Animal Law Outline Matthews Fall 2017

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Animal Law. Prof Matthew Fall 2017
1. What is an animal 3-15, 21-24, 26-33
a. What is “animal law”?
b. How do you define an “animal”?
c. What is the difference between a domesticated animal vs. a wild animal?
d. What is an animal
i. Arbitrary delineation. Answer is often crucial to the outcome of cases
1. Holdings are unpredictable
2. Counterintuitive.
e. Defining animal
i. Depends on statutes and attempts by legislature
ii. Different contexts
iii. Varies a lot
iv. Under American legal system, animals are property
f. Knox v. MA Soc for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals
i. Goldfish at fair
ii. No person shall offer or give away any live animal as a prize or an award in a
game
iii. Is a goldfish an animal?
iv. Interpreting this statute, designed to protect animals subject to possible
neglect, applies to goldfish
v. Similar examples
1. Trapholt art museum- goldfish in blenders
a. Only issue in Denmark
g. Lock v. Falkenstein
i. Cockfighting
ii. Gamecocks are animals and fighting is prohibited
iii. Court says biologically speaking, every living creature is presumed to be of the
animal species and several courts have construed numerous types of fowl to
come within the term
iv. However, court believes average person would not consider a rooster to be an
animal
v. Reasonable standard: Statute is found to be invalid. No ordinary man can
interpret. Would lead to absurd results. Tell legislature to make a new law if
they want to prohibit cock fighting.
1. Looked to other welfare acts in the state. Did define animals protected.
Believed that legislature wanted a broad definition but erred in doing
so. Slippery slope
vi. Other cases
1. People v. Baniqued- Animal is every dumb creature. Cockfighting
prohibited
2. State ex rel Miller v. Clairborne
a. Cocks are not animals. Chickens are seldom thought of as
animals
b. We interpret the law as we find it
Animal Law. Prof Matthew Fall 2017
3. TN lists no fighting of bull, bear, dog, cock, or other animal. Added
swine. Other animal still not defined
4. State v. Buford- Cocks are animals but cockfighting is not cruelty
h. State v. Cleve.
i. Deer caught in wire trap and caused to suffer. Charged and convicted of cruelty
to animals
1. Intent of legislature did not include game. Domestic animals and captive
wildlife.
2. Court said first clause wasn’t clear and next two was meant for
domestic animals. Court looked at past cases where only livestock and
domestics were included. As well as captive wildlife
i. ANIMAL WELFARE ACT
i. doesn’t Cover much. Minimal standards
ii. live or dead dog, cat, monkey (nonhuman primate mammal), guinea pig,
hamster, rabbit, or such other warm-blooded animal, as the Secretary may
determine is being used, or is intended for use, for research, testing,
experimentation, or exhibition purposes. “The agency excluded aquatic animals,
birds, rats, and mice.
iii. ACT Began to protect lab animals. Broadened to protect most animals used for
commercial purposes (research, zoos, circuses, exhibits, trainers). Farm animals,
birds, rats and mice excluded. Law supposed to provide lots of protection:
oversight by FDA, annual reviews of locations utilizing animals. In practice not
happening. Not enough resources. If law was being enforced, even then FDA has
not right to tell researchers what research is worthy, only to enforce minimal
standards of animal care. So many violations of AWA on regular basis, provides
good opportunities for animal rights lawyers. Criminal as well as civil cases
brought under AWA.
j. To bring an animal law case
i. Standing
1. Injury in fact that is traceably to the Ds actions and is redress able by the
requested relief. See EPSY
ii. Balancing
1. Courts want to balance to protect living creatures without extending
that protection to an unreasonable point and possibly unenforceable as
well.
a. Not experimenting on invertebrate fruit flies extreme in CA
iii. Problem in not having def
1. Ambiguity can lead to reversal of convictions after successful
constitution challenges for lack of notice and vagueness
k. Commonwealth v. Massini
i. Massini shot and killed neighbor’s cat
ii. Cat is not specifically named in statute. Equine animal, bovine animal, sheep,
goat pig
Animal Law. Prof Matthew Fall 2017
iii. Killing of cat not included. If the legislature wants to change the way this statute
is applied, they must change the statute
l. Commonwealth v. Cornella
i. Cornella’s dog attacked another dog. Her dog is considered dangerous now
ii. . Cornella was cited for "unlawfully keep[ing] or harbor[ing] a dangerous dog."
The Dog Law states that "a person whose domestic animal has been killed or
injured without provocation … may file a complaint … charging the owner or
keeper of such a dog with harboring a dangerous dog." P.S. Sec. 459-502A(a)(1)(ii)
iii. Cori argues that the definition of domestic animal in PA does not include dogs.
So her dog did not attack a domestic animal
iv. Domestic animal is not defined. Dogs are commonly domestic. It would be weird
not to. So yes. It is
m. US v. Geidon
i. Dog does not have value such as horse or cow etc. Therefore no criminal
charges
ii. Criminal offense should not be created by uncertain and doubtful construction
of a statute
n. Morgan v. Kroupa
i. Finders keepers for lost dog
ii. Note- dog theft is growingly becoming a felony!
o. Defining Companion Animal
i. Any non-human animal involved with one or more human beings in a
relationship which is at the very least a continuous bidirectional relationship
that brings significant benefit to a central aspect of the lives of each, which is in
some sense voluntary and in which each party treats the other just as
something entitled to respect and benefit in its own right but also as an object
of admiration.
1. Kranskey v. Meffen
a. Seven sheep killed. Considered companion animals. Names,
birthdays, special food. Court held the Ps were not entitled to
damages still.
2. Hudson v Janesville Conservation Club
a. P injured when a buck deer charged him while feeding other
deer at a park.
b. Statute precluded land owner liability from harm by a wild
animal
c. No definition for wild animal
d. Court found that animals in captivity are not considered wild.
Allowing them to be would create zero liability for zoo owners
3. Filipetti v Dept of wildlife
a. Snowball wild deer- family pet
b. Cannot keep wildlife without permit
c. Sent to petting zoo
Animal Law. Prof Matthew Fall 2017
4. Zinter ex rel Lyons v Oswkey
a. A wild caged rabbit is still wild
5. People v. Hepburn
a. Wolf hybrid born in captivity was not wildlife since raised as pet.
6. Moe the Chimp example
a. Davises had Moe for 30 years
b. He escaped and bit a police officer
c. Next year tip of woman’s finger
d. Removed and sent to Animal Haven Ranch.
e. Davies visit Moe and two other chimps escape and bit of Mr
Davis’ gentiles, all of his fingers, most of his face, and part of his
foot. Both chimps had to be shot.
7. Travis the Chimp
a. Attacked owners friend
b. She had to stab him multiple times. Wouldn’t stop
c. Police shot him
8. City of Rolling Meadows v. Kyle
a. Couple had monkey since birth- 7 years. Undomesticated animal
within city limits
b. Prohibited animals were bees goats sheep hogs cattle fowl
reptile or other normally wild dangerous to humans or
carnivore other than house pet
c. Where statute text has not specifically defined a term- common
or dictionary meaning prevails
d. Does domestic house pets mean only cats and dogs?
e. No; "domesticated house pets" does not include only cats and
dogs as the City contends. The statute does not define "house
pets," so the common popular meaning of that term applies.
That meaning clearly includes animals other than cats and dogs.
The Court therefore determined that the statute language did
not apply to the monkey (who was domesticated, and did not
have dangerous propensities of a wild animal). Additionally, to
interpret the phrase “domesticated house pets" to mean only
cats and dogs would have absurd result of banning the sale of
other common pets such as hamsters, birds, tropical fish, etc.
The couple presented evidence that the monkey was raised
from very young age, toiled trained, communicated, etc. and no
evidence was presented to the contrary which would show that
the monkey was a danger to the community. White’s dissent
maintains that, clearly, the statute disqualifies the allowance of
domesticated animals which were once wild (in the text
"attempted to domesticate" etc.).
9. Lakeshore Hills v. Adcox
a. Bear named yogi.
Animal Law. Prof Matthew Fall 2017
b. NOT DOMESTIC (thank god)
10. Caviler v Skelton
a. Tigers not household pets
11. Warren County Combined Health District v. Rittenhouse
a. Used to human interaction does not alter wild and untamed
nature to render them domestic (cougars)
12. Turudic v. Stephens
a. Cougars on property were integral part of family and had very
strong bond. Court found them to be family pets.
2. Property and Beyond- PP 35-63 and Trial Court Order
a. 1) What is a “person” under the law?
b. 2) What were the arguments FOR and AGAINST expanding protections, rights, and
privileges for certain groups of beings in the past?
c. Historically and generally even now, animals are the same as property of inanimate
objects.
d. Two justifications for status of animals in western legal system
i. “Humans are the best” -God
ii. Philosophical Justification
1. Humans are superior- Aristotle
2. Non-human animals are machines without souls. Not conscious or able
to suffer _-Descartes
e. Legal Definitions
i. Wild animals at Common Law (Blackstone)
1. Wild animals belong to the government, but an individual can get a
qualified property right in a wild animal by taming it, confining it, or
hunting taking and killing it to the exclusion of others
2. If a wild animal escapes, property rights can be defeated
ii. Domestic animals per Blackstone
1. Humans have ABSOLUTE property right in domestic animals
2. More legal protection over food animals as property $$$$$$$$$$$$4
iii. Black's Law Dictionary definition of a "person" -- in general usage, a human
being; though by statute, term may include a firm, labor organization,
partnership, association, corporations, legal representatives, trustees, trustees
in bankruptcy or receivers.
iv. A legal person has interests which can be protected by rights. A thing (like an
animal) may have interests, but they do not have legal rights. Things can be
protected by laws, but persons get to decide how much protection and by what
priority should be given to things.
v. Chimpanzee Cases -- if they got a positive ruling, it would be the first time that
the American legal system has recognized a nonhuman animal as a legal person.
This could have been an incredible precedent for future cases, regardless of the
final outcome. The writ was denied this July 2015. They did find, however, that
the organization did have standing to litigate on behalf of the chimpanzees.
f. Legal strategies
Animal Law. Prof Matthew Fall 2017
i. Try to ensure that protection for animals that are written into law are actually
enforced
ii. Provide their nonhuman clients some substitute for their delay in court when
they are injured
iii. Enable their human clients to bestow testamentary gifts on their animals
iv. Increase amount of damages for wrongful death or injury of Ps animal
g. Compare to History
i. Slavery pg 36
ii. Women pg 42
iii. Children pg 44
iv. Mental Incompetents pg 48
v. Potential humans- 52
vi. Non humans 56
1. Animals are not humans and are not inanimate objects
2. Two clearly separated categories in law
a. Property
b. Juristic persons
c. Favre’s theory is before 65
3. Injuries to animals- Theories of Liabilities 165-174. 176-186 200-208
a. How can I seek redress for the injury or death of my companion animal?
b. As a lawblr
i. Which causes of action to assert in a complaint has significance on damages and
public policy issues raised
ii. Will the court be asked to view the animals at issue as family members or
property?
iii. Can there be intentional torts
1. Emotional distress
2. Punitive damages
iv. Trespass in chattels?
v. Fourth amendment violations?
c. Common tortious causes of action involving pets:
i. NIED
ii. IIED
iii. Bailment
iv. Trespass to Chattel
v. Conversion
vi. Veterinary Malpractice
vii. Outrage
viii. Negligence / Gross Negligence
ix. Negligent harm to property WILL NOT support an emotional distress claim,
except in rare instances. States have carved out narrow sets of circumstances
under which NIED can be asserted even for harm o another person
x. Elements of NIED
1. Victim suffered a serious injury or death
Animal Law. Prof Matthew Fall 2017
2.
3.
4.
5.
Based on the negligence of D
P has a close/special relationship with V
P observed/was involved in Ds negligent act
Which caused P to suffer severe emotional distress
a. Florida uses the physical impact rule for deciding NIED cases.
This rule simply requires that something, anything, contacted or
impacted the P as a result of the D’s negligent act -- even a
pebble or the percussive effect of an explosion will fulfill the
requirement.
d. Detailed elements for NEID
i. D was negligent
ii. Ps emotional harm was so severe that it created observable and objective
physical symptoms or manifestations; and
iii. One of the three following elements depending on the state
1. the D’s conduct must have caused some kind of physical contact or
impact (however minor);
a. The "impact rule" is only followed in a few states. This rule
simply requires that something, anything, contacted or
impacted the P as a result of the D’s negligent act -- even a
pebble or the percussive effect of an explosion will fulfill the
requirement. Note that the D’s act must still be negligent, it is
only the impact that can be minor.
2. the P must have been in the "zone of danger" of the D’s negligent act;
a. The "zone of danger" rule is followed in a fair number of states.
This rule requires that the P was close enough to the D’s
negligent act that the P was at immediate risk of physical harm.
Like the impact rule, the zone of danger rule limits an NIED
claim to emotional harm based almost exclusively on fear of
injury.
3. it must have been foreseeable that the D’s negligent conduct would
have caused the P emotional harm.
a. The "foreseeability" rule is followed by a majority of states.
Foreseeability is a requirement in all standard negligence cases:
in essence, a D must have been able to reasonably predict that
his or her actions could result in the negative consequences
experienced by the P. This rule does not create the same kind of
artificial restrictions on NEID claims that the impact and zone of
danger rules do. The essential difference is that there is no
requirement that the D’s negligent conduct involve some form
or risk of physical harm.
iv. "Bystander" Cases Involving Close Family Members
1. A "bystander case" is where a close family member witnesses or arrives
immediately on the scene of an accident where another family member
was injured or killed by the D's negligence.
Animal Law. Prof Matthew Fall 2017
2. The difference between a bystander case and a typical NIED case is that
the P in a bystander case experienced mental or emotional anguish as a
result of seeing or believing a close family member would suffer grave
injury, as opposed to being the direct victim of the D's negligent act.
a. For example, where a wife witnesses a husband's severe injury
as a result of the D's reckless driving, or she arrives to witness
the immediate aftermath, that would likely create an NEID claim
in most states. A close friend of the husband witnessing the
same accident, however, could not sue for NIED.
b. Note that even in states that typically apply the impact or zone
of danger rule, the court will apply the foreseeability rule to a
"bystander" case.
v. McDougall v. Lamm
1. P witnesses her dog killed by Ds dog. Urges court that her dog was more
than property
2. Denied. Damages limited to intrinsic value or replacement cost.
3. "Although we recognize that many people form close bonds with their
pets, we conclude that those bonds do not rise to the level of a close
familial relationship or intimate, marital-like bond. We therefore decline
to expand the traditionally and intentionally narrow grounds
established in Portee to include claims arising from the death of a pet."
a. Portee- woman saw son die in elevator door
vi. Rabideau v. City of Racine
1. Dog shot and killed by police officer. Woman sees this incident. She
collapsed and needed medical treatment. Wants NIED for bystander
2. Nope. Dogs are property Nied not available. P had to be related.
Furthermore, no evidence officer acted with that intent. Used Bowen
Kleinken factors (Public Policy)
a. Whether the injury is too remote from the negligence
b. Whether the injury is wholly out of proportion to the culpability
of the negligence
c. Whether in retrospect it appears too extraordinary that
negligence should have brought the harm
d. Whether allowance of recovery would place an unreasonable
burden on the negligent tortfeasor
e. Whether allowance of recovery would be too likely to open the
way to fraudulent claims or
f. Whether allowance of recovery would enter a field that has no
sensible stopping point
e. Intentional Torts tho
i. Intentional torts most commonly applicable to cases of intentional inflection of
emotional distress, outrage, trespass to chattel and conversion
ii. Conversion
Animal Law. Prof Matthew Fall 2017
1. Ds intentional conduct deprives another of personal property by
withholding it or intentionally damaging it
2. Ds good or bad faith doesn’t matter
3. Crime is the nasty knowing “I’m GOING to take this away from you
iii. IIED
f.
1. Ds conduct must intend to cause emotional distress
a. Domestic abuser kills animal of victim
2. Ds conduct must be extreme and outrageous
3. Must cause the emotional distress in P
a. Why is this ok for animals? Because the IIED DEPENDS ON THE
CONDUCT of D not the subject of conduct
iv. Burgess v. Taylor
1. Boarding place sells horses for slaughter
2. Was a free lease where P made sure D knew that she was not giving
them ownership? She would take them back if they couldn’t keep them.
3. P visits her horses within a week to make sure they are ok without her.
They were gone. They were slaughtered within a month.
4. IIED BITCH- court held
a. (1) The element of outrage/IIED requiring "outrageous and
intolerable conduct" depends on conduct of the wrongdoer, not
the subject of conduct;
b. (2) Burgess's actions constituted outrage; and
c. (3) the trial court / jury award of $50,000 compensatory
damages and $75,000 punitive damages was not excessive.
v. Langford v. Emergency Pet Clinic
1. P sued a clinic and pet cemetery that had buried her dog in a massive
grave and court granted summary judgement in favor of Ds bc P failed
to prove that D conduct was intentional or reckless. Furthermore,
Mental anguish must be so serious and of a nature that no reasonable
man could be expected to endure it
vi. Womack v. Con Rardon- malicious injury to a pet which supported emotional
distress damages
1. Set cat on fire.
vii. Plotnick v Meinhaus
1. Ps dog sustained injuries from being hit with a bat.
2. Pet owner may recover for emotional distress under TRESPASS to
personal property. Court wouldn’t allow P to recover for dog’s injuries
under IIED bc they would have recovered duplicative damages
Vet Malpractice- Bailment
i. Bailment is delivery of personal property in trust for particular purpose
ii. MUTUALLY beneficial bailment- both parties benefit from the bailment, IE one
party gets paid the other party gets services
iii. To prove breach of bailment
1. There was an agreement
2. Property was delivered
Animal Law. Prof Matthew Fall 2017
3. Prove that it was either not returned or returned in worse condition
iv. Price v. Brown
1. Dog had surgery and was left unattended. Failed to monitor dogs
condition. Dog died
2. The issue presented in this appeal is whether a complaint based upon
an alleged breach of a bailment agreement states a cause of action for
injury or death suffered by an animal that has been entrusted to a
veterinarian for surgical and professional treatment.
3. Held. The court agreed with the trial court that the purpose for which
an animal is entrusted to the care of a veterinarian is a material fact that
must be considered in determining whether a P's complaint states a
cause of action as a matter of law, and that Price's complaint failed to
state a cause of action for professional negligence. The court held that
allegations of breach of a bailment agreement are insufficient to state a
cause of action against a veterinarian who has performed surgery on an
animal when the animal suffers an injury as a result or does not survive
the surgery.
a. To state a cause of action based upon negligent acts or
omissions of a vet P must plead
i. The employment of the vet or other basis for the duty
ii. The vet’s failure to exercise appropriate standard of
care
iii. That the vet’s departure from that standard was
proximate cause of animal’s injury or death
1. P must specifically allege that the vet was
negligent in performance of prof services
v. Williamson v. Prada
1. Court held medical malpractice standard applies to vet malpractice
cases
a. Several states have conflicting authority on this issue 206
g. Three standards for VM
i. Locality rule1. Look at other vets in the area
2. Made to protect small town doctors
ii. Comparable community1. Whatever is normal for a vet in a similar area
iii. State/nationwide1. Whatever is normal on a national / state level
a. Restrepo v. State of NY- horse racing case
h. Res Ipsa Loquitur- the thing speaks for itself. The breach is so obvious that you don’t
need expert testimony
i. If conduct was not within realm of profession negligence and needed no expert
testimony, P may not be required to prove breach of standard of care or meet
other malpractice requirements
Animal Law. Prof Matthew Fall 2017
ii. Horse hoof caught in treadmill. Has to be put down
i. Vet malpractice has no federal law
i. Requirements
1. Duty is always implied
2. Breach is failure to exercise appropriate standard of care
a. Big issue
b. Expert witness necessary
i. Difficult bc vets protect their own
c. Causation: Vets departure from standard of care was prox cause
d. Damage
3. Pro- animals treated more like peeps!
4. Cons
a. Animals considered animals when convenient
b. Raises costs of litigation
c. Difficult in establishing standard of care
d. Harder to prove than bailment
e. No doctor -pt relationship. No professional human relationship
f. Record keeping and proof problems
g. Eliminates bailment, assault, battery, negligent injury to
property and other tort claims
4. Injuries to animals- damages and valuation 210 thru 218. 221 through 222 232 thru 247, 231252
a. What damages can I recover when someone kills my companion animal or injures them?
i. Emotional distress damages are available where intentional tort has been
committed and sometime sin cases where the Ds conduct was reckless or
amounted to gross negligence but generally not in cases of simple negligence.
Punitive damages are also available for international torts, but such damages
focus on the conduct and financial means of the tortfeasor as opposed to the
harm suffered by the P and their animals
ii. . Traditional rule
1. You can always get fair market value for damage to any type of personal
property. Maybe zero bucks though- think Peluche
a. Sherman and Strickland- if the animal is merely injured, you get
the difference between its price before the injury and its price
after the injury. If the animal is killed, you get the FMV of a
similar/same animal or the cost of replacing the animal.
Whichever is less.
2. What if there is no FMV? Owner can get actual value, special value,
pecuniary value or just value. (minority)
a. This is the objective value of the animal to the owner but not in
a sentimental way. Depends on usefulness or services to the
owner.
i. Peculiar value- allows victim to value property when its
hard to figure how much its worth
Animal Law. Prof Matthew Fall 2017
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
ii. Real value- Green v, Leckington – no FMV, then would
consider actual value. If dog is worth nothing but does
something useful, this might be worth more.
iii. Heirloom value- no market value but personal value. D
would have to know that it is worth a lot to P. Could be
especially good if the dog is dead (withholding the
body)
iv. Factors to consider: Safety/protection provided by pet.
Value of training. Special training.
Companionship/emotional connection. Therapy
avoided. FMV. Age. Pedigree. Lineage.
Neutered/Spayed.
La Porte v. Associated Independents
i. Garbageman hurls can at Ps tethered dog and kills it. Dachshund.
ii. Court says obvi malicious and demonstrated an extreme indifference to the
right of the P. There was no prohibition of punitive damages relative to
awarding compensation for mental anguish as would be the case had there
been physical injury. Malicious destruction provides an element of damage for
which the owner should recover, irrespective of the value of the animal bc its
special training
Knowles Animal Hospital v. Wills FL
i. Left on heating pad. Mental pain considered
ii. Neglectful conduct which resulted in the burn injury suffered by the dog to have
been a character amounting to great indifference to the property of P, justifies
jury award
Kennedy v. Bias (FL)
i. Fred had stomach issues. Had to be watched after surgery. Was not. Next day
Fred dead.
ii. FL court pointed to impact rule= requires some physical impact prior to
emotional distress
iii. Welker v. S. Baptist Hospital FL recognized that there are exceptions
iv. Per Kennedy court, dogs don’t count. This is simple negligence
Andres ex rel Andes v. Lee County
i. Dog picked up by animal control
ii. Over heats waiting at shelter
iii. No negligence. No emotional distress
Barrios v. Safeway ins LA
i. Dog hit while kid walking him
ii. Dog died. Kid injured
iii. Mental anguish resulting from negligent harm to property is permitted when
owner is present or nearby and suffers psychic trauma as a result. P has to
prove psychic trauma in the nature of or similar to a physical injury as a direct
result of the property damage.
Animal Law. Prof Matthew Fall 2017
1. Judge looked at close relationship with pet. Dad picked up remains very
next day and buried in their yard. Had dog for 12 years. They were
nearby and arrived on scene. Etc
g. Corso v. Crawford Dog and Cat Hospital Inc
i. The 15 year old poodle. Brought in for treatment. Vet recommends euthanasia.
Lady plans elaborate funeral. Headstone, epitaph and attendance by others.
Casket has dead cat inside instead.
ii. Court says more than property less than person. P entitled to damages based on
value of dog beyond FMV since dog had already died when the tort was
committed. Normally P would be entitled to nothing bc dog is worth nothing
dead. Animals are “special”. Rejected heirloom value
h. Brouseau v. Rosenthal
i. Bailment CASE: Dog dies in kennel. Sued under bailment. Presumption of
negligence. P get damages for value to owner, not fair market value.
ii. How do we make the P whole in dollars for the negligence? Dog was a gift and a
mutt, no FMV. The court contravened common law principles and assessed the
dogs actual value to the owner in order to make the owner whole. Wanted to
avoid romanticizing the virtues of mans best friend, court stated it would be
wrong not to acknowledge the companionship and protection P lost with death
of her dog of 8 years
i. Strickland v. Melden
i. Dog escapes and is picked up by animal control. Family did not have fee at the
time. The shelter hung a hold for owner tag. Mistake- dogs euthanized
ii. Where a dog’s market value is unascertainable, the correct damages measure is
the dog’s ‘special or pecuniary value’ (that is, its actual value)—the economic
value derived from its ‘usefulness and services,’ not value drawn from
companionship or other non-commercial considerations. Relies on common law
ps and public policy concerns. Dogs are property. Rejects heirloom. Recovery
rooted in pet owner’s feelings is prohibited.
iii. McCurdy v. Union sets up personal property loss
1. Property is a total loss the measure of damages is the value of the
property destroyed or damaged- This is market value. If it has it
2. If the property is damaged but not destroyed, the measure of damages
is the difference between the market value of the property before the
injury and its market value after the injury= again if it has market value
3. If the property does not have a market value, then if a total loss, the
measure of damages is the cost to replace or reproduce the article. If it
cannot be reproduced or replaced, THEN its value to the owner MAY be
considered in fixing damages.
a. Miskie uses McCurdy to establish intrinsic loss for family films
pg 241
b. Womack v. Rardon held that malicious injury to an animal can
support a claim for emotional distress
Animal Law. Prof Matthew Fall 2017
c. Dillion v Oconnor- hunting dog hit and killed. Jury instructed
that awarding damages for factors over and above market value
was erroneous statement of law and ambiguous
d. P BEARS BURDEN OF PROOF TO SHOW WHICH MEASURE OF
DAMAGES APPLIES
j. Intrinsic value v. market value varies by jurisdiction
i. OR and WA P has to prove NO market value before intrinsic value applies
ii. In CA P cannot obtain peculiar value UNLESS they can prove some market value.
k. Anzilone v. Kragness
i. Cat gets attacked in animal hospital. Owner may include some element of
sentimental value.
l. Leith v. Frost
i. Dachshund gets attacked. Very old dog. $200 FMV. P however demonstrated
how much Molly was worth by paying $4784 for the vet care. Court changed
200 to match the 4784 in compensatory damages
m. Kimes v. Grosser
i. Adopted cat with no FMV shot on fence with BB gun
ii. Cat paralyzed. Fees of above 30000. Ct grants summary judgement for no FMV.
iii. Appellate court send back down. P is not plucking number out of air for
sentimental value. Costs incurred for pumpkins care. If D feels this is
unreasonable, burden is on D to prove so. Jury to decide if the care is
reasonable
1. Example of shot German Shepard
2. Example of Golden Retriever with gauze in leg
a. Katrina showed that Pets are exceptional with pet evacuation
legislation
b. CA statutes find animals are special 245
n. Hyland v. Borras
i. P allowed to be restored for necessary and reasonable expenses she incurred to
restore the dog to its condition before the attack. P raised dog, put effort into
dog to get it to maturity. 246
o. SOMETIMES YOU CAN GET FMV AND SENTIMENTAL BUT PROBABLY NOT A summary of
cases 246-24
5. Unlocking the Cage
6. Torts- Damages and Valuation 685-86, 229-230 -- Injuries caused by animals- strict liability and
common law 262-279
a. 685 and 86 are codes
b. TN was first state to codify right to recover damages for emotional distress and loss of
companionship for tortious harm. TBo act
c. Illinois follows suit
d. Injuries inflicted by animals
e. Common law rule
Animal Law. Prof Matthew Fall 2017
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
k.
l.
m.
n.
o.
i. SL for damage by livestock unless livestock on way to market, in which case only
N standard. Cats and dogs are allowed to roam without liability except if dog
enters land with livestock
Premise liability
i. Duty to maintain
ii. Strict Liability for wilds
Participants in activities involving animals
i. Strict liability
Animals known to be dangerous or wild
i. Eggshell P doesn’t apply here. Strict liability. Dangerous propensity required.
Negligent standard for dogs not known to be dangerous/ Negligent in preventing harm
i. Middle ground. Injuries from normal consequences of expected behavior.
Example Jumping.
1. Is it typical of the animal, breed, species or other criteria?
Baugh v. Betty.
i. Kid was bit by monkey at circus
ii. Court found instructions given were pre judicial where the jurors were told that
the patron could not recover if patrons conduct caused the injury or his dad did.
Sole Q should have been whether Patron knowingly and voluntarily Invited
injury bc animal was fearae natural, savage and vicious nature. No way a 4 year
old could know this
1. Strict liability
Enrych v. Robert Earli. 5 yr. old killed by jag at circus. Court hold circus organizers and handler liable.
Parallels to product liability
ii. Strict liability
iii. No experts bc jags are inherently dangerous. Anyone benefiting from ultrahazardous activity is liable
Stamp Case
i. Lions escape and enter orchestra. P was injured by crowds, not lions. Court
applied SL against the harborer of the animals, concluding panic of the crowd
was directly caused by the fera of an unsecured vicious animal
Theobald Case
i. P attacked by Lion at car show
ii. SL against auto dealer that used lion, public relations company that arranged for
the lion, animal agency that provided the lion and sponsor of the show
1. On appeal, sponsor was overturned.
Opet v. AL G Barnesi. D wins where leopard scratches kid who crossed rope to approach the cage
Land owner cannot be held liable for farae natural, indigenous wild animals, unless they
have taken possession, or control, or introduced a non-indigenous animal. Belhumer v.
Zilm.
i. Wild bee attack happened
ii. Wild animals are owned by no one except people generally- The Romans
Animal Law. Prof Matthew Fall 2017
p. Drake v. Dean
i. Jehovah’s come over and get knocked down by pit bull in driveway. Argues
negligence in addition to strict lability. Court agrees, finding that a negligence
cause of action arises whenever there is insufficient control of a dog in a context
which could be reasonably expected that injury COULD occur and did prox result
from negligence.
Note from Professor Matthews:
When we were talking about common law strict liability in terms of the Drake case, the P/victim
would need to show the owner/possessor knew or should have known the animal has a vicious or
dangerous propensity abnormal to its class. Let's not get confused. Look first to the "class"
component." Dogs, as a class, are not dangerous. (See Restatement and look at the Drake case
again.) So, the law sees a "vicious or dangerous propensity" as being abnormal to them as a class.
However, turning to the "vicious or dangerous propensity" component, the dog might be engaged
in what many of us think is "normal" dog behavior (e.g., playfully jumping on people in excitement), but a
jury might find that behavior to be a "dangerous propensity" ("dangerous playfulness" --re-read Drake). If
you then prove the owner/possessor knew about that habit, you could prove he/she was liable for the
resulting injury. Bottom line: A jury could find a dog has a particular "dangerous propensity" for
engaging in a behavior that many of us see as "normal" for many dogs.
Hopefully, when you go back and re-read Drake, it will make more sense to you. In many states,
common law strict liability for harm by domesticated animals has been superseded by statutes.
q. Pfeffer v. Simon
i. Dog bit Ps lip
ii. Dog previously at Ds cockatiel. Is dog propensity for danger? Nope
r. Some places give into breeds like pitties 276
s. Boitz v Preblich
i. Anything that injures. Dog bumps person and they fall. Remanded to trial. Not
excluded
t. Smith v. Pitchford
i. Ps mere presence on private property does not constitute provocation
regardless of movements interpretation
u. Anderson v Chrispherson
i. Dog has to be direct and immediate cause. P fell while trying to separate dogs
and broke hip
v. Nelson v. Hall
i. Vet bit while administering treatment- Knew of risk.
w. Dogs labeled as
i. Potentially dangerous
ii. Dangerous
iii. Potentially vicious
iv. Vicious
x. County is first line of authority that deals with dogs who bite or injure humans or other
animals. Variety of consequences
Animal Law. Prof Matthew Fall 2017
i. Waring with no restriction
ii. Muzzle and leash restrictions
iii. Euthanasia
iv. Hearing is usually informal. If goes to court – De Novo
y. Property but not owner of dog
i. Duty of care exists only if premises owner had
1. Knowledge of presence of dangerous animal
2. Knowledge of dangerous propensity
3. Right to remove animal by retaking possession f premises.
7. Injuries caused by animals- Florida §§ 767.01, 767.03, 767.04, 767.10-767.14, Fla. Stat. (2017)
a. 767.01. Dog owner's liability for damages to persons, domestic animals, or livestock
i. Owners of dogs shall be liable for any damage done by their dogs to a person or
to any animal included in the definitions of “domestic animal” and “livestock” as
provided by s. 585.01.
b. 767.03. Good defense for killing dog
i. In any action for damages or of a criminal prosecution against any person for
killing or injuring a dog, satisfactory proof that said dog had been or was killing
any animal included in the definitions of “domestic animal” and “livestock” as
provided by s. 585.01 shall constitute a good defense to either of such actions.
c. 767.04. Dog owner's liability for damages to persons bitten
i. The owner of any dog that bites any person while such person is on or in a
public place, or lawfully on or in a private place, including the property of the
owner of the dog, is liable for damages suffered by persons bitten, regardless of
the former viciousness of the dog or the owners' knowledge of such viciousness.
However, any negligence on the part of the person bitten that is a proximate
cause of the biting incident reduces the liability of the owner of the dog by the
percentage that the bitten person's negligence contributed to the biting
incident. A person is lawfully upon private property of such owner within the
meaning of this act when the person is on such property in the performance of
any duty imposed upon him or her by the laws of this state or by the laws or
postal regulations of the United States, or when the person is on such property
upon invitation, expressed or implied, of the owner. However, the owner is not
liable, except as to a person under the age of 6, or unless the damages are
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of the owner, if at the time of
any such injury the owner had displayed in a prominent place on his or her
premises a sign easily readable including the words “Bad Dog.” The remedy
provided by this section is in addition to and cumulative with any other remedy
provided by statute or common law.
d. 767.05. Owner's liability for damages by dog to dairy cattle
i. An owner or keeper of any dog that kills, wounds, or harasses any dairy cattle
shall be jointly and severally liable to the owner of such dairy cattle for all
damages done by such dog; and it is not necessary to prove notice to or
knowledge by any such owner or keeper of such dog that the dog was
mischievous or disposed to kill or worry any dairy cattle.
Animal Law. Prof Matthew Fall 2017
e. 767.10. Legislative findings
i. The Legislature finds that dangerous dogs are an increasingly serious and
widespread threat to the safety and welfare of the people of this state because
of unprovoked attacks which cause injury to persons and domestic animals; that
such attacks are in part attributable to the failure of owners to confine and
properly train and control their dogs; that existing laws inadequately address
this growing problem; and that it is appropriate and necessary to impose
uniform requirements for the owners of dangerous dogs.
f. 767.11. Definitions
i. As used in this act, unless the context clearly requires otherwise:
ii. (1) “Dangerous dog” means any dog that according to the records of the
appropriate authority:
1. (a) Has aggressively bitten, attacked, or endangered or has inflicted
severe injury on a human being on public or private property;
2. (b) Has more than once severely injured or killed a domestic animal
while off the owner's property; or
3. (c) Has, when unprovoked, chased or approached a person upon the
streets, sidewalks, or any public grounds in a menacing fashion or
apparent attitude of attack, provided that such actions are attested to
in a sworn statement by one or more persons and dutifully investigated
by the appropriate authority.
iii. (2) “Unprovoked” means that the victim who has been conducting himself or
herself peacefully and lawfully has been bitten or chased in a menacing fashion
or attacked by a dog.
iv. (3) “Severe injury” means any physical injury that results in broken bones,
multiple bites, or disfiguring lacerations requiring sutures or reconstructive
surgery.
v. (4) “Proper enclosure of a dangerous dog” means, while on the owner's
property, a dangerous dog is securely confined indoors or in a securely enclosed
and locked pen or structure, suitable to prevent the entry of young children and
designed to prevent the animal from escaping. Such pen or structure shall have
secure sides and a secure top to prevent the dog from escaping over, under, or
through the structure and shall also provide protection from the elements.
vi. (5) “Animal control authority” means an entity acting alone or in concert with
other local governmental units and authorized by them to enforce the animal
control laws of the city, county, or state. In those areas not served by an animal
control authority, the sheriff shall carry out the duties of the animal control
authority under this act.
vii. (6) “Animal control officer” means any individual employed, contracted with, or
appointed by the animal control authority for the purpose of aiding in the
enforcement of this act or any other law or ordinance relating to the licensure
of animals, control of animals, or seizure and impoundment of animals and
includes any state or local law enforcement officer or other employee whose
Animal Law. Prof Matthew Fall 2017
duties in whole or in part include assignments that involve the seizure and
impoundment of any animal.
viii. (7) “Owner” means any person, firm, corporation, or organization possessing,
harboring, keeping, or having control or custody of an animal or, if the animal is
owned by a person under the age of 18, that person's parent or guardian.
g. 767.12. Classification of dogs as dangerous; certification of registration; notice and
hearing requirements; confinement of animal; exemption; appeals; unlawful acts
i. (1) An animal control authority shall investigate reported incidents involving any
dog that may be dangerous and, if possible, shall interview the owner and
require a sworn affidavit from any person, including any animal control officer
or enforcement officer, desiring to have a dog classified as dangerous.
1. (a) An animal that is the subject of a dangerous dog investigation
because of severe injury to a human being may be immediately
confiscated by an animal control authority, placed in quarantine, if
necessary, for the proper length of time, or impounded and held. The
animal may be held pending the outcome of the investigation and any
hearings or appeals related to the dangerous dog classification or any
penalty imposed under this section. If the dog is to be destroyed, the
dog may not be destroyed while an appeal is pending. The owner is
responsible for payment of all boarding costs and other fees as may be
required to humanely and safely keep the animal pending any hearing
or appeal.
2. (b) An animal that is the subject of a dangerous dog investigation which
is not impounded with the animal control authority must be humanely
and safely confined by the owner in a securely fenced or enclosed area.
The animal shall be confined in such manner pending the outcome of
the investigation and the resolution of any hearings or appeals related
to the dangerous dog classification or any penalty imposed under this
section. The address at which the animal resides shall be provided to
the animal control authority. A dog that is the subject of a dangerous
dog investigation may not be relocated or its ownership transferred
pending the outcome of the investigation and any hearings or appeals
related to the dangerous dog classification or any penalty imposed
under this section. If a dog is to be destroyed, the dog may not be
relocated or its ownership transferred.
ii. (2) A dog may not be declared dangerous if:
1. (a) The threat, injury, or damage was sustained by a person who, at the
time, was unlawfully on the property or who, while lawfully on the
property, was tormenting, abusing, or assaulting the dog or its owner or
a family member.
2. (b) The dog was protecting or defending a human being within the
immediate vicinity of the dog from an unjustified attack or assault.
iii. (3) After the investigation, the animal control authority shall make an initial
determination as to whether there is sufficient cause to classify the dog as
Animal Law. Prof Matthew Fall 2017
dangerous and, if sufficient cause is found, as to the appropriate penalty under
subsection (5). The animal control authority shall afford the owner an
opportunity for a hearing prior to making a final determination regarding the
classification or penalty. The animal control authority shall provide written
notification of the sufficient cause finding and proposed penalty to the owner by
registered mail, certified hand delivery, or service in conformance with the
provisions of chapter 48 relating to service of process. The owner may file a
written request for a hearing regarding the dangerous dog classification,
penalty, or both, within 7 calendar days after receipt of the notification of the
sufficient cause finding and proposed penalty. If the owner requests a hearing,
the hearing shall be held as soon as possible, but not later than 21 calendar days
and not sooner than 5 days after receipt of the request from the owner. If a
hearing is not timely requested regarding the dangerous dog classification or
proposed penalty, the determination of the animal control authority as to such
matter shall become final. Each applicable local governing authority shall
establish hearing procedures that conform to this subsection.
iv. (4) Upon a dangerous dog classification and penalty becoming final after a
hearing or by operation of law pursuant to subsection (3), the animal control
authority shall provide a written final order to the owner by registered mail,
certified hand delivery or service. The owner may appeal the classification,
penalty, or both, to the circuit court in accordance with the Florida Rules of
Appellate Procedure after receipt of the final order. If the dog is not held by the
animal control authority, the owner must confine the dog in a securely fenced
or enclosed area pending resolution of the appeal. Each applicable local
governing authority must establish appeal procedures that conform to this
subsection.
v. (5)
1. (a) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (b), the owner of a dog
classified as a dangerous dog shall:
a. 1. Within 14 days after issuance of the final order classifying
the dog as dangerous or the conclusion of any appeal that
affirms such final order, obtain a certificate of registration for
the dog from the animal control authority serving the area in
which he or she resides, and renew the certificate annually.
Animal control authorities are authorized to issue such
certificates of registration, and renewals thereof, only to
persons who are at least 18 years of age and who present to the
animal control authority sufficient evidence of:
i. a. A current certificate of rabies vaccination for the
dog.
ii. b. A proper enclosure to confine a dangerous dog and
the posting of the premises with a clearly visible
warning sign at all entry points which informs both
Animal Law. Prof Matthew Fall 2017
children and adults of the presence of a dangerous dog
on the property.
iii. c. Permanent identification of the dog, such as a tattoo
on the inside thigh or electronic implantation.
The appropriate governmental unit may impose an
annual fee for the issuance of certificates of registration
required by this section.
2. 2. Immediately notify the appropriate animal control authority when
the dog :
a. a. Is loose or unconfined.
b. b. Has bitten a human being or attacked another animal.
c. c. Is sold, given away, or dies.
d. d. Is moved to another address.
Before a dangerous dog is sold or given away, the owner shall
provide the name, address, and telephone number of the new
owner to the animal control authority. The new owner must
comply with all of the requirements of this section and
implementing local ordinances, even if the animal is moved
from one local jurisdiction to another within the state. The
animal control officer must be notified by the owner of a dog
classified as dangerous that the dog is in his or her jurisdiction.
3. 3. Not permit the dog to be outside a proper enclosure unless the dog
is muzzled and restrained by a substantial chain or leash and under
control of a competent person. The muzzle must be made in a manner
that will not cause injury to the dog or interfere with its vision or
respiration but will prevent it from biting a person or animal. The owner
may exercise the dog in a securely fenced or enclosed area that does
not have a top, without a muzzle or leash, if the dog remains within his
or her sight and only members of the immediate household or persons
18 years of age or older are allowed in the enclosure when the dog is
present. When being transported, such dogs must be safely and
securely restrained within a vehicle.
a. (b) If a dog is classified as a dangerous dog due to an incident
that causes severe injury to a human being, based upon the
nature and circumstances of the injury and the likelihood of a
future threat to the public safety, health, and welfare, the dog
may be destroyed in an expeditious and humane manner.
vi. (6) Hunting dogs are exempt from this section when engaged in any legal hunt
or training procedure. Dogs engaged in training or exhibiting in legal sports such
as obedience trials, conformation shows, field trials, hunting/retrieving trials,
and herding trials are exempt from this section when engaged in any legal
procedures. However, such dogs at all other times in all other respects are
subject to this and local laws. Dogs that have been classified as dangerous may
not be used for hunting purposes.
Animal Law. Prof Matthew Fall 2017
vii. (7) A person who violates any provision of this section commits a noncriminal
infraction, punishable by a fine not to exceed $500.
h. 767.13. Attack or bite by dangerous dog; penalties; confiscation; destruction
i. (1) If a dog that has previously been declared dangerous attacks or bites a
person or a domestic animal without provocation, the owner is guilty of a
misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s.
775.083. In addition, the dangerous dog shall be immediately confiscated by an
animal control authority, placed in quarantine, if necessary, for the proper
length of time, or impounded and held for 10 business days after the owner is
given written notification under s. 767.12, and thereafter destroyed in an
expeditious and humane manner. This 10-day time period shall allow the owner
to request a hearing under s. 767.12. The owner shall be responsible for
payment of all boarding costs and other fees as may be required to humanely
and safely keep the animal during any appeal procedure.
ii. (2) If a dog that has previously been declared dangerous attacks and causes
severe injury to or death of any human, the owner is guilty of a felony of the
third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. In
addition, the dog shall be immediately confiscated by an animal control
authority, placed in quarantine, if necessary, for the proper length of time or
held for 10 business days after the owner is given written notification under s.
767.12, and thereafter destroyed in an expeditious and humane manner. This
10-day time period shall allow the owner to request a hearing under s. 767.12.
The owner shall be responsible for payment of all boarding costs and other fees
as may be required to humanely and safely keep the animal during any appeal
procedure.
iii. (3) If the owner files a written appeal under s. 767.12 or this section, the dog
must be held and may not be destroyed while the appeal is pending.
iv. (4) If a dog attacks or bites a person who is engaged in or attempting to engage
in a criminal activity at the time of the attack, the owner is not guilty of any
crime specified under this section.
i. 767.135. Attack or bite by unclassified dog that causes death; confiscation; destruction
i. If a dog that has not been declared dangerous attacks and causes the death of a
human, the dog shall be immediately confiscated by an animal control
authority, placed in quarantine, if necessary, for the proper length of time or
held for 10 business days after the owner is given written notification under s.
767.12, and thereafter destroyed in an expeditious and humane manner. This
10-day time period shall allow the owner to request a hearing under s. 767.12. If
the owner files a written appeal under s. 767.12 or this section, the dog must be
held and may not be destroyed while the appeal is pending. The owner is
responsible for payment of all boarding costs and other fees as may be required
to humanely and safely keep the animal during any appeal procedure.
j. 767.136. Attack or bite by unclassified dog that causes severe injury or death; penalties
i. (1) If a dog that has not been declared dangerous attacks and causes severe
injury to, or the death of, a human, and the owner of the dog had knowledge of
Animal Law. Prof Matthew Fall 2017
k.
l.
m.
n.
o.
p.
q.
r.
s.
t.
the dog's dangerous propensities, yet demonstrated a reckless disregard for
such propensities under the circumstances, the owner of the dog commits a
misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s.
775.083.
ii. (2) If the dog attacks or bites a person who is engaged in or attempting to
engage in a criminal activity at the time of the attack, the owner of the dog is
not guilty of any crime under this section.
767.14. Additional local restrictions authorized
i. This act does not limit any local government from adopting an ordinance to
address the safety and welfare concerns caused by attacks on persons or
domestic animals, placing further restrictions or additional requirements on
owners of dogs that have bitten or attacked persons or domestic animals, or
developing procedures and criteria for the implementation of this act, provided
that no such regulation is specific to breed and that the provisions of this act are
not lessened by such additional regulations or requirements. This section does
not apply to any local ordinance adopted prior to October 1, 1990.
___________________________________________________
Do dogs have dangerous propensities as a class?
i. No general rule- law recognizes dogs as a class. Vicious or dangerous
propensities would be abnormal as a class
Common law strict liability
i. P knows or should have known
ii. Dangerous
iii. Abnormal to class
iv. Causes harm or injury
1. Look at size of dog etc
Savage or ill tempered
i. If owner has a large dog and knows they have a habit of jumping, that could
qualify as dangerous propensity. Although normal behavior. If you know about
the habit- strictly liable
Some states have provocation some don’t. Is it from the viewpoint of the animal or
human after the fact
i. FL considers age of victim.
ii. Bad dog sign may not save you if small child
1. No longer has to say bad dog
767.04- unclear what last sentence means
767.01- is different from .04- damage caused by dog, you have to show but for dogs
actions injury would not have occurred
No public case law on 767.03
Definition of dangerous dog- any dog that has according to the records of appropriate
authority:
i. Has aggressively bitten, attacked or endangered or has inflicted severe injury on
a human being on public or private property
Animal Law. Prof Matthew Fall 2017
ii. Has more than once severely injured or killed a domestic animal while OFF
owner’s property
iii. Has, when unprovoked, chased or approached a person upon the streets,
sidewalks, or any public grounds in a menacing fashion or apparent attitude of
attack, provided that such actions are attested to in a sworn statement by one
or more persons and dutifully investigated by appropriate authorities.
8. Police Power and Due Process- Look at BSL Ch. 5 (bottom of p. 330- through n. 5 on p 339)
a. BSL – Breed specific legislation
i. Simply an extension of state and local laws that ban exotic, dangerous or wild
animals.
ii. OR discriminatory targeting of an identifiable group of dogs solely bc of their
race.
b. American Dog Owners Association and the City of Yakima
i. Three attacks by pits on unsuspecting citizens in town. Town bans all related pit
dogs.
ii. P argues vague and claims that a person of ordinary intelligence cannot tell
what is prohibited.
1. Must show adequate notice to citizens
a. Yes
2. Must show adequate standards to prevent arbitrary enforcement.
a. Just because it requires subjective evaluations by an officer
does not mean its unconstitutional.
b. Q is whether it invites an inordinate amount of discretion.
i. Passes
iii. Dogs are subject to police power and may be destroyed or regulated to protect
citizens
iv. Can ban harmless due to the group as long as rational basis
c. Garcia v. Village of Tijeras
i. Bans pit bulls
ii. Challenge based that
1. Void for vagueness
a. Nope. Passes
2. Violates substantive and procedural due process
a. Nope. Passes. Inherent characteristics
3. Provides for the taking of private property without just compensation
a. Passes.
d. Public outcry for these laws
i. Opponents state- most incidents are caused by irresponsible owners or the
training of dogs to fight or attack. Not inherently dangerous. Most are great
with kids.
9. Affirmative Acts of Cruelty and failure to act- 72-80. 86-90. 103-105. 142-146. 838.02, 828.12 Fl
Statute
a. Anti-cruelty statutes
b. Common provisions
Animal Law. Prof Matthew Fall 2017
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
vii.
viii.
ix.
Community service
Counseling
Cross-reporting
Definition of animal
Law enforcement policies
Penalties
Preconvention costs of care and forfeiture
Post-conviction reimbursement for costs of care
Payment procedures for costs of care
1. Bonding
2. Liens
3. Court ordered reimbursement
x. Restitution
xi. Vet Reporting Act
c. Exclusions
i. Classes of animals
ii. Specific activities
1. Hunting.
d. Challenges
i. Training
ii. Personal biases
iii. Financial burdens
iv. Community pressure
v. Animals as victims
e. State of OR v. Nix
i. Horses, and other farm animals, neglected and starved.
ii. Animals found to be victims! Individual animals as sentient beings.
f. Special Procedural issues in animal cruelty cases
i. Evidence
1. Property under law. Both victims and evidence under Anti-cruelty
statutes
2. Suffering animals not same as contraband found
ii. Pretrial forfeiture
1. Seizures upheld, early forfeiture of ownership rights in exchange for
dismissal
iii. Proving ownership
1. D has duty to provide minimum care.
2. Proof of ownership required as element of crime
3. Circumstantial evidence can be used to prove this fact even where
direct evidence is not available
iv. Examination of remains
1. Died of cruelty? Keep those remains as evidence through DOCUMENTED
post mortem examination as soon as possible
v. Conditions of release
Animal Law. Prof Matthew Fall 2017
1. No contact with animals provison
g. Affirmative acts of Cruelty
i. People v. Bunt
1. Beat a dog with a bat.
2. Law states- person who overdrives, overloads, tortures or cruelly beats
or unjustifiably injures, maims, mutilates or kills any animal, whether
wild or tame, and whether belonging to himself or to another. or
causes, procures or permits any animal to be overdriven, overloaded,
tortured, cruelly beaten or unjustifiably injured, maimed, mutilated, or
killed… or who willfully sets on foot, instigates, engages in, or any in way
furthers any act of cruelty to any animal or any act tending to produce
such cruelty, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
3. D says no definition of animal.
4. D says hard to understand
5. Court holds constitutional but not swell drafted. Not too broad. Room
for community standards and morals. Good to go.
ii. People v. Voelker
1. D kills and eats iguanas on TV.
2. Unjustifiable kill
3. Ct says only justification is that of protection of property.
4. Cooking show v. cruelty
5. Not torture- no prolonged pain
6. Is it a first amendment? Nope. Animal cruelty statute is based on action.
iii. Crush videos
1. 18 U.S.C. 48 (1999) Criminalized knowingly creating, selling or
possessing a “depiction of animal cruelty” with the intent to place it in
interstate commerce for “commercial gain.”
a. Depiction of animal cruelty = “any visual or auditory depiction . .
. of conduct in which a living animal is intentionally maimed,
mutilated, tortured, wounded, or killed, if such conduct is illegal
under Federal law or the law of the State in which the creation,
sale, or possession takes place, regardless of whether the
maiming, mutilating, torture, wounding, or killing took place in
the State.”
2. US v Stevens
a. SC held statute violated first amendment bc it was
unconstitutionally overbroad
b. Criminalizes depictions that are, in fact, not necessarily cruel:
statute is not tailored to prevent animal cruelty, even with the
requirement that underlying conduct be illegal
c. What Court did not address: whether preventing animal cruelty
is a compelling Gov’t interest or not
Animal Law. Prof Matthew Fall 2017
3. Animal Crush Video Prohibition Act of 2010 made it a crime to
knowingly create, sell, market, advertise, exchange, or distribute an
“animal crush video” in or using interstate commerce
a. “Animal Crush Video” = “depicts actual conduct in which 1 or
more living non-human mammals, birds, reptiles, or amphibians
is intentionally crushed, burned, drowned, suffocated, impaled,
or otherwise subjected to serious bodily injury”; and “is
obscene”
b. Facts from United States v. Richards: “Generally, the videos
portray Richards binding animals (a kitten, a puppy, and a
rooster), sticking the heels of her shoes into them, chopping off
their limbs with a cleaver, removing their innards, ripping off
their heads, and urinating on them. Richards is scantily clad and
talks to both the animals and the camera, making panting
noises and using phrases such as ‘you like that?’ and ‘now that’s
how you fu– a pussy real good.’”
c. First Challenge Under New Statute: United States v. Richards
d. 2013: Texas district ct struck down law on First Am grounds
e. 2014 – Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed lower court’s
ruling, holding that the 2010 Animal Crush Video Prohibition Act
is constitutional, noting that Congress has legitimate interest in
preventing “wanton torture and killing that, as demonstrated by
federal and state animal-cruelty laws, society has deemed
worthy of criminal sanction”
h. Martinez v. TX
i. 83 yr old takes in homeless animals
ii. Charged with cruelty to animals and convicted by jury.
iii. 1 yr confinement and 1000.00
iv. The trial court probated the sentence and the fine for two years on the
condition that Martinez perform one hundred hours of community service at a
local animal shelter.
v. Martinez raises five appellate issues. In two key issues, Martinez challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting her conviction. Specifically, Martinez
argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to prove she
"intentionally or knowingly" withheld care for the animal she called "Lobo."
vi. The jury, faced with evidence, had no choice but to find the old bit guilty. She
should have not accepted the dog nor kept it without treatment for so long.
i. People v. Thomason
i. More crushing
ii. Argues killing mice and rodents that are hazardous to property and health make
this ok
iii. Difference here is motive
iv. Moral sensitivity
v. Torture before death isn’t cool
Animal Law. Prof Matthew Fall 2017
vi. Motive outweighs other things. EVEN if trapping them first, still not ok
j. Pertinent Criminal Statutes Florida Statutes (2017)
k. § 828.02 Definitions.
i. In this chapter, and in every law of the state relating to or in any way affecting
animals, the word “animal” shall be held to include every living dumb creature;
the words “torture,” “torment,” and “cruelty” shall be held to include every act,
omission, or neglect whereby unnecessary or unjustifiable pain or suffering is
caused, except when done in the interest of medical science, permitted, or
allowed to continue when there is reasonable remedy or relief; and the words
“owner” and “person” shall be held to include corporations, and the knowledge
and acts of agents and employees of corporations in regard to animals
transported, owned, employed by or in the custody of a corporation, shall be
held to be the knowledge and act of such corporation.
l. § 828.12 Cruelty to Animals.
i. (1) A person who unnecessarily overloads, overdrives, torments, deprives of
necessary sustenance or shelter, or unnecessarily mutilates, or kills any animal,
or causes the same to be done, or carries in or upon any vehicle, or otherwise,
any animal in a cruel or inhumane manner, commits animal cruelty, a
misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or by a
fine of not more than $5,000, or both.
ii. (2) A person who intentionally commits an act to any animal, or a person who
owns or has the custody or control of any animal and fails to act, which results
in the cruel death, or excessive or repeated infliction of unnecessary pain or
suffering, or causes the same to be done, commits aggravated animal cruelty, a
felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or by a fine of
not more than $10,000, or both.
1. (a) A person convicted of a violation of this subsection, where the finder
of fact determines that the violation includes the knowing and
intentional torture or torment of an animal that injures, mutilates, or
kills the animal, shall be ordered to pay a minimum mandatory fine of
$2,500 and undergo psychological counseling or complete an anger
management treatment program.
2. (b) A person convicted of a second or subsequent violation of this
subsection shall be required to pay a minimum mandatory fine of
$5,000 and serve a minimum mandatory period of incarceration of 6
months. In addition, the person shall be released only upon expiration
of sentence, is not eligible for parole, control release, or any form of
early release, and must serve 100 percent of the court-imposed
sentence. Any plea of nolo contendere shall be considered a conviction
for purposes of this subsection.
iii. (3) A person who commits multiple acts of animal cruelty or aggravated animal
cruelty against an animal may be charged with a separate offense for each such
act. A person who commits animal cruelty or aggravated animal cruelty against
more than one animal may be charged with a separate offense for each animal
such cruelty was committed upon.
iv. (4) A veterinarian licensed to practice in the state shall be held harmless from
either criminal or civil liability for any decisions made or services rendered
under the provisions of this section. Such a veterinarian is, therefore, under this
Animal Law. Prof Matthew Fall 2017
subsection, immune from a lawsuit for his or her part in an investigation of
cruelty to animals.
v. (5) A person who intentionally trips, fells, ropes, or lassos the legs of a horse by
any means for the purpose of entertainment or sport shall be guilty of a third
degree felony, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. As
used in this subsection, “trip” means any act that consists of the use of any wire,
pole, stick, rope, or other apparatus to cause a horse to fall or lose its balance,
and “horse” means any animal of any registered breed of the genus Equus, or
any recognized hybrid thereof. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply
when tripping is used:
1. (a) To control a horse that is posing an immediate threat to other
livestock or human beings;
2. (b) For the purpose of identifying ownership of the horse when its
ownership is unknown; or
3. (c) For the purpose of administering veterinary care to the horse.
m. § 828.122 Fighting or Baiting Animals; Offenses; Penalties
i. (1) This act may be cited as “The Animal Fighting Act.”
ii. (2) As used in this section, the term:
1. (a) “Animal fighting” means fighting between roosters or other birds or
between dogs, bears, or other animals.
2. (b) “Baiting” means to attack with violence, to provoke, or to harass an
animal with one or more animals for the purpose of training an animal
for, or to cause an animal to engage in, fights with or among other
animals. In addition, “baiting” means the use of live animals in the
training of racing greyhounds.
3. (c) “Person” means every natural person, firm, copartnership,
association, or corporation.
iii. (3) Any person who knowingly commits any of the following acts commits a
felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s.
775.084:
1. (a) Baiting, breeding, training, transporting, selling, owning, possessing,
or using any wild or domestic animal for the purpose of animal fighting
or baiting;
2. (b) Owning, possessing, or selling equipment for use in any activity
described in paragraph (a);
3. (c) Owning, leasing, managing, operating, or having control of any
property kept or used for any activity described in paragraph (a) or
paragraph (b);
4. (d) Promoting, staging, advertising, or charging any admission fee to a
fight or baiting between two or more animals;
5. (e) Performing any service or act to facilitate animal fighting or baiting,
including, but not limited to, providing security, refereeing, or handling
or transporting animals or being a stakeholder of any money wagered
on animal fighting or baiting;
6. (f) Removing or facilitating the removal of any animal impounded under
this section from an agency where the animal is impounded or from a
location designated by the court under subsection (4), subsection (5), or
subsection (7), without the prior authorization of the court;
Animal Law. Prof Matthew Fall 2017
iv.
v.
vi.
vii.
viii.
ix.
x.
7. (g) Betting or wagering any money or other valuable consideration on
the fighting or baiting of animals; or
8. (h) Attending the fighting or baiting of animals.
9. Notwithstanding any provision of this subsection to the contrary,
possession of the animal alone does not constitute a violation of this
section.
(4) If a court finds probable cause to believe that a violation of this section or s.
828.12 has occurred, the court shall order the seizure of any animals and
equipment used in committing the violation and shall provide for appropriate
and humane care or disposition of the animals. This subsection is not a
limitation on the power to seize animals as evidence at the time of arrest.
(5) If an animal shelter or other location is unavailable, a court may order the
animal to be impounded on the property of its owner or possessor and shall
order such person to provide all necessary care for the animal and to allow
regular inspections of the animal by a person designated by the court.
(6) If a veterinarian finds that an animal kept or used in violation of this section
is suffering from an injury or a disease severe enough that it is not possible to
humanely house and care for the animal pending completion of a hearing held
under s. 828.073(2), final disposition of the criminal charges, or court-ordered
forfeiture, the veterinarian may euthanize the animal as specified in s. 828.058.
A veterinarian licensed to practice in this state shall be held harmless from
criminal or civil liability for any decisions made or services rendered under this
subsection.
(7) If an animal can be housed in a humane manner, the provisions of s. 828.073
shall apply. For the purpose of a hearing provided pursuant to s. 828.073(2), any
animal baited, bred, trained, transported, sold, owned, possessed, or used for
the purpose of animal fighting or baiting shall be considered mistreated.
(8) In addition to other penalties prescribed by law, the court may issue an
order prohibiting a person who is convicted of a violation of this section from
owning, possessing, keeping, harboring, or having custody or control over any
animals within the species that are the subject of the conviction, or any animals
kept for the purpose of fighting or baiting, for a period of time determined by
the court.
(9) This section shall not apply to:
1. (a) Any person simulating a fight for the purpose of using the simulated
fight as part of a motion picture which will be used on television or in a
motion picture, provided s. 828.12 is not violated.
2. (b) Any person using animals to pursue or take wildlife or to participate
in any hunting regulated or subject to being regulated by the rules and
regulations of the Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission.
3. (c) Any person using animals to work livestock for agricultural purposes.
4. (d) Any person violating s. 828.121.
5. (e) Any person using dogs to hunt wild hogs or to retrieve domestic hogs
pursuant to customary hunting or agricultural practices.
(10) This section shall not prohibit, impede, or otherwise interfere with
recognized animal husbandry and training techniques or practices not otherwise
specifically prohibited by law.
Animal Law. Prof Matthew Fall 2017
10. Dog fighting speaker. 100-103, 114-118; 147-154. Rodriguez v. State 155-161 n.3
a. Failure to act
i. Failure to provide a min care
1. Hoarding is difficult due to number of animals involved, resources to
rescue said animals, treat and foster the animals and the case
management issues that arise.
ii. State v. Schott
1. Hog farmer and cattle farmer
2. Negligence- dead and starving cattle were visible from road.
3. Problems due to snow.
4. Once accused of a crime may be convicted on basis of circumstantial
evidence, even if, taken as a whole, the evidence establishes guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. State not required to disprove every hypo
of that guilt.
5. He intentionally or recklessly subjected livestock to cruel mistreatment
6. The first Schott was intentionally or recklessly cruel to his livestock. The
second Schott, hindered by weather, was prevented from caring for his
animals.
7. As reflected by the verdict, the jury did not hear the second Schott.
Judgment of Schott's conviction is affirmed.
b. People v. Youngblood
i. 92 cats! Kept in a trailer. Less than 1 sq foot per cat. D charged with seven
counts of animal cruelty
ii. NECESSITY! Saving the cats
iii. Trial court rejects this.
iv. FELONY and on probation
v. Better to have public and private shelters pick up or take in animals than
citizens.
c. State v. Thompson
i. D collected strays and sent sold them to a serum company.
ii. Held dogs on vacant lots
iii. Dogs thin and quite hungry
iv. When found on hot day, most without water.
v. Ct reversed the conviction holding that no evidence the dogs suffered
unjustifiable pain or distress bc evidence only showed they were hot
11. Continued 10
a. Animal FIGHTING
i. FEDERAL ANIMAL FIGHTING PROVISION -- unlawful to:
1. “knowingly sponsor or exhibit an animal in an animal fighting venture”
2. “knowingly sell, buy, possess, train, or transport, deliver, or receive any
animal for purposes of having the animal participate in an animal
fighting venture”
3. “knowingly attend an animal fighting venture”
4. Knowingly cause [a minor under 16] to attend”
Animal Law. Prof Matthew Fall 2017
ii. -underlined language added in 2014
1. Enhanced Fed. Penalties After Vick:
2. Pre-2007: max. 1-yr prison sentence
3. Post-2007: max. 5-yr prison sentence except for:
4. Attendance: max of 1 yr prison & $100,000 fine
5. Bring a minor: max of 3 yr prison & $250,000 fine
6. Michael Vick’s dog-fighting case:
7. August 2007: pled guilty to criminal charges and also admitted to
executing several dogs
iii. Sentence:
1. Restitution: $928,073 to evaluate dogs and find proper disposition
2. $5,000 for each dog likely to be rehab’d and adopted by members of
public
3. $18,275 to rescue organizations for each dog likely to spend rest of life
in more restrictive envt (e.g., sanctuary or rescue group)
4. Sentenced to 23 months in prison, with supervised release for 3 yrs
5. Suspended from National Football League
iv. Florida’s Animal Fighting Act – § 828.122(3), Fla. Stat. (2015)
Unlawful to knowingly do any of the following:
1. (a) Baiting, breeding, training, transporting, selling, owning, possessing,
or using any wild or domestic animal for the purpose of animal fighting
or baiting;
2. (b) Owning, possessing, or selling equipment for use in any activity
described in paragraph (a);
3. (c) Owning, leasing, managing, operating, or having control of any
property kept or used for any activity described in paragraph (a) or
paragraph (b);
4. (d) Promoting, staging, advertising, or charging any admission fee to a
fight or baiting between two or more animals;
5. (e) Performing any service or act to facilitate animal fighting or baiting,
including, but not limited to, providing security, refereeing, or handling
or transporting animals or being a stakeholder of any money wagered
on animal fighting or baiting;
6. (f) Removing or facilitating the removal of any animal impounded under
this section from an agency where the animal is impounded or from a
location designated by the court under subsection (4), subsection (5), or
subsection (7), without the prior authorization of the court;
7. (g) Betting or wagering any money or other valuable consideration on
the fighting or baiting of animals; or
8. (h) Attending the fighting or baiting of animals.
9. Notwithstanding any provision of this subsection to the contrary,
possession of the animal alone does not constitute a violation of this
section.
b. Cockfighting
Animal Law. Prof Matthew Fall 2017
i. Not legal any more yo
ii. Rodriguez v. State
1. 100 animals on Ds property with overwhelming paraphernalia used to
prepare and treat roosters for fighting
2. Mere possession of fowl is not evidence of crime
3. Offenses within the statute include the element of fighting or bating
(828.122) Requires evidence of animal fighting or bating
4. Court granted motion for acquittal bc state failed to produce evidence
of actual fighting or bating beyond paraphernalia.
c. Dog Fighting
i. Ash v. State
1. Guilty of promoting or engaging in dog fighting or possessing a dog for
that purpose and fined D.
2. Police raided Ds home and found an arena for dog fighting. Court faced
with issue of “promotes”
3. Court affirmed though. Defined as further, encourage, advance.
4. D was familiar with pit. Knew what it could be used for. Knew her
Husband fought dogs. Reasonable conclusion. YES BITCH
ii. Hargrove v State
1. Ds convicted of dogfighting and gambling.
a. 1) the statute prohibiting dogfighting is not unconstitutionally
vague, and does not violate equal protection;
b. (2) penalty provided for violating the dogfighting statute does
not amount to cruel and unusual punishment;
c. (3) evidence was sufficient to support convictions;
d. (4) dogfighting is not as a matter of law a lesser included
offense of commercial gambling; and
e. (5) dogfighting was not as a matter of fact a lesser included
offense of commercial gambling.
d. Animal abuse and human abuse
i. Schambon v. Commonwealth
1. Animal shelter told of animals in grage
2. Without food or water or vents
3. Covered in dog shit, super hot, etc water empty.
4. Poodle eating Pomeranian
5. Cats inside!
6. Ladys like- they’re my husbands. He doesn’t listen.
7. Has four kids. Aged 13-5
8. Bad conditions for animals evidenced the bad environment for the kid.
Relevant to all charges..
12. Regulation of Ag animals. NJ for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. V. NJ Department of
Agriculture 377-400. Eating Animals excerpt
a. 10 billion land animals are raised and killed for meat, eggs, milk each year
b. Makes up 98% of animal use
Animal Law. Prof Matthew Fall 2017
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i. 90% chickens
CAFO- concentrated animal feeding operations
NJ Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. V. NJ department of Agriculture
i. Interst groups challenged regulations adopted by AG establishing standards for
humane treatment of domestic livestock.
Routine Industry practices at issue
i. Debeaking.
ii. Force feeding
iii. Tail docking
iv. Casteration without anesthesia
v. Battery cage hens
vi. Veal tethering
vii. Transporting downed animal for slaughter
viii. Holdings
1. regulations were not arbitrary or capricious as a whole;
2. safe harbor for routine husbandry practices failed to comply with
statutory directive that practices be humane;
3. evidence was insufficient to support safe harbor for cow tail docking;
4. safe harbor for castration, de-beaking, and toe-trimming lacked
objective standards of “knowledge” required to “minimize pain”;
5. safe harbor for crating and tethering veal calves and swine was not
arbitrary and capricious; and
6. safe harbor for transporting sick or downed animals was not arbitrary
and capricious
Humane and Animal Welfare wa defined byt also made safe harbor for routine
husbandry practices
i. Humane- marked by compassion, sympathy and consideration for welfare of
animals
ii. Animal Welfare- means a state or condition of physical or psychological
harmony between animal and its surroundings. Absence of deprevation,
aversive stimulation, over stimulation or any other imposed condition that
adversely affects health and productivity of the animal”
iii. Routine Husbandry Practices: “means those techniques commonly taught by
veterinary schools, land grant colleges, and agricultural extension agents for the
benefit of animals, the livestock industry, animal handlers and the public health
...”
Cafo- Concentrated Animal Feeding Operation
i. Enables companies to raise large numbers of animals
ii. Max effiency, increase profits, lower maintenance, decreased price
Public health
i. Antibiotic resistance- half us antibiotics go to animals
ii. Climate change- 18% of greenhouse gasses
iii. Water pollution
iv. Air pollution
Animal Law. Prof Matthew Fall 2017
i.
State anti cruelty statutes
i. Some have exemption for customary farming practices or accepted husbandry
practices
1. Idaho: if its commonly acceptable it’s not cruel, animals should be
slaughtered in a humane way
ii. Some states have animal cruelty statutes that exclude farm animals from the
definitions
iii. A few states have anti-cruelty laws that appear to include farm animals (e.g.,
NY, Calif, Fla.) but enforcement is problematic
j. Other state laws
i. State humane slaughter laws
ii. State laws re: animal transportation
iii. Laws re: proper disposal of dead animal
k. No federal laws that regulate the welfare of farm animals while they are being raised
i. but plenty about how you handle farm animals to keep the public health food
supply clean, pollution, etc.
ii. No federal cruelty laws that protect farm animals
l. Animal Welfare Act (fed. Law)
i. Covers adequate shelter, food, care etc
ii. Protects zoos, exhibition animals, research animals etc.
1. Not farm animals raised for food or chickens/turkeys
iii. Thus only protects farm animals used for research or exhibition or teaching
1. All other farm animals not covered
2. Not applicable for birds like chickens and turkeys bc birds arent included
in definition of animal
iv. Does not regulate small breeders, pet stores, sales of animals online or at flea
markets (lots of exemptions
m. 28 hour law (federal law)
i. After 28 consecutive hrs of travel transporters are required to unload the
animals and give them 5 hrs of food, water, and rest.
ii. Limitations
1. Not applicable to chickens and turkeys bc not defined as animals
2. Up until 2006 not applicable to transport by truck
3. Difficult to monitor and the fine is minimal
4. Transport that provides food, water, and opportunity for rest is
exempted
n. Humane Methods of Slaughter Act(fed law)
i. When first passed gave no teeth the gov't to enforce act, but now does
o. Only 2 methods of slaughter deemed to be "humane"
i. Must render the animal "insensible to pain" before slaughter- eliminate their
ability to feel pain; OR
Animal Law. Prof Matthew Fall 2017
ii. Must qualify for ritual slaughter exception (i.e. not required to eliminate their
ability to feel pain (i.e., not required to eliminate their ability to feel pain before
slaughter)
p. Insensible to pain
i. Captive bolt (most used for cows, sheep, goats)
ii. Electrical shock (most used for pigs)
iii. Gunshot (most used for pigs)
iv. Chemical stunning (tunnel gas chamber, sheep, calves, and swine, have to kill
quickly before it wears off)
v. Before slaughter: Before the animal is shackled, hoisted, thrown, cast or cut
open
q. Do exceptions slaughter the rule?
i. HMSA does not include: chickens, turkeys, rabbits, fish, bison, elk, antelope,
ostrich
ii. USDA finds these animals are not “livestock” under the HMSA
iii. Does not apply: Farm animals killed for personal consumption, Animals killed
solely for their skins/furs, or other parts, and Diseased animal
iv. Doesn't include birds bc the year it passed the dictionary definition of livestock
did not include them
r. The language of the statute is misleadingly humane bc of how it is put into practice
s. Horse Meat for Human Consumption
t. We export A LOT of horse meat, but there is no real market for it domestically
i. In 2006 there were 3 horse slaughter plants in America and they were owned by
foreign companies for export
u. Then Congress withheld money for inspection for horsemeat
v. So it could not be transported for human consumption across state lines
w. TX passed a law banning the sale of horsemeat for humans to eat
x. Upheld
y. IL followed up doing same thing
z. By 2007 he 3 horse slaughter houses closed
aa. OK banned horse meat sale too so only 3 states have banned it
i. LA says its unfit but didn’t ban it
ii. Since then three states opened new slaughterhouses and got permits (facing
opposition)
iii. This year the legislature struck down a move to ban horse meat sale
iv. Basically what people are doing is sending the horses to Mexico and Canada to
be slaughtered
v. Preventing horse slaughter facilities from opening in the US has pros and cons
13. No class
14. Regulation of Agricultural Animals ALDF v. Otter, FLA statute 828.22-828.26 Article 10, section
21 Fla constitution
a. Regulation of Ag Animals
b. Slaughtering horses
i. Are there pros?
Animal Law. Prof Matthew Fall 2017
ii. Cons
1. Not treated like livestock
2. Transporation issues involved
3. Height requirements in trailers
c. Ag Gag
i. Utah first prosecution of ag gag law
ii. First amendment?
1. No material harm caused
2. First amendment protects false speech except when it directly causes
material harm
d. Five freedoms
i. Thrist and hunger
ii. Discomfort
iii. Pain injury and disease
iv. Fear and distress
e. Reduce the speedline of slaugher houses, increase training of workers, apply humane
methods to birds, gas or chemical stunning
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