ELECTION LAW
JALOSJOS v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 205033 | 18 June 2013
Qualification of Candidates
DOCTRINE: While Sec. 40(a) of the Local
Government Code allows prior convict to
run for local elective office after the
lapse of two years from the time he
serves his sentence, said provision
should not be deemed to cover cases
where the law imposes a penalty, which
has the effect of disqualifying the
convict to run for elective office
(i.e.
perpetual
absolute
disqualification).
FACTS:







Romeo Jalosjos was convicted of rape and acts of
lasciviousness and was sentenced to suffer the
principal penalties of reclusion perpetua and temporal,
which both carried the accessory penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification.
Upon the grant of a commutation on his prison term,
Jalosjos was discharged from prison on March 18,
2009.
Jalosjos applied to register as a voter in Zamboanga
City. However, because of his previous conviction, this
application was denied, prompting him to file a
petition for Inclusion in the Permanent List of Voters.
Pending the resolution of the petition for inclusion,
Jalosjos filed a CoC on October 5, 2012 seeking to run
as mayor of Zamboanga City.
The petition for inclusion was denied on the account of
his perpetual absolute disqualification, which in effect
deprived him of the right to vote in any election.
Jalosjos’ CoC was eventually denied due course
through a motu proprio resolution by the COMELEC
En Banc, again on account of his perpetual absolute
disqualification.
Jalosjos claimed that Art. 30 of the RPC on the effect
of the perpetual absolute disqualification was partially
amended by Sec. 40(a) of the LGC
has the effect of disqualifying the convict to run for elective
office.
The principle in statutory construction that where two statutes
are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one
specifically designed therefor should prevail. Between Art. 30 of
the RPC and Sec. 40(a) of the LGC, the latter is more specific in
nature.
Section 40(a) of the LGC would not apply to cases wherein a
penal provision ― such as Article 41 in this case ― directly and
specifically prohibits the convict from running for elective office.
Hence, despite the lapse of two (2) years from Jalosjos’s service of
his commuted prison term, he remains bound to suffer the
accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification which
consequently, disqualifies him to run as mayor.
It is well to note that the use of the word “perpetual” in the
aforementioned accessory penalty connotes a lifetime restriction
and in this respect, does not depend on the length of the prison
term which is imposed as its principal penalty.
The effectivity of this accessory penalty does not depend on the
duration of the principal penalty, or on whether the convict
serves his jail sentence or not.
PABILLO v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 179267 | 21 April 2015
PROCUREMENT
DOCTRINE: It is an established public
policy, as well as a statutory mandate
that all government procurement shall
be done through competitive bidding. As
an
exception,
Art.
XVI
of
the
Government
Procurement
Reform
Act
(GPRA) sanctions resort to alternative
methods of procurement, including via
direct
contracting.
This
is
only
available in highly exceptional cases
and subject to several conditions.
FACTS:

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 40(a) of the LGC excluded the
application of perpetual absolute disqualification under Art. 30 of
the RPC?

RULING: NO. While Section 40(a) of the LGC allows a prior
convict to run for local elective office after the lapse of two (2)
years from the time he serves his sentence, the said
provision should not be deemed to cover cases wherein the
law imposes a penalty, either as principal or accessory, which
1

After bidding, a lease with option to purchase until
December 31, 2010 and warranty for labor, technical
support and maintenance for 10 years for the
Automated Electronic System (AES) was awarded to
Smartmatic-TIM in 2009.
In 2012, COMELEC exercised the option to purchase.
In 2013, Smartmatic offered to extend the warranty of
the PCOS machines for 3 years, and a draft contract
was sent to COMELEC.
The COMELEC’s Law Department upon review stated
that the procedure for direct contracting would only
be applied if the conditions for resort to said method

were present, and that the Bids and Awards
Committee and COMELEC’s Information Technology
Department should first confirm if Smartmatic was the
sole provider of the services to be procured.
However, the COMELEC approved the proposal.
Petitioners challenged the validity of the contract due
to the resort to direct contracting.
right of suffrage, but a mere aspect of
procedure, of which the State has the
right to reasonably regulate.
FACTS:

ISSUE: Whether or not the resort to direct contracting was
valid.
RULING: NO, Public bidding is the established procedure in the

grant of government contracts. As an exception, Art. XVI of the
Government Procurement Reform Act (GPRA) sanctions resort to
alternative methods of procurement, including via direct
contracting. This is only available in highly exceptional cases and
subject to several conditions.

The Manual of Procedures for the Procurement of Goods and
Services of the Government Procurement Policy Board allows
alternative methods if:
(1) There is prior approval of the Head of the Procuring
Entity, as recommended by the BAC; and
(2) The conditions required by law for the use of
alternative methods are present. Also,
(3) The Procuring Entity must ensure that the chosen
method promoted economy and efficiency; and
(4) The most advantageous price for the government
must be obtained.
There was non-compliance with (2). Sec 50(a), Art XVI of the
GPRA allows direct contracting only when it involves goods of
proprietary nature, which can be obtained only from the
proprietary source. The “goods” herein involved refer to the
services of the machines’ repair and refurbishment, not the
machines themselves. No evidence was shown that SmartmaticTIM possessed intellectual property rights over the method,
process, system, program, or work servicing the PCOS machines
for their repair and refurbishment, and thus cannot be said to be
the services’ proprietary source. Moreover, based on the 2009
contract, COMELEC was granted a license to use, modify and
customize the PCOS systems and software, including the right to
alter and modify the source code, due to the exercise of the
option to purchase.
KABATAAN PARTY LIST v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 221318 | 16 December 2015
Suffrage
DOCTRINE: The process of registration
is a procedural limitation on the right
to vote. The biometric registration
requirement
is
this
not
a
“qualification” to the exercise of the
2
President Benigno Aquino signed into law RA10367
which mandates the COMELEC to implement a
mandatory biometrics registration system for new
voters in order to establish a clean, complete,
permanent, and updated list of voters through the
adoption of biometric technology.
The law likewise directs that “registered voters whose
biometrics have not been captured shall submit
themselves for validation.” “Voters who fail to submit
for validation on or before the last day of filing of
application for registration for purposes of the May
2016 elections shall be deactivated x x x.”
COMELEC issued a resolution, which provides that:
“the registration records of voters without biometrics
data who failed to submit for validation on or before
the last day of filing of applications for registration for
the purpose of the May 9, 2016 National and Local
Elections shall be deactivated. Such deactivated
voters are not allowed to vote.
o
Kabataan filed for a TRO and preliminary
mandatory injunction, before the SC,
assailing the constitutionality of of the
imposed requirements under RA10367, as
well as its IRRs on the ground that, among
others, the biometrics validation imposes
an additional, substantial qualification of
literacy or property where there is penalty
of deactivation
ISSUE: Whether or not the statutory requirement of biometrics
validation is an unconstitutional requirement of literacy and
property.
RULING: NO. Jurisprudence has characterized registration as a
form of regulation and not as a qualification for the right of
suffrage.
Under Sec. 1, Art V of the CONST, one must meet the following
qualifications in order to exercise the right of suffrage:
1.
he must be a Filipino citizen;
2. he must not be disqualified by law; and
3.
he must have resided in the Philippines for at least one
(1) year and in the place wherein he proposes to vote
for at least six (6) months immediately preceding the
election.
The second item more prominently reflects the franchised nature
of the right of suffrage. The State may therefore regulate said
right by imposing statutory disqualifications, with the restriction,
however, that the same do not amount to, as per the second
sentence of the provision, a "literacy, property or other
substantive requirement."
As a form of regulation, compliance with the registration
procedure is dutifully enjoined. Thus, although one is deemed to
be a "qualified elector," he must nonetheless still comply with the
registration procedure in order to vote. This was echoed in
AKBAYAN-Youth v. COMELEC, wherein the Court pronounced
that the process of registration is a procedural limitation on the
right to vote.
To reiterate, this requirement is not a "qualification" to the
exercise of the right of suffrage, but a mere aspect of the
registration procedure, of which the State has the right to
reasonably regulate. It was institutionalized conformant to the
limitations of the 1987 Constitution and is a mere complement to
the existing Voter's Registration Act of 1996.
COMELEC v. MAMALINTA
G.R. No. 226622 | 14 March 2017
Suffrage
DOCTRINE: A compete canvass of votes is
necessary in order to reflect the true
desire of the electorate, and that a
proclamation of winning candidates on
the basis of incomplete canvass is
illegal and of no effect. This is true
when the election returns missing or
not
counted
can
still
drastically
affect the outcome of the election.
FACTS:



3
While being the Chairman for the Municipal Board of
Canvassers for South Upi, Maguindanao, Bai Haidy D.
Mamalinta allegedly committing the following:
o
the double proclamation of Sinsuat (from
19/35 election returns) and Gunsi (from
30/35) as mayor of South Upi;
o
the transfer of the place for canvassing of
votes without prior authority from the
COMELEC; and
o
the premature proclamation of Sinsuat as
the winning candidate on the basis of an
incomplete canvass of election returns.
For such actions, she was charged and was found
guilty by the COMELEC, and affirmed by the CSC, of
Grave Misconduct, Gross Neglect of Duty, Gross
Inefficiency and Incompetence, and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and was
dismissed from public service.
In her defense, Mamalinta denied the charges,
essentially claiming that the contested acts were
attended by duress in view of the imminent danger to
their lives due to the violence and intimidation
employed by Gunsi’s supporters. This was given
credence by the CA, which ordered Mamalinta’s
reinstatement
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the CSC ruling
by absolving Mamalinta from administrative charges?
RULING: YES, while Mamalinta may be absolved from
administrative liability for her acts of double proclamation and
unauthorized transfer of the place for canvassing as such acts
were done under duress, she is nevertheless administratively
liable for her premature proclamation of Sinsuat as the winning
candidate on the basis of an incomplete canvass of votes.
Jurisprudence provides that a compete canvass of votes is
necessary in order to reflect the true desire of the electorate, and
that a proclamation of winning candidates on the basis of
incomplete canvass is illegal and of no effect. This is true when
the election returns missing or not counted can still drastically
affect the outcome of the election.
Prematurely proclaiming a winning candidate – as a result of an
incomplete canvass of election returns – without justifiable
grounds is considered as Grave Misconduct, Gross Neglect of
Duty, and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of Service,
and thus, Mamalinta should be held administratively liable
therefor.
PUBOFF RULING (Liabilities of PubOff): Court herein defined
what constitutes the misconduct of a public officer that can be
subject to administrative liability. Misconduct is a transgression
of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. To
warrant dismissal from the service, the misconduct must be
grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling.
The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere
error of judgment and must also have a direct relation to and be
connected with the performance of the public officer’s official
duties amounting either to maladministration or willful,
intentional neglect, or failure to discharge the duties of the office.
In order to sustain a finding of administrative culpability under
the foregoing offenses, only the quantum of proof of substantial
evidence is required, or that amount or relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.
Thus, “[d]uress, as a valid defense, should be based
onreal, imminent or reasonable fear for one’s own life. It should
not be inspired by speculative, fanciful or remote fear. A threat of
future injury is not enough. It must be clearly shown that the
compulsion must be of such character as to leave no opportunity
for the accused to escape.
DIMAPILIS v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 227158 | 18 April 2017
Qualifications of Candidates
DOCTRINE: A person suffering a penalty
of perpetual disqualification to hold
public office is barred by law from
running in an election.
FACTS:




Joseph Dimapilis was elected as Punong Barangay.
He, again, ran for re-election, where he filed his CoC
declaring under oath that he is “eligible for the office
to be elected to.”
He won in the said election and was proclaimed as the
duly elected.
On the same day, COMELEC Law Department filed a
petition for Disqualification against Dimapilis pursuant
to Section 40 of the LGC, claiming that the latter was
barred from running in an election since he was
suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification to hold public office as a consequence
of his dismissal from service as then Kagawad of his
barangay, after being found guilty, among others, of
the administrative offense of Grave Misconduct.
COMELEC 2nd Division granted the petition and
cancelled Dimapilis’s CoC.
o
It treated the petition as one for
cancellation of CoC pursuant to Section 78
of the OEC, notwithstanding that it was
captioned
as
a
“Petition
for
Disqualification” under Section 40(b) of the
LGC, holding that the nature of the petition
is not determined by the caption given to it
by the parties, but is based on the
allegations it presented.
o
It ruled that Dimapilis committed material
misrepresentation (a cause to deny due
course) in solemnly avowing that he was
eligible to run for the office he seeks to be
elected to, when he was actually suffering
from perpetual disqualification to hold
public office by virtue of a final judgment
dismissing him from service.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in cancelling Dimapilis’ CoC?
RULING: NO. Dimapilis’ perpetual disqualification to hold
public office is a material fact involving eligibility. A CoC is a
formal requirement for eligibility to public office. Section 74 of
the OEC provides that the CoC of the person filing it shall state,
among others, that he is eligible for the office he seeks to run,
and that the facts stated therein are true to the best of his
knowledge.
To be "eligible" relates to the capacity of holding, as well as that
of being elected to an office. Conversely, "ineligibility" has been
defined as a "disqualification or legal incapacity to be elected to
an office or appointed to a particular position." In this relation, a
4
person intending to run for public office must not only possess
the required qualifications for the position for which he or she
intends to run, but must also possess none of the grounds for
disqualification under the law.
In this case, Dimapilis had been found guilty of Grave Misconduct
by a final judgment, and punished with dismissal from service
with all its accessory penalties, including perpetual
disqualification from holding public office. Verily, perpetual
disqualification to hold public office is a material fact involving
eligibility which rendered petitioner's CoC void from the start
since he was not eligible to run for any public office at the time he
filed the same.
With the cancellation of his CoC, petitioner is deemed to have not
been a candidate in the 2013 Barangay Elections, and all his votes
are to be considered stray votes. A person whose CoC had been
cancelled is deemed to have not been a candidate at all because
his CoC is considered void ab initio, and thus, cannot give rise to a
valid candidacy and necessarily to valid votes. The cancellation of
the CoC essentially renders the votes cast for him or her as stray
votes, and are not considered in determining the winner of an
election. This would necessarily invalidate his proclamation and
entitle the qualified candidate receiving the highest number of
votes to the position.
There is another more compelling reason why the eligible
candidate who garnered the highest number of votes must
assume the office. The ineligible candidate who was proclaimed
and who already assumed office is a de facto officer by virtue of
the ineligibility.
The rule on succession in Section 44 of the Local Government
Code cannot apply in instances when a de facto officer is ousted
from office and the de jure officer takes over. The ouster of a de
facto officer cannot create a permanent vacancy as contemplated
in the Local Government Code. There is no vacancy to speak of as
the de jure officer, the rightful winner in the elections, has the
legal right to assume the position.
DIMAPILIS v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 227158 | 18 April 2017
Petition to Deny or Cancel Certificates
of Candidacy
DOCTRINE: The COMELEC has the legal
duty to cancel the CoC of anyone
suffering from the accessory penalty of
perpetual
disqualification
to
hold
public office, albeit, arising from a
criminal conviction.
FACTS:

Joseph Dimapilis was elected as Punong Barangay of
Brgy. Pulung Maragul in the October 2010 Barangay
Elections. In the 2013 Barangay Election, he ran for re-



election for the same position, where he filed his CoC
declaring under oath that he is “eligible for the office
to be elected to.”
He won in the said election and was proclaimed as the
duly elected. On the same day, COMELEC Law
Department filed a petition for Disqualification against
Dimapilis pursuant to Section 40 of the LGC, claiming
that the latter was barred from running in an election
since he was suffering from the accessory penalty of
perpetual disqualification to hold public office as a
consequence of his dismissal from service as then
Kagawad of Brgy. Pulung Maragul, after being found
guilty, along with others, of administrative offense of
Grave Misconduct.
In opposition to the same, Dimapilis averred that the
petition should be dismissed, considering, among
others, that while the petition prayed for his
disqualification, it partakes the nature to deny due
course to or cancel CoC which should be a distinct and
separate actions, and that, having been re-elected and
applying the Aguinaldo doctrine, he his acts were
condoned.
COMELEC 2nd Division granted the petition and
cancelled Dimapilis’s CoC.
o
It treated the petition as one for
cancellation of CoC pursuant to Section 78
of the OEC, notwithstanding that it was
captioned
as
a
“Petition
for
Disqualification” under Section 40(b) of the
LGC, holding that the nature of the petition
is not determined by the caption given to it
by the parties, but is based on the
allegations it presented.
o
It ruled that Dimapilis committed material
misrepresentation (a cause to deny due
course) in solemnly avowing that he was
eligible to run for the office he seeks to be
elected to, when he was actually suffering
from perpetual disqualification to hold
public office by virtue of a final judgment
dismissing him from service.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in cancelling Dimapilis’ CoC?
RULING: NO. The COMELEC has the duty to motu proprio bar
from running for public office those suffering from perpetual
disqualification to hold public office. Under Constitution, the
COMELEC has the duty to "[e]nforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election x x x." The Court
had previously ruled that the COMELEC has the legal duty to
cancel the CoC of anyone suffering from the accessory penalty of
perpetual disqualification to hold public office, albeit, arising
from a criminal conviction.
Dimapilis’ perpetual disqualification to hold public office is a
material fact involving eligibility. A CoC is a formal requirement
5
for eligibility to public office. Section 74 of the OEC provides that
the CoC of the person filing it shall state, among others, that he is
eligible for the office he seeks to run, and that the facts stated
therein are true to the best of his knowledge.
To be "eligible" relates to the capacity of holding, as well as that
of being elected to an office. Conversely, "ineligibility" has been
defined as a "disqualification or legal incapacity to be elected to
an office or appointed to a particular position." In this relation, a
person intending to run for public office must not only possess
the required qualifications for the position for which he or she
intends to run, but must also possess none of the grounds for
disqualification under the law.
In this case, Dimapilis had been found guilty of Grave Misconduct
by a final judgment, and punished with dismissal from service
with all its accessory penalties, including perpetual
disqualification from holding public office. Verily, perpetual
disqualification to hold public office is a material fact involving
eligibility which rendered petitioner's CoC void from the start
since he was not eligible to run for any public office at the time he
filed the same.
With the cancellation of his CoC, petitioner is deemed to have not
been a candidate in the 2013 Barangay Elections, and all his votes
are to be considered stray votes. A person whose CoC had been
cancelled is deemed to have not been a candidate at all because
his CoC is considered void ab initio, and thus, cannot give rise to a
valid candidacy and necessarily to valid votes. The cancellation of
the CoC essentially renders the votes cast for him or her as stray
votes, and are not considered in determining the winner of an
election. This would necessarily invalidate his proclamation and
entitle the qualified candidate receiving the highest number of
votes to the position.
There is another more compelling reason why the eligible
candidate who garnered the highest number of votes must
assume the office. The ineligible candidate who was proclaimed
and who already assumed office is a de facto officer by virtue of
the ineligibility.
The rule on succession in Section 44 of the Local Government
Code cannot apply in instances when a de facto officer is ousted
from office and the de jure officer takes over. The ouster of a de
facto officer cannot create a permanent vacancy as contemplated
in the Local Government Code. There is no vacancy to speak of as
the de jure officer, the rightful winner in the elections, has the
legal right to assume the position.
LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. YU
G.R. No. 189041 | 31 July 2012
Termination of Official Relation
DOCTRINE: Abandonment of an office is
the voluntary relinquishment of an
office by the holder with the intention
of
terminating
his
possession
and
control thereof. In order to constitute
abandonment of office, it must be total
and under such circumstance as clearly
to indicate an absolute relinquishment.
There must be a complete abandonment of
duties of such continuance that the law
will
infer
a
relinquishment.
Abandonment of duties is a voluntary
act; it springs from and is accompanied
by deliberation and freedom of choice.
There are, therefore, two essential
elements
of
abandonment: first,
an
intention to abandon and, second, an
overt or ‘external’ act by which the
intention is carried into effect.
FACTS:







6
The national government implemented a devolution
program pursuant to the LGC, which affected the
Department of Health (DOH) along with other
government agencies.
Dr. Fortunata Castillo held the position of Provincial
Health Officer II (PHO II) of DOH Regional Office in
Zamboanga City
Respondent Dr. Agnes Ouida P. Yu, on the other hand,
held the position of PHO I. She was assigned,
however, at the Integrated Provincial Health Office in
Isabela, Basilan.
Upon the implementation of the devolution program,
Basilan Governor Gerry Salapuddin refused to accept
Dr. Castillo as the incumbent of the PHO II position
that was to be devolved to the LGU of Basilan,
prompting the DOH to retain Dr. Castillo at the
Regional Office.
Two years after the implementation of the devolution
program, Dr. Yu was appointed to the PHO II position.
A law was then passed whereby the hospital positions
previously devolved to the local government unit of
Basilan were re-nationalized and reverted to the DOH.
The Basilan Provincial Health Hospital was later
renamed the Basilan General Hospital, and the
position of PHO II was then re-classified to Chief of
Hospital II. (CH II)
While Dr. Yu was among the personnel reverted to the
DOH with the re-nationalization of the Basilan General



Hospital. She was made to retain her original item of
PHO II instead of being given the re-classified position
of CH II.
Subsequently, another doctor was appointed to the
position of CH II.
Aggrieved, Dr. Yu filed a letter of protest before the
CSC claiming that she has a vested right to the
position of CH II.
CSC a resolution granting Dr. Yu’s protest and
revoking the appointment of the other doctor.
However, upon motion for reconsideration, the CSC
reversed itself declaring that:
o
the position of PHO II was never devolved
to the Provincial Government of Basilan but
was retained by the DOH;
o
that the PHO II position held by Dr. Yu was
a newly-created position; and
o
that, therefore, she did not have a vested
right to the Chief of Hospital II position that
was created by virtue of R.A No. 8543.
ISSUE: Whether Dr. Casitllo considered to have abandoned her
position for consistently failing to assert her rights.
RULING: NO, “Abandonment of an office is the voluntary
relinquishment of an office by the holder with the intention of
terminating his possession and control thereof. In order to
constitute abandonment of office, it must be total and under
such circumstance as clearly to indicate an absolute
relinquishment. There must be a complete abandonment of
duties of such continuance that the law will infer a
relinquishment. Abandonment of duties is a voluntary act; it
springs from and is accompanied by deliberation and freedom of
choice. There are, therefore, two essential elements of
abandonment: first, an intention to abandon and, second, an
overt or ‘external’ act by which the intention is carried into effect.
By no stretch of the imagination can Dr. Castillo’s seeming
lackadaisical attitude towards protecting her rights be construed
as an abandonment of her position resulting in her having
intentionally and voluntarily vacated the same.
Governor Salapuddin’s tenacious refusal to accept Dr. Castillo
negates any and all voluntariness on the part of the latter to let
go of her position.
Based on the circumstances, SC ruled that with Dr. Castillo’s reabsorption by the DOH, which appears to bear the former’s
approval, her devolved position with the LGU of Basilan was left
vacant. As such, Dr. Yu was validly appointed to the position of
PHO II in 1994 and, consequently, acquired a vested right to its
re-classified designation—Chief of Hospital II. As such, Dr. Yu
should have been automatically re-appointed by Secretary
Dayrit.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. DE ZOSA
and DELA CRUZ
G.R. No. 205433 | 21 January 2015
Liabilities of Public Officers
DOCTRINE:
The
fundamental
rule
in
administrative proceedings is that the
complainant has the burden of proving,
by
substantial
evidence,
the
allegations in his complaint.
FACTS:





Pursuant to the Resolution by SB of Kawit Cavite
authorizing the mayor to sell municipal properties
(lands), the Municipal Appraisal Board (MAB) issued a
resolution decreasing the assessed fair market values
of the lands from P700 to P500/sqm.
One parcel of land was auctioned off with the
minimum bid price pegged at P500/sqm.
However, having found by the Commission on Audit
that the proper fair market value for the said land was
P876/sqm, complaints of graft and corruption was filed
against the members of the MAB, including
respondents. The complaint alleged that MAB’s
reappraisal was done sans any basis or computation.
o
Respondents maintain that the reappraisal
and reevaluation was based on MAB’s aim
of maintaining a uniform assessment of lots
with similar attributes within the area.
The Office of the Ombudsman found that the
respondents’ acts had caused undue injury to the
government, and are therefore liable for Grave
Misconduct for their disregard of established rules in
arriving at the questioned valuation.
Contrary to the findings of the OMB, the CA held that
there is no substantial evidence to support the finding
that corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or
disregard of established procedures may be ascribed
to the respondents.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents were rightfully
absolved from administrative liability for Grave Misconduct?
RULING: YES, the OMB had insufficient evidence to support
their claim.
At the outset, it must be stressed that in administrative cases,
substantial evidence is required to support any findings.
Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The
requirement is satisfied where there is reasonable ground to
believe that one is guilty of the act or omission complained of,
even if the evidence might not be overwhelming.
The fundamental rule in administrative proceedings is that the
complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence,
the allegations in his complaint. Section 27 of the Ombudsman
Act is unequivocal: Findings of fact by the Office of the
Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are
7
conclusive. Conversely, therefore, when the findings of fact by
the Ombudsman are not adequately supported by substantial
evidence, they shall not be binding upon the courts.
In the case at bar, there is no substantial evidence to hold
respondents administratively liable for Grave Misconduct.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite
rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross
negligence by the public officer. To warrant dismissal from
service, the misconduct must be grave, serious, important,
weighty, momentous, and not trifling. The misconduct must
imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment and
must also have a direct relation to and be connected with the
performance of the public officer’s official duties amounting
either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or
failure to discharge the duties of the office. In order to
differentiate gross misconduct from simple misconduct, the
elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant
disregard of established rule, must be manifest in the former.
Records were bereft of any showing that respondents wrongfully
intended to transgress some established and definite rule of
action which is attended by corruption, clear intent to violate the
law, or flagrant disregard of the rules.
PURISIMA v. CARPIO-MORALES
G.R. No. 179267 | 26 July 2017
Liabilities
of
Public
Officers
Preventive Suspension
–
DOCTRINE:
Preventive
suspension
is
merely
a
preventive
measure,
a
preliminary step in an administrative
investigation. The
purpose
of
the
suspension order is to prevent the
accused from using his position and the
powers and prerogatives of his office
to influence potential witnesses or
tamper with records which may be vital
in the prosecution of the case against
him.
FACTS:



In 2011, the PNP entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement with WER FAST without going through
any public bidding. In the said memo, the PNP
undertook to allow WER FAST to provide courier
services to deliver firearm licenses to gun owners.
Said MoA was instructed to be reviewed by the PNP’s
Legal Service.
Upon his appointment as PNP Chief in 2012, Purisima
approved a memorandum accrediting WER FAST.
However, for doing so, complaints were filed against
Purisima el at, praying that the former be


administratively charged for gross negligence/gross
neglect of duty, with a prayer for preventive
suspension.
Without waiting for Purisima’s counter-affidavit, the
OMB issued an Order, which preventively suspended
Purisima and other PNP officers for 6 months without
pay.
Purisima’s petition for certiorari assailing the order
was denied by the CA holding that:
o
Petitions were moot in view of the lapse of
the 6-month period of preventive
suspension
o
OMB is authorized by Sec. 24 of the
Ombudsman Act to preventively suspend
without pay any public officer or employee
during the pendency of an investigation, as
part of the OMB’s investigatory and
disciplinary authority.
may be said to have gravely abused her discretion in finding that
the first condition was met.
In the present case, the OMB found that the evidence of guilt
against Purisima was strong enough to place him under
preventive suspension. Said finding cannot be said to be tainted
with grave abuse of discretion as it was based on supporting
documentary evidence, none of which were questioned to be
inadmissible.
On the issue of mootness
The subsequent lifting of the preventive suspension order against
the accused does not render the petition moot and academic. It
does not preclude the courts from passing upon the validity of a
preventive suspension order, it being a manifestation of its
constitutionally mandated power and authority to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.
ISSUE: Was Purisima’s preventive suspension valid?
RULING: YES. The Ombudsman is explicitly authorized to issue
a preventive suspension order when two conditions are met:
(a) the evidence of guilt is strong based on the
Ombudsman’s judgment; and
(b) any of the three (3) circumstances are present —
(1) the charge against such officer or employee
involves dishonesty, oppression or grave
misconduct or neglect in the performance of
duty;
(2) the charges would warrant removal from service;
or
(3) the respondent’s continued stay in office may
prejudice the case filed against him.
As regards the first condition, case law states that the strength of
the evidence is left to the determination of the OMB by taking
into account the evidence before her.
Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a
preliminary step in an administrative investigation. The purpose
of the suspension order is to prevent the accused from using his
position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to
influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may
be vital in the prosecution of the case against him.
This being the case, the OMB is given ample discretion to
determine the strength of the preliminary evidence presented
before her and thereafter, decide whether or not to issue such
order against a particular respondent.
However, as in any governmental power, the Ombudsman’s
authority to preventively suspend is not unlimited. When a
complaint is virtually bereft of any supporting evidence or the
evidence so cited is, on its face, clearly inadmissible, then no
deference ought to be accorded. Under these instances, the OMB
8
In this case, despite the lapse of the period of his preventive
suspension, there remains some practical value or use in resolving
its propriety or impropriety. The suspension’s validity would
essentially determine Purisima’s entitlement to back salaries
during the period.
Ultimately, it should be borne in mind that the issuance of a
preventive suspension order does not amount to a prejudgment
of the merits of the case. Neither is it a demonstration of a public
official’s guilt as such pronouncement can be done only after trial
on the merits.
LOCAL GOVERMENTS
PIMENTEL v. ExecSec OCHOA
G.R. No. 195770 | 17 July 2012
Principles of Local Autonomy
DOCTRINE: Under the concept of local
autonomy, the national government has
not completely relinquished all its
powers
over
local
governments,
including
autonomous
regions.
The
purpose of the delegation is to make
governance more directly responsive and
effective at the local levels. But to
enable the country to develop as a
whole,
the
policy-setting
for
the
entire
country
still
lies
in
the
President and Congress.
FACTS:



In issue is the constitutionality of certain provisions in
the General Appropriations Act of 2011, which
provides budget allocation for the Conditional Cash
Transfer Program (CCTP), a project under the DSWD,
on the ground that it amounts to a “recentralization”
of government functions that have already been
devolved from the national government to local
government units (LGUs)
DSWD embarked on a poverty reduction strategy –
CCTP – with the poorest of the poor as target
beneficiaries. In 2008, Congress funded the CCTP. The
initial budget allocation increased in the following
years, with the biggest allotment amounting to P21B.
Pimentel et al challenged the disbursement of public
funds and the implementation of the CCTP which are
alleged to have encroached into the local autonomy of
the LGUs.
o
DSWD should not be the primary
implementing agency, but rather LGUs,
which have the responsibility and functions
of delivering social welfare, agriculture and
health care services.
ISSUE: Whether or not the budget allocation in the GAA
FY2011 violated the constitution and the LGC by providing for the
recentralization of the national government in the delivery of
basic services already devolved to the LGUs.
RULING: Yes. The Constitution declares it a policy of the State
to ensure the autonomy of local governments. In order to fully
secure to the LGUs the genuine and meaningful autonomy that
would develop them into self-reliant communities and effective
partners in the attainment of naional goals, Sec. 17 of the LGC
vested upon the LGUs the duties and functions pertaining to the
delivery of basic services and facilities. With local autonomy, the
9
Constitution did nothing more than “to break up the monopoly of
the national government over the afairs of the local government”
and, without intending to sever “the relation of partnership and
interdependence betwen the central administration and local
government units.”
While the provision charges the LGUs to take on the functions
and responsibilities that have already been devolved upon them
from the national agencies on the aspect of providing for basic
services and facilities in their respective jurisdictions, paragraph
(c) of the same provision provides a categorical exception of
cases involving nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs
and services. The essence of this express reservation of power by
the national government it that, unless a LGU is particularly
designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a
program for which funding has been provided by the national
government under the GAA, even if the program involves the
delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.
Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national
government has not completely relinquished all its powers over
local governments, including autonomous regions. Only
administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to political
subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to make
governance more directly responsive and effective at the local
levels. In turn, economic, political and social development at the
smaller political units are expected to propel social and economic
growth and development. But to enable the country to develop
as a whole, the programs and policies effected localy must be
integrated and cordinated towards a common national goal.
Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the
President and Congress. To yield unreserved power of
governance to the local government unit as to preclude any and
all involvement by the national government in programs
implemented in the local level would be to shift the tide of
monopolistic power to the other extreme, which would amount
to a decentralization of power.
The national government is, thus, not precluded from taking a
direct hand in the formulation and implementation of national
development programs especially where it is implemented locally
in coordination with the LGUs concerned.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. YU
G.R. No. 189041 | 31 July 2012
Powers of Local Government Units
DOCTRINE: “devolution” is the
which the national government
power and authority upon the
local
government
units
to
specific
functions
responsibilities.
FACTS:
act by
confers
various
perform
and

The national government implemented a devolution
program pursuant to the LGC, which affected the
Department of Health (DOH) along with other
government agencies, mandating the latter to devolve
to the local government units the responsibility for the
provision of basic services and facilities.


ISSUE: What were the effects of the devolution on public
position?

RULING: As defined, “devolution” is the act by which the
national government confers power and authority upon the
various local government units to perform specific functions and
responsibilities.

Based on the devolution process, it was mandatory for Governor
Salapuddin to absorb the position of PHO II, as well as its
incumbent, Dr. Fortunata Castillo.
The only instance that the LGU concerned may choose not to
absorb the NGA personnel is when absorption is not
administratively viable, meaning, it would result to duplication of
functions, in which case, the NGA personnel shall be retained by
the national government. However, in the absence of the
recognized exception, the devolved permanent personnel shall
be automatically reappointed by the local chief executive upon
their transfer.
Cacayuran and other residents opposed the
redevelopment of the Plaza as well as the means of
the funding.
Cacayuran’s request for the documents relating to the
plaza’s redevelopment was not granted, which
prompted Cacayuran to file a taxpayer’s suit against
LBP and officers of the municipality He questioned the
validity of the loan agreements and prays that the
redevelopment is enjoined.
The lower courts ruled in favor of Cacayuran holding
that the subject loans are null and void. Further, the
resolutions approving the procurement were passed
irregularly, lacking the proper authority and are thus
ultra vires.
LBP avers that the Subject Resolutions provided
ample authority for the Mayor to contract the same. It
posits that Sec. 444(1)(1)(vi) LGC merely requires that
the municipal mayor be authorized by the SB
concerned and that such authorization need not be
embodied in an ordinance.
ISSUE: Whether or the subject loans are ultra vires being
transacted without the proper authority and their
collateralization constituted improper disbursement of public
funds.
RULING: YES, the Mayor was not properly authorized to enter
into the loan agreements.
If devolved personnel is not immediately reappointed, he may
resort to appealing his case to the CSC.
LAND BANK
CACAYURAN
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES
v.
G.R. No. 191667 | 17 April 2013
Powers of Local Government Units
Ultra Vires Contracts
–
DOCTRINE: An act, which is outside of
the
municipality’s
jurisdiction,
is
considered as a void ultra vires act,
while an act attended only by an
irregularity but remains within the
municipality’s power is considered as
an ultra
vires act
subject
to
ratification and/or validation.
FACTS:


10
The Municipality of Agoo, La Union entered into two
loans transaction with LBP in order to finance a
Redevelopment Plan of the Agoo Public Plaza. In both
instance, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality,
through a resolution, authorized the Mayor to contract
the loans
A portion of the Plaza was put up as collateral for the
loans.
A careful perusal of Sec. 444(b)(1)(vi) of the LGC shows that while
the authorization of the municipal mayor need not be in the
form of an ordinance, the obligation which he is authorized to
enter into must be made pursuant to a law or ordinance.
In the present case, while Mayor Eriguel’s authorization to
contract the Subject Loans was not contained―as it need not be
contained―in the form of an ordinance, the said loans and even
the Redevelopment Plan itself were not approved pursuant to
any law or ordinance but through mere resolutions.
Generally, an ultra vires act is one committed outside the object
for which a corporation is created as defined by the law of its
organization and therefore beyond the powers conferred upon it
by law.
There is a distinction between an act utterly beyond the
jurisdiction of a municipal corporation and the irregular
exercise of a basic power under the legislative grant in matters
not in themselves jurisdictional. The former are ultra vires in the
primary sense and void; the latter, ultra viresonly in a secondary
sense which does not preclude ratification or the application of
the doctrine of estoppel in the interest of equity and essential
justice.
An act which is outside of the municipality’s jurisdiction is
considered as a void ultra vires act, while an act attended only by
an irregularity but remains within the municipality’s power is
considered as an ultra vires act subject to ratification and/or
validation.

PROVINCE OF CAGAYAN v. LARA
On the other hand, Lara maintains that the MGB and
DENR-EMB had already authorized him to extract
sand and gravel from the Permit Area, as evidenced by
the ISAG Permit and ECC, thereby dispensing with the
need to secure any permit from the local government.
RTC granted the petition and made permanent the
writ and enjoined petitioners from stopping or
disturbing Lara’s quarrying operations. Hence, the
recourse to the SC.
G.R. No. 188500 | 24 July 2013
Powers of LGUs – Taxing Power
ISSUE: Whether or not Lara must first secure the necessary
The conversion of the said plaza is beyond the Municipality’s
jurisdiction considering the property’s nature as one for public
use and thereby, forming part of the public dominion.
DOCTRINE: In order for an entity to
legally undertake a quarrying business,
he must first comply with all the
requirements imposed not only by the
national government, but also by the
local
government
unit
where
his
business
is
situated.
Particularly,
Section 138(2) of
RA 7160 requires
that, for purposes of Tax on Sand,
Gravel, and other Quarry Resources,
such
entity
must
first
secure
a
governor’s permit prior to the start of
his quarrying operations.
FACTS:



11
Joseph Lasam Lara obtained an Industrial Sand and
Gravel Permit (ISAG Permit) from the Mines and
Geosciences Bureau (MGB) of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
authorizing him to conduct quarrying operations and
extract and dispose of sand, gravel, and other
unconsolidated materials in Peñablanca, Cagayan
(Permit Area). He also obtained an Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the DENR
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB).
Equipped with the said permits, Lara commenced his
quarrying operations. However, trucks loaded with
sand and gravel extracted from the Permit Area were
stopped and impounded by several local officials. Lara
filed an action for injunction with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the
said officials, seeking to enjoin the stoppage of his
quarrying operations. The writ of PI was issued
enabling Lara to restart his business.
Lara then received a Stoppage Order from Cagayan
Governor for failure to secure all necessary permits or
clearances from the local government unit concerned
as required by the ECC. Cagayan argues that despite
the issuance of the ISAG Permit, Lara has yet to
comply with its terms and conditions – as he has yet to
secure the necessary permits and clearances from the
local government unit concerned – and hence, remains
to be proscribed from conducting any quarrying
operations.

permits and clearances from the LGU concerned in order to
conduct quarrying operations.
RULING: YES. In order for an entity to legally undertake a
quarrying business, he must first comply with all the
requirements imposed not only by the national government, but
also by the local government unit where his business is situated.
Particularly, Section 138(2) of RA 7160 requires that such entity
must first secure a governor’s permit prior to the start of his
quarrying operations.
Records, however, reveal that Lara admittedly failed to secure
the same; hence, he has no right to conduct his quarrying
operations within the Permit Area.