Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner.
Article 408 of the Civil Code. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births;
(2) marriages;
(3) deaths;
(4) legal separations;
(5) annulments of marriage;
(6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning;
(7) legitimations;
(8) adoptions;
(9) acknowledgments of natural children;
(10) naturalization;
(11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship;
(13) civil interdiction;
(14) judicial determination of filiation;
(15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and
(16) changes of name. (326a)
MERCEDITA MATA ARANES, petitioner, vs. JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO, respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390.
April 11, 2002.
FACTS
Petitioner Mercedita Mata charged respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law. On
February 17, 2000, respondent judge solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador
Orobia without the requisite Marriage License and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his
territorial jurisdiction (Balatan, Camarines Sur). Because their marriage was nulled, her right to
inherit the vast properties left by Orobia and her entitlement for a pension was not granted.
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his illegal acts and
unethical misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so much hardships, embarrassment
and sufferings. Judge Occiano averred that before starting the ceremony, he examined the
documents submitted to him by the petitioner and he discovered that the parties did not possess
a marriage license so he refused to solemnize the marriage. However, due to the earnest pleas
of the parties, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. After the
solemnization, respondent reiterated the need for the marriage license and admonished the
parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured
the respondent that they would give the license to him but they did not do so. He attributes the
hardships and embarrassment suffered by the petitioner as due to her own fault and negligence
ISSUES
WON respondent is guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a marriage license and outside his
territorial jurisdiction.
RULING
Yes. Respondent is guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a marriage license and outside his
territorial jurisdiction. Article 3 of the Family Code provides the formal requisites of marriages.
Article 4 provides that absence of the requirements shall render the marriage void from the very
start. Also, Article 7 gives the limitation of a judge or any incumbent member of the judiciary to
solemnize a marriage only within their court’s jurisdiction. Respondent judge did not possess
such authority when he solemnized the marriage of the petitioner because he officiated the
marriage outside his jurisdiction and knowing that the documents submitted to him lacked
marriage license.
Important Laws Related To the Case
Art. 3 of the Family Code. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and
their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal
age.
Art. 4 of the Family Code. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio,
except as stated in Article 35 (2).
Art. 7 of the Family Code. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction.
LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
G.R. No. 145226 February 06, 2004
FACTS
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina
Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4) years. Lucio Morigo
and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other. In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to
receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The former replied and after an
exchange of letters, they became sweethearts. In 1990, Lucia came back to the
Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get
married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990. Lucia reported back to her work in
Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind. On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario
Court (General Division) a petition for divorce against appellant which was granted by the
court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992. On October 4, 1992,
appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago On September 21, 1993,
accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial
Court of Bohol, The complaint seek among others, the declaration of nullity of accused’s
marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.
ISSUES
WON petitioner committed bigamy and if so, whether his defense of good faith is valid.
RULING
No. Petitioner is not guilty of bigamy but his defense of good faith and lack of criminal
intent does not render him innocent because Article 3 of the Civil Code provides that
everyone is presumed to know the law. Lucia was belied by the fact that he had filed for
a judicial declaration of nullity on his marriage with Lucia a year after his subsequent
marriage. The defense of good faith in the case became moot and academic for there
was no first marriage to speak of. In this case, no marriage ceremony at all was performed
by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete merely signed
a marriage contract on their own. The reason is that what is sought to be punished by
Article 349 the Revised Penal Code is the act of contracting a second marriage before
the first marriage had been dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the fact that the first marriage
was void from the beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy case.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia from the
Canadian court could not be accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article 15 of
the Civil Code and given the fact that it is contrary to public policy in this jurisdiction. Under
Article 17 of the Civil Code, a declaration of public policy cannot be rendered ineffectual
by a judgment promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.
Important Laws Related To the Case
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person
who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before
the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
Article 3, of the Civil Code. Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. (2)
Article 15, of the Civil Code. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
Article 17 of the Civil Code. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be
governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed. When the acts referred to are executed before the
diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by
Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public
policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
Article 40 of the Family Code. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage
on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Article 3 of the Family Code. The formal requisites of marriage are:(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;(2) A valid
marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and (3) A marriage ceremony which takes
place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that
they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
Article 4 of the Family Code. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void
ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2).A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable
as provided in Article 45.An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party
or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable
ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE
NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., petitioners, v.
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.
G.R. No. 133778
March 14, 2000
FACTS
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their
marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death
on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito
and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof,
Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from
securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After
their father’s death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of
Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license.
The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second
marriage would affect petitioner’s successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on
the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons
who could file an action for “annulment of marriage” under Article 47 of the Family Code.
ISSUES
1. WON plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the declaration
of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her specially so
when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal is already
dead;
2. WON the second marriage of plaintiffs’ deceased father with defendant is null and void
ab initio;
RULING
1. Yes. Article 47 of the Family Code cannot be applied even by analogy to petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of marriage relied
upon by the trial court, which allows “the sane spouse” to file an annulment suit “at any
time before the death of either party” is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds,
periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of
marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a
marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annullable is
valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is
considered as having never to have taken place and cannot be the source of rights. The
first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the
other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in
a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void
marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages
can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in
which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly
valid. That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable
marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail
it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.
2. Yes. The second marriage of plaintiffs’ deceased father with defendant is null and void
ab initio. Article 76 of the Civil Code is the provision that gives one of the few exemptions
to entering into a marriage without the marriage license. In this case, at the time of Pepito
and respondent’s marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as
husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito’s
first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty
months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact,
and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has
already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was
not the cohabitation contemplated by law. Having determined that the second marriage
involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage
license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.
Important Laws Related To the Case
Art. 45 of the Family Code. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the
marriage:
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years of age or over but
below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents, guardian or person having
substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party
freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife;
(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other
as husband and wife;
(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the
facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the same having
disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such incapacity
continues and appears to be incurable; or
(6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious and appears to be
incurable. (85a)
Art. 47 of the Family Code. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by the following persons and within
the periods indicated herein:
(1) For causes mentioned in number 1 of Article 45 by the party whose parent or guardian did not give his or her
consent, within five years after attaining the age of twenty-one, or by the parent or guardian or person having legal
charge of the minor, at any time before such party has reached the age of twenty-one;
(2) For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45, by the same spouse, who had no knowledge of the other's
insanity; or by any relative or guardian or person having legal charge of the insane, at any time before the death of
either party, or by the insane spouse during a lucid interval or after regaining sanity;
(3) For causes mentioned in number 3 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years after the discovery of the
fraud;
(4) For causes mentioned in number 4 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years from the time the force,
intimidation or undue influence disappeared or ceased;
(5) For causes mentioned in number 5 and 6 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years after the marriage.
(87a)
Art. 76 of the Civil Code. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the
age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to
marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized
by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit
that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal
impediment to the marriage. (n)
APOLONIO TANJANCO, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARACELI
SANTOS, respondents.
G.R. No. L-18630
December 17, 1966
FACTS
Apolonio Tanjanco courted Araceli Santos in 1958 both being adult of age. In
consideration of Tanjanco’s promise of marriage, Santos consented to Tanjanco’s pleas
for carnal knowledge, which became a regular occurrence for one year of protestations
of love and the promises of marriage. This resulted to the pregnancy of Santos. To avoid
embarrassment and social humiliation, she had to resign as secretary in IBM Philippines,
Inc, thus becoming unable to support herself and her baby. Tanjanco refused to marry
Santos, who, as a result, suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation.
ISSUES
WON Apolonio Tanjanco is liable for damages under Article 21 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines when he refused to marry Araceli Santos despite his promise of marriage?
RULING
No. Tanjanco is not liable for damages under Article 21 of the Civil Code. Over and above
the partisan allegations, the facts stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959,
the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with
appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea
of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant
been deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions
and wiles of the defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less
for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and
would have cut chart all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill
his promises
Important Laws Related To the Case
ART. 21 of the Civil Code. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
ART. 23 of the Civil Code. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Republic of the Philippines, Petitioner v. Jennifer Cagandahan, Respondent
G.R. No. 166676
12 September 2008
FACTS
Respondent alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a
female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male
characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which
is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics.
She further alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years
and at age six, underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that she has small
ovaries. At age thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian structures had minimized, she
has stopped growing and she has no breast or menstrual development. She then alleged
that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a
male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender
be changed from female to male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.
ISSUES
WON the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of
respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground of her
medical condition known as CAH, and her name from Jennifer to Jeff, under Rules 103
and 108 of the Rules of Court.
RULING
No. Respondent has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps
to arrest or interfere with what he was born with. And accordingly, he has already ordered
his life to that of a male. Respondent could have undergone treatment and taken steps,
like taking lifelong medication, to force his body into the categorical mold of a female but
he did not. He chose not to do so. Nature has instead taken its due course in respondent’s
development to reveal more fully his male characteristics.
In the absence of evidence that respondent is an "incompetent" and in the absence of
evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of
society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and
justified the respondent's position and his personal judgment of being a male. The Court
has held that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be
exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow. The
trial court's grant of respondent's change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change
of a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the consequence that respondent's
change of name merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondent's
change of name. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth
certificate from female to male.
Important Laws Related To the Case
Rule 103 CHANGE OF NAME
SECTION 1. Venue. - A person desiring to change his name shall present the petition to the Regional Trial Court of the
province in which he resides, [or, in the City of Manila, to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court].
SEC. 2. Contents of petition. - A petition for change of name shall be signed and verified by the person desiring his
name changed, or some other person on his behalf, and shall set forth:
(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for at least three (3) years
prior to the date of such filing; (b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is sought; (c) The name
asked for.
SEC. 3. Order for hearing. - If the petition filed is sufficient in form and substance, the court, by an order reciting the
purpose of the petition, shall fix a date and place for the hearing thereof, and shall direct that a copy of the order be
published before the hearing at least once a week for three (3) successive weeks in some newspaper of general
circulation published in the province, as the court shall deem best. The date set for the hearing shall not be within thirty
(30) days prior to an election nor within four (4) months after the last publication of the notice.
SEC. 4. Hearing. - Any interested person may appear at the hearing and oppose the petition. The Solicitor General or
the proper provincial or city fiscal shall appear on behalf of the Government of the Republic.
SEC. 5. Judgment. - Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the order that such order has been
published as directed and that the allegations of the petition are true, the court shall, if proper and reasonable cause
appears for changing the name of the petitioner, adjudge that such name be changed in accordance with the prayer of
the petition.
SEC. 6. Service of judgment. - Judgments or orders rendered in connection with this rule shall be furnished the civil
registrar of the municipality or city where the court issuing the same is situated, who shall forthwith enter the same in
the civil register.
Rule 108 CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY
SECTION 1. Who may file petition. - Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status
of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of
any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. - Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil
register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of
annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i)
acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction;
(m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
SEC. 3. Parties. - When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all
persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. - Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for
the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The
court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. - The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose
cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of
publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. - The court in which the proceedings is brought may make orders expediting the
proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such
proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. - After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the cancellation or
correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned
who shall annotate the same in his record.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner vs MARELYN TANEDO MANALO,
Respondent
G.R. No. 221029
April 24, 2018
FACTS
Respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for cancellation of entry of
marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, by virtue of a judgment of divorce
rendered by the Japanese court. Manalo was allowed to testify. Among the documents
that were offered and admitted were: (1) Court Order finding the petition and its
attachments to be sufficient in form and in substance; (2) Affidavit of Publication; (3)
Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former Japanese husband; (4) Divorce
Decree of the Japanese court; (5) Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine
Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the Notification of Divorce; and (6) Acceptance of
Certificate of Divorce.
The Office of the Solicitor’s General, as it appeared for the petitioner Republic of the
Philippines, did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the allegations of Manalo.
The trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. It opined that, based on Article of Article
15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine law “does not afford Filipinos the right to file for
a divorce, whether they are in the country or living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos
or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in another
country.
ISSUE
WON a Filipino citizen, who initiated a divorce proceeding abroad and obtained a
favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry, has
the capacity to remarry pursuant to Article 26 (2) of the Family Code.
RULING
Yes. A Filipino citizen, who initiated a divorce proceeding abroad and obtained a favorable
judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry, has the capacity
to remarry pursuant to Article 26 (2) of the Family Code. Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26
speaksof "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that
there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the
alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree
was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the
respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC
decision. It held that Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines is applicable even if
it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her Japanese husband because the decree
they obtained makes the latter no longer married to the former capacitating him to
remarry.
Important Laws Related To the Case
Art. 15 of the Civil Code. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a)
Art. 26 of the Family Code. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38. (17a)
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227)
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
G.R. No. 175581
March 28, 2008
FACTS
On 1986, Jose and Felisa were married in Pasay City Hall. Instead of a marriage license,
they executed of a sworn affidavit attesting that both of them are legally capacitated and
that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.
In 1993 Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual. Felisa filed an action for
bigamy against Jose. After which, Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment and/or
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Biñan, Laguna. He
contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was
celebrated between the parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he
and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five years; and that his consent to
the marriage was secured through fraud. The complaint was dismissed on Regional Trial
Court stating that Jose is deemed estopped from assailing the legality of his marriage for
lack of marriage license. The RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint for the
ground that the testimonies (Including his sister) and evidence presented, the marriage
celebrated between Jose and Felisa was valid.
ISSUE
WON the marriage between Jose and Felisa is void ab initio.
RULING
Yes. The marriage between Jose and Felisa is void ab ignition. Article 4 of the Family
Code states the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the
marriage void ab initio. It cannot be denied that the marriage between Jose and Felisa
was celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage license. Neither did Jose and
Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76 of the Family Code, that they should
have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be exempted
from the requirement of a marriage license.
Important Laws Related To the Case
Art. 34 of the Family Code. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The
contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths.
The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties are
found no legal impediment to the marriage.
Art. 76 of the Civil Code. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the
age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to
marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by
law to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that
he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal
impediment to the marriage. (n)
Art. 87 of the Civil Code. The action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by the parties and within the
periods as follows:
(1) For causes mentioned in Number 1 of Article 85, by the party whose parent or guardian did not give his or her
consent, within four years after attaining the age of twenty or eighteen years, as the case may be; or by the parent or
guardian or person having legal charge, at any time before such party has arrived at the age of twenty or eighteen
years;
(2) For causes mentioned in Number 2 of Article 85, by the spouse who has been absent, during his or her lifetime; or
by either spouse of the subsequent marriage during the lifetime of the other;
(3) For causes mentioned in Number 3 of Article 85, by the sane spouse, who had no knowledge of the other's
insanity; or by any relative or guardian of the party of unsound mind, at any time before the death of either party;
(4) For causes mentioned in Number 4, by the injured party, within four years after the discovery of the fraud;
(5) For causes mentioned in Number 5, by the injured party, within four years from the time the force or intimidation
ceased;
(6) For causes mentioned in Number 6, by the injured party, within eight years after the marriage. (31a)
Article 3 of the Family Code. The formal requisites of marriage are:(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;(2) A valid
marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and (3) A marriage ceremony which takes
place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that
they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
Article 4 of the Family Code. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void
ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2).A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable
as provided in Article 45.An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party
or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 198780
October 16, 2013
FACTS
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge
Ofelia I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as
evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage.
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of her
marriage with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated
and never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of
entering into a married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations.
She described their marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio.
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007,
Albios filed a motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC
ordered the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and determine
the existence of a collusion. On October 2, 2007, the Assistant Prosecutor complied and
reported that she could not make a determination for failure of both parties to appear at
the scheduled investigation.
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not
attend the hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing
on the merits ensued.
ISSUE
WON a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in
consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?
RULING
No. The marriage contracted cannot be considered as void ab initio. Article 2 provides
the essential requisites for a marriage to be valid which includes consent. Consent was
not lacking between the parties. In fact, there was real consent because it was not vitiated
or rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious and
intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient
consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. A marriage in
jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke, with no real intention
of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear understanding that the parties
would not be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct indicating a purpose
to enter into such a relation. Albios and Fringer had an undeniable intention to be bound
in order to create the very bond necessary to allow the respondent to acquire American
citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married would allow them to further their
objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly support an application for
citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the actual marriage status
and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore,
clearly present. A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under the
grounds provided by law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into
for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of
foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed
by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it
shall be declared valid.
Important Laws Related To the Case
Art. 2 of the Family Code. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites are present:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female; and
(2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer. (53
a)
Article 4 of the Family Code. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void
ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2).A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable
as provided in Article 45.An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party
or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable
RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA, petitioner, v. ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. 167746.
August 28, 2007
FACTS
A petition for annulment of marriage was filed by petitioner against respondent Rosita A.
Alcantara alleging that he and respondent celebrated their marriage twice (One on Dec
8, 1982 and another on March 26, 1983) without securing the required marriage license.
The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage
contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never went to
Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil registrar of the said place. On 14
October 1985, respondent gave birth to their child Rose Ann Alcantara. In 1988, they
parted ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment
be issued declaring their marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the
corresponding marriage contract and its entry on file.
Countering the petition for annulment of marriage, respondent asserts the validity of their
marriage and maintains that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a
certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. She had actually
gave birth to two children, one as stated by the petitioner and the other was Rachel Ann
Alcantara on October 27, 1992. Moreover, petitioner filed the said case in order to evade
prosecution for concubinage for he had a mistress with whom he had three children. The
case for concubinage was actually filed and that petitioner prays that the annulment case
be dismissed for lack of merit.
The Regional Trial Court of Makati City dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The Court
of Appeals dismissed also the petitioner’s appeal. Hence, the appeal to the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE
Whether or not The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it
ruled that the Petition for Annulment has no legal and factual basis despite the evidence
on record that there was no marriage license at the precise moment of the
solemnization of the marriage.
RULING
No. The Honorable Court of Appeals did not commit a reversible error when it ruled that
the Petition for Annulment has no legal and factual basis despite the evidence on record
that there was no marriage license at the precise moment of the solemnization of the
marriage. Petitioner and respondent went through a marriage ceremony twice in a span
of less than one year utilizing the same marriage license. There is no claim that he went
through the second wedding ceremony in church under duress or with a gun to his head.
Everything was executed without nary a whimper on the part of the petitioner. In fact, for
the second wedding of petitioner and respondent, they presented to the San Jose de
Manuguit Church the marriage contract executed during the previous wedding ceremony
before the Manila City Hall. In this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and
respondent reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this effect was also
issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The certification moreover is precise
in that it specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued,
namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further validating the fact that a license
was in fact issued to the parties herein. Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the
probative value of the marriage license, claims that neither he nor respondent is a resident
of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, the court still hold that there is no sufficient basis to annul
petitioner and respondent’s marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or
municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a
marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10day period for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity
of the marriage. An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect
its validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and
administratively liable.
Important Laws Related To the Case
Art. 53 of the Civil Code. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character (Sec. 1a, Art. 3613).
OBERGEFELL et al. v. HODGES, DIRECTOR, OHIO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, et
al.
SC-USA No. 14-556
June 26, 2015
FACTS
Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee define marriage as a union between one man
and one woman. The petitioners are 14 same-sex couples and two men whose samesex partners are deceased. The respondents are state officials responsible for enforcing
the laws that are in question. The petitioners claim that the respondents violated the
Fourteenth Amendment by denying them the right to marry or to have their marriages
lawfully performed in another State, given full recognition.
ISSUE
1. Whether the petitioners were denied due process, particularly the right to liberty.
2. Whether petitioners were denied of equal protection of the laws.
RULING
1. Yes. The petitioners were denied due process. Same-Sex Marriage is a right under the
Due Process Clause. Requiring states to license same-sex marriage is grounded in the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process clause. The right to marry, including for samesex couples, is fundamental under the Constitution for four reasons: (i) individual
autonomy dictates our personal choice on who to marry; (ii) we have a right to enjoy
intimate association; (iii) it protects children and families, because children suffer if they
are raised by unmarried parents; (iv) marriage is a keystone to our nation’s social order.
2. Yes. The petitioners were denied of the equal protection of the laws. Same-Sex
Marriage is a Right Under Equal Protection. The Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of
equal protection also requires that all states license same-sex marriage. Burdening the
liberty of same-sex couples, but not that of opposite-sex couples, shows that current laws
are inherently unequal.
Important Laws Related To the Case
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution: No state shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws