Case Title: UMIL v. RAMOS
Case Nature : PETITIONS for Habeas Corpus.
Syllabi Class : Remedial Law|Criminal Law|Criminal Procedure|Arrests|Habeas Corpus|Subversion|No
compelling reason to abandon the doctrine laid down in the case of Ilagan vs. Enrile
Consti: Warrantless arrests
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Arrests; Arrest of a person without a warrant of arrest or previous
complaint is recognized in law.—The arrest of a person without a warrant of arrest or previous complaint
is recognized in law. The occasions or instances when such an arrest may be effected are clearly spelled
out in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
Same; Same; Same; Arrest without a warrant is justified when the person arrested is caught in flagranti
delicto.—An arrest without a warrant of arrest, under Section 5 paragraphs (a) and (b) of Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court, as amended, is justified when the person arrested is caught in flagranti delicto, viz., in the
act of committing an offense; or when an offense has just been committed and the person making the
arrest has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has committed it.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Rationale behind lawful arrests without warrant stated in the case of People vs.
Kagui Malasugui.—The rationale behind lawful arrests, without warrant, was stated by this Court in the
case of People vs. Kagui Malasugui thus: “To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and
searched for the evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be to leave society, to a large
extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert, and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating
their escape in many instances.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Petitioners had freshly committed or were actually committing an offense when
apprehended so that their arrests without a warrant were clearly justified.—The record of the instant cases
would show that the persons in whose behalf these petitions for habeas corpus have been filed, had
freshly committed or were actually committing an offense, when apprehended, so that their arrests
without a warrant were clearly justified, and that they are, further, detained by virtue of valid informations
filed against them in court.
Criminal Law; Habeas Corpus; Subversion; The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to
commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith
constitute direct assaults against the State are in the nature of continuing crimes.—However, Rolando
Dural was arrested for being a member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive
organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without warrant is
justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense when arrested. The crimes of rebellion,
subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in
furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State and are in the
nature of continuing crimes.
Same; Same; If a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process
issued by a court or judge and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or make the
order or if such person is charged before any court, the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed.—It is to
be noted that, in all the petitions here considered, criminal charges have been filed in the proper courts
against the petitioners. The rule is, that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody
of an officer under process issued by a court or judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue
the process or make the order, or if such person is charged before any court, the writ of habeas corpus will
not be allowed.
Same; Same; No compelling reason to abandon the doctrine laid down in the case of Ilagan vs. Enrile; As
the court stated in Morales Jr. vs. Enrile, in all petitions for habeas corpus the court must inquire into every
phase and aspect of petitioner’s detention.—We find, however, no compelling reason to abandon the
said doctrine. It is based upon express provision of the Rules of Court and the exigencies served by the
law. The fears expressed by the petitioners are not really unremediable. As the Court sees it, reexamination or reappraisal, with a view to its abandonment, of the Ilagan case doctrine is not the answer.
The answer and the better practice would be, not to limit the function of habeas corpus to a mere inquiry
as to whether or not the court which issued the process, judgment or order or of commitment or before
whom the detained person is charged, had jurisdiction or not to issue the process, judgment or order or
to take cognizance of the case, but rather, as the Court itself states in Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile, “in all
petitions for habeas corpus the court must inquire into every phase and aspect of petitioner’s
detention—from the moment petitioner was taken into custody up to the moment the court passes upon
the merits of the petition:” and “only after such a scrutiny can the court satisfy itself that the due
process clause of our Constitution has in fact been satisfied.” This is exactly what the Court has done in
the petitions at bar. This is what should henceforth be done in all future cases of habeas corpus. In short,
all cases involving deprivation of individual liberty should be promptly brought to the courts for their
immediate scrutiny and disposition.
FACTS:
These are 8 consolidated petitions for habeas corpus. Petitioners assert that their detention is unlawful on
two grounds: (1) they were arrested without warrant; and (2) no prior preliminary investigation was
conducted.
Rolando Dural’s petition
Dural shot 2 CAPCOM Soldiers. He was charged with double murder without bail. Later, Bernardo Itucal
was included as defendant. A petition for habeas corpus was filed on behalf of Roberto Umil, Rolando
Dural, and Renato Villanueva. Umil and Villanueva were charged for violating the Anti-subversion Act but
subsequently posted bail and were released. The double murder case filed against Dural and Itucal
proceeded to trial. The two were found guilty and were serving their sentences at the time the petition
was filed. Hence, the writ of habeas corpus is no longer available to Dural.
Arguments
Ocaya, Anonuevo, Caiple and Roque assert that the subversive documents found in their possession were
planted by the military. The People argued that they failed to substantiate their claim. There was also no
evil motive on the part of the respondents to falsely accuse the petitioners. The People also points out
that the arrest of the petitioners was not a a “witch-hunt” but borne out of an in-depth surveillance of
NPA safe houses.
ISSUE: Whether the warrantless arrests of the petitioners were valid – YES
RATIO: In all the cases above, criminal charges have been filed against the petitioners. Hence, habeas
corpus is not be allowed.
Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is
in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge, and that the court or judge had
jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order, or if such person is charged before any court, the writ
of habeas corpus will not issue.
The court refused to abandon its ruling in Ilagan v. Enrile, where it was held that the writ of habeas corpus
is not allowed after an information has been filed. The remedy would be that the Court inquires into every
phase of detention and that all cases of deprivation of liberty be brought to the courts for immediate
scrutiny and disposition.