Gimbel v. Signal Companies, Inc. Delaware Court of Chancery 316 A.2d 599 (Del. Ch. 1974) Rule of Law The sale of a wholly owned subsidiary by a conglomerate does not require majority stockholder approval if the sale does not constitute a sale of all or substantially all of the conglomerate's assets. Facts Signal Companies, Inc. (Signal) (defendant) was incorporated as an oil business. Signal then became a conglomerate that engaged in a variety of industries. Signal transferred its oil and gas business to its wholly owned subsidiary, Signal Gas & Oil Co. (Signal Oil). Signal’s operation involved constant acquisition and disposal of corporate branches. Signal’s board of directors approved a proposal to sell Signal Oil to Burmah Oil Inc. (Burmah). Signal’s books showed that Signal Oil represented 26 percent of Signal’s total assets, 41 percent of its net worth, and 15 percent of Signal’s revenues and earnings. Louis Gimbel (plaintiff), a Signal shareholder, sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the sale. Gimbel alleged that the approval by the Signal board was insufficient and that majority shareholder approval was necessary to authorize the sale, as it accounted for all or substantially all of Signal’s assets. Issue Does the sale of a wholly owned subsidiary by a conglomerate require majority stockholder approval if the sale does not constitute a sale of all or substantially all of the conglomerate's assets? Holding and Reasoning (Quillen, J.) No. Delaware statute requires majority stockholder approval for a sale of "all or substantially all" of the assets of a Delaware corporation. Del. C. tit. 8, § 271(a). The sale of a wholly owned subsidiary by a conglomerate does not require majority stockholder approval if the sale does not constitute a sale of "all or substantially all" of the conglomerate's assets. A sale of assets should be measured both quantitatively and qualitatively. If the sale is "of assets quantitatively vital to the operation of the corporation" and is "out of the ordinary and substantially affects the existence and purpose of the corporation," it constitutes a sale of all or substantially all assets and majority stockholder approval is required. In Philadelphia Nat’l Bank v. B.S.F., 199 A.2d 746 (1964), the court held the sale of stock was a sale of substantially all assets, because the asset sold was the corporation's principal asset and constituted at least 75 percent of the total assets. In this case, Signal Oil represents only about 26 percent of the total assets of Signal. While Signal Oil represents 41 percent of Signal's total net worth, it produces only 15 percent of Signal’s revenues and earnings. Thus, quantitatively, the sale of Signal Oil does not constitute a sale of all or substantially all of Signal's assets. Further, although Signal's original business was oil and gas, Signal is now a conglomerate whose operation involves constant acquisition and disposal of its corporate branches. Thus, acquisition and disposal of corporate branches, including the oil and gas subsidiary, has become part of Signal's ordinary course of business. Therefore, the sale of Signal Oil by Signal does not constitute a sale of all or substantially all of Signal's asset, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Accordingly, majority stockholder approval is not necessary. Katz v. Bregman Delaware Court of Chancery 431 A.2d 1274 (Del. Ch. 1981) Rule of Law The sale of substantially all of a corporation’s assets requires approval by a majority of the corporation's outstanding shareholders entitled to vote at a meeting called upon at least 20 days' notice. Facts Plant Industries, Inc. (Plant) (defendant) produced steel drums. Over the course of six months, Plant’s board of directors sold off several of its unprofitable subsidiaries. Plant’s chief executive officer, Bregman (defendant), then began negotiating the sale of Plant National (Quebec) Ltd. (National) to raise funds and help Plant’s balance sheets. National was Plant’s Canadian division and had been the only Plant facility producing income for the past four years. In the years leading up to the negotiated transfer, National accounted for 34.9 percent, 36.9 percent, 42 percent, 51 percent, and 52.4 percent of Plant’s pre-tax income, respectively. By then, National accounted for 51 percent of Plant’s total assets and 45 percent of its net sales. After the sale, Plant planned to move away from its steel-drum business and begin making plastic drums. Plant ultimately entered into an agreement to sell National to Vulcan Industrial Packaging, Ltd. (Vulcan), despite getting a higher offer from Universal Drum Reconditioning Co. (Universal). Plant’s board argued that it could not negotiate with Universal because it had entered a firm agreement with Vulcan. Hyman Katz, one of Plant’s shareholders, filed a lawsuit in the Delaware Court of Chancery, seeking to enjoin the sale. Katz argued that the deal with Vulcan constituted a sale of “substantially all” of Plant’s assets and could therefore only be accomplished by a majority vote of the shareholders at a meeting called with 20 days’ notice under 8 Del. C. § 271. Issue Does the sale of substantially all of a corporation’s assets require approval by a majority of the corporation's outstanding shareholders entitled to vote at a meeting called upon at least 20 days' notice? Holding and Reasoning (Marvel, J.) Yes. Delaware law provides that a sale of substantially all of a corporation’s assets can only be accomplished by a majority vote of all outstanding shareholders entitled to vote at a shareholders’ meeting called upon at least 20 days’ notice. 8 Del. C. § 271. A sale may be considered to be of "substantially all" of the corporation's assets if the sale is of "quantitatively vital" assets to the corporation's operation and if the sale is not an ordinary transaction, but rather one that affects the corporation's very existence and purpose. If this type of sale is negotiated, an injunction may be issued to stop the transfer until a shareholders’ vote can take place. In this case, National represents 51 percent of Plant’s assets and 45 percent of its net sales. Further, Plant’s management plans to leave its historically successful steel-drum business to take the company in a whole new direction. The sale of all of Plant’s Canadian operations thus constitutes the sale of substantially all of its assets. For comparison, in Gimbel v. Signal Companies, Inc., 316 A.2d 599 (Del. Ch. 1974), the sale of a subsidiary representing only 26 percent of the company’s assets, 41 percent of its net worth, and 15 percent of its revenues was deemed not to be the sale of substantially all of the corporation’s assets. Because the Vulcan deal is a sale of substantially all of Plant’s assets, there is no need to consider the adequacy of consideration or whether the board breached trust by not negotiating with Universal. The injunction is granted, at least until shareholder approval is obtained for the proposed sale to Vulcan. Hollinger, Inc. v. Hollinger International, Inc. Delaware Court of Chancery 858 A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 2004) Rule of Law Assets comprise substantially all of a corporation’s assets only if they: (1) are quantitatively vital to the operation of the corporation and (2) substantially affect the existence and purpose of the corporation. Facts Hollinger International, Inc. (International) (defendant) owned TelegraphGroup Ltd. (Telegraph) and Chicago Group, entities that owned newspapers in the United States and England. These assets were, together, extremely valuable for International. Each asset was of similar importance to International, although Telegraph arguably was slightly more valuable than Chicago Group. International agreed to sell Telegraph to a third party. Hollinger, Inc. (Inc.) (plaintiff) controlled 68 percent of the voting power in International and objected to the sale. Inc. filed a motion in the Delaware Court of Chancery, seeking a preliminary injunction enjoining the sale of Telegraph on the grounds that it amounted to a sale of substantially all of International’s assets and thus required shareholder approval. Issue Do assets comprise substantially all of a corporation’s assets if they: (1) are not quantitatively vital to the operation of the corporation and (2) do not substantially affect the existence and purpose of the corporation? Holding and Reasoning (Strine, J.) No. Under Delaware law, a corporation’s board of directors may sell all or substantially all of the corporation’s assets only after approval by shareholder vote. Assets comprise substantially all of a corporation’s assets if they: (1) are quantitatively vital to the operation of the corporation and (2) substantially affect the heart of the existence and purpose of the corporation. These quantitative and qualitative analyses, while separate, are not unrelated. In this case, Telegraph does not amount to all or substantially all of International’s assets. Beginning with a quantitative analysis, while Telegraph is without a doubt important to International’s economic success, it is not vital to such success. International will retain the Chicago Group after the proposed sale, and the Chicago Group is almost, if not equally, as important to International’s finances as Telegraph. Indeed, it is clear that International will survive financially after the sale of Telegraph. It thus cannot be said that Telegraph is vital to the operation of International. The qualitative analysis, although legally separate, cannot be conducted without reference to the quantitative analysis, as the qualitative test is heavily influenced by economic quality. After the sale of Telegraph, Inc. and other International stockholders will still own interest in the Chicago Group. As such, while the stockholders would be losing interest in valuable newspapers, they will still have an interest in various other newspapers, and valuable newspapers at that. It cannot be said, then, that the sale of Telegraphaffects the heart of the existence and purpose of International. In sum, the sale of Telegraph does not amount to a sale of all or substantially all of International’s assets. Accordingly, a shareholder vote is not required for the sale. Inc.’s motion for a preliminary injunction is denied. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. Delaware Supreme Court 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) Rule of Law Minority shareholders voting in favor of a proposed merger must be informed of all material information regarding the merger for the merger to be considered fair. Facts The Signal Companies, Inc. (Signal) acquired 50.5 percent of UOP, Inc.’s (UOP) (defendants) outstanding stock. Signal elected six members to the new board of UOP, five of which were either directors or employees of Signal. After the acquisition, Signal still had a significant amount of cash on hand due to a sale of one of its subsidiaries. Signal was unsuccessful in finding other good investment opportunities for this extra cash so it decided to look into UOP once again. Charles Arledge and Andrew Chitiea, two Signal officers who were also UOP directors, conducted a “feasibility study” for Signal and determined that the other 49.5 percent of UOP would be a good investment for Signal for any price up to $24 per share. The study found that the return on investment at a purchase price of $21 per share would be 15.7 percent, whereas the return at $24 per share would be 15.5 percent. Despite this small difference in return, the difference in purchase price per share would mean a $17 million difference to the UOP minority shareholders. This information was never passed along to Arledge and Chitiea’s fellow UOP directors or the UOP minority shareholders. The UOP board agreed on a $21 per share purchase price. The UOP minority shareholders subsequently voted in favor of the merger. Weinberger, et al. (plaintiffs) were UOP minority shareholders and brought suit, challenging the merger. The Delaware Court of Chancery found in favor of the defendants. The plaintiffs appealed. Issue Is a minority shareholder vote in favor of a proposed merger fair if the shareholders were not given information on the highest price that the buyer was willing to offer for the shares? Holding and Reasoning (Moore, J.) No. The “entire fairness” of a merger is comprised of fair dealing and fair price. Minority shareholders voting in favor of a proposed merger must be informed of all material information regarding the merger for the dealing to be fair. Failure to provide the minority shareholders with all material information is a breach of fiduciary duty. Here, although Arledge and Chitiea had prepared their study for Signal and were actually Signal officers, they still owed a duty to UOP because they were also UOP directors. The feasibility study and, more specifically, the possible sale price of $24 per share and the resulting $17 million difference in amount paid to the UOP minority shareholders clearly constitute material information that the shareholders were entitled to know before voting. Arledge and Chitiea’s failure to disclose that information was a breach of their fiduciary duties and their actions thus cannot be considered fair dealing. In terms of fair price, to determine whether the price of a cash-out merger was fair, a court is to consider “all relevant factors,” something that the Delaware Court of Chancery did not do. On remand all relevant factors concerning the value of UOP should be considered in determining whether the price was fair. As a result of the foregoing, the Delaware Court of Chancery’s findings that the circumstances of and price paid for the merger were fair are reversed and the case is remanded. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. Supreme Court of Delaware 634 A.2d 345 (1993) Rule of Law The judicial appraisal process must consider non-speculative future value attributable to the acquiring party’s post-merger plans for the company. Facts Technicolor, Inc. (defendant) was in serious financial trouble in early 1982. Ron Perelman, controlling shareholder of MacAndrews & Forbes Group, Inc. (MAF), determined that Technicolor would be an attractive takeover candidate for MAF. Technicolor agreed to a two-step merger, in which MAF would first make a cash tender offer and then conduct a cash-out merger with any shareholders who did not accept the tender offer. The tender offer opened in November 1982, and by the end of the month, MAF had acquired 82 percent of Technicolor’s shares. Meanwhile, Perelman had developed a plan for improving Technicolor’s performance, which included selling all of Technicolor’s unprofitable units. Cinerama, Inc. (plaintiff) did not accept the tender offer and dissented from the cash-out merger, which was completed in January 1983. Cinerama sued for an appraisal. The trial court computed an appraisal value which excluded any value created by Perelman’s plans for the new company, on the reasoning that the appraisal should exclude any future value which, but for the merger, would not exist. Cinerama appealed, arguing that Perelman’s plans should be factored in. Issue Must the court appraisal process consider non-speculative future value attributable to the acquiring party’s post-merger plans for the company? Holding and Reasoning (Holland, J.) Yes. A shareholder that dissents to a merger is entitled to receive his proportion of the enterprise’s going concern value. That valuation is calculated as of the date of the merger, but projected future value as of that time may be considered. In a two-step merger, a period of months may elapse between the announcement of the tender offer and the second-step merger. Significantly, during that time, the acquiring party gains control of the company. It may begin to implement new strategies. The appraised valuation should not include speculative future gains, based on unverifiable claims made by the acquiring party. However, when the acquiring party has formulated concrete steps that will affect the future value of the company, these factors must be considered. Here, MAF developed a strategy for Technicolor prior to beginning the two-step merger process. During the intermediate period while the tender offer was pending, MAF refined its strategy and took initial steps towards eliminating unprofitable divisions. Though the appraised value of Cinerama’s shares should not include speculative future gains the company might make under MAF’s control, MAF’s specific plans to sell certain assets must be considered. The trial court erred as a matter of law when it ruled that any future value stemming from the merger could not be considered. This requirement has never been imposed by statute or by this court. The trial court therefore undervalued Technicolor’s shares. The case is remanded for a recalculation of Technicolor’s value as of the date of the merger, specifically considering Perelman’s plans for the company. Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chemical Corporation Delaware Supreme Court 498 A.2d 1099 (Del. 1985) Rule of Law In a cash-out merger appraisal rights are not a stockholder’s only remedy where the stockholder has claimed specific acts of misconduct. Facts Olin Corp. (Olin) bought 63.4 percent of the outstanding shares of Philip A. Hunt Chemical Corporation (Hunt) (defendant) from Turner and Newall Industries, Inc. (Turner) for $25 a share. Olin’s purchase agreement with Turner required that if Olin acquired the remaining Hunt stock within one year, it would pay $25 per share for that stock as well. Olin had always intended to acquire the remaining Hunt stock, but did not act on that intention until right after one year had passed, thus avoiding the $25 per share requirement in the agreement with Turner. After the year had passed, Olin hired Morgan Lewis to render a fairness opinion on a purchase price of $20 per share. Morgan Lewis agreed that it was fair and Olin’s Finance Committee voted unanimously to propose a price of $20 per share for the remaining Hunt stock. Upon the merger proposal, the Hunt board appointed a committee to review its fairness. The committee’s advisor, Merrill Lynch, found that although $20 per share was fair, it was on the low end as the stock was worth somewhere between $19 to $25 per share. The committee recommended to Olin that it increase its offer, but Olin declined to act on the recommendation. The committee subsequently declared that $20 per share was fair and recommended approval of the merger. Rabkin, et al. (plaintiffs) brought suit challenging the merger. The plaintiffs claim that Olin manipulated the timing of its merger proposal to avoid the one year commitment price it had agreed to with Turner, thus costing the plaintiffs $4 per share. The Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims, holding that absent fraud or deception, the plaintiffs’ only remedy was their appraisal right. The plaintiffs appealed. Issue In a cash-out merger are appraisal rights a stockholder’s only remedy where the stockholder has claimed specific acts of misconduct? Holding and Reasoning (Moore, J.) No. In a cash-out merger appraisal rights are not a stockholder’s only remedy where the stockholder has claimed specific acts of misconduct. Upon review of the specific claims in a given case, appraisal rights may be the best, or, in some cases, only remedy available, but that is not necessarily the case. It cannot be found to be the only remedy available without an inquiry into the entire fairness—the fair price and fair dealing aspects—of the merger, established in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). In this case, the Delaware Court of Chancery did not look into the entire fairness of the merger, it merely dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim on the theory that appraisal was the only possible remedy. This was inappropriate because it was clear that Olin manipulated the timing of its purchase of the remaining shares of Hunt in order to be able to pay less than $25 per share. Such conduct surrounding a transaction, although not necessarily fraudulent, calls for an inquiry into the entire fairness of the transaction and possibly a remedy other than appraisal. The Delaware Court of Chancery is therefore reversed and the case is remanded. Basic Inc. v. Levinson United States Supreme Court 485 U.S. 224 (1988) Rule of Law Misstatements about merger negotiations can be material statements of fact, depending on the significance that a reasonable investor would place on the withheld or misrepresented information. Facts Starting in 1976, Combustion Engineering, Inc. (Combustion) had discussions with directors of Basic Inc (Basic) (defendants) about a possible merger between the corporations. Over the next two years, Basic made three public statements denying that it was engaged in any merger negotiations. Allegedly in reliance on those statements, the plaintiffs sold their stock in Basic at artificially low prices. The plaintiffs then brought a class action suit against Basic and its directors, alleging that the false public statements violated SEC Rule 10b-5. The district court certified the class, but granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding that statements about merger negotiations are not material statements of fact. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the class certification based on the fraud-on-the-market theory of reliance, but reversed the summary judgment. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on the two issues. Issue Can misstatements about merger negotiations be material statements of fact? Holding and Reasoning (Blackmun, J.) Yes. Generally, the materiality of a statement about a prospective event depends on the probability that the event will occur and the importance of the event to the company. Thus, because mergers can be the most important event in a company’s existence, misstatements about merger negotiations can be material statements of fact. Whether they are or not depends on the facts of the case, specifically the significance that a reasonable investor would place on the withheld or misrepresented information. This standard differs from the standard used by the lower courts, so the case is remanded on this issue. In terms of the certification of the plaintiffs as a class, the Court determines that the fraud-on-the-market theory is an appropriate method by which to certify the class. Requiring each individual plaintiff to prove actual reliance on the misstatements would place an “unnecessarily unrealistic evidentiary burden on the rule 10b-5 plaintiff.” In addition, it is common sense that people who buy or sell stocks rely on the integrity of the market, and this integrity is based on the available public information about companies. An investor’s reliance on public misinformation about a company is therefore presumed under rule 10b-5. The lower courts’ certification of the plaintiffs’ class is affirmed, but the presumption may be rebutted by Basic. In accordance with the foregoing, the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is vacated and the case is remanded. United States v. O'Hagan United States Supreme Court 521 U.S. 642 (1997) Rule of Law (1) A person is guilty of securities fraud when he misappropriates confidential information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty to the source of that information. (2) SEC Rule 14e-3 is a proper use of the SEC’s rulemaking authority and should be given deference. Facts James O’Hagan (defendant) was a partner in the law firm that represented Grand Metropolitan PLC in its tender offer of Pillsbury Company (Pillsbury) common stock. The possibility of the tender offer was confidential and not public until the offer was formally made by Grand Met. However, during the time when the potential tender offer was still confidential and nonpublic, O’Hagan used the inside information he received through his firm to purchase call options and general stock in Pillsbury. Subsequently, after the information of the tender offer became public, Pillsbury stock skyrocketed and O’Hagan sold his shares, making a profit of over $4 million. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) initiated an investigation into O’Hagan’s transactions and brought charges against O’Hagan for violating § 10(b) and § 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act. The trial jury convicted O’Hagan, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed on the grounds that violation of SEC Rule 10b-5 cannot be grounded in the misappropriation theory of insider trading. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Issue (1) Is a person guilty of securities fraud when he misappropriates confidential information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty to the source of said information? (2) Is SEC Rule 14e-3, creating a duty to disclose or abstain from trading on information that is obtained from an insider, a proper use of the SEC’s rulemaking authority that should be given deference? Holding and Reasoning (Ginsburg, J.) (1) Yes. A person is guilty of securities fraud when he misappropriates confidential information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty to the source of the information. Under the misappropriation theory of insider trading, an individual misappropriates material nonpublic information for the purposes of trading, in breach of a fiduciary duty to the source of the information. This is in contrast to the classical theory of insider trading where a corporate insider misappropriates material nonpublic information for the purposes of trading, in breach of a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of the corporation itself. Insider trading under the misappropriation theory satisfies SEC Rule 10b-5’s requirements of fraudulent practices because individuals who engage in such misappropriation clearly use deceptive practices in connection with the purchase of securities. Such individuals “deal in deception” by feigning loyalty to the principal while using confidential information to purchase stocks—a clear violation of Rule 10b-5. In this case, the misappropriation theory applies because O’Hagan violated a fiduciary duty to his law firm and Grand Met (i.e. the sources of the information), not Pillsbury, the trading party in which he bought the stock. This deceptive misuse of confidential information in order to purchase stocks constitutes a violation of Rule 10b5. Therefore, O’Hagan breached his duty, and his conviction should be upheld. The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed. (2) Yes. SEC Rule 14e-3, which creates a duty to disclose or abstain from trading on information that is obtained from an insider, is a proper use of the SEC’s rulemaking authority and should be given deference. O’Hagan’s conviction based on violation of Rule 14e-3 should not have been vacated because the SEC’s creation of this rule was proper. The SEC is permitted to prohibit acts if the intent is to prevent fraudulent acts, and if the prohibition is reasonably designed to prevent these acts. The SEC will be granted deference in its prohibition of certain acts as long as the prohibition is not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to statute. In regard to Rule 14e-3, the SEC has created a reasonable rule in which fraud is prevented by prohibiting trades based on the acquisition of inside information. The SEC is well within its authority to prohibit trades that may be fraudulent. Since the rule is proper, O’Hagan may be found guilty of violating the rule. The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed. United States v. Newman United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 773 F.3d 438 (2014) Rule of Law To sustain a conviction for insider trading against a tippee, the government must prove that the tippee knew that an insider disclosed confidential information in exchange for a personal benefit. Facts Financial analysts at various firms obtained non-public information from corporate insiders. The analysts knew the insiders as family friends, casual acquaintances, or fellow business school alumni. With one exception involving the mutual sharing of career advice, the insiders received nothing in exchange for their disclosures to the analysts. Todd Newman and Anthony Chiasson (defendants) were fund managers several levels removed from the disclosing corporate insiders. They received and traded on the inside information. The U.S. government (plaintiff) charged Newman and Chiasson with securities fraud. The district court instructed the jury that, in order for it to reach a guilty verdict, the defendants had to have known that the corporate insiders disclosed material, non-public information. Newman and Chiasson were convicted. They appealed, arguing that the jury instructions were improper and that the government had failed to prove that they knew that the corporate insiders had obtained a personal benefit in exchange for their disclosure. Issue To sustain a conviction for insider trading against a tippee, must the government prove that the tippee knew that an insider disclosed confidential information in exchange for a personal benefit? Holding and Reasoning (Parker, J.) Yes. To sustain a conviction for insider trading against a tippee, the government must prove that the tippee knew that an insider disclosed the confidential information and that he did so in exchange for a personal benefit. This is the same standard as is applied to a tipper. A tippee’s liability is derived from the tipper’s breach of fiduciary duty, and the tippee must have knowledge of each element of the tipper’s breach. A receipt of personal benefits in exchange for disclosure of information is a necessary element of a tipper’s breach. If a tippee does not know that the tipper received a personal benefit in exchange for information, then the tippee cannot know that the tipper has breached his or her fiduciary duty. If the tippee did not know about the tipper’s breach, then the tippee is not guilty. In this case, the district court erred because its jury instructions did not require Newman and Chiasson to have knowledge of the corporate insiders’ receipt of personal benefit in exchange for their disclosure. No reasonable jury could find that Newman and Chiasson had such knowledge, because there was not sufficient evidence that the insiders received any personal benefit in exchange for their disclosure. The insiders mostly had casual relationships with the analysts. Even the career advice received in one instance is not sufficient to constitute the personal benefit necessary to maintain a securities fraud claim. This advice was what any analyst might give a fellow alumnus without the exchange of any insider information. Moreover, the government also failed to prove that Newman and Chiasson knew that the information originated from corporate insiders in the first place. In sum, Newman and Chiasson did not have the intent to commit insider trading. The convictions are reversed. Salman v. United States United States Supreme Court 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016) Rule of Law A tippee is liable for securities fraud if the tipper breaches a fiduciary duty by making a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend. Facts Maher Kara (Maher) was an investment banker for Citigroup. Maher gave inside information to his brother, Michael Kara (Michael). Maher knew that Michael would trade on the information. Maher loved his brother and testified at trial that he gave Michael the information to help him. In addition to trading on this information himself, Michael gave the information to his friend Bassam Salman (defendant), who also traded on the inside information. At trial, Michael testified that Salman knew the inside information was coming from Maher. Salman made over $1.5 million in profits using the inside information. A jury in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California convicted Salman of securities fraud. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Issue Is a tippee liable for securities fraud if the tipper breaches a fiduciary duty by making a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend? Holding and Reasoning (Alito, J.) Yes. A tippee is liable for securities fraud if the tipper breaches a fiduciary duty by making a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend. Generally, a tippee is liable for securities fraud based on insider trading if the tipper personally benefits from the disclosure of the inside information. A tipper personally benefits from a gift of the inside information if the gift is made to a trading relative or friend because, absent the gift of information, the tipper could simply use the information to trade for himself or herself and then pass the profits on to the tippee. This practice would clearly be securities fraud, and if the information is given to and traded on by a friend or relative, the result of the practice is the same. Thus, in a securities fraud case under these circumstances, the jury can infer that the tipper intended the information to be the same as a cash gift. Here, the lower courts properly found Salman liable for securities fraud. Maher gifted inside information to Michael, a close relative. The jury was entitled to infer that Maher intended the information to be the equivalent of a monetary gift to Michael, and that Maher thus personally benefitted from disclosing the information. Salman knew Maher had gifted the information to Michael, and, as a tippee, Salman is also liable for securities fraud. The conviction is affirmed. Smith v. Van Gorkom Delaware Supreme Court 488 A.2d 858 (Del.Sup.Ct. 1985) Rule of Law There is a rebuttable presumption that a business determination made by a corporation’s board of directors is fully informed and made in good faith and in the best interests of the corporation. Facts Jerome Van Gorkom, the CEO of Trans Union Corporation (Trans Union), engaged in his own negotiations with a third party for a buyout/merger with Trans Union. Prior to negotiations, Van Gorkom determined the value of Trans Union to be $55 per share and during negotiations agreed in principle on a merger. There is no evidence showing how Van Gorkom came up with this value other than Trans Union’s market price at the time of $38 per share. Subsequently, Van Gorkom called a meeting of Trans Union’s senior management, followed by a meeting of the board of directors (defendants). Senior management reacted very negatively to the idea of the buyout. However, the board of directors approved the buyout at the next meeting, based mostly on an oral presentation by Van Gorkom. The meeting lasted two hours and the board of directors did not have an opportunity to review the merger agreement before or during the meeting. The directors had no documents summarizing the merger, nor did they have justification for the sale price of $55 per share. Smith et al. (plaintiffs) brought a class action suit against the Trans Union board of directors, alleging that the directors’ decision to approve the merger was uninformed. The Delaware Court of Chancery ruled in favor of the defendants. The plaintiffs appealed. Issue May directors of a corporation be liable to shareholders under the business judgment rule for approving a merger without reviewing the agreement and only considering the transaction at a two-hour meeting? Holding and Reasoning (Horsey, J.) Yes. Under the business judgment rule, a business determination made by a corporation’s board of directors is presumed to be fully informed and made in good faith and in the best interests of the corporation. However, this presumption is rebuttable if the plaintiffs can show that the directors were grossly negligent in that they did not inform themselves of “all material information reasonably available to them.” The court determines that in this case, the Trans Union board of directors did not make an informed business judgment in voting to approve the merger. The directors did not adequately inquire into Van Gorkom’s role and motives behind bringing about the transaction, including where the price of $55 per share came from; the directors were uninformed of the intrinsic value of Trans Union; and, lacking this knowledge, the directors only considered the merger at a two-hour meeting, without taking the time to fully consider the reasons, alternatives, and consequences. The evidence presented is sufficient to rebut the presumption of an informed decision under the business judgment rule. The directors’ decision to approve the merger was not fully informed. As a result, the plaintiffs are entitled to the fair value of their shares that were sold in the merger, which is to be based on the intrinsic value of Trans Union. The Delaware Court of Chancery is reversed, and the case is remanded to determine that value. Unocal Corporation v. Mesa Petroleum Co. Delaware Supreme Court 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) Rule of Law A board of directors may repurchase stock from a selected segment of its stockholders in order to defeat a perceived threat to the corporation’s business so long as the board’s selection of which stockholders to repurchase from is reasonable in relation to the threat and not motivated primarily out of a desire to effectuate a perpetuation of control. Facts Mesa Petroleum Co. (Mesa) (plaintiff) owned 13 percent of Unocal Corporation’s (Unocal) (defendant) stock. Mesa submitted a “two-tier” cash tender offer for an additional 37 percent of Unocal stock at a price of $54 per share. The securities that Mesa offered on the back end of the two-tiered tender offer were highly subordinated “junk bonds.” With the assistance of outside financial experts, the Unocal board of directors determined that the Mesa offer was completely inadequate as the value of Unocal stock on the front end of such a sale should have been at least $60 per share, and the junk bonds on the back end were worth far less than $54 per share. To oppose the Mesa offer and provide an alternative to Unocal’s shareholders, Unocal adopted a selective exchange offer, whereby Unocal would self-tender its own shares to its stockholders for $72 per share. The Unocal board also determined that Mesa would be excluded from the offer. The board approved this exclusion because if Mesa was able to tender the Unocal shares, Unocal would effectively subsidize Mesa’s attempts to buy Unocal stock at $54 per share. In sum, the Unocal board’s goal was either to win out over Mesa’s $54 per share tender offer, or, if the Mesa offer was still successful despite the exchange offer, to provide the Unocal shareholders that remained with an adequate alternative to accepting the junk bonds from Mesa on the back end. Mesa brought suit, challenging Unocal’s exchange offer and its exclusion of Mesa. The Delaware Court of Chancery granted a preliminary injunction to Mesa, enjoining Unocal’s exchange offer. Unocal appealed. Issue May a board of directors repurchase stock from its stockholders selectively? Holding and Reasoning (Moore, J.) Yes. Although in cases where a corporation purchases shares with corporate funds to remove a threat to control the burden is on the directors to prove that their actions were reasonable, the business judgment rule kicks in when the directors prove a good faith and reasonable investigation resulted in the purchase. Thus, a board of directors may repurchase stock from its stockholders selectively in order to defeat a perceived threat to the corporation’s business so long as the board’s selection of which stockholders to repurchase from is reasonable in relation to the threat and not motivated primarily out of a desire to effectuate a perpetuation of control. In the case at bar, Unocal’s board’s selective tender offer to the exclusion of Mesa was reasonable in relation to the threat posed by Mesa. Mesa’s two-tiered tender offer to Unocal stockholders was inadequate on both the front and back ends. The offer’s purpose was to force stockholders to accept the undervalued $54 per share offer so they could avoid being stuck with accepting junk bonds on the back end of the offer. Unocal was thus entitled to attempt to provide its stockholders with a viable alternative and it did so by offering $72 per share. This alternative would have effectively been thwarted if Mesa was included in the $72 per share offer as this would have subsidized Mesa’s continuing efforts to buy Unocal stock. In addition, Unocal’s selective exchange offer was designed to protect its stockholders from Mesa’s tender offer, and Mesa certainly would not qualify in the class of stockholders being protected from its own offer. Accordingly, the selective exchange offer was reasonable in light of the threat posed to Unocal by Mesa’s tender offer. It is therefore upheld under the business judgment rule and the Delaware Court of Chancery is reversed. Moran v. Household International, Inc. Delaware Supreme Court 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985) Rule of Law Under Delaware law, the enactment of a poison pill shareholders’ rights plan to prevent hostile takeovers is a valid exercise of a corporate board’s business judgment. Facts Household International, Inc.’s (Household) (defendant) director, Moran (plaintiff), was chairman of DysonKissner-Moran Corporation (DKM) (plaintiff), Household’s largest shareholder. DKM suggested a buyout. A financial survey showed that Household’s assets were worth more than its share price reflected. Household’s board became concerned about bust-up takeovers and two-tier tender offers. The board adopted a “poison pill” shareholders’ rights plan. Under the plan, shareholders would be issued one right per common share allowing the holder to buy 1/100 of a share of preferred stock if a triggering event occurred. If a tender offer was made for 30 percent of Household’s shares, the right issued fully exercisable. The board could redeem the right for $0.50. If one entity acquired 20 percent of shares, non-redeemable rights issued. After the merger, unexercised rights allowed holders to buy the offeror’s common stock for half price under a “flip-over” provision. Moran and DKM sued in the Delaware Court of Chancery to challenge the provision. The chancery court affirmed the rights plan as a valid exercise of the Household board’s business judgment. The plaintiffs appealed to the Delaware Supreme Court. Issue Is the enactment of a so-called “poison pill” shareholders’ rights plan to prevent hostile takeovers a valid exercise of a corporate board’s business judgment? Holding and Reasoning (McNeilly, J.) Yes. A board may enact a poison pill to block hostile takeovers. The business judgment rule applies to a board’s authorized actions. The directors bear the burden of proving there were reasonable grounds to believe “a danger to corporate policy…existed.” Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). This burden is met if the directors acted in good faith after reasonable investigation and the act bore “reasonable...relation to the threat posed.” Id. Sections 157 and 151(g) of Delaware’s corporate law authorize a board to issue rights to buy stock and preferred shares. 8 Del. C. §§ 157, 151(g). Section 141(a) grants the board inherent powers to manage the business. Delaware law thus provides authority for a board to enact a poison pill. Nothing in the legislative history suggests an intent to limit the issuance of rights unless the board’s purpose is to raise capital. Here, the rights are not a sham; they will be issued after a triggering event and grant the holder superior rights. There is no reason to bar flip-over provisions. Antidestruction clauses guarantee security holders’ rights in case of a merger by allowing conversion of shares into the surviving entity’s stock; the issuance of the rights to block takeovers does not negate their validity. That Delaware law does not bar hostile takeovers does not mean it forbids private blocking mechanisms. Household’s shareholders retain the right to receive tender offers, though the methods may be limited. The board owes fiduciary duties and cannot reject tender offers arbitrarily. The plan does not impair the company’s assets, tax liability, or share price. Further, because proxy holders are not beneficial owners, holding proxies for 20 percent of shares is not a trigger. Household’s board acted in good faith on its belief in the threat of hostile takeovers after DKM’s buyout talks. The plan’s enactment is reviewed under the business judgment rule; it bore a reasonable relation to the threat the board feared. The board still owes fiduciary duties if a takeover bid actually occurs, and the plan can be challenged then. Judgment is affirmed. Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc. Supreme Court of Delaware 500 A.2d 1346 (1985) Rule of Law A corporation’s board of directors may give existing shareholders the right to buy the shares of a hostile purchaser at a discount. Facts The board of directors (defendants) of Household International, Inc. (Household) (defendant) adopted a shareholder rights plan. Under the plan, if a single entity made a tender offer for at least 30 percent of Household’s shares or acquired at least 20 percent of Household’s shares, Household’s existing stockholders would have the right to buy that entity’s shares at half price, following the entity’s acquisition of the shares. The plan was adopted as a defense against future hostile takeovers. Moran (plaintiff) was one of two directors who voted against the plan. Moran was also the chairman of the Dyson-Kissner-Moran Corporation (DKM) (plaintiff), which was the single largest stockholder of Household and had considered a buyout of Household. Moran and DKM (Moran) sued Household and its directors. The court of chancery ruled in the defendants’ favor. Moran appealed. Issue May a corporation’s board of directors give existing shareholders the right to buy the shares of a hostile purchaser at a discount? Holding and Reasoning (McNeilly, J.) Yes. A corporation may defend against a hostile takeover by giving its shareholders the right to buy the shares of a hostile purchaser at a discount following a takeover, thereby diluting the value of the hostile purchaser’s targeted shares. Despite Moran’s arguments to the contrary, the Delaware General Corporation Law, Del. Code tit. 8, § 157, provides sufficient authority for Household’s rights plan. Section 157 allows a corporation to create and issue rights or options entitling the right or option holder to purchase stock from the corporation. While § 157 has never been used to authorize a takeover defense like the one in this case, its silence on the matter does not mean that such a use is prohibited. The rights issued under the plan are also not sham rights that have no economic value, which Moran argues are not authorized under § 157. The rights of the existing stockholders to purchase a hostile bidder’s shares at a discount can and will be exercised whenever those rights are triggered, either by a tender offer to purchase 30 percent of Household’s shares or the acquisition of 20 percent of Household’s shares. Moran also argues that Household’s board of directors may not usurp stockholders’ rights to receive hostile tender offers. However, there are several ways to make a tender offer despite the plan, such as conditioning the tender offer on the board’s redemption of the rights. Finally, Moran argues that the plan restricts stockholders’ rights to conduct a proxy contest, because it prevents stockholders from forming a group to solicit proxies if, together, those stockholders own 20 percent or more of Household’s stock. However, most proxy contests are won on less than 20 percent ownership, and the effect of the plan on these contests will be minimal. The adoption of the plan was therefore within the authority of Household’s directors. Under the business judgment rule, corporate directors that make a business decision are presumed to have acted on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that the decision was in the company’s best interests. Here, there are no allegations of bad faith on the part of Household’s directors. The directors’ adoption of the plan was a response to what they reasonably perceived to be a threat of hostile takeovers. The Household directors' decision is therefore protected under the business judgment rule. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. Delaware Supreme Court 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) Rule of Law When the break-up of a corporation is inevitable, the duty of the corporation’s board of directors changes from maintaining the company as a viable corporate entity to maximizing the shareholders’ benefit when the company is eventually and inevitably sold. Facts Pantry Pride, Inc. (Pantry Pride) (plaintiff) sought to acquire Revlon, Inc. (Revlon) (defendant) and offered $45 per share. Revlon determined the price to be inadequate and declined the offer. Despite defensive efforts by Revlon, including an offer to exchange up to 10 million shares of Revlon stock for an equivalent number of Senior Subordinated Notes (Notes) of $47.50 principal at 11.75 percent interest, Pantry Pride remained committed to the acquisition of Revlon. Pantry Pride raised its offer to $50 per share and then to $53 per share. Meanwhile, Revlon was in negotiations with Forstmann Little & Co. (Forstmann) (defendant) and agreed to a leveraged buyout by Forstmann, subject to Forstmann obtaining adequate financing. Under the agreement, Revlon stockholders would receive $56 per share and Forstmann would assume Revlon’s debts, including what amounted to a waiver of the Notes covenants. Upon the announcement of that agreement, the market value of the Notes began to drop dramatically and the Notes holders threatened suit against Revlon. At about the same time, Pantry Pride raised its offer again, this time to $56.25 per share. Upon hearing this, Forstmann raised its offer under the proposed agreement to $57.25 per share, contingent on two pertinent conditions. First, a lock-up option giving Forstmann the exclusive option to purchase part of Revlon for $100-$175 million below the purported value if another entity acquired 40 percent of Revlon shares. Second, a “no-shop” provision, which constituted a promise by Revlon to deal exclusively with Forstmann. In return, Forstmann agreed to support the par value of the Notes even though their market value had significantly declined. The Revlon board of directors approved the agreement with Forstmann and Pantry Pride brought suit, challenging the lock-up option and the no-shop provision. The Delaware Court of Chancery found that the Revlon directors had breached their duty of loyalty and enjoined the transfer of any assets, the lock-up option, and the no-shop provision. The defendants appealed. Issue When the break-up of a corporation is inevitable, does the corporation’s board of directors violate its duty of loyalty to the shareholders if its first consideration is not maximizing the shareholders’ benefit when the company is eventually and inevitably sold? Holding and Reasoning (Moore, J.) Yes. In cases where a board implements “anti-takeover measures,” the burden is on the directors to prove that their actions were reasonable. However, the business judgment rule kicks in if they prove a good faith and reasonable investigation resulted in their decision. In the present case, the Revlon board’s initial defensive measures—its exchange offer for Notes—was reasonable under the holding in Unocal Corporation v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985), given the board’s determination that Pantry Pride’s offer was less than adequate. However, when Pantry Pride continually increased its offer, the court determines that it became obvious that “the break-up of [Revlon] was inevitable.” At that point, the Revlon board’s duty was changed from maintaining Revlon as a viable corporate entity to maximizing the shareholders’ benefit when the company was eventually and inevitably sold. By granting the lock-up option to Forstmann that in turn guaranteed par value for the Note holders who were threatening litigation against Revlon, it is apparent that the Revlon board of directors had their own legal interests in mind, rather than the maximization of Revlon shareholders’ benefits. There was essentially an auction ongoing between Forstmann and Pantry Pride for Revlon’s shares and the granting of the lock-up option effectively ended the auction rather than letting the auction play out to obtain the highest bid for the Revlon stockholders. The Revlon board put its own legal interests first to the detriment of the stockholders. This constitutes a breach of the board’s duty of loyalty and therefore the board is not entitled to the deference of the business judgment rule. The lock-up option should be enjoined and the Delaware Court of Chancery is affirmed. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Incorporated Delaware Supreme Court 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989) Rule of Law A board of directors may enter into a transaction in order to defeat a reasonably perceived threat to the corporation’s business so long as the board’s decision is reasonable in relation to the threat posed. Facts Time (defendant) began considering entering the field of entertainment and researched a wide range of companies as merger candidates, including Paramount (plaintiff) and Warner Brothers (Warner). Time and Warner eventually agreed to, and both boards approved, a stock-for-stock merger. However, before the merger was approved by Time stockholders, Paramount announced an all-cash offer for all of Time’s outstanding shares at $175 per share. Time’s board met to discuss the offer, but concluded that the offer posed a threat to Time’s future business and the retention of the “Time Culture.” At the same time, the Time board decided to change its merger with Warner into an all-cash and securities acquisition of Warner. Time then made a cash offer for 51 percent of Warner’s outstanding stock at $70 per share with the remainder to be purchased at a future date for a combination of cash and securities equaling $70 per share. A couple of weeks later, Paramount raised its offer for Time’s outstanding stock to $200 per share. The Time board again rejected the offer, maintaining that the Warner acquisition offered better long-term value for its stockholders and that it did not jeopardize Time’s corporate survival and “culture.” Time shareholders (plaintiffs) brought suit based on Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (1985), claiming that the Time-Warner agreement effectively put Time up for sale, thus triggering Revlon duties such as the requirement that the Time board seek to increase the corporation’s short-term value for its shareholders. In addition, Paramount brought suit based on Unocal Corporation v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985), claiming that Time’s belief that Paramount posed a threat to its future was not reasonable, that Time failed to fully investigate Paramount’s offer, and, under Unocal’s second prong, that Time’s response to any perceived threat was unreasonable. The Delaware Court of Chancery found in favor of the defendants on all claims. The plaintiffs appealed. Issue May a board of directors enter into a transaction in order to defeat a perceived non-economic threat to the corporation’s business? Holding and Reasoning (Horsey, J.) Yes. Under Unocal, a board of directors may enter into a transaction in order to defeat a reasonably perceived threat to the corporation’s business so long as the board’s decision is reasonable in relation to the threat posed. Such perceived threats include, but are not limited to inadequate value of the tender offer. In this case, Paramount’s claim is misguided as Time’s conclusion that inadequate value was not the only possible threat to its future is reasonable. There was the threat that Time shareholders would accept Paramount’s tender offer without knowing the long-term benefits of the Paramount deal; there was the threat to the Time “Culture”; and there was a general threat to Time’s business model moving forward since it would be entering the new field of entertainment. Similarly, Paramount’s claim that Time did not fully investigate its offer is misguided. Before deciding on Warner, the Time board fully investigated other options for mergers—including a merger with Paramount—and determined that Paramount was not as good of a fit as Warner. Moving to the second prong of the Unocal analysis, the court determines that Time’s response to the threat posed by Paramount’s offer was reasonable. The defensive restructuring of the Time-Warner merger, including the change to an all-cash/securities merger, was a way for Time to achieve its goal of the “carrying forward of a pre-existing transaction in an altered form.” It was merely a way to achieve its initial goal of the Time-Warner merger through another means, without interference from Paramount. Accordingly, the Time board’s response to the Paramount threat was reasonable and the business judgment rule granting deference to the board’s decision is invoked. Additionally, the Time shareholders’ Revlon claim must fail because there is no evidence that the dissolution or break-up of Time was inevitable, as is required by Revlon. The Time board’s defensive reaction to Paramount’s hostile tender offer was not a step towards the end of Time’s existence. Therefore, Revlon duties did not attach to the board. The Delaware Court of Chancery’s ruling in favor of the defendants is affirmed. Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc. Delaware Supreme Court 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994) Rule of Law When a corporation undertakes a transaction which will cause a change in corporate control or a break-up of the corporate entity, the directors’ obligation is to seek the best value reasonably available to the stockholders. Facts Paramount Communications Inc. (Paramount) (defendant) approved a merger agreement with Viacom Inc. (Viacom). The agreement contained various defensive measures, including the following: a no-shop provision, under which Paramount would not solicit any other offers, subject to certain exceptions; a termination fee provision, under which Viacom would be paid a $100 million termination fee if the merger was not consummated; and a stock option provision under which Viacom was granted an option to purchase about 19.9 percent of Paramount’s outstanding stock if the merger was not consummated. After the proposed merger was announced, QVC Network Inc. proposed an alternative merger to Paramount, whereby QVC would acquire Paramount for $80 per share. Upon hearing of this offer, Viacom sweetened its bid for Paramount, itself offering $80 per share. Paramount approved an amended merger agreement with Viacom, although the terms were largely similar to the original agreement and the defensive measures in place to make it hard for Paramount to effectuate an alternative transaction remained unchanged. Subsequently, Viacom unilaterally raised its offer to $85 per share and QVC followed with an offer of $90 per share. The Paramount board then made a final determination that the Viacom merger was in the better interests of the Paramount stockholders. QVC and Paramount stockholders (plaintiffs) brought suit and the Court of Chancery granted a preliminary injunction enjoining the Paramount merger with Viacom. Paramount appealed. Issue May a no-shop provision in a merger agreement between two corporations define or limit the fiduciary duties of the directors of one or both of the corporations? Holding and Reasoning (Veasey, J.) No. When a corporation undertakes a transaction which will cause a change in corporate control or a breakup of the corporate entity, the directors’ obligation is to seek the best value reasonably available to the stockholders. Defensive measures such as a no-shop provision making it difficult or unfeasible for a corporation to accept another offer may not legally prevent directors from carrying out their fiduciary duties to the corporation and its stockholders. In the case at bar, there were no protections in the merger agreement for the Paramount stockholders who were about to become minority stockholders in the corporation. Those stockholders are entitled to receive a control premium and because there were no protections built into the agreement, it was up to the Paramount board of directors to obtain for them the best possible value. Because of the no-shop and other draconian defensive measures in the agreement— that the Paramount directors agreed to and did not modify even in the amended merger agreement—the Paramount directors were not able to do this and thus did not fulfill their fiduciary duties. In addition, QVC repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to meet and exceed Viacom’s offers. Paramount’s failure to acknowledge this and amend the merger agreement with Viacom to make it more favorable constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty. The Delaware Court of Chancery is therefore affirmed and the injunction is upheld. Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan Delaware Supreme Court 970 A.2d 235 (2009) Rule of Law A fiduciary satisfies its good-faith requirement if it cannot be demonstrated that the fiduciary intentionally failed to act in the face of a known duty to act. Facts Basell AF (Basell) made an offer to purchase Lyondell Chemical Company (Lyondell) at $40 per share. Dan Smith, Lyondell’s CEO and Chair, responded that the offer was too low. Negotiations commenced and eventually, Smith took an offer of $48 per share to the Lyondell board of directors (defendants). The board held a special meeting at which it considered the offer, as well as a valuation report that had just been prepared for Lyondell. A merger agreement was drafted, and the board, along with Lyondell’s financial and legal advisors, reviewed the agreement. Lyondell’s financial advisor stated that Basell’s offer was fair and that no other offers from the chemical industry would top it. The defendants approved the merger for a stockholder vote. Lyondell did not receive any other offers between the board’s approval and the vote. The stockholders approved the merger with 99 percent of the voting shares voting in favor. Walter Ryan, a Lyondell stockholder (plaintiff), brought a class action suit alleging, among other things, that the Lyondell directors breached their duty of loyalty by not obtaining the best available price in the sale to Basell. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The Delaware Court of Chancery denied the motion, finding that the defendants did not conduct an auction for the sale, conduct a market check, or demonstrate “an impeccable knowledge of the market,” as is required under Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). The defendants appealed. Issue Does a fiduciary satisfy the good-faith requirement if it cannot be demonstrated that the fiduciary intentionally failed to act in the face of a known duty to act? Holding and Reasoning (Berger, J.) Yes. A court will find that a director acted in bad faith if the director intentionally failed to act in the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a conscious disregard for the duty. Thus, if a failure or disregard cannot be demonstrated, the fiduciary satisfies its good-faith obligation. Under Revlon, directors have a duty to obtain in a sale the best available price for the stockholders. Importantly, Revlon does not require a particular path for the directors to obtain the best price. In this case, although the defendants did not take all the steps that they possibly could have prior to the sale to Basell, including those that the chancery court outlined, the defendants did not fail to act in the face of their duty to find the best available price. As mentioned, Revlon does not instill in directors any specific duty other than to achieve the best sale price possible. Here, all indications are that the defendants acted in the face of that duty and did just that. The Lyondell board met several times to discuss the sale; the board was aware of the chemical company market, as well as Lyondell’s place within that market and valuation; the board considered the possibility that it would receive any other offer, let alone any better offers; and the board negotiated the sale price to $48 per share, up from $40. It cannot be demonstrated that the defendants exhibited a conscious disregard for their duty to achieve the best sale price possible, so it cannot be said they breached their duty of loyalty. Thus, the chancery court's decision is reversed, and the matter is remanded for judgment in favor of the defendants. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc. Delaware Supreme Court 818 A.2d 914 (2003) Rule of Law Deal-protection devices that are designed to force the consummation of a merger and foreclose consideration of any superior transaction are preclusive and coercive, and they are thus unenforceable. Facts Genesis Health Ventures, Inc. (Genesis) (defendant) entered into negotiations to acquire NCS Healthcare, Inc. (NCS) (defendant). At the urging of Genesis, the parties entered into an exclusivity agreement, which prevented NCS from engaging in any negotiations in regards to a competing acquisition or transaction. Subsequently, Omnicare, Inc. (Omnicare) (plaintiff) contacted NCS about a proposed transaction. NCS did not respond due to the exclusivity agreement with Genesis, but NCS did use Omnicare's proposed transaction to negotiate more favorable terms with Genesis. Complementary to Genesis’s merger proposal was a voting agreement under which Jon Outcalt, Chairman of the NCS board, and Kevin Shaw, NCS President and CEO, agreed to vote all of their shares—combined, a majority of NCS shares—in favor of the merger agreement. This voting agreement effectively meant that NCS shareholder approval of the merger was guaranteed even if the NCS board did not recommend its approval. The merger agreement, which contained a clause restricting the rights of NCS to discuss an alternative merger with a third party, was then executed. The merger agreement did not contain a fiduciary out clause, which would have given the NCS board the opportunity to opt out of the agreement if it needed to do so to discharge its fiduciary duties to the corporation. Meanwhile, before the official—although futile—NCS shareholder vote on the Genesis merger proposal, Omnicare submitted a merger proposal that was superior to that of Genesis. At that point, the NCS board withdrew its recommendation that the shareholders vote in favor of the Genesis merger agreement. However, the Genesis merger agreement provided that the proposal still must be submitted to a shareholder vote and, because of the Outcalt/Shaw voting agreement and the omission of a fiduciary out clause, that meant that the merger agreement was going to be approved no matter what. Omnicare brought suit. Issue Are deal-protection devices that are designed to force the consummation of a merger and foreclose consideration of any superior transaction enforceable? Holding and Reasoning (Holland, J.) No. Deal-protection devices that are designed to force the consummation of a merger and foreclose consideration of any superior transaction are preclusive and coercive, and they are thus unenforceable. Under Unocal Corporation v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985), and its progeny, a board of directors may enter into a transaction in order to respond to and defeat a reasonably perceived threat to the corporation’s business so long as the board’s response is reasonable in relation to the threat posed and not coercive or preclusive. A response is coercive if it forces stockholders to accept a “managementsponsored alternative to a hostile offer,” and a response is preclusive if it prevents stockholders from hearing and voting on all available tender offers. In this case, the combination of the Outcalt/Shaw voting agreement, the Genesis merger terms, and the omission of a fiduciary out clause amounted to a lock-up that prevented any other merger proposal besides Genesis’s, including Omnicare’s, from succeeding no matter how much better it was for NCS and its stockholders. This response to Genesis’s merger proposal is not within the range of reasonable responses to the threat of losing Genesis's offer, and it is both coercive and preclusive. Furthermore, the defensive measures taken by NCS are invalid and unenforceable because they failed to allow the NCS board to discharge its fiduciary duties to the corporation. Accordingly, the court rules in favor of Omnicare. In re The Topps Company Shareholders Litigation Delaware Court of Chancery 926 A.2d 58 (2007) Rule of Law When a board is soliciting bids for the sale of the company, it may not use a standstill agreement to prevent a disfavored suitor from presenting its side of the story to the shareholders. Facts Arthur Shorin, son of the founder of The Topps Company, Inc. (defendant), has been chairman and CEO of Topps since 1980. Topps’ performance began to falter in the early 2000s and Topps began to consider a sale of its business. Michael Eisner approached Shorin, expressing interest. He proposed a merger at $9.24 per share, which the board negotiated upward to $9.75 per share. The board entered into a merger agreement with Eisner at that price, which permitted Topps to shop for other bids for 40 days and to accept a “superior proposal” subject only to a termination fee to be paid to Eisner. Eisner expressed to Shorin and others at Topps that he intended to keep Shorin and substantially all of the rest of the company’s management in place after the merger. During the 40-day shop period, the only party to express interest was Topps’ main competitor, The Upper Deck Company (plaintiff). Near the end of the period, Upper Deck expressed willingness to pay $10.75 per share, subject to financing and other conditions. Topps had the option under the merger agreement to designate Upper Deck as an Excluded Party and to continue negotiating after the 40 days. Topps declined to do so, opting to move forward and submit the Eisner merger proposal to the shareholders for a vote. After the 40-day period, Upper Deck made another unsolicited offer at $10.75 per share, without a financing condition. Topps did not seriously consider this proposal. Topps’ statement to the shareholders on the Eisner merger did not accurately reflect the seriousness of Upper Deck’s proposals. It also did not disclose that Eisner had promised to retain management figures after the merger. Topps had required Upper Deck to enter into a Standstill Agreement which prohibited Upper Deck from negotiating or engaging directly with Topps’ shareholders. A group of Topps shareholders (plaintiffs), along with Upper Deck, sued Topps and moved for a preliminary injunction blocking the shareholder vote on the Eisner merger. Issue When a board is soliciting bids for the sale of the company, may it use a standstill agreement to prevent a disfavored suitor from presenting its version of events to the shareholders? Holding and Reasoning (Strine, J.) No. When a corporation’s directors seek to sell the company, they have a duty to get the best price reasonably attainable for their shareholders. Additionally, when proposing a particular merger to shareholders, the directors must provide the shareholders with all the material facts they need to make an informed decisions, and the directors must avoid making misleading statements. Though standstill agreements are often an appropriate means of ensuring that bidders do not misuse confidential information, they are subject to abuse. If a bidder accepts a standstill agreement and is ultimately rebuffed by the board, it may be prevented by the agreement from sharing its version of events with the shareholders. The board of the target corporation may therefore have a duty to release a bidder from a standstill agreement to fulfill its disclosure requirements. In this case, it appears that the directors of Topps have breached their fiduciary duty to their shareholders by not pursuing the $10.75 offer from Upper Deck since it represented a significantly better price than that offered by Eisner. It compounded this breach of duty by inaccurately describing events in its proxy statements and by refusing to permit Upper Deck to engage with Topps’ shareholders. The plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction against the merger vote is granted. It will remain in place until Topps permits Upper Deck to (1) make an all-shares non-coercive tender offer similar to its most recent $10.75 offer, and (2) communicate its version of events to Topps shareholders. Topps must also issue corrective disclosures. Gantler v. Stephens Supreme Court of Delaware 965 A.2d 695 (2009) Rule of Law A complaint challenging a board’s decision to reject a merger proposal must allege other facts beyond a self-entrenchment motive in order to adequately state a claim that the directors acted disloyally. Facts The board of directors of First Nile Financial, Inc. (First Nile) put the company up for sale in August 2004 and attracted interest from several firms. An offer from Farmers National Banc Corp. (Farmers) was ignored after Farmers stated that it would not retain the First Nile board if its bid were accepted. Cortland Bankcorp (Cortland) and First Place Financial Corp. (First Place) also made offers and submitted due diligence requests. William Stephens (defendant), First Nile’s chairman and CEO, did not inform the rest of the board of the due diligence requests. This caused Cortland to drop out of the bidding and First Place to reduce its bid. Ultimately the board rejected First Place’s offer and decided to pursue a privatization plan instead of a sale. Because the privatization plan involved changes to shareholder rights, it required shareholder approval. The board of First Nile submitted a proxy statement to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) which disclosed that the each of the directors had a conflict of interest with respect to the privatization plan because, by virtue of their positions, they could structure the plan to their own benefit. The shareholders nonetheless voted in favor of the privatization plan. A group of dissident shareholders (plaintiffs) brought a derivative action against several First Nile directors (defendants), including Stephens. The complaint alleged that the directors breached their fiduciary duty by rejecting a valuable opportunity to sell the company. Three directors, constituting a majority that opposed the sale, were alleged to have had improper personal motives in rejecting First Place’s offer. All wished to preserve their positions. Director Kramer owned a heating and cooling company which did work for First Nile, which would presumably be lost in the event of a sale. Director Zuzolo was a principal in a law firm which likewise did work for First Nile. The trial court granted the directors’ motion to dismiss the complaint, on the grounds that (1) the business judgment rule shielded the directors from duty of care claims, and (2) the shareholder vote ratified the board’s actions and also served to shield the directors. The dissident shareholders appealed the dismissal. Issue Must a complaint allege specific facts to adequately state a claim that directors acted disloyally in rejecting a merger offer? Holding and Reasoning (Jacobs, J.) Yes. Ordinarily, the business judgment rule shields directors from liability for decisions involving the potential sale of the corporation. However, the business judgment rule does not apply if either (1) the board did not act in the good-faith pursuit of a legitimate corporate interest, or (2) the board did not act advisedly. In an effort to meet the first prong, a plaintiff could always allege the improper motive of self-entrenchment in cases where a board rejects a purchase offer. Therefore, plaintiffs must allege facts beyond a selfentrenchment motive to state a claim that the board did not act in pursuit of a legitimate corporate interest. The plaintiffs in this case have done so. With regard to Director Stephens, they specifically point to his failure to disclose the due diligence requests to the rest of the board, in addition to his desire to keep his positions as chairman and CEO. Directors Kramer and Zuzolo are alleged to be protecting specific interests beyond their own positions: Kramer’s heating and cooling business and Zuzolo’s law firm both provided services to First Nile. These three directors constituted a majority of the board. The board therefore is not entitled to the protection of the business judgment rule, and the trial court’s dismissal on that ground was inappropriate. The trial court was also incorrect in holding that the shareholder vote ratified the board’s decision to reject the purchase offer. Despite some court rulings suggesting otherwise, shareholder votes only serve to ratify board actions in cases where a shareholder vote was not otherwise required. Here, the shareholder vote was necessary for the board to proceed with the privatization plan. The vote cannot also serve to cleanse the board’s prior decision to reject First Place’s offer. The trial court’s decision to dismiss the complaint is therefore reversed. In re Pure Resources, Inc. Shareholders Litigation Delaware Court of Chancery 808 A.2d 421 (Del. Ch. 2002) Rule of Law A tender offer made by a controlling shareholder is not subject to the entire fairness standard if the offer is non-coercive and accompanied by full disclosure of all material facts. Facts Unocal Corporation (Unocal) (defendant) owned 65.4 percent of Pure Resources, Inc. (Pure) stock. Pure's management controlled between a quarter and a third of Pure stock. There were five Unocal-designated directors, two management-designated directors, and one jointly designated director. Unocal had a business opportunities agreement, which provided that as long as Unocal owned 35 percent of Pure, Pure's business activities would be limited and Unocal could compete with Pure. Pure's management had put agreements with Unocal that provided the managers better incentives than common shareholders when tendering shares. Unocal had access to Pure's non-public information. Unocal made an offer to buy the rest of Pure's stock. The offer contained a non-waivable majority-of-the-minority provision, a waivable condition that the tender give it 90 percent ownership, and a planned second-step, short-form merger. The "minority" included shareholders who were affiliated with Unocal and Pure's management. An independent special committee was formed to consider the offer. The committee retained its own advisors and negotiated the offer price with Unocal. The special committee did not deal with Unocal as aggressively as it would have with a third-party bidder, such as by adopting a poison pill. Unocal refused to raise its price, and the special committee voted against the offer. Pure's minority shareholders (plaintiffs) sought a preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs alleged that the offer was inadequate and should be subject to the entire fairness standard. The defendants argued that the offer should not be subject to the entire fairness standard, but the Solomon standard, which they had met. Solomon v. Pathe Communications Corp., 672 A.2d 35 (Del. 2010). Issue Is a tender offer made by a controlling shareholder subject to the entire fairness standard if the offer is noncoercive and accompanied by full disclosure of all material facts? Holding and Reasoning (Strine, J.) No. A tender offer made by a controlling shareholder is not subject to the entire fairness standard if the offer is non-coercive and accompanied by full disclosure of all material facts. Delaware law treats mergers and tender offers by controlling shareholders differently, although it is uncertain that tender offers provide more protections for minority shareholders than mergers. Courts apply the entire fairness standard if a target board negotiates a merger with a controlling shareholder. Courts apply the Solomon standard if a controlling shareholder seeks to buy out the company through a tender offer. Under Solomon, there will be no judicial intervention, provided the offer is fully disclosed and non-coercive. Coercion is found if shareholders are forced to tender at an inadequate price to avoid an even lower price later. A tender offer by a controlling shareholder is non-coercive if: (1) it is subject to a non-waivable, majority-of-the-minority tender condition, (2) the controlling shareholder promises to do a short-form merger at the same price if he obtains 90 percent ownership, and (3) the controlling shareholder has made no retributive threats. Here, the offer is subject to the Solomon standard rather than the entire fairness standard. The offer is coercive, because its majorityof-the-minority provision includes Unocal-affiliated shareholders and Pure's management in the "minority." However, all the other the non-coercive requirements are met. Unocal promised to do a short-form merger, and it has made no retributive threats. Therefore, the offer is preliminarily enjoined for lack of disclosure of material information. Unocal can cure the problem by amending the offer to condition it on approval of a majority of Pure's unaffiliated shareholders. In re Pure Resources, Inc. Shareholders Litigation Delaware Court of Chancery 808 A.2d 421 (Del. Ch. 2002) Rule of Law A tender offer made by a controlling shareholder is not subject to the entire fairness standard if the offer is non-coercive and accompanied by full disclosure of all material facts. Facts Unocal Corporation (Unocal) (defendant) owned 65.4 percent of Pure Resources, Inc. (Pure) stock. Pure's management controlled between a quarter and a third of Pure stock. There were five Unocal-designated directors, two management-designated directors, and one jointly designated director. Unocal had a business opportunities agreement, which provided that as long as Unocal owned 35 percent of Pure, Pure's business activities would be limited and Unocal could compete with Pure. Pure's management had put agreements with Unocal that provided the managers better incentives than common shareholders when tendering shares. Unocal had access to Pure's non-public information. Unocal made an offer to buy the rest of Pure's stock. The offer contained a non-waivable majority-of-the-minority provision, a waivable condition that the tender give it 90 percent ownership, and a planned second-step, short-form merger. The "minority" included shareholders who were affiliated with Unocal and Pure's management. An independent special committee was formed to consider the offer. The committee retained its own advisors and negotiated the offer price with Unocal. The special committee did not deal with Unocal as aggressively as it would have with a third-party bidder, such as by adopting a poison pill. Unocal refused to raise its price, and the special committee voted against the offer. Pure's minority shareholders (plaintiffs) sought a preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs alleged that the offer was inadequate and should be subject to the entire fairness standard. The defendants argued that the offer should not be subject to the entire fairness standard, but the Solomon standard, which they had met. Solomon v. Pathe Communications Corp., 672 A.2d 35 (Del. 2010). Issue Is a tender offer made by a controlling shareholder subject to the entire fairness standard if the offer is noncoercive and accompanied by full disclosure of all material facts? Holding and Reasoning (Strine, J.) No. A tender offer made by a controlling shareholder is not subject to the entire fairness standard if the offer is non-coercive and accompanied by full disclosure of all material facts. Delaware law treats mergers and tender offers by controlling shareholders differently, although it is uncertain that tender offers provide more protections for minority shareholders than mergers. Courts apply the entire fairness standard if a target board negotiates a merger with a controlling shareholder. Courts apply the Solomon standard if a controlling shareholder seeks to buy out the company through a tender offer. Under Solomon, there will be no judicial intervention, provided the offer is fully disclosed and non-coercive. Coercion is found if shareholders are forced to tender at an inadequate price to avoid an even lower price later. A tender offer by a controlling shareholder is non-coercive if: (1) it is subject to a non-waivable, majority-of-the-minority tender condition, (2) the controlling shareholder promises to do a short-form merger at the same price if he obtains 90 percent ownership, and (3) the controlling shareholder has made no retributive threats. Here, the offer is subject to the Solomon standard rather than the entire fairness standard. The offer is coercive, because its majorityof-the-minority provision includes Unocal-affiliated shareholders and Pure's management in the "minority." However, all the other the non-coercive requirements are met. Unocal promised to do a short-form merger, and it has made no retributive threats. Therefore, the offer is preliminarily enjoined for lack of disclosure of material information. Unocal can cure the problem by amending the offer to condition it on approval of a majority of Pure's unaffiliated shareholders. Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp. Delaware Supreme Court 777 A.2d 242 (Del. 2001) Rule of Law The parent corporation in a short form merger does not have to establish entire fairness. Facts Unocal Corporation (UC) owned 96 percent of Unocal Exploration Corporation (UXC) (defendants) and decided to eliminate the UXC minority to save the company money. The Delaware statute on short form mergers provided the following: “In any case in which at least 90 percent of the outstanding shares of each class of the stock of a corporation is owned by another corporation, the corporation having such stock ownership may merge the other corporation into itself by executing, acknowledging and filing . . . a certificate of such ownership and merger setting forth a copy of the resolution of its board of directors to so merge and the date of the adoption.” Glassman, et al. (plaintiffs) filed a class action lawsuit, asserting that UC and its directors breached their fiduciary duty of entire fairness to UXC’s stockholders. The Delaware Court of Chancery found in favor of the defendants. The plaintiffs appealed. Issue Does the parent corporation in a short form merger have to establish entire fairness? Holding and Reasoning (Berger, J.) No. The short form merger statute enacted by the Delaware legislature does not include any requirement for fair dealing, thus removing from short form mergers one of the main components of the entire fairness standard. By doing this, the legislature made clear that the parent corporation in a short form merger does not have to establish entire fairness. Accordingly, in this case, the defendants were not required to establish entire fairness when they decided to merge UXC into UC. The defendants did everything that was required of them under the Delaware short form merger statute, and in fact did more than was necessary. The only remaining avenue for the plaintiffs—absent fraud or illegality—is appraisal. The Delaware Court of Chancery is affirmed. Solomon v. Pathe Communications Corp. Supreme Court of Delaware 672 A.2d 35 (Del. 1996) Rule of Law A tender offer is voluntary if there is no (1) coercion or (2) materially false or misleading disclosure made to shareholders in connection with the offer. Facts Credit Lyonnais Banque Nederland NV (CLBN) controlled 89.5 percent of the voting stock of Pathe Communications Corp. (Pathe) (defendant). CLBN made a tender offer for the remaining shares. Pathe created a special committee to review the offer. The committee supported the offer. John Solomon (plaintiff), a minority Pathe shareholder, brought suit in the Delaware Court of Chancery, claiming that the Pathe directors improperly supported the tender offer. Solomon claimed that the offer price was inadequate and that the offer was coercive. Pathe filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. The trial court granted the motion. Solomon appealed. Issue Is a tender offer voluntary if there is no (1) coercion or (2) materially false or misleading disclosure made to shareholders in connection with the offer? Holding and Reasoning (Hartnett, J.) Yes. A tender offer is voluntary if there is no coercion or materially false or misleading disclosure made to shareholders in connection with the offer. There is no fundamental right of a shareholder to obtain a particular desired price in a voluntary tender offer. In the present case, Solomon merely pleads that the tender offer price was inadequate. Solomon makes only conclusory statements with regard to coercion. A court may not, on a motion to dismiss, infer facts to complete an adequate pleading for the plaintiff. Solomon’s complaint does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The trial court’s dismissal of the complaint is affirmed. In re Volcano Corp. Stockholder Litigation Delaware Court of Chancery 143 A.3d 727 (2016) Rule of Law Upon the acceptance of a first-step tender offer by fully informed, disinterested, and uncoerced stockholders representing a majority of a corporation’s outstanding stock, the business judgment rule irrebuttably applies to the transaction. Facts Volcano Corporation (Volcano) and Koninklijke Philips, N.V. (Philips) agreed to a two-step merger. Philips made a tender offer to Volcano stockholders, and 89.1 percent of Volcano’s outstanding shares were tendered. Volcano and Philips completed the merger. Former stockholders of Volcano (plaintiffs) brought suit against Volcano’s board of directors (defendants), alleging that the board breached its fiduciary duty in approving the merger. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the merger. The board filed a motion to dismiss. Issue Upon the acceptance of a first-step tender offer by fully informed, disinterested, and uncoerced stockholders representing a majority of a corporation’s outstanding stock, does the business judgment rule irrebuttably applies to the transaction? Holding and Reasoning (Montgomery-Reeves, J.) Yes. Upon the acceptance of a first-step tender offer by fully informed, disinterested, and uncoerced stockholders representing a majority of a corporation’s outstanding stock, the business judgment rule irrebuttably applies to the transaction. This is true even though the tender offer is statutorily required for the merger’s approval. In so holding, the court expands to stockholder acceptance of a tender offer the cleansing effect of a stockholder vote approving a merger. Stockholder acceptance of a tender offer is sufficiently similar to a stockholder merger approval to warrant this extension. The policy reasons behind applying the business judgment rule to a merger approved by a stockholder vote apply equally to stockholder acceptance of a tender offer. Each require approval, in some form, of a majority of the company’s outstanding stock. Further, a board’s role in a first-step tender offer is similar to a board’s role in a merger approved by a stockholder vote because, in each case, the board must negotiate, agree to, and advise on the terms of the transaction. Further, a first-step tender offer is no more coercive than a stockholder vote, because there are certain protections for stockholders in the two-step merger statute that eliminate the risk of undue coercion. In this case, the business judgment rule applies to the Volcano board’s decision to consummate the merger with Philips. The plaintiffs did not present sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that the Volcano stockholders who accepted the tender offer were not fully informed, disinterested, or uncoerced. Accordingly, as the accepting stockholders represented a majority of Volcano’s outstanding stock, the business judgment rule irrebuttably applies to the board’s approval of the merger. The board’s motion to dismiss is granted. Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc. Delaware Court of Chancery 16 A.3d 48 (2011) Rule of Law The board of directors has the ultimate power to defeat an inadequate hostile tender offer. Facts Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. (Air Products) (plaintiff) launched a $60 per share, all-cash, structurally non-coercive hostile tender offer to acquire Airgas, Inc. (Airgas) (defendant). Airgas had a poison pill (i.e., a corporate strategy to defend against hostile takeovers), which its directors (defendants) refused to remove. Airgas had a classified board of nine directors. With one class of directors up for election each year, it took two shareholder meetings to win a board majority. Air Products successfully nominated a class of three independent directors to the Airgas board. The Air Products nominees became supporters of the poison pill. Air Products raised its bid several times and made its final offer of $70 per share. The Airgas board, with the opinions of its independent financial advisors, again rejected the offer as inadequate. Evidence showed that a majority of the Airgas shareholders were willing to tender their shares, regardless of whether the price was adequate or not. Air Products asked the chancery court to remove the poison pill. If the poison pill remained in place, Air Products could continue pursuing Airgas in two ways: (1) call a special meeting and remove the entire board without cause by a 67 percent vote, as provided in the charter, and (2) wait another eight months to nominate another class of directors at the next annual meeting. Issue Does the board of directors have the ultimate power to defeat an inadequate hostile tender offer? Holding and Reasoning (Chandler, J.) Yes. Under Delaware law, the board of directors has the ultimate power to defeat an inadequate hostile tender offer. A board's decision not to remove a poison pill when facing a hostile tender offer is reviewed under Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). The first prong of Unocal requires the board to show its good faith, a reasonable investigation, and a threat to the corporation. There are three types of threats: (1) structural coercion (different treatments of non-tendering shareholders may change shareholders' tender decisions), (2) opportunity loss (shareholders may lose the opportunity to choose a better offer proposed by management), and (3) substantive coercion (shareholders may accept an inadequate offer due to misvaluation). The second prong ofUnocal requires the defensive measure to be proportionate in response to the threat brought by the tender offer. The directors must show that their response is not preclusive or coercive and falls within "a range of reasonableness." The reasonableness of the board's response is determined based on the context of the specific threat involved. A response is coercive if it is meant to "cram down" a management-sponsored alternative. A response is preclusive if it makes it "realistically unattainable" for a bidder to win a proxy context and gain control of the target board. "Realistically attainable" must be something more than a theoretical possibility of overcoming a poison pill. In this case, although Air Products's offer is not structurally coercive and poses no threat of opportunity loss, it involves substantive coercion. Evidence shows that a majority of the shareholders were willing to tender their shares even though the price might be inadequate. Further, the Airgas board's defense was not coercive, because there is no management-sponsored alternative. Neither is the defense preclusive. Although Air Products's removal of the entire board without cause at a special meeting is realistically unattainable, it is realistically attainable for Air Products to nominate another slate of directors at the next annual meeting. Considering the circumstances, the response falls within "a range of reasonableness." Therefore, the Airgas board's decision not to remove the poison pill satisfies Unocal. The court rules in favor of the defendants. In re eBay, Inc. Shareholders Litigation Delaware Court of Chancery 2004 WL 253521 (Del. Ch.) Rule of Law Directors of a corporation are not permitted to personally accept private stock allocations in an initial public offering of the corporation’s stock when the corporation itself could have purchased said stock. Facts Goldman Sachs was hired to underwrite the initial public offering of eBay stock. In doing so, Goldman Sachs allocated shares of the initial eBay stock to eBay “insiders,” including members of eBay’s board of directors. Shareholders of eBay (plaintiffs) brought suit against the directors (defendants), alleging that the directors’ acceptance of the private allocations violated their fiduciary duty to eBay by usurping eBay’s corporate opportunity in that eBay could and would have purchased the stock that was allocated. It is undisputed that eBay could afford the stock financially, that it was in the business of investing in securities, and that eBay was never given an opportunity to turn down the allocations. The directors filed a motion to dismiss the claim. Issue Are directors of a corporation personally permitted to accept private stock allocations in an initial public offering of the corporation’s stock when the corporation itself could have purchased said stock? Holding and Reasoning (Memorandum) No. Directors of a corporation are not permitted to personally accept private stock allocations in an initial public offering of the corporation’s stock when the corporation itself could have purchased said stock. There was a clear conflict of interest between the self-interest of the defendants in acquiring the valuable eBay stock and the interest of eBay, Inc., which could have acquired the stock for itself. The acceptance by the eBay directors in this case is a violation of the corporate opportunity doctrine. eBay could afford the stock financially, eBay was in the business of investing in securities, and eBay would have surely been interested in purchasing the stock had it been given the opportunity. Further, even if it is assumed in this case that the allocations in question do not constitute a “corporate opportunity” under the doctrine, it might still be a breach of the directors’ fiduciary duty of loyalty as it is likely that Goldman Sachs intended the allocations to be bribes designed to induce the eBay directors to hire Goldman Sachs for future business. As a result of the foregoing, the defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. McDavid Georgia Court of Appeals 693 S.E.2d 873 (2010) Rule of Law Damages for breaching a contract to sell an asset are usually determined by the difference between the contract price and the fair market value of the assets at the time the contract was breached. Facts Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. (Turner) (defendant) owned the Atlanta Hawks and Atlanta Thrashers sports teams. Turner also owned the operating rights to Philips Arena. In October 2002, Turner announce that it was interested in selling these assets. David McDavid (plaintiff) expressed interest in purchasing the assets, and the parties entered into a Letter of Intent. The parties negotiated the terms of the sale. Eventually, the parties agreed to the primary terms, and Turner’s CEO stated that a deal had been reached. The parties then turned to negotiating the written documents to memorialize the transaction. After a few months of negotiations, Turner suggested a simplified restructuring of the deal. However, Turner assured McDavid that the restructuring did not change the primary terms of the transaction and that the deal was done. McDavid agreed to the restructuring, and Turner’s board of directors approved the restructured deal. However, two members of Turner’s board of directors opposed the deal based on concerns that the assets were undervalued. Subsequently, another corporation, Atlanta Spirit, LLC (Spirit), approached Turner about purchasing the assets. Turner began to negotiate with Spirit while continuing to exchange drafts of documents with McDavid. On September 12, 2003, Turner and McDavid agreed on the last remaining items in the written agreement, and Turner again announced that the deal was done. Turner and McDavid agreed to meet a few days later to sign the documents and hold a press conference. However, Turner signed an agreement for the sale of the assets to Spirit on the same day. A few days later, Turner informed McDavid that the deal was off. McDavid sued Turner for breach of the oral agreement. The parties submitted competing evidence regarding the valuation of the assets. McDavid’s experts testified that the value of the assets was between $647 million and $656 million. The jury found in favor of McDavid and awarded him $281 million in damages. Turner appealed to the Georgia Court of Appeals. Issue Are damages for breaching a contract to sell an asset usually determined by the difference between the contract price and the fair market value of the assets at the time the contract was breached? Holding and Reasoning (Bernes, J.) Yes. Damages for breaching a contract to sell an asset are usually determined by the difference between the contract price and the fair market value of the assets at the time the contract was breached. A jury award will only be reversed if, in light of the evidence, the award is so flagrantly excessive or inadequate as to create a clear implication of bias, prejudice, or gross mistake on the part of the jurors. In this case, the parties submitted competing expert testimony regarding the valuation of the assets. McDavid’s experts provided testimony that the value of the assets was between $647 million and $656 million. Those values would generate damages between $283 million and $335 million. Additionally, some members of Turner’s board of directors thought that the sales price undervalued the assets. The jury award was thus supported by the evidence presented at trial. The jury award was large in comparison to the total contract price, but the question of damages was squarely an issue for the jury to determine. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 760 F.2d 945 (1985) Rule of Law A tender offer’s existence can be determined by the Wellman test: widespread solicitation of public shareholders; solicitation for a substantial percentage of a company’s stock; the offer for the shares is at a premium, given the market price for the shares; the offer’s terms are firm; the offer is contingent on a fixed number of shares; the offer is only open for a limited time; offerees are pressured into selling their stock; and the announcement of the offer is accompanied by a large accumulation of shares. Facts In 1984, The Limited, a corporation, commenced a tender offer for Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc. (defendant), in an attempt to obtain more than 50 percent of Carter Hawley. To prevent this from happening, Carter Hawley began to buy back its stock at market price. The Securities and Exchange Commission (plaintiff) then brought an action to obtain an injunction to prevent Carter Hawley from engaging in the buy back, alleging that it constituted a tender offer, for which Carter Hawley did not register. The district court ruled in favor of Carter Hawley. The SEC then appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Issue Whether the Wellman test is appropriate for determining whether an offer constitutes a tender offer. Holding and Reasoning (Skopil, J.) Yes. Carter Hawley’s actions did not constitute a tender offer because several key factors in determining the existence of a tender offer were not present. A tender offer’s existence can be determined by the Wellman test: widespread solicitation of public shareholders; solicitation for a substantial percentage of a company’s stock; the offer for the shares is at a premium, given the market price for the shares; the offer’s terms are firm; the offer is contingent on a fixed number of shares; the offer is only open for a limited time; offerees are pressured into selling their stock; and the announcement of the offer is accompanied by a large accumulation of shares. In this case, Carter Hawley did not have firm terms for its offer, it did not offer a premium over the market price for the shares in question, there was no timeframe in which the offer would remain open, and there was no pressure on shareholders placed by Carter Hawley. Since these factors were not present, Carter Hawley’s offer cannot be considered a tender offer. Thus, the judgment of the court below is affirmed. Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corporation United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 774 F.2d 47 (1985) Rule of Law A solicitation for the sale of stock will not be considered a tender offer unless there is a substantial risk that solicitees will lack sufficient information to make an investing decision if the rules governing a tender offer are not followed. Facts In 1985, Hanson Trust PLC (defendant) registered a tender offer for SCM Corporation (plaintiff) with the Securities and Exchange. The board of SCM was against the tender offer, and as a result, negotiated with Merrill Lynch to purchase the SCM shares that Hanson was attempting to purchase. Merrill Lynch agreed to purchase the SCM stock at a price higher than that offered by Hanson. Hanson realized that its tender offer was going to fail since Merrill Lynch was offering a higher price for SCM stock, and thus, withdrew its tender offer. After withdrawing the tender offer, Hanson negotiated with five private SCM shareholders for the purchase of their shares. SCM then brought an action to stop Hanson from utilizing this purchasing arrangement, arguing that it still constituted a tender offer. The district court ruled in favor of SCM. Hanson appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Issue Will a solicitation for the sale of stock be considered a tender offer if there is a substantial risk that solicitees will lack sufficient information to make an investing decision if the rules governing a tender offer are not followed? Holding and Reasoning (Mansfield, J.) Yes. Hanson’s offer to five private investors after withdrawal of its tender offer did not constitute another tender offer because the investors involved were sophisticated and had sufficient information available to make an investing decision. A solicitation for the sale of stock will not be considered a tender offer unless there is a substantial risk that solicitees will lack sufficient information to make an investing decision if the rules governing a tender offer are not followed. In this case, the investors involved in the private sale of SCM stock were all sophisticated investors. Therefore, they were aware of the information that must be available in order to make sound investing decisions. Thus, these particular investors were not in need of the protections offered by the federal securities laws requiring registration of a tender offer. Since the rules governing a tender offer were not necessary in this case, the transactions in question are not considered a tender offer. The judgment of the court below is reversed and remanded for judgment consistent with this opinion. Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc. United States Supreme Court 472 U.S. 1 (1985) Rule of Law A violation of § 14(e) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 will only be found if a party made a misrepresentation or nondisclosure in connection with a tender offer. Facts Burlington Northern, Inc. (Burlington) (defendant) attempted a hostile takeover of El Paso Gas Co. (El Paso) (defendant) by a tender offer for 25.1 million shares at $24. El Paso’s management supported the offer once shareholders showed support. Burlington rescinded the offer, and then offered to buy over four million shares from El Paso and 21 million from shareholders at $24 per share. The new offer acknowledged “golden-parachute” agreements with El Paso managers. Forty million shareholders accepted, resulting in major proration of the per share price. Barbara Schreiber (plaintiff) sued Burlington, El Paso, and El Paso’s board in district court on behalf of all similarly positioned stockholders. Schreiber claimed that the defendants violated § 14(e) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (SEA) by their “manipulative” behavior surrounding the two tender offers and failure to disclose the “golden parachutes.” Schreiber’s action was dismissed for failure to state a claim, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld the dismissal. Schreiber appealed to the United States Supreme Court. Issue Will the conduct of a tender offeror be held to violate SEA § 14(e) if there was no misrepresentation or nondisclosure? Holding and Reasoning (Burger, C.J.) No. SEA § 14(e) prohibits “fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any tender offer.” The term “manipulative” has a special meaning in the context of securities law. Under Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), the word suggests “intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud.” The legislative history of the Williams Act indicates that Congress intended to require full disclosure so that shareholders could make informed decisions. Congress wanted to ensure “a neutral setting” for offerors to make proposals. The few congressional reports that address § 14(e) provide evidence that the goal of the provision was to ensure accurate disclosures of all material information. There is no indication that Congress meant the antifraud provision to apply to anything other than disclosures or intended for judges to weigh the merits of a proposal. That type of judicial oversight would create uncertainty and be contrary to the will of the legislature. Conduct is not “manipulative” and in violation of § 14(e) unless there has been a misrepresentation or nondisclosure. In this case, Schreiber argued that the defendants behaved in a manipulative manner with respect to the tender offers, even though the defendants were transparent about their activities. Schreiber was harmed by the rescission of the initial tender offer, and the only misrepresentations or nondisclosures that occurred took place after that. Thus, there is no causation for the harm. The district court’s dismissal is affirmed. Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp. Delaware Supreme Court 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014) Rule of Law The business judgment rule is the appropriate standard of review for a merger between a controlling stockholder and its subsidiary that is conditioned upon: (1) the approval of an independent, adequately-empowered special committee that fulfills its duty of care and (2) the uncoerced, informed vote of a majority of the minority stockholders. Facts MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. (M & F) (defendant) was a 43 percent stockholder in M & F Worldwide Corp. (MFW). M & F proposed to buy the remaining common stock of MFW to take the corporation private. The transaction was subject to two stockholder-protective procedural conditions: (1) the approval of a special committee to be appointed by the MFW board of directors, and (2) the approval of a majority vote of MFW minority stockholders. The MFW board established the special committee, which approved the transaction. The minority stockholders voted to approve the merger. Kahn, et al. (plaintiffs) brought suit, arguing that even both protections combined are inadequate to protect minority stockholders, because directors on the special committee may be inept or timid and MFW minority stockholders may be subject to improper influence. The plaintiffs claimed that the entire fairness standard should apply to the merger. In addition, the plaintiffs alleged that the special committee was not independent because of various relationships between members of the special committee and M & F. The Delaware Court of Chancery ruled in favor of M & F. The plaintiffs appealed. Issue Is the business judgment rule the appropriate standard of review for a merger between a controlling stockholder and its subsidiary that is conditioned upon (1) the approval of an independent, special committee that fulfills its duty of care and (2) the informed vote of a majority of the minority stockholders? Holding and Reasoning Yes. The standard of review for a merger between a controlling stockholder and its subsidiary that is from the outset conditioned upon: (1) the approval of an independent, adequately-empowered special committee that fulfills its duty of care or (2) the uncoerced, informed vote of a majority of the minority stockholders is entire fairness. However, when a merger between a controlling stockholder and its subsidiary is conditioned upon both protections, the business judgment rule applies. There, the entire fairness standard is not necessary to adequately protect minority stockholders’ interests, because the two procedural protections offer the merger “the shareholder-protective characteristics of third-party, arm’s-length mergers, which are reviewed under the business judgment standard.” This standard will only apply, however, if each characteristic of the special committee and stockholder vote is met. The special committee must (1) be independent, (2) be empowered to choose its own financial and legal advisors, and (3) exercise its duty of care. The minority stockholder vote must be: (1) informed and (2) uncoerced. In the present case, the court determines that the business judgment rule is the proper standard on which to review the merger, because each of the prerequisites involving the two stockholder protections is met. First, the special committee was independent. While certain members of the committee may have had social or business relationships with M & F, such bare allegations are not enough to rebut the presumption of independence. To establish a lack of independence, a plaintiff must show that a director is beholden to the acquiring interests. The plaintiffs in this case did not make such a showing. Additionally, there is no evidence that the special committee was not empowered or did not meet its duty of care. Similarly, there is no evidence that the MFW stockholder vote was coerced or uninformed. As a result, the business judgment rule is the proper standard of review for the merger. The judgment of the Delaware Court of Chancery is affirmed. CTS Corporation v. Dynamics Corporation of America United States Supreme Court 481 U.S. 69 (1987) Rule of Law A state statute requiring a majority vote of all disinterested shareholders in a corporation to give voting rights to an entity that acquires “control shares” in the corporation does not interfere with a federal statute designed to protect the interests of minority shareholders. Facts Indiana passed a law (Indiana Act) requiring a majority vote of all disinterested shareholders in a corporation to give voting rights to an entity that acquires “control shares” in the corporation—an amount of shares that would bring the entity’s amount of shares above 20, 33 1/3, or 50 percent. This gave the minority shareholders a chance to consider the fairness of the tender offer collectively to make a well-informed decision in their best interests. Under the Indiana Act, the shareholders must vote on whether to grant the voting rights to the acquirer within 50 days of the acquisition. Dynamics Corporation of America (Dynamics) (plaintiff) owned 9.6 percent of the stock of CTS Corporation (CTS) (defendant) when it announced a tender offer for another million shares of CTS, an amount that would have brought Dynamics’s ownership interest above the 20 percent threshold under the Indiana Act. Dynamics brought suit alleging that the Indiana Act was preempted by the federal Williams Act, and that the Indiana Act violated the Commerce Clause. The Williams Act was passed to regulate hostile tender offers and protect minority shareholders by putting them “on an equal footing with the takeover bidder.” The Williams Act required (1) the offeror to disclose certain information about the offer and the offeror’s business, and (2) certain procedural rules, including a requirement that the offer remain open for at least 20 business days. Dynamics argued, among other things, that the 50-day allowance under the Indiana Act conflicted with this 20-day period. The district court ruled that the Williams Act preempted the Indiana Act and that the Indiana Act violated the Commerce Clause. The court of appeals affirmed. CTS appealed. Issue Does a state statute requiring a majority vote of all disinterested shareholders in a corporation to give voting rights to an entity that acquires “control shares” in the corporation interfere with a federal statute designed to protect the interests of minority shareholders? Holding and Reasoning (Powell, J.) No. A state law will be preempted when simultaneous compliance with both the federal and state laws is impossible or when the state law interferes with the objectives of the federal law. Here, simultaneous compliance with the Indiana and Williams Acts is possible, so for Dynamics to prevail, it must be found that the Indiana Act interferes with the purpose of the Williams Act. The court finds that it does not. The Indiana Act is designed to protect the interests of minority shareholders, which is a basic purpose of the Williams Act. By allowing minority shareholders to vote as a group on corporate control issues in this situation, the Indiana Act protects them from the oppressive or coercive aspects of hostile tender offers. This in no way conflicts with, but rather furthers the purposes of the Williams Act. In addition, Dynamics’s argument on the timing of the voting rights vote is immaterial. Although the Indiana Act allows for a 50-day window for the minority shareholders’ vote, there is nothing precluding an offeror from purchasing its shares on the condition that its voting rights are approved. The conflict between the 20- and 50-day periods is “illusory” and does not warrant preemption. Additionally, the court determines that the Indiana Act does not violate the Commerce Clause as the Act has the same effect on tender offers coming from outside of Indiana as it does on offers by residents of Indiana. Furthermore, the Act merely regulates entities that are a product of state laws as states have the right to create corporations and define the rights by which they are acquired and transferred. This regulation does not improperly intrude upon interstate commerce. As a result of the foregoing, the Indiana Act is not preempted by the Williams Act, or in violation of the Commerce Clause. The court of appeals is reversed. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp. (In Re Unitrin, Inc.) 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995) RULE: Under the Unocal standard, the business judgment rule will be applied in the context of a hostile battle for control of a Delaware corporation where board action is taken to the exclusion of, or in limitation upon, a valid stockholder vote. But, the board must carry its own initial two-part burden: first, a reasonableness test, which is satisfied by a demonstration that the board of directors had reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed, and second, a proportionality test, which is satisfied by a demonstration that the board of directors' defensive response was reasonable in relation to the threat posed. FACTS: American General, which had publicly announced a proposal to merge with Unitrin for $ 2.6 billion at $ 503/8 per share, and certain Unitrin shareholder plaintiffs, filed suit in the Court of Chancery to enjoin Unitrin from repurchasing up to 10 million shares of its own stock (the “Repurchase Program"). On August 26, 1994, the Court of Chancery temporarily restrained Unitrin from making any further repurchases. After expedited discovery, briefing and argument, the Court of Chancery preliminarily enjoined Unitrin from making further repurchases on the ground that the Repurchase Program was a disproportionate response to the threat posed by American General's inadequate all cash for all shares offer. ISSUE: Did the chancery court correctly determine that the Unocal standard of enhanced judicial scrutiny be applied to the defensive actions of the defendants? ANSWER: Yes. CONCLUSION: The court held that the chancery court correctly determined that the Unocal standard of enhanced judicial scrutiny applied to the defensive actions of defendants in establishing the poison pill and implementing the repurchase program. The court determined, however, that the chancery court incorrectly determined that the repurchase program was a disproportionate defensive response and incorrectly applied an erroneous legal standard of "necessity" to the repurchase program as a defensive response. As such, the Court remanded the case for the chancery court to apply the appropriate standard. Quickturn Design Systems. v. Shapiro PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant corporation challenged a ruling by the Court of Chancery, New Castle County (Delaware), favoring appellee hostile bidder, and which declared appellant's amended rights plan invalid, which plan included a delayed redemptive provision. Appellant contended that the provision was proper. OVERVIEW: Appellee hostile bidder sought a declaratory judgment that appellant corporation's adopted takeover defenses were invalid, and sought an injunction requiring appellant's board to dismantle those defenses. In response to a take-over bid initiated by appellee, appellant board had voted to amend its by-laws pertaining to the requirements and time for holding any special meeting requested by shareholders. The board also amended appellant's shareholder plan and replaced it with a deferred redemption provision. The lower court found that the amended by-law was valid, but that the deferred redemption provision was invalid. Appellant challenged the ruling. HOLDING: The court affirmed, holding that the delayed redemption provision was invalid under 8 Del. Laws § 141(a), because it prevented a newly elected board of directors from completely discharging its fundamental management duties to the corporation and its stockholders for six months. ANALYSIS: The provision improperly and illegally restricted the board's exercise of fiduciary duties on matters of management policy, including the ability to negotiate a possible sale of the corporation, which was a matter of fundamental importance to shareholders. OUTCOME: The court affirmed the lower court's ruling in favor of appellee hostile bidder, that the deferred redemption provision enacted by appellant corporation was invalid. The court found that the provision restricted appellant board's exercise of its fiduciary duties and curbed its statutory right to manage and direct the affairs of the business. In re Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation (Disney II) Delaware Court of Chancery 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003) Rule of Law Exculpatory provisions do not protect corporate directors from personal liability if the directors consciously and intentionally disregard their responsibilities. Facts [Shareholders (plaintiffs) filed a derivative action against the old and the new Disney board of directors (defendants), challenging the board's approval of the compensation package for the company's numbertwo executive, Michael Ovitz (defendant).] When the Disney compensation committee first met to discuss Ovitz's compensation, the committee received a summary of the employment contract. The summary indicated that Ovitz would receive stock options for 5,000,000 shares, which were worth around $80–$100 million. The committee failed to calculate the value of the options. The board approved the employment contract based on the committee's recommendation. No director asked about the details of the options. The board let Michael Eisner (defendant), Disney's chief executive officer and Ovitz's good friend, negotiate the specific terms of the agreement. The contract also included a non-fault termination clause. Under it, Ovitz would receive: (1) his salary for the remainder of the contract, (2) a $7.5 million bonus for each year remaining on his contract, though no bonus was guaranteed if he was not terminated, and 3) a termination payment of $10 million, which was the amount he would receive if he completed his full term without receiving a new contract. Further, Ovitz's stock options would vest immediately. In other words, "the contract was most valuable to Ovitz the sooner he left Disney." When Ovitz wanted out due to his unsatisfying performance, Eisner granted him a non-fault termination and awarded him more than $38 million cash and $3 million stock options, which had a total present value of $140 million. Although the new board played no role in Eisner's agreement to award Ovitz cash and stock options, the new board refused to explore any alternatives or delay the transaction. Disney's charter had an exculpatory provision based on Del. C. tit. 8 § 102(b)(7), which would protect individual directors from personal liability for breaches of the duty of care. The defendants moved to dismiss based on the exculpatory provision. Issue Do exculpatory provisions protect corporate directors from personal liability if the directors consciously and intentionally disregard their responsibilities? Holding and Reasoning (Chandler, J.) No. An exculpatory provision, based on Del. C. tit. 8 § 102(b)(7), protects individual directors from personal liability for any breach of the duty of care. Exculpatory provisions do not apply if directors consciously and intentionally disregard their responsibilities. Directors' failure to inform themselves adequately about a material corporate matter is merely negligence or gross negligence. However, directors' adoption of a donot-care attitude about the risks of a material corporate decision is conscious and intentional disregard of their responsibilities. Such conduct is not in good faith or the best interests of the company. Here, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the complaint sufficiently stated a breach of the directors' duty to act in good faith in the best interests of the corporation. The approval of Ovitz's compensation and handling of Ovitz's non-fault termination were material corporate decisions. The directors knew that they did not have adequate information and simply did not care whether the decision would cause injury to the corporation and the shareholders. The alleged facts, if true, implicate more than negligence by the directors. Instead, they involve intentional misconduct, meaning actions not taken in good faith in the best interest of the company. Therefore, the exculpatory provision does not apply. The defendants' motion to dismiss is denied. In re Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation (Disney III) Delaware Court of Chancery 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005) Rule of Law Directors do not necessarily breach their fiduciary duties by failing to comply with the best practices of ideal corporate governance. Facts Shareholders (plaintiffs) filed a derivative action against the Disney board of directors (defendants), challenging the board's hiring of the company's number-two executive, Michael Ovitz. Ovitz left Disney and received a non-fault termination after unsatisfying job performance. The non-fault termination triggered a large amount of severance pay. The plaintiffs alleged that Ovitz's employment contract incentivized Ovitz to leave Disney as soon as possible and receive a non-fault termination, rather than complete the term of the contract. As such, the plaintiffs argued that this amounted to waste. However, Ovitz argued that he had no incentive to leave early, because he could not know whether he would be terminated or if the termination would be without fault. Issue Do directors necessarily breach their fiduciary duties by failing to comply with the best practices of ideal corporate governance? Holding and Reasoning (Chandler, J.) No. In Delaware, although directors are strongly encouraged to employ the best practices of ideal corporate governance, they do not necessarily breach their fiduciary duties by a failure to comply with the best practices. It is easy to blame a decision that eventually turns out to be a failure based on hindsight, but the essence of business is risk. The outcomes may be predictable, but never certain. Therefore, on the one hand, Delaware corporate law requires directors, who are corporate decision-makers, to strictly comply with their fiduciary duties. Directors must act in good faith and make informed decisions in the best interests of the shareholders. On the other hand, within the boundaries of those duties, directors are free to exercise their business judgment without being punished by a court with the benefit of hindsight. In this case, the evidence does not support the plaintiffs' allegation that Ovitz's employment contract incentivized Ovitz to leave Disney and receive a non-fault termination, rather than complete the term of the contract. Ovitz could not know if he would be terminated or whether he would be terminated with or without cause. It is unlikely that Ovitz intended to perform just poorly enough to be fired quickly, but not so poorly to be fired for cause. Based on Ovitz's performance, Ovitz could not be fired for cause. Any early termination of his employment had to be a non-fault termination. Many of the defendants' actions are significantly below the best practices of ideal corporate governance. However, in hiring Ovitz and approving his employment contract, the defendants did not act in bad faith and were, at most, ordinarily negligent. Ordinary negligence is insufficient to constitute a violation of the fiduciary duty of care. Therefore, the directors did not breach their fiduciary duties. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation Delaware Supreme Court 906 A.2d 27 (Del. June 8, 2006) Rule of Law The concept of intentional dereliction of duty and a conscious disregard for one’s responsibilities is an appropriate standard for determining whether fiduciaries have acted in good faith. Facts Michael Ovitz was hired as the president of The Walt Disney Company (Disney). Ovitz was a much respected and well known executive, and in convincing him to leave his lucrative and successful job with Creative Artists Agency (CAA), Disney signed Ovitz to a very lucrative contract. The contract was for five years, but if Ovitz were terminated without cause, he would be paid the remaining value of his contract as well as a significant severance package in the form of stock option payouts. The contract was approved by Disney’s compensation committee after its consideration of term sheets and other documents indicating the total possible payout to Ovitz if he was fired without cause. The compensation committee then informed Disney’s board of directors of the provisions of the contract, including the total possible payout to Ovitz. The board approved the contract and elected Ovitz as president. After Ovitz’s first year on the job, it was clear that he was not working out as president and that he was “a poor fit with his fellow executives.” However, Disney’s CEO and attorneys could not find a way to fire him for any cause, so Disney instead fired him without cause, triggering the severance package in the contract. Ovitz ended up being paid $130 million upon his termination. Disney shareholders (plaintiffs) brought derivative suits against Disney’s directors for failure to exercise due care and good faith in approving the contract and in hiring Ovitz, and, even if the contract was valid, for breaching their fiduciary duties by actually making the exorbitant severance payout to Ovitz. The Delaware Court of Chancery found that although the process of hiring Ovitz and the resulting contract did not constitute corporate “best practices,” the Disney directors did not breach any fiduciary duty to the corporation. The Disney shareholders appealed. Issue Is the concept of intentional dereliction of duty and a conscious disregard for one’s responsibilities an appropriate standard for determining whether fiduciaries have acted in good faith? Holding and Reasoning (Jacobs, J.) Yes. As an initial matter, the court determines that the directors did not breach their duty of due care in approving the contract or hiring Ovitz because the directors were fully informed of all information available, including the total possible severance payout to Ovitz. In terms of the bad faith claim, there are at least three categories of fiduciary bad faith. The first two are clearer: subjective bad faith, meaning intent to harm, and the lack of due care, meaning gross negligence. However, there is a form of fiduciary bad faith that is not intentional, but “is qualitatively more culpable than gross negligence.” This category is appropriately captured by the concept of intentional dereliction of duty and a conscious disregard for one’s responsibilities. Therefore, although it is not the exclusive definition of fiduciary bad faith, that concept is an appropriate standard for determining whether fiduciaries have acted in good faith. The court determines that because the Disney compensation committee and directors were fully informed about the total potential payout, and because of the well known skills and qualifications of Ovitz, the Delaware Court of Chancery properly held that the directors’ actions, although not in line with corporate best practices, did not violate a duty to act in good faith. Finally, the court finds that the directors did not violate any fiduciary duties by actually making the severance payout to Ovitz because the directors were entitled, under the business judgment rule, to rely on advice from Disney’s CEO and attorneys that there were no grounds for Ovitz to be fired for cause. They were thus entitled to fire him without cause. As a result of the foregoing, the court finds in favor of the defendants and the Delaware Court of Chancery is affirmed. In re CNX Gas Corporation Shareholders Litigation Delaware Court of Chancery 2010 WL 2291842 (Del. Ch. May 25, 2010) Rule of Law Under the unified standard, the business judgment standard of review applies to two-step freeze-out mergers initiated by a controlling shareholders if the first-step tender offer was (1) recommended by an independent committee of directors and (2) conditioned on approval by a majority of the minority shareholders. Facts CONSOL Energy (CONSOL) (defendant) owned 83.5 percent of CNX Gas Corp. (CNX) (defendant). After an unsuccessful attempt at acquiring CNX’s outstanding shares, CONSOL eliminated CNX’s board committees and decreased the number of directors. Only one director, John Pipski, was independent. CONSOL negotiated with T. Rowe Price (Price), an institutional investor that held 6.3 percent of CNX’s stock and 6.5 percent of CONSOL’s on an acceptable tender offer. CONSOL commenced a two-step freeze-out merger, offering $38.25 per share for its tender offer and planning a short-form merger afterward. The offer was conditional on a majority of the minority shares being tendered. CNX’s board authorized a special committee consisting of Pipski to consider the merger and complete a Section 14D-9 form for the Securities and Exchange Commission. The board refused to add an additional director or authorize the committee to negotiate. Pipski nevertheless tried to get CONSOL to up its offer. The CNX board retroactively authorized the committee to negotiate, but CONSOL refused to raise the price. The committee did not give an opinion on the offer, but suggested that CONSOL’s agreement with Price, whose interests were different than other minority shareholders’, assured the tender offer’s success and nullified the majority-of-the-minority condition. CNX’s minority shareholders (plaintiffs) sued in the Delaware Court of Chancery to challenge the tender offer. Issue Does the business judgment standard of review always apply to two-step freeze-out mergers initiated by controlling shareholders? Holding and Reasoning (Laster, J.) No. Business judgment review does not automatically apply to two-step freeze-out mergers. Under Kahn v. Lynch Communications Systems, Inc., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994), a freeze-out merger by a controlling shareholder will be reviewed for entire fairness. In re Siliconix Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 2001 WL 716787 (Del. Ch. 2001), imposed a less protective standard for two-step mergers in which the controlling shareholder first made a tender offer and then a short-form merger. Siliconix was based on (1) the difference between mergers in tender offers under statute and (2) the ruling in Solomon v. Pathe Communications Corp., 672 A.2d 35 (Del. 1996) that tender offerors owed no duty to pay a fair price. This is what is wrong with Siliconix. The statutory difference between mergers and tender offers does not justify different fiduciary requirements. Further, Soloman did not involve a freeze-out merger, abolish entire fairness review, or eliminate fiduciary duties on controlling shareholders. In re Cox Communications, Inc., 876 A.2d 607 (Del. Ch. 2005) held that when a freeze-out merger was (1) approved by an independent committee and (2) conditional on approval by “a majority of the minority stockholders,” business judgment review was proper. If not, or if there is doubt about one of the requirements, the appropriate standard is entire fairness. Here, the committee did not approve the transaction and lacked authority to negotiate. The agreement with Price practically guaranteed the tender offer’s success and nullified the protection majorityof-the-minority condition. Price’s equity meant that it would benefit equally under any deal. This does not mean courts must always consider institutional shareholders’ other interests or motivations. CONSOL put Price’s interests at issue by negotiating with Price alone beforehand. A special committee did not approve the deal, and the defendants must prove entire fairness. Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., Inc. (Lynch I) Delaware Supreme Court 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994) Rule of Law Under the entire fairness standard, the burden of proof will not shift to the plaintiff if the transaction is approved by an independent committee that has no real bargaining power. Facts Alcatel U.S.A. Corp. (Alcatel) (defendant) owed 43.3 percent of Lynch Communication Systems, Inc. (Lynch) (defendant) stock. Lynch's charter required a supermajority vote to approve any business combination. The Lynch board had 11 directors, five of which were Alcatel designees. Lynch's management recommended that Lynch acquire Telco Systems, Inc. (Telco). Alcatel rejected this and proposed that Lynch acquire Celwave Systems, Inc. (Celwave), one of Alcatel's affiliates. The Lynch board established an independent committee to consider the Celwave proposal. Alcatel's investment banker suggested a stockfor-stock merger. The committee rejected the proposal, because its own investment banker said Celwave was overvalued. Instead of further negotiating with the Lynch board about its Celwave proposal, Alcatel responded by offering to buy the rest of Lynch's stock for $14 cash per share. The committee determined that $14 was inadequate. After a few rounds of negotiations, the committee accepted Alcatel's offer of $15.50 per share. Although some committee members considered $15.50 inadequate, they accepted the offer under the pressure that there were no alternatives for Lynch, because Alcatel could block any alternative transaction and would proceed with a hostile tender offer if this one got rejected. The Lynch board approved the cash-out merger based on the committee's recommendation. Alcatel's nominees did not participate in the approval. Alan Kahn (plaintiff), a minority shareholder of Lynch, sued to challenge the cash-out merger. The court of chancery found that Alcatel owed the fiduciary duties of a controlling shareholder to other Lynch shareholders, because Alcatel exercised actual control over Lynch by dominating its corporate affairs. However, the court held that the independent committed effectively negotiated the transactions at arm's length, and therefore, the burden of proof shifted to the challenging shareholder, Kahn. Kahn appealed. Issue Under the entire fairness standard, will the burden of proof shift to the plaintiff if the transaction is approved by an independent committee that has no real bargaining power? Holding and Reasoning (Holland, J.) No. Under the entire fairness standard, the burden of proof will not shift to the plaintiff if the transaction is approved by an independent committee that has no real bargaining power. As established in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983), a controlling shareholder sitting on both sides of a transaction bears the burden of proving the transaction's entire fairness. Thus, the standard of review for a cash-out merger by a controlling shareholder is entire fairness. An approval of the transaction by an independent committee shifts the burden of proving that the transaction is unfair to the plaintiff. However, the mere existence of an independent committee does not shift the burden. The controlling shareholder must not dictate the terms of the merger, and the independent committee must have "real bargaining power." Here, the independent committee's ability to bargain at arm's length with Alcatel was questionable. Although the committee effectively rejected the merger with Celwave, as to Alcatel's offer to buy Lynch, the committee lacked the ability to negotiate with Alcatel at arm's length. Alcatel threatened to proceed with a hostile tender offer if the committee did not accept the $15.50 offer. Even though initially the committee was able to negotiate for a few rounds, the arm's length bargaining ended when the committee "surrendered to" Alcatel's final offer. Therefore, the judgment that the committee negotiated the transaction at arm's length is reversed and remanded. The burden of proof remains on Alcatel. Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., Inc. (Lynch II) Delaware Supreme Court 669 A.2d 79 (Del. 1995) Rule of Law A defendant who bears the burden of proving the entire fairness of an interested transaction must demonstrate both fair dealing and fair price. Facts In Lynch I, Alan Kahn (plaintiff), a minority shareholder of Lynch Communication Systems, Inc. (Lynch) (defendant), challenged a cash-out merger dominated by Lynch's controlling shareholder, Alcatel U.S.A. Corp. (Alcatel) (defendant). The case was remanded to the court of chancery to reexamine the merger with the burden of proof on Alcatel. The court held that the defendants met the burden of proving that the merger was entirely fair to Lynch shareholders. The court found that the transaction was conducted with fair dealing. Lynch faced a development hurdle due to a lack of technology. The merger with Celwave Systems, Inc. (Celwave) would remedy this weakness. Alcatel offered to buy Lynch as an alternative to the Celwave proposal, after Lynch's chief executive officer (CEO) told Alcatel that a cash-out merger with Alcatel would be better. Alcatel vetoed the acquisition of Telco Systems, Inc. (Telco), because Telco was not profitable, and its technology was limited. Although being coerced, the independent committee did negotiate an increase in price from $14 to $15.50 per share. Alcatel paid cash for all shares tendered. In finding the price fair, the court accepted on the valuation by Alcatel's investment banker, which was $15.50 to $16.00 per share. The valuation was based on the market stock price, plus a merger premium. The court also considered the valuations by the independent committee's two investment bankers, which were $16.50 to $17.50 per share. The court rejected the valuation by Kahn's expert, which was $18.25 per share, because it found the valuation methodology flawed. Therefore, the court of chancery held that the defendants had proven the entire fairness of the transaction. Kahn appealed. Issue Must a defendant who bears the burden of proving the entire fairness of an interested transaction demonstrate both fair dealing and fair price? Holding and Reasoning (Walsh, J.) Yes. As noted in Lynch I, a controlling shareholder sitting on both sides of a transaction bears the burden of proving the transaction's entire fairness. To prove entire fairness, the defendant must demonstrate both fair dealing and fair price. Fair dealing is about the timing, initiation, structure, and negotiation of the transaction, while fair price considers all the factors that affect the value of the company's stock. The test requires consideration of all aspects of the transaction to decide whether "the deal in its entirety is fair." Further, to show coercion of the controlling shareholder, the coercive conduct must be "a material influence on the decision to sell." As to the issue of valuation, when faced with various valuations, the court of chancery may reach its own conclusion, provided the valuation it adopts is based on "recognized valuation standards." Here, the court of chancery correctly finds that the transaction constitutes fair dealing, based on its timing, initiation, structure, and negotiations. The Celwave proposal and the cash-out merger were in response to Lynch's development need. Although being coerced by Alcatel, the independent committee negotiated an increase in price. Further, such coercion was not material to the decision to sell. This was not a two-tier tender offer or squeeze-out merger situation. Every shareholder was treated the same. As for the price, the court of chancery was free to adopt the opinion of Alcatel's investment banker, rejecting the flawed valuation by Kahn's expert, and thus find the merger price fair. Therefore, the court of chancery's holding that the defendants have proven the entire fairness of the transaction is logical and supported by the evidence. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.