Constitutional Law Outline | Spring 2019 Bobbit’s Modalities: The mode Justices use when interpreting the Constitution. These methods may be characterized as the forms of constitutional argument or the modalities of constitutional interpretation. 1. Textual – which looks to the meaning of the words of the Constitution, as an average contemporary American would interpret them today. 2. History – Which relies on the original intentions of the ratifiers of the Constitution 3. Structural – which infers rules from the relationships that the Constitution mandates between the structures it sets up. 4. Doctrine – which generates and applies rules from precedent. 5. Ethos – which derives rules from those morals and political commitments of the American ethos that are reflected in the Constitution. 6. Prudence – which balances the cost and benefits of a proposed rule, “Strict Construction” consists of an exclusive reliance on the first three forms. I: Introduction: The Marshall Court and the Federal Constitution. A. The Constitution of the United States pg. 1-15 BLBAS (photocopy) B. Interpreting the New Constitution: How and by Whom? 1. The Scope of Congressional Powers McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) (pg. 240) Defined the scope of the US Congress legislative power and how it relates to the state legislatures. The dispute in McCulloch involved the legality of the national bank and a tax that the state of Maryland imposed on it. In it’s ruling the Supreme Court established that the “Necessary & Proper” clause of the Const. gives the federal government certain implied powers that are not explicitly enumerated in the Constitution and secondly that the American federal government is supreme over the states, and so states ability to interfere with the federal government is limited. 1 The case established two important principles in constitutional law. First, the Constitution grants to Congress implied powers to implement the Constitution’s express powers to create a functional national government. Prior to the Supreme Court decision in McCulloch, the scope of the U.S. government’s authority was unclear. Second the state action may not impede valid constitutional exercises of power by the federal government. Marshall: (1) Yes, Congress had the constitutional power to charter the Bank of the United States. This power is ultimately derived from the Constitution’s grant to Congress of the general power to “tax ad spend” for the general welfare. Congress is also given general powers under the Necessary and Property Clause. (Art. 1 §8), functions to expand not limit Congress’s enumerated powers. A federally created institution because federal laws are supreme to state law. *** Remember 10th amendment is but a truism. 2. Judicial Review Marbury v. Madison (1803) “Who Decides?” This case established the power of the Supreme Court to review the constitutionality of federal executive actions and of federal statutes. The Courts landmark decision established that the US constitution is actual law not just a statement of political principles and ideals and helped define the boundary between the constitutionality separate executive and judicial branches of the American form of government. The Court held firstly that Madison’s refusal to deliver Marbury’s commission was illegal, and secondly that it was normally for a court in such situation to order the government official in question to delivery the commission. Judiciary Act of 1789 to establish the American federal court system, since Art. III. After ruling that it conflicted with the constitution, Marshall struck down the relevant portion of the Act. Marshall ruled that American federal courts have the power to refuse to give any effect to congressional legislation that is inconsistent with their interpretation of the Constitution- a move known as “striking down” laws. “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is”. Martin v. Hunter’s Lesse – Justice Story argued that the Constitution presumed that the Supreme Court 2 could review state court decisions. Story argued that the Constitution creates a Supreme Court and gives Congress discretion whether to create lower federal courts. But if Congress chose not to establish such tribunals then the Supreme Court would be powerless to hear any cases, except for the few that fitting within its original jurisdiction, unless it could review state court rulings Supreme court review is essential to ensure uniformity in the interpretation of the federal law. The judiciary has the authority to review the constitutionality of laws and executive acts. 3. Presidential Interpretation Who should be the authoritative interpreter of the constitution? All government officials and institutions are required to engage in constitutional interpretation. The executive must consider the constitutionality in deciding what laws to propose, which bills passed by the legislature to veto and what executive policies to implement. Three possible approaches of who should be the authoritative interpreter of the constitution. (CHEM pg. 26-30) 1. No Authoritative Interpreter – Each branch of the government would have equal authority to determine the meaning of constitutional provisions and conflicts would be resolved through political power and compromise. 2. Each Branch is Authoritative in Certain Areas – For each part of the Constitution one branch of govt is assigned the role of being the final arbiter of disputes, but it is not the same branch for all parts of the constitution. Ex: Challenges to the president’s conduct of foreign policy such as whether the Vietnam war was constitutional pose a political question not to be resolved by the judiciary. By declaring a matter to be a political question, the Court states that it is for other branches of government to interpret the constitutional provisions in questions and determine whether the Constitution is violated. The effect of the political question doctrine is that for each part of the constitution there is a final arbiter, but it is not the same branch for all constitutional provisions. 3. The Judiciary is the Authoritative Interpreter. 3 The phrase presidential veto does not appear in the US Const, but Art I, §7 requires every bill, order, resolution or other act of legislation approved by Congress to be presented to the President for their approval. After that is done, there are several scenarios in which a bill may or may not be enacted into law. The president may sign the bill within 10 days (excluding Sundays). This enacts the bill into law. The president may return the bill to Congress with a statement of objections within 10 days (excluding Sundays). This is a "veto." If the president vetoes a bill, the president's objections shall be considered by the Congress. Each house may vote to override the president's veto. If 2/3 of each house agree to override the president's veto, the bill is enacted into law. The president may do nothing, and after 10 days (excluding Sundays) if Congress has not yet adjourned, the bill is enacted into law. The president may do nothing, and if Congress adjourns before the 10th day (excluding Sundays), the bill is not enacted into law. This is known as "pocket veto". (It can't be overridden) A pocket veto occurs when a bill fails to become law because the president does not sign the bill and cannot return the bill to Congress within a 10 day period because Congress is not in session 4. The Jacksonian Era & Slavery “Using Natural Law to Protect Property” Calder v. Bull (1798) CHEM pg, 636 This cases in which the court decided four important points of constitutional law. 1. Ex post facto clause in the US constitution applies only to criminal laws that have at least one of four effects. 1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2nd. Every law that aggravates a crime, makes it greater than it was, when committed. 4 3rd. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender 2. The Supreme Court lacks the jurisdiction to determine that any law of any state Legislature is contrary to the Constitution of that state. 3. No man should be compelled to so what the laws do not require; not to refrain from acts which the laws permit. 4. Not a violation of the ex post facto clause if there is not fact done by Bull, that is in any manner affected by the law or resolution of Connecticut: it does not concern, or relate to any act done by them. Natural Law: is a philosophy asserting that certain rights are inherent by virtue of human nature, endowed by nature traditionally by God; and that these can be understood universally through human reasons. Majority Opinion: Judges ought to rely on natural law when making their decisions. Iredell Concurrence: courts cannot strike down statutes based only upon principles of natural justice: the ideals of natural justice are regulated by no fixed standard: the ablest and the purest men have differed upon the subjects; and all that the Court could properly say in such an event would be that the legislature had passed an act which in the opinion o the judges was inconsistent with the abstract principles of natural justice. The court cannot pronounce something void merely because it is in their judgment contrary to the principles of natural justice. Unresolved Question – what to do with natural laws: what should the court do if confronted with a statute that violates natural laws? Fletcher v. Peck (1810) A majority of the Georgia legislature was bribed in 1795 to convey approximately 35 million acres of state land to private companies at a bargain price. The following year, Georgia’s legislature rescinded the grant. However, large parcels of the land had already been sold to investors. A lawsuit was filed based on warranty of title to determine whether the 1796 rescission could affect the rights of one of the 5 purchasers of the land. The United States Supreme Court took up the question. Can a state legislature take away rights that have vested by repealing a law that is essentially a contract? Supreme court ruled that state legislatures repeal of the law was unconstitutional. The sale of a binding contract cannot be invalidated even if it is illegally secured. Court refers to general principles, states can’t impair obligations of contracts; property is a fundamental element of freedom; property rights are vested. The government interfering with vested rights in unconstitutional. Additionally, the Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution prohibits state legislatures from passing laws that retroactively impair private contract rights. The 1795 conveyance of state land was a contract that cannot be set aside under the Contracts Clause. The Contracts Clause does not contain any exception for contracts where the state is a party. In fact, the Contracts Clause can be viewed as evidence that the founders of the United States were concerned about rash decisions of state legislatures and adopted the Contracts Clause to guard against these sudden actions. Therefore, the Georgia legislature does not have the authority to affect the rights of these third-party purchasers, without notice of the fraud, based on both the general principles of law and the Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. CHEM 720-22: NOTE OF SLAVERY Prior to the adoption of the 13th amendment, slavery was constitutional. Prior to the adoption of the 14th amendment there was no assurance of equal protection and thus no limit on race discrimination. Priggs v. Pennsylvania The Supreme Curt declared unconstitutional a state law that prevented the use of force or violence to remove any person from the state to return the individual to slavery. Con. Itself precludes PA law with fugitive slave clause; statute does too, Fugitive slave Act in constitution trumps state law. 6 The Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 – adopted by the 2nd congress, required that judges return escaped slaves. In Prigg the Supreme Court relied on this act to invalidate the Pennsylvania law. The times (1850s) Tensions with slavery – controversy if areas of LO Purchase would be free or not New Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 – even stricter, appoints judges, they get paid more if send slaves back to owners Missouri compromise (prohibited slavery past a certain line above MI) repealed by Kansas – Nebraska Act- lets states decide is slave or not- lead to Civil War Republican party created- wanted MI compromise, committed to prohibition of slavery in territories Dred Scott v. Sanford Supreme Court declared the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional and broadly held that slaves were property, not citizens. Dred Scott a slave owned in Missouri was taken into Illinois a free state. Scott sues for his freedom, claiming that his residence in Illinois made him a free person. SC held that slaves were not citizens and thus could not invoke federal court diversity. Congress could not grant citizens to slaves or their descendants; this would be a taking of property from slave owners without due process or just compensation. Although the SC thought it was resolving the controversy over slavery (by judging the case despite finding that they did not have jurisdiction.) this decision had the opposite effect. The ruling became the focal point in the debate over slavery and by striking down the Missouri Compromise, the decision helped to precipitate the Civil War. Historical Modality Judiciary role is to only interpret Con in light of framers intent!! Looks at history of slavers – inferior, were not citizens when Con was made, state marriage laws (even free states have laws against Africans- they not equals) Impossible to think that framers wanted to give ppl of African descent rights! They have NEVER been citizens Large slave holding states would have never consented to a Con that made blacks citizens Textual Modality 3/5ths clause- puts down slaves – not treated as citizens Fugitive slave clause – return slaves to master Naturalization law – confines citizenship to white race (only “aliens being white free persons”) 7 Militia law- “every free anle-bodied white male” must enroll “except citizens of US, or persons of color” (distinction made here Anti- Ethical Modality Judiciary job to interpret con is NOT to take into account common norms Changes in world have no role Dissent (Curtis) Need to respect power of the state they can make ppl citizens. Con is not pro-slavery Just b/c you don’t have certain rights doesn’t mean you not a citizen (women cant vote) A4 § 2 (priv/immunities clause) – The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.--- not clear is theres such a thing as state and national citizenship (*later he is right there is no distinction according to 14th amend citizenship clause) Taney rejects – no ppl who are citizens is who were citizens at the time of the founding Dissent rejoinder - At time of founding blacks were citizens! Some could vote Voting doesn’t mean citizen – some noncitizen aliens could vote and some citizens couldn’t (women) Dissent – ppl don’t have vested rights of prop when they willingly enter into free state with their slave Times (1850s) - Abolitionist – agree with Taney and think Con is horrible doc. That is racist/allows slavery and cannot be enforced (Fredrick Douglass disagrees) - Fredrick Douglass (1860) Textualism view – Con is anti-slavery - Con does not give the right to enslave/hold prop in another class of people (slavery never mentioned) - Must look at TEXT and construe strictly; not intent of writers (it was made secretly -could never know; if ambiguity, must use innocent not wicked meaning- look at consequences and what is most just - 3/5th-actually encourages freedom. Wanted to end international slave trade In 1808, fugitive slave provision about Irish ppl who became servants under a K, Lincoln v. Other Douglas - Lincoln disagrees with Dred Scott b/c way to nationalize slavery - Douglas says Pres view is irrelevant SC has spoken; Lincoln- no invokes Jacksons veto to show decisions don’t stop at SC (im not taking away 8 prop, he’s just concerned about territories- ct wrong saying K can make territories free) Counter-majoritarian argument – judges can’t have last word Succession from the union - Lincoln became pres- lost pop vote, only northern sates voted for him so - 7 states announced succession from union and 8 states followed - Debate: DO states have right to deport from the union? – Lincoln rejects it (1st inaugural address) – once union made, cant be broken – Con cannot have a provision for secession o Lincoln really anti-secession- said if stay in union he would allow Carwin Amend- prohibits Ks power to outlaw slavery (wanted to protect/confine slavery to slave states) South Carolina Succeeding and others - Have duty that when any form of gov becomes destructive, its right of ppl to alter or abolish it - Now being in union is not in our best interest and we want to take back the sovereign power we gave up - It’s a peaceful exit, we not starting a way - Use compact theory- country was formed through a compact agreed upon by the states- states should be the final arbiters over whether the fed gov had overstepped the limits of its authority - 14 states deliberately refused to fulfill con duties/ our rights to property! The Civil War (1861- 1865) - South Carolina shot at Union through ships - Lincoln- called militia, blockaded confederate ports/seized ships o Suspended habeas corpus (ppl could be taken into custody w/out gov giving justification for it) - said he had authority under Con in times of war Prize Cases (1863) - Is it okay for pres to blockaid ports? - Exec power- if there’s an invasion, pres can defend force with force and doesn’t need to consult leg – even though K didn’t declare war, it was declared unilaterally so okay - He assumed necessary powers - Lincoln argues that uncon measures can be taken and lawful when becoming indispensable to the preservation of the Con o Madison rejects- is it right to effectively legitimize w/e a pres does in an emergency for self-preservation (what’s remedy if pres overreaches) - Lincoln Emancipation Proclamation Before said: each state has right to control own gov, we not interfering w/ your institutions of slavery! 9 - - Said now: Under my power as commander in chief, all slaves in rebellious southern states are free! (not across board, some state in union still had it) “uncon action can be lawful to preserve the union” – says authority comes from war power (function of military necessity) and god He breaks the con in order to save it Dissent (Curtis) Exec power can’t eliminate legal state laws. Where does war power end? If you saying they can’t secede, then they still in union, then you can’t take away their rights Hes a dictator Supporters of Lincoln overstepping power this was a dictatorship entered to save the existing constitutional order (he was great dictator/democrat- contradiction here) 5. The Civil War and Reconstruction. Lincoln has been assassinated and Andrew Johnson is not President; he agrees to welcome back the states if they ratify the 13th Amendment. - 13th Amendment – “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.” (Exception clause used today for prisons) Section 2 – affirmative grant of power to Congress to make laws/ legislate for what is prescribed in S1 Southern states at this time were still discriminating with black codes (marriage, can’t live in certain places, congregate etc.) Congress outlawing slavery is not enough; they must now give rights to slaves. Civil Rights Act of 1866: All people born in US are citizens, regardless of race or previous slavery conditions can make contracts, sue, purchase , lease, sell real property, full and equal benefit of all laws and proceeds for security of persons/ property. Congress got the power to enact this Act through 13th Amendment S2. Congress passed but did not give blacks complete equality; still segregation. To legitimize this, Congress wanted to add amendments to the Const. 14h Amendment – “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall 10 make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” Some say the 14th constitutionalized the Civil Rights Act; others say that it did much more. 3 Clauses: 1) Privileges & Immunities Clause; (2) Due Process Clause; (3) Equal Protection Clause. (Keep in mind that these clauses do not mention race or color so they go far beyond disadvantaged groups. Citizenship Clause: Overrides Dred Scott; anyone born or naturalized in the US are citizens, also does not mention a state citizen vs. national citizen. (issue today is that people who are born in the US have illegal immigrant parents.) S5 – “Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation the provisions of this article.” Congress can interpret S1 and pass legislation to enforce it. The question here is what does the clauses entail (what the hell does equal protection of the law mean?) Who has the last word of what S1 entails? The Slaughter House Cases CHEM 520-22 - - First case that interpreted the 14th amendment. The City of New Orleans faced severe outbreaks of disease after its water supply was contaminated with the refuse from slaughterhouses located about a mile upstream on the Mississippi River. The Louisiana state legislature sought to remedy this problem by centralizing the location of all slaughtering away from the water supply. It did this by creating the Crescent City Livestock Landing & Slaughter-house Co. (defendant) and gave the company a monopoly over the entire slaughtering business in and around New Orleans. Butchers argue that monopoly hurt their right to pursue trade, invoke They argued that the restriction created involuntary servitude, deprived them of their property without due process of law, denied them equal protection of the laws and abridged their privileges and immunities as citizens. 13th and 14th amendments; cant use the 5th amendment 11 b/c only constrained by federal actors, does not apply to states “nor be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation. The SC says regulating butchering is a state police power by the 10th amend; powers not enumerated default to the state. State powers are inherent and don’t need to one enumerated like federal powers. SC must be deferential to the states choice of means unless there is a constitutional restraint. The court also mentions that the purpose of the 13th & 14th amendments was solely to protect former slaves. - - Bradley v. Illinois p. 391 BLBAS This case solidified the narrow reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 14th amendment and determined that the right to practice a profession was not among these privileges. Woman applied for admission to the Illinois bar in accordance with a state statute that permitted any adult of good character and with sufficient training to be admitted to the practice of law. Because she was a woman, however, the Illinois Supreme Court denied her admission, noting that the "strife" of the bar would surely destroy femininity. Bradwell appealed the decision to the United States Supreme Court, arguing that her right to practice law was protected by the Privileges or Immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. o SC upheld the decision of the Illinois court, ruling that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 14th amendment did not include the right to practice a profession, so it was properly regulable by the states. CT refers to the Slaughterhouse Cases. Minor v. Happersett (1874) Woman attempts to vote, Missouri state constitution forbids it, she is denied and brings action, asserting violation of the Privileges and Immunities act under the 14th amendment. The court then asked whether the right to vote was one of the "privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States" at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment's adoption in 1868. Citing a variety of historical sources, it found that it was not. The court reasoned that the Constitution of the United States did not explicitly give citizens an affirmative right to vote and that, throughout the history of the nation from the adoption of the Constitution, a wide variety of persons— 12 including women—were recognized as citizens but denied the right to vote. 6. Reconstruction & Reaction III: The Reconstruction Amendments Strauder v. West Virginia Equal Protection used in race context. West Virginia enacted a statute limiting jury service to white males over the age of 21 who are state citizens. An all white jury convicted Strauder, a black man of murder. Strauder argues that his conviction by a jury selected under the West Virginia statute violated the 14th Amendment. P argues for a process where black men COULD participate on the jury. He says “right to fair trial by jury of his peers is denied” Court agrees with P 14th is assure that blacks have same rights as whites; guarantees stopping “unfriendly legislation” Statute denied right to blacks to participate on juries (a guaranteed rights of citizens) States can give their own qualifications for juries (age, sex) but it cant be based on race. Historical Modality (framers intent); state law barring blacks from being on jury violates the equal protection clause. Law in states should be the same for blacks and whites. The Goal of Equal Protection clause was to protect against subordination of a group. (Republicans agreed on protecting blacks civil rights but split about political/ social rights; later suffrage is intentionally excluded from 14th amendmentits political privilege for competent men not natural right.) The Civil Rights Cases CHEM pg. 533 The Civil Rights Act of 1875 “ That all persons within jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or water, theaters, and other places of public amusement; subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law, and applicable alike to citizens of every race and color, regardless of any previous condition of servitude.” 13 The law specifically prohibited discrimination on the basis of race and color or on the basis of any previous condition of servitude. In other words the law prohibited private race discrimination and provided both criminal and civil penalties. The Court ruled that the 14th amendment applies to just state and local government actions not to private conduct. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject matter of the amendment. The central holding in this case is that the 14th amendment applies only to the state government, not private conduct, “no state shall”, this remains the law and is a central principle of constitutional law. In other words, the Constitution offers no protection against private wrongs no matter how discriminatory or much they infringe fundamental rights. The 13th Amendment is the one provision that directly regulates private conduct; “shall exist in the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction”. In other words the 13th amendment forbids people from being or owning slaves. For example the SC has said that the 13th amendment forbids compelling a person tow work for another individual to pay off a debt. Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) Upheld the constitutionality of racial segregation laws for public facilities as long as the segregated facilities were equal in quality; a doctrine that came to be known as “separate but equal”. The decision legitimized the many state laws re establishing racial segregation that had been passed in the American south at the end of the Reconstruction Era. In 1890, the state Louisiana passed the Separate Car Act, which required separate accommodations white on railroads including separate railway cars. The court concluded that although the 14th amendment was meant to guarantee legal equality of all races in America, it was not intended to prevent social or other types of discrimination. “Deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” “But in the nature of things it could not have been intended to abolish distinction based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political equality or a 14 commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either. It is now well settled that the requirement of equal protection are the same whether the challenge is to the federal government under the 5th amendment or to state and local actions under the 14th amendment. The SC has expressly declared that EP analysis in the 5th amendment is is the same as that under the 14th amendment. But technically equal protection applies to the federal government through judicial interpretation of the due process clause of the 5th amendment and to state and local government through the 14th amendment. Read step EP analysis pg. 697 6. The Lochner Era “Substantive Due Process and “Liberty of Contract” Historical Overview: Economic liberties generally refer to constitutional rights concerning the ability to enter into and enforce contracts; to pursue a trade or profession; and to acquire possess and convey property. Beginning in the late nineteenth century and continuing until 1937 the Court found that freedom of contract was a basis right under the liberty and property provisions of the due process clause. The Lochner Era is one in which the SC aggressively protecting economic liberties under the Due Process clause. Many state laws such as minimum and maximum wage hour statues were declared unconstitutional as violating the 14th Amendment by impermissibly interfering with the freedom of contract. It is extremely important to note that during this same Era the court used federalism to limit the ability of Congress to regulate the economy. From the late nineteenth century until 1937, the Court narrowly defined the scope of Congress’s powers under the commerce clause, and it also found that the 10th amendment reserved a zone of authority exclusively to the states. Ex: If the federal government adopted a min wage law it would have been declared unconstitutional as exceeding the scope of Congress’s powers or as 15 violating states rights and the 10th Amendment. After 1937, the law changed dramatically and the Court adopted a policy of great deference to government economic regulations. No longer did the Court protect the freedom of contract under the liberty prong of the due process clause. Nor did the Court impose limits on Congress’s ability to regulate the economy based on federalism or on narrow definitions of federal powers. Lochner v. New York CHEM pg. 643 The New York law provided that no employee shall “work in a biscuit, bread or cake bakery or confectionery establishment more than 60 hours in any one week, or more than ten hours in any one day. The Supreme Court declared the law unconstitutional as violating the due process clause o the Fourteenth Amendment “ no state shall” because it interfered with freedom of contract and because it did not serve a valid police purpose. The Court ruled the act was not within any fair meaning of the term health law, but is an illegal interference with the rights of individuals both employers and employees to make contracts regarding labor upon such terms as they may think best, or which they may agree upon with the other parties to such contracts. First, the Court and throughout this era stated that freedom of contract is a basic right protected as liberty and property rights under the due process clause of the 14th amendment. Liberty includes the right to enter into all contracts, which may be proper, necessary, and essential to carrying out a trade or profession. The Court in Lochner declared that general right to make a contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty of the individual protected by the 14th amendment. The right to purchase and sell labor is part of the liberty protected by this amendment. Second the Lochner court said that the government could interfere with freedom of contract only to serve a valid police purpose: to protect the public safety, public health or public morals. 16 Third, the Court said that it was the judicial role to carefully scrutinize legislation interfering with freedom of contract to make sure that it served a police purpose. The court intended that many laws that purport to be exercises of the police powers in reality are to redistribute wealth or to help a particular group at the expense of others. Harlan Dissent: emphasized the need for judicial deference to legislative choices. He stressed that the legislation was a reasonable way to protect the health of bakers who suffered serious medical problems because of exposure to flour dust and intense heat. Homes Dissent: The majority decided this case based on an economic theory that is largely unsupported by the popular will of the United States. It is settled by various precedent decisions and state constitutions that state laws can regulate the lives of individuals in many ways that are not supported by the national legislature. However, the purpose of the United States Constitution is not to require states to exercise their police powers uniformly, but to instead give them the power to make their own judgments about what laws are best for their individual citizens. The “liberty” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment should not function to prevent the exercise of a dominant opinion among states, that opinion being, in this case, that states can constitutionally regulate the work hours of employees within their borders. The majority ignores the reality of state regulations across the country. Lochner Era Cases: Federalism and National Powers: Where the SC is shooting down legislation left and right because of the NARROW READING OF CONGRESS COMMERCE CLAUSE POWERS. Champion v. Ames 1903 Congress enacted the Federal Lottery Act of 1895 (FLA) which prohibited the buying and selling of lottery tickets across state lines. Charles Champion (defendant) was indicted by U.S. Marshall Ames (plaintiff) for bringing Paraguayan lottery tickets into the United States and shipping them from Texas to California in violation of the FLA. Issue: Does the trafficking of lottery tickets across state lines constitute interstate commerce that Congress may prohibit under the Commerce Clause. Yes. Congress alone can regulate all aspects of interstate commerce and can do so in whatever manner it deems appropriate. Congress’s plenary power includes the power to 17 prohibit items (such as lottery tickets) that are deemed to be harmful to the welfare of the people of the United States. Hammer v. Dagehart 1918 Congress passed the Keating Owen Act, out of concerns over child labor conditions in mills and factories. United States attorney alleged that the Act was an unconstitutional exercise of Commerce clause powers. Congress inappropriately attempted to regulate interstate commerce for the underlying purpose of seeking to standardize child labor regulations among the states. The regulations bear no relationship to the goal of promoting interstate commerce as required by the constitution. Taxing Power, 518-520 Spending Power, 521-524 Constitutional Innovation During the Progressive Period – 17th, 18th & 19th amendments. New Deal Constitutionalism 7. Emergence of the Modern Paradigm of Constitutional Scrutiny. The Great Depression (Backdrop) Nebbia v. NY (1934) Government is now getting more involved in the economy in ways they could never in the Lochner. The question in Nebbia, is whether the state regulation violate the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. To combat the effects of the Great Depression, New York adopted a Milk Control Law in 1933, which established a board to set a minimum retail price of milk. It set the price of a quart of milk at nine cents. Nebbia a storeowner violated the law by offering two quarts of milk and five cent loaf of bread for a total of 18 cents. The Court that since the price controls were not “arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant” to the policy adopted by the legislature to promote the general welfare, the regulation was constitutional. 18 Regulations are not inappropriate way to serve the public interest; when industry is tied to into public interest it is more subject to the state police powers. Rational basis review which is used for economic regulations, requires that the law is not unreasonable or arbitrary and also there is a reasonable relationship between the law and the interest that it serves. The law here meant to protect farmers from dying/help competition milk was selling to public. Different reading of the DP clause – all public business are subject to control in the interest of the public good. DP only demand the law not be unreasonable/ arbitrary and the means to be relevant (doesn’t overrule Lochner but says it does not make sense.) Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell CHEM pg. 662 During the Great Depression in 1933, Minnesota responded to a large number of home foreclosures in the state by passing the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law which extended the amount of time for mortgagors to redeem their mortgages from foreclosure contrary to the terms previously agreed upon in the mortgage contract. Banks challenged for violating Contracts clause 10th amend “ No state shall.. Make any law impairing the obligations of contracts. The SC upheld the Minnesota law and dismissed the framers intent for the contracts clause as being irrelevant. The SC upheld the Minn law because it was an emergency measure of limited duration, “to protect the vital interest of the community.” The court stressed that the law “was not for the mere advantage of particular individuals but for the protection of a basis interest of society.” Blaisdell, is extremely important for limiting the scope of the contracts clause. It reaffirms that the government can interfere with existing contracts if it has a valid police purpose, and it describes the police power broadly enough to include debtor relief, protecting people from foreclosure of their mortgages as a valid governmental objective. Does a state law interfere with contracts clause? (1) Is there a substantial impairment of a contractual 19 relationship? (2) If so, does it serve a significant and legitimate public purpose; and (3) is it reasonably relating to achieving the goal? The test is very similar to traditional rational basis review. SC – “We must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding a constitution intended to endure for ages to come and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs. The framers intent is not controlling in contemporary constitutional adjudication. 1935-1937 – SC shot down a lot of legislation for economic emergency, stating gov lacked power under the commerce clause, which controleed intrastate activity. (New Deal recovery measures stuff with President Roosevelt) President Roosevelt threatens to “crowd the bench” up to 15 justices, until he has judges that agree with him. “The switch in time that saved 9” Was this switch/change of reading the con from coercion or responsiveness? Does SC respond to majorities? The notion that SC is insulated from the times is a fantasy they are influenced by the times and the public. West Coast Hotel v. Parrish (1937) This case upheld the constitutionality of minimum wage legislation enacted by the state of Washington overturning an earlier decision in Adkins v. Children’s Hospital (federal minimum wage legislation for women was an unconstitutional infringement of liberty of contract as protected by the due process clause of the 5th amendment). The decision is usually regarded as having ended the Lochner era, a period in American legal history during which the Supreme Court tended to invalidate legislation aimed at regulating business. The State of Washington passed a law, which regulated the minimum wages paid to female and minor employees. Elsie Parrish (plaintiff) was employed as a maid at a hotel owned by the West Coast Hotel Co. (defendant). Together with her husband, Parrish brought suit in Washington state court to recover the difference between the wages she was paid by West Coast Hotel Co. and the minimum wage fixed under Washington state law. West Coast defended the suit on the grounds that the state law violated its Due Process right to freely contract under the Fourteenth Amendment. The SC ruled that the constitution permitted the restriction of liberty of contract by state law where such restriction protected the community, health 20 and safety or vulnerable groups. (in this case women) Carolene Products Co. (1938) | Modern Constitutionalism In 1923, Congress passed the Filled Milk Act (FMA), which criminalized the shipment in interstate commerce of skimmed milk compounded with any fat or oil other than milk fat, so as to resemble milk or cream. Carolene Products Co. (defendant) owned a milk processing plant. The United States government (plaintiff) indicted Carolene Products in district court for violating the FMA. Carolene was accused of shipping a product called “Milnut” that consisted of a compound of skim milk and coconut oil. Carolene argued that the FMA infringed on their liberty to contract freely under the due process clause of the 5th amendment and violated the Commerce Clause , “Congress shall have the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states”. SC ruled – it was not for the courts to overrule because it was supported by substantial public health evidence and was not arbitrary or irrational. In other words the court applied rational basis review. (economic regulation) This case is well known for its statement of two principles. (1) The first concerns the presumption of constitutionality to be accorded to legislation regulating economic activity when challenged under the Due Process Clauses. “Regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional, unless in the light of the facts made known or general assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rest upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators.” The second principle emerges from immediate qualification of the first principle in the famous FOOTNOTE FOUR, where he suggested that such deferential review would not be appropriate “when legislation appears on it’s face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten Amendments. A higher level of scrutiny (i.e. less deference) should apply to the cases involving; (1) If legislation appears to be on its face a prohibition of the Constitution; a specific constitutional prohibition such as in the Bill of Rights (110 amend); (2) when legislation restricting peoples ability to participate in the political process to overturn the legislature (like their right to vote and gerrymandering – manipulating district boundaries for a political advantage because legislation must represent the people) (3) 21 legislation directed at discrete and insular minorities, such that they cannot adequately represent themselves through the political process. (groups that have been saddled with such disabilities or subjected to such a history or purposeful unequal treatment or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.) Also the Court has emphasized that race is an immutable trait. It is unfair to discriminate against people for a characteristic that is acquired at birth and cannot be changed. For all of these reasons, it is firmly established that race and national origin classifications must meet the most exacting standard of judicial review. Such discrimination will be tolerated only if the government can prove that it is necessary to achieve a compelling government interest. Williamson v. Lee Optical An Oklahoma state law made it unlawful for any person not licensed as an optometrist or ophthalmologist in the state to fit lenses to a face or fashion existing lenses into a frame unless given a prescription by a state-licensed optometrist or ophthalmologist. Lee Optical (plaintiff) of Oklahoma brought suit in district court against Williamson (defendant), the official charged with enforcing the Oklahoma state law, on the grounds that it violated the Due Process (right to contract) and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. SC upholds applying rational basis review; state legislature had a legitimate interest in requiring a prescription from a licensed from eye doctor. Although opticians were qualified to refit lenses without prescriptions, the Court reasoned that requiring prescriptions in every case would encourage more frequent eye examinations, which may enable early detection of more serious eye conditions. – If a legitimate governmental interest lies as reasoned by the Court, the law can survive a Due Process challenge. The Court further held that there was no Equal Protection violation because legislatures were permitted to deal with problems "one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem, which seems most acute to the legislative mind." Thus, that opticians were so impacted while sellers of ready-to-wear glasses were exempted may have been a signal that the sellers did not 22 represent a portion of the problem that loomed large in the legislature's mind. Notes on Incorporation of the Bill of Rights Against the states (554562) – A series of SCOUTUS decision s interpreted the 14th Amendment to “incorporate” most portions of the Bill of Rights, making these portions for the first time, enforceable against the state governments. National Power in the Wake of the New Deal: The Emergence of the Modern Regulatory State. Schecther Poultry v. US (1935) Before West Coast, SC strikes down signature Act of the new Deal to get economy back up. Was a decision by the SCOTUS, that invalidated regulations of the poultry industry according to the nondelgation doctrine ( ) and as an invalid use of the Congress power under the commerce clause. This was unanimous decision that rendered the National Industry Recovery Act of 1933, a main component of President Roosevelt’s New Deal unconstitutional. SC said government lacked the power under the commerce clause, this controlling intrastate activity. Last case before switch in time to save 9. NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp. (1937) US labor case that declared that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRB) of 1935 was constitutional. It effectively spelled the end to the Courts striking down of New Deal economic legislation and greatly increased the US Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. In 1935, Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which created the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) (defendant) to enforce federal fair labor practice standards, including the right of employees to unionize. After Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. (JLSC) (plaintiff) fired ten employees that attempted to unionize at one of its Pennsylvania plants; the NLRB sanctioned the company for engaging in discriminatory employment practices in violation of federal standards. JLSC brought suit alleging that the NLRA was an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s interstate commerce power, and the lower courts agreed. The NLRB appealed to the Supreme Court. SC rules that Congress does have the authority to regulate labor disputes that have a close relationship to interstate commerce. Justice Hughes writing for the majority stated that the court must reconsider its prior decisions about the limits of Congress’s power to regulate 23 interstate commerce. The activity’s impact on interstate commerce is the relevant consideration in determining if Congress can regulate the activity. The Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to regulate manufacturing activity if it has a close and intimate relation to interstate commerce. Wickard v. Filburn (1942) – Broad Comm Clause Interpretation Decision that dramatically increased the regulatory power of the federal government. Sets a precedent for an expansive reading of the US Constitutions Commerce Clause for decades to come. An Ohio farmer, Roscoe Filburn was growing wheat to feed animals on his own farm. The US government had established limits on wheat production, based on the acreage owned by a farmer, to stabilize wheat prices and supplies. Filburn grew more than the limits. In other words the distinctions which were crucial in the earlier era between commerce and production and between direct and indirect effects on commerce were no longer followed. Therefore even though Filburn’s wheat only had a negligible impact on interstate commerce. Congress could regulate his production because cumulatively homegrown wheat had a substantial effect on interstate commerce (think of if everyone was doing it?). “It is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation where as here his contribution taken together with that of many others similarly situation is far from trivial. United States v. Darby (1941) OVERULED HAMMER v. Dagenhart Darby broadened the scope of the commerce clause and increased Congress’s power to pass economic legislation. In the current case the Court found that earlier argument appearing neat and comprehensive only by ignoring the true complexities of an issue, and explained that Congress was aware that businesses produce their goods without thought to where they will go and product is pulled and shipped to meet the orders of the day. The Court also concluded that the requirement to keep records was entirely appropriate, as a matter of enforcing the Act. Bosniak: Congress had the authority to regulate interstate commerce and has the power to choose the means any means that are reasonably related, even if that means regulating intrastate activity. Darby involved a challenge to the constitutionality of the fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, which prohibited the shipment of interstate 24 commerce of goods made by employees who were paid less than the prescribed maximum number of hours. The Court upheld the Act as a lawful exercise of Congress’s commerce clause authority. The Court flatly rejected the claim that the law violated the 10th amendment and declared: “The 10th amendment states but s truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered.” The court expressly overruled Hammer v. Dagenhart, and its view that control of production was left to the exclusive regulation of the states. The Court made it clear that a law is constitutional so long as it is within the scope of Congress’s power; the 10th amendment would not be used as a basis for invalidating federal laws. Notes on Fiburn, Darby, & NLBR These cases expansively defined the scope of Congress’s commerce clause power. No longer did the Court distinguish between commerce and other states of business such as mining, manufacturing and production; instead Congress could exercise control over all phases of business. No longer did the Court distinguish between direct and indirect effects on interstate commerce; rather Congress could regulate any activity that taken cumulatively that had an effect on interstate commerce. A federal law would be upheld so long as it was within the scope of Congress’s power, and the commerce clause was interpreted so broadly that seemingly any law would meet this requirement. The law of commerce clause during this era could be simply stated: Congress could regulate any activity if there was a substantial effect on interstate commerce. A court may invalidate legislation enacted under the Commerce clause only if it is clear that there is no rational basis for a congressional finding that the regulated activity affects interstate commerce, or that there is no reasonable connection between the regulatory means selected and the asserted ends. Laws adopted under the Commerce clause to illustrate the breadth of the SC interpretation of the commerce clause. (1) Regulatory Laws; (2) Civil Rights laws (3) Criminal laws pg. 268. Civil Rights Legislation & the Warren Court Notes of the Civil Rights Acts – pg. 648-658 Civil Rights Act of 1964 – in part prohibits private employment discrimination based on race, gender, or religion, and which 25 prohibits discrimination by places of public accommodation such as hotels and restaurants. Congress enacted this legislation under its commerce clause power and the SC upheld it on that basis. Logically it would seem that Congress would use power under section 5 of the 14th amendment to pass this legislation. However the SC ruled in 1883 held that Congress could only regulate government conduct under the 14th amendment not private conduct. So at this time Congress was unsure as to whether they could use their 14th amendment powers, Congress thus chose to use the Commerce clause. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States.(Civil Rights Case pg. 269) The Court upheld the Constitutionality of title II of the Civil rights Act, which prohibited discrimination by places of public accommodation. The heart of Atlanta Motel was located in downtown Atlanta and had 216 rooms and about 75 percent of their registered guest were from out of state. The upheld the application of the Act to the Motel, which had a policy of refusing to provide accommodations to blacks. o The Court said that in evaluating the law and its application, “the only questions are” (1) whether Congress had a rational basis for finding that racial discrimination by motels affected commerce, and (2) if it had such a basis, whether the means it selected to eliminate that evil are reasonable and appropriate. The court concluded that the voluminous testimony presents overwhelming evidence that discrimination by hotels and motels impedes interstate travel. The Court notes that it did not matter that Congress motive in part was moral; many federal laws had been adopted under the commerce power to remedy moral wrongs. The Court also said that it did not matter that the hotel was purely or local character. “If it is interstate commerce that feels the pinch, it does not matter how local the operation which applies the squeeze.” 26 Katzenbach v. McClung CHEM pg. 269 The Court upheld the application of the Civil Right Act to a small business: “Ollie’s barbeque”, a family owned restaurant. The courts recitation of the facts emphasized the interstate connection of the restaurant. For example 46 percent of the meat purchased came from out of state. However the decision was not based on the interstate impact of this particular restaurant. Rather the Court found that Congress rationally concluded that discrimination by restaurants cumulatively had an impact on interstate commerce. The Court found that the testimony before Congress afforded ample basis for the conclusion that established restaurants in such areas sold less interstate goods because of the discrimination, that interstate travel was obstructed directly by its, that business in general suffered and that many new businesses refrained from establishing there as a result of it. Notes on Katzenback & Heart of Atlanta Motel – These decisions reflect the breadth of Congress’s commerce power. Based on Wickard racial discrimination by hotels and restaurants looked at cumulatively across the country surely has an effect on interstate commerce, Nor should it matter that Congress’ primary purpose was based more on moral judgment to eliminate discrimination than on concern for enhancing the economy. The Court has been consistently unwilling to limit Congress to acting under the commerce clause only to advance economic efficiency. Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co, (1986) Jones (plaintiff) brought suit in federal district court against Alfred H. Mayer Co. (Mayer) (defendant) alleging that Mayer refused to sell a house to Jones simply because Jones is African American. Jones relied on 42 U.S.C. §1982, which grants the right to all citizens of the United States to “inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.” The district court dismissed the complaint on the ground that §1982 only applies to state action and does not reach private actors who refuse to sell real estate. Congress may make whatever laws are necessary and proper for enforcing the 13th amendments abolition of slavery and the negative effects of slavery. (Can Congress enforce the 13th Amend by passing laws that govern the actions of purely private actors.) 27 Based on the “Enabling Clause” of the Thirteenth Amendment, Congress may make whatever laws are necessary and proper for enforcing the Thirteenth Amendment’s abolition of “all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States.” There is nothing present in the Thirteenth Amendment itself or the legislative history surrounding the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment that suggests it only applies to discriminatory conduct by state officials. The Amendment itself permits Congress to pass laws that address all forms of racial discrimination, including discrimination against African Americans in the housing market. Congress acted rationally in passing §1982 to address this type of discrimination, as permitting race-based housing discrimination to go unchecked can have significant detrimental effects on racial groups. Thus, §1982 is a valid exercise of Congressional power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment by prohibiting discriminatory conduct; even when that conduct is performed by private individuals. The Reach of the Commerce Clause: United States V. Lopez (1995) CHEM pg.273 Between 1936 & April 1995, the SC did not find one federal law unconstitutional as exceeding the scope of Congress’s commerce power. Then in this case the by 5-4 margin, the SC declared unconstitutional the Gun Free School Zone Act of 1990, which made it a federal crime to have a gun within 1,000 feet of a school. Alfonso Lopez was a 12th grade student, when he was arrested for carrying a concealed gun. He was charged with violating the Gun Free School Zone Act, which made it a federal offense for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows or has reasonable cause to believe is a school zone. Lopez appealed on the ground that the Act was an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s commerce power. The SC ruled the act unconstitutional not based on the absence of adequate findings by Congress rather; the court concluded that the law was unconstitutional because it was not substantially related to interstate commerce. The court returned to the notion that Art I limits Congress’s legislative powers to those that are express or implied in the Constitution. 28 After reviewing the history of decisions under the commerce clause, the Court identified three types of activities that Congress can regulate under this power (1) Congress can regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce; The Court cited Heart of Atlanta Motel Inc. v. United States, which upheld the federal law prohibiting discrimination by hotels and restaurants as an example of protecting the channels of interstate commerce. (2) Congress may legislate “ to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce”; the court said that this includes the power to regulate powers and things in interstate commerce, the court here cited several cases that upheld congressional power to regulate the railroads under its commerce power. (3) Finally the court said that Congress may regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce. Chief Justice said that prior case law was uncertain about whether an activity must affect or substantially affect interstate commerce to be regulated under this approach. The more restrictive interpretation of congressional power is preferable and that the proper test requires an analysis of whether the regulated activity substantially affects interstate commerce. (Guns near a school does not substantially affect interstate commerce.) U.S. v. Morrison This case presented the question as to whether the civil damages provision of the federal Violence Against Women Act is constitutional; The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the civil damages provisions of the Act could be upheld, either as an exercise of Congress’s commerce clause authority or as a permissible under Congress’s power pursuant to section 5 of the 14TH. In 5-4 decision, the Court held that Congress lacked the authority to adopt the provision under either of these powers. The provision authorizes victims of gender motivated violence to sue for money damages Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Act based on detailed findings of the inadequacy of state laws in protecting women who are victims of domestic violence and sexual assault. For example, Congress found that gendered motivated violence costs the American economy billions of dollars a year and is a substantial constraint on freedom of travel by women throughout the country. 29 The case was brought by Christy Brzonkala, who allegedly was raped by football players while a freshman at Virginia Polytechnic Institute. The players were not criminally prosecuted and ultimately avoided even sanctions by the university. She filed suit against her assailants and the university under the civil damages provision of the VAWA. The Court here reaffirmed the three part test for Congress’s commerce authority that was articulated in Lopez; Christy defended VAWA civil damages law based on the third part of the commerce test on the ground that violence against women has a substantial effect on the national economy. Gender motivated crimes of violence are not in any sense of the phrase economic activity. While we need not adopt a categorical rule against aggregating the effects of any non-economic activity in order to decide these cases, thus far in our nations history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is economic in nature. The Court thus concluded, “We accordingly reject the argument that Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct’s aggregated effect on interstate commerce. The Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local. Thus, Morrison goes further than Lopez in limiting the scope of Congress’s commerce power by narrowing the ability of Congress to regulate based on findings of substantial effect on interstate commerce. At least in areas that the Court regards as traditionally regulated by the states, Congress cannot regulate noneconomic activity based on a cumulative substantial effect on interstate commerce. Gonzalez v. Raich In this case the court held that Congress constitutionally may use its power to regulate commerce among the states to prohibit the cultivation and possession of small amounts of marijuana for medicinal purposes. Although California has created an exemption to its state marijuana laws for medical uses, no exception exist to the federal law. In 1970, Congress passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention & Control Act to combat illegal drug use in the United States. Shortly after Congress enacted the Act, which categorized illegal drugs into different schedules and prevented their sale purchase, and possession in the US; California enacted the Compassionate Use Act that allowed the use of medical marijuana within the state by persons needing it for legitimate medical purposes. Angel Raich and Diane Monson 30 (plaintiffs) were California residents who both legally used marijuana to treat legitimate medical issues. Despite receiving approval from California state officials, federal agents seized and destroyed Raich’s marijuana plants. Raich brought this suit against Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General of the United States (defendant), seeking injunctive and declaratory relief prohibiting the enforcement of the federal CSA. The SC upheld the federal law, explaining that for almost 70 years Congress had the authority to regulate activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The Court concluded that marijuana looked at cumulatively, including that grown for medical purposes, has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Court cites Wickard; in their decision which held that Congress may regulate the amount of wheat that farmer’s grow for their own home consumption. This case stands for the proposition that intrastate production of a commodity sold in interstate commerce is economic activity and this substantial effect can be based on cumulative impact. Congress Power to Regulate Activity but NOT inactivity: NFIB v. Sibelius pg. 281 This case indicates another additional limit on Congress commerce power: it may not regulate economic inactivity. The Patient Protection & Affordable Care Act sought to remedy the problem of 50 million Americans being with health insurance. A crucial mechanism is that it requires that almost all individuals have health insurance and those that do not must pay a penalty to the IRS. The said that the individual mandate is a tax and within the scope of Congress’s taxing power. The Court ruled that the individual mandate was not a valid exercise of Congress’ commerce (interpret as tax). “The individual mandate however does not regulate existing commercial activity. It instead compels individuals to become active in commerce by purchasing a product on the ground that their failure to do so affects interstate commerce. Construing the Commerce Clause to permit Congress to regulate individuals precisely because they are doing nothing would open a new and potentially vast domain to congressional authority. Necessary & Proper Clause: U.S v. Comstock 31 Is one of the most important cases focusing on the necessary and proper clause and it strongly reaffirms the approach taken in McCulloch v. Maryland, A federal statute, the Adam Walsh Child Protection Act of 2006, authorized federal courts to order the indefinite confinement of individuals in the custody of the FBI of Prisons who are deemed to be sexually dangerous. Earlier in another case Hendricks, the Court ruled that it does not violate due process for a state to indefinitely imprison such individuals even after they have completed their prison sentences. The issue in Comstock, is whether Congress had the constitutional authority to provide for such indefinite detentions. The SC upheld the federal law and stressed that this was permissible as an exercise of Congress’s power under the necessary and proper clause. Justice Breyer quoted at length “We have since made clear that in determining whether the necessary and proper clause grants congress the legislative authority to enact a particular provision we look to see whether the statute constitutes a means that is rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power. The Court explained that the relevant inquiry is simply whether the means chosen are “reasonably adapted” to the attainment of a legitimate end under the commerce power or under other powers that the Constitution grants Congress the authority to implement. Using this approach the court decided that the indefinite commitment of sexually dangerous individuals fits within the scope of the necessary and proper clause. The Court stressed that Congress has the power under the necessary and proper clause to prescribe the sanctions for crimes it creates. The Taxing & Spending Powers: NFIB v. Sibelius (tax part) By a vote of 5-4, the Court upheld the individual mandate component of the ACA as a valid exercise of Congress’s power to lay and collect taxes. “The Congress shall have the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, impost and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States…” The Affordable Care Act’s requirement that certain individuals pay a financial penalty for not obtaining health insurance may reasonably be characterized as a tax, because the constitution permits such a tax, it is not our role to forbid it, or to pass upon its wisdom or fairness. 32 Further the court ruled that while the section 5000A penalty is treated as a tax for constitutional purposes, it is not a direct tax, and therefore is not required to be apportioned among the states according to the population. The Court concluded: “A tax on going without health insurance does not fall within any recognized category of direct tax. South Dakota v. Dole As the Court held, Congress has the broad power to spend funds to advance the general welfare. Congress may spend in any way it believes would serve the general welfare, so long as it does not violate another constitutional provision. Congress may place conditions on such grants, so long as the conditions are expressly stated, have some relationship to the purpose of the spending program and are not unduly coercive. This was affirmed in South Dakota v. Dole, A federal law sought to create a 21-year-old drinking age by withholding a portion of federal highway funds from any state government that failed to impose such a drinking age. Specifically five percent of federal highway funds would be denied to any state that did not create a 21-year-old drinking age. The SC approved this condition on federal money. The Court emphasized that the condition imposed by Congress was directly related to one of the main purposes behind federal highway money creating safe interstate travel. The court recognized that at some point the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at which pressure turns into compulsion. But the Court said that in this case, the condition of federal highway money was a relatively mild encouragement and was constitutional even if Congress might lack the power to impose a national minimum drinking age directly, we conclude that encouragement to state action is a valid use of the spending powers. SC held that Congress may place strings on grants to state and local governments so long as the conditions are expressly stated. The conditions on the money can not be ambiguous. So in sum, Congress possesses expansive power to spend for the general welfare so long as it does not violate another constitutional provisions. Congress may impose conditions on grants to state and 33 local governments so long as the conditions relate to the purpose of the spending, are clearly stated and not unduly Coercive. Spending Power Summary CHEM pg. 287-290 10th Amendment &Federalism CHEM pg. 326-327;332-340 10th amendment – “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” o The main question whether or not the 10th amendment is a judicially enforceable limit on Congress’s powers; can deferral laws be declared unconstitutional as violating this constitutional provision?” One approach is that the 10th amendment is not a separate constraint on Congress but rather is simply a reminder that Congress only may legislate if it has authority under the Constitution. Under this approach a federal law never would be found unconstitutional as violating the 10th Amendment but it could be invalidated as exceeding the scope of Congress’s powers under Art I of the Constitution or for violating another constitutional provision. The alternative approach is that the 10th amendment protects state sovereign from federal intrusion. Under this approach, the 10th Amendment is a key protection of states rights and federalism. The 10th amendment reserves a key protection of states rights and federalism. The 10th amendment reserves a zone of activity to the states for their exclusive control and federal laws intruding into this zone should be declared unconstitutional by the courts. Printz v. US Constrains Congress’s power to regulate guns – mandate to require states to do background checks on firearms. Anti Commandeering reading of the 10th amendment – it prevents Congress from doing certain things. If Congress acts within its powers to do something and state law is the opposite, then supremacy kicks in (McCulloch – Congress can create a bank and state cannot interfere with it.) Congress can not do certain things because the 10th amend prohibits them, Congress cannot commandeer/command states to act in certain ways. 34 But it is also the case that Congress can legislate in other ways that can mandate state action. The Modern Debate Over Racial Equality Backdrop CHEM pg. 734-735: Brown v. Board of Education overturned Plessey v. Ferguson Brown, one of the five cases decided together involved a challenge to the segregation of the Topeka Kansas public schools. Modality – historical looks at the intent of the framers when making 14th (what was their opinion of school … there was not schools) difficult and not enough for this problem anyway.. must look at present and take into account changes. Holding – Education is really important, so important that it cant be distributed in a discriminary way The SC stated the issue as “ Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other tangible factors may be equal deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities? The Court answered this question by declaring that state mandated segregation inherently stamps black children as inferior and impairs their educational opportunities. “To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their heats and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. Bolling v. Sharpe Reverse incorporation (Equal Protection guarantee in the 14th amendment will be read into the liberty prong of the 5th amendment Due Process lecture 3/11) In Bolling the Court did not address school desegregation in the context of the 14th amendment’s EP clause, which applies only to the states, but rather held that school segregation was unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the 5th amendment. The Court observed that the 5th amendment lacked as in the 14th amendment. The court held however that the concepts of EP and Due Process are not mutually exclusive, establishing the reverse incorporation doctrine. A group of parents from the Anacostia neighborhood of Washington, D.C., petitioned the BOE of the District of Columbia to open the nearly completed JPSJ High as an integrated school. The school board denied the petition and the school opened admitting only whites. 35 While 5th Amendment lacks an EP protection clause, the concepts of EP and DP both stemming from our American idea of fairness are not mutually exclusive. While EP is a more explicitly safeguard against discrimination, the Court states that discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process; referring to the technicalities raised by the cases location in the District of Columbia (14th applies to states, DC not a state.) SC links the 14th amendment EP clause into the liberty prong of the 5th amend; so segregation violates DP clause. Whether incorporation or reverse incorporation, in each case the concept of liberty in the due process clause of the 5th or the 14th amendment is being read substantively to include certain substantive rights. (Reading liberty in the Due process clause meaning among other things equal protections clause.) There is nothing in the Bill of rights that says EP applies to the federal governments that’s why it’s called reverse incorporation. (State protections applied to fed government) Liberty is used to read substantive rights into the Due process Clause. Massive Resistance & Remedies CHEM pg. 751-757 Remedies: The Problem of School Segregation: In examining the problem of fashioning remedies in school desegregation cases five topics are examined. o (1) First the history of massive resistance is reviewed; (2) The problem of proving discrimination in the schools’ context is considered; (3) The fashioning of remedies what courts can and cannot do and under what circumstances is discussed; (4) the section examines supreme Court decisions concerning when federal desegregation remedies should be ended; (5) the section concludes by considering the most recent SC decision on school desegregation, which limited the ability of school boards to use race as a factor in assigning students to schools to achieve desegregation. o The reality is that most children in the United States are educated only with their own race. In 2012-2013, in the Boston public schools, only 12 percent of the students were white. In part this is because of the SC created since the 1970s, discussed below to proving discrimination, to federal courts fashioning remedies, and to continuation of desegregation efforts. De Jure & De Facto Discrimination CHEM pg. 757-758 The Antidiscrimination Principle: Anti Classification & Anti-Subordination Keyes v. School District No. 1, thus held that absent laws requiring school segregation, plaintiffs must prove intentional segregative acts affecting a substantial part of the school system. Such proofs shift the burden of proving that other segregated schools within the system are not also the result of intentionally segregative actions. 36 The Court therefore drew a distinction between de jure segregation, which existed throughout the south, and de facto segregation, which existed in the North. The latter constitutes a constitutional violation only if there is proof of discriminary purpose. This approach is consistent with the Supreme Court cases, holding that when laws are facially neutral, proof of a discriminatory impact alone is not sufficient to show an equal protection violation; there must also be a discriminatory purpose Thus, proof of racial separation in schools is not sufficient to establish an equal protection violation or provide a basis for federal court remedies. As is true in other areas of equal protection law, there must be either proof of laws that mandated segregation or evidence of intentional acts to segregate the schools. Proof of intentional discrimination as to a substantial part of the school system will justify a system wide remedy, unless the school system can demonstrate that the segregation in those areas was not a consequence of its segregative acts. Race-Specific Classifications Disadvantaged Racial Minorities Korematsu v. United States (1944) Case where the SC upheld the constitutionality of the evacuation of Japanese Americans. The Court accepted the government’s claim that there was a serious risk to national security from Japanese Americans who were disloyal to the United States and that there was no way of screening to identify such individuals. Justice Black writing for the court “Like curfew, exclusion of those Japanese origin was deemed necessary because of the presence of an unascertainable number of disloyal members of the group, most of whom we have no doubt were loyal to this country. It was because we could not reject the finding of the military authorities that it was impossible to bring about immediate segregation of the disloyal from the loyal that we sustained the validity of the curfew order as applying to the whole group. The Court emphasized that it was upholding the order because it was wartime and hardships are part of war. Korematsu, is objectionable because the government used race alone as the basis for predicting who was a threat to national security and who would remain free. The racial classification was enormously overinclusive: All Japanese Americans were evacuated and interned because a few might be disloyal. The racial classification also was enormously under inclusive: Those of other races who posed a threat of disloyalty were not interned and evacuated. Even though winning the war undoubtedly was a compelling purpose, the means was not necessary to attaining that end. 37 o Perhaps these cases are best understood as examples of the Courts tremendous deference to the military especially in time of war. Yet it can be argued that the Constitution and the Courts role are most important precisely in such times when pressure and even hysteria to violate rights and discriminate will be most likely to occur. Loving v. Virginia overruled Pace v. Alabama The SC declared unconstitutional a states miscegenation statute that made it a crime for a white person to marry outside the Caucasian race. The Court express repudiated the states argument that the law was permissible it burdened both whites and minorities. The court said “we reject the notion that the mere equal application of a statute concerning racial classifications is enough to remove the classifications from the 14th amendments proscription of all invidious racial discriminations. There can be no question but that Virginia miscegenation statutes rest solely upon distinction drawn according to race. There can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications violates the central meaning of the EP clause. The Court concluded it’s opinion with a short section ruling that it also violated the Due Process clause, because it deprived its people of a constitutionally protected rights without due process of law. It held that the freedom to marry is a fundamental right, and therefore that depriving Americans of this liberty on an arbitrary basis such as race was unconstitutional. The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. Marriage is one of the basic civil rights of man.” Fundamental to our very existence and survival. To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications so directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the 14th amendment, is surely to deprive all the states citizens of liberty without due process of law. What is Race Dependent pg. 1160-64 Washington v. Davis Applicants for the police force in Washington Dc were required to take a test, and statistics revealed that blacks failed the exam much more 38 often than whites. The SC however held that proof of a discriminatory impact is insufficient by itself to show the existence of a racial classification. Justice White writing for the majority said that the Court never had held that “ a law or other official act without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact. The Court explained that discriminatory impact, standing alone does not trigger the rule that racial classification are to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny and are justifiable only by the weightiest of considerations. In other words laws that are facially neutral as to race and national origin will receive more than rational basis review only if there is proof of a discriminatory purpose. The court justified this conclusion, in part based on its view that the purpose of the equal protection clause “is the prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of race. The Court also emphasized that allowing discriminatory impact to suffice in proving a racial classification “would raise serious questions about and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor and the average black than to the more affluent white.” Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro Housing Corp., Case heard by the SCOTUS dealing with a zoning ordinance that in a practical way barred families of various socioeconomic, and ethnoracial backgrounds from residing in a neighborhood. The Court held that the ordinance was constitutional because there was no proof that “discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor in the Village’s decision.” The Court stated that the challenging party has the burden of showing that 1) the official action affects a protected class in greater proportion than others, and if such is established, 2) that the official action was intended to discriminate against a suspect or protected class. Determining the intent of the official action can be difficult (outside of rare cases where racial discrimination is obvious on the face), and the court suggested that a fact intensive balancing test considering many factors including but not limited to: 1) the impact of the challenged decision (whether it disproportionately impacted one race); 2) the historical background of decisions under the official action, particularly if unequally applied in situations involving race; 3) the specific sequences of events leading up to the decision challenged in the case, including departures from normal procedures in making decisions and substantive departures, (i.e., if the decision maker would have made a different choice had the applicant been white, then race was the 39 deciding factor); and 4) the legislative history where there are contemporary statements made by the governmental body who created the official action. Footnote 21 introduces an idea of causation to these cases. Namely, it states that the petitioner must prove respondent had 1) an improper intent (i.e. that his intent was to discriminate against another race). After this is proven, the burden of proof shifts to the respondent, who must prove that 2) the improper intent did not actually affect the outcome of his decision. Thus, the court is saying that to satisfy this test, you must prove improper intent, a disparate impact, and causation in-fact (i.e. that the improper intent is the cause of the disparate impact). If causation in-fact cannot be proven, "there would be no justification for judicial interference with the challenged decision," as "the complaining party in a case of this kind no longer fairly could attribute the injury complained of to improper consideration of a discriminatory purpose." Facially Neutral Laws with a Discriminatory Impact or with Discriminatory Administration CHEM pg. 740-743 The Requirement for Proof of a Discriminatory Purpose. Some laws that are facially race neutral are administered in a manner that discriminates against minorities or has a disproportionate impact against them. The SC has held that there must be proof of a discriminatory purpose in order for such laws to be treated as racial or national origin classifications. Mobile v. Bolden – The Court declared: “Only if there is purposeful discrimination can there be a violation of the EP clause this principle applies to claims of racial discrimination affecting voting just as it does to other claims of racial discrimination. U.S v. Clary Clary was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Federal law imposed minimum sentences of 20 years for possession of 50 grams of crack cocaine (cocaine base), or 5,000 grams of powder cocaine. Congress based this discrepancy on the potency addictiveness and low price of crack. In practice 92.6 percent of those convicted of possession of crack were black. Approximately the same percentages of these convicted of possession of powder cocaine were white. Is a facially neutral law that has a disproportionate adverse impact on an identifiable group constitutional if the effect cannot be traced to a discriminatory purpose? 40 Yes. A facially neutral law that has a disproportionate adverse impact on an identifiable group is unconstitutional if the effect can be traced to a discriminatory purpose. To be unconstitutional based on a disparate impact, the law must be passed because of, and not merely in spite of, its discriminatory effect. In this case, the sentencing guidelines are constitutional. There is no evidence that Congress passed the sentencing guidelines for the purpose of having a discriminatory effect on black individuals. Although the guidelines in practice may have a disparate impact on black individuals, and although Congress may not have accounted for the foreseeability of that impact, it is the intent behind the law that is the key inquiry. There is no evidence that Congress had intent to discriminate. Accordingly, the sentencing guidelines are constitutional. The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for resentencing. McClesky v. Kemp In this case the SC held that proof of discrimination impact in the administration of the death penalty was insufficient to show an equal protection violation. Statistics powerfully demonstrated racial inequality in the imposition of capital punishment. The SC however said that for the defendant to demonstrate an equal protection violation, he “must prove that the decision makers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose.” Because the defendant could not prove that the prosecutor or jury in his case was biased, no equal protection violation existed. Moreover the Court said that to challenge the law authorizing capital punishment, the defendant “would have to prove that the Georgia Legislature enacted or maintained the death penalty statute because of an anticipated racially discriminatory effect. Davis, Bolden, Kemp, clearly establish that proof of a discriminatory impact is not sufficient by itself to prove an equal protection violation; there also must be proof of a discriminatory purpose. It should be noted that civil rights statues can and often do allow violations to be proved based on discriminatory impact without evidence of a discriminatory purpose. For example Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act allow employment discrimination to be established by proof of a discriminatory impact, and the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act of 1965 permit proof of discriminatory impact to establish a violation of that law. But the Court has said that under the Constitution, proof of 41 discriminatory impact is by itself insufficient to establish a denial of EP. Affirmative Action: University of California v. Bakke Another important objective of affirmative action is enhancing diversity. Entirely apart from remedying past discrimination, race might be used in decision making to provide more diversity than would exist through a completely color blind system. The University of California, Davis Medical School practiced a policy whereby it reserved sixteen out of one hundred places in its entering class for members of racial minority groups. A special committee was appointed to administer this admissions policy. Allan Bakke (plaintiff) brought suit against the Regents of the University of California (defendant) on the ground that this policy was unconstitutional. Bakke challenged the policy in California state court after his application for admission was rejected even though applicants were admitted under this special policy with grade point averages, MCAT scores, and benchmark scores that were significantly lower than Bakke’s averages and scores. o Whether a public university receiving federal funds may constitutionally exhibit a preference for racial minorities in its admissions policy? o Rule – Strict Scrutiny if it is a race dependent decision then strict scrutiny should apply no matter whose benefitted and burdened. It would be preferential treatment for some groups to have less strict standard; Consistency theory – skepticism is always the appropriate standard. This justification for affirmative action is most frequently invoked with regard to decisions by colleges and universities, both in admitting students and in hiring faculty members. The argument is that race is a powerful factor in influencing a persons experiences and perceptions. Education is enhanced when there is a diverse student body and faculty. Justice Powell argued that the interest is compelling in the context of a university’s admissions program. Ideally such diversity would occur through a race blind admissions and hiring policies. City of Richmond v. Croson 42 The SC invalidated an affirmative action program in Richmond, Virginia that set aside 30 percent of public works monies for minority owned businesses. The Court emphasized that the set aside was not narrowly tailored because it also benefited Spanish speaking, oriental, Indian, eskimo or aluet persons, that may never have suffered from discrimination in the construction industry in Richmond. The Court also said “there does not appear to have been any consideration of the use of race neutral means to increase minority business participation in city contracting. In 1983, the City of Richmond, Virginia adopted the Minority Business Utilization Plan that required primary contractors to whom the City awarded construction contracts to subcontract at least thirty percent of the contract to one or more Minority Business Enterprises. The thirty percent set aside did not apply to primary contractors that were not themselves controlled by minority group. The City adopted the plan after studies suggested that very few contracts were awarded to MBEs despite the city’s large minority population. No direct evidence existed however of any discrimination against MBSs by the City or its prime contractors. The J.A. Croson Co. (plaintiff), a primary contractor, lost its contract with the city after failing to designate thirty percent of the value of its contract to MBEs. Croson sued the City of Richmond in federal district court, which upheld the constitutionality of the MBUP. May a city constitutionally use a set aside plan requiring prime contractors to give thirty percent of their business to minority controlled subcontractors? Majority- Here strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review to judge the constitutionality of the City’s actions in attempting to remedy discrimination. To pass strict scrutiny, the City must demonstrate that it used narrowly tailored means to accomplish a compelling state interest. In short the Court held that the city of Richmond’s minority set-aside program was unconstitutional under the EP clause. The Court found that the city failed to identify both the need for remedial action and that other non-discriminatory remedies would be insufficient. We, therefore hold that the city has failed to demonstrate a compelling interest in apportioning public contracting opportunities on the basis of race. To accept Richmond’s claim that past societal discrimination alone can serve as the basis for rigid racial preferences would be to open the door to competing claims for “remedial relief” for every disadvantaged group. The dream of a Nation of equal citizens in a societal where race is irrelevant to personal opportunity and achievement would be lost in a mosaic of shifting preferences based on inherently immeasurable 43 claims of past wrongs. Courts would be asked to evaluate the extent of the prejudice and consequent harm suffered by various minority groups. Those whose societal injury is though to exceed some arbitrary level of tolerability then would be entitled to preferential classification. We think such a result would be contrary to both the letter and the spirit of a constitutional provisions whose central command is equality. Adarand Constructors v. Pena The SC held that set asides created by federal law also must meet strict scrutiny. Adarand involved a challenge to the federal government’s practice of giving general contractors on government projects a financial incentive to hire minority businesses as subcontractors. The Supreme Court did not rule on the constitutionality of the program, but rather remanded the case for it to be evaluated under strict scrutiny. Rule: Skepticism, consistency, congruence – does not matter who is benefitted/burdened, all race base classifications get strict scrutiny even if intent is benign or invidious. Consistency means that when someone is treated differently because of race that person falls within equal protection. Congruence Principle- so that the 5th and 14th analyses are the same. Court said racial classification must serve a compelling government interest and must be narrowly tailored to further that interest. Court refused to hold benign racial classifications to a lower standard because it said it wasn’t clear what was benign. CHEM pg. 770 Grutter v. Bolinger (White Woman, Michigan Law) The University of Michigan Law School followed an unofficial policy that sought to achieve student body diversity by giving substantial weight to the race of each applicant in making admissions decisions, in addition to its consideration of other academic and non-academic variables. Barbara Grutter (plaintiff) was a Caucasian Michigan resident who applied to the Law School with a 3.8 grade point average and 161 LSAT score. The Law School rejected her application, and she filed suit in federal district court against Bollinger, the university president, and other university officials (defendants) alleging her denial of admission was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Yes. The Court previously addressed the use of race as a consideration in higher education admissions in its decision in University Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 235 (1978). In Bakke, the Court was unable to reach a 44 majority on the question of whether it was unconstitutional to consider race as an important factor in admissions for the purpose of remedying past discrimination against minorities. Student body diversity is a compelling state interest that justifies the use of race in university admissions. The proper standard for reviewing this issue is strict scrutiny. In determining that the Law School’s policy passed strict scrutiny, a certain amount of deference is given to the Law School’s admissions department in their determination that diversity is essential to its educational mission. The Law School cites significant benefits as reasons for its policy, including the promotion of crossracial understanding, the breaking down of racial stereotypes, and the enabling of students to better understand persons of different races. Any one of these benefits constitutes a compelling state interest for strict scrutiny. Additionally, the Law School uses narrowly-tailored means to accomplish its purpose because it does not employ a quota system as outlawed in Bakke to achieve diversity. The Law School provides an individual, holistic review of each of its applicants and reasons that alternative methods of achieving the Law School’s purpose risk sacrificing both academic excellence and other types of diversity in the school. However, the Law School should cease racial consideration in its admissions policies after instances of past discrimination have been sufficiently remedied. The admissions policy does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, and the decision of the court of appeals is affirmed. Gratz v. Bollinger Gratz and Hamacher (plaintiffs), both Caucasians, applied for admission to the University of Michigan’s undergraduate program. Both were denied admission and filed suit in federal district court against Bollinger (defendant), a University of Michigan administrator, seeking to challenge the University’s admissions policy on the grounds that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The challenged policy ranked applicants on a 150 point scale that accorded different point values to factors such as grade point average, test results, and personal achievements. However, an applicant automatically received twenty bonus points if he or she was a member of an underrepresented minority group, attended a predominantly minority or disadvantaged high school, or was recruited for athletics. Some applicants were flagged for additional personal consideration, but most were admitted solely based on the point system. Chem pg. 777: The Court invalidated an affirmative action program for undergraduate admissions that added 20 points to the applications for minority students. The Court ruled that the undergraduate program 45 was not sufficiently narrowly tailored to meet strict scrutiny used for government racial classifications. The bottom line is that the Court in Grutter and Gratz adhered to the position articulated by justice Powell in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke almost 40 years ago: Diversity is a compelling interest in education and universities may use race as a factor to ensure diversity, but quotas or numerical quantification of benefits is impermissible. The underlying question is whether this is a distinction that makes a difference. Practically speaking can colleges and universities effectively add points so long as it is not done explicitly and officially? Is there really a difference between a college having a set aside and a college using race as a factor in admissions decisions and keeping track of the number of minority students to ensure critical mass. Voluntary Desegregation Efforts (Parents involved v. Seattle) CHEM pg. 762 VIII. Gender Classifications and Gender Equality The Intermediate Scrutiny Standard Frontiero v. Richardson, pp. 1381-1388 In this case four justices took the position that gender classifications should be subjected to strict scrutiny. A federal law allowed a man to automatically claim his wife as a dependent and thereby receive a greater allowance for quarters and for medical benefits. A woman however only could gain these benefits if she could prove that her spouse was a dependent on her for over half of his support. Brennan for plurality – “classifications based on sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage or national origin are inherently suspect and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny. o Brennan explained – “There can be no doubt that our Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination. Traditionally such discrimination was rationalized by an attitude of romantic paternalism, which in practical effect put women, not on pedestal but in a cage. Characteristics that justify strict scrutiny of racial classification also are present as to gender discrimination: Women still face pervasive, although at times more subtle, discrimination in our educational institutions, in the job market and in the political arena. 46 o Moreover, since sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic determined solely by birth, the imposition of special disabilities upon members of a particular sex would seem to violate the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility. Because there was not a majority supporting strict scrutiny in this case, the level of scrutiny for gender classifications remained uncertain. Finally in Craig v. Boren, the Supreme Court agreed upon intermediate scrutiny as the appropriate level of review for gender classifications and declared, “ To withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classification by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to those objectives. Since Boren the Court on many occasions, has reaffirmed and applied intermediate scrutiny for gender classifications. The Court has held that intermediate scrutiny is to be used for both gender classifications discriminating against women and those discriminating against men. --Reasoning From Race? pp. 1388-1396 (through n.5) --Intermediate Scrutiny, pp. 1399-1405 United States v. Virginia (VMI), pp. 1413-1433 SC declared unconstitutional the exclusion of women by the Virginia Military Institute (VMI). Virginia in response to an order from the United States Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit had created the Virginia Women’s Institute for leadership at Mary Baldwin College. The Court found this insufficient to excuse VMI’s gender discrimination; women were denied an opportunity available only for men. Ginsburg applied intermediate scrutiny and said that parties who seek to defend gender based government action must demonstrate an exceedingly persuasive justification for that action. The burden of justification is demanding and it rests entirely on the State. The Justification must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities or preferences of males and females. VMI’s exclusion of women was found unconstitutional because it was based entirely on gender stereotypes. Indeed the Court emphasized that successful gender integration of the federal military academies belied any claims of a need to exclude women from VMI. Although it is clearly established that intermediate scrutiny is the test for gender classifications, there have been occasional cases since Craig v. Brown where gender classifications have been upheld without the 47 Court expressly using intermediate scrutiny or mentioning a level of scrutiny. Michael M & Rostker v. Goldberg, is an example of this. In one case a federal law upheld a federal law requiring men, but not women to register for the draft; the other states statutory rape law punished men for having sex with girls under 18 but did not punish women for having sex with a man under the age of 18. In neither case did the Court articulate a level of scrutiny, and in both the Court showed great deference to the government. B. What is Discrimination “On the Basis of” Sex? --Pregnancy As Justification For Sex-Differentiated Treatment, pp. 1442-1445 Personnel Administrator of MA v. Feeney, CHEM pp. 791 There are two main ways of proving a gender classification; they are identical to the two methods of demonstrating a racial classification. First the gender classification can exist on the face of the law; that is the law in its very terms draws a distinction among people based on gender. All of the cases discussed thus far concerning gender discrimination are of this type. Second, if a law is facially gender neutral, proving a gender classification requires demonstrating that there is both a discriminatory impact to the law a discriminatory purpose behind it. In Personnel v. Feeney, the SC upheld state law that gave a preference in hiring to veterans even though it had a substantial discriminatory impact against women. Helen Feeney repeatedly took civil service examinations for particular positions and received among the highest scores in the state but was placed below list of veterans with lower scores. At the time the litigation was commenced, “over 98 percent of veterans in Massachusetts were male; only 1.8 percent were female. And over one quarter of the Massachusetts population were veterans. Nonetheless the SC rejected the claim of gender discrimination. The Court said that the law providing a preference for veterans was gender neutral and that discriminatory impact was not sufficient to prove the existence of sex based classification; there also must be proof of a discriminatory purpose. The Court concluded that “nothing in the record demonstrates that this preference for veterans was originally devised or subsequently re-enacted because it would accomplish the collateral goal of keeping women in a stereotype and predefined place in the Massachusetts civil service. The ways of proving a 48 discriminatory purpose based on gender is identical to the ways to prove a discriminatory purpose based on race. Geduldig v. Aiello, CHEM pp. 792-793 Overruled by PDA The SC held that is was not a denial of EP for a state’s disability insurance system to exclude pregnancy related disabilities, but include disabilities affecting only men. California disability law provided payments for disabilities lasting more than 8 days and less than 26 weeks, but denied coverage for disabilities caused by pregnancy. The SC held that this was not a gender classification warranting more than rational basis review. The Court explained, “ There is no risk from which men are protected and women are not. Likewise, there is no risk from which women are protected and men are not. The court goes on and elaborates – “The lack of identity between the excluded disability and gender as such under this insurance program becomes clear upon the most cursory analysis. The program divides potential recipients into two groups: pregnant women and nonpregnant persons. While the first group is exclusively female, the second includes members of both sexes. The Court said that the exclusion of pregnancy met rational basis because the state has a legitimate interest in maintaining the fiscal integrity of its program and making choices in allocating its funds. Court assumes that pregnancy is not a sex-based characteristic? The entire burden from the exclusion of pregnancy is borne by women, making the discriminatory nature of the statute obvious. The exclusion would not only impact those pregnant but also those capable of becoming pregnant: women. o Congress overruled Geduldig, when it enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, which defined sex discrimination to include pregnancy discrimination and prohibits discrimination on that basis. Although Geduldig impact has been negated in the area of pregnancy by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, its reasoning is still applied by the Court in other context. Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, CHEM pp. 319 William Hibbs worked for the Nevada Department of Human Resources in its Welfare Division. He requested leave from the Department under the FMLA in order to care for his wife, who had been in a car accident and undergone neck surgery. The Department granted the request and told Hibbs he could use the full 12 weeks of FMLA leave intermittently as needed between May and December 1997. He used the leave intermittently until August 5th of that year, after which he did not return to work. In 49 October the Department informed Hibbs that he has exhausted his FMLA leave and was required to report to work by November 12. When he failed to report he was fired. The SC held that the family leave provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act fits within the scope of Congress’s section 5 powers and can be used to sue state governments. The FMLA requires that employers, including government employers, provide their employees with unpaid leave time for family and medical care. Held that the family leaves provision is a valid congressional abrogation of state sovereignty immunity. FMLA aims to protect the right to be free from gender-based discrimination in the workplace. The Court said that Congress, recognizing social realities, found that the absence of family leave policies disadvantaged women in the workplace. Although the FMLA is gender neutral in that it requires leaves be granted to both men and women, and Hibbs was male, the Court said that Congress clearly intended the law to prevent gender discrimination in employment. IX. Modern Substantive Due Process: Privacy, Sexual Autonomy, Guns, Tradition A. Privacy Constitutionalized Griswold v. Connecticut, pp. 1505-1523 SC declared unconstitutional a state law that prohibited the use and distribution of contraceptives. A Connecticut law said: “Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article, or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception shall be fined not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more than one year or both fined and imprisoned.” The law also made it a crime to assist, abet, or counsel a violation of the law. The case involved a criminal of Estelle Giswold, the executive director of the Planned Parenthood Legaue of Connecticut and a doctor who openly ran a family planning clinic from November 1 to November 10, 1961. They were prosecuted for providing contraceptives to a married woman. The SC found that the right to privacy was a fundamental right. Justice Douglass found that privacy was implicit in many of the specific provisions of the Bill of Rights; “The foregoing cases suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of rights have penumbras (the rights guaranteed by implication in a constitution or the implied powers of a rule.) Formed by emanations from those guarantees 50 that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy … We have had many controversies over these penumbral rights of privacy and repose. These cases bear witness that the right of privacy, which presses for recognition here, is a legitimate one. Douglass then concluded that the Connecticut law violated the right to privacy in prohibiting married couples from using contraceptives. Douglass said: “Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of the bedrooms for tell tale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notion of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship. In a attempt to avoid substantive due process, Douglass who had lived through the Lochner era found privacy in the “penumbra” of the Bill of rights. This approach does not seem to accomplish the goal of avoiding substantive due process because the bill of rights is applied to the states through the due process clause of the 14th amendment; the penumbra approach is thus ultimately a due process analysis. Also it is important to note that Douglass did not focus on a right to avoid procreation or to make reproductive choices. Rather, Douglass focused on the need to protect privacy of the bedroom from intrusion by the police and the ability to control information about contraceptive use. It was not until later cases, discussed that the Court expressly protected access to contraceptives as a part of reproductive autonomy. --Interpretive Issues, pp. 1523-1530 --The Reach of Griswold, pp. 1530-1533 --“Tradition as Source of Fundamental Rights,” pp. 1533-1537 (note Especially: Michael H. v. Gerald D. CHEM pp. 838 The SC went even further in limiting the rights of non-married fathers. The SC held that even an unmarried father who participated actively in the childs life is not entitled to due process if the mother was married to someone else. Specifically, the SC ruled that a state may create an irrebuttable presumption that a married woman’s husband is the father of her child even though it negates all of the biological father’s rights. Michael H. involved a married woman who conceived a child as a result of an affair. The biological father was regularly involved in the child’s life and sought a court order granting visitation rights. California law however created a presumption that a married woman’s 51 husband is the father of her child if they were cohabitating and if the husband is not impotent or sterile. The California law allowed this presumption to be rebutted only within two years after the child’s birth and only if the husband or wife filed a motion in court. The California court relied on this statute to deny the biological father all parental rights, including visitation. The SC held that this was constitutional. The Court said that the biological father fits into have a liberty interest in a relationship with his child because there was no tradition of protecting the father’s rights when the mother is married to someone else. Plurality – What counts is whether the states in fact award substantive parental rights to the natural father of a child conceived within and born into an extant marital union that wishes to embrace the child. We are not aware of a single case, old or new that has done so. This is not the stuff of which fundamental rights qualifying as liberty interest are made. B. Abortion, Autonomy, Equality --Did Roe “Cause” the Abortion Conflict? pp. 1560-1563 Roe v. Wade Of course is the key case recognizing a constitutional right to abortion. Roe involved a challenge to a Texas law that prohibited all abortion except those necessary to save the life of the mother. Blackman focused on the right to privacy; this right of privacy, whether it be founded in the 14th amendment conception of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is or in the 9th amendments reservation of rights to the people is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. It is notable that the Court did not find privacy in the Bill of Rights as Douglass did in Griswold in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights, but instead as part of the liberty protected under the due process clause. The Court observed, however that the right to abortion is not absolute and that it must be balanced against other considerations, such as the states interest in protecting prenatal life. The Court said that strict scrutiny was to be used in striking the balance because the right to abortion was a fundamental right. 52 The Court reiterated that where fundamental rights are involved regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a compelling interest and legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only legitimate state interest at stake. The Court rejected the states claim that fetuses are persons and that there was a compelling interest in protecting potential life. The Court observed that there was no indication that the term person on the constitution ever was meant to include fetuses. Moreover the Court noted that there was no consensus as to when human personhood begins, but rather enormous disagreement among various religions and philosophies. The Court said: “We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begin, when those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy and geology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary at this point in the development of mans knowledge is not in a position to speculate as to the answer. Court decides that the state has compelling interest in preserving mothers life after first trimester because after this point abortions are more dangerous. The compelling point is viability, this is because the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mothers womb. Thus, the Court divided pregnancy into three trimesters. During the first trimester, the government could not prohibit abortions and could regulate abortions only as it regulated other medical procedures, such as by requiring that they be performed by a licensed doctor, During the second trimester the government also could not outlaw abortions, but the government may if it chooses regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health. Finally for the stage subsequent to viability the government may prohibit abortions except if necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother. Abortion and Equality, pp. 1564-1565 Decisions After Roe v. Wade, pp. 1573-1578 or CHEM 856-857 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey CHEM pp. 860 By a 5-4 margin the Court reaffirms Roe, and that states cannot prohibit an abortion prior to viability. Overruled the trimester distinctions used in Roe, and also the use of strict scrutiny for evaluating government regulation of abortion. Instead the plurality said that government regulation of abortions 53 prior to viability should be allowed unless there is an “undue burden” on access to abortion. “Liberty finds no refuge in the jurisprudence of doubt” – obviously this is meant to explain the shift in Justice O’Connor position from Webster, where she said that the Supreme Court should not reevaluate Roe until the Court reviewed a law prohibiting abortion. – In this case they still reevaluated Roe, even though the Penn law before the Court did not prohibit abortions. The joint opinion reviewed the cases protecting family and reproductive autonomy and concluded that these fundamental rights are protected event though they are not mentioned in the text of the constitution. The joint opinion said that the right to abortion is constitutionally protected because of the importance of the choice and the intrusion in forcing a woman to remain pregnant against her will. “The liberty of the woman is at stake in a sense unique to the human condition and so unique to the law. The mother who carries a child to full term is subject to anxieties, to physical constraints, to pain that only she must bear, her suffering is too intimate and personal for the state to insist, without more, upon its own vision of the woman’s role; the destiny of the woman must be shaped to a large extent on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place in society. The opinion then went into a lengthy discussion about the importance of stare decisis and the circumstances that justify overruling an earlier precedent. The joint opinion explained that the Court is warranted in overruling precedents if the earlier decisions had proved unworkable, if there was an evolution of legal principles that undermined the doctrinal foundation of the precedents, or if there was a change in the factual predicate for the decision. The opinion concluded that the basic decision in Roe was based on a constitutional analysis, which we cannot now repudiate. The Court reaffirmed the viability standard set in Roe but overruled the trimester framework; they did not consider it to be apart of the essential holding in Roe. The trimester framework suffers from these basic flaws in its formulation: it misconceives the nature of the pregnant woman’s interest: and in practice it undervalues the states interest in potential life, as recognized in Roe. The test for evaluating the constitutionality of a states regulation on abortion is whether it places a “undue burden” on access to abortion. This was the courts way of reconciling the states interest with the woman’s constitutionally protected liberty. Undue burden is a shorthand way of saying that the state regulation has the purpose or 54 effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the way of a woman’s access to abortion. The Court says that to promote the states profound interest in potential life, throughout pregnancy the state may take measures to ensure that the woman’s decision is informed and measures designed to advance this interest will not be invalidated as long as their purpose is to persuade the woman to choose childbirth over abortion. These measures must not place an undue burden on the right. The Court upheld the 24hr-waiting period; the requirement that the woman be told of the availability of detailed information about the fetus and the reporting and recording requirements. However the Court said that spousal notification requirement is unconstitutional. Gonzalez v. Carhart, CHEM pp. 863-865 The Court again used the undue burden test, though this time to uphold a federal law prohibiting “partial birth” abortion. The key question after Casey, is what constitutes an “undue burden” on the right to abortion. However there are some problems in general with applying the undue burden test. First the undue burden test combines three distinct questions: Is there a fundamental right; is the right infringed; is the infringement justified by a sufficient purpose; are the means sufficiently related to the end sought? The undue burden test combines the latter three questions. Obviously Undue Burden pertains to whether there is an infringement of the right, but the joint opinion in Casey also uses it to analyze whether the law is justified. – There is no level of scrutiny articulated in Casey evaluating the undue burden test. Undue burden is confusing to apply because it combines three distinct issues. The Court thus seems to be saying that an undue burden exists only if there is proof that the regulation will keep someone from getting an abortion. However, it must be questioned why burdens, no matter how substantial, are allowed unless they are actually proven to prevent abortions. Also, it is unclear how challengers will 55 be able to prove that particular regulations create insurmountable obstacles to obtaining abortions. Third there is the issue of how many women must be adversely affected by a regulation of abortions in order for it to be considered an undue burden. The proper focus of constitutional inquiry is the group for whom the law is a restriction, not the group for whom the law is irrelevant. Casey the focus is on whether a law is an undue burden likely to keep some women from having access to abortion By Contrast in Gonzales v. Carhart, the Court said that for a law to be unconstitutional there must be a showing that it would be an undue burden for a large fraction of women. This is a significant change in the law and one that will make it more likely that courts will uphold regulation of abortion. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, Texas passed a law, placing a series of restrictions on abortion clinics within the state. The requirement that abortion providers have admitting privileges at a hospital within 30 miles took effect. In the time since the admitting privileges requirement took effect the number of abortion clinics in Texas declined from 42 to 19. On June 27, 2016, the Court ruled by a 5–3 vote that Texas cannot place restrictions on the delivery of abortion services that create an undue burden for women seeking an abortion, therefore the sections of Texas law H.B. 2 challenged here are invalid.[23] In an opinion written by Justice Stephen Breyer, the court struck key provisions of the law – requiring doctors who perform abortions to have difficult-to-obtain "admitting privileges" at a local hospital and requiring clinics to have costly hospital-grade facilities - as violating a woman's right to an abortion.[24] Observing that these provisions do not offer medical benefits sufficient to justify the burdens upon access that each imposes, the majority concluded: "Each places a substantial obstacle in the path of women seeking a pre-viability abortion, each constitutes an undue burden on abortion access, and each violates the federal Constitution."[25] The majority opinion struck down both provisions "facially", that is, the very words of the provisions are invalid, irrespective of how they might be implemented or applied.[26] According to the ruling, the task of judging whether a law puts an unconstitutional burden on a woman's right to abortion rests with the courts and not the legislatures See other con law outline. Sexual Orientation Intro, pp. 1630-1632 56 Courts unclear as to what level of scrutiny should be used for sexual orientation discrimination, go with rational basis. Bowers v. Hardwick, Chem pp. 881 Where the Court ruled that the right to privacy does not protect a right to engage in private consensual homosexual activity. Michael Bowers was arrested in his apartment for engaging in homosexual activity. A police officer came into his apartment on a unrelated matter and was directed to his room. The officer witness homosexual behavior and arrested Harwick. Georgia Sodomy law- “A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs one person and the mouth or anus of another.” The Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision upheld the Georgia statute. They began by stating that earlier decisions relating to privacy permitted to matters of family and reproduction; homosexual activity, he argued did not fit within these rights. We think that none of the rights announced in those cases bears any resemblance to the claimed constitutional right of gays to engage in acts of sodomy that is asserted in this case. No connection between family, marriage or procreation one the hand and gay activity on the other has been demonstrated. White said that the Court should protect rights as fundamental only if they are supported by the Constitutions text, the framers intent, or a tradition of being safeguarded. White said that neither text nor tradition justified finding a fundamental right to engage in gay activity. Romer v. Evans, pp. 821-23 The SC has not yet ruled as to whether discrimination based on sexual orientation warrants the application of intermediate or strict scrutiny. Discrimination based on sexual orientation has many characteristics that are present in other areas where heightened scrutiny is used. There have been two cases invalidating laws discriminating against gays and lesbians; one used rational basis and the other did not indicate the level of scrutiny being applied. In 1996, the SC used rational basis test to invalidate a Colorado initiative that encouraged discrimination based on sexual orientation. Colorado Amendment 2 repealed all state and local laws that prohibited discrimination against gays, lesbian, and bisexuals. The popular approved initiative also prevented future laws to protect these individuals. 57 Justice Kennedy – “Gays by state decree, are put in a solidary class with respect to transaction and relations in both the private and the governmental sphere.” The amendment withdraws from gays but no others, specific legal protection from the injuries caused by discrimination and it forbids reinstatement of these laws and policies. The Court said that the initiative failed even rational basis review. “the amendment has the peculiar property of imposing a broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named group, and exceptional and invalid form of legislation. The Concluded that there was no legitimate purpose for denying gays, lesbians, and bisexuals the same use if the political process available to everyone else. The only apparent purpose behind the law was animosity toward the class of persons affected, and this fails even the rational basis test. Romer v. Evans is significant because it was the first time the Court has invalidated discrimination based on sexual orientation. Although the used just rational basis review, the decision indication judicial willingness to protect gays lesbians and bisexuals from discrimination. Lawrence v. Texas, overruled Bowers A state cannot prohibit private, consensual homosexual activity The Court expressly overruled Bowers v. Hardwich. Lawrence arose when police in Texas received an anonymous tip of a disturbance in an apartment. They went to investigate and entered the apartment; they found two men engaged in sexual activity. The men were convicted and fined $200 under a Texas law prohibiting deviate sexual intercourse; defined as sexual activity between same sex couples. Lawrence is important in many respects: (Focusing on privacy and due process) First, Lawrence means that laws in 13 states prohibiting private consensual homosexual activity are unconstitutional; these statutes are usually the basis for discrimination against gays and lesbians. Second, Lawrence is a powerful affirmation of a right to privacy under the Constitution. The Court has safeguarded privacy even though it is not enumerated in the Constitution for almost a decade, in decisions involving family autonomy, contraceptive and abortion. 58 Third, more than any case in American history, recognizes that sexual activity is a fundamental aspect of personhood and that it is entitled to constitutional protection. Finally Lawrence is the most important decision to date recognizing the rights of gays and lesbians to equal dignity and equal treatment under the Constitution. Note on Sexual Orientation, Equal Protection and Level of Scrutiny, pp. 1683-1690 U.S. v. Windsor, pp. 822-23 Congress passed DOMA in response to a movement that was going on at the time to legalize same sex marriage. DOMA said that if a same sex couple got married one state, another state did not have to recognize it. DOMA also defined marriage for purposes of federal law as a union between one man and one woman. In 2007, Windsor and her partner decided to go to Canada and get married. They returned to NY and the state recognized their marriage as legal. In 2009 Windsor’s partner died and left her everything. Windsor tried to claim the exempt tax provided to survival spouses under federal law. She was denied based on the federal definition of marriage under DOMA. Windsor sued in federal court arguing that DOMA definition of marriage violated the 5th amendment. SC strikes down DOMA, stating that the exclusion of same sex marriage in DOMA definition violates the Due process clause. The legislative history of DOMA proves that it was only enacted due to an impermissible desire to disadvantage gays and lesbians. The court quoted the House Report on DOMA, which said the act was based on “both moral disapproval of homosexuality and a moral conviction that heterosexuality better comports with traditional (especially Judeo Christian) morality. This is consistent with Romer – govt cannot base a law on disapproval of homosexuality. The Court concluded that DOMA was unconstitutional because it failed to serve a legitimate government purpose. The Court declared “the federal statute is invalid for no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the state by its marriage laws sought to protect in personhood and dignity. By seeking to displace this protection and 59 treating those persons as living in marriages less respected than others, the federal statue is in violation of the 5th amendment. Obergefell v. Hodges, SC ruled that it is unconstitutional for states to deny same sex couples the right to marry. James Obergerfell and his partner wanted to get married, after John became terminally ill. At the time they were living in Ohio, a state that banned same sex marriage. So the couple went to Maryland and got married. When the partner John passed away, Ohio refused to list James as the surviving spouse on the death certificate. Obergefell and 13 other affected by the same sex marriage ban sued the officials responsible for enforcing the ban. The parties argued that by denying them marriage rights it violated the 14th amendment. 2 questions before the Court; (1) Does the 14th amendment require states to issue marriage licenses to same sex- couples? (2) Are states required to recognize lawful out-of-state marriages of same sex couples? Yes to both questions, same sex couples have a constitutional right to marry under the 14th amendment. The marriage right must be recognized across states. Justice Kennedy; the right to marry is a fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause. (Court cites Loving v. Virginia, state statute struck down for prohibiting interracial marriages. & Lawrence v. Texas, holding that same sex couples have an equal right to intimate association.) The Court offers four principles and traditions behind the constitutional right to marry; 1. The right to choose whether and whom to marry is inherent in individual autonomy. 2. The right protects the intimate relationship between two people. 3. The right to marry protects children and families by giving legal protection to homebuilding and childrearing. 4. Marriage is the keystone of the social order and the foundation of the family unit. The deep social importance of marriage is evident in the governments provision of numerous benefits to opposite sex couples, including tax benefits, inheritance rules, evidentiary privileges and medical decision making authority. Kennedy also notes that Due Process and EP are interrelated when it comes to marriage - Same sex couples are entitled to the same state benefits that opposite sex couples enjoy. 60 Roberts Dissent – The Constitution does not define marriage. The states should be free to define it. Americans should have an opportunity to redefine marriage through the democratic process. He also fears that Majority ruling will lead to the legalization of Polygamous relationships. Alito Dissent – The Constitution is silent on same sex marriage. The issue is reserved solely for the states. Thomas – The Due Process clause guarantees only procedural rights. The Due Process Clause does not provide a basis for creating new substantive rights. Majority reading dangerously stretches the Constitutional text. Scalia Dissent – The majority opinion is a threat to American Democracy. “Tradition as a Source of Fundamental Rights,” Where do they come from and who says what they are? o Liberty Prong of the 14th and 5th amendment (DP clause) o Talked about in Lochner Era (freedom of contract) D. Guns and “Self-Defense” --DC v. Heller; McDonald v. Chicago, pp. 1732-1772 (Excerpts to be assigned) --CHEM, pp. 956-96 Exam Outline for Answer The first distinction one should make is whether the law being challenged is a federal law or a state law. 61 The next issue is to confront exactly what constitutional objections can be made to the law at issue. If not told what issues to address and the law at issue is a federal law consider what source of power congress appears to be utilizing to enact the law and whether it could be argued that the law exceeds: The scope of Congress’s regulatory authority die to limits on the commerce power and the spending power or restrictions rooted in state sovereignty (10th amend) Next consider whether the law exceeds one of the affirmative limits on federal power designed to protect individual rights. The only individual rights limits on federal power we studied were 5th amendment DP & EP limits on the power of Congress, so these are the only limits you need to consider if a federal law is being challenged. If a state or local law is being challenged first consider whether you are told of the existence of a related federal law. If you are, this is a clear signal that the questions involve an issue of preemption. If there is a preemption issue and the regulation at issue impacts economic interests, you should look to see whether there might also be a dormant Commerce Clause or Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 argument available. (not sure if Bosniak covered preemption) Finally you should consider whether any due process or equal protection issues could be raised. If you spot a due process issue, you should consider whether the question may involve an EP issue as well and visa versa since many laws can be challenged on both grounds. After identifying the various constitutional issues that are involved, you must start by identifying the standard of review a court would use to analyze each constitutional issue. Sometimes this will be apparent once you identify the issue since a single standard is always used for some types of constitutional challenges. For example, all challenges arising under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 utilize the same test: (1) Does the state have a substantial reason for treating nonresidents differently; and (2) Does the degree of discrimination against nonresidents bear a substantial relation to the state's objective? This test is always applied after considering three preliminary hurdles: (1) does the state law discriminate against nonresidents of the state; (2) is the law being challenged by a flesh and 62 blood nonresident; and (3) does the discrimination affect the exercise of a right essential to interstate harmony? Similarly, there are several due process standards and which one applies depends on whether the right at issue is fundamental or nonfundamental. These characterization issues are critical to the remainder of the analysis because the standard applied is often outcome determinative. Each side will, of course, try and characterize the law at issue differently. The government will always want to characterize the law in such a way as to apply the most deferential standard of review available (such as minimum scrutiny in due process and equal protection cases) and the party challenging the constitutionality of the law will always want to characterize the law in such a way as to apply the most rigorous, least deferential standard of review available (such as strict scrutiny in due process and equal protection cases). Both sides must also be prepared to argue in the alternative, in case the court rejects the characterization they suggest. Once an applicable standard of review has been identified, it is necessary to apply the facts of the question to the standard. This often, but not always, involves an evaluation of both the legislative means as well as the legislative ends and the extent of the relationship between the two. In writing an exam answer, try and avoid reaching conclusions without providing a supporting rationale for your conclusions. This is particularly true when you apply the facts to a standard of review. For example, in applying the strick scrutiny test don’t just say that the means employed are narrowly tailored, but explain, using the facts provided, why the means are narrowly tailored and why there are no less restrictive alternative means available that would be equally effective in achieving the government’s objective. Questions on the exam will ask you to analyze the arguments available to each of the parties so you have to first be an advocate for one side and then an advocate for the other side. You will not be asked how a judge would decide the case so you do not need to consider how the case will ultimately be resolved. In organizing your answer to an exam question, you can choose to describe a single issue and then provide both the challenger’s argument on that issue and the government’s responsive argument on that 63 issue before going on to the next issue or you can describe all of the arguments available to the challenger before going on to describe all of the arguments available to the government. The choice between these two organizational techniques is a matter of personal preference. 64