International Journal of Civil Engineering and Technology (IJCIET)
Volume 10, Issue 03, March 2019, pp. 629–638, Article ID: IJCIET_10_03_063
Available online at http://www.iaeme.com/ijmet/issues.asp?JType=IJCIET&VType=10&IType=3
ISSN Print: 0976-6308 and ISSN Online: 0976-6316
© IAEME Publication
Scopus Indexed
PROTECTION OF CIVIL AVIATION AIRCRAFT
INVOLVED IN THE CARRIAGE OF
DANGEROUS GOODS AGAINST ACTS OF
UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE AND
EMERGENCY SITUATION PREVENTION
O. Lavrentyev
The State Scientific Research Institute of Civil Aviation,
Mikhalkovskaya Street, 67, building 1, 125438 Moscow, Russia
V. Gorshkov
The State Scientific Research Institute of Civil Aviation,
Mikhalkovskaya Street, 67, building 1, 125438 Moscow, Russia
B. Zubkov
The Moscow State Technical University of Civil Aviation,
20 Kronshtadtsky blvd, Moscow, GSP-3, 125993, Russia
A. Pleshakov, Yu. Popov, A. Guziy
The State Scientific Research Institute of Civil Aviation,
Mikhalkovskaya Street, 67, building 1, 125438 Moscow, Russia
ABSTRACT
The paper raises the issue of protection of civil aviation aircraft involved in the
carriage of goods against acts of unlawful interference. The importance of protection
of aircraft that are potentially dangerous transport infrastructure objects due to the
carriage of biological (bacteriological),chemical, nuclear (radioactive) components
as goods either legally or illegally reveals a real threat of emergency situation in the
case of unlawful interference in the use of explosive and incendiary devices. This
paper addresses the development and approval procedure scheme of the List of
potential threats of acts of unlawful interference in transport activities to implement
preventive measures for population and environment protection against the threat of
biological (bacteriological),chemical, nuclear (radioactive) terrorism. The mechanism
of security level distribution by the authorized bodies of the Russian Federation for
vehicles security, aircraft operators and procedures of civil aviation classification
have been studied as well. In conclusion, recommendations are presented for the
review and redevelopment of security levels taking into account the international,
national, and regional situation on a regular basis. It is recommended to add new
types of threats to the List of potential threats of acts of unlawful interference in
http://www.iaeme.com/IJCIET/index.asp
629
editor@iaeme.com
O. Lavrentyev, V. Gorshkov, B. Zubkov, A. Pleshakov, Yu. Popov, A. Guziy
transport activities timely; inform heads of airports and airlines about the new types
of threats; and add quantitative indicators of the possible ecological damage
connected with carriage of biological (bacteriological), chemical, nuclear
(radioactive) components by civil aviation aircraft to the legislative acts of the
Russian Federation.
Key words: acts of unlawful interference, aircraft, vehicles, goods (cargo), dangerous
object, classification, International Organization of Civil Aviation, threat, emergency
situation, critical element, category, criteria, security level, biological
(bacteriological), chemical, nuclear (radioactive) components.
Cite this Article: O. Lavrentyev, V. Gorshkov, B. Zubkov, A. Pleshakov, Yu. Popov,
A. Guziy, Protection of Civil Aviation Aircraft Involved in the Carriage of Dangerous
Goods Against Acts of Unlawful Interference and Emergency Situation Prevention,
International Journal of Civil Engineering and Technology 10(3), 2019, pp. 629–638.
http://www.iaeme.com/IJCIET/issues.asp?JType=IJCIET&VType=10&IType=3
1. INTRODUCTION
Aviation security measures are necessary to safeguard international civil aviation against acts
of unlawful interference (AUIs). Previous attacks on civil aviation committed or attempted by
concealing improvised explosive or incendiary devices in consignments demonstrate that it is
essential to remain vigilant and apply measures that secure air goods (cargo) and mail.
Vulnerabilities in cargo and mail security can stir terrorists and criminals into an attack. There
are two main threats: placement and/or concealment of an improvised explosive or incendiary
device in consignments to be loaded on an aircraft, and seizure of a commercial aircraft
(aircraft engaged in commercial flights) which is then used as a weapon of mass destruction
[1] that lead to emergency situation, i.e. the situation on a certain territory resulting from an
accident, dangerous natural phenomenon, disaster, natural or other disaster that may cause or
have caused human casualties, damage to human health or the environment (environmental
safety), significant material losses and violation of people living environment [2, 3].
This paper addresses a civil aviation aircraft as an object of transport infrastructure the
destruction or disruption of which leads to unacceptable damage, is a dangerous object that
requires protection against possible terrorist threats [4] and carries out transportation of illegal
items and substances which can create a threat to health, safety, property and environment as
specified in the dangerous goods list [5] in Technical Instructions for the Safe Transport of
Dangerous Goods by Air (Doc 9284 AN/905 ICAO) and also an aircraft carrying out
transportation of cargo in which biological (bacteriological), chemical, nuclear (radioactive)
components are hidden. An aircraft carrying this type of cargo is classified as a potentially
dangerous object of transport infrastructure by calculating the “unacceptable damage” from an
emergency situation, the following integral criterion for the identification of a dangerous
object (Kint):
Kint = Kl + Kecon + Кbal + Кecol,
where Kint is the lower damage level which consists of an applied set of specific criteria
for classifying an aircraft as a “dangerous object”;
Kl is financial damage determined by the number of dead and injured people in the case of
a terrorist attack on the object;
Kecon is financial damage caused by the reduction of cargo and passenger traffic as a
result of disabling the most vulnerable elements of the object;
Kbal is the balance cost of the facilities (or the cost of their recovery);
http://www.iaeme.com/IJCIET/index.asp
630
editor@iaeme.com
Protection of Civil Aviation Aircraft Involved in the Carriage of Dangerous Goods Against Acts
of Unlawful Interference and Emergency Situation Prevention
Kecol is the cost in value terms of environmental damage in case of terrorist attack on the
object [4].
Figure 1 shows the operations scheme that implements the identification procedure for
potentially dangerous transport infrastructure objects [4].
The current Russian aircraft certification system is fully aligned with international ICAO
standards including environmental requirements for aircraft [6, 21]; however, in accordance
with the Russian legislation, dangerous objects include vehicles (aircraft, marine and river
vessels, rail, road, rolling stock, etc.) that can be seized and used for terrorist attacks [4]; and
civil aviation aircraft are legally recognized as potentially dangerous objects since the hidden
biological (bacteriological), chemical, nuclear (radioactive) components transported on them
in the case of an act of unlawful interference can become a real emergency threat [2],
therefore taking into account the threat degree of an act of unlawful interference and its
possible consequences [7], these components are subject to mandatory categorization.
Figure 2 Operations scheme implementing identification procedure for potentially dangerous objects
of transport infrastructure
In this connection the possible consequences of acts of unlawful interference in civil
aviation aircraft involved in the cargo transportation are determined on the basis of
quantitative indicators of the dead or injured people, damage to the environment, and material
damage [8].
2. POTENTIAL THREATS OF ACTS OF UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE
IN THE OPERATION OF AIRCRAFT INVOLVED IN THE CARRIAGE
OF CARGO
According to Chapter 1 “Definitions” of Annex 17 Security to the Convention on
International civil aviation, the acts of unlawful interference (AUIs) that directly endanger the
safety of aircraft during the transportation of goods, members of cabin crews and passengers,
causing damage to human health, the environment (environmental safety), significant material
losses and violation of human living environment [2, 3] referred to above include:

- destruction of an aircraft in service; introduction on board an aircraft or at an airport of a
weapon or hazardous device or material intended for criminal purposes;

- use of an aircraft in service for the purpose of causing death, serious bodily injury, or serious
damage to property or the environment [9].
http://www.iaeme.com/IJCIET/index.asp
631
editor@iaeme.com
O. Lavrentyev, V. Gorshkov, B. Zubkov, A. Pleshakov, Yu. Popov, A. Guziy
It should be noted that the ICAO regulatory framework for the air cargo secure supply
chain has been developed incrementally over a period of time and is set out in a series of
Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) in Annex 17 Security to the Chicago
Convention, supported by guidance material in the Aviation Security Manual (Document
8973 - Restricted). This regulatory framework remains under constant review and is updated
periodically to provide the best responses to evolving threats. [1].
ICAO recommends that threat levels be reviewed on an ongoing basis taking into account
the international, national and regional environment and conditions to ensure that appropriate
preventive security measures are identified [5].
In its turn, the Russian legislation treats illegal interference in aviation activities as illegal
actions (inaction) that infringe on the safe operation of aviation, resulting in accidents with
people, material damage, hijacking or skyjacking of an aircraft or threatening the onset of
such consequences [10]; but the notion “acts of unlawful interference” from Chapter 1 of
Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention expanding and supplementing the List of potential
threats of acts of unlawful interference in the activities of vehicles of air transport unites the
following:

- explosion threat - the possibility of vehicle destruction or causing damage to it and/or their
cargo, personnel’s, passengers’ and other people’s lives or health by explosion (shooting);

- the threat of placement or attempted placement of explosive devices (explosive substances)
on a vehicle - the possibility of placement or taking actions to place explosive substances by
any means whatsoever on a vehicle that can destroy it, cause damage to it or its cargo;

- the threat of hazardous substances - the possibility of contamination of vehicles or their
critical elements with hazardous chemical, radioactive or biological agents that threaten
personnel’s, passengers’ and other people’s lives or health;

- the threat of explosion of a vehicle critical element - the possibility of destruction of a critical
element of the vehicle or causing damage to it by explosion (shooting), threatening the
functioning of the vehicle, personnel’s, passengers’ and other people’s lives or health;

- the threat of placement or attempted placement of explosive devices (explosive substances)
on a vehicle critical element - the possibility of placement or committing actions for the
purpose of placement of explosive devices (explosive substances) by any means whatsoever
on a vehicle critical element that can destroy the vehicle critical element or cause damage to it,
threatening the safe functioning of the vehicle, personnel’s, passengers’ and other people’s
lives or health [11].
The notion of “vehicle” in the List of potential threats of acts of unlawful interference in
the activities of vehicles in respect to civil aviation means “aircraft”; and “critical elements”
are constructive, engineering and technical elements of the vehicle, an act of unlawful
interference in respect of which will lead to complete or partial vehicle shutdown and/or
emergency situations [12].
Can the level or list of threats (AUIs) formed by the International civil aviation
organization be complete and final? No, it can’t be; only a carefully verified and constantly
updated list of potential threats, the so-called “threat model”, and their timely localization are
the basis of the aviation security system protecting aircraft transporting cargo.
Ideally, the procedure algorithm for consisting a list of potential threats, that is, for the
formation of a detailed modified threat model for an object of transport infrastructure
combined with the formation and subsequent analysis of scenarios of the most significant
AUI types [13, 22, 25, 27, 28] can be represented by the following sequence:

- determination of the potential sources of danger, their possibilities of influence an object and
possible ways of this influence;
http://www.iaeme.com/IJCIET/index.asp
632
editor@iaeme.com
Protection of Civil Aviation Aircraft Involved in the Carriage of Dangerous Goods Against Acts
of Unlawful Interference and Emergency Situation Prevention

- determination of the object critical elements on which the impact of a potential source of
danger is possible;

- determination of a list of possible threats from a potential source of danger for each critical
element of the object;

- determination of the possible implementations for each threat [4, 23, 24, 26].
The main emphasis in the consisting of the list of potential threats (threat model) is that
the damage or destruction of the aircraft structure and its critical elements occurs under the
influence of explosive devices, that is, of specially made objects consisting of several
interacting elements (as a rule, these include: explosive substance, shell, delay mechanism,
initiation elements, etc.) that can be used to disperse toxic, poisonous, radioactive and other
dangerous substances [14], or incendiary devices that are intended to or can cause death,
serious injury or substantial material damage and consist of a power source, switching device,
wiring and incendiary mixture.
3. THREATS OF BIOLOGICAL (BACTERIOLOGICAL), CHEMICAL
AND NUCLEAR (RADIOACTIVE) CONTAMINATION AND
OCCURRENCE OF EMERGENCY SITUATIONS
Biological (bacteriological), chemical or nuclear (radioactive) contamination of the aircraft or
the area overflown by the aircraft carrying cargo occurs due to that any person:

- destroys an aircraft in service or causes damage to such an aircraft, which renders it
incapable of flight or which is likely to endanger its safety in flight;

- places or causes to be placed on an aircraft in service, by any means whatsoever, a device or
substance which is likely to destroy that aircraft, or to cause damage to it, which renders it
incapable of flight, or to cause damage to it, which is likely to endanger its safety in flight;

- uses an aircraft in service for the purpose of causing death, serious bodily injury, or serious
damage to property or the environment;

- releases or discharges from an aircraft in service any BCN weapon or explosive, radioactive,
or similar substances in a manner that causes or is likely to cause death, serious bodily injury
or serious damage to property or the environment;

- uses against or on board an aircraft in service any BCN weapon or explosive, radioactive, or
similar substances in a manner that causes or is likely to cause death, serious bodily injury or
serious damage to property or the environment;

- transports, causes to be transported, or facilitates the transport of, on board an aircraft:

any explosive or radioactive material, knowing that it is intended to be used to cause, or in a
threat to cause, with or without a condition, as is provided for under national law, death or
serious injury or damage for the purpose of intimidating a population, or compelling a
government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act;

any biological, chemical or nuclear weapon, knowing it to be a BCN weapon;

any source material, special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed
or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, knowing that
it is intended to be used in a nuclear explosive activity or in any other nuclear activity not
under safeguards pursuant to a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy
Agency [15].
All of the above implies the implementation of illegal interference in the activities of civil
aviation in the transportation of cargo on board the aircraft by:
http://www.iaeme.com/IJCIET/index.asp
633
editor@iaeme.com
O. Lavrentyev, V. Gorshkov, B. Zubkov, A. Pleshakov, Yu. Popov, A. Guziy

- biological (bacteriological) terrorism which uses in terrorist activities various biological
means and bacteriological cultures (bacteria, viruses, toxins etc.) for the spread of epidemics,
epizootics or epiphytoties (mass diseases of people, animals, plants);

- chemical terrorism – terrorist activities carried out with the use of various toxic and other
dangerous chemical substances against individuals, animals and plants;

- nuclear terrorism – the use or threat of use for terrorist purposes of nuclear explosive
devices as well as radioactive materials and their waste for radioactive contamination
of objects, terrain, water bodies, air as well as the destruction (damage, seizure) of
nuclear facilities [14] which can lead to emergency situations with great human losses
and material losses as well as significant damage to human health and the
environment.
3.1. Categorization of vehicles-aircraft
Vehicles-aircraft categorization is being carried out having accepted as an axiom [16] the fact
that civil aviation aircraft involved in the carriage of cargo are potentially dangerous objects,
having defined the List of potential threats of acts of unlawful interference of vehicles by
determination of quantitative indicators about the casualties or injured people, about damage
to environment and material damage [8], the List of the activities which are directly connected
with transport safety [17] and the Procedure for establishment of number of categories and
categorization criteria for transport infrastructure objects and vehicles [18].
Categorization of transport infrastructure objects and vehicles means classifying them
into certain categories taking into account the degree of threat of an act of unlawful
interference and its possible consequences [7].
4. CATEGORIES AND CRITERIA OF VEHICLES-AIRCRAFT
CATEGORIZATION
The algorithm for determining the number of categories and criteria of categorization of civil
aviation aircraft involved in the transportation of cargo is as follows:

- aircraft categorization on the basis of methods and criteria of categorization taking into
account the degree of threat of the act of unlawful interference and its possible consequences

- assigning a category corresponding to the highest quantitative indicator of any of the
categorization criteria;

- definition of the categorization criterion of an aircraft carrying out transportation of cargo,
i.e. possible consequences of the act of unlawful interference which are defined on the basis of
quantitative indicators about the casualties or injured people, about damage to environment,
material damage:

- inclusion of rated aircraft transporting cargo in the register of rated objects of transport
infrastructure and vehicles.
Figure 2 shows sequence of operations implementing the categorization procedure, that is,
assigning categories to transport infrastructure facilities and vehicles; in our case these are
aircraft carrying out the transportation of cargo assigned to one of the categories established
by the Ministry of transport of the Russian Federation - the Federal Executive Authority
performing functions on development of the state policy and regulation in the field of
transport in coordination with the Federal Executive Authority in the field of safety of the
Russian Federation, the Federal Executive Authority performing functions on development of
the state policy and regulation in the field of internal affairs, and the Federal Executive
Authority carrying out functions on development of the state policy and regulation in the field
of economic development [7].
http://www.iaeme.com/IJCIET/index.asp
634
editor@iaeme.com
Protection of Civil Aviation Aircraft Involved in the Carriage of Dangerous Goods Against Acts
of Unlawful Interference and Emergency Situation Prevention
Figure 2 Sequence of operations implementing the categorization procedure
The Ministry of transport of the Russian Federation established that the number of
categories of air transport vehicles-aircraft should not exceed four; the first category being the
highest [8].
Based on the formula of unacceptable damage Kint = Kl+ Kecon + Kbal + Kecol of the
integral criterion for identifying dangerous objects Kint and its components, Kecol - the cost in
value terms of environmental damage in case of a terrorist attack on the object, that is, the
private criteria for classifying the object as “dangerous” [4] according to the damage danger
degree, in the case of AUIs, in the activities of a civil aviation aircraft transporting cargo with
biological (bacteriological), chemical and nuclear (radioactive) components when using
explosive and incendiary devices by extremist individuals for the destruction or partial
destruction of the aircraft - will be the main criterion for assessing the damage.
However, the table Categories and quantitative indicators of categorization criteria of
transport infrastructure objects and air transport vehicles of Appendix No. 2 to the Order of
the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation of February 21, 2011 No. 62 on the
procedure for establishing the number of categories and criteria for categorizing objects of
transport infrastructure and vehicles by the competent authorities in the field of transport
safety [18] shows only quantitative indicators of possible material damage to the categories of
vehicles (aircraft) but there are no quantitative indicators of possible environmental damage.
In this connection, the tables of Categories and quantitative indicators of criteria for
categorizing objects of transport infrastructure and vehicles of road transport and objects of
transport infrastructure of the road sector (railway transport, marine and river vessels, urban
land electric transport, subway facilities (there are no vehicles, damage is calculated only for
an object of transport infrastructure) [18] determine quantitative indicators of criteria for
possible environmental damage.
5. INTERCONNECTION BETWEEN SAFETY LEVEL OF THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION TRANSPORT COMPLEX AND VEHICLEAIRCRAFT CATEGORY
On the basis of the categories assigned to civil aviation aircraft and levels of safety on the
transport complex which are declared (established) depending on decisions of heads of the
Federal operational staff, operational headquarters in the subjects of the Russian Federation,
the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation or the Minister of Transport of the
Russian Federation, the following levels are used:
http://www.iaeme.com/IJCIET/index.asp
635
editor@iaeme.com
O. Lavrentyev, V. Gorshkov, B. Zubkov, A. Pleshakov, Yu. Popov, A. Guziy

- level 1 - the degree of protection of the transport complex against potential threats consisting
in the presence of a set of specific conditions and factors that create the risk of an act of
unlawful interference in the activities of the transport complex;

- level 2 - the degree of protection of the transport complex against direct threats consisting in
the presence of a set of specific conditions and factors that create the risk of an act of unlawful
interference in the activities of the transport complex;

- level 3 - the degree of protection of the transport complex against direct threats consisting in
the presence of a set of conditions and factors that created the risk of committing an act of
unlawful interference in the activities of the transport complex [19]; similar levels of security
are declared (established) by aircraft operators - subjects of transport safety. In this
connection, with regard to vehicles of categories 1-4 in the case of safety levels 2 or 3
declared, aircraft operators - subjects of transport safety are obliged to introduce additional
safety measures [20] provided for by the Russian legislation.
The main feature of the declaration (establishment) of the safety level by the subject of
transport safety of aircraft operators or an airport of the Russian Federation is that the current
level of safety cannot directly affect the level of threats arising from the act of unlawful
interference on board the aircraft or at the airport while the level of threats - AUIs on board an
aircraft or at an airport when they occur directly affects the declaration (establishment) of
safety levels 2 or 3 in the subject of transport safety.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Biological (bacteriological), chemical, nuclear (radioactive) components of the cargo
transported by air transport, in case of their release or discharge from the aircraft [15] and
forced spraying in case of activation on board the aircraft or in the cargo of an explosive or
incendiary device depending on the jet currents, the speed and altitude of flight, the direction
and shift of the wind near the ground can cause irreparable damage to human health and the
environment since the width and length of the contamination of an area will be hundreds of
times greater than the environmental damage in the explosion or fire on vehicles of road, rail,
sea, river, urban land electric transport or subway.
On the basis of the above it is proposed:


For the purpose of creation of the preventive measures system aimed at prevention of the
emergency situations connected with AUIs in activities of civil aviation with the use of
biological (bacteriological), chemical and nuclear (radioactive) components transported by
civil aviation aircraft, to recommend that the competent authorities of the Russian Federation
in the field of aviation safety:
o
- taking into account the international, national and regional situation, review the
levels of threats regularly and update the list of potential threats with new types of
threats constantly;
o
- timely and on a regular basis inform the heads of airports and aircraft operators
responsible for the implementation of preventive measures on aircraft about new types
of threats.
Recommend that the Federal Executive Authority performing functions on development of the
state policy and regulation in the field of transport in aviation security, enter quantitative
indicators of possible environmental damage connected with transportation by civil aviation
aircraft of BCN components into table Categories and quantitative indicators of categorization
criteria of transport infrastructure objects and air transport vehicles of the Appendix No. 2 to
the Order of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation of 21.02.2011 No. 62.
http://www.iaeme.com/IJCIET/index.asp
636
editor@iaeme.com
Protection of Civil Aviation Aircraft Involved in the Carriage of Dangerous Goods Against Acts
of Unlawful Interference and Emergency Situation Prevention
REFERENCES
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
Moving Air Cargo Globally. Second Edition. Montreal. ICAO, WCO, 2016, 36 p.
GOST R 22.0.02-2016. Safety in emergencies. Terms and definitions. Moscow,
Standartinform Publ., 2016, 12 p.
On security. The Federation Council of the Russian Federation]. Available at:
http://base.garant.ru/12181538/ (accessed 06.01.2019).
Chereshkin D.S., Tzigichko V.N., Kozlov Yu.P., Kononov A.A. The concept of
categorization of potentially dangerous objects of national transport infrastructure:
Proceedings ISA RAN, 2007, vol. 31 (section I), pp. 1-16.
Doc 8973. Aviation Security Manual. Tenth Edition. Montreal. ICAO, 2017. 916 p.
Samoylov I.A., Stradomskiy O.Yu., Shapkin V.S. Russian airlines aircraft park
development. Scientific Bulletin of the State Scientific Research Institute of Civil Aviation,
2 (312), 2012, pp. 7-14.
On transport security. Federal law of the Russian Federation dated 09.02.2007 No. 16-FZ
The
Federation
Council
of
the
Russian
Federation.
Available
at:
http://base.garant.ru/12151931/ (accessed 06.01.2019).
On the procedure for establishing the number of categories and criteria for categorizing
transport infrastructure and vehicles. Order of the Ministry of transport of the Russian
Federation dated 03.11.2009 No. 194 The Ministry of transport of the Russian Federation.
Available at: http://base.garant.ru/197681/ (accessed 06.01.2019).
Annex 17 «Security» to the Convention on the International civil aviation. Tenth Edition.
Montreal: ICAO, 2017. 64 p.
The air code of the Russian Federation. Federal law of the Russian Federation threats of
сommission of acts of illegal interference in activity of objects « of transport infrastructure
and vehicles. Order of Ministry of transport of the RF, the Federal security service of the
RF and the Ministry of internal Affairs of the RF dated 05.03.2010 No. 52/112/134 The
Ministry of transport of the RF, the Federal security service of the RF and the Ministry of
internal Affairs of the RF. Available at: http://base.garant.ru/12174831/ (accessed
06.01.2019).
About the approval of the list of potential threats of commission of acts of illegal
intervention in activity of objects of transport infrastructure and vehicles. Order of the
Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation, Federal Security Service of the Russian
Federation and Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation of 05.03.2010
No.52|112|134. Available at: http://base.garant.ru/12174831/ (accessed 06.01.2019).
GOST R 57119-2016. Technique of carrying out assessment of vulnerability objects of
transport infrastructure and vehicles. General requirements. Moscow, Standartinform
Publ., 2016. 12 p.
Ismailov T.A., Petrov I.N. Clarification of the threat model of the objects of transport
infrastructure of civil aviation. Scientific Bulletin of The State Scientific Research Institute
of Civil Aviation, 3 (313), 2013, pp. 87-90.
Trunov I.L., Gorbunov Yu.S. Terrorizm. Pravovye aspekty protivodejstviya. Normativnye
I mezhdunarodnye pravovye akty s kommentariyami, nauchnye stat`i [Terrorism. Legal
aspects of counteraction: normative and international legal acts with comments, scientific
articles]. Moscow, Eksmo Publ., 2007, 768 p.
ICAO Doc 9960. Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to
International Civil Aviation. Montreal, 2010, 94 p.
Evgenyeva A.P. Slovar` russkogo yazyka [Dictionary of the Russian language]. Vol. 1.
Ed. 4. Moscow, Russkij yazyk Publ., Poligrafresursy Publ., 1999, 702 p.
About the approval of the list of the works which are directly connected with ensuring
transport safety. The decree of the RF Government dated 05.11.2009 No. 1653. The
http://www.iaeme.com/IJCIET/index.asp
637
editor@iaeme.com
O. Lavrentyev, V. Gorshkov, B. Zubkov, A. Pleshakov, Yu. Popov, A. Guziy
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
government
of
the
Russian
Federation.
Available
at:
http://www.garant.ru/products/ipo/prime/doc/96578/ (accessed 06.01.2019).
About the order of establishment of number of categories and criteria of categorization of
objects of transport infrastructure and vehicles by competent authorities in the field of
ensuring transport security. Order of Ministry of transport of the RF dated 21.02.2011 No.
62. The Ministry of transport of the RF. Available at: http://www.garant.ru/
products/ipo/prime/doc/96578/ (accessed 06.01.2019).
About levels of safety of objects of transport infrastructure and vehicles and about the
order of their announcement (establishment) Resolution of the Government of the RF
dated 10.12.2008 No.940. The Government of the RF. Available at:
http://www.garant.ru/products/ipo/prime/doc/96578/ (accessed 06.01.2019).
About the approval of requirements for ensuring transport safety, including requirements
to anti-terrorist security of the objects (territories) considering safety levels for various
categories of objects of transport infrastructure and air transport vehicles, Resolution of
the Government of the RF dated 28.07.2018 No. 886 The Government of the RF.
Available
at:
http://www.garant.ru/products/ipo/prime/doc/71903704/
(accessed
06.01.2019).
Samoylov I.A., Lesnitchiy I.V., Samoilov V.I., Kipcharskiy D.A. State and prospects of
development of the park of aircrafts of civil aviation of Scientific Bulletin of The State
Scientific Research Institute of Civil Aviation, 4 (315), 2014, pp. 9-16.
Blagorazumov A.K., Glukhov G.E., Kirpichev I.G. Current issues and trends in
introduction of information systems for monitoring aviation operations safety. Scientific
Bulletin of The State Scientific Research Institute of Civil Aviation, 10 (321), 2015, pp. 5765.
Shapkin V.S., Demin S.S., Nikitin A.V., Demin D.S., Kovtushenko D.V. About
application of risk oriented approach in a problem of safety of flights. Scientific Bulletin of
The State Scientific Research Institute of Civil Aviation, 16 (327), 2017, pp. 61-69.
Spryskov V.B., Isaakian K.L., Kuznetsov S.V. Estimation of aircraft accident risk in the
air-space of air traffic controller zone of responsibility through aircraft operation using
ATM surveil-lance system data. Scientific Bulletin of The State Scientific Research
Institute of Civil Aviation, 10 (321), 2015, pp. 78-89.
Glukhov G.E., Kirpichev I.G., Nikonov V.V., Maslennikova G.E., Konyaev E.A.
Creation of a state system for continuous monitoring of aviation security in compliance
with the international requirements. International Journal of Civil Engineering and
Technology (IJCIET). Volume 8, Issue 11, November 2017, pp. 695-713
Kuklev E.A., Shapkin V.S., Daletsky S.V., Demin S.S., Plekhanov A.I. Assessment of
accident and collision risks in presence of fuzzy threats to flight safety. International
Journal of Civil Engineering and Technology (IJCIET). Volume 8, Issue 11, November
2017, pp. 1093-1106.
Daletsky, S.V., Kolitievsky Yu. M., Nikonov V.V., Sirotin N.N., Yudaev V.V.
Investigation of a multi-level baggage control process using petri nets. International
Journal of Economic Perspectives. Volume 11, December 2017, Special Section, pp.
1192-1203.
Popov Yu.V., Gorshkov V.A., Pleshakov A.I., Kamzolov S.K., Frolkov A.I. Diagnostics
in methodology of aviation accident investigation. Information-an international
interdisciplinary journal. Volume 20, No.9 (A), September, 2017, pp. 6615-6626.
http://www.iaeme.com/IJCIET/index.asp
638
editor@iaeme.com