Human Trafficking Aff and Neg - SDI 2018 BGHT (1)

advertisement
---Trafficking Aff---
--Case--
1AC (Modeling+Syndicates)
1AC — Plan
The United States federal government should provide visas that include
access to relevant services and protections for internationally trafficked
victims to the United States, via legal immigration, who would otherwise be
excluded based on the law enforcement cooperation requirement or a narrow
definition of human trafficking.
1AC — Global Crime Syndicates
Contention _: Global Crime Syndicates
Victim centered approaches are key to effectively obtain information to
prosecute and end global trafficking rings
Heinrich 10 — Kelly Hyland Heinrich, Esq. Senior Policy Advisor in the Office to Monitor
and Combat Trafficking in Persons at the U.S. Department of State, “Ten Years After the
Palermo Protocol: Where are Protections for Human Trafficking Victims?” Human Rights Brief,
Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 1,
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1145&context=hrbrief
Introduction
This year, we celebrate the 10-year anniversary of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (Palermo Protocol or Protocol),1
which introduced the concept of the “3P” paradigm of prevention, victim protection, and
prosecution efforts to combat modern slavery.2 Anniversaries, including this one, afford us a
moment to look back, celebrate accomplishments, and begin to chart a path forward. In 2001, in
this publication, I predicted that without strong protection measures, the law enforcement
efforts that the Protocol mandates for State Parties would suffer.3 The conclusion was that the
ultimate measure of the Palermo Protocol’s impact would therefore be determined by the level
of victim protections State Parties chose to incorporate into their domestic law.
While ten y ears may be too soon to judge, an interim assessment is important to gauge our progress and po int the way forward. This article aims to report on the current statu s of
protections afforded to traffic ked persons and how they are connected to the success of prosecution efforts, focusin g on what appear to be the most egregious v iolations of v ictim protection s — the lack of proactive identif ication, v ictim services, and alternatives to detentio n and deportation. Backgrou nd Th e U.S. Department of State ’s Office to Mo nitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons leads the U. S. government’s dip lomatic engagement on the issue of h uman trafficking. T he Office is mandated by the U.S. Con gress to prod uce the annual Traffickin g in Persons Report, 4 w hich is then used as a tool to encourage government progress from one year to the next. The Report is dis tinct in that it focuses on trafficking not only as a violation of human righ ts norms, but also as a crime to be con- fronted by vigorous law enforcement action, victim protection, and preventio n efforts.5 The Repor t places countries ’ anti -trafficking efforts in fo ur grouping s or tiers from which sanctions and o ther actions can flow.6 U pon the release of each y ea r’s Report, the United States wor ks
in partnership with go vernments worldwide to develop national action p lans, su pport civ il society efforts, and generally make advancements in the interwoven approaches of prosecution, pro tection, and prevention. Human Trafficking in 2010 A decade of a ctual victims ’ accounts has greatly aided our unde rstanding of human trafficking. Ten y ears ago, reports, stud ies, and programs focused primarily on women and girls and, to a large degree, they still d o. Today , however, there is greater recognition that men and boy s are also found in bondage in con structio n, food service, manufacturing, agriculture, begging, and commercial sex industr ies.7 Women are found trapped in commercial sexual exploitation and with in variou s labor sectors includin g domestic wor k, garment manufacturing, and agriculture.8 Prosecutors, service providers, and trafficked persons themselves can also spea k to the fact that the y ear 2000’s depiction of victims as naïve, uneducated, duped or kidnapped is an unhelpful and offensive stereoty pe.9 The portray al of the weak and easily duped victim
ignores the impulse, necessity , and agency of many who seek a better life in the face of difficult circumstances, even at the ris k of being in harm’s way . The reality today is that people see king and accepting employ ment are finding themselves in coercive situation s at the hands of their employ ers and pimps. The outdated focus on internatio nal or cross-border trafficking is diminis hing as well, with more governments recognizing that the term “trafficking” as set forth in the Palermo Protocol does not conno te movement, but is instead a crime of compelled service, and that a significant number of trafficking vic tims never travel any distance or cross a border; governments are recognizing that their own citizens are trafficking victims with in their borders. We have also learned that traffickers are adap tive, respons ive and seek out zones of v ulnerability that result from weak criminal penalties, lax law enforcement, unregulated labor recruitment and temporary w orker programs, and changing migration patterns. It is u nclear in the ten y ears since the Palermo Protocol
whether trafficking itself has changed or whether our un derstanding of the phenomenon has aligned with the realities of modern slavery around the world. Victim Protection in the Con text of the Protocol’s Mandatory Prosecution Provisio ns The Palermo Protocol’s most observable result has been its rapid adoption by 141 coun tries as of October 201 0.10 The achievement of consensus on an agreed upon definit ion of traffic king in persons ro oted in exp loitation, and the resulting criminal laws that countries have adopted to comply with the Protocol, cannot be u nderstated. An enacted law, however, is o nly as good as its enforcement. Thousands of traffickers worldwide have been brought to justice over the decade.11 Yet, the number of convictions b oth annually and in the aggregate is to o low to reflect even the most conservative estimates of the prob lem. By the U.S. Department of State ’s calculation, from 200 8 to 2009 , State Parties collectively convicted 4,166 traffickers worldw ide.12 Many governments reported just one or two conv iction s. Acc ording to the United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 62 State Parties have never convicted a single trafficker.13 Moreover, just 33514 of the 4,16 6 convictions were for labor traffickin g, despite millio ns of persons known to suffer in forced labor around the world. As I sugges ted in 2 001, the Palermo Protocol represented an opportun ity to improve law enforcement outcomes both quantitatively and qualitatively by protecting and assis ting victims. However, in 2010, the most common antitrafficking strategy remains enforcement-only , relegating victim protectio n to a secondary role rather than a complementary or necessary role. This u nder cuts not only victim assis tance, but also hampers the very enforcement mandated by the Protocol. Clumsy responses that arrest, detain, or deport victims only serve to thwart identification and the opp ortunity to empower victims to testify against their trafficker. Add itio nally , programs that conditio n services on extens ive cooperation or, even worse, a successful prosecution have the effect of shifting the burden to the v ictims, placing them in a
situation where refusing services and goin g underground becom es an understandable response.15 Therefore, State Parties should not dismiss the Protocol’s protection measures as discretionary . Instead, they should be understo od as critical, integral components of the Protoco l’s mandatory law enforcement requirem ents that are in keeping w ith the tenets of the modern crime victims’ rights movement that has emerged in many countries over the last th irty y ears. The Protocol outlines services that are meant to assist and protect trafficked persons. Article 6 requ ires that State Parties consider implementing services for trafficked persons’ p hy sical and psy chological recovery , including medical ca re, housing, mental health counseling, job training, legal ass istance, and phy sical safety .16 Article 7 requires State Parties to consider providing temporary or permanent residence for victims. Article 8 requires State Partie s to facilitate the repatriation of citizens or nationals with due regard for the safety of the victim by providing necessary travel documentation and a re turn
without unreasonable delay . Taken as a whole, these measures, if implemented, would constitute a nascent internatio nal version of a crime victim’s bill of righ ts and wou ld gu ide a truly effective law enforcement response to modern slavery . These provisions recognize that trafficked person s require alternatives to sy stems in wh ich repatriation or deportation is the default o utcome , such as services, wor k authorization, and legal immigration statu s. Unfortunately , these core protection principles are sparsely applied by many State Parties and are wholly absent in too many countries. Victim protection s are not in conflict with toug h law enforcement. Implementation of proactive victim iden tification, fu nded victims services, and alternatives to detentio n and deportatio n would respect trafficked persons ’ human righ ts and y ield better prosecution results. Victim Identif ication – No t Jus t a Law Enforcement Responsib ility While attempts to estimate the magnitude and scope of human trafficking have often failed, adop ting even the most conservative estimates puts the number
of victims worldwide in the million s,17 y et governments only identified approx imately 50,000 victims worldwide last y ear.18 This falls far short of reflecting the scope of the problem or the popu lation that needs protections. Similarly hidden crimes such as sexual assault or domestic v iolence are vastly underreported and it is reasonable to ass ume comparable underreporting for human trafficking, especially as traffickers often conv ince their victims that the p olice are to be feared rather than thought of as po tential rescu ers.19 As a result, some governments interpret the d isparity between estimated and identified victims as a sign that there is not a significant trafficking problem in their coun try . Still others claim that their anti-traffic king efforts have been successful in reducing the n umber of identified victims. In both instances, NGOs simultaneou sly report large numbers of escaped victims who do not trust po lice enough to go to them for help. At this poin t in the modern anti-slavery effort, too few cases have been brought in total for a decrease in arrests or conviction s
to stand as an indicator of success. Successful governmental in terventions should ins tead be marked by an increase in the num ber of traffickers brought to justice and a similar increase in the number of victims protected. State Parties must use criminal law to vind icate the violation of traffic king victims ’ most basic human rights. Human traffickin g is a crime and governments are being held accountable whether in the Trafficking in Persons Repor t or in international tribunals,20 for us ing criminal law t o vind icate the violation of the victims ’ most bas ic human rights. Ho wever, as stated above, criminal law enforcement likely uncovers only a small fraction of victims; fear of law enforcement makes them more likely to report to other trusted indiv iduals a nd organizations . Therefore, State Parties should support nongo vernmental organizatio ns to identify trafficked persons in concert with protective law enforcement practices. If law enforcement does not demonstrate a capacity to treat victims with compassion, there is no incentive for NGO service providers to refer their
clients to the police. To improve victim identification, we need to move bey ond an enforcement-only approach to an interdiscip linary whole-ofgovernment approach. For example, labor ministries are in the pos ition to be detecting a whole range of activities cons titu ting labor exploitation , of which compelled service is the extreme manifestation. Increased identification could result from targeted, proactive enforcement efforts in indus tries where human trafficking has been found and where populations are most vulnerable, ty pically low wage employment sectors. Other ministries could also be inv olved. To provide further examples, to what extent are education ministries wor king to identify trafficke d y outh recruited with in and away from schools? Are health minis tries training emergency personnel and health care workers to iden tify trafficked persons ? Are ministries for women and children screening for traffickin g with in sexual as sault and d omestic violence contexts as well as child protectio n sy stems? Are immigration authorities as king the rig ht ques tions at the
Despite the Protocol’s
promotion of humanitarian treatment, which would correspond with status as a crime victim
rather than a criminal, many State Parties continue to arrest and detain trafficked persons. A
staggering 104 countries do not have laws prohibiting the deportation of trafficked persons.21
Trafficked persons are misidentified most frequently as either unauthorized migrants or as
criminals who have committed offenses that the trafficker forced them to perform, despite the
Protocol’s policy of non-culpability.22 Even recognized trafficked victims are knowingly jailed.
This practice manifests in three ways. First, they are detained in preparation for deportation. In
some countries, trafficked persons are detained alongside criminals, thereby equating the two
and instilling the trafficked person with fear, shame, and a false sense of wrongdoing. Second,
they are detained for a specified period of time during which they are required to meet with law
enforcement prior to their eventual deportation, regardless of any cooperation. In some
instances, law enforcement takes down a written statement, after which the witness is deported.
Whether this is a way to hasten deportation or a misguided effort to ease the victim’s burden is
unknown. Such early statements can harm not only the victim, but also the prosecution. First
accounts are often incomplete or inaccurate due to fear and psychological impairments and
deportation may prevent a victim from being offered services. In other instances, a prosecutor
may meet with a detained trafficked person for the first time shortly before trial, which does
not allow enough time for the victim to trust the prosecutor, feel invested in the process, or be
calmed about confronting their trafficker.23 Third, victims are often detained in what the
government dubs a “shelter” that is nothing but a secure detention facility.24 They are not
permitted to leave and there are no services. The time they spend in the facility is considered
under the country’s laws to be temporary residence during which time they should reflect on
border and in detentio n centers? Th is is the essence of proactive identif ication – tailored strategies to find trafficked persons based on evidence of existing or s uspected trafficking. NGOs are replete with examples of missed op portunities for victim identification in em ergency rooms, immigration detention centers, at border entry points, and during labor ins pections. NGO service providers and victims themselves have good information on how victims are identified and in whom they trusted to confide in and seek help. This is u seful data, in add ition to law enforcement characterizations of victim populations, on which to base proactive identifica tion efforts. Services, Shelter, and Immigration Status Versus Detention and Deportation
whether or not to cooperate with law enforcement. In these cases, the law masquerades as
temporary residence, shelter, and return, but the reality is incarceration, detention, and
deportation. Ironically, these government practices validate traffickers’ threats that law
enforcement will arrest, detain, and deport them if they escape. In each of these scenarios,
trafficked persons are devalued, used for the information they can provide, and treated as if they
are criminals. These harmful practices send a message that the government does not care about
the trafficked person, so why should the trafficked person feel compelled to assist the
government? Not only is there no incentive for trafficked persons to cooperate, but these
measures are punitive and re-traumatizing. Adding insult to injury, a response in which
deportation is the default response means no assessment of danger upon return, no
reintegration, serious risk of the traffickers’ retaliation or retrafficking, and potential
criminal consequences.
, few State Parties offer services to victims prior to their cooperation with law
enforcement; some require extensive cooperation or even a successful prosecution before
making services available. In these instances, the requirement of a decision to undertake
extensive cooperation, forced upon the victim when they are recently liberated and still
suffering from the physical and psychological ramifications, may serve as a disincentive for
NGOs to recommend that their clients come forward. Where there are no meaningful victim
protections or opportunities to stabilize the victim before making choices of such import, the
voluntariness of the victim’s decision is called into question. This is yet another example of
undercutting victim assistance, reducing identification, spoiling the opportunity to empower
victims to testify against their traffickers, and impeding the enforcement mandated by the
Protocol. Conclusion Human trafficking investigations and prosecutions are tremendously
complex. Convictions often depend on the strength of victims’ cooperation and their ability to
confront their traffickers in court, which means law enforcement must spend countless hours
working to gain victims’ trust, obtain the full account of the crime, and prepare for trial. Who is
more likely to be an effective victim-witness — the person awaiting deportation behind bars
or the person receiving restorative support services? Prosecution and protection are therefore
as inextricably intertwined in practice as they are in the Protocol. Without the implementation
of the fundamental concept of the interdependence between prosecution and protection that
is set forth in the Palermo Protocol, State Parties will continue to misplace their resources and
efforts. Adoption of protection measures — victim identification through a whole-ofgovernment approach and comprehensive services to potential victims along with work
authorization and legal immigration status — would respect trafficked persons’ human rights
and yield better prosecution results. The promise of the Palermo Protocol was in its
recognition that we will never prosecute trafficking away. We will never identify trafficked
persons by waiting for them to come to us. We will never have a complete anti-trafficking
response with a singular approach. In the next ten years, on the occasion of the Palermo
Protocol’s 20th anniversary, let us hope that we can point to a decade in which State Parties did
not see victim protections as a luxury or a nuisance, but as an integral part of the interlocking
paradigm of prevention, protection and prosecution that helps us deliver on the promise of
freedom.
Other State Parties may provide eligibility for limited services as ou tlined by the Protocol, but the burden and responsibility of funding v ictim services often falls to nong overnmental organizations. In coun tries where there is no civ il society to s peak of, victim services is a largely unmet need. With limited budgets, service -providing or ganizations are either unable to meet all of the vas t needs of victims whom they assist, or they are unable to assis t all of the victims that seek their help. Shelter, general health care, legal services, and mental health care, in particular, are expensive to provide and require financia l support from State Parties. In some of these countries, even when services are offered, victims are not eligible for tempor ary work authorization. Traffic ked persons often incur debts to
achieve a work opportu nity or they have family members rely ing on their remittances; the inability to wor k and pay down the debt or su pport the family therefore weighs significantly on a trafficked person even when services are being offered. For that reason alone, a trafficked person may choose not to report the crime or to continue ass isting law enforcement. If the house used for collateral is abou t to be repossessed or loan s harks are threate ning family members, the trafficked person will no t want to reflect upon whether to ass ist law enforcement. To ignore this bas ic e conomic necessity is detrimental to th e well-being of the trafficked person as well as the investigation and prosecution of the trafficker. The majority of State Parties condition the provision of services on cooperation with law enforcement to vary ing degrees. The Protocol’s protection provision s are silent on this practice, but overall encourage a compassionate and humanitaria n response with d ue regard for the trafficked person’s phy sical and mental recovery . NGOs have long advocated that prov idin g
services and helping to restore the victim aids in the victim’s ability to cooperate with law enforcement and be a more effective victim-witness. However
Human trafficking is a direct source of funding for ISIS---it also establishes
pathways for entry to the United States and sustains ongoing operations
including financing fighters and sustaining their entire network
Welch 17 — Shannon Welch, Juris Doctor Candidate at Duke University School of Law,
“Note: Human Trafficking and Terrorism: Utilizing National Security Resources to Prevent
Human Trafficking in The Islamic State,” 24 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol'y 165, Spring, 2017, Lexis
Nexis, Language Modified*
With the advent of ISIS and the rise of terrorism, human trafficking is now globally used for
the dual purposes of fear and funding these huge groups. Human trafficking is now enshrined
by ideology.20 As many as 5,000 women are now enslaved in the Islamic State, trafficked around
the region at alarming rates.21 ISIS uses fear, dehumanization, and violence to oppress women.
Moreover, they use human trafficking to systematically target and decimate ethnic and religious
minorities in the region. U.N. reports state that ISIS human trafficking is part of their broader
“policy that aims to suppress, permanently cleanse or expel, or in some instances, destroy those
communities within areas of its control.”22 The Islamic State indoctrinates its fighters, as part of
its warped creed, that rape [sexual assault] and sexual slavery are a form of worship, punishing
the non-believer.23 Not only is this market a clear source of income for the ISIS, but also is
deeply imbedded in their ideology. ISIS is one of the first organizations to create a
sophisticated, openly public market for human trafficking. Zainab Bangura, a U.N. special
representative, described the methodical and institutionalized approach of the ISIS to human
trafficking. After attacking a village, [ISIS] splits women from men and executes boys and men
aged 14 and over . . . [G]irls are stripped naked, tested for virginity and examined for breast size
and prettiness. The youngest, and those considered the prettiest virgins fetch higher prices and are
sent to Raqqa, the IS stronghold. There is a hierarchy: sheikhs get first choice, then emirs, then
fighters . . .We heard about one girl who was traded 22 times, and another, who had escaped, told
us that the sheikh who had captured her wrote his name on the back of her hand to show that she
was his “property.”24 From capture, to market, to treatment, to resale, ISIS instituted a ruthless
system of human trafficking, sexual violence, and slavery. “Their captors appeared to have a
system . . . of inventorying the women, as well as their own lexicon.25 Women and girls were
referred to as ‘Sabaya,’ meaning slave, followed by their name.26 Some were bought by
wholesalers, who photographed and gave them numbers, to advertise them to potential buyers.”
27 Women are both terrorized and used for lucrative profit, feeding the internal economy of
the Islamic State and rewarding fighters.28 Human trafficking is now being carried out in a
large scale, systematic, public, and institutionalized manner, and must be combatted in a new
manner. Rather than small autonomous and scattered perpetrators, ISIS has built the foundation
of their terrorist network on the backs of human trafficking victims. Human trafficking is now
an act of war and must be treated as such.29 While the direct victims of ISIS’s slave market
have not yet permeated throughout the United States, their sale funds our enemies. There is a
very real possibility that ISIS or other terrorist organizations will use existing trafficking
networks in South America to enter across our borders undetected. Threatening our domestic
integrity and international security, the issue implicates public health, labor exploitation, sexual
abuse, counterterrorism, and child welfare concerns. Only a coordinated global approach
attacking the source of trafficking will successfully combat this growing threat.
Territorial defeats for ISIS don’t translate into defeating the terrorist group--ISIS is just rejuvenating after a series of defeats
Keller 18 — Jared Keller, Journalist, 1-22-2018, Date Accessed: 6-26-2018, "The War Against
ISIS Is Far from Over" Task & Purpose, https://taskandpurpose.com/us-military-campaign-isisiraq-syria/
ISIS may have suffered major territorial defeats under an onslaught of U.S.-armed regional
partners and coalition bombs, but the terror group is far from routed in Iraq and Syria despite the
efforts of Operation Inherent Resolve. According to Laith Alkhouri, co-founder of intel group
Flashpoint and director of its Jihadist Threat Intelligence service, even without territory to call its
own, ISIS “remains strong as an organization, with stronger and more organized ranks and
ideology” than when it first moved into Syria in 2013. “The group will likely up the ante in its
guerrilla warfare, with main retreat zones like the Anbar desert in west Iraq, while also
directing its cells in places like Baghdad and Damascus,” Alkhouri told Task & Purpose.
Beyond a protracted battle to retake footholds in Iraq and Syria, Alkhouri notes that ISIS
increasingly embraced the decentralized, franchising model that’s spurred successful and
attempted terror attacks in cities like London, Paris, and New York without direct coordination
from a command post in the Middle East and North Africa. The caliphate may be routed from its
urban strongholds of Mosul and Raqqa, but the foreign fighters returning home and domestic
“lone wolves” following ISIS from afar who both increasingly comprise the non-state actors that
are central to the Trump administration’s Jan. 19 National Defense Strategy will remain a
constant source of anxiety for security forces worldwide. “It has elevated its incitement of
followers around the world, not merely with messages and propaganda, but also with practical
advice to attack using available methods, like cars and knives,” Alkhouri told Task & Purpose.
“ISIS will likely continue inciting its followers to launch terror attacks on its behalf. It will
likely highlight its loss of territory and the coalition attacks — among others — as central topics
in its propaganda.” This means an uptick in coordinated ISIS attacks in places where the group’s
networks have grown significantly but its commanders don’t necessarily exercise a significant
command-and-control influence. According to Alkhouri, those places mean distant battlefields
where the United States “isn’t actively involved militarily” like Egypt or has only some “advise
and assist” presence like the Philippines, Yemen, Niger, and weak states across Central and
Southeast Asia. The weaker a nation’s security environment, the more likely ISIS is to spread
there, especially in countries already subject to social and economic turbulence “ISIS is remorphing into a terror organization,” says Alkhouri. “What it’s been able to accomplish
throughout the last few year is a robust radicalization machine, bringing the group the support of
thousands around the world. Well after the group is potentially defeated as a dominating entity,
its ideology remains alive and well online.”
ISIS implodes the Middle East – region-wide instability, sectarianism, and
Iranian aggression
Knights 15 – PhD in Iraqi military History, Fellow @ Washington Institute
(Michael, Lafer fellow at The Washington Institute, specializing in the political and security
affairs of Iraq, Iran, Yemen, and the Gulf Arab states, PhD in Iraqi military history at the
Department of War Studies, King’s College, London, “The Long Haul: Rebooting U.S. Security
Cooperation in Iraq,” January, Policy Focus 137,
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus137_Knights4.pdf)
Now the need to defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS or ISIL) has drawn the U.S.
military back to Iraq, and not only because of ISIS’s potential threat to the U.S. homeland or due
to the humanitarian disasters unleashed by the group. Prior to June 2014 ISIS controlled key
terrain on Syria’s civil war battlefields but U.S. military involvement was not forthcoming. Yet
the level of U.S. involvement was immediately intensified once ISIS achieved dominance in
significant swaths of Iraq. This is precisely because of Iraq’s strategic significance to the United
States, the Middle East region, and the world. Though a humanitarian calamity first and foremost,
ISIS’s takeover of northwestern Iraq is also a timely reminder that vital U.S. interests are at stake
in Iraq—strategic interests that were temporarily submerged in the clamor to put the Iraq War
behind us. The first vital U.S. interest in Iraq is the country’s linchpin role in the state system in
the Middle East. Many great edifices have a keystone, a foundation that holds the structure
together. In the Middle East Iraq is one of the keystones that hold the system of states and borders
in place. Iraq touches on a huge range of vulnerable and strategically vital states. The Kurdish
north of Iraq borders Kurdish parts of Syria, Turkey, and Iran, all clamoring for greater
autonomy, if not independence. To the east there is Iran, with ambitions to become a regional
hegemon over a crescent of Shia-led communities in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Bahrain, and eastern
Saudi Arabia. To the south are the relatively young monarchies of the Arab Gulf States, vital to
the smooth functioning of global energy markets but deeply nervous about changes threatened
in Iraq by both Iranian- backed and ISIS militants. ƒ The Levantine states of Jordan, Syria, and
Lebanon complete the ring, each threatened by the rise of ISIS and the concomitant risks of state
fragmentation, ungoverned spaces, and sectarian conflict in Iraq. A failure to maintain stability
and state borders in Iraq could have dire consequences across the region and more broadly. Oil
exports provide a second set of compelling U.S. strategic interests in Iraq. Iraq is projected to be
the fastest-growing source of new oil production in the world in the next decade. Iraq exported
2.46 million barrels of oil a day in October 2014 and the KRG a further 259,000 barrels per day
(bpd). 2 By 2019 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) expects Iraqi exports to rise to 4.6
million bpd, while the KRG is aiming to achieve exports of around a million barrels pnervouFer
day by that point. 3 Significant long-term disruption in Iraq—particularly in oil-rich Basra—
threatens the future growth of the U.S. economy. A final strategic interest for the United States
relates to the sectarian politics of the crisis in Iraq. In addition to sending sectarian shockwaves
around the region, exacerbating tensions in Bahrain, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia’s Eastern
Province, the crisis in Iraq is a test of resolve. For America’s allies in the region, the survival of
Iraq as an independent state is a way of gauging Washington’s commitment to its interests and
partners in the Middle East and to the entire regional order. If Iraq is allowed to disintegrate, with
sectarian cantons falling fully under the sway of ISIS or Iran, the Gulf States and other moderate
Arab allies will justifiably question U.S. resolve and capacity.
Middle East war sparks global great power war
Walter Russell Mead 14, Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities at Bard College; Editorat-Large of The American Interest magazine, 7/7/14, “Have We Gone from a Post-War to a PreWar World?” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/walter-russell-mead/new-globalwar_b_5562664.html
One hundred years later, the world is nervously keeping its eyes peeled for misguided chauffeurs
and asking itself whether history could repeat. The great powers are at peace, and trade and
cultural ties between nations seem closer than ever before, yet the international scene is in many
ways surprisingly brittle. In particular, a rising naval power is challenging an established
hegemon, and a "powder keg" region replete with ethnic and religious quarrels looks less stable
by the day. In 1914, Germany was the rising power, the U.K. the weary hegemon and the Balkans
was the powder keg. In 2014, China is rising, the United States is staggering under the burden of
world leadership and the Middle East is the powder keg. Only a few years ago, most western
observers believed that the age of geopolitical rivalry and great power war was over. Today, with
Russian forces in Ukraine, religious wars exploding across the Middle East, and territorial
disputes leading to one crisis after another in the East and South China seas, the outlook is darker.
Serious people now ask whether we have moved from a post-war into a pre-war world. Could
some incident somewhere in the world spark another global war? MIDDLE EAST POWDER
KEG Let's start with the powder keg. The immediate cause of the fighting in World War I was the
set of ethnic and religious conflicts in the Balkans. In the second half of the 19th century,
economic development and modernization led to heightened competition among the region's
peoples. The drive for self-determination set Croats, Serbs, Magyars, Kosovars, Bosniaks,
Macedonians, Bulgarians, Greeks and others at one another's throats. The death toll mounted and
the hatred grew as massacres and ethnic cleansing spread -- and the ability of the outside powers
to control the region's dynamics shrank as the imperial powers were themselves undermined by
rising social and nationalist tensions. The Middle East today bears an ominous resemblance to
the Balkans of that period. The contemporary Middle East has an unstable blend of ethnicities
and religions uneasily coexisting within boundaries arbitrarily marked off by external empires.
Ninety-five years after the French and the British first parceled out the lands of the fallen
Ottoman caliphate, that arrangement is now coming to an end. Events in Iraq and Syria suggest
that the Middle East could be in for carnage and upheaval as great as anything the Balkans saw.
The great powers are losing the ability to hold their clients in check; the Middle East today is at
least as explosive as the Balkan region was a century ago. GERMANS THEN, CHINESE NOW
What blew the Archduke's murder up into a catastrophic world war, though, was not the tribal
struggle in southeastern Europe. It took the hegemonic ambitions of the German Empire to turn a
local conflict into a universal conflagration. Having eclipsed France as the dominant military
power in Europe, Germany aimed to surpass Britain on the seas and to recast the emerging world
order along lines that better suited it. Yet the rising power was also insecure, fearing that worried
neighbors would gang up against it. In the crisis in the Balkans, Germany both felt a need to back
its weak ally Austria and saw a chance to deal with its opponents on favorable terms. Could
something like that happen again? China today is both rising and turning to the sea in ways that
Kaiser Wilhelm would understand. Like Germany in 1914, China has emerged in the last 30 years
as a major economic power, and it has chosen to invest a growing share of its growing wealth in
military spending. But here the analogy begins to get complicated and even breaks down a bit.
Neither China nor any Chinese ally is competing directly with the United States and its allies in
the Middle East. China isn't (yet) taking a side in the Sunni-Shia dispute, and all it really wants in
the Middle East is quiet; China wants that oil to flow as peacefully and cheaply as possible.
AMERICA HAS ALL THE ALLIES And there's another difference: alliance systems. The Great
Powers of 1914 were divided into two roughly equal military blocs: Austria, Germany, Italy and
potentially the Ottoman Empire confronted Russia, France and potentially Britain. Today the
global U.S. alliance system has no rival or peer; while China, Russia and a handful of lesser
powers are disengaged from, and in some cases even hostile to, the U.S. system, the military
balance isn't even close. While crises between China and U.S. allies on its periphery like the
Philippines could escalate into US-China crises, we don't have anything comparable to the
complex and finely balanced international system at the time of World War I. Austria-Hungary
attacked Serbia and as a direct result of that Germany attacked Belgium. It's hard to see how, for
example, a Turkish attack on Syria could cause China to attack Vietnam. Today's crises are
simpler, more direct and more easily controlled by the top powers. On the other hand, the Middle
East's supplies of oil will keep China, as well as other powers, more involved in events there
than geography would suggest. The Balkans had no products in 1914 that the rest of the world
much cared about; the Middle East looms much larger in the global economy than the Balkan
peninsula ever has. Already, countries including Russia and Iran have been involving
themselves in Iraq. If the slide into regional chaos continues and countries like China and Japan
believe that direct action is needed to secure their oil supplies, almost anything could happen in
a few years.
ISIS will obtain cyber-weapons and use them---financing is key
Bennett 15---Cory Bennett and Elise Viebeck, “ISIS preps for cyber war,” 5/17,
http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/242280-isis-preps-for-cyber-war
Islamic terrorists are stoking alarm with threats of an all-out cyber crusade against the United
States, and experts say the warnings should be taken seriously. Hackers claiming affiliation with
the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) released a video Monday vowing an “electronic war”
against the United States and Europe and claiming access to “American leadership” online.
“Praise to Allah, today we extend on the land and in the Internet,” a faceless, hooded figure said
in Arabic. “We send this message to America and Europe: We are the hackers of the Islamic State
and the electronic war has not yet begun.” The video received ridicule online for its poor phrasing
and the group’s apparent inability to make good on its cyber threat this week. But as hackers
around the world become more sophisticated, terrorist groups are likely to follow their lead and
use the same tools to further their ends, experts said. “It’s only really a matter of time till we
start seeing terrorist organizations using cyberattack techniques in a more expanded way,”
said John Cohen, a former counterterrorism coordinator at the Department of Homeland Security.
“The concern is that, as an organization like ISIS acquires more resources financially, they will
be able to hire the talent they need or outsource to criminal organizations,” Cohen added. “I
think they’re probably moving in that direction anyway.” Military officials agree. NSA Director
Adm. Michael Rogers this week called the pending shift “a great concern and something that we
pay lots of attention to.” “At what point do they decide they need to move from viewing the
Internet as a source of recruitment … [to] viewing it as a potential weapon system?” Rogers
asked. While ISIS has been widely recognized for its social media prowess, the growing
computer science talent of its recruits has mostly gone unnoticed. “A number of individuals
that have recently joined the movement of ISIS were folks that studied computer science in
British schools and European universities,” said Tom Kellermann, chief cybersecurity officer at
security firm Trend Micro, who said ISIS’s cyber capabilities are “advancing dramatically.”
Cyber-attacks escalate---nuclear war
Gartzke 17 — Erik Gartzke, Professor at the University of California, San Diego, PhD in
Political Science from the University of Iowa, Jon R. Lindsay, Assistant Professor of Digital
Media and Global Affairs and Director of the Trudeau Centre for Peace, Conflict and Justice at
the Munk School of Global Affairs at the University of Toronto, 02-014-2017, Date Accessed:
09-23-2017, “Thermonuclear Cyberwar” Journal of Cybersecurity, Volume 3, Issue 1, Pages 37–
48, https://academic.oup.com/cybersecurity/article/2996537/Thermonuclear
The nuclear domain can bound the intensity of destruction that a cyber attacker is willing to
inflict on an adversary. US declaratory policy states that unacceptable cyber-attacks may
prompt a military response; while nuclear weapons are not explicitly threatened, neither are they
withheld. Nuclear threats have no credibility at the low end, where the bulk of cyber-attacks
occur. This produces a cross-domain version of the stability–instability paradox, where deterrence
works at the high end but is not credible, and thus encourages provocation, at low intensities.
Nuclear weapons, and military power generally, create an upper bound on cyber aggression to the
degree that retaliation is anticipated and feared [22, 83, 84]. In the other direction, the unstable
cyber domain can undermine the stability of nuclear deterrence. Most analysts who argue that the
cyber–nuclear combination is a recipe for danger focus on the fog of crisis decision making [85–
87]. Stephen Cimbala points out that today’s relatively smaller nuclear arsenals may perversely
magnify the attractiveness of NC3 exploitation in a crisis: “Ironically, the downsizing of U.S. and
post-Soviet Russian strategic nuclear arsenals since the end of the Cold War, while a positive
development from the perspectives of nuclear arms control and nonproliferation, makes the
concurrence of cyber and nuclear attack capabilities more alarming” [88]. Cimbala focuses
mainly on the risks of misperception and miscalculation that emerge when a cyber-attack
muddies the transparent communication required for opponents to understand one another’s
interests, redlines, and willingness to use force, and to ensure reliable control over subordinate
commanders. Thus, a nuclear actor “faced with a sudden burst of holes in its vital warning and
response systems might, for example, press the preemption button instead of waiting to ride out
the attack and then retaliate” [85]. The outcome of fog of decision scenarios such as these depend
on how humans react to risk and uncertainty, which in turn depends on bounded rationality
and organizational frameworks that might confuse rational decision making [89, 90]. These
factors exacerbate a hard problem. Yet within a rationalist framework, cyber-attacks that have
already created their effects need not trigger an escalatory spiral. While being handed a fait
accompli may trigger an aggressive reaction, it is also plausible that the target’s awareness that
its NC3 has been compromised in some way would help to convey new information that the
balance of power is not as favorable as previously thought. This in turn could encourage the
target to accommodate, rather than escalate. While defects in rational decision making are a
serious concern in any cyber–nuclear scenario, the situation becomes even more hazardous when
there are rational incentives to escalate. Although “known unknowns” can create confusion, to
paraphrase Donald Rumsfeld, the “unknown unknowns” are perhaps more dangerous. A
successful clandestine penetration of NC3 can defeat the informational symmetry that
stabilizes nuclear relationships.
Nuclear weapons are useful for deterrence because they impose a degree of consensus about the distribu tion of power; each side knows the other can inflict prohibitive levels of damage, even if they may disagree about the precise extent of this damage. Cy ber operations are attractive precisely because they can secretly revise the distribution of po wer. NC3 neutralization may be an expensive and rarified capability in the reach of only a few states with mature signals intelligence agencies, but it is much cheaper than nuclear attack. Yet the very usefulness of cy ber operations for nuclear warfighting ensure tha t deterrence failure during brin ksmanship crises is more likely . Nuclear states may initiate crises
of ris k and resolve to see who will back down first, which is not a lway s clear in advance. Chicken appears viable, iron ically , because each play er understands that a nuclear war would be a disaster for all, and thu s all can agree that someone can be expected swerve. Nuclear deterr ence should ultimately make dealing with an adversary diplomatically more attractive than fighting, pro vided that fighting is costly —as wou ld seem evident for the prospect of nuclear war—and assuming that bargains are available to s tates willing to accept compromise rather than annihilation. If, h owever, one side knows , but the other does not, that the attac ker has disabled the target’s ability to perceive an impending military attack, or to react to one when it is un derway , then they will not have a shared understanding of the probable ou tcome of war, even in broad terms. Consider a brin ksmanship crisis between two nuclear states wh er e only one has realized a successful penetration of the rival’s N C3. The cy ber attacker knows that it has a military advantage, but it cannot reveal the
advantage to the target, lest the advantage be los t. The target does n ot know that it is at a disadvantage, and it cannot be told by the attac ker for the same reason. The attacker perceives an imbalance of power while the target perce ives a balance. A dangerous competition in ris k ta king ensues. T he first s ide knows that it does not need to back d own. The second s ide feels confident that it can s tand fast and raise the s takes far bey ond what it w ould be willing to if it understood the true balance of power. Each side is w illing to escalate to create more risk for the other side, ma king it more likely that one or the o ther will conclu de that deterrence has failed and move into warfightin g mode to attempt to limit the damage the other can inflict. The targeted nature and uncertain effects of offensive cy ber operations put add itio nal pressure on decision makers. An intrus ion will probab ly disable only part of the enemy ’s NC3 architecture, not all of it (wh ich is n ot on ly operationally formidable to achieve but also more likely to be noticed by the target). Thus the target may retain
control over some nuclear forces, or conventional forces. The target may be tempted to use some of them piecemeal to signal a willing ness to escalate further, even thou gh it cannot actually escalate because of the cy ber operation. The cy ber attacker know s that it has escalation dominance, but when even a minor demonstration by the target can cause great damage, it is temptin g to preempt this move or others like it. Th is s ituation wou ld be especially unstable if on ly second strike bu t not primary strike NC3 was incapacitated. Uncertainty in the efficacy of the clandestine penetration wou ld discount the attacker’s confidence in its escalation dominance, with a r ange of possib le outcomes. Enoug h uncertainty would d iscount the cy ber attack to no thing, which wou ld have a stabilizing effect by returning the crisis to the p ure nuclear domain. A little bit of u ncertainty about cy ber effectiveness would heighten ris k ac ceptance while also raising the incentives to preempt as an insurance measure. Adding allies in to the mix introduces additional instab ility . An ally emboldened
by its nuclear umbrella might run provocative ris ks that it wou ld be much more reluctant to embrace if it was aware that the umbrella was actually full of holes. Conversely , if the clandestine advantage is held by the state extend ing the umbrella, allies could become unnerved by the willingness of their defender to run what appear to be outsize ris ks, obliv ious of the reasons for the defender’s confidence, creating discord in the alliance and incentives for self-protective actio n, leading to greater uncertainty about alliance solidarity . The direction of influence between the cy ber and nuclear realms depends to large degree on which domain is the main arena of action. Planning and cond ucting cy ber operations will be boun ded by the ability of aggressors to con vince themselves that attacks w ill remain secret, and by the confidence of nuclear nations in their invu lnerability . Fears of cross-domain escalation w ill tend to keep in stability in cy berspace bounded. However, if a crisis has risen to the poin t where nuclear threats are being seriously considered or made, then NC3
exploitation will be destabilizing . Brin ksmanship crises seem to have receded in frequency since the Cuban Miss ile Crisis b ut may be more likely than is generally believed. President Vladimir Putin of Russ ia has ins inuated more than once in recent y ears that his government is willing to use tactical nuclear weapons if necessary to support his policies. Cy ber power and nuclear stability Not all crises are the same. Indeed, their very idiosy ncrasies create the uncertainties that make bargaining failure more likely [75]. So far our analy sis would be at home in the Cold War, with the techno logical novelty of cy ber operations. Yet no t every state has the same cy ber capabilities or vu lnerabilities. Variation in cy ber power relations across dy ads should be expected to affect the strategic stab ili ty of nuclear states. The so-called second nuclear age differs from superpower rivalry in important way s [91]. There are fewer absolute numbers of warheads in the world, down from a peak of over 70 000 in the 1980 s to abo ut 15 000 to day (less than 5000 deploy ed), but they are distributed
very unevenly [92]. The United States and Rus sia have comparably sized arsenals, each with a fully diversified triad of delivery platforms, while North Korea only has a dozen or s o bombs and no meaningful delivery sy stem (for now). China, India, Pakis tan, Britain, France, and Israel have modest arsenals in the range of several dozen to a couple hun dred weapons, but they have very different doctrines, conventional force complements, domestic political institu tions , and alliance relations hips. The recent nuclear powers lack the hard-won experience and shared norms of the Cold War to guide them through c rises, and even the United States and Rus sia have much to relearn. Cy ber warfare capacity also varies considerably across contemporary nuclear nations. The United States, Russ ia, Israel, and Britain are in the top tier, able to run sophisticated, persis tent, clandestine penetrations. Ch ina is a un iquely active cy ber power with ambitious cy ber warfare doctrine, but its operational f ocus is o n economic espionage and political censorsh ip, resulting in less refined
tradecraft and more porous defenses for military purposes [16]. France, India, and Pakis tan also have active cy ber warfare programs, while North Korea is the least developed cy ber nation, depending on Ch ina for its expertise [93]. It is bey ond the scope of this artic le to assess cris is dy ads in detail, a nd data on nuclear and cy ber power for these countries are shrouded in secrecy . Here, as a way of summing up the arguments above, we offer a few conjectures about how sty lized aspects of cy ber power affect crisis stability throug h incentives and key aspec ts of decision making. We do no t stress relative nuclear weapon capabilities on the admittedly strong (and con testable) assum ptio n that n uclear transparency in the absence of cy ber operations would render nuclear asy mmetry irrelevant for crisis bargaining because both sides would agree about the terrible consequences of conflict [94]. We also omit domestic or psy chological varia bles that affect relative power assessments, altho ugh these are obvio usly important. Even if neither India nor Pakistan have v iable cy ber–
nuclear capabilities, brin ksmanship between them is dangerous for many other reasons, notably compressed decision timelines, Pa kis tan’s willingnes s to shoot f irst, and domestic regime instability . Our focus is on the impact of offensive and defensive cy ber power on nuclear deterrence above and bey ond the other factors that certainly play a role in real-world outcomes. First, does the cy ber attacker have the organizational capacity , technical expertise, and in telligence sup port to “compromise” the target’s N C3 ? Can hackers access critical networ ks, exp loit technical vulnerabilities , and confidently execute a pay load to disr upt or exp loit strategic sens ing, command, forces, or transport capacity ? The result would be some tangible advantage for warfighting , such as tactical warning or control paraly sis, bu t one that cannot be exercised in bargainin g. Second, is the target able to “detect” the compromise of its NC3 ? The more complicated and sensitive the target, the more likely cy ber attackers are to make a mistake that undermines the in trusio n. Attr ibution is not likely to
be difficult given the constricted pool of p otential attackers, but at the same time the consequences of misattributing “false flag” operations could be severe [95]. At a minimum, detection is assumed to prov ide information to the target that the balance of power is perhaps not as favorable as imagined previo usly . We assume that detection with out an actual compromise is po ssib le because of false positives or deceptive information operation s designed to create pessimism or paranoia. Third, is the target able to “mitiga te” the compromise it detects? Revelation ca n prompt patch ing or networ k reconfiguration to bloc k an attack, but this as sumption is no t alway s realistic. The attac ker may have multiple pathway s open or may have implanted malware that is difficult to remove in tactically meaningful timelines. In such cases the cy ber commitment problem is not absolu te, since the d iscovery of the power to hurt doe s not automatically disarm it. Succ essful mitigation here is ass umed to restore mutual assessments of the balance of power to what they would be absent the
cy ber attack. Table 1 sh ows how these factors combine to produce different deterrence outcomes in a brinksmanship (chicken) cris is. If there is no cy ber compromise and the target detects nothing (n o false positives) then we have the o ptimis tic ideal case where nuclear transparency affords stable “deterrence.” Transparency about the nuclear balance, including the viability of secure second strike forces, provides s trategic stability . We also expect this box to describe situations w here the target has excellent networ k defense capabilities and thu s the prospect of defense, denial or deception successfully deters any attempts to penetrate NC3. This may resemble the Cold War situation (with electronic warfare in lieu of cy ber), or even the present day US–Russ ia dy ad, where the odds of either side pulling off a successful compromise against a highly capable defender are not favorable. Alternate ly the attack may be deemed risky enough to encourage serious circumspection. However, the exis tence of Canopy Wing does no t encourage optimism in this regard. Co nversely , if
there is a compromise that goes undetected, then there is a heightened ris k of “war” because of the cy ber commitment problem. This box may be particularly relevant for asy mmetric dy ads such as the United States and North Korea, where one side has real cy ber power but the other side is willing to go to the brin k where it believes, false ly , that it has the capability to compel its co unterpart to bac k down. Cy ber disruption of N C3 is attractive for damage limitation sho uld deterrence fail, given that the weaker state ’s d iminutive arsenal makes damage limitation by the stronger state more likely to s ucceed. The dilemma for the stronger state is that the clandestine coun terforce hedge, which makes warfighting s ucc ess more likely , is precisely what makes deterrence more likely to fail. The United States would face similar counterforce dilemmas with other dy ads like Ch ina or even Ru ssia, alth ough even a stron g cy ber power should be more circumspect when confronted with an adversary with a larger/more capable nuclear and conventional arsenal. More complex and cy ber
savvy targets, moreover, are more likely to detect a breach in NC3 , leading to more ambiguous outcomes depending on how actors cope with ris k and uncertainty . Paradoxically , confidence in cy ber security may be a major contributor to failure; believing o ne is safe from attack increases the chance that an attack is successful. If the successful compromise is detected bu t not mitigated, then the target learns that the balance of power is not as favorable as though t. This pos sibility sugges ts fleeting opportun ities for “coercion” by revealing the cy ber coup to the target in the midst of a crisis while the cy ber attacker maintains or develops a favorable military advantage before the target has the opportunity to reverse or compensate the NC3 disruption. Recognizing the newly transparent costs of war, a ris k neutral or ris k averse target should prefer compromise. The coercive advantages (deterrence or compellence) of a detected but unmitigated NC3 compromise will likely be fleeting. T his s uggests a logical po ssib ility for creating a window of opportun ity for using particular
cy ber operations that are more robust to revelation as a credible s ignal of su perior capability in the mids t of a crisis. It would be important to exploit th is fleeting advan tage via other credible military threats (e.g. forces mobilized on vis ible alert or deploy ed into the crisis area) before the window closes. One side may be able gain an unear ned advantage, an opportunity for coercion via a “bluff,” by the same window-of-opportunity logic. A target concerned about NC3 compromise will probably have some network monitoring sy stem and other protectio ns in place. Defensive sy stems can produce false positives as a result of internal errors or a deception operation by the attacker to encourage paranoia. It is logically possible that some false positives would appear to the target to be d ifficult to mitigate. In this situation, the target could believe it is at a disadvantage, even th ough this is no t in fact the case. This gambit would be operationally very difficult to pu ll off wi th any reliability in a real nuclear crisis. Cy ber–nuclear coercion and bluffing strategies are fraught with
danger. Detection withou t mitigation migh t put a ris k-acceptant or loss-averse target into a “use-lose” situatio n, creating pressures to preempt or escalate. The muddling of decision-making heig htens the ris k of accidents or irratio nal choices in a crisis scenario. Worry about preemption or accident then heig htens the likeliho od that the initiator will exercise counterforce options w hile they remain available. These pressures can be expected to be particularly intense if the target’s detection is only partial or has n ot re vealed the true extent of damage to its NC3 (i.e. the target does no t realize it has already lost som e or all of what it h opes to use). These ty pes of scenarios are most usually invo ked in analy ses of inadvertent escalatio n [23–27]. The essen tial d istinction be tween “use-lose” risks and “war” in this ty pology is the target’s knowledge of some degree of NC3 compromise. Use-lose and other cognitive pressur es can certainly result in nuclear war, since the breakd own of deterrence leads to the release of nuclear weapons, but we dis tingu ish these outcomes to highlight
the different decision making processes or rational incentives at wor k. A “spiral” of mistrus t may emerge if one side attempts a compromise but the defender detects and mitigates it. Both sides again have common mutual estimates of the relative balance of power, which su perficially resembles the “deterrence” case because the NC3 compromise is negated. Unfortunately , the detection of the compromise will provide the target with information about the hos tile intentions of the cy ber attacker. This in turn is likely to exacerbate other political or psy cholog ical factors in the crisis itself or in the crisis-proneness of the broader relationship. The strange log ical case where there is no compromise but one is detected and mitigated cou ld result from a false positive misperception (including a third-party false flag operation) that could conf lict sp iraling [96, 97]. The bluff and coercion ou tcomes are also likely to encour age spiraling behavior once the fleeting bargaining advantage dis sipates or is dispelled (provided any one survives the in teraction). The ris k of crisis ins tability is
not the same for all dy ads. It is harder to compromise the NC3 of s trong s tates because of the redundancy and active defenses in their arsenal. Likewise, stron g states are better able to compromise the NC3 of any states but especially of weaker states, bec ause of strong states ’ greater organizational capacity and expertise in cy ber operations. Stable deterrence or MAD is most li kely to ho ld in mutually strong dy ads (e.g. the United States and the Soviet U nion in the Cold War or Russia today to a lesser extent). Deterrence is slightly less likely in o ther equally matched dyads (India–Pakistan) where defensive vulnerabilities create temptations bu t offensive capabilities may not be sufficient to exploit them. Most states can be expected to refrain from targeting American NC3 given a US reputation for cy ber power (a general deterrence benefit enhanced by Stuxnet and Snowden). The s ituation is less s table if the United States is the attac ker. The most dangerous dy ad is a stron ger and a weaker state (United States and North Korea or Israel and Iran). Dy ads involvin g stron g
and middle powers are also dangerous (United States and China). The s tronger side is tempted to d isrupt N C3 as a warfighting hedge in case deterrence breaks down, wh ile the wea ker but s till formidable side has a reasonable chance at detection. The marginally weaker may also be tempted to subvert NC3, particularly for r econnaissance; the stronger side is more likely to detect and correct the intrus ion bu t will be alarmed by the ambiguity in distin guis hing intelligence collection from attack plannin g [98]. In a brin ksmanship crisis between them, windows for coercion may be available y et fleeting, with real ris ks of sp iral and war. Policy implications Skeptics are right to challenge the hy pe about cy berwar. The term is confusing, and hacking rarely amounts to any thing approaching a weapon of mass destructio n. Cy berspace is most usefully exploited on the lower end of the conflict spectrum for intelligence and subversion, i.e., not as a s ubstitu te for military or economic power but a complement to it. Yet the logic of complementarity has at least one exception
. Cyberwar is not war per se, but in rare
circumstances it may make escalation to thermonuclear war more likely.
regarding conflict severity , and it is a big one. Offensive cy ber operations against N C3 raise the ris k of nuclear war. They do so because cy ber operations and nuclear weapons are extreme complements regarding their informational properties. Cy ber operations rely on deception. Nuclear deterrence relies on clear communication. In a brin ksmanship crisis, the former undermines the latter. Nuclear crises were rare events in Co ld War history , than kfully . Today , the proliferation and modernization of nuclear weapons may raise the risk slightly . Subversion of NC3 raises the danger of nuclear war slightly more
Human Trafficking is also linked to organized crime, and the massive
migrant patterns caused by it create the conditions to generate state
instability
Babatunde 14 — Abosede Omowumi Babatunde, lectures at the Centre for Peace and
Strategic Studies, University of Ilorin, Nigeria, PhD in Peace and Conflict Studies from the
University of Ibadan, Nigeria, “Human Trafficking and Transnational Organized Crime:
Implications for Security in Nigeria,” The Canadian Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies
Volume 46, Number 1 (2014), JSTOR
Human trafficking also threatens national security in its link to transnational organized
crime, for in many states, including Nigeria, international criminal networks that support mafialike organizations undermine the states sovereignty over particular areas. A growing
realisation through the 1980s and 1990s was that the rise of transnational organized crime is
closely connected with the weakness of states and their inability to control their territorial
borders.54 The uncontrolled flow of illegal migrants and refugees across porous borders
heightens competition over scarce resources, exacerbates ethnic and sectarian tensions, and adds
stress on already weak state institutions.55 Porous borders allow politically organized non-state
actors access to territory and population groups that can be used for political mobilization, which
in turn can lead to the emergence of refugee warrior communities. Refugee flows can act as
conduits that regionalize and inter nationalize internal conflicts with disastrous consequences for
weak states, as seen in Africa's Great Lakes region.56 The high levels of illegal migration and the
failure to control territorial borders strengthen the perception of weak ness and can precipitate
security challenges such as those of Boko Haram in Nigeria. The porous and ungoverned
territories along Nigeria's borders with Benin, Cameroon, Niger, and Chad complicate this
further. Given the emergence of organized criminal networks around illegal migration and the
vast amounts of money involved, such operations erode normal governance and present real
threats to national sovereignty.
Great power conflict
Grugiel 09 — Jakub Grygiel, George H. W. Bush Associate Professor of International
Relations at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at the Johns Hopkins
University, 7/1/2009, Date Accessed: 6-26-2018, "Vacuum Wars" American Interest,
https://www.the-american-interest.com/2009/07/01/vacuum-wars/
This prevailing view of failed states, however, though true, is also incomplete. Failed states are
not only a source of domestic calamities; they are also potentially a source of great power
competition that in the past has often led to confrontation, crisis and war. The failure of a state
creates a vacuum that, especially in strategically important regions, draws in competitive greatpower intervention. This more traditional view of state failure is less prevalent these days, for
only recently has the prospect of great power competition over failed “vacuum” states returned.
But, clearly, recent events in Georgia—as well as possible future scenarios in Iraq, Afghanistan
and Pakistan, as well as southeastern Europe, Asia and parts of Africa—suggest that it might be a
good time to adjust, really to expand, the way we think about “failed states” and the kinds of
problems they can cause. The difference between the prevailing and the traditional view on state
failure is not merely one of accent or nuance; it has important policy implications. Intense great
power conflict over the spoils of a failed state will demand a fundamentally different set of
strategies and skills from the United States. Whereas the response to the humanitarian disasters
following state failure tends to consist of peacekeeping and state-building missions, large-scale
military operations and swift unilateral action are the most likely strategies great powers will
adopt when competing over a power vacuum. On the political level, multilateral cooperation,
often within the setting of international institutions, is feasible as well as desirable in case of
humanitarian disasters. But it is considerably more difficult, perhaps impossible, when a failed
state becomes an arena of great power competition. The prevailing view of failed states is an
obvious product of the past two decades—
a period in which an entirely new generation of scholars and policy makers has entered their respective professions. A co mbination of events —the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet U nion and the prostration of states such as Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti and Bo snia, and most importantly the terrorist attac ks of September 11—created two interloc ked impressio ns concerning the sources of state failure that are today largely accepted uncritically . The first of these is that weak states have unr aveled because of the great powers’ d isin terest in them, which has allowed seriou s domestic
problems, ranging from poverty to ethnic and social s trife, to degenerate into chaos and sy stemic governance failure.1 The basic idea here is that the Cold War had a stabilizing effect in several strategic regions where either the United States or the Soviet Un ion s upported recently fashioned states with little domestic legitimacy and cohesion for fear that, if they did not, the rival superpower might gain advan tage. Some fortunate Third World neutrals even managed a kin d of foreign aid arbitrage, attracting help from both s ides. When su pport from the superpowers ended, many of these states, such as Somalia and Yugoslav ia, were torn apart by internal factionalism. The state lac ked the money to bribe compliance or to generate a larger economic pie, degenerating rapidly into corruptio n and vio lence. The key conclusion : The most egregious and tragic examples of failed states in the 1990 s occurred because of great power ne glect rather than meddling. The related second impression that po st-Co ld War events have created is that the main threat po sed by failed states starts
from within them and subsequen tly spills over to o thers. Failed states exp ort threats ranging from crime to drugs to refugees to, most dramatically , global terrorism.2 The lawlessness an d vio lence of such states often s pills across borders in the form of waves of refugees, the creation of asy lums for criminals and more besides. As the number and severity of f ailed state cases rose, Western powers reacted much of the time by hoping that the problems arising from the failure of state s, even those geographically close to the United States or Europe like Haiti and Bosn ia, would remain essentially limited so that internal chaos could simply be waited out. Interventions such as in Somalia, Bo snia or Haiti were driven by a Western public shoc ked by vivid images of suffering and slaughter rather than by a sense that these collapsed states d irectly threatened U.S. national security . The 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States changed the perception that failed states could be safely ignored. The Hobbesian world of a failed s tate could be d istant, but it was also a breeding
ground for terrorist networ ks that cou ld train their foot so ldiers, estab lish logistical bases and p lan attac ks against dis tant countries . Failed states s uddenly were not only humanitarian disasters bu t security threats. As Francis Fu kuy ama observed in 2004, “radical Islamist terrorism combined with the availability of weapons of mass destruction added a major security dimension to the burden of prob lems created by we ak governance.”3 However, 9/11 did no t alter the conv iction that the main threat posed by failed states stems from endogenous problems and no t from a great power competition to fill the vacuum created by their demise. At least in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks , there was a naive feeling that the Islamist threat festering in failed or weak states such as Afg hanistan was a menace to the internatio nal community writ large, and certainly to great powers like Rus sia and China, as well as the U nited States. It was therefore assumed that the great powers would cooperate to combat terrorism and not compete with each other for control over failin g
or failed states. As Stephen David poin ted out in these pages, “Instead of livin g in a world of internatio nal anarchy and domestic order, we have international order and domestic anarchy .”4 The solution stemming from such a view of failed states falls un der the broad category of “nation-building .” If the main challenge of failed states is in ternally generated and caused by a collapse of domestic order, then the solu tion mus t be to rebuild sta te institutions and restore authority and order, preferably under some sort of multilateral arrangement that would enhance the legitimacy of what is necessarily an intr usive e ndeavor. Great powers are expected to cooperate, not compete, to fix failed states . U.S. foreign policy continues to reflect this prevailing view. Then-Director of the Policy Planning s taff, Stephen Krasner, and Carlos Pascual, then-Coordina tor for Reconstruction and Stabilization at the State Department, wrote in 2005 that, “when chaos prevails, terrorism, narcotics trade, wea pons proliferation, and other forms of organized crime can flourish.” Moreover, “modern
conflicts are far more likely to be internal, civil matters than to be clashes between opposing countries .”5 The prevailing view of failed states is, to repeat, not wrong, just incomplete—for it ignores the competitive nature of great power interactions. T he traditio nal understand ing of power vacuums is s till ve ry relevant. Sudan, Central Asia, Indo nesia, parts of Latin America and many other areas are characterized by weak and often collaps ing s tates that are increasingly arenas for great power competition. The interest of these great powers is not to rebuild the state or to engage in “nation-b uild ing” for humanita rian purposes but to establish a foo thold in the regio n, to o btain favorable economic deals, especially in the energy sector, and to weaken the presence of other great powers. Let’s loo k at just three poss ible future scenarios. In the first, imagine that parts of Indones ia become increasingly difficult to govern a nd are wracked by riots. Chinese minorities are attacked, w hile pirates prow l sealanes in ever greater numbers. Bejing, pressured by domestic opinion to help
the Chinese d iaspora, as well as by fears that its seaborne commerce will be interrupted, intervenes in the region. China ’s actio n is then perceived as a threat by Japan, which projects its own power in to the region. The United States, In dia and others then intervene to pro tect their in terests, as well. In the second scenario, imagine that U zbe kis tan collapses after y ears of chronic mismanagement and continued Islamis t agitation. U zbe kis tan’s natural resources and its strategic value as a route to the Casp ian or Mid dle East are suddenly up for grabs, and Russ ia and Ch ina begin to compete for control over it, p ossibly followed by other states like Iran and Tur key . In a third scenario, imagine that the repressive government of Sudan loses the ability to maintain con trol over the s tate, and that chaos spreads from Darfur outward to Chad and other neig hbors. Powers dis tant and nearby decide to extend their control over the threatened oil fields. China, thoug h still at least a de cade away from having serious power projection capabilities, already has men on the ground in Sudan
protecting some of the fields and uses them to con trol the coun try ’s natural resources. These scenarios are not at all o utland ish, as recent events have show n. Kosov o, which formally declared independence on February 17, 2008, continues to strain relationsh ips between the Un ited States and Europe, o n the one hand, and Serbia and Russ ia, on the o ther. The resultin g tension may degenerate into vio lence as Serbian nationalists an d perhaps even the Serbian army intervene in Kosovo. It is conceivable then that Russia wo uld s upport Belgrade, leading to a serious confrontation with the E uropean Union and the United States. A s imilar conflict, pittin g Ru ssia agains t NATO or the Un ited States alone, or s ome other alliance of European states, could develop in several post-Soviet region s, from Georgia to the Baltics. Las t summer’s war in Georgia, for ins tance, showed incip ient sig ns of a great power confrontation between Russia and the United States o ver the fate of a weak state, further destabilized by a rash local leadership and aggressive meddling by Mo scow. The
future of Ukraine may follow a parallel pattern: Ru ssian citizen s (or, to be precise, ethnic Russ ians who are given pas sports by Moscow) may claim to be harassed by Ukrainian authorities, who are weak and d ivided. A refugee problem could the n arise, giving Mo scow a ready justification to intervene militarily . The question would then be whether NATO, or the United States, or some alliance of Poland and other states w ould feel the need and have the ability to prevent U kraine from falling u nder Russ ian control. Another example could arise in Iraq. If the United States fails to stabilize the situation and w ith draws, or even merely scales down its military presence too quic kly , one outcome could be the collap se of the central government in Bagh dad. The resulting vacuum would be filled by militias and other groups , who wou ld engage in v iolent co nflict for oil, political con trol and sectarian revenge. This tragic situation would be compounded if Iran and Saud i Arabia, the two regio nal powers with the most direct interests in the ou tcome, entered the fray more directly
than they have so far. In sum, there are many more plausible scenarios in wh ich a failed state could become a play ground of both regional and great power rivalry , which is why we urgently need to dust off the traditional view of failed s tates and consider its main features as well as its array of consequences. The traditional view s tarts from a widely shared assumption that, as nature abhors vacuums, so does the international sy stem. As Richard Nixon once said to Mao Zedong, “In international relations there are no good choices. One thin g is s ure—we can leave no vacuums, because they can be filled.”6 The power vacuums created by failed states attract the interests of great powers because they are an easy way to expand their spheres of influence while weakening their op ponents or forestalling their in tervention. A state that decides not to fill a power vacuum is effectively inviting o ther states to do so, thereby potentially decreasing its own relative power. Th is simple, inescapable logic is based on the view that international relations are essentially a zero-sum game:
My gain is y our loss. A failed state creates a dramatic opportunity to gain something, whether natural resources, territory or a strategically pivotal location. The power that con trols it first necessarily increases its own stand ing relative to other states. As Walter Lippmann wrote in 1915, the anarchy of the world is due to the bac kwardness of wea k states; . . . the modern nations have lived in armed peace and collapsed into hideou s warfare because in Asia, Africa, the Balkans, Central and Sou th America there are rich territories in which wea kness invites exp loitation, in which inefficiency and corruption invite imperial expansion, in w hich the prizes are so great that the competition for them is to the knife.7 The threat posed by failed states, therefore, need not emanate mainly from within. After all, by definition a failed s tate is no longer an actor capable of conducting a foreign po licy . It is a politically inert geogra phic area whose fate is dependent on the action s of others. T he main menace to international security stems from competition between these “others.” As Arno ld
Wolfers put it in 195 1, because of the competitive nature of in ternational relatio ns, “expansion would be sure to ta ke place wherever a power vacuum existed.”8 The challenge is that the incentive to extend con trol over a vacuum or a failed state is s imilar for many states. In fact, even if one state has a stronger desire to control a power vacuum because of its geographic proximity , natural resources or strategic locatio n, th is very interest spurs o ther states to seek command over the same territory simply because doing so weaken s that s tate. The ability to deprive a state of somethin g that w ill give it a substan tial advantage is itself a so urce of power. Hence a failed state suddenly becomes a strategic prize, because it either adds to one ’s own power or subtracts from another’s . The prevailing and traditional views of failed states reflect two separate realities. Therefore, we should n ot restrict ourselves to o ne view or th e other when study ing our op tion s. The difference is not just academic; it has very practical consequences. First and foremost, if we ta ke the traditional view,
failed states may pose an even greater danger to international security than policy makers and academics currently predict. Humanitarian disasters are certainly tragedies that deserve serious attentio n; y et they do not pose the worst threats to U. S. security or world stab ility . That ho nor still belongs to the po ss ibility of a great power confrontation. While the pas t decade or so has allowed u s to ignore great power rivalries as the main feature of international relatio ns, there is n o guarantee that th is happy circumstance will continue long into the future. Second, there is no one-size-fits-all policy optio n for a given failed state. Humanitarian disas ters carry a set of policy prescriptions that are liable to be counterproductive in an arena of great power conflict. It is almost a truism that failed states require multila teral cooperation, given their global impact. But the traditional v iew of failed states leads u s not to see k multilate ral settings but to act preemptively and ofte n unilaterally . Indeed, it is often safer to seek to extend one ’s contro l over failed states quic kly in order to limit the
possib ility of intervention by other great powers. Third, the role of armed forces engaged in failed states needs to be re-evaluated in lig ht of the traditio nal view. If failed states require on ly “nation-build ing”, the military forces of the intervening powers will have to develop s kills that are more like tho se of a police force: comfortable with a limited use of force, adept at dist inguishing peaceful civilians from criminals, able to enforce law and order, good at managing in teractions within the societies and many other tas ks as well. However, the traditional view s uggests that one must be prepared to apply the full spectrum of military force in case of a direct confrontation with another great power. Sending a wea kly armed peacekeeping force into a situa tion in which such a confrontation is po ssib le could easily prove disas trous. Th us the Un ited States sh ould n ot focus o nly or overly much on preparing for low-intensity conflicts and counterins urgency operations to the detriment of preparing for a major war involving another state. Rather, it should maintain and improve its
ability to deny other powers access to regions at s ta ke and increase its readiness for a direct confrontatio n. Finally , on the po litical level, nation-building under the aegis of the Un ited Natio ns or even NATO may not be the solu tion to failed s tates. If they are problems not just of foreign aid and law enforcement, but also of great power conflict and bilateral dip lomacy , we should expect a reversion to an atavistic set of state action s that were suppo sed to have been made obsolete by the triumph of liberal internatio nalism. As to the ou tcomes of vacuum wars, finally , history suggests four basic po ssib ilities: n on- intervention by all powers; partition; u nilateral preventive intervention ; and war. If a failed state was too d istant and ultimately strategically irrelevant, great powers simply ignored it, sensing that an in tervention w ould n ot increase their own power. In many way s the irrelevance of a failed state leads to the most stable situatio n, one in w hich the prevailing view is most app licable. Bu t there are ever fewer areas of the world that fall in to th is cate gory .
. The inability
to reach an agreement to divide or unilaterally control a failed state can lead to a violent clash.
The exact features of such a war may range from battles between mass armies to attempts at
subversion and insurgency. But the underlying characteristic is the direct involvement of two or
more powers.
Interconnectedness combined with the grow ing power-projection capability of powers such as China creates incentives to intervene in even the most remote areas. The possible scenarios of Indonesia or Sudan are good examples of this. So we are left with the o ther three option s. Great powers have employed partition or d ivision into spheres of influence to avoid a massive conf rontation. The partitions of Poland at the end of the 18 th century are a classic example. The next optio n is u nilateral preventive intervention. Basically , this inv olves a rapid intervention by one power to establis h its dominance over the area in question, preventin g the other interested parties from projecting their power there. In brief, one power arrives first at the carcass of the failed or failing s tate and preempts conflict by making it to o costly for others. The las t option, wh ich is n ot mutually exclusive of the others, is war
1AC — Modelling
Contention _: Modelling
Assistance requirements place the United States out of compliance with the
intentions and legal obligations present in then Palermo protocol--undermining U.S. response to both trafficking victims and traffickers--removing the law enforcement assistance requirements helps bring the United
States into compliance with the protocol and towards a victim centered
approach that deviates from a US-originated framework to one that is far
more consistent with international law
Culkin 15 — Laurie Culkin, J.D. from the University of Baltimore in 2016, Current MPH
Candidate at The George Washington University – Milken Institute School of Public Health, The
Women's Law Center of Maryland Legal Intern, Trafficking Victims Post-Conviction Advocacy
Project The Women's Law Center of Maryland, “Student Comment: Exchange Cooperation for
Visas: Flaws in U.S. Immigration System Criminalizes Trafficking Victims,” University of
Baltimore Journal of International Law, Volume 3 Issue 2, Article 5, Page 115,
https://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1031&context=ubjil
PROBLEM
The Palermo Protocol intends to prevent the criminalization and revictimization of trafficking
victims. Thus, having ratified the Protocol, the U.S. expressly prohibits criminalizing victims
through it’s domestic criminal law and immigration law systems, and offers undocumented
victims of trafficking remedies to remain in the U.S. legally. However, in order to access these
remedies, undocumented trafficking victims must cooperate with law enforcement in
prosecuting their trafficker, or they will be subject to removal proceedings back to their
country of origin, under a violation of immigration law. The strict constraints of the T- Visa
means many victims will not meet the statutory requirements. Further, those who meet the
statutory requirements still may not satisfy the standards of local law enforcement, failing to
provide whatever assistance is deemed “adequate cooperation” in that particular jurisdiction.
Though relief is available to a few victims who manage to jump through the various bureaucratic
hoops, many other undocumented victims are being criminalized by the flaws in the system, and
are subject removal proceedings that are indistinguishable from criminal law proceedings.
ANALYSIS The Palermo Protocol and U.S. law calls for the decriminalization of trafficking
victims. To this end, the TVPA established T Visas, which allow undocumented trafficking
victims the opportunity to remain in the U.S. legally for a period, as long as they aid law
enforcement in prosecuting their trafficker. However, there are limited numbers given out
annually, and, as noted above, the visa is drastically underutilized.
In order for an individual to be eligib le for a T-Visa, the government must identify the person as a “victim” of a “severe form of trafficking,” and the v ictim must meet certain statutory requirements. Specifically , individuals must cooperate with law enforcement to prosecute their traffic ker in order to be certified as
eligible for relief; however, th is certification is at the d iscretion of the law enforcement organization in volved. V ictims must als o demonstrate that send ing them back to their country of origin wou ld amount to “unusual and severe” harm.67 Even if a victim meets all of the statutory requirements, the T-Visa is a temporary , non-immigrant visa, which s till leaves her vulnerable to removal proceedings once the visa expires.68 The Criminalization of Immigration Removal Proceedings Removal proceedings are the primary mechanism by which the government expels noncitizens from the U.S., or prevents their ad mission u nder the Immigration and Naturalization Act.6 9 Deportatio n is traditio nally a civil matter; however, for those going throu gh removal proceedings, the experience is often in distingu ishable from traditio nal criminal proceedings.70 The h istory of expuls ion, the procedural parallels to the criminal justice sy stem, the methods of enforcement, and recent Supreme Court jurisprudence have led scholars to argue that depor tation is more akin to criminal
proceedings rather than a civil, adminis trative functio n. i. Purpose of Criminal and Immigration Law Bo iled down to the core, criminal and immigration law serve the same function.71 Bo th serve to con trol phy sical inclu sion or exclusion from society in the Un ited States, and create rules that establish lesse r levels of citizenship.72 M odern American law further intertw ines criminal law and immigration law, where noncitizens that have committed past crimes may not be admitted in to the U. S., immigration law viola tions themselves are crimes, and many criminal law violatio ns are deportable offenses for lawful permanent residents.73 Loo king to the history of deportation, wh ich has its roots in ban ishment, sheds ligh t on the intent of current law.74 Through out h istory , banishment from one’s community has been used as a punishment for serious v iolations of socie ty ’s mores.75 Under English common law, ban ishment was used as a criminal punishment imposed on b oth s ubjects and foreigners.76 In 1718, E nglish Parliament enacted the Transportation Act, wh ich
allowed criminals to be sen tenced to “transportatio n” out of the Kingdom for major crimes, and allocated public funds to transp ort the criminals to the United States.77 Criminal transportation was the only ty pe of expulsion available, with no civil expulsion pro visions.78 The English Model set the precedent for expulsion in the Ame rican colonies, which followed suit, and used banishment as a pun ishment imposed for criminal vio lation s.79 Under President Jo hn Adams’ admin istratio n, the United States enacted the Alien and Sedition Acts in 179 8, which allowed for the expulsion of any alien who committe d a crime in America after the alien went before a criminal court.80 ii. Procedural Parallels There are striking procedural parallels between criminal law and immigration law enforcement. In both, a judge’s decisio n in a case directly impac ts the subject’s phy sical liberties, either by incarcerating the indiv id ual or by forcibly removing them from the country .81 An individ ual suspected of v iolating immigration law is subject to a hearing in court before a judge, and
may be represented by a lawy er; however, in immigration law one will no t be provided by the court. In an immigration hearing, the respon dent has the opportun ity to present witnesses, and in many cases there is also a prosecuting attorney pursuing the rights of the U. S.82 iii. E nforcement Parallels Prior to 2002, the Department of Commerce and Labor handled immigration enforcement, responsibilities then sh ifted to the Department of Justice, and eventually to the Department of Homeland Security at present.83 This change in departments shifted immigration enforcement towards a more law enforcement like s tructure.84 Immigration law enforcement officers are uniformed, and, like criminal law enforcement officers, are permitted to conduct surveillance, execute warrants, make arrests, and detain tho se suspected of violatin g immigration law.85 In 2001, to aid domestic officers, Immigration and Naturalization Service began to enter civil immigration information into the Federal Bureau of Investigation database that state p olice frequently use in day -to-day
investigations and arrests.8 6 Detentio n is the immigration law equivalent to incarceration in criminal law.87 Nonciti zens, including w omen and children, may be held at detention centers awaiting their hearing or during investigation periods.88 Undocumented people in the U.S. may be detained for seven day s without cause,89 and adminis trative rules have been expanded to permit detention for a “reasonable period of time” under extraordinary circumstance.90 The U.S. Supreme Court has distingu ished detention from incarceration, say ing that the purpose of deten tion in an immigration contex t is to ensure that the individual facing dep ortation attends their administrative hearings, and to g uarantee ease of removal from the country .91 Despite this dis tinction, no ncitizens are often held in the same detention centers as criminals.92 U nder U.S. immigration law, there is also ma ndatory detention of noncitizens for violatio ns of certain crimes.93 Prostitu tion is one of these crimes, and is also the charge most often given to v ictims of trafficking wh o are being sexually
exploited.94 The law further allows n oncitizens to be deported if the person has committed prostitu tion w ithin ten y ears prior to admission or app lication for a visa.95 There is on ly one exception that allows for the v ictim to be released, and similar to the T-Visa, it also requires the victim to cooperate with law enforc ement.96 iv. Padilla v. Kentucky In 2010, the U. S. Su preme Court issued an o pinion that express ly confirmed what legal scholars have been asserting, that depor tation is no t strictly a civil, administrative action. In Padilla v. Kentuc ky , the Supreme Court ac knowledged that deportation is uniq uely difficult to classify , and is no t a civil matter per se, but rather falls s omewhere between civil and criminal law.97 The case arose when a man, who had been a lawful permanent resident of the United States for 4 0 y ears, pled guilty to a felony drug charge under the suggestion of his legal counsel. 98 Mr. Pad illa’s counsel adv ised him tha t because he had been in the U.S. for so lon g, he would not be deported for pleading g uilty .99 However, the gu ilty plea put his
immigration status in jeopardy .100 The Court held that an attorney is obligated to tell a no ncitizen client that pleading guilty to a crime may result in forced removal from the United States. 101 Previously , the Supreme Court viewed deportation as a “collateral consequence” of a criminal plea.102 In Padilla, the Supreme Court ac knowledged that deportation is a severe and more direc t consequence of pleading guilty , and effectively struck down this n otio n.103 In practice, th is ho lding had the effect of expanding the protections g iven to n oncitizens in criminal proceedings.10 4 In addition, this h olding set a new standard for the effectiveness of counsel.105 Legal sch olars have interpreted this decisio n as the begin ning of a tidal sh ift in immigration law jurisprudence. The Court began to recognize that deportation proceedings are quasi criminal in nature,106 and these penalties are serious, often draconian, and lifelo ng.107 b. Implications of Deportation Unique to Trafficking According to the U.S. Department of State, more than 50,000 peop le are trafficked into the U.S.
each year.108 Although there is immigration relief for non-citizen victims in the Un ited States, enacted law is o nly as good as its enforcement.109 Today , T-Visas are drastically underutilized, and victims are slipp ing through the cracks in the sy stem.110 This discrepancy can be attributed to law enforcement’s inability to iden tify victims, and victims who are unwilling to report trafficking to authorities for fear of deportation.111 Traffic king v ictims are more likely than many other kin ds of victims to be misidentified, most often as unauth orized migrants or as criminals, when in reality they have only committed offenses the trafficker forced them to perform, such as prostitutio n or drug smugg ling. 112 Even if indiv iduals are identified as victims, they are often still detained if they choose not to coo perate with law enforcement.113 This incarceration is re-traumatizing to victims and reinforces the notion that society sees them as criminals, though they are not going throu gh criminal proceedings.11 4 When deportatio n is the default response to lac k of cooperation with a
prosecution or in vestigation, it means that no o ne is assess ing the dangers of returning v ictims to their country of origin.1 15 This puts the victim at ris k of retaliation and re-trafficking. 116 In addition, if cooperating w ith law enforcement is a victim’s only option, and n o other meaningful immigration pro tections or o pportun ities are available, it calls the v olun tariness of the v ictim’s compliance into ques tion.1 17 C. Comparative Legis lation - Italy Internationally , other countr ies have acknow ledged that restrictive immigration laws in “destination” countries contribu te to the grow th of trafficking in persons.1 18 Those vulnerable to trafficking are often enticed by the opportunity for a better life abroad, but have little means to get to that country legally , due to stringent immigration laws.119 Vu lnerable individuals rely on others to prov ide them with false documents, arrange their travel, and find them employ ment in the receiving country , which often leads to sexual exploitation and labor trafficking .120 Italy has been identif ied as a popular destination co untry in Europe,
In practice, current U.S.
immigration law criminalizes victims of human trafficking, and therefore violates the intention
of the Palermo Protocol. In the Supreme Court case, which made deportation a civil sanction,
Justice Brewer famously dissented, saying: But it needs no citation of authorities to support the
proposition that deportation is punishment. Everyone knows that to be forcibly taken away
from home and family and friends and business and property, and sent across the ocean to
with a high popu lation of “migrants” from other nation s relocating to wor k.121 H igher levels of migrants frequently means higher levels of trafficking.1 22 To combat human trafficking, Italy , in conjunction w ith the International Organization for Migration, identified frequent migration ro utes and institute d program s to allow easy and legal immigration options to poten tial victims of trafficking.123 Specifically , Italy issues 5,00 0 wor k visas annually to Alban ians, acknowledging the Balkan Peninsu la as its largest source country for trafficking and smugg ling. 124 Havin g legal op tions means potential v ictims are less likely to rely on traffickers to migrate for better employ ment.125 CON CLUSI ON a. The U. S. is in V iolation of the Palermo Protocol
distant land, is punishment, and that oftentimes most severe and cruel.126 The TVPA is the
United States’ implementation of the requirements of the Palermo Protocol.127 The Palermo
Protocol calls for all State Parties to consider adopting laws to permit victims of trafficking to
remain in that territory,128 and that if a State Party returns a victim to their country of origin
they do so with “due regard” for the safety of the victim. The Protocol also specifies that the
return should “preferably be voluntary.”129 The TVPA incorporates these ideals in its protection
arm, which offers the T-Visa as protection from involuntary deportation, and aims to ensure
victims are not improperly incarcerated, fined or penalized.130 Indeed, the U.S. acknowledges
that trafficking victims should not be detained or penalized for acts associated with
trafficking, and extends this protection to those who violate immigration laws as a result.131 In
the 2014 TIP Report, the theme is “The Journey from Victim to Survivor,” and the introduction
reads: Another early step, while seemingly obvious, is nevertheless one of the greatest challenges
to anti-trafficking efforts in general: finding the victims and getting them out of harm’s way. The
strongest victim protection scheme is useless if victims remain trapped in exploitation.
Governments cannot sit back and wait for victims to self-identify; rather, they must proactively
seek victims out by investigating high-risk sectors, screening vulnerable populations, and training
relevant government officials to recognize trafficking when they see it. It is vital that victims not
be treated like criminals or be subjected to arrest or deportation for other offenses.132 T-Visas are
the device created by the U.S. to protect victims from being exposed to immigration sanctions.
Though the stated intention is to protect victims, T-Visas only offer incentives to those victims
who cooperate in prosecution. The immigration law statute governing the T-Visa requires an
individual to comply with “any reasonable request” by law enforcement in order to
qualify.133 By forcing victims to either work with law enforcement to prosecute their
trafficker, or go through removal proceedings, the U.S. is still forcing victims into the hands of
law enforcement with their physical liberty on the line. Victims do not have a choice; they must
go through the system one way or the other. In addition, the small number of visas available
annually,134 and the even smaller number actually issued,135 compared to the 50,000 people
trafficked into the U.S. each year, shows that victims are slipping through the cracks in the
system. This leads to disproportionate numbers of trafficking victims going through deportation
proceedings. The Protocol requires that countries “shall” establish comprehensive measures to
protect trafficking victims from revictimization.136 Removal proceedings criminalize victims,
though they are still technically classified as non-criminals, because they are indistinguishable
within the criminal justice system. Although the U.S. argues that deportation is civil and
administrative in nature, we still force victims to go through a quasi-judicial hearing in front of a
finder of fact. We also require that the individual defend him or herself in that hearing, and
encourage the victim to seek counsel, who can examine witnesses and put on evidence on their
behalf. The U.S. aims to encourage victims to come forward and report their traffickers, but
we force those who do come forward to make the choice between cooperation and
deportation. Corruption is rampant among police, border police, and other government officials
that handle immigration and law enforcement in source countries with major trafficking
problems.137 By forcing victims in the U.S. to comply to obtain a visa, it reinforces noncitizen
victim’s distrust of law enforcement and fear that they will be deported. In the U.S., Immigration
officials look and act the same as criminal law enforcement officials, and victims may face
detention for extended periods of time while awaiting their hearing. Finally, undocumented
victims going through deportation proceedings are likely unfamiliar with the American judicial
system. If deportation proceedings appear so closely related to the criminal justice system to
American legal academics that study them, how could the American government expect a foreign
victim of trafficking to tell the difference? b. Switching to a Victim Centered Approach The U.S.
Department of State in the 2014 T.I.P. Report, calls for a victim-centered approach to antitrafficking programs, and specifically highlights the importance of victim identification and
immigration relief.138 The Protocol protection provisions are silent on the practice of
required compliance with law enforcement, but overall encourage a compassionate and
humanitarian response. Despite claims to the contrary, the U.S. follows a prosecutorial
approach to anti-trafficking, which places prosecution of traffickers as the first priority.139
Enforcement-dominated anti-trafficking strategies relegate victim protection to a secondary
role rather than a complementary or necessary role.140 Responses that arrest, detain and deport
vic tims thwart victim identification, and consequently disempower the victim.141 Switching
from a prosecutorial approach to a victim-centered, human-rights approach would be
congruent with the Protocol, would help victims begin to heal, and would lead to more
successful prosecutions overall.142 Trafficked people require alternatives to systems in which
deportation is the default, such as services, work authorization, and legal immigration status.143
Victim protections are not in conflict with tough law enforcement, and implementation of
proactive identification of victims, funded victims services, and alternatives to detention would
respect the trafficked persons’ human rights and yield better prosecution results.
Lack of US effective prosecutions and noncompliance with Palermo makes
U.S. pressure against Russia ineffective---US action is vital to cause Russian
compliance
Huber 10 — Professor Robert Huber. Martin Sletzinger. Nancy Palekha. Kate Sumpter,
Alexander Dominguez, Sungjoo Hwang.; Violetta Zdanovskaya, Austin Houvener, Jessica
Anderson, Tomoko Burse. Alexis Jenkins, Krystle Butler, Laura Jordan, Vivica Williams. Emily
Liebeskind, Whitney Saueressig, Ryan Simcic, Aaron Tilley. “Commission on Russian-American
Relations 2010,” Task Force, 495F Winter,
https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/bitstream/handle/1773/15600/TF_SIS495F_2010
.pdf.txt;jsessionid=12AB0526B9377182489717D42BEF9300?sequence=2, Language Modified*
The Russian Federation has enacted laws to combat the human trafficking situation as the
issue continues to make headlines and cause concern for Europe and other allies. President
Putin introduced anti-trafficking legislation that passed in 2003 making trafficking of people
illegal and established a punishment. This prompted the United States Department of State to
move Russia from a category three, a group not addressing the problem, to a category two,
meaning Russia is making some, though still inadequate, efforts to combat the issue.24 The
following year, Russia had ratified the UN Palermo Protocol. The protocol committed Russia
to prevent and combat human trafficking and also to provide assistance to victims.25 However,
the exploitation of people continues. Article 127 of the Russian Federation Criminal Code
prohibits the trafficking of humans and gives a punishment of up to fifteen years for violation of
this code. This code has not detracted this booming industry, mostly due to the complex nature
of catching the offenders as well as the low priority assigned to this task. Victims of
trafficking are sent to Turkey, Greece, South Africa, Germany, Poland, Israel, Vietnam, Thailand,
Australia, the Middle East, and the United States.26 Many of these destination countries are allies
of the United States. Thus, the United States is able to exert its influence in conducting
international cooperation to reduce the number of victims. Since passing article 127, the
instigations on human trafficking cases has been few and the sentences imposed have been fewer.
There are various factors that contribute to this low number, including the complexity of offences,
lack of consistency in the investigations and the low priority assigned to them. In 2004, under
article 127 there were eighteen cases that went to trial under human trafficking. Of these eighteen,
only seven verdicts were made regarding nine people. Two of these people were acquitted but the
others were only found criminally accountable for crimes other than human trafficking.
Frequently, the classification of the human trafficking crimes is changed during the investigation
of organized crime, forgery, management of brothels, rape [sexual assault], or involvement in
prostitution. In March of 2001, Oxana Rancheva was trafficked to Cyprus on an artist visa to
work in a cabaret but quit after three days. Her note indicated she was going back to Russia.
When the cabaret owner found her he took her to the police to have her declared an illegal
immigrant but the police found no evidence that she was illegal. One hour later, Rancheva was
found dead. It was concluded that she fell off the balcony while trying to escape. The ECHR
fined Russia?s lack of actions in this case as Russia failed to investigate how and where the
victim was recruited and hold those people accountable. This fine from the ECHR only came
about because the father of the victim pressed the ECHR on the issue and took nine years to
occur.27 The lack of government interest in finding the traffickers and holding them
accountable to the human rights standards that the Russian Federation agreed to shows how
low of a priority human trafficking is. The cabaret owner wanted this woman deported so that
he could purchase another woman for prostitution. His presence at the police station in Cyprus
could have been a start to an investigation in bringing down the organization involved in
trafficking women from Russia to Cyprus. In 2004, two Russian citizens were charged for the
recruitment of three minor girls they transported to Moscow and forced into the prostitution ring.
Instead of being prosecuted for the human trafficking, these men were charged for? organization
of prostitution with involvement of a minor?.28 In fact, between 2004 and 2005, there were only
four prosecutions with no one sentenced to more than seven years imprisonment.29 The United
States does not have a much better history in regard to prosecution of human traffickers.
From 1996 to 2000 there were four cases of human trafficking busts in the United States where
illegal Russian women were being held. None of the accused traffickers were prosecuted.30
Actions like this show the Russian Federation that the United States does not put a priority on
the lives of these people and hence will not pressure Russia to increase prevention and
punishments to end this problem.
Russian compliance with U.S. pressure effectively fights Russian human
trafficking---it’s a massive and growing industry in Russia
Dietel 08 — Clara A. Dietel, “Note: "Not Our Problem": Russia's Resistance to Joining the
Convention on Action Against Trafficking In Human Beings,” 32 Suffolk Transnat'l L. Rev. 161,
Winter 2008, Lexis Nexis
A decrease in the supply of women trafficked from Russia could have a large impact on the rest
of the region. 127 As a major supplier of human trafficking, any steps that Russia takes to
curb the problem would reduce the number of women trafficked into other nations. 128 The
fewer women there are to traffic, the fewer people become involved in the trafficking industry.
129 This would make the industry less profitable and could dramatically slow the rate of
trafficking throughout Europe. 130 By signing the Trafficking Convention, Russia has the
potential to do more than just send a signal to other nations that they should address their
trafficking problems. 131 It would also make a profound difference to those who are directly
affected by trafficking within Russia's borders. 132 While human trafficking may be a lucrative
business, the toll it takes on its victims is exceptionally high. 133 This is more than a social or
personal problem for the victims involved; it is an economic crisis for Russia. 134 C. Other Steps
to Take Outside the Convention Given the depth of the human trafficking problem in Russia,
signing the Trafficking Convention would not quickly solve all of Russia's problems, nor is it
the only necessary step toward [*184] a solution. 135 Russia would have to institute numerous
reforms to adopt all of the suggested measures of the Trafficking Convention because of the lack
of a proper legislative framework. 136 There are additional steps, however, that Russia can take
to help address the issue of human trafficking. 137 As the U.S. Department of State suggests,
Russia should begin to track conviction and sentencing data for trafficking cases so the
government will have a better sense of the scope of the problem. 138 This would enable the
government to better assess what measures are necessary. 139 Compiling such data may also
illustrate the gravity of the problem, thereby prompting the Russian government to address the
issue more quickly. 140 There is a sense within the government that the sex trade is something in
which victims partake voluntarily. 141 Concrete data may help to dispel this myth and
demonstrate to officials that large crime rings control the trafficking networks. 142 Next, Russia
should consider incorporating some of the legislative changes that are required in the
Trafficking Convention. 143 Passing laws that would increase the punishment for involvement
in trafficking, or that would punish recruiters, would be an important first step. 144 The
Trafficking Convention includes "recruitment" in the definition of human trafficking, and Russia
should do the same. 145 There are many employment agencies in Russia that function as cover
operations for trafficking [*185] networks, and implementing legislation to regulate those
agencies that specialize in employment abroad could reduce the number of women trafficked
abroad.
It’s the preferred crime of choice for the Russia mafia---highest profit
margins
Weiss 14 — Dena Weiss, a Full-Time Professor at American Public University System, 7-242014, Date Accessed: 6-20-2018, "Organized Crime’s Involvement in Sex Crimes and Human
Trafficking" In Public Safety, https://inpublicsafety.com/2014/07/organized-crimes-involvementin-sex-crimes-and-human-trafficking/
Organized crime plays a significant role in human trafficking in countries worldwide. Often
beginning as a voluntary action, human trafficking quickly turns into the recruitment,
transport, and control of an individual. The criminal act not only involves trafficking an
individual, but also the demand for exorbitant fees to transport a person and create fraudulent
passport documents. Once an individual has arrived in a new country, the organized crime
members remain in control and usually force the immigrant into prostitution or forms of slavery
such as working in a sweatshop. Human smuggling is considered the recruitment, transport, and
harboring of illegal immigrants, however, it does not involve misrepresentation of illegal
immigration fees or extortion. Immigrants involved in smuggling transactions pay fees upfront
and the business transaction and contact with the recruiter ends at the border (Grubb, 2009).
Immigrants rarely have any additional interaction with the group that assisted them and are not
obligated to the organization financially. They are expected to find their own work and
accommodations once they have arrived at their destination. Transnational human trafficking is
believed to have become one of the least dangerous and most profitable enterprises for
organized crime groups. Organized crime has easily adapted to the technology changes
mandated for travel abroad. Unlike the 19th century when distinct ethnic groups dominated
during different time periods, organized crime has no prejudice at present. Many different
criminal groups all over the world work together and often share profits, which makes controlling
human trafficking next to impossible for law enforcement. Asian Gangs and Human Trafficking
China has experienced economic growth within urban areas of southeastern provinces; however,
the rural areas have suffered with little agricultural progression. Most available jobs are reserved
for those who are well educated and living in the city. Migrant workers who live a transient life
quickly fill factory jobs that pay low wages and require long hours. The United States is seen as
the ultimate escape where there are no limits on family size and citizens have endless
opportunities for employment. Due to poor economic conditions in China, the business of
trafficking Chinese citizens into the United States has become a lucrative business for organized
crime. One specific Asian crime organization is referred to as the “Triads.” The group has been
very successful in the United States creating cells in New York, Miami, San Francisco, Los
Angeles, Chicago, Boston, and Houston (Abadinsky, 2010). Human trafficking has become the
crime of choice not only because it is safer than offenses such as drug trafficking, but because
there is low overhead. Century old cargo carriers are used for travel and occupancy is triple what
it should be resulting in rancid conditions onboard vessels. Traffickers may charge as much as
$35,000 per immigrant but only require a $100 deposit (Logan, Walker, & Hunt, 2009). Once the
person arrives in the United States they are obligated to pay the remainder of their debt or become
enslaved by the Triads either in sweatshops or prostitution houses. Gang members threaten death
or violence against them or their families if they attempt escape. The home base for the Triad
organized crime group is believed to be in Hong Kong; however, they have heavy control of
Taiwan where billions in profit flow through legitimate businesses. In Spain, the Triad gangs
have infiltrated a small Chinese community and have corrupted both law enforcement and
government agencies. When someone dies in this town, the Triad gangs simply give the person a
new identity by recycling their legal citizenship documents. Nobody ever questions why the
population is skewed and there are no deaths year after year. Triad groups are masters in
exploiting foreign government and often pay large sums to agencies masked as donations to the
military or economic development when the money is actually bribe money for access to ports
and facilities needed for their operations. Although there are many hierarchical groups within
Asian organized crime it is decentralized making it difficult to obtain information regarding
international connections when an arrest is made (Logan et.al. 2009). Human trafficking mainly
for the purpose of prostitution has also become the preferred crime for the Russian mafia due to
the high profit margin. The majority of women who fall victim to trafficking are from poor
economic countries such as the Ukraine and Romania who do not offer many job opportunities
for young women even if they are educated (Zalisko, 2000). Women are recruited using
appealing advertisements in newspapers and magazines. The advertisements promise big
money and free housing for employment as a nanny, go-go dancer, or waitress in the United
States. Many victims are assured they will meet rich men in the big city eager for marriage
(Walker-Rodriguez & Hill, 2011). Victims are provided transportation and travel papers but are
quickly stripped of identification once they arrive at their destination. Once the women realize
they have been tricked into what some call modern-day slavery, they often fight or attempt to
escape. Mafia thugs subdue the women with violence and isolation. Narcotics such as heroin
and methamphetamine are given to the women routinely to get them hooked and dependent on
the gang members to feed their habit. In typical mafia fashion, the mob photographs the sex
slaves with clients and threatens to send the photographs to their family members if they step out
of line (Abadinksy, 2010).
Russian organized crime causes accidental use
Cilluffo 3 (Frank, Executive Director – Homeland Security Advisory Council, “Dealing with
Transnational Threats”, http://www. ndu.edu/inss/books/books%20%201999/US%20Russian%20Partnership%20July%2099/usrp18.html)
The stranglehold of Russian organized crime on Russian society is immense. Crime is truly usurping
the state’s authority to resolve legal disputes. Unable to depend on overburdened or corrupt courts, Russian businesses and individuals are forced to turn
to kryshas (protection rackets), many with criminal ties for adjudication. The criminals, on the other hand, do brutally enforce their own criminal code,
settling everything from parking tickets to major business disputes. Once ingrained into the Russian ethos, this phenomenon cannot be eradicated
overnight. This is precisely why the United States needs to support processes, as opposed to individuals. An independent judiciary, insulated from
corruption and politics, is crucial. This is not an issue of simply placing more laws on the books, it is an issue of political will and making the
bureaucracy more professional. Crime
and corruption have also been the greatest impediments to attracting
foreign direct investment, which cannot be treated in isolation of infrastructure modernization, shareholder rights, contract
enforcement, Russian customs, and taxation and licensing issues. Russia finds itself in the unpalatable position of depending on foreign investment, given
The current fiscal
crisis in Russia is, of course, undermining urgently needed maintenance of nuclear command
systems and is weakening security and safeguards of nuclear weapons. A former army general and
massive capital flight and the wholesale plundering of its natural resources by its oligarchs and organized crime groups.
Duma member, the late General Rokhlin, stated that the Russian strategic nuclear forces were nearing extinction for want of funds for maintenance. Both
In this atmosphere the prospect for a criminal diversion of
nuclear materials or an unauthorized and perhaps even accidental launch is at an all-time
high. This threat may not be as apocalyptic as nuclear war, but nevertheless the likelihood of a nuclear event is greater today than it was during the
officers and ranks are unpaid, not fed, and unhappy.
Cold War.
Russia organized crime allows expansion to Kazakhstan
Dulac 1/13 (Jay- The Diplomat freelance writer, “Could the Russian Mob Take Advantage of
the Eurasian Economic Union?”, http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/could-the-russian-mob-takeadvantage-of-the-eurasian-economic-union/)
All this seems bad enough, but most experts and observers, let alone the public, have failed to
focus on one crucial point: the EEU won’t just allow the cross-border free flow of goods, capital
and labor; Belarus and Kazakhstan will now also be exposed to Russian organized crime,
penetrating the countries’ businesses and government structures, which have hitherto been under
the tight control of authoritarian leaderships. In Belarus, the common feeling is that the streets
and avenues of Minsk are clean and well-kept, medical services are fine, and policemen are “real”
– not like Russia’s bent cops. The concern about what might happen may explain why
Lukashenko, when faced with Moscow’s ban on Belarusian meat and dairy products, bluntly
questioned Putin’s ability to fight “crooks feathering their nests” off bilateral trade. Or, he
assumed, perhaps Moscow was using a combination of politics, shady schemes and “internal
forces” as foreign policy instruments. Astana has a lot to lose as well. In spite of all the ups and
downs of Kazakhstan’s transformation to a market economy, the nation has risen 47th place on
the World Bank’s Competitiveness Index and 50th place in the Ease of Doing Business rating.
Red tape is consistently being cut, thanks to the effective implementation of the e-government
concept: Kazakhstan has climbed to 28th place in the UN e-government ranking. Most
importantly, the mindset of the majority of Kazakh citizens is market-oriented. Kazakhstan’s
entrepreneurs have already become accustomed to working under more or less civilized rules.
President Nursultan Nazarbayev claims his nation is ranked among the world’s 20 most attractive
countries for foreign investment. Russian organized crime groups have long been known for
taking advantage of economic and social crises and reforms to increase their influence and
wealth. And any initiatives by Russian criminals to get in touch with their counterparts in
Kazakhstan, to prepare the ground for the common market, may well find that the soil is fertile.
While Kazakhstan gradually climbs the business and investment climate rankings, it is making
much slower progress in the fight against corruption – according to Transparency International,
the country ranked 126th in the Corruption Perceptions Index in 2014, compared to 140th in
2013.
Causes Central Asian war
Ratsiborynska 14 (Vira- political analyst European Parliament/EU reporter correspondent,
May 9, “Opinion: Kazakhstan’s importance for Central Asia, the EU, China and Russia: Relations
in progress”, http://www.eureporter.co/magazine/2014/05/09/opinion-kazakhstans-importancefor-central-asia-the-eu-china-and-russia-relations-in-progress/)
The Central Asian region has a rich history of development of trade and energy relations with
these leading powers which explains why this region is appealing in its potential and intriguing in
its development. Central Asia consists of five former Soviet Union republics namely Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan. Kazakhstan, with its important geographical position, rich cultural and historical
background and its extensive natural resources constitutes an important geostrategic asset of
the Central Asian region. As the heart of Eurasia and the geopolitical core of the region
Kazakhstan simultaneously maintains and develops strong trade, energy and political relations with the
EU, China and Russia. These powers exercise economic and political influence on the post- Soviet
republic, which connects the Central Asian market to their respective export markets. Trade and energy fields
represent the priority targets in the development of strategic relations for them as they provide any country with many possibilities and further trade
opportunities. Very often in these priority fields the interests of the aforementioned leading powers overlap and their political influence thus tends to
expand significantly in a country. In Kazakhstan with its important geographical position there is a combination of Chinese leadership in the energy field
with Russian political influence in many other strategic fields of relations. The EU plays a mediating and soft power role in the general political and
economic development of this country which represents a significant geopolitical interest for the two other competing powers in the region – Russia and
China. Concerning Russia’s field of trade Kazakhstan is a third country partner in Russia’s and Belarus’ Customs Union, a project that represents only
one step in Russia’s ambitious plan to further implement the Eurasian economic integration project. This trade integration project helps Russia to shape
the regional agenda of Central Asia and helps to keep the country in its geopolitical orbit. China is also influential in the field of trade relations with
Kazakhstan as the Kazakh market represents an advantageous and complementary market for China. This market is useful for the Chinese market as it
can satisfy the growing Chinese consumption of oil and gas. In the field of energy and trade these two markets are interconnected: Kazakhstan is an
important energy producer while China is an important energy consumer. Kazakhstan in turn is also benefitting from good economic links with China as
China creates many business opportunities and attracts foreign investment for common trade and energy projects with Kazakhstan. Such relations result
in many tangible economic benefits and are geopolitically crucial for Kazakhstan to counterbalance the Russian influence in the Central Asian region.
The EU is also interested in trade relations with Kazakhstan as more than 40% of Kazakhstan’s exports are going to the EU market. The Kazakh market
is important for the EU due to the EU’s need to diversify its sources for oil and gas supply. Kazakhstan mainly exports oil and gas to the EU while it
imports machinery and manufacturing products. For Kazakhstan, the EU market remains attractive because the EU remains a crucial investment partner.
This includes the exchange of best practices related to European know-how and expertise and an exchange of technology. The EU also supports and
develops the diversification of Kazakh economy. In geopolitical terms, trade relations with the EU are also very important for Kazakhstan because they
represent an alternative to the trade relations with Russia and China. The EU is also maintaining good relations in other crucial fields in the region such as
in security and good governance development. As the Central Asian region represents many challenges for the EU that it needs to address, Kazakhstan
The security of the Central Asian
region and political stability in each member country of the region stays the main priority of the EU’s
relations with this part of the world. In order to achieve energy and trade stability and security in the whole
region, the EU addresses such questions as the rule of law, democracy and the protection of human rights first
remains essential for tackling these challenges through mutual efforts between both partners.
with each member country of the region. For the Kazakhstan-EU relations these questions represent a priority as they combine regional policy dialogue
with soft power promotion. Projects
such as the promotion of democracy and the rule of law can help the EU to
encourage Kazakhstan’s approach to EU norms and values and to make the country more stable
and secure in the EU’s integration perspectives. This can also help the EU in tackling regional security threats like
terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime and secure border management in the whole Central
Asian region. The engagement of Kazakhstan in a mutual dialogue is crucial for the EU to be able to successfully use its soft power tools and
methods in Central Asia. Kazakhstan that respects human rights, that develops democratically and that is ready to
commit in different fields of mutual co-operation with the EU can be a valuable partner for every
country in the world and for the EU as a whole. This mutual cooperation is challenging as Kazakhstan is still facing many severe
shortcomings in upholding the rule of law.
Great power war
Blank 12 (Stephen Blank Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College- he studies this
stuff, January 27, “Whither the new great game in Central Asia?”, pdf)
Although many scholars dislike the term “great game”¶ or “new great game” because to them
these terms smack of¶ echoes of the imperial rivalry of the nineteenth and¶ twentieth centuries; the
point of the term “new great¶ game” is precisely that we have surmounted the era and¶ what we
see now is something entirely different. This¶ difference does not, however, mean that we have
seen the¶ end of policies resembling those of the age of imperialism.¶ First, there is an enormous
competition among the US,¶ Russia, India, and China for military bases in Central Asia.¶ All of
these states either have bases, have had bases, or have¶ sought bases in Central Asia in the last
decade and the¶ growth of the CSTO eloquently testifies to the continuation¶ of the military
dimension in the great powers’ search for¶ security in Central Asia. The different factor today is
that¶ local governments of their own accord are actively soliciting¶ US military involvement if
not that of Russia and China¶ for the reasons outlined above (Kucera, 2011a).¶ Similarly we see
what amounts to naked land grabs by¶ the great powers, albeit on a relatively small scale in
Central¶ Asia. For example, Tajikistan has been induced to surrender¶ to China 1100 square miles
(2000 ha of land) to Chinese¶ farmers. Allegedly this “rectification” of the borders¶ ensures
Tajikistan’s inviolability of its borders, definitively¶ solves its border problems with China, and
ensures its¶ stability “for decades to come.” (Laruelle & Peyrouse, 2011c)¶ But that statement
implies that without this agreement¶ Tajikistan’s security vis-à-vis China would have been¶
questioned if not at risk. And the further details of this¶ agreement indicate the visible presence of
Chinese power¶ in Dushanbe’s decision-making.¶ This agreement, allegedly based on a prior
accord¶ between the two governments in 2002 that was ratified¶ again in 2010 cedes about 1000
square km in the Pamir¶ Mountains to China, about 1 percent of Tajikistan, albeit¶ a sparsely
settled area (Singh, 2011; Pannier, 2011a, 2011b).¶ Tajikistan’s government hailed this as a
victory because¶ China had actually claimed some 28,000 km and settled for¶ only about 3.5
percent of its claims. Moreover, Shukhrob¶ Sharipov, Director of the Presidential Center for
Strategic¶ Studies, argued that, “If we hadn’t decided to transfer the¶ land (at this time), we would
not have been able to resist¶ China’s pressure” (Pannier, 2011a, 2011b). This remark¶ basically
sums up the nature of Central Asian states’ relationship¶ to China.¶ This agreement clearly also
conformed to the pattern we¶ have seen in China’s earlier expansionist activities vis-à-vis¶
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Worse yet, the raw material¶ resources in the land ceded by
Tajikistan allegedly equals¶ the entire Chinese investment in Tajikistan to date. Thus¶ China has
allegedly recouped its investment at no cost to¶ itself and has both the land and its resources as
well as¶ maintaining its investments and penetration of Tajikistan¶ (Singh, 2011). On the other
hand, these deals triggered¶ a strong political backlash in all three countries against¶ China and its
perceived intentions. Perhaps Tajikistan’s¶ backlash was triggered more by the fact that between
1500¶ and 2000 Chinese farmers will settle another 2000 ha of¶ land beyond the border agreement
(Pannier, 2011a, 2011b).¶ According to the opposition Tajikistan is becoming¶ increasingly
economically dependent on China due to its¶ large investment in the area and this causes great
resentment.¶ Attacks on Chinese workers in other countries also¶ testifies to this backlash across
Central Asia.¶ At the same time, we might also point to the following¶ likely developments in
what presently constitutes the great¶ power rivalry for influence in Central Asia. In the current¶
configuration it is not only the great powers: US, Russia,¶ China, India, and the EU who are
pursuing influence, access,¶ and leverage in Central Asia, indeed, middle ranking¶ powers:
Pakistan and Iran are clearly enhancing their¶ efforts to improve relations with all the actors in
Central¶ Asia as are South Korea and Japan in order to obtain¶ economic-political and possibly
even strategic benefits.¶ Third, beyond these aforementioned trends, regional¶ actors like
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have already begun¶ to take actions to shape their security
environment as their¶ power and wealth grows and second, in the expectation of¶ both the US
withdrawal and concurrently intensified Sino-¶ Russian pressure upon them and rivalry with each
other for¶ precedence in Central Asia. Indeed, we even find Uzbekistan¶ and Kazakhstan thinking
of projecting their influence¶ and power into neighboring Central Asian states like¶ Kyrgyzstan
either through investments as in Kazakhstan’s¶ case or in more direct military threats and
interference in¶ other states’ economic activity as we often see with Uzbekistan¶ (Weitz, 2008b).
But we also find that on occasion, e.g.¶ during the Kyrgyz revolution of 2010, these two
governments¶ engaged each other in substantive disussions about¶ possible reactions and power
projection into Kyrgyzstan.¶ Fourth, international financial institutions (IFI) like the¶ Asian
Development Bank, the World Bank, the UN and its¶ agencies like the UN Development Program
(UNDP), are¶ also heavily involved in major projects and policies here.¶ Finally, and perhaps
most important, as a mark of distinction¶ from the imperial past, each of the Central Asian states¶
is now a fully empowered (at least formally) state and¶ sovereign foreign policy actor.
Consequently each one is¶ conducting its own version, insofar as possible, of a multivector¶ or
more accurately balancing approach attempting¶ to balance all the multiple external sources of
benefits to¶ them to enhance their domestic stability.¶ Therefore, based on the foregoing we can
point to¶ certain likely developments regarding interstate rivalry¶ and especially great or major
power rivalry and competition¶ in Central Asia for the foreseeable future. First, because the
effort to define and gain control over Central Asia or at¶ least gain lasting influence over it
coincides with the¶ escalation of the war in Afghanistan since 2008 the stakes¶ involved in the
effort to direct the destiny of Central Asia¶ Central Asia have grown. Though the following
assertion by¶ Ahmed Rashid may somewhat exaggerate the importance¶ of these stakes, from the
standpoint of regional governments¶ this is actually an understatement because they¶ believe their
fate is linked with that of Afghanistan. Thus¶ Rashid writes that,¶ The consequences of state
failure in any single country¶ are unimaginable. At stake in Afghanistan is not just the¶ future of
President Hamid Karzai and the Afghan people¶ yearning for stability, development, and
education but¶ also the entire global alliance that is trying to keep¶ Afghanistan together. At stake
are the futures of the¶ United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization¶ (NATO), the
European Union, and of course America’s¶ own power and prestige. It is difficult to imagine how¶
NATO could survive as the West’s leading alliance if the¶ Taliban are not defeated in Afghanistan
or if Bin Laden¶ remains at large indefinitely.(Rashid, 2009, p. xxxix)¶ Those stakes also involve
the other states of Central Asia¶ as well since it is widely believed that a Taliban victory in¶
Afghanistan makes them a prime target for insurgency in¶ the future. Especially in the light of
fears for the stability of¶ the Karzai government and the overall region in the light of¶ a US
withdrawal, every state, large or small, is jockeying for¶ greater capability and power in the
region and some, like¶ Uzbekistan, clearly expect both to have to project power¶ and that they
will be asked to project power to neighbors to¶ preserve stability in the area after 2014. Second, as
Emelian¶ Kavalski has observed, the nature of what we call the “new¶ great game,” the
proliferation of actors in a continuous¶ multi-dimensional struggle for influence in Central Asia¶
precludes any one actor obtaining previous levels of¶ imperial or neo-imperial domination, though
Russia still¶ tries for it, and has led to a situation where, given the¶ concurrent proliferation of
actors and agents operating in¶ Central Asia,¶ The simultaneity of these two dynamics reveals that
the¶ agency of external actors is distinguished not by an¶ imperial desire for the control of
territory, but by the¶ establishment of ‘niches of influence.’ Consequently, the¶ notion of the ‘new
great game’ comes to characterize the¶ dynamics of processing, selection and internalization of¶
some externally promoted ideas and not others. (Rashid,¶ 2009, p. xxxix).¶ Third, in view of the
impending US military withdrawal¶ ssit is not clear that Washington, confronted by wrenching¶
fiscal stresses, either has the vision or the means to develop¶ or implement a coherent postAfghanistan Central Asian¶ strategy, a vacuum could well develop there with regard to¶ the US
position that will inevitably be filled by other actors.¶ Certainly there is no sign yet of what will
replace the US¶ military presence after 2014 and no sign of a formal¶ document worked out with
Afghanistan that delineates the¶ extent to which a US presence in the region will look like. In¶ the
absence of such a policy statement every regional actor¶ is hedging its bets and preparing for
the worst in the future,¶ a trend that most likely means intensified competition¶ among the great,
regional, and local powers for influence in Central Asia.
1AC (Soft Left)
1AC — Relived Violence
Contention _: Relived violence
Stringent restrictions, aforementioned in the plan, result in repatriation--that forces trafficking victims to leave the country
Barbagiannis 16 — Efthimia Barbagiannis, Staff Editor, Cardozo Journal of International and
Comparative Law. Candidate for Juris Doctor, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, May 2017;
B.A., SUNY Geneseo, 2014, “Note: Protecting Victims of Human Trafficking: Creating Better
Residency Visas” 25 Cardozo J. Int'l & Comp. L. 561, (2016-2017), Hein Online, Language
Modified*
III. Why Residency Permits are an Essential Element for the Protection of Victims A. Trafficking
Victims Face Vulnerable Situations Upon Repatriation "Looking at who cannot be returned
safely to his country of origin requires considering human trafficking as a crime against a
person and not against the state." 40 In order to understand why residency permits [*568] are
essential for the protection of victims, it is important to understand the vulnerability of victims
who have been trafficked in the first place and the re-victimization they face upon
repatriation to their home country. This can be understood through an explanation of how a
typical trafficking ring operates. A trafficking ring most often involves local traffickers who send
victims to foreign destinations where foreign traffickers will exploit them. 41 International
smuggling involves moving a person across an international border and is a common avenue for
trafficking. As such, a common human smuggling arrangement involves an individual voluntarily
entering into an agreement with a smuggler to gain illegal entry into a foreign country to find
better employment opportunities, most often by procuring fraudulent documents and
transportation. 42 It is important to highlight that pure situations of trafficking and smuggling are
rare, as international smuggling can very easily become international human trafficking. 43
Persons who seek to be smuggled abroad are often poor and learn of other people in their
communities who became wealthy by sending a family member abroad to work and send money
back home to their families. 44 Therefore, they become interested in being smuggled to a
wealthier country to find employment. 45 Typically, a person finds a sponsor to finance their trip
and initial expenses, which is usually over $ 10,000. 46 Sponsors agree to do this with the
expectation that the person they are financing will work for free until such time that they are able
to pay off their debt. 47 When victims are sent to their destination, the trafficker who receives
them may confiscate their travel documents and then use violence, threats, isolation, and sexual
abuse to break the victim and force them into prostitution or domestic servitude. 48 Traffickers
will maintain control over victims by instilling a fear of the [*569] police, insisting that if they
escaped, the police would arrest them or deport them. 49 Trafficking victims who are rescued
are often repatriated to their origin country. While some victims want to return home to their
families, repatriation poses many problems for others. Haphazard repatriation efforts increase
the risk of re-victimization and re-trafficking. 50 Victims face psychological problems due to
the trauma they suffered, medical problems, lack of housing, and stigmatization and rejection by
their family and friends. 51 Repatriated victims also face severe social stigma because they may
be considered a "prostitute", which can result in violence from the community, including
rape [sexual assault]. 52 This often prevents victims from telling anyone about their
experiences, worsening their psychological trauma. 53 Additionally, in many impoverished
countries that victims may be repatriated to, there is an unmet need for victim services, such
as counseling, medical aid, legal aid, and financial support,
furthering their vulnerability. 54 Moreover, victims are often still indebted to their traffickers, who initially sponsored their trip. They then cannot find adequate employment in their home country due to
lack of qualifications, and are thus unable to pay off their debts. 55 This makes victims susceptible to accepting another offer of working abroad, even if it is with the same trafficker. 56 This clearly illustrates that a vital aspect for the protection of victims of trafficking is to offer them an opportunity to remain in the destination country where they have been trafficked. Without a residency visa program for trafficking victims to access, the only option available for victims is to apply for asylum. 57 B. Asylum is Not a Viable Option The
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention) creates an international obligation for states to provide refugees with asylum. The Refugee Convention defines a refugee as a [*570] person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his [or her] nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself [or herself] of the protection of that country. 58 It
would appear that survivors of human trafficking would be able to evade forced repatriation to their origin country and the negative consequences of such a return by applying for asylum. However, asylum has a high bar and is difficult to access due to the nexus requirement and the requirement of persecutors to be state actors. 59 1. The Nexus Requirement A person who has a "well-founded fear of persecution" may be denied asylum if they are unable prove that their fear of persecution comes from one of the five enumerated grounds,
"race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion." 60 There are indications that race or ethnicity may be factors for targeting victims of sex trafficking, but the sheer numbers of persons who are trafficked for sexual exploitation, make it difficult to prove that race or ethnicity is a meaningful factor. 61 Therefore, the nexus ground that appears to be most accessible is "membership of a particular social group". 62 However, it is difficult to form a particular social group (PSG) that would allow a
trafficking victim to successfully prevail on an asylum claim. In 2002, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) produced guidelines on the formation of a PSG, which stated: this definition includes characteristics which are historical and therefore cannot be changed, and those which, though it is possible to change them, ought not to be required to be changed because they are so closely linked to the identity of the person or are an expression of fundamental human rights. 63 [*571] Courts in the United States
have determined that PSGs cannot be sweeping, generalized classifications 64 rather, they must include an immutable characteristic. 65 In deciding what constitutes a particular social group, the United States in Matter of Acosta held that, the definition of a particular social group, must involve "persecution aimed at an immutable characteristic: a characteristic that either is beyond the power of an individual to change or is so fundamental to individual identity or conscience that it ought not be required to change." 66 The requirement for
an immutable characteristic is also seen in Canada 67 and the United Kingdom. 68 It is difficult to prove that a person was trafficked based on an immutable characteristic. As previously mentioned, due to the large numbers of trafficking victims, a specific immutable characteristic that caused trafficker to target to a specific [*572] victim is practically impossible to discern. 69 However, in United Kingdom's recent decision of Moldova v. Secretary of State for Home Dep't, an appellate court rejected case precedent which held that
"people who have been trafficked" do not form a particular social group. 70 The judge recognized that the victim had been "trafficked because she is a woman," living in a country with severe trafficking problems and granted her asylum. 71 Therefore, the immutable characteristic requirement, while being difficult, is not an impossible obstacle. The UNHCR's PSG Guidelines further illustrate the difficulties for a human trafficking victim to be able to successfully apply for asylum on the basis of a PSG, when it further explained that a
particular social group cannot be defined exclusively by the persecution that members of the group suffer or by a common fear of being persecuted. Nonetheless, persecutory action toward a group may be a relevant factor in determining the visibility of a group in a particular society. 72 This is perhaps one of the most difficult requirements for trafficking victims. In the United States, courts have held that a social group may not be circularly defined by the fact that it is persecuted, 73 which prevents a PSG, such as "persons who have
experienced trafficking and face re-trafficking upon return home" to be successful in an asylum claim. As aforementioned, the stigmatization and danger that trafficking victims are likely to face upon return to their home countries is due mainly to the fact that they were previously trafficked. Therefore, most often, their definition of a PSG would be defined by the persecution they have suffered. However, this does not mean that asylum is not a completely impossible option. Victims of past trafficking have been able to prevail on
membership in the particular social group of "trafficked women who escaped from their traffickers" because each element qualifies as an unchangeable status. 74 Unfortunately, due to the discretionary nature of asylum applications, this type of PSG is not always successful. [*573] Furthermore, the motive of the persecutor must be causally connected to the Convention ground, an even more difficult requirement for trafficking victims. 75 This is demonstrated in Rreshpja v. Gonzales, where the Sixth Circuit held that the relevant group
that petitioner suggested, which was "young (or those who appear to be young), attractive Albanian women who are forced into prostitution," 76 does not constitute a social group, in turn denying the petitioner asylum. 77 The formation of a PSG and connecting it to the persecution suffered is excessively difficult to do, making asylum a less than viable option for trafficking victims to access immigration relief. 2. Persecutors Must be State Actors or the State Must be Unwilling or Unable to Provide Protection Another obstacle for
trafficking victims in their applications for asylum is that persecutors must be state actors. 78 If not, then the government must be unwilling or unable to provide protection. 79 This presents another obstacle for victims of trafficking to successfully apply for asylum because human trafficking is predominantly a form of persecution committed by non-state actors. Canada, however, has ruled that, "state complicity in persecution is not a pre-requisite to a valid refugee claim." 80 Therefore, non-state actors can persecute an individual under
the meaning of the Refugee Convention if "the home state cannot or does not afford them protection from persecution." 81 The United Kingdom also recognized that non-state actors could be persecutors, when the court in Shah v. Islam v. SSHD held that, "if a Refugee Convention ground motivates either the party inflicting the serious harm, or the state in failing to protect from that harm, the persecution qualifies as having been carried out for reasons of a Convention ground." 82 However, In the United States, persecution "always
implies some connection to governmental action or inaction, related to a protected ground." 83 In Burbiene v. Holder, the Sixth Circuit determined that human trafficking in Lithuania is a criminal element and "Lithuania is [*574] "making every effort to combat' human trafficking, "a difficult task not only for the government of Lithuania, but for any government in the world.'" 84 The Court further held that "because the facts do not establish a nexus between the petitioner's fear of harm and the government of Lithuania … petitioner
failed to establish the well-founded fear of persecution required for asylum." 85 Proving a government's unwillingness or inability to provide protection is, therefore, a high burden in the United States. This note does not purport to assert that trafficking victims can never successfully apply for asylum. Rather, as demonstrated above, applying for asylum is a difficult process, with high burdens. Additionally, asylum is not specifically tailored to suit the needs of trafficking victims. Therefore, creating a type of immigration relief that is
created to meet the specific needs of trafficking victims would be significantly more effective in affording trafficking victim adequate protections. IV. What type of Visa Program is Best? In examining what type of visa procedure provides the most effective protections for trafficking victims, this note will use country studies to compare three different types of visa programs currently in place: the United Kingdom's temporary and arbitrary visa that provides victims a 45 day temporary visa; 86 Canada's longer temporary visa program,
the Temporary Residency Permit that provides victims a 180 day temporary visa that provides victims with temporary work authorization; 87 and the United States' long-term T-Visa programs. 88 Using this comparative analysis, this note will suggest that the United States' T-Visa program is the most progressive, but could be enhanced by utilizing some components from other countries' visa programs. A. Overview of CurrenT-Visa Programs in Place 1. United States As mentioned, the United States has the most comprehensive
legislation in the effort to combat human trafficking: the TVPA. The [*575] TVPA follows the 3P model established in the Palermo Protocol: Prosecution, Protection, and Prevention. 89 The TVPA has procedures in place for the prosecution of traffickers, providing extensive legislation on criminalizing the industry of human trafficking. 90 In its efforts towards prevention, the United States has a monitoring and evaluation system, where the Secretary of State publishes an annual "Trafficking in Persons" (TIP) report. TIP reports gather
data on human trafficking statistics and evaluate individual states on what anti-trafficking measures they have in place and ranks them in tiers. 91 Unlike the UNODC, the United States State Department produces annual TIP reports, which provide extensive and the most up to date data on human trafficking. 92 For the protection of victims, 5,000 T visas are made accessible to victims of trafficking. 93 To be eligible for a T-Visa, a victim must meet four statutory requirements: (1) Applicant must be a victim of a "severe form' of human
trafficking 94 as defined by the TVPA; (2) Applicant must be "physically present' in the United States as a direct result of human trafficking; (3) Applicants must cooperate with any "reasonable requests' for assistance in the investigation of human trafficking from law enforcement; and (4) Victim must show that she will experience "extreme hardship' 95 if removed from the State. 96 There is an exception to the third requirement for the cooperation with law enforcement for victims who are under 18 years old or are unable to
participate in the investigation due to "physical or psychological trauma." 97 T-Visa applicants may also apply for their spouses and children to receive status. 98 The 5,000 T-Vvisa quota does not include [*576] these derivative beneficiaries. 99 If a victim qualifies for a T-Visa, she or he may remain in the United States for four years, during which time she or he is eligible to receive state and federal services and benefits. 100 At the end of the four years, when the T-Visa has expired, the victim may apply to adjust his or her status to a
lawful permanent resident if she or he can prove that they had a physical presence for a "continuous period of three years" during the course of the investigation for prosecution; "good moral character"; compliance with "any reasonable request for assistance in the investigation" or prosecuting traffickers unless the applicant would "suffer extreme hardship involving unusual and severe harm" if removed." 101 The T visa is a viable resource for victims of trafficking and their families. However, certain difficulties remain. The
requirement to cooperate with law enforcement poses many issues because victims have often been conditioned by their traffickers to fear law enforcement and the trauma exception is not extensive enough to provide adequate protections. 102 Additionally, without safety procedures in place, victims who cooperate with law enforcement may fear retribution from their traffickers. 103 2. Canada Canada offers victims of human trafficking a "reflection and recovery period" with a 180-day Temporary Residency Permit (TRP) that may be
temporary or permanent. 104 To receive a TRP, victims are not required to testify against their traffickers to gain temporary status. 105 With the TRP, victims are eligible for healthcare benefits and trauma counseling, and the ability to work legally in Canada. 106 In determining whether or not to issue a TRP, immigration officers take into account whether, "the recruitment of the individual was fraudulent or coerced and for the purposes (actual or intended) of exploitation; the [*577] individual was coerced into employment or other
activity were exploitative; or the individual's freedom was restricted." 107 If a victim chooses to cooperate with law enforcement, protections are available "including a witness protection program and the availability of closed-circuit testimony." 108 Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have reported that trafficking victims can have a difficult time accessing the TRP because government agencies disagree on whether the applicant has been a victim of trafficking. 109 There is no legal provision to allow trafficked persons to apply
for permanent residence status, and unlike T visas, TRPs are not necessarily offered to family members of survivors, despite the fact that many victims fear for their families' safety. 110 Trafficked persons can apply for residence as a refugee (although as previously mentioned, this option is difficult) or through Humanitarian and Companionate (H and C) applications. 111 Therefore, the TRP is less effective for the protection of victims than T visas are. 3. United Kingdom The United Kingdom Border Agency (UKBA) has a National
Referral Mechanism (NRM), a framework for identifying victims of human trafficking to ensure that they receive appropriate support. Like the TRP, the United Kingdom only grants a temporary visa, a 45-day reflection and recovery period for victims. 112 Trained decision makers consider whether individuals are victims of trafficking according to the definition in the Council of Europe Convention and are then referred to NRM. 113 The NRM, in Stage One, has a target date of five working days to decide if there are reasonable
grounds 114 to believe that the applicant is a potential victim of trafficking. If the applicant is considered to be a potential victim, then the potential victim will be sent to a safe house accommodation and possibly be granted a 45-day reflection and recovery period. 115 In Stage Two, the competent authority gathers further information in order to conclusively decide 116 [*578] whether the applicant is a victim of human trafficking. This should be done within the 45-day reflection and recovery period. 117 If an applicant has gone
beyond Stage Two, then there are three options for what happens next. First, if a victim co-operates fully with a police investigation and subsequent prosecution of their trafficker, the victim may be granted discretionary leave to remain in the United Kingdom for one year. 118 If a victim does not participate in the criminal justice system, the second option is that the Home Office may consider granting a discretionary leave to remain in the United Kingdom, depending on the victim's personal circumstances. If neither of the first two
options apply, then the Home Office Assisted Voluntary Return of Irregular Migrants (AVRIM) provides help and financial assistance to victims who are from outside the European Economic Area to return home. 119 B. Temporary Visas, as Used by the United Kingdom, are Ineffective for the Protection of Victims of Human Trafficking The current system utilized by the United Kingdom provides a case study of a country whose sole immigration benefit given for the protection of victims of human trafficking is a temporary 45-day
visa meant to provide them with a reflection and recovery period. 120 This study of the NRM demonstrates that states should not simply enact a very brief temporary visa to protect victims, because the United Kingdom's policy is ineffective in protecting victims of trafficking. It is included in this note to demonstrate that states should strive to enact a policy that offers more than simply a bare minimum visa. Police and prosecutors can arrange to extend temporary residency visas up to one year for victims who cooperate with the
criminal justice system in order to prosecute their traffickers. 121 Even if granted, however, this extension still does not provide a permanenT-Visa. 122 The NRM has a review program that periodically evaluates and assesses its impact. Its most recent review shows that while this program is better than its predecessor, it has serious flaws, 123 because it does not [*579] adequately address two of the vital elements in the international effort to combat trafficking: prosecution and protection. 124 It is important to note that the United
Kingdom, as a member of the European Union is bound by the 2005 Council of Europe Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings (ECAT), which develops a rights-based approach to trafficking. 125 The ECAT, which was drafted by a human rights organization, is considered to be more progressive than the Palermo Protocol. 126 The ECAT mandates that "each Party shall provide in its internal law a recovery and reflection period of at least 30 days, when there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person
concerned is a victim." 127 The ECAT is more progressive than the Palermo Protocol because it mandates some sort of protection, however, it is minimal and the ECAT highlights that once again, prosecution is considered to be superior to protection. This is further demonstrated in Article 14 of the ECAT which asserts that states shall issue a renewable residence permit to victims if "(a) the competent authority considers that their stay is necessary owing to their personal situation; (b) the competent authority considers that their stay is
necessary for the purpose of their co-operation with competent authorities in investigation or criminal proceedings." 128 The United Kingdom's policy follows the ECAT. Its reflection and recovery period is fifteen days longer than mandated by the ECAT. 129 While slightly [*580] better than the ECAT, fifteen more days still does not afford victims adequate protection. A recent review of the NRM showed that 86 percent of referrals receive a positive decision at the reasonable grounds stage. 130 Therefore, it appears that for those
who are referred, the services that the AVRIM offers to victims of trafficking are accessible. However, the number of persons who are referred to NRM in the first place appears to be low, considering the estimated number of trafficking victims that exist. 131 Additionally, the reasonable grounds stage still remains arbitrary. NRM officials have been accused of picking holes at a victim's story. For example, an African trafficking victim who was forced into prostitution in the United Kingdom was refused by the Home Office as a
trafficking victim, because her story did not match the initial visa she used to enter the country, which was presented by her trafficker. 132 This reasoning is flawed because traffickers produce fraudulent documents. Additionally, trafficking can occur after a person has crossed an international border, making the visa a person entered in with irrelevant. NGOs have suggested that there is a nationality bias in acceptance into the NRM. 133 Klara Skrivankov of Anti Slavery International has said that, "the international obligations the UK
has signed up to make it very clear that whoever is established as a potential victim of trafficking should have the same [equal] access to protection and assistance. But if you look at the numbers, the likelihood you are going to get access is much lower if you're from Nigeria than, say, Poland." 134 Generally, a higher percentage of EEA nationals receive positive reasonable grounds than victims from other regions of the world. 135 Furthermore, even if victims of trafficking are successfully identified they may not consent to entering the
NRM for various reasons including them not recognizing themselves to be victims, fear of [*581] involving the authorities, or victims fearing their traffickers and possible repercussions. 136 Moreover, the benefits that the NRM and the AVRIM offer do not appear to be enticing. The purpose of the 45-day reflection and recovery period is to provide victims of trafficking access to resources and services to help them recover from the trauma and abuses that they have suffered. 137 However, the NRM provides different services for
different victims of trafficking, making this reflection and recovery period inherently unfair. 138 UK citizens, European Union (EU), and European Economic Area (EEA) nationals receive access to services (health and benefits), labor market, vocational training and education, and access to assistance to return home for EU and EEA nationals. 139 Non-EEA nationals with existing or new immigration services receive the same benefits listed above. 140 Non-EEA nationals with outstanding asylum claims and Non-EEA nations who
have not been granted immigration status receive access to healthcare and asylum support and access to assistance to return home, but no access to services. 141 Therefore, there are fewer services that are available to victims of trafficking to allow them to make full use of their recovery and reflection period for non-EEA citizens, further restricting this already limited option. The main service that the United Kingdom offers foreign victims of trafficking is access to assistance to return home. This is done primarily through the AVRIM,
which is available to migrants who are in the United Kingdom without legal documentation. 142 While the AVRIM targets vulnerable groups, such as trafficking victims, it is not specifically designed for trafficking victims, and fails to sufficiently take their specific protection needs into consideration. 143 The repatriation procedure lacks in-depth national or even regional assessments regarding the countries where victims are returned. There is little assessment regarding whether the return of a trafficking victim is appropriate, and
repatriation procedures leave space for forced return to a place which may present risks of further abuse, stigmatization, or re-trafficking. 144 It is clear that protection of victims is not the priority [*582] for the United Kingdom in their effort to combat trafficking, as it appears to be in direct conflict with their immigration policies. Furthermore, the United Kingdom's policy does not promote prosecution because without providing for immigration benefits, victims of human trafficking are reluctant to come forward, fearing arrest and
deportation. 145 As aforementioned, there is a distinction between international smuggling and international trafficking, but cases of international smuggling may become international trafficking. 146 During such instances, where persons are initially smuggled into the country, but then end up trapped in forced servitude, victims are unlikely to come forward to authorities about their traffickers. 147 Their employers threaten them by telling them that if they were to go forward to the authorities, they would be deported. 148 Not
providing victims of trafficking with a viable option to remain the country validates these fears and makes them unlikely to report their abuse. 149 Thus, the United Kingdom loses a large opportunity to identify and punish traffickers. The NRM's 45-day visa is a bare minimum standard and it should not be emulated by other states. The ideal solution would be for a long-term residency visa program to be established. However, if states are determined to only offer temporary visas, the United Kingdom's program should not be used as an
example. C. Canada's Longer Temporary Visa is an Improvement, but Still Flawed As demonstrated above, a bare-minimum temporary visa is ineffective to provide victims of trafficking with appropriate protections. Canada does not offer a long-term residency visa program specifically tailored to victims of trafficking. However, if states wish to adopt a temporary visa program to benefit victims of trafficking, Canada's Temporary Residency Permit is significantly more effective than the United Kingdom's policy, and would provide a
helpful model. In analyzing Canada's policy to combat trafficking, it is important to note that Canada has a different definition of trafficking from the United States. 150 It is defined in the Criminal Code of Canada § 27.04: [*583] (1) For the purposes of sections 27.01 to 279.03, a person exploits another person if they cause them to provide, or offer to provide, labour or a service by engaging in conduct that, in all the circumstanced, could reasonably be expected to cause the other person to believe that their safety or the safety of a
person known to them would be threatened if they failed to provide, or offer to provide. 151 This is significant because Canada puts exploitation as its main focus, making it more inclusive of different types of human trafficking and not limiting itself. 152 This definition allows more victims to access services available to trafficking victims. However, this definition is problematic because it creates a condition where the victim must believe that their safety or the safety of others is threatened. 153 The Canadian policy is notable in that it
combines elements of a program that grants temporary and permanent residency. As aforementioned, the Temporary Residence Permit (TRP) program, issued by Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) is a service intended specifically for internationally trafficked victims. 154 The initial TRP may be issued for up to 180 days, 155 a period that it is significantly longer than the United Kingdom's NRM program. This gives victims more time to focus on their recovery and is better for their rehabilitation. Like the United Kingdom's
NRM, this 180 day period is meant to provide victims of trafficking a reflection and recovery period. 156 Additionally, like the United Kingdom, the initial TRP does not require that victims participate in the prosecution of their traffickers. 157 The TRP, however, offers greater benefits and services to victims of trafficking. TRP holders may qualify for medical and social [*584] services to provide them with access to resources to recover from the trauma they underwent 158 and may apply for fee-exempt work permits. 159 For persons
who were initially smuggled and had to pay their sponsor a fee, the temporary work permit provision offers an opportunity for them to be able to earn wages to pay off their debt, making them less vulnerable to re-trafficking. The temporary residency program that Canada offers to victims of trafficking provides greater services to victims to allow them to take better advantage of a reflection and recovery program, allowing it to be significantly more effective than the United Kingdom's program. A longer-term TRP can be issued for a
period of up to three years where there is a more complete verification of facts to provide reasonable grounds for CIC officials to believe that the applicant is a genuine victim of trafficking. 160 This longer-term permit has a higher burden of proof. The CIC officer considers: (1) whether it is reasonably safe and possible for the victim to return and re-establish a life in their country of origin or last permanent residence; (2) whether the victim is needed and willing to assist authorities in investigation and prosecution of a trafficking
offence; or (3) any other factor, that in the opinion of the officer and given circumstances, justifies issuing a TRP. 161 However, this three-year program is arbitrary and may be strongly contingent on a victim's decision to participate in the criminal justice program, again emphasizing the international community's greater dedication to the prosecution and punishing of traffickers, rather than the protection of victims. During this three-year period, applicants may obtain a work permit and have access to medical and social services. 162
Clearly, this program provides greater benefits for victims of trafficking. A distinct challenge for victims of trafficking upon their return home is that they often face great poverty, making them vulnerable to re-trafficking. 163 However, giving trafficking victims a chance to remain in Canada and earn wages may mitigate the poverty they would fact upon return. While, permanent residency is a significantly better option for trafficking victims, the structure of Canada's temporary residency program is better for trafficking victims [*585]
than the United Kingdom's temporary visa. It provides them with greater services and a greater chance to be able to better recover. Again, repatriation has unfortunate consequences. However, Canada's temporary program provides a real chance for victims to recover and be able to face these consequences better before their return. Furthermore, it does not distinguish between different classes of trafficking victims. Therefore, if an international protocol requires, at a bare minimum, a temporary residency program, it should be modeled
after Canada's TRP. It is important to note that many NGOs have reported that victims are unable to access any of the services available to trafficking victims until they are able to obtain a TRP and there are significant delays in victims being able to obtain a TRP. 164 Therefore, on paper this program may be better, but in practice it is still flawed. However progressive this policy is, in practice, it is underutilized. Furthermore, Canada, in practice, prioritizes prosecution over protection. Police identified 261 victims in cases where there
were specific trafficking charges in 2014. 165 In that same year, police charged 121 individuals in 77 trafficking cases under trafficking statutes. 166 The government proceeded to convict 22 sex traffickers in 2014. 167 Despite 261 victims of trafficking being identified by the police, the government issued only five TRPs to an undisclosed number of foreign victims in 2014. 168 This number is down from the 14 TRPs granted to foreign victims in 2013. 169 Clearly, the TRP program is being underutilized. It has great potential, but
lacks efficient enforcement. Eventually, victims may apply for permanent residency from within Canada through the refugee determination process based on humanitarian and compassionate grounds. 170 Their other option is to apply for permanent residency over time as members of the permit holder class after three or five years. 171 While permanent residency is an option in Canada, there is no permanent residency option specific to trafficking victims. Rather, they must go through the asylum procedure, which as highlighted above
The United States has one of the
most progressive policies to combat human trafficking. 172 Its T visa program is designed to
afford victims important protections.
is a difficult process for trafficking victims [*586] to access. Therefore, the permanent residency options for victims of trafficking are not tailored for them and difficult to obtain. Protection of victims would be enhanced if a pathway to permanent residency was created through the TRP. D. The United States and its T-Visa Program
173 As mentioned, people who qualify may receive a T visa, which allows a victim of trafficking to remain in the United States for four years. 174 During this
period, victims are able to access federal and state services, including housing, food, cash assistance, job training, counseling, medical care, and legal assistance. 175 After the T visa has expired, the victim may apply to adjust their status to a lawful permanent resident if
they have had a continuous physical presence for three years and comply with reasonable requests for assistance in the investigation or prosecution of their traffickers. 176 This visa program is unique in that it is a long-term solution that is specifically tailored to the
protection of victims of human trafficking, unlike the long-term residency visa options available to victims of trafficking in Canada. In order to be eligible for a T visa, a victim is required to meet four statutory requirements: the individual must be 1) a victim of a
"severe form" of human trafficking, 177 2) "physically present" in the United States as a direct result of human trafficking, 3) they must cooperate with any "reasonable requests" for assistance in the investigation of human trafficking, and 4) prove that he or she will
experience "extreme hardship" 178 if deported. 179 These terms are difficult to define, identify, [*587] and prove, causing many trafficked individuals to find themselves ineligible for benefits. 180 This definition is narrower than the Canadian definition, which as,
previously noted, is centered on exploitation, making it more inclusive of different forms of trafficking. The narrow definition can make it difficult for a victim to successfully apply for a T visa. Furthermore, even if a victim meets all the criteria for a T -Visa, she or he
may be denied if she or he triggers a ground of inadmissibility. 181 Therefore, while the T visa is an excellent initiative, in order to be able to more fully protect victims of trafficking, the United States needs to apply a more inclusive definition to allow victims of
trafficking to access this benefit. In 2008, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) received 394 T visa applications, but only granted 247 applications. 182 The number of T visa applications is significantly lower than the amount available, demonstrating that it is
clearly underutilized. The TVPA and the T-Visa is criticized because its focus is on prosecution and punishing of traffickers, rather than victims of trafficking. This criticism comes from the requirement that in order to adjust status to lawful permanent resident,
applicants are required to work with any reasonable requests to aid any investigation and prosecution of traffickers. 183 Reasonableness depends on the "totality of the circumstances taking into account general law enforcement and prosecutorial practices, the nature of
the victimization, and the specific circumstances of the victim, including the fear, severe traumatization (both mental and physical), and the age and maturity of young victims." 184 This is not a clear definition and provides law enforcement officials great discretion in
determining whether a T-Visa applicant complied and is eligible for law enforcement certification, which is the only prima facie evidence of the applicant's reasonable compliance with a request. 185 This is problematic because there are various reasons why a
certification may not be issued, and it provides no indication of the [*588] level of cooperation by the victim. 186 Without this endorsement, it is unlikely that applicants will be successful with a T-Visa application. 187 Furthermore, it may be difficult for victims of
human trafficking to confront their traffickers in order to prosecute them, due to the severe trauma they suffered. 188 Many trafficking victims suffer from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). 189 Victims may distrust law enforcement because their traffickers
convinced them that law enforcement officers are dangerous and seek either to harm or deport them. 190 In order to address this issue, a trauma exception was created in 2008. 191 This trauma exception only applies for victims who are unable, not unwilling, to assist.
192 The inability to assist must be due to physical or psychological trauma that the victim would suffer. 193 While the trauma exception would appear to alleviate the detrimental effect of requiring a victim to participate in her trafficker's prosecution, in practice, the
trauma exception does not have this effect. 194 The statute provides little guidance regarding what qualifies as severe trauma. 195 Furthermore, according to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the trauma exception is rarely granted. 196 The trauma exception
could provide greater help to victims of trafficking if the statute provided greater clarity and was more easily accessible. Without an effective trauma exception, the emphasis in the United States' trafficking policy will remain within a criminal justice atmosphere,
focusing on prosecution, rather than the protection of victims. Even when victims of trafficking are eligible to receive T-Visas, the services that they are eligible to receive are not immediately available. 197 T-Visa applications are made through DHS, but it is the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) that determines eligibility for services. 198 HHS states that "the certification process typically takes only a few days after HHS is notified that person has made a bona fide T-Visa application or has been granted
continued [*589] presence status, it takes a significant amount of time for an individual to amass the proper documentation to support a "bona fide" T-Visa application in the first instance." 199 In some cases, initial T-Visa applications take up to 9 months to process.
200 Part of the protection of trafficking victims requires necessary medical and social services to be available to victims so that they can recover from the traumas they endured. However, the bureaucratic delays in accessing these services does not aid in the protection
of trafficking victims. The most progressive aspect of the T-Visa and the TVPA is the fact that T-Visa applicants may also file for their family members to receive derivative nonimmigrant status. 201 If thzze principle applicant is under 21 years of age, they may apply
on behalf of their spouse, children, parents, and unmarried siblings under 18z years of age. 202 If the applicant is 21 years old or older, they may apply on behalf of their spouse and children. 203 This is significant in the protection of victims of trafficking. Trafficking
victims are often initially smuggled into the country. 204 Families promise to pay a recruiter a great sum 205 to smuggle an individual into a developed country and set them up with adequate employment. Smuggling becomes trafficking when the recruiter forces them
into forced servitude. 206 Despite the smugglers deception, victims and their families are still expected to pay off their debts. Traffickers often use physical violence and threats of violence not only to the trafficked individual but also to her or his family in or der to
enforce the debt bondage. 207 Even if such debt bondage does not exist, traffickers often maintain control over their victims by threatening their family members at home. 208 By allowing victims to file for their family members' immigration status, fears of their loved
.
ones being harmed because they left their traffickers are alleviated. This is very important for the protection of trafficking victims and their families, and is a notable aspect of the TVPA that should be maintained and other [*590] countries should emulate this program
The T-Visa program is flawed in that it has too narrow a definition and the focus is clearly on
the prosecution and punishment of traffickers rather than the protection of individuals. For a
more effective program, the trauma exception should be expanded and a more inclusive
definition of trafficking should be included. However, it is a notable program and the TVPA is
one of the most progressive statutes internationally in the combat against human trafficking.
Repatriation results in victims being re-trafficking into the country---it
results in literarily have to go through horrendous experiences again--effective provisions of services is key to solve
Adams, 11—Cherish Adams, Law Clerk, Florida Fifth District Court of Appeals, 2011 (“ReTrafficked Victims: How A Human Rights Approach Can Stop The Cycle Of Re-Victimization
Of Sex Trafficking Victims”, Jun 23, The George Washington International Law Review,
https://heinonline.org/hol-cgi-bin/get_pdf.cgi?handle=hein.journals/gwilr43&section=9,
Accessed 6/26/18, Language Modified,* MJ)
Why are Victims Re-Trafficked After Being Rescued? Thankfully, some victims are rescued
from their traffickers.53 However, upon rescue victims face serious problems which leave them
highly vulnerable to being re-trafficked. After rescue, a trafficking victim is often quickly
repatriated to her origin country, where she [they] faces serious challenges such as continued
debt bondage and social stigma without the help of significant victim services, as explained
below. 1. Poor Repatriation Policies Place Victims in High-risk Situations Without Due Regard
for the Victim's Safety and Recovery Haphazard repatriation efforts significantly increase the risk
of re-victimization.54 The first of many concerns is that a repatriated victim may be
intercepted by the local member of the trafficking ring upon arrival in the origin state.55 This is a
legitimate fear, as "[t]here have been documented cases of victims having been met on their
return by the traffickers and quickly re-trafficked."56 Repatriated victims also face social
marginalization, the continued weight of debt bondage and lack of employment, and very little if
any victim assistance.57 As a result, forced repatriation has become "a surplus of suffering and
a hard condemnation" for victims, often resulting in re-victimization.5 8 Despite the serious
risks associated with repatriation of a trafficking victim, victims are repatriated more often than
not.5 9 2. Continued Debt Bondage and Severe Financial Need Drive the Victim to Once Again
Seek Overseas Employment A major obstacle faced by repatriated trafficking victims is the debt
bondage, which is still hanging over their heads and keeping them under the control of the
traffickers.60 Trafficking victims often still feel obliged to repay the debt to their traffickers,
even if they have been rescued.61 This feeling of obligation is reinforced by the local member of
the trafficking ring who is able to threaten the victim and her family members if the debt is not
repaid.62 In particular, traffickers have threatened to kidnap, harm, or similarly exploit the
victim's younger sister if the victim does not repay the debt.63 Such threats, especially directed at
the victim's family, keep the victim under continued debt bondage and force her to find a way to
repay the debt.6 4 Not only does the victim feel pressured to repay the debt, she often still feels
obliged to help provide for her family.6 5 This family pressure is particularly important because
the family's need for money is often the reason why the victim initially left her family to work
abroad. 66 When a victim returns without money, the family is often just as financially desperate,
if not more, than they were when the victim left, increasing the victim's pressure to find an
income.67 Repaying the trafficking debt upon repatriation is very difficult, if not impossible. A
trafficking victim is most often not able to find employment because of her lack of qualifications,
particularly employment that will pay enough to provide for her family and repay her debt.68 As
a result of this dire financial situation and need to support their family, many victims are placed
in such desperate need that they see no alternative to accepting another offer of working
abroad, even if it is with the same trafficker. 69
Independently, assistance requirements placed on international trafficking
victims make entry to the United States sizably more difficult for victims and
can result in a wide range of issues for victims including retaliation from
traffickers toward their families or even revictimization from having to relive
their experience as they divulge sensitive information to law enforcement
Chakraborti 14 — Aretha Chakraborti, J.D. May 2014, Columbia Law School; M.Phil. 2010,
University of Cambridge; B.A. 2008, Northwestern University, “Article: Alien HumanTrafficking Victims in The United States: Examining the Constitutionality of The TVPA And
INA's Assistance Requirements,” 17 U. Pa. J.L. & Soc. Change 55, Lexis Nexis, Language
Modified*
II. THE ASSISTANCE REQUIREMENT'S BURDENS Proponents of the current TVPA and
related INA sections might ask why assisting investigatory or prosecutorial processes burdens
human trafficking victims. It may not in all cases. However, there are many reasons why
victims may not want to provide assistance. Commonly cited reasons include victims' fear of
retaliation by their traffickers, either against themselves or their families. 38 One scholar has
commented: Even a victim from a smaller-scale trafficking ring may face serious risk because
traffickers are often men from the victim's home country or even hometown who fraudulently
brought her [them]* to [the] United States with promises of legitimate work. Although the
TVPA provides for some witness protection measures for victims, and occasionally for their
families, these measures are shockingly insufficient. 39 Moreover, for victims of repeated
sexual assaults, testifying against perpetrators can facilitate re-victimization, as they must relive their experiences while sharing them with law enforcement officials or in court. 40 Some
victims develop Stockholm syndrome or "trauma [*64] bonding" during captivity and therefore
refuse to support prosecutorial efforts against traffickers with whom they associate positive
feelings. 41 Others simply are so traumatized or otherwise psychologically affected by their
trafficking that they are unable to communicate. 42 Trafficking victims may also not trust
United States law enforcement officials, as they may have been trafficked by law enforcement
officers from their home or transit countries. 43 They may also fear self-criminalization or
deportation based on their own real or perceived histories of crime, drug use, or other activities
unrelated or related to the trafficking itself. 44 Finally, victims may come from different cultural
backgrounds or normative belief systems and therefore be prohibitively uncomfortable or
unwilling to speak about their abuse with officials. 45 Critics of the assistance requirement
have used these reasons to justify TVPA and related INA sections reform. 46 Moreover, they
have tied the requirement to a decreased number of visas granted. 47 While the TVPA and
INA authorize 5,000 T visa grants annually, at most 2,000 have been filled in total since 2000,
despite estimates of annual alien human trafficking victims greatly exceeding 5,000. 48 Critics
thus argue that the assistance requirement is too onerous, and that it therefore undermines the
purpose and value that the TVPA provides to human trafficking victims. 49
The violence that is done to the victims by the act of being forced to testify is
analogous to sexual assault
George, 11—Shelly George Associate Professor at the Lincoln Memorial University Duncan
School of Law, 2011 (“The Strong Arm Of The Law Is Weak: How The Trafficking Victims
Protection Act Fails To Assist Effectively Victims Of The Sex Trade”, Creighton Law Review,
https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/creigh45&div=23&g_sent=1&casa_token
=&collection=journals#, Accessed 6/26/18, MJ, Language Modified)
The Requirement to Assist in Prosecution
Perhaps one of the biggest impediments to the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 92
("TVPA") actually assisting victims is the requirement that the victim assist in the prosecution
of her trafficker. The law specifies that in order to receive the social benefits, a victim must be
willing to cooperate with the state in the prosecution of the trafficker. 93 The treatment that
these victims have endured cannot be understated. These women (not children as this
requirement does not apply to those seventeen and younger) have been traumatized and
brutalized to the point of what one author equates to post-traumatic stress disorder. 94 These
same victims are then expected to assist, cooperate, and testify in a court of law against the
perpetrators that have inflicted this atrocious harm on them. To say that we, as a civilized
society, will not afford the victims the services they need to function in our society unless they
face the individual that enslaved them is a re-victimization all unto itself. One of the problems
with the TVPA's requirements for receiving benefits is the unwillingness of the victim to testify.
There are many reasons a victim may choose not to testify against her perpetrator. Fear of
retaliation is perhaps the greatest reason a victim would not want to assist in the prosecution. The
victim, in most cases, has been beaten and brutalized and is in real fear. This fear extends not
only to herself but also to her family and friends. Many victims of sex trafficking (as well as rape
[sexual assault]) feel that they are being re-rape [sexual assaulted] by the criminal justice
system in being forced to testify and speak out against the trafficker. Some victims have
issues recalling the details of what transpired due to the trauma sustained, as well as long periods
of forced drug use.
Provision of a visa, that includes access to protections and services, to a wide
array of trafficking victims is key to solve and get modelled---expanding the
definition to be “more inclusive” is and removing the law enforcement is key
Barbagiannis 16 — Efthimia Barbagiannis, Staff Editor, Cardozo Journal of International and
Comparative Law. Candidate for Juris Doctor, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, May 2017;
B.A., SUNY Geneseo, 2014, “Note: Protecting Victims of Human Trafficking: Creating Better
Residency Visas” 25 Cardozo J. Int'l & Comp. L. 561, (2016-2017), Hein Online
The T-Visa program can serve as a model for other countries to replicate. Other countries
should create similar long-term residency programs that are suited for victims of trafficking.
Long-term residency reduces the chances of a victim being repatriated to a place where his or
her vulnerabilities can be exploited to re-traffic them. 213 With a fifty percent rate of retrafficking, 214 long-term residency programs could significantly reduce that percentage, and
doing so, better combat human trafficking. Creating such a visa program in the first place would
be an important step forward for most countries. While ideally, a state should not require that a
victim participate in the prosecution of their traffickers to receive protections, it is unlikely
[*591] that states will do so. Therefore, other states should, after creating a residency visa
program, at a minimum, replicate the trauma exception that is available to persons who are unable
to participate due to severe physical and mental trauma. 215 It should be noted, that to create a
better visa program, the trauma exception should be expanded and be made more accessible for
persons who need it. Additionally, the T-Visa's provision for derivative beneficiaries, spouses
and children, provides greater protections for victims, because it reduces the chances for
traffickers to use family members to continue to exploit trafficking victims. 216 These are
important aspects of the T-Visa program that other states that consider adopting a long-term
residency program for victims of trafficking should adopt into such a program. B. How to
Make the T-Visa a Better Option for Victims of Trafficking While the TVPA and its T-Visa
program should serve as a model for other countries to replicate, there are still ways to better
the T-Visa program to be more inclusive and offer better and greater protections for victims
of trafficking. In order to do so, it can replicate certain aspects of Canada's TRP program. First, it
should expand its definition of trafficking to be more similar to Canada's and focus on
exploitation. 217 Critics of the T-Visa have maintained that its definition is too narrow and
prevents some victims from being able to access the vital protections and services it provides.
218 However, adopting a more inclusive definition of trafficking, such as Canada's would allow
the T-Visa to be more inclusive and expand its reach to provide more victims of trafficking
with necessary protections. 219 Second, as previously mentioned, the "reasonable
compliance" 220 standard is problematic. It reinforces the emphasis that trafficking protocols
and statutes give to the criminalization of trafficking and leaves protection to be an inferior
concern. The United States adopted the trauma exception to address the needs of victims who
have been severely traumatized by their experience and to prevent them from being re-victimized
though prosecution proceedings. 221 However, the [*592] trauma exception remains too narrow
and victims continue to be re-traumatized through the "reasonable compliance" standard.
Expanding the trauma exception and making it more widely accessible, would be important
because it would reduce the re-victimization of victims as they are often fearful to face their
traffickers. 222
1AC — Plan
The United States federal government should provide visas that include
access to relevant services and protections for internationally trafficked
victims to the United States, via legal immigration, who would otherwise be
excluded based on the law enforcement cooperation requirement or a narrow
definition of human trafficking.
1AC — Framing
Contention _: Framing
First is trafficking —
There is an ethical obligation to prioritize resolving issues within human
trafficking as it is the root cause of economic and social rights, discrimination,
and poverty
Tordes 11
Jonathan Todres, Todres serves as a regular advisor to nongovernmental organizations working on legislative and
policy initiatives to address human trafficking and other children’s rights issues. He is child rights advisor to ECPATUSA (End Child Prostitution and Trafficking) and a board member of the Georgia Asylum and Immigration Network.
Todres is also a Fellow of the American Bar Foundation. Todres serves as a member of the Board on Children, Youth,
and Families of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. Since 2012, he has also served on
three committees of the National Academies: the Committee on Biological and Psychosocial Effects of Peer
Victimization: Lessons for Bullying Prevention (2015-2016); the Planning Committee on Increasing Capacity for
Reducing Bullying and Its Impact on the Lifecourse of Youth Involved (2014), and the Committee on Commercial
Sexual Exploitation and Sex Trafficking of Minors in the United States (2012-2013). Todres served as chair of the
AALS Section on International Human Rights in 2015 and chair of the AALS Section on Children and the Law in
2013. He has held several leadership posts within the ABA Section of International Law, including chair of the
Section’s International Life Sciences and Health Law Committee and vice chair of its International Human Rights
Committee. Todres previously served as an acting assistant professor at New York University School of Law, an
adjunct professor of law at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University and a visiting professor
(Human Rights) at Vytautas Magnus University School of Law in Lithuania. He also practiced law with Davis Polk &
Wardwell in New York and London and clerked for Judge Rosemary Barkett of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th
Circuit. Todres received his J.D. from Columbia Law School, where he was a Harlan Fiske Stone Scholar, and his B.A.
(with high honors in International Development) from Clark University, where he was elected to Phi Beta Kappa. Prior
to attending law school, he worked for a number of years in international development and served as a U.S. Peace
Corps volunteer in Thailand. Todres is a member of the Center for Law, Health & Society and teaches Family Law,
Torts, Human Rights and Children, Public Health Law, and Global Perspectives on Children and the Law. (“Widening
Our Lens: Incorporating Essential Perspectives in the Fight against Human”, Hein Online,
https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/mjil33&collection=journals&id=57&startid=&endid=80,
Michigan Journal of Law, Fall 2011) EH
To begin, a rights-based approach offers several important benefits. A human rights framework
acknowledges the inherent human dignity in each individual.67 Human trafficking persists, in
part, when societies tolerate denials of the dignity and humanity of vulnerable individuals.
68 Human rights law is designed to address vulnerability.69 More specifically, marginalized
individuals and populations are often at heightened risk of various forms of exploitation,
including human trafficking.7 Poor children whose births are not registered or who lack access to
health care and education are at heightened vulnerability.7 Children whose births are not
registered do not exist in government records, exposing them to a broad range of potential
harm.72 In addition, unregistered children often encounter obstacles in accessing health care
services. 73 Children without regular access to health care have a higher incidence of unmet
health needs,74 and children with unmet health needs are more likely to miss school, fall be hind
their classmates, and drop out of school.7 5 Adolescents who do not finish school enter the
workforce at a younger age with fewer skills, leaving them at greater risk of an array of
exploitative practices, including trafficking.7 6 Similarly, discrimination creates barriers to
individuals' full realization of their rights, pushing primarily minorities, women, and children to
the margins and increasing their risk of exploitation.77 Human rights law has a response at every
stage in this process. The right to birth registration, 7 8 health and education rights,79 labor
rights,"° the right to live free from discrimination,8' and other rights all have the capacity, if fully
realized, to reduce the vulnerability of individuals who might otherwise end up at risk of
trafficking. In short, a human rights framework can help address the root causes of human
trafficking, including denial of economic and social rights, discrimination, and poverty.
Rights are an absolute good – must act to protect them in all instances
Human Rights Watch ‘97
“An Introduction to the Human Rights Movement,” 1997, http://www.hrweb.org/intro.html.
Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have
outraged the conscience of [hu]mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall
enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the
highest aspiration of the common people, Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to
have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights
should be protected by the rule of law... These are the second and third paragraphs of the
preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted by the United Nations
General Assembly on December 10, 1948 without a dissenting vote. It is the first multinational
declaration mentioning human rights by name, and the human rights movement has largely
adopted it as a charter. I'm quoting them here because it states as well or better than anything I've
read what human rights are and why they are important. The United Nations Charter, Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, and UN Human Rights convenants were written and implemented
in the aftermath of the Holocaust, revelations coming from the Nuremberg war crimes trials, the
Bataan Death March, the atomic bomb, and other horrors smaller in magnitude but not in impact
on the individuals they affected. A whole lot of people in a number of countries had a crisis of
conscience and found they could no longer look the other way while tyrants jailed, tortured, and
killed their neighbors. In Germany, the Nazis first came for the communists, and I did not speak
up, because I was not a Communist. Then they came for the Jews, and I did not speak up, because
I was not a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists, and I did not speak up, because I was not
a trade unionist. Then they came for the Catholics, and I did not speak up, because I was not a
Catholic. Then they came for me... and by that time, there was no one to speak up for anyone. -Martin Niemoeller, Pastor, German Evangelical (Lutheran) Church Many also realized that
advances in technology and changes in social structures had rendered war a threat to the
continued existence of the human race. Large numbers of people in many countries lived under
the control of tyrants, having no recourse but war to relieve often intolerable living conditions.
Unless some way was found to relieve the lot of these people, they could revolt and become the
catalyst for another wide-scale and possibly nuclear war. For perhaps the first time,
representatives from the majority of governments in the world came to the conclusion that basic
human rights must be protected, not only for the sake of the individuals and countries involved,
but to preserve the human race. Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket
fired signifies in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are
cold and are not clothed. This world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat
of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children. This is not a way of life at all
in any true sense. Under the clouds of war, it is humanity hanging on a cross of iron. -- Dwight D.
Eisenhower President of the United States "I know not with what weapons World War III will be
fought, but World War IV will be fought with sticks and stones." -- Albert Einstein
There is no impact to death absent basic human dignity
Shue ‘89
Henry Shue, Professor of Ethics and Public Life, Princeton University, 89 “Nuclear Deterrence and Moral Restraint,”
pp. 141-2
Given the philosophical obstacles to resolving moral disputes, there are at least two approaches
one can take in dealing with the issue of the morality of nuclear strategy. One approach is to stick
doggedly with one of the established moral theories constructed by philosophers to “rationalize”
or “make sense of” everyday moral intuitions, and to accept the verdict of the theory, whatever it
might be, on the morality of nuclear weapons use. A more pragmatic alternative approach
assumes that trade-offs in moral values and principles are inevitable in response to constantly
changing threats, and that the emergence of novel, unforeseen challenges may impel citizens of
Western societies to adjust the way they rank their values and principles to ensure that the moral
order survives. Nuclear weapons are putting just such a strain on our moral beliefs. Before the
emergence of a nuclear-armed communist state capable of threatening the existence of Western
civilization, the slaughter of millions of innocent human beings to preserve Western values may
have appeared wholly unjustifiable under any possible circumstances. Today, however, it may be
that Western democracies, if they are to survive as guardians of individual freedom, can no longer
afford to provide innocent life the full protection demanded by Just War morality. It might be
objected that the freedoms of Western society have value only on the assumption that human
beings are treated with the full dignity and respect assumed by Just War theory. Innocent human
life is not just another value to be balanced side by side with others in moral calculations. It is the
raison d’etre of Western political, economic, and social institutions. A free society based on
individual rights that sanctioned mass slaughter of innocent human beings to save itself from
extinction would be “morally corrupt,” no better than soviet society, and not worth defending.
The only morally right and respectable policy for such a society would be to accept destruction at
the hands of tyranny,
Second is risk analysis —
Affectively compelling but contrived narratives result in faulty predictions
that have an artificially inflated probability because they rely on cognitive
biases---it relies on using faulty understanding Bayesian conditional
probability that allows you to view “internal links” as insulated from the rest
of their arguments---but the logical multiplication of probabilities renders
their offense astronomically small
Piattelli 96 – Dr. Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini, Professor of Cognitive Science, Linguistics,
Psychology at Arizona State University, Doctorate in Physics at the University of Rome, Founder
and Director of the Department of Cognitive Science at the Scientific Institute San Raffaele,
Former Principal Research Scientist at the Center for Cognitive Science of MIT, Inevitable
Illusions: How Mistakes of Reason Rule our Minds, p. 134-137
Here is deadly sin number 7 in its most blatant form, in that our judgment of probability allows
itself to be influenced by fictions, including scenarios that we know to be the fruit of pure
invention. I call this the Othello effect. You may remember that the lustful and thwarted Iago sets
out to make Othello believe his beloved wife, Desdemona, is unfaithful to him. Iago makes up a
scenario involving Desdemona’s handkerchief. This plausible but fallacious scenario convinces
Othello of Desdemona’s betrayal, and in a fury of passion, Othello kills her. Such fictitious
scenarios can be taken advantage of by any shrewd and unscrupulous Iago. But before we seek to
save Desdemona, let us go back a few years to when Tversky and Kahneman ran their
experiment on the Polish situation. Let’s imagine a much stranger possibility than the withdrawal
of the U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union. How likely do you think it is that the United States
might invade Poland? Here the chances are in the order of one in a million or less. But supposing
we ask our respondents to consider the following sequence of events (you have to think yourself
back into those times): Strikes in Poland intensify; crowds are fired on; Lech Walensa is
imprisoned; the pope goes to Warsaw on a peace mission and is arrested; world public opinion is
inflamed; the United States sends a specialist force to free the Pope… As the narrative unfolds
one event is linked with another, making for a script that seems plausible—always admitting,
of course, that each stage has really been preceded by another. In the end, don’t we think that
the probability of a U.S. invasion is somewhat higher than one in a million? Here we leave
statistics behind and enter the domain of pure fiction. Look a bit closer, and one can see that we
are not yet out of the realm of cognitive science, for these questionaire-experiments, just like real
life, have countless times shown us that a plausible and well-told story can lead us to hold as
“objectively” probable events that, just minutes before, we would have considered totally
improbable. The notorious “Protocols of Zion,” a pure fabrication of the czar’s anti-Semitic
propaganda taken up by the Nazi regime raised an Anti-Semitic storm. It did little good to show
that it was a pure invention. What the propagandists sought to do, in order to seize power, was to
make imaginatively presentable the probability of a worldwide Jewish conspiracy, and in
doing so they succeeded admirably, at least in the minds of those uncritically committed to
hatred. I will not waste space on other instances, but limit myself to the purely cognitive aspects
of the phenomenon. Offering a “plausible” sequence of events that are causally linked one to
another has the effect of immediately raising our estimate of probability. It suffices that the
links between these “events” should hold from one to the next for our minds to approach the
final link in the chain. For, as we have seen, that which we can readily imagine is ipso facto
more probable. Even if the probability of the very first link in this chain is very low, the fact is
soon forgotten. Say “Let’s suppose that…” and we’re off, putting together a series of
consequences, all of them “plausible” enough. I put “plausible” in quotation marks because true
plausibility, in effect, depends wholly on that initial “Let’s suppose…” Once the first link in the
chain of our script is “supposed,” then all the rest of the links “hold” one to another. Rationally
speaking, however, and having regard to the calculation of probabilities, we are in the domain of
what is known as “compound probabilities,”, or, more restrictively, “conditional probabilities.”
(What is the likelihood that B will be true, supposing that A has to be true?) The probability of
the last link in the chain being true is calculated on the basis of a series of conditional
probabilities being true, and that in turn is obtained by combining the probabilities of each
link in the chain, from the first to the last. Probabilities being, by their nature, less than one, the
probability of the entire chain (or the last link) being true is always and without exception less
probable than the probability of the least probable link in the chain. We fail to notice this
progressive attenuation of probability. The story takes over from reality. The last link seems
ever truer to our mind, and our increased facility in representing or imaging makes that last link
seem ever more probable. The trick—which is one of the oldest in the book—is to find the
narrative path by which the last, and most implausible, link can be made imaginatively
compelling. My Othello effect depends on this perverse use of the imagination. If by chance one
or two of the intervening links in this chain should come true, then poor Desdemona will indeed
die. A narrative chain put together with art by some cunning Iago, and “resting” on a pair of
intermediate links that come true (though only true for quite different reasons, and for reasons
that no one may know), becomes irresistible. Poor us! The narrative then becomes an
impregnable “logical” demonstration. Iago can transform doubt into certainty. Iago is not acting
in good faith, and Othello, truth to tell, is no Sherlock Holmes. A rational, rigorously deductive
man, knows perfectly well that the deductive inferences Iago makes about Desdemona’s fidelity
don’t amount to much. His “indications,” hints, and “proofs”could all be explained without the
infidelity hypothesis. Bayes’ law, or for that matter any sensible use of compound probability
calculations, can save Desdemona from a horrible and unjust fate. Instead, reinforced by our
cognitive illusions and dark passions, by a single imaginary chain of “plausibilities,” and by a
pair of intermediate links that for totally unrelated reasons are true, Desdemona’s tragic death is
set into motion. The implausible becomes plausible, indeed certain. Give us a little story, a
script, something born of our own imagination, and our own natural tendencies, cognitive or
emotional, do the rest. Isn’t this really the deadliest of our deadly sins?
Reject approaches that securitize bodies for the purpose of protecting the
state – calculating lesser evils results in the more extreme systemic violence
and state of exceptions.
Weizman ’11 (Eyal, London University spatial and visual cultures professor, The least of all
possible evils, pg 8-10)
The theological origins of the lesser evil argument still cast a long shadow on the present. In fact
the idiom has become so deeply ingrained, and is invoked in such a staggeringly diverse set of
contexts - from individual situational ethics and international relations, to attempts to govern the
economics of violence in the context of the war on terror' and the efforts of human rights and
humanitarian activists to maneuver through the paradoxes of aid - that it seems to have altogether
taken the place previously reserved for the term "˜good'. Moreover, the very evocation of the
"˜good' seems to everywhere invoke the utopian tragedies of modernity, in which evil seemed
lurking in a horrible manichaeistic inversion. If no hope is offered in the future, all that remains is
to insure ourselves against the risks that it poses, to moderate and lessen the collateral effects of
necessary acts, and tend to those who have suffered as a result. In relation to the "˜War on terror,
the terms of the lesser evil were most clearly and prominently articulated by former human rights
scholar and leader of Canada's Liberal Party Michael Ignatieff. In his book The Lesser Evil
Ignatieff suggested that in "˜balancing liberty against security' liberal states establish mechanisms
to regulate the breach of some human rights and legal norms, and allow their security services to
engage in forms of extra juridical violence - which he saw as lesser evils - in order to fend off or
minimize potential greater evils, such as terror attacks on civilians of western states. If
governments need to violate rights in a terrorist emergency, this should be done, he thought, only
as an exception and according to a process of adversarial scrutiny. "˜Exceptions', Ignatieff states,
"˜do not destroy the rule but save it, provided that they are temporary, publicly justified, and
deployed as a last resort. The lesser evil emerges here as a pragmatic compromise a “tolerated
sin” that functions as the very justification for the notion of exception. State violence in this
model takes part in a necro-economy in which various types of destructive measure are weighed
in a utilitarian fashion, not only in relation to the damage they produce, but to the harm they
purportedly prevent and even in relation to the more brutal measures they may help restrain. In
this logic, the problem of contemporary state violence resembles indeed an all-too-human version
of the mathematical minimum problem of the divine calculations previously mentioned, one
tasked with determining the smallest level of violence necessary to avert the greatest harm. For
the architects of contemporary war this balance is trapped between two poles: keeping violence at
a low enough level to limit civilian suffering, and at a level high enough to bring a decisive end to
the war and bring peace. More recent works by legal scholars and legal advisers to states and
militaries have sought to extend the inherent elasticity of the system of legal exception proposed
by Ignatieff into ways of rewriting the laws of armed conflict themselves. Lesser evil arguments
are now used to defend anything from targeted assassinations and mercy killings, house
demolitions, deportation, torture, to the use of (sometimes) non~ lethal chemical weapons, the use
of human shields, and even "˜the intentional targeting of some civilians if it could save more
innocent lives than they cost. In one of its more macabre moments it was suggested that the
atomic bombings of Hiroshima might also be tolerated under the defense of the lesser evil.
Faced with a humanitarian A-bomb, one might wonder what, in fact, might come under the
definition of a greater evil. Perhaps it is time for the differential accounting of the lesser evil to
replace the mechanical bureaucracy of the "banality of evil' as the idiom to describe the most
extreme manifestations of violence. Indeed, it is through this use of the lesser evil that societies
that see themselves as democratic can maintain regimes of occupation and neo-colonization.
Beyond state agents, those practitioners of lesser evils, as this book claims, must also include the
members of independent nongovernmental organizations that make up the ecology of
contemporary war and crisis zones. The lesser evil is the argument of the humanitarian agent that
seeks military permission to provide medicines and aid in places where it is in fact the duty of the
occupying military power to do so, thus saving the military limited resources. The lesser evil is
often the justification of the military officer who attempts to administer life (and death) in an
"˜enlightened' manner; it is sometimes, too, the brief of the security contractor who introduces
new and more efficient weapons and spatio-technological means of domination, and advertises
them as "˜humanitarian technology'. In these cases the logic of the lesser evil opens up a thick
political field of participation bringing together otherwise opposing fields of action, to the extent
that it might obscure the fundamental moral differences between these various groups. But, even
according to the terms of an economy of losses mid gains, the concept of the lesser evil risks
becoming counterproductive: less brutal measures are also those that may be more easily
naturalized, accepted and tolerated - and hence more frequently used, with the result that a greater
evil may be reached cumulatively
We are not responsible for the second-order consequences of the affirmative
— we must resolve this issue first then resolve others
Couturier ‘17
David B. Couturier is both a Professor in and The Dean of the School of Franciscan Studies at St. Bonaventure
University. He also received training in socio-analysis and was granted a Certificate in Organizational Development
from the William Alanson White Institute for Psychiatry - “DACA AND THE DEPORTATION OF DREAMERS: A
FRANCISCAN ETHICAL PERSPECTIVE” - #CutWithRJ- http://www.ssjtosf.org/justice/docs/20265DACAaFranciscanEthicalPerspective.pdf
We begin with the recognition that there is a difference between political decisions that are legal
and those that are ethical. Some decisions may be legal but may go so far beyond the social
norms of goodness that citizens expect from their government and society, that they may rightly
be considered immoral and unethical. Moral problems erupt quickly in complex societies like
ours. Ethical challenges come to us rapidly and, for that reason, we need to have strong
principles and core convictions if we are to meet them well. Ethical decisions require solid
anthropological footings and good theological and philosophical reasoning. We do not have the
luxury to decide which moral problems will emerge, what sufferings will erupt, what kind of
problems will surface in our complicated society. However, we can come to them with the
equipment of social integrity. DACA erupted unexpectedly last week and asks us some profound
questions: • What kind of society do we really want to be? • Do we truly want to be an inclusive
society after all? Or are we at a point where we want to restrict those to be considered American?
Who decides? • Do we intend to continue to see ourselves as a highly racialized society that
judges people by their skin tones and determines their level of deservedness for health care,
education, and a job by the shade of their complexion? • What attitude should we take toward
800,000 young people in the middle of their most important formative years, during the days that
will be critical and indeed definitive for the general success or failure of their lives? Do we want
to promote their possibilities and potentials? Or do we intend to make their lives anxious and
insecure? • What is the level of our compassion as a people? What kind of nation are we
becoming? These are the questions that are before us as a result of the decision of the Trump
administration to rescind the previous administration’s DACA initiative. We can’t run away and
ignore what the Trump administration is proposing. Each of us must take a stand and have moral
reasons for how we proceed.
Third is no war —
*obviously do not read this if you are reading a war impact
Decades of studies all show risk of war is at a statistical low – MAD, economic
ties, and proxy states.
Harari ’17 (Yuval Noah is an Israeli historian and a tenured professor in the Department of
History at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, June 23, “Why It’s No Longer Possible for Any
Country to Win a War” http://time.com/4826856/russia-trump-north-korea-china-war/)
The last few decades have been the most peaceful era in human history. For the first time ever,
fewer people die today from human violence than from traffic accidents, obesity or even suicide.
Whereas in early agricultural societies human violence caused up to 15% of all human deaths,
and in the twentieth century it caused 5%, today it is responsible for only about 1%. Yet the
international climate is rapidly deteriorating; warmongering is back in vogue, and military
expenditure is ballooning. Both laypeople and experts fear that just as in 1914 the murder of an
Austrian archduke sparked the First World War, in 2017 some incident in the Syrian Desert or an
unwise move in the Korean Peninsula might ignite a global conflict. Yet there are several key
differences between 2017 and 1914. Back then, war had great appeal to elites across the world
because they had concrete examples for how successful wars contribute to economic success and
political power. Now, successful wars seem to be an endangered species. From the days of
Assyria and Rome, great empires were usually built through war, and elites in 1914 had plenty of
recent examples for the huge profits a successful war can bring. In 1846–48 the United States
invaded Mexico, and for the price of 13,000 dead American soldiers, it got California, Nevada,
Utah, Arizona, New Mexico and parts of Colorado, Kansas, Wyoming and Oklahoma. It was the
bargain of the millennium. Similarly, imperial Japan cherished its victories over China and
Russia; Germany glorified its triumph over France; and almost every great power had a string of
splendid little colonial wars to its name. When France, Britain or Italy contemplated putting boots
on the ground in Vietnam, Nigeria or Libya, their main fear was that somebody else might get
there first. In 2017, global elites don’t know what a successful war even looks like. They may
have read about them in history books and seen fanciful recreations in Hollywood blockbusters,
but they have good reason to suspect that this type of war has gone extinct. Though some thirdworld dictators and non-state actors still manage to flourish through war, it seems that major
powers no longer know how to do so. The greatest victory in living memory — of the United
States over the Soviet Union — was achieved without any major military confrontation. The U.S.
then got a fleeting taste of old-fashioned military glory in the First Gulf War — which only
tempted it to waste trillions on humiliating military fiascos in Iraq and Afghanistan. China, the
rising power of the early twenty-first century, has assiduously avoided all armed conflicts since
its Vietnamese debacle of 1979, and it owes its ascent strictly to economic factors. In this, it has
emulated not the Japanese and German empires of the pre-1914 era, but rather the nonviolent
Japanese and German economic miracles of the post-1945 era. Even in the Middle East, regional
powers don’t know how to wage successful wars. Iran gained nothing from the long bloodbath of
the Iran-Iraq War and subsequently avoided all direct military confrontations. It became regional
hegemon by default, as its two main enemies — the U.S. and Iraq — got embroiled in a war that
destroyed both Iraq and the American appetite for Middle Eastern quagmires. Much the same can
be said of Israel, which waged its last successful war fifty years ago. Since 1967, Israel has
prospered despite its many wars, not thanks to them. Its conquered territories are a heavy
economic burden and a crippling political liability. Like Iran, Israel has recently improved its
geopolitical position not by waging successful wars, but by avoiding getting sucked into the wars
that devastated Iraq, Syria and Libya. The only recent successful war waged by a major power
has been the Russian conquest of the Crimea. However, it was made possible by an extraordinary
set of circumstances: The Ukrainian army showed no resistance; other powers refrained from
intervening; and the Crimean population either supported the invaders or peacefully accepted the
conquest as a fait accompli. These circumstances will be hard to reproduce. If the precondition
for a successful war is the absence of any enemies willing to resist, it limits the available
opportunities. Indeed, when Russia sought to reproduce its Crimean success in other parts of the
Ukraine, it encountered substantially stiffer opposition, and the war in eastern Ukraine bogged
down into an unproductive stalemate. Conquering decrepit Soviet-era factories in Luhansk and
Donetsk hardly pays for the war, and it certainly does not offset the costs of international
sanctions. The conquest of Crimea notwithstanding, it seems that in the twenty-first century the
most successful strategy is to keep your peace and let others do the fighting for you. Why
has it become so difficult for major powers to wage successful wars? One reason is the change in
the nature of the economy. In the past, if you defeated your enemy on the battlefield, you could
easily cash in by looting enemy cities, selling enemy civilians in the slave markets and occupying
valuable wheat fields and gold mines. Yet in the twenty-first century, only puny profits could be
made that way. Today, the main economic assets consist of technical and institutional knowledge
— and you cannot conquer knowledge through war. An organization such as ISIS may flourish
by looting cities and oil wells in the Middle East — in 2014, ISIS seized more than $500 million
from Iraqi banks and in 2015 made an additional $500 million from selling oil. But China and the
U.S. are unlikely to start a war for a paltry billion. As for spending trillions of dollars on a war
against the U.S., how could China repay these expenses and balance all the war damages and lost
trade opportunities? Would the victorious People’s Liberation Army loot the riches of Silicon
Valley? True, corporations such as Apple, Facebook and Google are worth hundreds of billions of
dollars, but you cannot seize these fortunes by force. There are no silicon mines in Silicon Valley.
A successful war could theoretically still bring huge profits by enabling the victor to rearrange the
global trade system in its favor, as the U.S. did after its victory over Hitler. However, present-day
military technology would make it extremely difficult to repeat this feat. By definition, profits
large enough to make a global war worthwhile for the victor will also make it worthwhile for the
loser to resort to weapons of mass destruction. The atom bomb has turned “victory” in a
World War into collective suicide. It is no coincidence that since Hiroshima superpowers never
fought one another directly, and engaged only in what (for them) were low-stake conflicts in
which none was tempted to use nuclear weapons to avert defeat. Indeed, even attacking a
second-rate nuclear power such as Iran or North Korea is an extremely unattractive
proposition. Cyber warfare makes things even worse for would-be imperialists. As recently as
the days of George W. Bush, the U.S. could wreak havoc in far-off Fallujah while the Iraqis had
no means of retaliating against San Francisco. But if the U.S. now attacks a country possessing
even moderate cyber warfare capabilities, malware and logic bombs could stop air traffic in
Dallas, cause trains to collide in Philadelphia and bring down the electric grid in Michigan. In the
great age of conquerors, warfare was a low-damage, high-profit affair. At the battle of Hastings in
1066, William the Conqueror gained the whole of England in a single day for the cost of a few
thousand dead. Nuclear weapons and cyber warfare, by contrast, are high-damage, low-profit
technologies. You could use such tools to destroy entire countries, but not to build profitable
empires. Hence in a world filling up with saber-rattling and bad vibes, perhaps our best
guarantee of peace is that major powers aren’t familiar with any recent example of a
successful war. While Genghis Khan or Julius Caesar would invade a foreign country at the drop
of a hat, present-day strongmen talk loud but are very careful about actually launching wars. Of
course, if somebody does find a formula to wage successful wars under twenty-first-century
conditions, the gates of hell might open with a rush. This is what makes the Russian success in
the Crimea a particularly frightening omen. Let’s hope it remains an isolated example. Though,
even if it is impossible to wage successful wars in the twenty-first century, that does not give us
an absolute guarantee for peace. We should never underestimate human stupidity.
Tons of checks on conflict – courts, congress, and international pressure.
Burdette ‘17 (Zachary, National Security Intern at the Brookings Institution and M.A.
candidate at Georgetown University's Security Studies Program concentrating in military
operations. “America’s Counterterrorism Partners as a Check on Trump” 3-1-17
https://www.lawfareblog.com/americas-counterterrorism-partners-check-trump)
President Trump has begun to shift U.S. counterterrorism policies toward an extreme paradigm
that departs from both liberal and conservative orthodoxy. In his first weeks in office, Trump
recast the enemy as radical Islam, reconsidered U.S. policy on black sites and torture, and
instituted a travel ban covering seven Muslim-majority countries. The unifying logic of these
approaches is one of defining Islam as the problem, unshackling humanitarian constraints, and
adopting extreme tools to combat terrorism. In implementing this vision, Trump inherits an
already formidable counterterrorism architecture and an expansive legal interpretation of
executive war powers from the Obama administration. Ideally, the checks and balances of the
U.S. political system will force moderation and curtail executive overreach. The national security
bureaucracy, Congress, the courts, the press, and civil society are—individually and
collectively—powerful impediments to illegal and extreme counterterrorism measures. While
there are fierce debates over how effectively these domestic constraints have operated in the past,
the early judicial challenges to Trump’s counterterrorism policies suggest that domestic
institutions could place meaningful constraints on the new administration. International dynamics
may reinforce these domestic checks and balances. U.S. allies and partners could leverage their
continued cooperation on counterterrorism to pressure the Trump administration to exercise
uncharacteristic self-restraint. In other words, the United States could soon face an
uncomfortable dilemma: President Trump must either restrain his most hawkish impulses or his
administration may find itself increasingly going it alone in the war on terror. The Trump
administration may not be concerned about such a possibility, given the President’s dismissive
attitude toward American allies throughout the campaign, but it should be. Allies provide
important assets in international counterterrorism operations, many of which the U.S. intelligence
community would be hard-pressed to replace. If partners believe the new administration’s
counterterrorism policies are illegal or excessive, they will likely turn first to diplomatic
condemnation to induce moderation. The collective voice of the international community
shapes expectations about what is acceptable, which raises the political costs of crossing
certain legal and political thresholds. Global outcry would lend weight and legitimacy to
those inside the United States calling for restraint, serving as an external prompt to
jumpstart dialogue and the internal processes of U.S. checks and balances. For example,
international naming and shaming of the Obama administration helped end the U.S. practice of
spying on the communications of certain allied heads of state. While the Trump administration
may prove itself immune to such international condemnation, there is some cause for optimism.
In addition to his uncompromising demand for unconditional praise, one of Trump’s few
consistencies is his lack of principled commitment to any particular policy. He flip-flopped on
proposed counterterrorism measures when domestic audiences criticized him during the
campaign. A concerted, global effort may have a similar effect during his presidency, especially
if it were combined with fawning praise for his leadership when he moderates.
Economic decline doesn’t cause war – prefer long term studies.
Friedman et al ‘13 (research fellow in defense and homeland security studies; Brendan
Rittenhouse Green, the Stanley Kaplan Postdoctoral Fellow in Political Science and Leadership
Studies at Williams College; Justin Logan, Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute
Fall 2013, “Correspondence: Debating American Engagement: The Future of U.S. Grand
Strategy,” International Security, Vol. 38, No. 2, p. 181-199)
Brooks et al. argue that the specter of U.S. power eliminates some of the most baleful consequences of anarchy, producing a
more peaceful world. U.S. security guarantees deter aggressors, reassure allies, and dampen security dilemmas (p. 34). “By supplying
reassurance, deterrence, and active management,” Brooks et al. write, primacy “reduces security competition and does so in a way that slows the
diffusion of power away from the United States” (pp. 39–40). There
are three reasons to reject this logic : security
competition is declining anyway; if competition increases, primacy will have difficulty stopping
it; and even if competition occurred, it would pose little threat to the United States.¶ an increasingly peaceful world.
An array of research , some of which Brooks et al. cite, indicates that factors other than U.S. power are
diminishing interstate war and security competition .2 These factors combine to make the costs of military aggression very
high, and its benefits low.3¶ A major reason for peace is that conquest has grown more costly. Nuclear weapons make it
nearly suicidal in some cases.4 Asia, the region where future great power competition is most likely, has a “geography of
peace”: its maritime and mountainous regions are formidable barriers to conflict.5 ¶ Conquest also yields lower economic
returns than in the past. Post-industrial economies that rely heavily on human capital and information are more difficult to exploit.6
Communications and transport technologies aid nationalism and other identity politics that make foreigners harder to manage. The lowering of
trade barriers limits the returns from their forcible opening.7¶ Although states are slow learners, they
increasingly appreciate these trends . That should not surprise structural realists. Through two world wars, the
international system "selected against" hyperaggressive states and demonstrated even to victors the
costs of major war. Others adapt to the changed calculus of military aggression through
socialization.8¶ managing revisionist states. Brooks et al. caution against betting on these positive trends. They worry that if states
behave the way offensive realism predicts, then security competition will be fierce even if its costs are high. Or, if
nonsecurity preferences such as prestige, status, or glory motivate states, even secure states may become aggressive (pp. 36-37).9¶ These
scenarios, however, are a bigger problem for primacy than for restraint . Offensive realist security
paranoia stems from states' uncertainty about intentions; such states see alliances as temporary expedients of last resort,
and U.S. military commitments are unlikely to comfort or deter them .10 Nonsecurity preferences
are, by definition, resistant to the security blandishments that the United States can offer under primacy
Brooks et al.'s revisionist actors are unlikely to find additional costs sufficient reason to hold back, or the threat of those costs to be particularly credible. ¶
The literature that Brooks et al. cite in arguing that the United States restrains allies actually suggests that offensive realist
and prestige-oriented states will be the most resistant to the restraining effects of U.S. power. These
studies suggest that it is most difficult for strong states to prevent conflict between weaker allies and their rivals when the restraining state is defending
nonvital interests; when potential adversaries and allies have other alignment options;11 when the stronger state struggles to mobilize power
domestically12; when the stronger state perceives reputational costs for non-involvement;13 and when allies have hawkish interests and the stronger state
has only moderately dovish interests.14¶ In other words, the
cases where it would be most important to restrain U.S.
allies are those in which Washington's efforts at restraint would be least effective. Highly motivated actors,
by definition, have strong hawkish interests. Primacy puts limits on U.S. dovishness, lest its commitments lack the credibility to deter or reassure. Such
credibility concerns create perceived reputational costs for restraining or not bailing out allies. The United States will be defending secondary interests,
which will create domestic obstacles to mobilizing power. U.S. allies have other alliance options, especially in Asia. In short, if
states are
insensitive to the factors incentivizing peace, then the United States' ability to manage global security
will be doubtful. Third-party security competition will likely ensue anyway. ¶ costs for whom? Fortunately,
foreign security competition poses little risk to the United States. Its wealth and geography create natural security.
Historically, the only threats to U.S. sovereignty, territorial integrity, safety, or power position have been potential regional hegemons that could mobilize
their resources to project political and military power into the Western Hemisphere. Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union arguably posed such threats.
None exist today. ¶ Brooks
et al. argue that "China's rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional
hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term" (p. 38). That possibility is remote , even assuming that China
sustains its rapid wealth creation. Regional hegemony requires China to develop the capacity to conquer
Asia's other regional powers. India lies across the Himalayas and has nuclear weapons. Japan is across a sea and has
the wealth to quickly build up its military and develop nuclear weapons. A disengaged United States would have
ample warning and time to form alliances or regenerate forces before China realizes such vast ambitions.
Relived Violence Backlines
2AC — Mental Health
Requiring victims to cooperate with Law enforcement puts them in danger
and directly effects their mental health
Gott 5
Lynsay Gott Associate Attorney at Kozoll & Associates Immigration Law PLLC, Senior
Attorney WMR Immigration Law Group, PC, Human Rights USA Acting Executive Director
Human Rights USA, Program Director Human Rights USA, Human Rights USA Staff Attorney
& Equal Justice Works Fellow Human Rights USA, Research Fellow University of Cincinnati
College of Law, (“UNREALISTIC BURDENS: HOW THE T VISA AND ASYLUM LAW
FAIL TO PROTECT MANY VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING”, Immigration and Nationality Law
Review, 2005,
https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/inlr26&div=20&g_sent=1&casa_token=
&collection=journals, Hein Online) EH
Law enforcement officials report that many victims are reluctant to talk about the traffickers.28
Some remain in danger from traffickers in the United States or in their home countries, and
may also fear for their families' safety. Cooperating with the prosecution could prove
dangerous.29 Trafficked people may also have a built-in fear of police, derived from previous
experiences with corrupt officials.3 " Additionally, medical evidence indicates that posttraumatic stress disorder-from which trafficking victims may suffer--causes cognitive difficulties
and memory loss, and discussing their experiences can lead to further trauma.3 Even for
those victims willing to cooperate with law enforcement, acquiring a T visa can remain an
imposing task. Trafficking victims are not provided counsel to assist in the process of applying
for a T visa or the benefits and services available under the TVPA, and many must navigate the
process alone.32 To obtain legal status under the TVPA, victims must still prove "extreme
hardship involving unusual and severe harm" upon removal.3 " This standard leaves less
room for broad judicial interpretation than "extreme hardship" alone; Congress tellingly chose
this over a "well founded fear of retribution" standard.34 Victims who do provide assistance to
law enforcement and then fail to receive a T visa, may find themselves in greater danger
from retribution-seeking traffickers, with no help from the United States.35 The cap on
yearly T visas provides a further limit to its usefulness. Of the 14,000-50,000 victims trafficked
into the United States each year, no more than 5,000 can receive the full protection and assistance
of the U.S. government under the TVPA. Only 136 T visas were granted in 2004, along with 484
grants of continued presence,36 raising the question of how seriously officials have taken the
goal of protecting and assisting victims. Victims whose experiences do not fit the requirements
of the T visa may be powerless to extricate themselves from the danger posed by international
trafficking. Those who cannot get T visas will eventually be subjected to forced repatriation, a
clear violation of human rights norms,37 and traffickers may be waiting for women who return
home.38 The U.S. government has no authority to help victims who suffer retribution after
repatriation or to punish the perpetrators in their home countries. Yet, corruption in their
native country may prevent victims and their families from receiving any assistance from the
local government. Members of trafficking rings are often powerful and influential people in their
communities. 39 Deported victims may also face isolation from their communities because of
their prostitution activities, even being turned away by their families. For example, some
trafficking victims who returned to their native Albania were killed by their shamed
families.4 " Others could be punished by local law enforcement for having illegally left their
home countries.4 1 Finally, people victimized by traffickers wholly in another country who
then escape to the United States would not be eligible for T visas, nor would people who only
fell victim to traffickers after entering the United States. Overall, the TVPA framework
leaves many victims without sufficient access to aid and protection.
2AC — AT — SQ Solves
Status quo policy fails — lack of definitional clarity, data, and resources
Kara 16 (Siddharth, Director, Human Trafficking and Modern Slavery Program, Harvard
Kennedy School, the date was found by looking at the earliest wayback machine snapshot,
accessed 7-13-2018, "3 Ways Our Anti-Trafficking Efforts Fail", Impacting Our Future:
http://www.impactingourfuture.com/advocacy/3-ways-our-anti-trafficking-efforts-fail)
1. Lack of definition However, human trafficking continues to pervade the world due to the
ongoing ability of exploiters to generate substantial profits at almost no real risk through the
exploitation of a global sub-class of impoverished and vulnerable people. Three primary
deficiencies are responsible for this reality. First, the issue remains mired in definitional
confusion as to whether human trafficking is slavery, or the process of entering an individual into
a condition of slavery. The term connotes movement and was codified in a trans-national
organized crime instrument. However, policy leaders posit that movement of the victim is not
relevant to the offense, just the slave-like exploitation. Needless to say, if one cannot be clear on
what the offense is, it can be challenging to address it. 2. Lack of information Second, the
anti-trafficking movement has historically suffered from a data deficit. Inflated numbers of
victims have been bandied around from the outset without any basis in research. This has led to a
loss of credibility with policy makers and donors. The last five years have seen a shift towards
gathering accurate data, but the global paucity of sound research remains a chief hurdle to
galvanizing sufficient resources to address the offense. 3. Lack of resources The third deficit is
this resource gap. The United States is the global leader at addressing human trafficking, but it
spends more on defense in one day than it has spent in the last fifteen years to combat human
trafficking. Anti-trafficking efforts remain hampered by insufficient resources, and until this
insufficiency is addressed, advocates will be fighting a valiant but losing battle.
Global Crime Syndicates Advantage
2AC — AT — Prosecution not key
Effective prosecution model creates a deterrent mechanism---prevents
further trafficking
Rickert 10 — Michelle Crawford Rickert, Professor at the Helms School of Government at
Liberty University, “A Deterrence Model to Curbing Human Trafficking in the United States”
Second Annual Interdisciplinary Conference on Human Trafficking, 2010, University of
Nebraska,
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1025&context=humtrafconf2
Human trafficking is squarely a criminal justice problem. In order to eradicate human
trafficking the traffickers need to be deterred from engaging in the business of trafficking in
people. From a law and economics perspective, optimal deterrence is reached when a sentence
or fine is just greater than the probability of getting caught multiplied by the benefit to the
criminal. Utilizing this model, the proposed presentation will attempt to demonstrate how to
sufficiently deter the trafficker by increasing probability of prosecutions through local laws,
increasing the fines and sentences of traffickers once convicted, and increasing the certainty of
detection through increased law enforcement training and public awareness campaigns.
Additionally, this presentation will address the issues that the deterrence model does not deal
with as readily including organized criminal units which are vertically integrated, and cultural
trafficking of domestic servants, both of which likely deserve departure from this model to
account for motivational factors.
2AC — AT — SQ Solves
Current prosecutions are insufficient---the deterrent mechanism is still
drastically in favor of the traffickers
HRF 15 — Human Rights First, 6-4-2015, Date Accessed: 6-22-2018, "Dan Lungren on
Human Trafficking Prosecutions, Deterrence, and Justice"
https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/blog/dan-lungren-human-trafficking-prosecutions-deterrenceand-justice
Increasing prosecutions of human trafficking is about more than putting bad guys away, as
Dan Lungren, former member of Congress from California, explains: “There is a sense of justice
about punishing those who have committed crimes. But there also is the sense of deterrence.”
Right now, the human traffickers enjoy a relatively low risk and high reward for exploiting
victims of modern slavery. While there are an estimated 21 million victims of human trafficking
worldwide, in 2013 there were only 5,776 convictions for the crime. Meanwhile, exploiters net
about $150 billion annually from this illicit trade.
2AC — AT — Trafficking not key
Human trafficking has a massive impact on revenues---it’s the main source of
revenue for terrorism
Welch 17 — Shannon Welch, Juris Doctor Candidate at Duke University School of Law,
“Note: Human Trafficking and Terrorism: Utilizing National Security Resources to Prevent
Human Trafficking in The Islamic State,” 24 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol'y 165, Spring, 2017, Lexis
Nexis
C. Financing Terrorism Whether directly through internal trafficking operations or partnerships
with other criminal organizations, human trafficking now rivals drug trafficking as the main
source of funding for terrorism.75 Child soldiers, domestic servants, and sex slaves are
exchanged between terrorists as rewards, and moved into countries without documentation.
Because the penalties are negligible, profits high, and investment low, sex trafficking is becoming
the crime of choice for these organizations.76 But raising the legal penalties for traffickers
themselves is only as effective as the ability to catch them. Instead, using existing counterterrorism legislation and incorporating human trafficking prosecutions and prevention into these
laws and executive orders, the United States can more effectively cut off the sources of funding
and victims for traffickers.77
2AC — AT — Coop not key
Human trafficking is key---it’s impossible to solve terrorism without the
prosecution and cooperation the plan facilitates
Gonzalez et al. 13 — Elsie Gonzalez, J.D. Candidate, Seton Hall University, 5-1-2013, “The
Nexus between Human Trafficking and Terrorism/Organized Crime: Combating Human
Trafficking by Creating a Cooperative Law Enforcement System”
http://scholarship.shu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1227&context=student_scholarship
Technical cooperation among law enforcement agencies is essential for investigating and
prosecuting human traffickers. Actress Mira Sorvino, the U.N. goodwill ambassador against
human trafficking, said that there is a lack of strong legislation and police training to combat
trafficking.164 Even in the United States "only 10 percent of police stations have any protocol to
deal with trafficking."165 Yuri Fedotov, the head of the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, called
for coordinated local, regional and international responses that balance "progressive and proactive
law enforcement" with actions that combat "the market forces driving human trafficking in many
destination countries."166 Human trafficking, currently, is treated as a social issue rather a matter
of national security. Links between terrorists and criminals, which capitalize upon gaps in law
enforcement and weak security structures, are increasingly becoming the norm. Any successful
approach in countering terror and crime will have to address human trafficking. Both
terrorist networks and organized criminal groups take advantage of the gray areas in the law.
Officials need to acknowledge the network structure of terrorists and criminal groups with
human trafficking and fight the networks cooperatively.
2AC — AT — No impact
Terrorists have the motivation and capability to get nuclear weapons---the
impact is nuclear war
Hayes 18 — Peter Hayes, Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute for Security and
Sustainability, Ph.D. in Energy and Resources from the University of California—Berkley, "NonState Terrorism And Inadvertent Nuclear War", NAPSNet Special Reports, Nautilus Institute for
Security and Sustainability, January 18, 2018, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-specialreports/non-state-terrorism-and-inadvertent-nuclear-war/
Are non-state actors motivated and able to attempt nuclear terrorism? A diverse set of non-state
actors have engaged in terrorist activities—for which there is no simple or consensual
definition. In 2011, there were more than 6,900 known extremist, terrorist and other organizations
associated with guerrilla warfare, political violence, protest, organized crime and cyber-crime. Of
these, about 120 terrorist and extremist groups had been blacklisted by the United Nations, the
European Union and six major countries.[6] Some have argued that the technical,
organizational, and funding demanded for a successful nuclear attack, especially involving
nuclear weapons, exceeds the capacity of most of the non-state actors with terrorist proclivities.
Unfortunately, this assertion is not true, especially at lower levels of impact as shown in Figure
1; but even at the highest levels of obtaining authentic nuclear weapons capabilities, a small
number of non-state actors already exhibit the motivation and possible capacity to become
nuclear-armed.
Ellingsen sug gests a useful distinctio n that n uclear terrorists may be impelled by two divergent motivations, as shown in Fig ure 2, creating “opportunistic” and “patient” profiles.[7] The requirements for an opportunis t non-s tate nuclear terrorist tend towards immediate use and the search for short-term pay offs with only tactical levels of commitment; whereas the patient non-s tate nuclear terrorist is able and w illing to sustain a long-term acquisitio n effort to deal a strategic blow to an adversary in a manner that could be achieved only with nuclear weapons. Figure 2: Oppor tunis t versus strategic nuclear terrorist motivation In turn, many factors will drive how a potential nuclear terrorist non-state organ ization that obtain s nucle ar weapons or materials may seek to employ them, especially in its nuclear command-and-control orientations. Blair and Ac kerman suggest that the goals,
condition s, and capacity limitation s that s hape a possib le nuclear terrorist’s posture lead logically to three ty pes of nuclear terrorist nuclear command-and-control postures, v iz: pre-determined (in which the leadership send s a fire order to a nuclear-armed subordinate and no change is entertained and no capacity to effect change is established in the field , that is, the order is f ire-and-forget); assertive (in which only the central command can issue a nuclear fire order, central control is maintained at all times, with resulting demanding communications sy stems to s upport such control); a nd delegative (in wh ich lo wer level commanders control nuclear weapons and have pre-delegated authority to use them in defined circumstances, for example, evidence of nuclear explosions combined w ith loss-of-connectivity with their central command).[8] An example of such delegative control sy stem was the November 26, 2008 attack on Mumbai that used soc ial media reporting to enable the attacking terrorists to respon d to d istant controller direction and to adapt to coun ter-terrorist
attacks—a connectivity tactic that the authorities were too slow to s hut dow n before may hem was achieved.[9] Logically , one might expect nuclear terrorists oriented toward sh ort-term, tactical goals to employ pre-determined nuclear command-and-control strategies in the hope that the speed of attac k and minimum field communications avoids discovery and interdiction before the attack is complete; whereas nuclear terrorists oriented toward long-term, strategic goals mig ht employ more pre-delegative command-and-control sy stems that would s upport a bargaining use and therefore a field capacity to deploy nuclear weapons or materials that can calibrate actual attack based on communications w ith the central leadership with the ris k of interdiction throu gh surveillance and counter-attack. These d iffering strategic motivations, timelines, and s trategies in many respects invert those of nuclear weapons states th at re ly on large organizations, procedures, and technical controls, to ensure that nuclear weapons are never used without legitimate authorization ; and if they are
used, to minimize needless civilian casualties (at least some nuclear armed states aspire to this ou tcome). The repertoire of state-based practices that presents other states with credible nuclear threat and reassures them that nuclear weapons are secure and controlled is likely to be completely mismatched with the strength s and strategies of non-state nuclear terrorists that may seek to maximize civilian terror, are not alway s concerned about their own survival or even that of their families and communities-of-origin, and may be willing to ta ke extraordinary risk combined with creativity to exploit the opportu nities for attack presented by nuclear weapons, umbrella, and non-nuclear states, or their private adversaries. For non-state actors to succeed at complex engineering project such as acquiring a nuclear weapons or nuclear threat capacity demands substantial effort. Gary Ackerman specifies that to have a chance of succeeding, non-state actors with nuclear weapons aspiratio ns m ust be able to demonstrate that they control substantial resources, have a safe haven in which
to conduct research and development, have their own or procured expertise, are able to learn from failing and have the stamina and strategic commitment to do s o, and manifest lon g-term planning and ability to make ratio nal choices on decadal timelines. He identified five s uch vio lent non-s tate actors who already conducted such engineering projects (see Figure 3), and also n oted the importan t facilitating condition of a global networ k of expertize and hardware. Thus, although the s kill, financial, and materiel requirements of a non-state nuclear weapons project present a high bar, they are certainly reachable. Figure 3: Complex engineering projects by five violent non-state actors & Khan networ k A long s imilar lines, James Forest examined the extent to which non-s tate actors can pose a threat of nuclear terrorism.[10] He notes that such entities face practical constraints, including expense, the ob stacles to s tealing many essential elements for nuclear weapons, the ris k of d iscovery , and the difficulties of con structing and concealing such weapons. He also recognizes the
only a few nonstate actors such as Al Qaeda and Islamic State have exhibited such underlying stamina and
organizational capacities and actually attempted to obtain nuclear weapons-related skills,
hardware, and materials, the past is not prologue
strategic constraints that wor k again st ob taining nuclear weapons, includ ing a cost-benefit analy sis, p ossible de-legitimatio n that migh t follow from perceived genocidal intent or use, and the primacy of political-ideological o bjectives over long-term projects that might lead to the group ’s elimination, the av ailability of cheaper and more effective alternatives that would be foregone by pursuit of nuclear weapons, and the ris k of failure and/or discovery before successful ac quisition and use occurs. In the pas t, almost all —but not all—non-s tate terrorist group s appeared to be restrained by a combination of high practical and strategic constraints, plus their own cos t-benefit analy sis of the opp ortunity costs of pursuing nuclear weapons. However, shou ld some or all of these cons traints diminis h, a rapid non-s tate nuclear proliferation is p ossible. Although
. An incredibly diverse set of variously motivated terroris t groups exist already , including p olitico-ideolog ical, apocaly ptic-millenarian, politico-religious, nationalist-separatis t, ecological, and p olitical-insurgency entities, s ome of which converge with criminal-military and criminal-scientist (profit based) netw orks; bu t also py scho-patho logical mass killin g cults, lone wolves, and ephemeral copy -cat non-state actors. The social, economic, and deculturating condition s that generate such entities are likely to persis t and even
expand. In particular, rapidly growing coastal mega-cities as part of rapid global urbanization offer such actors the ability to sustain themselves as “flow gate keepers,” possib ly in alliance with global criminal networ ks, thereby supplanting the h ighland origin s of many of today ’s non-state violen t actors with global reach.[11] Other contributing factors contributin g to the supp ly of possib le non-state actors see king nuclear weapons include new entries s uch as city states in search of new security strategies, megacities creating their own transnationally active security forces, non-states with partial or complete territorial control such as Taiwan and variou s micro-states, failing states, prov inces in d issociating, failing sta tes that fall v ictim to internal chaos and the d isplacement effects of untrammeled globaliza tion, and altogether failed states resu ltin g in u ngoverned spaces. To th is must be added domestic terrorist entities in the advanced industr ial states as they hollow ou t the ir economies due to economic globalization and restructuring, adjust to cross-border migration, and
adapt to cultural and political dis location. In short, the prognos is is for the fifth tier of non-state actors to beset the o ther four tiers with inten se turbulence just as waves on a beach swirl around sandcastles, washing away their foundations, causing grains of sand to cascade, and eventually collapsin g the who le structure. Observed non-state nuclear threats and attac ks In ligh t of the cons traints faced by non-state terrorist actors in past decades, it is not surpris ing that the constellation of actual nuclear terrorist attacks and threats has been relatively limited during and since the end of the Cold War. As Martha Cren shaw noted in a comment on the dra ft of th is paper: We still do n’t know w hy terrorists (in the sense of n on-state actors) have not moved in to the CBRN [chemical,biolog ical, radiolog ical or nuclear ] domain. (Many people thin k bio security is more critical, for that matter.) Such a move would be extremely ris ky for the terrorist actor, even if the group pos sessed both capability (resources, secure space, time, patience ) and motivation (willing ness to expen d the
effort, considering opportunity costs). So far it appears that “conventional” terrorism serves their purposes well enough. Mos t of what we have seen is rhetoric, w ith s ome scattered and not alway s energetic initiatives.[12] No netheless, those that have occurred demonstrate unambiguously that such threats a nd attacks are not merely hy pothetical, in sp ite of the limiting con ditions o utlined above. One survey documented eighty actual, planned attacks on nuclear facilities con taining nuclear materials between 1961-2016[13] as follow s: 80 attacks in 3 waves (1970s armed assaults, 1 990s thefts, pos t-2010, breaches) High threat attac ks: 32 /80 attacks posed su bstantial, verified threat of which 4 4 percent involved ins iders. All ty pes of targets were found in the data set —on reactors, other nuclear facilities, military bases leading Gary Ackerman and to conclude: “Overall, empirical evidence suggests that there are sufficient cases in each of the listed categories that no ty pe of threat can be ignored.”[14] No region was immune; no y ear was without such a threat or attack. Thus,
there is a likely to be a coincidence of future non-state threats and attacks with inter-state nuclear-prone conflicts, as in the past, and pos sibly more so given the current trend in and the generative condition s for global terrorist activity that will likely pertain in the com ing decades. Of these attacks , about a qu arter each were ethno-nationalist, secular uto pian, or un known in motivation; and the remaining quarter were a motley mix of religious (11 percent), “other” (5 percent), personal-idiosy ncratic (4 percent), single issue (2 percent) and state spon sored (1 percent) in motivation. The conclus ion is unavoidable that there a non-state nuclear terrorist attack in the Northeast Asia region is po ssib le. The follow ing sections ou tline the poss ible s ituations in which nuclear terrorist attac ks migh t be implicated as a trig ger to in terstate conflict, and even nuclear war. Particular attention is paid to the how n uclear command, control and communications sy stems may play an independent and unanticipated role in leadin g to inadvertent nuclear war, separate to the contributors to
inadvertency normally included such as degradation of decision-making due to time and other pressures; accident; “wetware” (human failures), software or hardware failures; and misinterpretation of intended or unin tended signals from an adversary . Regional pathway s to in terstate nuclear war At least five distinct nuclear -prone axes of conflict are evident in Northeast A sia. These are: US-DPRK conflict (includ ing with United States, US allies Japan, Sou th Korea and Australia; and all other UNC command allies. Many permutations poss ible ranging from non-violent co llapse to implosio n and civil war, inte r-Korean war, slow humanitarian crisis. Of these implos ion-civil war in the DPRK may be the most dangerous, followed closely by an altercation at the Joint Security Area at Panmunjon where US, ROK, and DPRK so ldiers interact constantly . Ch ina-Taiwan conflict, whereby China may use nuclear weapons to o vercome US forces operating in the West Pacific, either at sea, or based on US (Guam, Alas ka) or US allied territory in the ROK, Japan, the Philip pines,
or Australia); or US uses nuclear weapons in respo nse to Chinese attac k on Taiwan. Ch ina-Japan conflict escalates via attac ks on early warning sy stems, for example, underwater hy drophone sy stems (Ay son-Ball, 2011). China-Russ ia conflict, po ssib ly in context of loss-of-control of Chinese nuclear forces in a regional conflict involving Taiwan or North Korea. Rus sia-US conflict, inv olving horizon tal escalation from a head-on collision with Russian n uclear forces in Europe or the Midd le East; or somehow starts at sea (mostly likely seems ASW) or ove r North Korea (some have cited risk of U S miss ile defenses against North Korean attack as ris king Rus sian immediate response) . Combinations of or s imultaneous eruption of the above conflicts that culminate in n uclear war are also possible. Other unanticipated nuclear-prone conflict axes (such as Ru ssia-Japan) could als o emerge with little warning. Precursors of such nuclear -laden conflicts in this region also ex ist that could lead states to the brin k of nuclear war and demonstrate that nuclear war is all too p ossible
between states in th is region . Examples include the August 1958 Q uemoy -Matsu crisis, in wh ich the United Sta tes deploy ed nuclear weapons to Taiwan, and the U S Air Force has only a nuclear defense strategy in place to defend Taiwan should Ch ina have escalated its shelling campaign to an actual attack; the October 1962 Cuban Miss ile Crisis, w hen a US nuclear armed missile was nearly fired from Okinawa due to a false fire order; the March 1969 Chinese- Soviet military clash and resulting con sideration of n uclear attacks by both sides; and the Augu st 19 76 pop lar tree crisis at Panmunjon in Korea, when the United States moved nuclear weapons bac k to the DMZ and the White Hou se issued pre-delegated orders to the US commander in Korea to attack North Korea if the tree cutting tas k force was attacked by North Kore an forces. Loss-of-control of Nuclear Weapons As is well know n, nuclear armed states must routinely —and in the midst of a crisis—ensure that their nuclear weapons are never used without legitimate authority , but also ens ure at the same time
that they are alway s available for immediate use with legitimate authority . This “alway s-never” paradox is managed in part by a set of negative and positive contro ls, reliant upon procedural and technical measures, to maintain legitimate state-based command-and-control (see Figure Four). Figure Four: Co ntrols and Measures on Nuclear Weapons Use Source: Virginia Tech Applied Research Corporation, N uclear Command, Control, and Stab ility Framework, December 29, 2016, at: http s://calhoun.np s.edu/b itstream/handle/109 45/48 707/Nuclear%20Command%20Control%2 0and%20 Stability %20Assessment_Final%20r eport_29Dec15%20rev2. pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y In this framework, Jerry Conley has produced a taxonomy of nuclear command-and-control structures that embody vary ing notional national “command-and-control” orientations (also referred to as stability poin ts or biases). Each nucle ar armed state exhibits a d istinct preference for technical and procedural measures to achieve negative and positive control of nuclear weapons. The way that a
state constructs its con trol sy stem varies depending on its size, wealth, technolo gy , leadership, and strategic orientation, lend ing each state a uniq ue use propensity affected by the information processing and transmiss ion functions of the nuclear command-and-control sy stem, that in part determines the use or non-use decision s made by the leaders of nuclear armed states. The resultin g ideal nuclear command-and-control state structures are shown in Table 1. Table 1: Ideal Nuclear command-and-control structures Wealthy A nuclear program that has economic resources to research, expand, and bolster itself with bo th experienced people and technical inn ovation s. Poor A nuclear program that does not have s ufficient economic resources to properly research, expand, and bolster itse lf and relies on procedures ins tead of technology and experience. Complex A nuclear program that has the material resources and personnel to su pport a wide range of controls and redundancies. Simple A nuclear program that has minimal material resources or personnel to adequately support
a robust and redundant C2 s tructure. Centralized A nuclear program that maintains author ity and control of its nuclear armament as a singular capability throug h a defined chain of command. Decentralized A nuclear program that distributes au thority of its nuclear armament to a ne twork of commanders or individuals who o perate as independent decision makers with minimal oversight. Civilian A nuclear program that is governed by an elected, non-military government that maintains authority and control over the nuclear arsenal through a defined chain of authority . Military A nuclear program that is governed by a weak civilian g overnment and/or the military maintains control and au thority over the nuclear arsenal. Source: Virgin ia Tech Applied Research Corporation, N uclear Command, Control, and Stab ility Framework, December 29, 2016, at: http s://calhoun.np s.edu/b itstream/handle/109 45/48 707/Nuclear %20Command%20Contro l% 20and%20 Stability %20Asses sment_Fina l%20report_29Dec15%20rev2.pdf ?sequence=1&isAllowed=y These ideal ty pes are
summarized with respect to the defin ing axes of contro l measure in Figure Five. Figure Five: State nuclear weapons control b iases by NC3 ty pe Note: according to dominant characteristic shown in orange circle; also, real states may exhibit more than one characteristic Source: Virginia Tech Applied Research Corporation, Nuclear Command, Con trol, and Stability Framework, December 29, 2016, at: h ttps ://calho un.nps .edu/bitstream/handle/1094 5/487 07/Nuclear%20Command%20Co ntrol%20and% 20Stability %20Assessment_Final%20report_2 9Dec 15%20rev2.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y In Northeast Asia, a four-way nuclear threat sy stem exists that has a three world-class nuclear armed states, the United States, Russia and China, interacting with a fourth tier, barely nuclear armed state, the DPRK. In this q uadrilateral nuclear standoff, the DPRK ’s s imple NC3 sy stem likely is an amalgam of a poorly resourced, militarized, and per sonalized leadership—wh ich may lead it to oscillate between procedural and technical measures as the basis of con trol, with a
primary emphasis on positive use control, not negative control to avoid u nauthorized use. China ’s large, centralized NC3 sy stem co-mingles nuclear and conventional communications between natio nal commanders and deploy ed nuclear forces and may emphasize negative more than positive use controls to ensure Party control. Rus sia’s hig hly centralized, complex NC3 sy stem relies on legacy tec hnology and limited economic base for modernization. I t too may be more oriented towards negative controls in peacetime, but have the capacity to spring almost in stantly to primary reliance on positive contro ls in times of crisis or tensio n. The US NC3 sy stem is large, complex and based on wealth and technological prowess. It is un der civilian, not military control, at least in principle and in peacetime, and is redundant, diverse, and relatively resilient. Non-s tate nuclear attack as trigger of inter-state nuclear war in Northeast Asia The critical issue is how a nuclear terrorist attac k may “cataly ze” inter -state nuclear war, especially the NC3 sy stems that inform and partly
determine how leaders respond to nuclear threat. Current condition s in Northeast Asia su ggest that multip le precursory conditions for nuclear terrorism already exist or exist in nascent form. In Japan, for example, low-level, individual, terroristic violence with nuclear materials, against nuclear facilities, is r eal. In all countries of the regio n, the ris k of diversio n of nuclear material is real, although the ris k is like ly higher due to volume and laxity of security in some countries of the region than in o thers. In all coun tries, the ris k of an ins ider “sleeper” threat is real in security and nuclear agencies, and such inside rs already operated in actual terrorist organizations. Insider corruption is als o observable in nuclear fuel cy cle agencies in all countries of the region. The threat of extortion to ind uce insider cooperation is also real in all countr ies. The pos sibility of a cult attemptin g to b uild and buy nuclear weapons is real and has already occurred in the region.[15] Cy ber-terrorism against nuclear reactors is real and such attacks have already taken place in South K orea (although it
remains difficult to attribute the so urce of the attacks w ith certainty ). The stand-off ballistic and drone threat to nuclear weapons and fuel cy cle facilities is real in the region, including from non-s tate actors, some of whom have already adopted and used such technolo gy almost instantly from when it becomes accessible (for example, drones).[16] Two other broad risk factors are also present in the region. The s ocial and political cond itio ns for extreme ethnic and xenophobic nationalism are emerging in Ch ina, Korea, Japan, and Rus sia. Although there has been no ris k of attac k on or los s of control over nuclear wea pons since their removal from Japan in 1972 and from South Korea in 1991, this ris k con tinues to exis t in North Korea, China, and Rus sia, and to the extent that they are deploy ed on aircraft and ships of these and other nuclear weapons states (inclu ding submarines) deploy ed in the region ’s h igh seas, also outs ide their territorial borders. The most conducive circumstance for cataly sis to occur due to a nuclear terrorist attac k might involve the follow ing nexi of
timing and condition s: Low-level, tactical, or random indiv idual terroris t attac ks for whatever reasons, even assassination of national leaders, up to and inclu ding d irty radiological bomb attac ks, that overlap with in ter-state crisis dy namics in way s that affect state decisions to threaten with or to use nuclear weapons. This migh t be underta ken by an opportun ist n uclear terrorist entity in search of rapid and high political im pact. Attac ks o n major national or international events in each country to maximize terror and to de-legitimate national leaders and whole g overnments. In Japan, for example, more than ten heads of state and senior minis terial international meetings are held each y ear. For the strategic nuclear terrorist, patien tly acquiring higher level n uclear threat capabilities for such attacks and then s taging them to maximum effect could accrue strategic gains. Attacks or threatened attacks, includ ing deceptio n and disgu ised attac ks, w ill have maximum leverage when nuclear-armed states are near or on the brink of war or during a national crisis (such as Fu ku shima),
when intelligence agencies, national leaders, facility operators, surveillance and policing agencies, and firs t responders are already maximally committed and over-extended. At th is point, we no te an important caveat to the orig inal concept of cataly tic nuclear war as it might pertain to nuclear terrorist threats or attacks . Alth ough an attack migh t be dis guised s o that it is attribu ted to a nuclear-armed state, or a ruse might be undertaken to threaten such attac ks by deception, in reality a cataly tic strike by a nuclear weapons state in conditions of mutual vulnerability to nuclear retaliation for s uch a strike from other nuclear armed states would be h ighly irrational. According ly , the effect of nuclear terrorism involvin g a nuc lear detonation or major radiological release may not of itself be cataly tic of nuclear war—at least not in tentionally –because it will n ot lead directly to the destruction of a targeted nuclear -armed state. Rather, it may be cataly tic of non-nuclear war between states, especially if the non-state actor turns out to be alig ned with or spons ored by a state (in many
Japanese minds, the natural candidate for the perpetrator of such an attac k is the pro-North Korean General Association of Korean Residents, often called Chosen Soren, which represents many of the otherwise stateless Koreans who were born and live in Japan) and a further seque nce of coincident events is necessary to drive escalation to the point of nuclear first u se by a state. Also, the cataly st—the n on-state actor–is almos t assured of discovery and destruction either during the attac k itself (if it ta kes the form of a nuclear suicide attack then self-immolation is ass ured) or as a result of a search-and-destroy campaign from the targeted state (unless the targeted government is annihilated by the in itial terrorist nuclear attack). It fo llows that the effects of a non-state nuclear attack may be characterized better as a trigger effect, bringing abou t a cascade of nuclear use decisions with in NC3 sy stems that shif t each state increasingly away from nuclear non-use and increasingly towards nuclear use by releasing negative controls and enhancing positive controls in multiple
action-reaction escalation spirals (depending on h ow many nuclear armed states are party to an inter-state conflict that is already underway at the time of the non-state nuclear attack); and/or by inducing concatenating nuclear attacks across geographically proximate nuclear weapons force s of states already caught in the crossfire of nuclear threat or attac ks of their ow n makin g before a nuclear terrorist attack.[17] An example of a cascading effect would be a non-state attack on a key node of lin ked early warning sy stems that is un ique to and critical for strategic nuclear forces to be em ploy able, or the effect of multiple, coinciden t and erroneous sensor alerts of incoming attac ks (as occurred during the Cuban Miss ile Crisis w ith radar in Florida monitoring Sovie t missiles in Cuba that mis ta kenly fused an erroneous reading of a missile trajectory with a real observation of a So viet satellite that happened to be pas sin g overhead). An example of a concatenating e ffect would an attack that leads a nuclear weapons state to target two other states forces because it cannot
determine whose forces attacked its own. This circumstance might arise if key anti-submarine forces or an aircraft carrier battle group were attacked and it was imposs ible to determine in a given waterway or area of ocean whose submarines were present or responsible for the attac k, leading the attac ked sta te to destroy all the su bmarines presenting on-go ing threat to its strategic forces. As we noted above, a terrorist nuclear shoc k may take various forms and appear in diffe rent places. Ever since an extortion attempt in Bo ston in 197 4 based on the threat of nuclear detonation, the threat of an improvised n uclear device has been credible. For such a threat to be credible, a non-state terrorist entity must release a plausible precursor such as nuclear material or warhead design information, or stage an actual demonstratio n attac k that ma kes it plausib le that the attacker controls a sign ificant quantity of fissile material (most likely pluto nium, or simply radioactive materials suitab le for a radiological device that migh t be used to draw in first respo nders and then detonate a
warhead to maximize damage and terror). Such an attack migh t be combined with a separate attack on critical infrastructure such as a cy berattack. The attacker might retain sufficient material for bargaining and insurance shou ld the initial attac k fail. Given the need to adapt to circumstances, such an attacker is likely to be patient and strategic, in the terms defined earlier, and to have extensive organizational and communication capacities; and to be a ble to o perate at multiple targeted sites, pos sibly in multiple coun tries. Given its patience and stamina, such an attacker wou ld select a hig hly sy mbolic target such as a high level meeting. Such a case would present the targeted state with an exquis ite di lemma: bargaining and negotiation with the non- state actor threatening such an attack may be justified given the explicit and p lausible nature of the threat, which may be politically impossib le while making coun ter-terrorism operations very risky and only possib le with ex treme caution. And, such an attac ker might well issue a false statement about s tate-sponsors hip to
invo ke th ird parties in way s that vas tly complicate the response to the threat. If the attacker is less capable and driven for immediate political or other returns, then it may be satisfied with h ighly delegated delivery with no recall op tion, and no use of communications to minimize the ris k of d iscovery or interdiction. Such an attac ker is also less likely to wait for the circumstances in whic h inter-state nuclear war is more likely due to inter-state tens ion; and also les s likely to seek third party effects bey ond the damage to the immediate target and resulting terror. Sh ould surveillance ind icate that an improvised n u clear device is in motion, t hen an all-out search to interdict the attackers and to retrieve the device or materials would likely ensue. In these two in stances of c redible threat of non-state n uclear attack, the insider versus o uts ider perpetrator factor will affect significantly how the attac k affects possible inter-state conflicts. In Kobe ’s terms, if the perpetrator is confirmed to be an ou tsider, then a country -of-origin suspicion matrix may cast suspicio n onto another state
as possib le spons or. For an attac k threatened in Ch ina, the lin kage might be bac k to Russ ia, the United States, or North K orea. For an attack threatened in Russia, the lin kage migh t be back to the Un ited States, China, or North Korea. For an attac k threatened in North Korea, the lin kage migh t be back to the United States, China, or Russia. A nd for an attack threatened in one of the umbrella s tates in the region, South K orea and Japan, such an attack mig ht be lin ked to each other, as well as to China, North Korea, or Russ ia. In each case, the shadow of suspicion and po ssib le accusations could tilt decisio n-makin g processes in one or more of these states and way s that could worsen pre-existing views abou t the nuclear use propensity of an opposin g nuclear armed state. Should an actual n uclear attack occur, the situation is even more complex and problematic. Such an attac k might be p urely accidental, due to hardware, software, or human err or while nuclear materials or weapons are in transit. In principle, th is limits the site of s uch an event to the nuclear weapons states or
their ships and aircraft as neither South Korea nor Japan host n uclear weapons today . If an insider is inv olved, then the perpetrator may be identified quickly , and whether there is a lin kage with another state may become evident (depending on n uclear forensics as well as ins ight o btained from surviving atta ckers). If an outsider is the perpetrator, then the susp icion ma trix will come into play again, with poss ibly severe effects on inter-state tens ion due to accusation, su spicio n, and fear of follow-on attac ks. During the attac k, especially if it is a hos tage-taking ty pe of attack, the identity of the perpetrator may be un known or ambiguou s, and maintaining th is ambiguity or even opacity as to the attacker may be deliberate—as was the case with the 2008 Mumbai attack in which the controller tried to ensure that all the attac kers were killed in the course of the twelve separate but coordinated attac ks across the city over four day s. Although much progress has been made in establishing local nuclear forensics capability in Japan,[18] China, and Sou th Korea, there is no certainty
that it is sufficiently developed to iden tify the perpetrator of an act of nuclear terrorism, especially if there is a state sponsor and deceptio n invo lved. Conclus ion We now move to o ur conclusio n. Nuclear-armed states can place themselves on the edge of nuclear war by a combination of threatening force deploy ments and threat rhe toric. Statements by US and North Korea’s leaders and sup porting amplification by state and private m edia to present just such a lethal combination. Many observers have observed that the ris k of war and nuclear war, in Korea a nd globally , have increased in the last few y ears—although no-one can say with authority by how much and exactly for what reasons. However, states are restrained in their actual decisions to escalate to conflict an d/or nuclear war by conventional deterrenc e, vital national interests, and o ther ins titu tional and political restraints , both domestic and in ternational. It is not easy , in the real world, or even in fiction, to start nuclear wars.[19] Rhetorical threats are standard fare in realist and constructivist accounts of interstate nuclear deterrence, compellence, and reassurance, and are not cause for alarm per se. States will manage the risk in each of the threat relations hips w ith other nuclear armed states to stay back from the brin k, let alo ne go over it, as they have in the past. Th is argument was powerful and to many , persuasive during the Co ld War although it d oes not deny the hair-raising ris ks taken by nuclear armed states during th is period. T oday , the multi-polarity of nine nuclear weapons states interacting in a four-tiered nuclear threat sy stem means that the practice of sustainin g nuclear threat and preparing for nuclea r war is no longer merely complicated, but is now enormously complex in way s that may exceed the capacity of some and perhaps all states to manage, even without the emergence of a fifth tier of non-state actors to add further un predictability to how th is sy stem works in practice. The pos sibility that n on-state actors may attack withou t advance warning as to the time, place, and angle of attack presents another lay er of uncertainty to this complexity as to how inter-
an event coincides with
already high levels of tension and even military collisions between the non-nuclear forces of
nuclear armed states, then a non-state nuclear terrorist attack could impel a nuclear armed
state to escalate its threat or even military actions against other states, in the belief that this
targeted state may have sponsored the non-state attack, or was simply the source of the
attack, whatever the declared identity of the attacking non-state entity. This outcome could
trigger these states to go onto one or more of the pathways to inadvertent nuclear war,
especially if the terrorist attack was on a high value and high risk nuclear facility or involved the
seizure and/or use of fissile material. Some experts dismiss this possibility as so remote as to be
not worth worrying about. Yet the history of nuclear terrorism globally and in the Northeast
Asian region suggests otherwise. Using the sand castle metaphor, once built on the high tide
line, sand castles may withstand the wind but eventually succumb to the tide once it reaches
the castle—at least once, usually twice a day. Also, theories of organizational and technological
failure point to the coincidence of multiple, relatively insignificant driving events that interact
or accumulate in ways that lead the “metasystem” to fail, even if each individual component of
a system works perfectly. Thus, the potential catalytic effect of a nuclear terrorist incident is not
that it would of itself lead to a sudden inter-state nuclear war; but that at a time of crisis when
alert levels are already high, when control systems on nuclear forces have already shifted from
primary emphasis on negative to positive control, when decision making is already stressed,
state nuclear war may break out. T hat is, non-state actors with nuclear weapons or threat goals and capacities do no t see k the same goals, will no t use the same control sy stems, and will use radically different organizatio nal procedures and sy stems to deliver on their threats compared with nucle ar armed states. If used tactically for immediate terrorist effect, a non-state nuclear terrorist could violen tly attack nuc lear facilities, exploiting any number of vulnerabilities in fuel cy cle fac ility security , or use actual nuclear materials and even warheads against military or civilian targets. If a persistent, strategically oriented nuclear terrorist succeed in gainin g cre dible nuclear threat capacities, it might ta ke hostage one or more states or cities. If such
when the potential for miscalculation is already high due to shows of force indicating that firstuse is nigh, when rhetorical threats promising annihilation on the one hand, or collapse of morale
and weakness on the other invite counter-vailing threats by nuclear adversaries or their allies to
gain the upper hand in the “contest of resolve,” and when organizational cybernetics may be in
play such that purposeful actions are implemented differently than intended, then a terrorist
nuclear attack may shift a coincident combination of some or all of these factors to a threshold
level where they collectively lead to a first-use decision by one or more nuclear-armed states. If
the terrorist attack is timed or happens to coincide with high levels of inter-state tension
involving nuclear-armed states, then some or all of these tendencies will likely be in play
anyway—precisely the concern of those who posit pathways to inadvertent nuclear war as
outlined in section 2 above. The critical question is, just as a catalyst breaks some bonds and lets
other bonds form, reducing the energy cost and time taken to achieve a chemical reaction, how
would a nuclear terrorist attack at time of nuclear charged inter-state tension potentially shift the
way that nuclear threat is projected and perceived in a four or five-way nuclear-prone conflict,
and how might it affect the potential pathways to inadvertent nuclear war in such a system? Such
a pervasive incremental effect is shown in Figure 6 below. Figure 6: Impact of a Terrorist Nuclear
Threat or Attack on Interstate Nuclear Use Control Any one or indeed all of these starting nuclear
control profiles may be disputed, as might the control profile at the end of the response arrow. (In
Figure 6, each nuclear state responds to a terrorist nuclear attack by loosening or abandoning
negative controls against unauthorized use, and shifts towards reliance mostly on positive
procedural controls biased towards use). But each nuclear armed state will make its moves in
response to the posited terrorist nuclear attack partly in response to its expectations as to how
other nuclear armed states will perceive and respond to these moves, as well as their perception
that an enemy state may have sponsored a terrorist nuclear attack—and considered together, it is
obvious that they may not share a common image of the other states’ motivations and actions in
this response, leading to cumulative potential for misinterpretation and rapid subsequent action,
reaction, and escalation. It is also conceivable—although intuitively it would seem far less likely–
that a terrorist nuclear attack at such a conjuncture of partly or fully mobilized nuclear armed
states might induce one or more of them to stand down, slow down its decision making or
deployments, establish new communication channels with potential nuclear enemy states, and
even make common cause to hunt down and eliminate the non-state nuclear terrorist entity, or
coordinate operations to respond to the threat of a second terrorist nuclear attack—the credibility
of which would be high in the aftermath of a successful initial non-state nuclear attack. As Robert
Ayson concluded: In considering the ways in which a terrorist nuclear attack could (wittingly
or unwittingly) spark off a wider nuclear exchange government leaders are entitled to be just as
worried about their own actions—how they would respond to a terrorist nuclear attack and
how that response might get very catastrophically out of control—as about the terrorist act per
se. If so, states need to do more than consider the best ways to prevent terrorists from acquiring,
deploying and then detonating a nuclear weapon. They also need to think about how they can
control themselves in the event of a nuclear terrorist attack (even if some might suggest this
risks handing the terrorist a premature and unnecessary victory by giving them indirect influence
over the choices states make).[20]
2AC — AT — Not key to O-Crime
It’s especially used to fund organizations that destabilize countries
Allred 05 — Captain Keith J. Allred, a Senior Military Judge in the Judge Advocate General's
Corps, US Navy, the Faculty of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in
Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany, 2005, Last Cited, “Combating Human Trafficking,” NATO
Review, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/Invokation-Article5/Combating_human_trafficking/EN/index.htm
It may seem odd for NATO to have decided to make a security issue of what appears to be a
social or police problem, but the initiative reflects a growing awareness that human trafficking
poses a threat to NATO operations, which themselves can create or increase the demand for
trafficked women. Various international organizations have estimated that hundreds of
thousands of victims are trafficked each year. Human trafficking is a significant source of
revenue for criminal organisations whose activities may destabilise legitimate governments and
undermine the NATO mission. Hence, human trafficking should be viewed as a security threat
that merits NATO's attention.
Solvency
2AC — AT — TVPA Doesn’t Exist
Even though the TVPA doesn’t exist T visas are still being handed out —
prefer the newest DHS data
DHS 18 (Department of Homeland Security, “Legal Immigration and Adjustment of Status
Report Fiscal Year 2018, Quarter 1”, DHS:
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/FY2018_Q1_tables_d.xlsx)
--Offcase--
T LPR
2AC — LPR
WM — the plan mandates that it would be legal immigration — if they win
their definition of legal immigration the plan would fiat that the T visas
become permanent and provide a path to citizenship
WM — we provide a direct path to LPR and Citizenship
Gott 5
Lynsay Gott Associate Attorney at Kozoll & Associates Immigration Law PLLC, Senior
Attorney WMR Immigration Law Group, PC, Human Rights USA Acting Executive Director
Human Rights USA, Program Director Human Rights USA, Human Rights USA Staff Attorney
& Equal Justice Works Fellow Human Rights USA, Research Fellow University of Cincinnati
College of Law, (“UNREALISTIC BURDENS: HOW THE T VISA AND ASYLUM LAW
FAIL TO PROTECT MANY VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING”, Immigration and Nationality Law
Review, 2005,
https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/inlr26&div=20&g_sent=1&casa_token=
&collection=journals, Hein Online) EH
One novel aspect of the TVPA is that it allows for temporary legal immigration status for
trafficking victims in two forms: continued presence 4 or the T nonimmigrant visa (T visa). 5
The purpose of continued presence is to aid law enforcement in prosecuting traffickers. A victim
cannot apply for this remedy; rather, a federal law officer must request continued presence from a
local immigration official, but only for a victim who is willing to assist in the investigation and/or
prosecution of the traffickers. If a victim receiving continued presence later ceases to work with
law enforcement her status can be revoked.' 6 Victims who receive continued presence can work
and can receive social services.' 7 Trafficking victims can apply directly for T visas, which
grant legal immigration status for three years, including work authorization as well as the
same benefits given to refugees. After the three years expire, the individual can apply for
adjustment to lawful permanent resident status. 18 While this provision seems incredibly
helpful, achieving T nonimmigrant status involves meeting significant requirements designed to
limit its applicability. To be eligible for a T visa, an applicant must be a victim of a "severe"
form of trafficking and physically present in the United States on account of that
trafficking.1 9 Furthermore, an applicant must comply with "any reasonable request for
assistance" from law enforcement if she is over 18 years of age and must show that she would
suffer a heightened form of "extreme hardship" described as "involving unusual and severe
harm.""° T visa allotments are capped at 5,000 people per year,21 a fraction of the number of
people trafficked into the United States annually.
“Legal immigration” includes temporary admission for employment and
residence– the plan does that
Wasem 12 (Ruth Ellen Wasem, Specialist in Immigration Policy, “Overview of Immigration
Issues in the 112th Congress,” 1-12-12)
The scope of legal immigration includes permanent admissions (e.g., employment-based,
familybased immigrants) and temporary admissions (e.g., guest workers, foreign students).
There are some foreign nationals admitted temporarily in a conditional status who may be on a
path to permanent residence. The challenge inherent in reforming the system of legal immigration
is balancing the hopes of employers to increase the supply of legally present foreign workers,
the longings of families to re-unite and live together, and a widely shared wish among the various
stakeholders to improve the policies governing legal immigration into the country.
Prefer our interpretation of the topic:
1.) Aff Flex – temporary worker protections are key to affirmative
ground, H1B & H2A visa affs are central – the neg overlimits - forcing
the aff to be just LPR severely constrains the affirmative – the
temporary counterplan beats all the best affs
2.) Topic education – We access the best literature – employment-based,
residency requirements set a clear limit on the topic and create the best
debates over economy and heg advantages.
Functional limits check – the neg can read international counterplans to take
in refugees, and affs under our interpretation still link to core neg generics
like the midterms and wage disads.
Prefer reasonability — competing interpretations are a bad model for
establishing a topic – creates a race to the bottom, incentivizes moving the
goal posts, and results in substance crowd-out
1AR — CI
“Legal immigration” includes temporary – DHS agrees
Perez 10 (Roberto Perez, “Discrimination of Hispanic’s in America,” 6-4-10,
http://robertorequim.blogspot.com/2010/06/discrimination-of-hispanics-in-america.html)
Though some of these individuals may be native born and assimilated into mainstream society
there is those individuals new to the American Culture, immigrants. According to the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) there were 12,600,000 legal permanent residents with the leading
country of origin being Mexico with 3,390,000 legal residents. The D.H.S. defines legal
immigration as “all people who were granted lawful permanent residence; granted asylee status;
admitted as refuges; or admitted as non-immigrants for a temporary stay in the United States”
(DHS Office of Immigration, 2009). Then there are those who enter the US illegally, or as we
know them as “illegal’s”. The D.H.S. reported 791,568 apprehensions through the Border Patrol
and of those apprehended individuals from Mexico lead the charts (DHS Office of Immigrations
Statistics). Today the immigration topic is a large controversial conversation with both its pros
and cons that is effecting hundreds if not thousands of individuals, families and companies. Some
of the discrimination comes from preconceived notions that illegal’s come from the language gap
and put many Hispanic and non-Hispanics alike at a disadvantage when trying to assimilate. In an
article in the ‘American Journal of Economics and Sociology’ by Jin Haum Park, states that those
immigrants whose English speaking skills are not adequate are put at a earning disadvantage
compared to those who know or are fluent in English.
Aff meets the “legal resident” argument. “Legal immigrant” includes
refugees, asylum, and temporary.
Delahunty & Yoo 13 (Robert J. Delahunty is Associate Professor of Law, University of St.
Thomas School of Law and John C. Yoo, Professor of Law, University of California Berkeley
School of Law, “Dream On: The Obama Administration's Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws,
the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause,” 91 Tex. L. Rev. 781)
Michael Hoefer et al., Office of Immigration Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Estimates
of the Unauthorized Immigration Population Residing in the United States: January 2011, at 4
(2012), available at http://www.dhs.gov/estimates-unauthorized-immigrant-population-residingunited-states-january-2011. An "illegal immigrant" (or "unauthorized resident") is defined as a
foreign-born noncitizen who is not a legal resident. Id. at 2. A legal resident immigrant is
defined to include "all persons who were granted lawful permanent residence; granted asylum;
admitted as refugees; or admitted as nonimmigrants for a temporary stay in the United States
and not required to leave by January 1, 2011." Id.
2AC — Another CI Option
Legal immigration includes adjustment of status — that includes refugees
and asylees, but still limits out visas that don’t grant benefits, employment, or
eventual LPR status
Mulder et, al. 1 (Tammany J., Frederick W. Hollmann, Lisa R. Lollock, Rachel C. Cassidy,
Joseph M. Costanzo, and Josephine D. Baker, from the US Census Bureau website, “U.S. Census
Bureau Measurement of Net International Migration to the United States: 1990 to 2000”, US
Census Bureau:
https://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0051/twps0051.html#legimm)
Legal immigration The sub-component of net international migration, legal
immigration (LPR), refers to non-citizens
who are granted legal permanent residence in the United States by the federal government, or who reside in the
United States and will ultimately be granted this status. Legal permanent residence includes the right to
remain in the country indefinitely, to be gainfully employed, and to seek the benefits of U.S. citizenship
through naturalization. The character of legal immigration is highly dependent on current immigration law. Major revisions of the U.S.
immigration code include the Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965. Under this Act, numerical limitations were
placed on various categories of immigration. Moreover, the Act was groundbreaking in the sense that it defined one class of
immigrants--immediate relatives of U.S. citizens--that was not subject to a numerical limitation. A major overhaul of the Act in 1990
established a special class of immigrants known as "diversity immigrants" who are chosen by lottery from countries that have a history
of being underrepresented among immigrants. Finally, the Act established a set of "preferences," or priorities, among other familysponsored immigrants (besides immediate relatives of citizens) and employment-based immigrants, with an elaborate formula by
which numerical limitations were imposed on the resulting preference groups. Table 3 summarizes the distribution of the major legal
immigrant categories and identifies whether they are subject to numerical limitations. The majority of legal immigrants granted
permanent residence in FY1998 were immediate relatives of U.S. citizens, followed by family sponsorship preference migrants and
employment preference migrants. Legal
immigrants obtain permanent resident status through two separate
mechanisms that do not differ in legal requirements, depending on where they live at the time of application.
The INS accepts the applications for permanent resident status for people living in the United States when they apply. Referred to as
adjustees, this category generally consists of, but is not limited to, nonimmigrants, refugees, asylees (people granted
political asylum), and unauthorized residents. In contrast, the U.S. Department of State (DOS) accepts applications and issues visas
from consular offices abroad to potential immigrants residing outside the United States, which are processed as they enter the United
States. These immigrants are referred to as new arrivals. Consequently, applicants can obtain permanent residence in the United States
with or without changing geographic residence before immigration. In fact, immigrants may be living in the United States for a
number of years while awaiting adjustment to immigrant status. During this time, they are likely to view themselves as U.S. residents,
and are therefore in the.S. population for the purposes of population estimates. As of 1995, the number of adjustees and new arrivals
remained about equal in proportion, with adjustees
generally outnumbering new arrivals each year.
T Substantial
2AC — Substantial
WM — 50,000 people are trafficked each year
Culkin 15 — Laurie Culkin, J.D. from the University of Baltimore in 2016, Current MPH
Candidate at The George Washington University – Milken Institute School of Public Health, The
Women's Law Center of Maryland Legal Intern, Trafficking Victims Post-Conviction Advocacy
Project The Women's Law Center of Maryland, “Student Comment: Exchange Cooperation for
Visas: Flaws in U.S. Immigration System Criminalizes Trafficking Victims,” University of
Baltimore Journal of International Law, Volume 3 Issue 2, Article 5, Page 115,
https://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1031&context=ubjil
PROBLEM
The Palermo Protocol intends to prevent
the criminalization and revictimization of trafficking victims.
prohibits criminalizing victims through it’s
domestic criminal law and immigration law systems, and offers undocumented victims of trafficking
remedies to remain in the U.S. legally. However, in order to access these remedies, undocumented trafficking
victims must cooperate with law enforcement in prosecuting their trafficker, or they will be subject to
removal proceedings back to their country of origin, under a violation of immigration law. The strict
constraints of the T- Visa means many victims will not meet the statutory requirements. Further, those who meet
the statutory requirements still may not satisfy the standards of local law enforcement, failing to
provide whatever assistance is deemed “adequate cooperation” in that particular jurisdiction. Though
Thus, having ratified the Protocol, the U.S. expressly
relief is available to a few victims who manage to jump through the various bureaucratic hoops, many other
undocumented victims are being criminalized by the flaws in the system, and are subject removal proceedings that are
indistinguishable from criminal law proceedings. ANALYSIS The Palermo Protocol and U.S. law calls for the
decriminalization of trafficking victims. To this end, the TVPA established T Visas, which allow
undocumented trafficking victims the opportunity to remain in the U.S. legally for a period, as
long as they aid law enforcement in prosecuting their trafficker. However, there are limited numbers given out
annually, and, as noted above, the visa is drastically underutilized.
In order for an individual to be eligible for a T-Visa, the government must identify the person as a “victim” of a “severe form of trafficking,” and the victim must meet certain statutory requirements. Specifically , individuals must cooperate with law enforcement to prosecute their trafficker in order to be certified as eligib le for relief; however, this certification is at the discretion of the law enforcement
organizatio n inv olved. Victims must also demonstrate that sendin g them back to their coun try of origin would amount to “un usual and severe” harm.67 Even if a victim meets all of the statu tory requirements, the T-Visa is a temporary , non-immigrant visa, which s till leaves her vulnerable to removal proceedings once the visa expires.68 The Criminalization of Immigration Removal Proceedings Removal proceedings are the primary mechanism by which the government expels noncitizens from the U.S., or prevents their ad mission under the Immigration and Naturalization Act. 69 Deportatio n is traditio nally a civil matter; however, for those going throu gh removal proceedings, the experience is often in distingu ishable from traditional criminal proceedings.70 The h istory of expuls ion, the procedural parallels to the criminal justice sy stem, the methods of enforcement, and recent Supreme Court jurisprudence have led scholars to argue that deportation is more akin to criminal proceedings rather than a civil, adminis trative functio n. i. Purpose of Criminal and Immigration
Law Boiled d own to the core, criminal and immigration law serve the same function.71 Both serve to con trol phy sical inclusio n or exclusio n from society in the United States, and create rules that es tablish lesser levels of citizen ship.7 2 Modern American law further intertwines criminal law and immigration law, where noncitizens that have committed past crimes may not be admitted in to the U.S. , immigration law violatio ns themselves are crimes, and many criminal law violations are deportable offenses for lawful permanent residents.73 L oo kin g to the history of deportation, which has its ro ots in banishm ent, sheds light o n the in tent of current law.74 T hroughou t his tory , banishment from one’s community has been used as a punishment for seriou s vio lation s of society ’s mores.75 Un der Englis h common law, banishment was used as a criminal pun ishment imposed on both subjects and foreigners.76 In 1718 , Englis h Parliament enacted the Transportation Act, wh ich allowed criminals to be sentenced to “transportation” out of the Kin gdom for major crimes, and
allocated public fund s to transport the criminals to the Un ited States.77 Criminal transp ortation was the only ty pe of expulsion available, with no civ il expu lsion provis ions.7 8 The Eng lish Model set the precedent for expulsion in the American colonies, which followed suit, and used banishment as a punis h ment imposed for criminal violation s.79 Under President J ohn Adams’ admin istratio n, the United States enacted the Alien and Sedition Acts in 17 98, which allowed for the expulsion of any alien who committed a crime in America after the alien went before a criminal court.80 ii. Proc edural Parallels There are strikin g procedural parallels between criminal law and immigration law enforcement. In both, a judge’s de cis ion in a case directly impacts the subject’s phy sical liberties, either by incarcerating the individual or by forcibly rem oving them from the country .81 An individ ual sus pected of violating immigration law is subject to a hearing in court before a judge , and may be represented by a lawyer; however, in immigration law one will not be prov ided by the
court. In an immigration hearing, the responden t has the op portunity to present witnesses, and in many cases there is also a prosecuting attorney pursuing the rights of the U.S.82 iii. Enforcement Parallels Prior to 2002, the Department of Commerce and Labor handled immigration enf orcement, responsibilities then sh ifted to the Department of Justice, and eventually to the Department of Homeland Security at present.83 This change in departments shifted immigration enforcement towards a more law enforcement like s tructure.84 Immigration law enforcement officers are uniformed, and, like criminal law en forcement officers, are permitted to conduct surveillance, execute warrants, make arrests, and detain those su spected of violating immigration law.85 In 200 1, to aid domestic officers, Immigration and Naturalization Service began to enter civil immigration information in to the Federal Bureau of Investigation database that state po lice frequently use in day -to-day investigations and arrests.8 6 Detention is the immigration law equivalen t to incarceration in criminal
law.87 Noncitizens, includ ing women and children, may be held at detention centers awaitin g their hearing or d uring investigation period s.88 Un documented people in the U.S. may be detained for seven day s without cause,89 and adminis trative rules have been expanded to permit detention for a “reasonable period of time” under extraordinary circumstance.90 The U.S. Supreme Court has dis tingu ished detention from incarceration, say ing that the purpose of deten tion in an immigration contex t is to ensure that the ind ividual facing deportation attends their administrative hearing s, and to guarantee ease of removal from the country .91 Despite this d istinction, noncitizens are often held in the same detention centers as criminals.92 Under U.S. im migration law, there is also mandatory detention of noncitizens for vio lations of certain crimes.93 Prostitution is one of these crimes, and is als o the charge most often given to victims of traffickin g who are being sexually explo ited.94 T he law further allows no ncitizens to be deported if the person has committed prostitution
within ten y ears prior to admission or application for a visa.9 5 There is only one exception that allow s for the victim to be released, and similar to the T-Visa, it also requires the v ictim to cooperate with law enforcement.96 iv. Padilla v. Kentuc ky In 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court issued an op inio n that expr e ssly confirmed what legal scholars have been asserting, that deportation is not strictly a civil, admin istrative actio n. In P adilla v. Ken tuc ky , the Supreme Court acknowledged that deportation is uniquely difficult to class ify , and is not a civ il matter per se, but rather falls somewhere between civil and criminal law.97 The case arose when a man, who had been a lawful permanent r esident of the United States for 4 0 y ears, pled guilty to a felony drug charge under the suggestion of his legal counsel.98 Mr. P adilla’s counsel advised him that because he had been in the U.S. for s o long , he would not be deported fo r pleading guilty .99 However, the guilty plea put his immigration status in jeopardy .100 The Court held that an attorney is obligated to tell a noncit izen client
that pleading guilty to a crime may result in forced removal from the United States.101 Previously , the Su preme Court viewed deportation as a “collateral consequence” of a criminal plea.102 In Padilla, the Supreme Court ac knowledged that deportation is a severe and more direct consequence of pleading guilty , and effectively struck down this notion.10 3 In practice, this h olding had the effect of expanding the protections given to noncitizen s in criminal proceedings. 104 In addition, this hold ing set a new standard for the effectiveness of counsel.105 Legal scholars have interpreted th is decision as the beginn ing of a tidal shift in immigration law jurisprudence. The Court began to recognize that deportation proceedings are quasi criminal in nature,106 and these penalties are serious, often draconian, and lifelong.1 07 b. Implicatio ns of Deportation Uniq ue to Trafficking According to the U. S. Department of State, more than 50,000 people are trafficked in to the U. S. each y ear.108 Although there is immigration relief for non-citizen victims in the Un ited States, enacted
law is only as good as its enforcement.109 Today , T-Visas are drastically underutilized, and victims are slipping throu gh the cracks in the sy stem.110 Th is discrepancy can be attributed to law enforcement’s inab ility to identify victims, and v ictims who are unwilling to report traffic king to authorities for fea r of deportation.111 Traffic king v ictims are more likely than many other kind s of victims to be misiden tified, most often as unauthor ized migrants or as criminals, when in reality they have only committed offenses the trafficker forced them to perform, suc h as prostitu tion or drug smuggling.11 2 Even if in dividuals are identified as victims, they are often still detained if they choose not to cooperate with law enforcement.113 This incarceration is re-traumatizing to victims and reinforces the no tion that society sees them as criminals, thoug h they are not going through criminal proceedings. 114 When deportation is the default response to lack of coo peration with a prosecution or investigation , it means that n o one is assessin g the dangers of returning victims to their
country of origin.115 Th is pu ts the victim at ris k of retaliation and re-trafficking.116 In ad dition, if cooperating with law enforcement is a victim’s on ly option, an d no other meaningful immigration protection s or opportunities are available, it calls the volu ntariness of the victim’s compliance into questio n. 117 C. Comparative Legislation - Italy Internationally , other countries have ac knowledged that restrictive immigration laws in “destination” countries con tribute to the growth of trafficking in persons.118 Those vu lnerable to trafficking are often enticed by the opportun ity for a better life abroad, but have little mea ns to get to that coun try legally , due to stringent immigration laws.11 9 Vulnerable ind ivid uals rely on others to pro vide them with false documents, arrange their travel, and find them employ ment in the receiving country , which often leads to sexual exploitation and labor trafficking.12 0 Italy has been identified as a popu lar destination country in Europe, w ith a high pop ulatio n of “migrants” from other nations relocating to wor k.12 1 Higher levels of
U.S. immigration
law criminalizes victims of human trafficking, and therefore violates the intention of the Palermo Protocol.
migrants frequently means higher levels of trafficking.12 2 To combat human traffickin g, Italy , in conjunction w ith the International Organizatio n for Migration, iden tified frequent migration rou tes and in stituted programs to allow easy and legal immigration optio ns to potential victims of traffickin g.123 Sp ecifically , Italy issues 5,000 w ork visas ann ually to Albanians , ackn owledgin g the Balkan Peninsula as its largest source country for trafficking and smuggling.1 24 Having legal options means potential victims are less likely to rely on traffickers to migrate for better employ ment.125 CONCLU SION a. The U.S. is in Violatio n of the Palermo Protocol
In practice, current
In the Supreme Court case, which made deportation a civil sanction, Justice Brewer famously dissented, saying: But it
needs no citation of authorities to support the proposition that deportation is punishment. Everyone
knows that to be forcibly taken away from home and family
and friends and business and property, and
sent across the ocean
to distant land, is punishment, and that oftentimes most severe and cruel.126 The
States’ implementation of the requirements of the Palermo Protocol.127 The
Palermo Protocol calls for all State Parties to consider adopting laws to permit victims of trafficking to
remain in that territory,128 and that if a State Party returns a victim to their country of origin they do so with
TVPA is the United
“due regard” for the safety of the victim. The Protocol also specifies that the return should “preferably be
voluntary.”129 The TVPA incorporates these ideals in its protection arm, which offers the T-Visa as protection from
involuntary deportation, and aims to ensure victims are not improperly incarcerated, fined or penalized.130 Indeed, the
U.S. acknowledges that trafficking victims should not be detained or penalized for acts associated with
trafficking, and extends this protection to those who violate immigration laws as a result.131 In the 2014 TIP
Report, the theme is “The Journey from Victim to Survivor,” and the introduction reads: Another early step, while
seemingly obvious, is nevertheless one of the greatest challenges to anti-trafficking efforts in general: finding the
victims and getting them out of harm’s way. The strongest victim protection scheme is useless if victims remain
trapped in exploitation. Governments cannot sit back and wait for victims to self-identify; rather, they must proactively
seek victims out by investigating high-risk sectors, screening vulnerable populations, and training relevant government
officials to recognize trafficking when they see it. It is vital that victims not be treated like criminals or be subjected to
arrest or deportation for other offenses.132 T-Visas are the device created by the U.S. to protect victims from being
exposed to immigration
sanctions. Though the stated intention is to protect victims, T-Visas only
offer incentives to those victims who cooperate in prosecution. The immigration law statute governing the
T-Visa requires an individual to comply with “any reasonable request” by law enforcement in
order to qualify.133 By forcing victims to either work with law enforcement to prosecute their trafficker,
or go through removal proceedings, the U.S. is still forcing victims into the hands of law enforcement with
their physical liberty on the line. Victims do not have a choice; they must go through the system one way
or the other. In addition, the small number of visas available annually,134 and the even smaller
number actually issued,135 compared to the 50,000 people trafficked into the U.S. each year,
shows that victims are slipping through the cracks in the system. This leads to disproportionate numbers of
trafficking victims going through deportation proceedings. The Protocol requires that countries “shall” establish
comprehensive measures to protect trafficking victims from revictimization.136 Removal proceedings
criminalize victims, though they are still technically classified as non-criminals, because they are
indistinguishable within the criminal justice system. Although the U.S. argues that deportation is civil and
administrative in nature, we still force victims to go through a quasi-judicial hearing in front of a finder of fact. We also
require that the individual defend him or herself in that hearing, and encourage the victim to seek counsel, who can
examine witnesses and put on evidence on their behalf. The U.S. aims to encourage victims to come forward and
report their traffickers, but we force those who do come forward to make the choice between
cooperation and deportation. Corruption is rampant among police, border police, and other government officials
that handle immigration and law enforcement in source countries with major trafficking problems.137 By forcing
victims in the U.S. to comply to obtain a visa, it reinforces noncitizen victim’s distrust of law enforcement and fear that
they will be deported. In the U.S., Immigration officials look and act the same as criminal law enforcement officials,
and victims may face detention for extended periods of time while awaiting their hearing. Finally, undocumented
victims going through deportation proceedings are likely unfamiliar with the American judicial system. If deportation
proceedings appear so closely related to the criminal justice system to American legal academics that study them, how
could the American government expect a foreign victim of trafficking to tell the difference? b. Switching to a Victim
Centered Approach The U.S. Department of State in the 2014 T.I.P. Report, calls for a victim-centered approach to
anti-trafficking programs, and specifically highlights the importance of victim identification and immigration relief.138
The Protocol protection provisions are silent on the practice of required compliance with law
enforcement, but overall encourage
a compassionate and humanitarian response. Despite claims to the
approach to anti-trafficking, which places prosecution of
traffickers as the first priority.139 Enforcement-dominated anti-trafficking strategies relegate victim
protection to a secondary role rather than a complementary or necessary role.140 Responses that arrest,
contrary, the U.S. follows a prosecutorial
detain and deport vic tims thwart victim identification, and consequently disempower the victim.141 Switching from a
prosecutorial approach to a victim-centered, human-rights approach would be congruent with
the Protocol, would help victims
begin to heal, and would lead to more successful prosecutions
overall.142 Trafficked people require alternatives to systems in which deportation is the default, such as services,
work authorization, and legal immigration status.143 Victim protections are not in conflict with tough law enforcement,
and implementation of proactive identification of victims, funded victims services, and alternatives to detention would
respect the trafficked persons’ human rights and yield better prosecution results.
WM — there are currently only 5,000 T visas allotted the plan drastically
increases that number and allows 50,000 — that’s a 900% increase
Substantial is a significant amount
Lectlaw No Date, “SUBSTANTIAL”, https://www.lectlaw.com/def2/s086.htm
Significant in size or amount as distinguished from some relatively insubstantial, insignificant or
trivial amount
We meet our counter interp — trafficking is a significant part of immigration
policy
Prefer it —
a) Precision — its impossible to determine a numerical value for
substantial
Ken Adams 18, Author at Adam’s drafting, “Substantial” and “Substantially”,
http://www.adamsdrafting.com/substantial-and-substantially/, January 25
How big does something have to be before it
is substantial or can be said to do something substantially? More than 50% of its maximum
potential magnitude? More than 70%?
the subjectivity inherent in vagueness is
compounded by imprecision Maybe substantial and substantially refer to
a
reasonable person in the position of whoever has the benefit would be satisfied
Substantial and substantially exhibit the same problem as aggressively, which I ranted about in this October 2010 AdamsDrafting blog post.
85.42%? I have no idea. So
.
a magnitude that’s close enough to the maximum that
. That may be the case, but I’m not aware that that
meaning is sufficiently accepted that you can take it for granted.
b) Education — they exclude core affs such as refugees, asylum,
trafficking, EB-5s, etc
Prefer reasonability — competing interpretations are a bad model for
establishing a topic – creates a race to the bottom, incentivizes moving the
goal posts, and results in substance crowd-out — Adams says that
reasonability is specifically key in defining substantial
CP – Asylum
2AC — Asylum Fails
CP Fails —
a) Relived violence — the victims that come to the US are still forced to
cooperate
b) Burdens — applying for asylum is extremely hard as its nearly
impossible to create a definition that allows them in
c) Enumerated grounds — due to the number of trafficking victims there
is no way to prove that people are being targeted by race or any of the
other categories
d) UN — the UN definition is extremely vague and doesn’t include
trafficking victims
e) Courts — the courts have ruled that there must be proof and that the
definition must be precise — that limits out trafficking victims
f) State actors — court rulings have said that persecutors must be state
actors and in the case of trafficking its non-state actors
Barbagiannis 17 (Efthimia, Staff Editor, Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative
Law. Candidate for Juris Doctor, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, May 2017; B.A., SUNY
Geneseo, 2014, “NOTE: PROTECTING VICTIMS OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING: CREATING
BETTER RESIDENCY VISAS, 25 Cardozo J. Int'l & Comp. L. 561”, accessed via nexis)
B. Asylum is Not a Viable Option The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
(Refugee Convention) creates an international obligation for states to provide refugees with
asylum. The Refugee Convention defines a refugee as a [*570] person who owing to a wellfounded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his [or her] nationality and is
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself [or herself] of the protection of that
country. 58 It would appear that survivors of human trafficking would be able to evade forced
repatriation to their origin country and the negative consequences of such a return by applying for
asylum. However, asylum has a high bar and is difficult to access due to the nexus requirement
and the requirement of persecutors to be state actors. 59 1. The Nexus Requirement A person who
has a "well-founded fear of persecution" may be denied asylum if they are unable prove that their
fear of persecution comes from one of the five enumerated grounds, "race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group, or political opinion." 60 There are indications that race
or ethnicity may be factors for targeting victims of sex trafficking, but the sheer numbers of
persons who are trafficked for sexual exploitation, make it difficult to prove that race or ethnicity
is a meaningful factor. 61 Therefore, the nexus ground that appears to be most accessible is
"membership of a particular social group". 62 However, it is difficult to form a particular social
group (PSG) that would allow a trafficking victim to successfully prevail on an asylum claim. In
2002, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) produced guidelines on the
formation of a PSG, which stated: this definition includes characteristics which are historical and
therefore cannot be changed, and those which, though it is possible to change them, ought not to
be required to be changed because they are so closely linked to the identity of the person or are an
expression of fundamental human rights. 63 [*571] Courts in the United States have determined
that PSGs cannot be sweeping, generalized classifications 64 rather, they must include an
immutable characteristic. 65 In deciding what constitutes a particular social group, the United
States in Matter of Acosta held that, the definition of a particular social group, must involve
"persecution aimed at an immutable characteristic: a characteristic that either is beyond the power
of an individual to change or is so fundamental to individual identity or conscience that it ought
not be required to change." 66 The requirement for an immutable characteristic is also seen in
Canada 67 and the United Kingdom. 68 It is difficult to prove that a person was trafficked based
on an immutable characteristic. As previously mentioned, due to the large numbers of trafficking
victims, a specific immutable characteristic that caused trafficker to target to a specific [*572]
victim is practically impossible to discern. 69 However, in United Kingdom's recent decision of
Moldova v. Secretary of State for Home Dep't, an appellate court rejected case precedent which
held that "people who have been trafficked" do not form a particular social group. 70 The judge
recognized that the victim had been "trafficked because she is a woman," living in a country with
severe trafficking problems and granted her asylum. 71 Therefore, the immutable characteristic
requirement, while being difficult, is not an impossible obstacle. The UNHCR's PSG Guidelines
further illustrate the difficulties for a human trafficking victim to be able to successfully apply for
asylum on the basis of a PSG, when it further explained that a particular social group cannot be
defined exclusively by the persecution that members of the group suffer or by a common fear of
being persecuted. Nonetheless, persecutory action toward a group may be a relevant factor in
determining the visibility of a group in a particular society. 72 This is perhaps one of the most
difficult requirements for trafficking victims. In the United States, courts have held that a social
group may not be circularly defined by the fact that it is persecuted, 73 which prevents a PSG,
such as "persons who have experienced trafficking and face re-trafficking upon return home" to
be successful in an asylum claim. As aforementioned, the stigmatization and danger that
trafficking victims are likely to face upon return to their home countries is due mainly to the fact
that they were previously trafficked. Therefore, most often, their definition of a PSG would be
defined by the persecution they have suffered. However, this does not mean that asylum is not a
completely impossible option. Victims of past trafficking have been able to prevail on
membership in the particular social group of "trafficked women who escaped from their
traffickers" because each element qualifies as an unchangeable status. 74 Unfortunately, due to
the discretionary nature of asylum applications, this type of PSG is not always successful. [*573]
Furthermore, the motive of the persecutor must be causally connected to the Convention ground,
an even more difficult requirement for trafficking victims. 75 This is demonstrated in Rreshpja v.
Gonzales, where the Sixth Circuit held that the relevant group that petitioner suggested, which
was "young (or those who appear to be young), attractive Albanian women who are forced into
prostitution," 76 does not constitute a social group, in turn denying the petitioner asylum. 77 The
formation of a PSG and connecting it to the persecution suffered is excessively difficult to do,
making asylum a less than viable option for trafficking victims to access immigration relief. 2.
Persecutors Must be State Actors or the State Must be Unwilling or Unable to Provide
Protection Another obstacle for trafficking victims in their applications for asylum is that
persecutors must be state actors. 78 If not, then the government must be unwilling or unable to
provide protection. 79 This presents another obstacle for victims of trafficking to successfully
apply for asylum because human trafficking is predominantly a form of persecution committed by
non-state actors. Canada, however, has ruled that, "state complicity in persecution is not a prerequisite to a valid refugee claim." 80 Therefore, non-state actors can persecute an individual
under the meaning of the Refugee Convention if "the home state cannot or does not afford them
protection from persecution." 81 The United Kingdom also recognized that non-state actors could
be persecutors, when the court in Shah v. Islam v. SSHD held that, "if a Refugee Convention
ground motivates either the party inflicting the serious harm, or the state in failing to protect from
that harm, the persecution qualifies as having been carried out for reasons of a Convention
ground." 82 However, In the United States, persecution "always implies some connection to
governmental action or inaction, related to a protected ground." 83 In Burbiene v. Holder, the
Sixth Circuit determined that human trafficking in Lithuania is a criminal element and "Lithuania
is [*574] "making every effort to combat' human trafficking, "a difficult task not only for the
government of Lithuania, but for any government in the world.'" 84 The Court further held that
"because the facts do not establish a nexus between the petitioner's fear of harm and the
government of Lithuania … petitioner failed to establish the well-founded fear of persecution
required for asylum." 85 Proving a government's unwillingness or inability to provide protection
is, therefore, a high burden in the United States. This note does not purport to assert that
trafficking victims can never successfully apply for asylum. Rather, as demonstrated above,
applying for asylum is a difficult process, with high burdens. Additionally, asylum is not
specifically tailored to suit the needs of trafficking victims. Therefore, creating a type of
immigration relief that is created to meet the specific needs of trafficking victims would be
significantly more effective in affording trafficking victim adequate protections.
Perm — do both
Perm — do the cp
CP – ICC
2AC — ICC
CP Fails —
a) Empirics — previous ICC limits on trafficking failed
Aston and Paranjape 12 (Mr. Joshua N. Aston1 and Dr. Vinay N. Paranjape, 2012, Human
Trafficking and its Prosecution: Challenges of the ICC,
https://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/356626199.pdf) doolittle
Among various such international legal frameworks, the International
Criminal Court enacted the Rome Statute to
combat human trafficking and to deal wit h and have universal jurisdiction on the most serious crimes which are of concern to humanity.
The Rome Statute also follows Article 7 of the Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade,
and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery of 1956.8 The slavery in the convention is defined as “the status or condition of a person over whom any
or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised.” Article
7 of the Rome Statute was constituted to deal
with crimes against humanity including enslavement, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution and
any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity. Article 7 of the Rome Statute was
enacted with reference to “trafficking in persons” which is considered as a crime against
humanity under the enslavement provision of the Statute which has been stated in Article 7 (1).9 The most important of the Article 7 of the Rome
Statute is Article 7 (1) (a) – (k). It states that the acts to come under the Crime Against Humanity, must be
“committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population,
with knowledge of the attack.”
the acts being
committed as mentioned in the Article 7 (1) (a)must constitute an attack directed against any
civilian population
be a widespread
committed has been a part of or intended to be a part of such attack. 8 Dr. Mohamed Y. Mattar, The International Criminal Court (ICC) Becomes a
Reality: When Will the Court Prosecute The First Trafficking in Persons Case?, The Protection Project (9 June 2002) 9 Ibid 10 Article 7 of the Rome
Statute In
many cases of such crimes being conducted and then being prosecuted by ICC, it has
been noticed that the cases include crime against humanity as well as war crimes and thus
prosecution of human trafficking in such cases is at the risk of being ignored or prosecuted under the
Article 7 of the Rome Statute. Thus it is very important to distinguish human trafficking and the war crimes in such cases while prosecution, and consider
it under the Article 7 of the Rome Statute – Crimes Against Humanity.
There are also various obstacles being faced while
prosecuting cases of human trafficking such as, the jurisdiction of a country where the
prosecution of the case being undertaken and the traditional laws and values of the countries.
b) Authority — ICC lacks authority to prosecute
Aston and Paranjape 12 (Mr. Joshua N. Aston1 and Dr. Vinay N. Paranjape, 2012, Human
Trafficking and its Prosecution: Challenges of the ICC,
https://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/356626199.pdf) doolittle
Another difficulty
and challenge before the ICC in prosecuting trafficking cases is the risk of
ignoring the seriousness and magnitude of human trafficking. The definition of trafficking as “trafficking in persons,
in particular women and children,” is clearly mentioned in Article 7(1)(c) of the Rome Statute. However, the appropriate definition of
trafficking, beyond the attachment of ownership over a person or deprivations of liberty – is not
lucid in the Statute. The Rome Statute does not include a proper definition of ‘trafficking’ and hence it is a
challenge before the ICC to have a potential prosecution of trafficking cases. Trafficking is considered to be modern day
slavery. The deficiency of a proper and precise definition for “trafficking” in the Rome Statute
poses a big problem because of the different definitions existing in different countries and this has a
possibility in affecting the scope of the Statute to deal with and prosecuting trafficking cases. Moreover, the definition of ‘enslavement’
is regarded as the modern day slavery but this is not accepted legally because enslavement covers a wide range of
forms which could be considered as slavery. Enslavement, as it is defined in the Article 7 of the Rome Statute and also in the Convention on the
Abolition of Slavery in the Elements of Crimes, is stated as “right of ownership over a person” but poses a major question whether it is applicable to
modern day slavery.18 There
are also cases where the crimes being conducted include crimes against
humanity as well as the war crimes when brought to the ICC for prosecution. Prosecution of such
human trafficking are at the risk of being ignored or prosecuted under the Article 7 of the Rome Statute.
Hence, there is an important and urgent need to distinguish the human trafficking and the war
crimes in such cases during the prosecution and consider it under the Article 7 of the Rome Statute of Crimes against Humanity. Further, it
has been also noticed that the jurisdiction of the countries becomes an obstacle in the prosecution of the
cases of human trafficking. The limited reach of the ICC jurisdiction and admissibility regime of the court is a
challenge in itself. This is a very unique combination in which a jurisdiction that is conservative in nature and state- sovereignty oriented
system based on the principle of territoriality is combined with an admissibility regime based on the complementarity principle.19 The
complementarity principle explains the challenge of the ICC to prosecute cases unless and until
the states are unwilling or fail to prosecute or unable to have jurisdiction and prosecute the cases.
The importance of the prosecution by the state parties is recognized by the Rome Statute. It is the state sovereignty which gives
the states the primary right to have the criminal jurisdiction and exercise its powers of prosecuting trafficking
cases or other cases of crimes against humanity which entails to international crimes. Thus, the ICC is only the last resort to prosecute
cases and have jurisdiction on the crimes conducted in the state party’s territory which constitute international crime and this happens only if the country
or the state fails to exercise criminal jurisdiction or are not able to investigate and prosecute the cases or are unwilling to investigate and prosecute
cases.20 It is a very complex system of the ICC. The ICC faces a dilemma also. On one hand, if the states start prosecuting and resolving cases of
trafficking and crimes against humanity in an effective manner at the national level, then the ICC will have no cases to prosecute. Whereas, on the other
hand, the ICC requires successful handling of cases and prosecuting cases effectively to establish its worthiness and aim with which it was established.21
The ICC also faces challenges while prosecuting cases due to lack of effective cooperation and
support from the states. Since the ICC is dependent on the sates to provide evidences, investigate in
an effective manner, it finds it difficult if the state parties are not cooperating and supporting the
ICC in the prosecution. The ICC does not have executive powers and police of its own to investigate cases and thus it is fully dependent on
the states. This is a weakness on the part of the ICC which is a major challenge because the
originator of the ICC wanted to keep the states’ 19 Judge Hans-Peter Kaul (Judge of the International Criminal Court),
The International Criminal Court: Current Challenges and Perspectives, Speech at the Conference on ‘The International Criminal Court in the 21st
Century’, held on 17 July 1998, Washington University Global Studies Law Review, Vol. 6:575 (2007) 20 Benjamn N. Schiff, Building the International
Criminal Court, Cambridge University Press, 1st Edition (2008) 21 Judge Hans-Peter Kaul (Judge of the International Criminal Court), The International
Criminal Court: Current Challenges and Perspectives, Speech at the Conference on ‘The International Criminal Court in the 21st Century’, held on 17
the ICC always requires full
cooperation and support from the state parties while prosecuting cases. Another challenge and
limitation of the ICC is its restraint to carry out investigations and collect evidences with regard
to the mass crimes committed in regions which are thousands of miles away. Thus, the ICC has difficulty to have its access,
reach to these areas and regions which could also be unsafe.23 These are difficulties pertaining
to technicalities and logistics which no other court faces in prosecuting crimes.24 Such difficulties
July 1998, Washington University Global Studies Law Review, Vol. 6:575 (2007) sovereignty.22 Hence,
were experienced by the ICC while prosecuting cases and investigating in regions such as Uganda, Central Africa and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
The ICC also faces dearth of resources such as financial and other related resources for conducting investigations.25 One more challenge faced by the
ICC is the protection of the victims of trafficking in prosecuting trafficking cases. The prosecutor and the security forces of the country need to have
appropriate security measures to provide victim protection and also to collect evidences form them, providing logistics pertaining to residence and
ICC needs to depend on the
states of both the countries involved in the trafficking case to cooperate and support the ICC for
efficient prosecution and judgment.
travelling while the prosecution of the cases are going on. To provide effective protection to the victims, the
c) Relived violence — the cp still forces trafficking victims to cooperate
with law enforcement and relieve their violence
Perm — do the cp
Non-governmental international fiat is a voting issue – it kills fairness –
there’s an infinite combination of non-governmental actors that makes it
unpredictable and impossible to garner solvency deficits to, and it kills topic
education because the neg never researches policy-making about immigration
Perm — do both
Perm — do the aff and have the us create a uniform definition for human
trafficking, prosecute human trafficking as a crime, and incorporate the
Palermo Protocol
Links to the net-benefit — the us will eventually have to comply to these
orders by passing a law similar to the aff — triggering the link
CP – Financial Diplomacy
2AC — FiDip CP
CP Fails —
a) Trafficking is key — we need cooperation between law enforcement
groups to truly stop the incoming flow of money — that’s Gonzalez
b) No Internal link — Roach says nothing about “financial diplomacy”—
he’s criticizing the U.S. strategic policy mistake of challenging the
Chinese-led AIIB which everyone perceives as a political decision—no
reason that that spills over to hurt U.S. Treasury attempts to stop
terrorist financing
c) Modelling — CP doesn’t solve Russia and India modelling which is key
to stop great power war, pandemics, and warming
d) Alt causes — Trump destroys fidip
Talley 16 (Ian, writes about sanctions, terror finance and other global illicit finance networks
from the Wall Street Journal's Washington, DC bureau. He previously covered international
economics and energy policy in the DC, London and Oslo bureaus, 11-25-2016, accessed 7-52018, "Economists Brace for a Donald Trump Rewrite of Global Financial Diplomacy", WSJ:
https://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2016/11/25/economists-brace-for-a-donald-trump-rewrite-ofglobal-financial-diplomacy/)
Could Donald Trump upend seven decades of U.S. international economic diplomacy? That what
some economists fear, taking the president-elect's trade threats at face value. In the wake of
World War II, the U.S. and its allies established several global institutions to help stabilize the
world economy and prevent spasms of interstate violence. Now, some political scientists and
economists fear Mr. Trump risks turning more countries inward if he disengages from the World
Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund and other cooperative forums Washington
has long relied on to help preserve world security. Mr. Trump's threats to slap China and Mexico
with hefty import tariffs, his snubbing of the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement and his plan to
label Beijing a currency manipulator are seen by many economists as a rejection of the WTO. But
analysts also see in Mr. Trump's comments signs he could shift away from global cooperation
more broadly, including the Group of Seven industrialized nations and the Group of 20 largest
economies, key forums for international collaboration. "He's not going to buy into the type of
cooperative arrangements that have been the underpinning of the liberal world order since the late
1940s," said Francis Fukuyama, a Stanford University political economist. Mr. Trump reinforced
expectations nationalist policies would define his administration after prioritizing a meeting with
U.K. Independent Party leader Nigel Farage, a leading proponent of Britain's exit from the
European Union, soon after his election. He also fueled worries about a broader repudiation of
multilateral diplomacy by questioning the utility of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and
U.S. military support for long-time Asian allies. "A Trump administration might try to rewrite
global architecture where he sees the American projection of power unduly constrained by
convention or international rules," says Robert Kahn, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign
Relations. Combined with congressional Republican's opposition to fresh funding for the IMF
and its sister development institution, the World Bank, many economists envision Mr. Trump's
White House largely ignoring the two organizations. If his administration does deprioritize the
IMF and the G-20, Washington could lose the ability to shape foreign policy through those
organizations, said Meg Lundsager, a former U.S. representative on the IMF's executive board.
"If the U.S. later seeks to use the institutions to push an initiative, no one will listen." Since its
inception, the WTO provided a rules-based court for countries to vent trade frustrations. Over the
years, it has kept some of the worst potential violations in check. Meanwhile, the IMF and the G20 proved critical in stemming global losses in the wake of the 2008-09 financial crisis. The fund
has also been a cost-effective conduit for U.S. soft power, encouraging economic changes in
countries seeking bailouts that can bolster U.S. interests abroad. Some analysts say the
responsibility of the leading the world's largest economy and a cabinet stocked with officials who
take a more pragmatic and traditional diplomatic stance will moderate the president-elect's
policies, taming his fiery campaign rhetoric. While Mr. Trump may take a more combative
approach to trade policy, they say, he may not turn his back on traditional channels of multilateral
diplomacy and rules-based global order. Still, many economists worry that a Trump-led White
House, by disengaging or sidestepping global organizations such as the WTO, the IMF and the G20, might abdicate a U.S.-leadership role that has fostered collaboration that supports global
security. "This is tremendously dangerous because there's a lot of economic nationalism already
out there, and the U.S. has played a role in keeping it under wraps," Mr. Fukuyama said. Britain
in June upended decades of regional integration in a referendum to exit the EU. Along with Mr.
Trump's win, the Brexit vote boosted anti-euro parties ahead of key elections next year.
Nationalism has also gained traction in Russia and China, two powers flexing their muscles on
the global stage in ways that threaten U.S. and allied security. "If the hegemonic power shifts
sides to a populist nationalist platform, the impetus towards maintaining that liberal order is
potentially going to collapse," Mr. Fukuyama says.
e) Relived violence — the cp still forces trafficking victims to cooperate
with law enforcement and relieve their violence
Perm — do both
Advantage CPs are a voting issue — they destroy topic specific education by
focusing the debate on unrelated issues
CP – Relevant Services PIC
2AC — Relevant Services PIC
CP fails--1) Services – prevent debt bondage and social stigma--- victims also need
psychological and medical services - that’s Adams
2) Protections – victims can be intercepted by local members of the
trafficking ring – documentation proves – that’s Adams
Perm do the aff and change status quo protections and benefits under the
TVPA
Perm do both
Services fail because of the assistance requirement---the plan solves.
Chakraborti 14 — Aretha Chakraborti, J.D. May 2014, Columbia Law School; M.Phil. 2010,
University of Cambridge; B.A. 2008, Northwestern University, “Article: Alien HumanTrafficking Victims in The United States: Examining the Constitutionality of The TVPA And
INA's Assistance Requirements,” 17 U. Pa. J.L. & Soc. Change 55, Lexis Nexis
As was the case in changing INA language, the better option is that the Court should recommend
the TVPA remove its assistance requirement as a condition for certification and services
receipt. Federal and state investigators and prosecutors can still seek out or subpoena the
assistance of alien and citizen victims. However alien victim services receipt will not be hinged
on willingness to assist, and predictably, post-service receipt aliens may be more willing to
come forward to assist, thereby increasing their likelihood for receiving CP status. In turn,
investigators and prosecutors may receive more information to help fight trafficking, which
could justify increased federal budget allocations toward victim services programs.
The Cianciarulo evidence is the status quo – the plan mandates adequate
protection and benefits which solves – TVPA doesn’t include that provision
Revision of the TVPA solves---provides guaranteed enhanced benefits and
trains law enforcement
Tiefenbrun ‘5 – Susan W., Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Global
Legal Studies, Thomas Jefferson School of Law. Founder and Director of the Hofstra University
School of Law International Law Summer Program in Nice, France in cooperation with the
University of Nice School of Law and Thomas Jefferson School of Law. J.D., New York
University School of Law; Ph.D. Columbia University; M.A., University of Wisconsin; B.S.,
University of Wisconsin, magna cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa, (“ARTICLE: SEX SLAVERY IN
THE UNITED STATES AND THE LAW ENACTED TO STOP IT HERE AND ABROAD, 11
Wm. & Mary J. of Women & L. 317,” William and Mary Journal of Race, Gender, and Justice,
Lexis Nexis, Spring, 2005, NC)
6. Enhanced Benefits of Victims
Victims of severe forms of trafficking are also eligible to receive expanded and enhanced
benefits and services. For example, while in the custody of the federal government, the TVPA
provides that they shall "not be detained in facilities inappropriate to their status as crime victims." Thus, the
TVPA has made it possible to eliminate the horrendous practice of locking up sex trafficked women in detention cells. Trafficked
women are also eligible to receive necessary medical care. As noted, they also receive
protection from "intimidation and threats of reprisals from traffickers." Finally, victims are
entitled to translation services when they are needed. The TVPA, therefore, treats the trafficked
person not as a criminal, but as a victim worthy of services and enhanced benefits.
7. Training of Law Enforcement Personnel and Immigration Officials
Investigations, prosecutions, and convictions of alleged traffickers occur more frequently when law enforcement and immigration
officers are sensitive to factors affecting trafficked persons in particular. Language differences, culture shock, fear for personal safety,
and fears relating to immigration irregularities are just some of the factors impacting victims of trafficking.
The TVPA authorizes DoJ to conduct training programs for law enforcement personnel and
immigration officials to enable them to better identify trafficked victims, to make them aware of
the victim's particular problems, and to require officials to inform the victims of their legal
rights.
The TVPA also mandates "not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Attorney General and the Secretary
of State shall promulgate regulations" implementing training of law enforcement personnel, immigration officials, and DoS and DoJ
officials. TVPA
also contemplates an amendment to the Immigration and Nationality Act in order to
accomplish its goals and to provide victims of severe forms of trafficking with enhanced benefits.
Perm do the CP
Not providing benefits sends a signal that incentivizes more trafficking and
destroys victims lives
Chakraborti 14 — Aretha Chakraborti, J.D. May 2014, Columbia Law School; M.Phil. 2010,
University of Cambridge; B.A. 2008, Northwestern University, “Article: Alien HumanTrafficking Victims in The United States: Examining the Constitutionality of The TVPA And
INA's Assistance Requirements,” 17 U. Pa. J.L. & Soc. Change 55, Lexis Nexis *we do not
endorse any problematic language
A final possible reason for why Congress differentiates between citizens and aliens with regard to
services is economic: simply, the government does not have the financial resources to provide services to all human trafficking
victims presenting as such and so has to line draw to preserve the quality of resources provided to eligible victims. This is plausible.
the Court uphold the TVPA’s assistance requirement to obtain federal
services for economic reasons, it will undermine the legitimacy of a statute promulgated for
the broad, internationally directed goal to assist human trafficking victims regardless of
However should
their nationality. Instead, it will write into precedent that the economic capacity of the federal
government limits victim access to services, and that such limitations justify the disparate
treatment of alien victims. In turn, this holding can signal to traffickers that so long as they
traffic aliens and threaten them into silence, and the United States likewise retains its line drawing to discriminate
against those same aliens, then traffickers can escape prosecution while their victims remain terrified, in deportation
limbo, and without services. By accepting that citizens and alien victims should differ in the services
they receive, and the Court would appear to accept laws that both inadvertently incentivize
traffickers to target aliens, and deprioritize alien victims’ needs.
CP – States
2AC — States CP
Counterplan can’t solve – state governments won’t investigate because it
doesn’t change the narrow federal definition of human trafficking – that’s
Kara
Perm do both
States can’t prevent deportations — fingerprint databases give immigrants
away.
Denvir ‘17 (Daniel, fellow at the Watson institute, writer at Slate and the Appeal, author of
All-American Nativism, “The False Promise of Sanctuary Cities,” Slate, 2/17/17,
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/02/the_false_promise_of_sa
nctuary_cities.html accessed 7/1/18) ssk
In the wake of President Trump’s nativist crackdown, mayors
in left-leaning cities have defiantly proclaimed that
their cities will remain “sanctuaries” where immigrants can find refuge. The definition of a sanctuary city is
somewhat murky: At minimum, it is a locality that won’t hold suspects for Immigration and
Customs Enforcement or allow their police officers or sheriffs’ deputies to do the work of federal
immigration agents. But for many immigrants, such protections mean nothing at all. It’s not just tough-on-crime
Republicans that preside over a criminal justice system that today serves as the front door for a massive deportation pipeline. Every day, police and
prosecutors in Democratic Party–controlled cities fuel mass incarceration by arresting and
charging people for low-level nonviolent offenses. An arrest for jumping a turnstile or a minor
drug charge could result in a person’s separation from his or her family forever. America is the
most incarceratory nation in the world—in 2015 alone, police made an estimated 11 million
arrests. For undocumented immigrants, an arrest can trigger detention and deportation by ICE. And
that’s true even if a self-described sanctuary city refuses to detain someone upon federal request. The fingerprints police collect when
booking someone into custody are automatically shared with federal immigration authorities,
whether that police department wants to share them or not. A fingerprint match alerts ICE that a
suspected undocumented immigrant has been arrested. ICE agents can then find that person,
detain them, and deport them. If ICE wants to detain someone, they can find and detain them
anywhere in the United States regardless of whether local officials are cooperating. Now, under Trump, a
man who has declared that the Mexican government is coordinating the mass migration of rapists to the United States and that Muslims pose an
existential threat to the West, things could get far worse. On Friday morning, the Associated Press reported the existence of a draft memo that indicates
the Trump administration is considering the unprecedented step of deploying 100,000 National Guard troops “to perform the functions of an immigration
officer in relation to the investigation, apprehension and detention of aliens in the United States.”
As of last year, ICE employed
roughly 5,800 deportation officers. (The White House has denied it is considering such a policy but did not deny the existence of such
a memo.) With more boots on the ground, the imperative for local criminal justice officials is clearer than ever. As long as police and
prosecutors continue to arrest and charge people for low-level offenses, sanctuary cities simply
aren’t safe for undocumented immigrants. Recently, the administration began an end run around self-proclaimed sanctuary cities.
In Travis County, Texas—which includes Austin, the state’s liberal mecca—Sheriff Sally Hernandez promised recently to ignore most ICE detainers
or requests to detain an immigrant. But according to a news report last week, immigration officials obtained federal arrest
warrants for at least 42 immigrants, charging most with federal felonies for illegally re-entering
the United States. By using judicial arrest warrants instead of detainers, ICE is now requiring
rather than requesting that immigrants be detained—and Hernandez was thus compelled to turn
them over to the feds.
Deportations will continue under the states because states because the
counterplan doesn’t fiat granting T-visas, services, and protection – that’s
Barbagiannis
Federal procedural changes are key because victim applicantions must go
through the USCIS
Pollock and Hollier 10 – Joycelyn M. Pollock & Valerie Hollier (2010) T Visas:
Prosecution Tool or Humanitarian Response?, Joycelyn M. Pollock started her career in criminal
justice as a probation and parole officer in the state of Washington. Women & Criminal Justice,
20:1-2, 127-146, https://doi.org/10.1080/08974451003641172/jtsang
Generally, victims of trafficking are brought to the attention of federal law enforcement agents and federal prosecutors through tips.
After an investigation, victims
are sometimes rounded up in a raid, or they sometimes come to
investigators on their own. Once they are identified as possible victims, they are referred to
advocates in NGOs, caseworkers in the Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency, and
victim service coordinators in U.S. Attorneys offices. In state investigations, state agencies and
professionals that parallel these federal agencies and professionals are involved. As discussed
previously, victims are first pre-certified to receive benefits from the ORR, which then proceeds with certification for full benefits.
Victim advocates, immigration attorneys, or NGOs who assist refugees and immigrants help trafficked
victims fill out the application for the T visa. A victim without these resources would find it
very difficult to understand and complete the application and to collect the required supporting
documentation. The application is submitted to the Vermont Service Center of the U.S. Customs and
Immigration Services, under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. The applications are adjudicated
under a standard of ‘‘any credible evidence’’ (Lee 2007). Appeals are submitted to the Administrative Appeals Office and can be
pursued further in federal court. Critics argue that immigration officials should not be evaluating these applications, as their mindset is
much different from one of victim services advocates. The charge is that a hyper-technical, inclination-to-deny approach holds victims
to unrealistic and legally incorrect standards of proof and fails to ‘‘implement the will of Congress’’ (Lee 2007:458). However, some
of those who have helped applicants with the process compliment the Vermont Service Center and have no complaints about the
process other than the time it takes to process the application (Citizen and Immigration Services Ombudsman 2009).
2AC — Links to Midterms
CP links to Midterms — sanctuary state policies drive GOP turnout.
Colvin 18 — Jill Colvin, Political reporter for NBC Los Angeles, 5-16-2018, "Trump Rails
Against California Sanctuary Policies", https://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/CaliforniaSanctuary-City-State-Law-Immigration-President-Trump-Orange-County-482793641.html,
Accessed: 7-3-2018, SL
Trump has been under fire for comments he made Wednesday while railing against California for its so-called
sanctuary immigration policies. Trump was speaking at a roundtable with local California officials when he responded to a
comment that had referenced MS-13.
"We have people coming into the country, or trying to come in — and we're stopping a lot of
them," Trump said after Fresno County Sheriff Margaret Mims complained about state
restrictions that limit cooperation with federal immigration authorities. "You wouldn't believe
how bad these people are. These aren't people. These are animals."
Trump has repeatedly referred to members of the violent street gang as "animals" in speeches,
rallies and at White House events. He has also used the term to describe terrorists and school
shooters.
Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer, D-N.Y., responded on Twitter to the president, saying,
"When all of our great-great-grandparents came to America they weren't 'animals,' and these
people aren't either."
And House Minority leader Nancy Pelosi said, "Every day that you think you've seen it all, along
comes another manifestation of why their policies are so inhumane."
But White House press secretary Sarah Huckabee Sanders defended the president's comments,
arguing the word "animals" didn't go far enough.
"This is one of the most vicious and deadly gangs that operates by the motto of, 'Rape, control
and kill,'" she said, adding that, "If the media and liberals want to defend MS-13, they're more
than welcome to. Frankly, I don't think the term that the president used was strong enough."
Trump was joined at the Wednesday White House meeting by mayors, sheriffs and other local
leaders from California who oppose the state's immigration policies and who applauded his
administration's hard-line efforts.
"This is your Republican resistance right here against what they're doing in California," said
Assemblywoman Melissa Melendez, coopting a term used by Democrats opposed to Trump's presidency. She, like others, said the
president and his policies were far more popular in the state than people realize.
They were criticizing legislation Gov. Jerry Brown signed into law last year that bars police from
asking people about their immigration status or helping federal agents with immigration
enforcement. Jail officials can transfer inmates to federal immigration authorities if they have been convicted of one of about 800
crimes, mostly felonies, but not for minor offenses.
Brown insists the legislation, which took effect Jan. 1, doesn't prevent federal immigration officials from doing their jobs. But the
Trump administration has sued to reverse it, calling the policies unconstitutional and dangerous.
Some counties, including San Diego and Orange, have voted to support the lawsuit or have passed their own anti-sanctuary
resolutions.
Republicans see backlash to the law as a potentially galvanizing issue during the midterm
elections, especially with Trump's anti-immigrant base. And Trump has held numerous events in
recent months during which he's drawn attention to California's policies.
During the session, Trump
thanked the officials, saying they had "bravely resisted California's deadly
and unconstitutional sanctuary state laws." He claimed those laws are forcing "the release of illegal
immigrant criminals, drug dealers, gang members and violent predators into your communities"
and providing "safe harbor to some of the most vicious and violent offenders on earth."
1AR — Fed Key
Fedkey – Congress editing TVPA requirements is key to administrative
compliance
Roby et al 8 – Jini L. Roby , Jennifer Turley & JoAnna Garrick Cloward (2008). Jini L. Roby
is a member of the Utah Bar and an assistant professor in the School of Social Work, Brigham
Young University U.S. Response to Human Trafficking: Is it enough?, Journal of Immigrant &
Refugee Studies, 6:4, 508-525, https://doi.org/10.1080/15362940802480241/jtsang
Second, there
should be government-funded services to provide the initial screening process in
which victims wishing to discuss their case can do so confidentially without fear of deportation.
Many such services currently exist to encourage potential violators to receive assistance without fear of criminal recrimination, such
as when parents are allowed to drop children off in ‘safe havens’ as an alternative to abandoning the child in unsafe conditions.
There could be safe shelters where victims could seek assistance, with trained professionals who
can provide legal and social services. If the United States is truly serious about abolishing the trade in human beings, it
must provide protection for those who risk so much in coming forward. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION While human trafficking
is a global issue, the United States has a special responsibility to address it as a prominent destination country into 522 JOURNAL OF
IMMIGRANT & REFUGEE STUDIES which up to 17,000 victims are estimated to be trafficked through force, fraud or coercion.
Most of these—women and children—come from impoverished backgrounds, and are easy targets for those who buy and sell human
beings. Both prominent forms of exploitation—labor and sexual exploitation—await victims in sweatshops, orchards, farms,
restaurants, bars, and brothels; often accompanied by cruel and inhumane treatment, abuse, extortion, physical and psychological
abuse, and severe limitations on personal freedom. In response to the growing knowledge about human trafficking into its territory, the
United States has embarked on a national effort to stem human trafficking, with the passage of federal legislation and by establishing a
scheme through which victims can receive protection and continuing legal status. Since the passage of the Trafficking Victims
Protection Act in 2000, approximately 1000 victims have received temporary legal status in the country as of the end of 2006.
Convictions of both forms of trafficking have increased from mere ten defendants in 2000 to 33 in 2004, 35 in 2005 and resulting in
dramatic increase to 98 in 2006. It is particularly encouraging that the TVPAalone is responsible for 79 of the 98 convictions for 2006
(USDOJ, 2007). The
reauthorizations of the Act in 2003 and 2005 have added features of outreach,
research, and training, in addition to other crimes that can be charged against perpetrators.
Despite these efforts, however, the policy is still overly focused on using victims as law
enforcement tools rather than assisting them based on their victim status, with the result that
relatively few victims are coming forward. This is not surprising since victims may in fact find that their exposure puts
their safety at risk, as well as their continuing stay in the U.S. when they are not determined to be ‘severe’ victims or if they are not
willing to cooperate in the apprehension, prosecution and sentencing of the perpetrators. It
is imperative that the United
States Congress establish a clear policy of acknowledging and assisting victims if it is truly
intending to abolish human trafficking, a modern day form of slavery. In implementing and monitoring such policies,
the various other government entities—law enforcement, human services, and judicial systems—should also take a victim-centered
approach. Donna Hughes (2006), a leading advocate of abolishing human trafficking, calls the trafficking of individuals the human
rights cause of this generation, much like the civil rights movement of past decades. Arguably,
law enforcement, the
judiciary, health professionals, business organizations and social workers in various sectors have
a mandate to respond to this important call. The various players must join in this interdisciplinary effort to uphold the
very basic values of human dignity and promote amore victim-friendly approach to human trafficking.
K – Victimization
2AC – Victimization K
Framework – the negative must disprove the desirability of the
implementation of the plan – prefer it –
a. Fairness – their framework moots 1AC offense and justifies infinite,
self-serving interpretations
b. Topic Education – debating the nuances of specific immigration policies
is critical to developing advocacy skills and individual agency
The aff outweighs the K and no root cause – war causally increases gender
violence
Goldstein 1 [Joshua S., professor of International Relations at American University,
Washington D.C., 2001 “War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa,”
Cambridge University Press, pp. 412]
Many peace scholars
and activists support the approach, “if you want peace, work for justice.” Then, if one believes
that sexism contributes to war, one can work for gender justice specifically (perhaps among
others) in order to pursue peace. This approach brings strategic allies to the peace movement
(women, labor, minorities), but rests on the assumption that injustices cause war. The evidence in this
book suggests that causality runs at least as strongly the other way. War is not a product of
capitalism, imperialism, gender, innate aggression, or any other single cause, although these influence
wars’ outbreaks and outcomes. Rather, war has in part fueled and sustained these and other
injustices. So, “if you want peace, work for peace.” Indeed, if you want justice (gender and
others), work for peace. Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis, from types of
First, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace.
individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It runs downward too. Enloe suggests that changes in attitudes towards
war and the military may be the most important way to “reverse women’s oppression.” The dilemma is that peace work
focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies, and moral grounding, yet, in light of this book’s evidence,
the emphasis on injustice as the main cause of war seems to be empirically inadequate.10
Permutation the aff and all non mutually exclusive parts of the alternative –
combining institutional advocacy with the personal critique solves best
Robinson 11 [Jill Robinson, Department of Human and Organization Development, Vanderbilt
University, December 2011, Science Direct, “Public Perceptions of Human Trafficking in
Moldova,” pg. 269-279,
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1132055911700527#!] lr
Combining community and
institutional knowledge and perceptions of a complex social problem, such as trafficking,
helps develop a better understanding of the phenomenon. Several of the respondents had been exposed to the
mechanisms of trafficking and had knowledge about victimization processes. Even though respondents tended to individualize the problem, they
also demonstrated a complex understanding of the structural or macro-level causes of trafficking.
In this article, I juxtaposed what the public and institutions have to “say” about trafficking.
Because of their intimate, on-the-ground knowledge of trafficking, they were able to contextualize the problem and explain how these macro-level causes
play out in a day to day basis. If the macro-level causes of trafficking are organized into the categories of push factors, pull factors, and immigration
policy, it is possible to compare community and institutional knowledge. According to institutions, pull factors
include the easing of emigration processes, international economic disparities, and poverty. The pull factors include the demand for cheap labor and sex
work. When
it comes to immigration policy, many institutions believe that the difficult migration
processes exacerbate the problem of trafficking. According to the public, push factors include poverty and corruption.
Pull factors include the Middle East/Islam and patriarchy. For immigration policy, community knowledge differed greatly from institutional knowledge.
The majority of the respondents believed that the state of borders (how open or closed they were) did not really matter. However, some respondents
believed that the open state of borders has become a problem since the collapse of the USSR. This combined
knowledge can help
guide policy decisions. For example, if institutions advocate for immigration reform, it may not matter what
reforms are made officially if the implementing agency and personnel are corrupt. Also, this combined knowledge indicates that decriminalizing the
It is also important to
consider what impact the interrelation of perceptions and policies might have on the victims of
human trafficking. While respondents did show an understanding of structural causes of trafficking, “victim blaming” did emerge during the
interviews. However, that was tempered by the respondents’ understanding of macro-level causes of trafficking. Combining institutional
and public perceptions and knowledge of a social problem is helpful not only in establishing a
more thorough understanding of the social problem and guiding policy decisions, but in
exploring what experiences victims may face at the community level.
prostitute and only criminalizing the solicitor of prostitution may be the best approach to changing laws on prostitution.
The alt fails – ignoring institutions makes their analysis useless
Coburn 16 [Cynthia E. Coburn, professor at the School of Education and Social Policy,
Northwestern University, March 18, 2016, American Journal of Education, What’s Policy Got to
Do with It? How the Structure-Agency Debate Can Illuminate Policy Implementation,”
http://www.sesp.northwestern.edu/docs/publications/4806215205776813f2bd2c.pdf] lr
focus on agency, the articles
highlight individuals’ power to make strategic choices and to disrupt, mediate, combine, and
interpret in the implementation process. But, by foregrounding how social structure constrains
and enables these actions, they also highlight the way that power is institutionalized in the
social structure. This is because constraints on agency are not evenly distributed. Individual agency
is constrained and enabled in different ways and to different degrees among individuals in different locations in the
Third, these articles highlight the multifaceted role of power in the implementation process. By virtue of their
social structure. For example, Jabbar shows that school leaders in different schools can be positioned differently in the market hierarchy and social
structure of competition, shaping the options that they even consider for strategic action. Articles by Rigby and Woulfin show how individuals in the
same role (school leaders in Rigby’s case, district coaches in Woulfin’s) have different access to information, ideas, and approaches that they use to
construct their practices by virtue of their positions in social structure. Bray and Russell show how parents and students have very different opportunities
to raise questions and contribute to IEP conferences than do professional educators. This state of affairs leads to different opportunities to influence the
educational services that students receive Thus, these articles show how existing
relations of power—shaped by history,
politics, institutionalized roles, and positions in social networks—enable and constrain the roles
one can play in the implementation process. This analysis may provide an explanation for why policy can sometimes reinforce
existing structures of inequality rather than interrupt them, even when the policy is designed to address this inequality, as was (arguably) the case in the
choice policies in Jabbar’s article and special education regulations in Bray and Russell’s. These articles also provide insight into the possibility for
interrupting existing power relations (e.g., disruption highlighted by Bray and Russell or strategic combining and recombining in Woulfin) but remind us
that these avenues
of possibility are conditioned by social location in a system of power
relations.
Turn – victim framing is good and key to empower women
Kapur 02 (Ratna Kapur, 2002, The Tragedy of Victimization Rhetoric: Resurrecting the
"Native" Subject in International/Post-Colonial Feminist Legal Politics,
https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/hhrj15&id=5)
Doolittle, Language Modified*
The focus on violence against women has had some extremely important and beneficial
consequences for women. The women's human rights movement drew attention to the lack of
domestic governmental response to women's demands for more effective rape [sexual assault]
laws, laws against child sexual abuse, and domestic violence laws. The VAW campaign has been
overwhelmingly successful in translating very specific violations experienced by individual
women into a more general human rights discourse." VAW discourse has succeeded partly
because of its appeal to the victim subject. In the context of law and human rights, it is
invariably the object victim subject who seeks tights, primarily because she is the one who has
had the worst happen to her. The victim subject has allowed women to speak out about abuses
that have remained hidden or invisible in human rights discourse. Moreover, the Vienna World
Conference and subsequent women's conferences have enabled women to speak out to the
international community. A powerful form of this presentation has been through personal
testimonials in public tribunals, as at Vienna, or through international video links." These
accounts are usually very graphic and horrifying. and are told through the location of the victim
subject. " The victim subject also provides a shared location from which women from different
cultural and social contexts can speak, it provides women with a subject that repudiates the
atomized, decontextualized, and ahistorical subject of liberal tights discourse, while at the same
time furnishing a unitary subject that enables women to continue to make claims based on a
commonality of experience. Any further fragmentation of the subject raises fears that the absence
of a common subject will leave feminists divided and women even more disempowered. The idea
of multiple or fractured subjectivities threatens to deprive women of a foundation from which to
make claims for rights and for broader global recognition." If women's experiences are
represented as fragmented, they may lose power and undermine certain "truth claims"
about women's lives.
There’s no impact to ressentiment and if anything it’s good
Dolger 10 (Stefan, Professor at Brock University, “In Praise of Ressentiment: OR, How I
Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Glenn Beck” file:///C:/Users/crumb/Downloads/dolgert.pdf)
In closing I would suggest that my praise of ressentiment is also in line with the more
deliberatively conceived multiculturalism of the Left than is the current puritanical disdain. As
Monique Deveaux argues, it is a failure of political imagination when we 29 fixate on liberal
principles as preconditions to multicultural dialogue, and in particular it is necessary to move
toward a deeper level of intercultural respect rather than mere toleration (Deveaux 2000). 10
But if it is appropriate to go beyond simply tolerating nonliberal peoples abroad and in immigrant
communities, if we must go beyond toleration to do justice to the rich tradition of cultural
pluralism, then perhaps we can also open our hearts and minds to the possibility that the
ressentiment-suffused need to be heard out as well. Perhaps rather than demonizing ressentiment
as a toxin to politics, as the worst of the worst for subjects whom we purport to free, we must
accept that ressentiment is for many inseparable from their conception of their own
freedom. Perhaps rather than pitying these poor fools, in ways that we would never pity a plural
wife in the global South, we should ponder whether ressentiment as a precondition of
subjectivity is as much a gift as a curse. And are we so sure, after all, we late Nietzscheans, that
our crusade against ressentiment is not itself suffused with ressentiment? Is not itself fully in the
grips of it? How would we know if it were or weren’t? Perhaps we are, in our own way, as
spiteful, vain, petty, weak, subjected, enraged against the past, capitalized, consumerized, unfree,
as those we purport to want to free from the chains of slave morality. Perhaps it is ourselves that
we need to give a break to, that we need to get over, when we first look to purge the other of
ressentiment. Perhaps we all swim in this current, perhaps we are all Ressentiment’s children, and
perhaps that is OK – even to the extreme of the using ressentiment unconsciously in the effort to
rid the world of ressentiment. Though just in 10 Though Deveaux would likely find the extension
of this to “the resentful” as a group to be a highly tendentious reading of her work, and also one
that, given my lens of leftist strategy, is also not entirely respectful of the views of the bitter
people I claim should be courted. This is a tension which I happily acknowledge, and whose
grasp I do not purport to escape. 30 saying so I wouldn’t expect that to do much to overturn
Ressentiment’s reign. No, she is far too puissant for that. But we do not need to rage against the
weakness in others because we fear the dependence and weakness in ourselves. As Vetlesen puts
it, defending Amery: “Against Nietzsche, who despised victims because he saw them as weak, as
losers in life’s struggles, Amery upholds the dignity of having been forced by circumstances
beyond one’s control into that position, thus reminding Nietzsche that as humans we are
essentially relational beings, dependent, not self-sufficient. In hailing the strong and despising the
weak, in denying that vulnerability is a basic ineluctably given human condition, a condition from
which not only the role of victim springs but that of the morally responsible agent too, Nietzsche
fails to be the provocateur he loves to believe he is: He sides with the complacent majority and so
helps reinforce the existential and moral loneliness felt by Amery, the individual victim who
speaks up precisely in that capacity” (Vetlesen 2006, 43). Perhaps we can begin to see how we
have been using the weak, the viewers of Glenn Beck and others, as the targets for our need to
find blameworthy agents. And that too is fine. The trouble comes when we think we’ve gone
beyond Ressentiment when in fact we’re just listening to her whisperings without realizing it. We
think that we can well and truly look down on the Rush Limbaughs, these destroyers of
civilization, because they are possessed by something that we are above. And far be it from me to
suggest that we should not resent, should not blame; I merely suggest we direct our blame toward
more useful ends than where it is currently located.
DA – Midterms
2AC — Link UQ
Link is non–unique — Congress recently decided on sex trafficking laws
Mucha 18 (Sarah Mucha, Cnn, 3-21-2018, "Senate approves anti-sex-trafficking bill," CNN,
https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/21/politics/sex-trafficking-bill/index.html) doolittle
Washington (CNN)The
Senate voted Wednesday to approve an anti-sex-trafficking bill that would allow
victims of sex trafficking to seek justice against online platforms that knowingly facilitate the act, a move that prosecutors,
victims and anti-trafficking activists are heralding as an essential step in cracking down on the
crime. But others, such as tech advocacy groups, fear the limitations it could place on free speech on the internet. The bill passed 97-2, and now goes
to the White House for President Donald Trump's signature. The White House has expressed support for the proposal. The bipartisan
measure, the Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers Act, would create an exception to Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act to allow victims of sex trafficking to sue websites that enabled
their abuse. The House version passed with an overwhelming majority from both parties by 388-25 and later received an endorsement from the
White House. 'Passing SESTA will help protect children against online sex trafficking' 'Passing SESTA will help protect children against
online sex trafficking' "The
bill really moves the ball forward on an area with strong Republican and
Democratic consensus at a time of horrible partisan rancor," Mark P. Lagon, the former US ambassador-at-large to
combat and monitor trafficking in persons, told CNN. Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell discussed the bill Tuesday, saying laws passed in the
1990s have not kept up with the changing technology. The
legislation is "designed to close a loophole in existing law
that allows websites to avoid responsibility even as they knowingly facilitate trafficking. It would
ensure any institutions that are party to this reprehensible practice are subject to the strict penalties they deserve," said the Kentucky Republican. "I urge
each of my colleagues to join us in taking decisive action for our nation's children."
2AC — Plan Popular
Link non-uq and turn — recently passed human trafficking reform was
popular and bipartisan
Daly 18 (Matthew, AP Congressional reporter specializing in energy, environment, politics, and
oversight. Former chairman, Standing Comm. of Correspondents, Former WH reporter.
Graduated from amherest with honors in polisci, worked for Associated Press, The Washington
Post, HuffPost, Bloomberg Businessweek, NPR, Fox News, The Independent, Chicago Tribune,
Washington Times, ABC News, Time Magazine and more, “House bill targets money laundering
by human traffickers”, https://global-factivacom.proxy1.cl.msu.edu/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=CWNS000020180410ee4a0073s&cat=a&ep
=ASE)
WASHINGTON - The government would take modest steps toward hindering money laundering
by human traffickers under legislation approved Tuesday by the House as lawmakers found a
widely popular cause to tackle in a mostly discordant election year. The bipartisan bill would
require an existing presidential task force to recommend how Congress can better thwart money
laundering by traffickers. Another federal council would suggest improvements in how U.S.
agencies train investigators to pursue such cases. The State Department would also have to factor
money laundering into its annual rating of how well countries combat human trafficking. The
House approved the bill, 408-2. It now goes to the Senate. Estimates of human trafficking victims
vary, but recent reports put the number at tens of millions of people globally. It generally includes
coerced sexual exploitation, prostitution, military service, labour and even organ donation. The
House also approved a separate bill imposing harsher penalties on predators convicted of stalking
children, including people who pursue them online. The bill would add five years to maximum
federal prison terms for convicted stalkers of minors under age 18. Victims' advocates say 7.5
million people are stalked annually in the U.S., with federal figures showing that about 1 in 4 of
them report online stalking. The bill was approved 409-2 and now goes to the Senate. The strong
bipartisan support for both bills is crucial for legislation to move through Congress in the months
approaching the November midterm elections. Partisan divisions are likely to block approval of
major measures on infrastructure, immigration, health care and other high-profile issues.
President Donald Trump is expected to sign related legislation this week making it easier for
prosecutors and sex trafficking victims to take legal action against websites that list ads for
prostitutes. Children's advocates say such advertising is one way minors are sexually exploited.
2AC — Plan Unpopular
Voters want to decrease overall immigration levels – the plan creates
backlash by increasing immigration caps
Kurtzleben 18 (Danielle Kurtzleben – political reporter assigned to NPR's Washington Desk bachelor's degree
in English from Carleton College. She also holds a master's degree in Global Communication from George Washington
University's Elliott School of International Affairs.; Article; 1/23/18; “What The Latest Immigration Polls Do (And
Don't) Say”; https://www.npr.org/2018/01/23/580037717/what-the-latest-immigration-polls-do-and-dont-say; accessed
7/1/18) [DS]
3. Americans are divided on legal immigration levels, but are more in favor of decreasing than
increasing them. For decades, Gallup has asked Americans if they think the level of legal
immigration should be "kept at its present level, increased, or decreased." In recent years,
Americans have been closely split between holding steady (38 percent as of June 2017) and
decreasing (35 percent). The remainder, around 1 in 4, want to increase legal immigration. While
the clear majority want to decrease or hold legal immigration steady, these numbers represent
a longer-term pro-immigration shift — as of the mid-1990s, two-thirds of Americans wanted to
decrease legal immigration, and only 6 or 7 percent wanted to increase it. The Politico/Morning
Consult poll asked it a different way, asking how they'd feel about halving the number of legal
immigrants over the next 10 years. It didn't offer the option for holding it steady, just varying
degrees of support or oppose. Nearly half, 48 percent, strongly or somewhat supported cutting
legal immigration in this way; 39 percent opposed it (the rest didn't know or had no opinion).
Once again, there's no majority here, but more people wanted to cut legal immigration than grow
it. The Harvard Harris poll tried the question yet another way: "In your opinion, about how many
legal immigrants should be admitted to the U.S. each year?" It then provided a series of choices:
zero to fewer than 250,000, 250,000 to 499,999 and so on up to 2.5 million or more. It's hard to
know how to interpret the results of that question without the context of current immigration
levels. As of 2016, the U.S. accepted nearly 1.2 million new legal permanent residents, according
to the Department of Homeland Security. Of those, just over half were new arrivals. The rest of
people received changes in status — for example, some might have been refugees who became
legal permanent residents. The poll found that 72 percent of people chose some number under 1
million, which might suggest that those people want to reduce legal immigration. But then, the
question didn't provide them with current immigration levels. There was no way for many of
them to know what direction they were arguing for immigration to move in. As a result, this is
one way that this poll's results may have been misleading.
2AC — Credit IL turn
Dems vote for plan with bare minimum of GOP crossovers – empirical
studies prove that’s normal means
Jeong 12---Gyung-Ho, assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at the
University of British Columbia, "Congressional Politics of U.S. Immigration Reforms:
Legislative Outcomes Under Multidimensional Negotiations" Political Research Quarterly, Vol
66, Issue 3, p. 609]
First, across the models, the most significant factor in explaining senators’ roll call voting is their
party affiliation. In most cases, intercepts are significantly different from zero, meaning that
political party as a group has a significant effect on its members’ positions. In particular, the
partisan difference is clear on the rights dimension. In all three years, Democrats preferred
granting more rights to immigrants, whereas Republicans consistently preferred limiting
rights to immigrants.
1AR — AT — Minority party
Studies prove electoral outcomes determined by individual members roll call
votes – being the minority party is irrelevant
Carson, 10 --- Jamie L. Carson is Associate Professor of Political Science, The University of
Georgia, Gregory Koger is Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Miami,
Matthew J. Lebo is Associate Professor of Political Science, Stony Brook UniversityEverett
Young is a 2009 PhD in political science from Stony Brook University, American Journal of
Political Science,Vol. 54, No. 3, July 2010, Pp. 598–616,
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/238605318_The_Electoral_Consequences_of_Party_Lo
yalty_in_Congress
The preceding discussion raises an important question for students of legislative politics: What
exactly is the type of behavior most likely to upset voters? To be sure, an overall pattern of
legislative voting that is viewed as too dissimilar from constituent interests can result in a
premature departure from Congress. As noted above, many prior studies have sought to explain
the effects of roll-call voting on election results in terms of the underlying ideology of votes cast
by a legislator. Yet, what we know about the individual psychology of voters tells us that voters
neither understand ideological concepts like liberalism and conservatism very well nor do they
have an easy time placing events in theoretical terms like ideology (see, e.g., Converse 1964;
Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991, 95–96, 188). Perhaps more central to voters in
congressional elections are concepts of partisanship. Voters may be much more comfortable
identifying themselves as Democrats or Republicans than they are as liberals or conservatives
(Bartels 2000; Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1964; Kinder 1998). If so, they would have a
much stronger reaction to political actions taken by a legislator classified in terms of the
legislator’s partisan opposition than his or her ideological opposition. Since “members of
Congress are far less familiar than the president to most voters, it is easy to accept the proposition
that party identification is a far more important determinant of congressional than of presidential
voting” (Mann and Wolfinger 1980, 619). In the current era of highly polarized politics,
ingroup/outgroup dynamics may be more prevalent with respect to Democrats versus Republicans
than to liberals versus conservatives. If partisan considerations motivate citizens’ voting
decisions, legislators may pay steep electoral costs for a pattern of extreme party loyalty. If voters
place greater weight on partisanship than on ideology when evaluating behavior in Congress, then
past research has largely mischaracterized the connection between roll-call voting and citizen
evaluation.Many studies have used roll calls to understand congressional structure and behavior
but have mostly framed these votes in ideological terms. While ideology and partisanship are
closely related—that is, ideology can predict partisanship—it is perhaps the latter concept, and
not the former, that is the more direct cause of electoral outcomes.4 4In one of the few studies
that have systematically examined the electoral effects of both ideological and partisan extremity,
Erikson (1971) found that the effects of both factors are very similar in terms of electoral
accountability If so, the partisan nature of roll calls should help us understand how voters hold
legislators accountable. How do voters become aware of excess partisanship by their elected
representatives? While most roll calls remain outside of the electoral arena, studies of legislative
behavior suggest that incumbents are riskaverse and worry about their votes because they suspect
some roll calls may become electorally salient (Arnold 1990; Bianco, Spence, and Wilkerson
1996; Fiorina 1974; Mayhew 1974), and they can never be absolutely certain which roll calls will
figure prominently in the next election. In fact, the more divisive or salient the roll call, the more
likely it is to generate attention from outside interests, especially if the overall pattern of
legislative voting is perceived as being too far out of touch with district sentiment (Carson 2005;
Jacobson 2009; Mann and Wolfinger 1980). Arnold (1990, 46) argues that legislators must be
careful when casting roll calls because citizens may use any number of the incumbents’ actions as
cues when engaging in retrospective voting. Incumbents must also establish voting records that
seek to dissuade challengers from exposing inconsistencies. “The fear is not simply that citizens
will notice on their own when a legislator errs, but that challengers will investigate fully a
legislator’s voting record and then share their interpretations of how he or she has gone wrong”
(Arnold 1990, 272–73). Indeed, “a prominent position on the wrong side of a major issue
[can]...galvanize potential opponents” (Jacobson 1987, 139). Wright (1978, 446) maintains that it
is not necessary for issues to account for much variance in election outcomes since electorally
insecure legislators only require token incentives to take note of the policy interests of their
constituents. He also suggests that “since the candidate’s issue stance is one of the few factors
relevant to his reelection that is also within his control, the representative is well advised to bring
his issue positions into line with those of his constituency. Not to do so could be the determining
factor in electoral defeat” (459). Media coverage surrounding salient votes in Congress suggests
that legislators have sufficient reason to worry about their roll calls being politicized. Media
coverage of showdown votes in Congress can expose “attentive publics” (Arnold 1990, 64–65) to
an incumbent’s roll-call choices. As a result, those individuals most capable of exploiting
legislators’ voting records for political advantage—prospective candidates, political activists,
and social elites—have ample opportunities to become aware of roll-call votes and transform
them into electorally salient political issues. This, in turn, can be sufficient for the roll call to
have an impact at the polls.5 5As Fiorina asserts, “an informed, issue conscious citizenry (in the
best traditions of democratic theory) may not be crucially important for representative
government. The entire district need not be watching, just some part of it—a potential
challenger, newspaper editor, interest group, or lone, informed citizen. Nor need they be watching
at the time of the vote; just so they dig up the dirt before the election” (1974, 123). It is even more
likely that party unity votes will attract considerable media attention given that a majority of
members in both parties are taking opposing sides on the issues under consideration. Whenever
possible, the party leadership attempts to make roll-call voting decisions as easy as it can for its
members on most legislation that comes before Congress. While the majority party wants to win,
it frequently does not need its entire membership to fall in line to do so. Moreover, the party
leadership is preoccupied with maintaining its majority status, and doing so occasionally requires
placating representatives who represent crosspressured districts (Arnold 1990). In order to
maximize the likelihood the party will win while simultaneously minimizing its loss of seats, the
party leadership must be strategic in choosing when to pressure members on controversial
legislation. Thus, when the party leadership finds it has more votes than necessary to pass a bill
(or realizes it does not have enough votes to win), it will release extraneous, cross-pressured
members to vote with their constituencies.6 6Griffin (2006) finds that elected officials who
represent competitive House districts tend to be more responsive to their constituents’
preferences. These legislators might otherwise find it difficult to support the party position on
controversial legislation (Cox and McCubbins 2007; Desposato and Petrocik 2003; King and
Zeckhauser 2003; Mayhew 1974). At other times, i.e., when an upcoming vote becomes critical
to the collective reputation of a party, the political stakes may be too high to allow crosspressured members to defect on important legislative issues. Party leaders may be more reluctant
to allow a member to defect if it is on a procedural issue, as this is where we should expect to see
the majority party attempting to structure the legislative agenda (Cox and McCubbins 2005; Cox
and Poole 2002; Jenkins, Crespin, and Carson 2005; Theriault 2008). Party loyalty in voting can
thus become a campaign issue in two distinct ways: a challenger can criticize an incumbent’s
overall pattern of voting (“Smith votesin lockstepwith her party”) or specific votes on which an
incumbent joined with his or her party (“Smith sided with her party bosses on the minimum
wage”). This article explores the extent to which elected representatives are held accountable for
loyalty to their political party. When the stakes are high, and policy outcomes are at risk, the
majority party leadership has a lot riding on the final outcome.7 7This is not meant to suggest,
however, that minority party leaders fail to recognize the importance of these types of votes.
Indeed, minority party leaders often try to maintain high levels of party cohesion on the off
chance they can pick off a few members of the majority and “roll” them in the process (Cox and
McCubbins 2005). Failing that, they may seek to force as many majority members as possible to
cast votes that can be used against them in the next election. In such cases, party leaders may
place greater pressure on rank-and-file members to support the party’s position. In other words,
there is reason to suspect theoretically that the degree of party pressure placed on legislators may
be conditional upon a variety of circumstances as well as the specific electoral prospects of the
legislators asked to support the political party. Drawing upon legislative voting behavior since the
1950s, we move beyond prior work that has focused exclusively on ideological extremity and
examine whether party unity directly affects incumbent electoral success in the U.S. House given
the theoretical linkages outlined above
1AR — Pro-immigration
Dems perceived as the pro-immigrant party – they get the blame.
Khalid 18---Asma, NPR political reporter, "How Immigration Could Motivate Democrats In
2018" NPR, February 18, https://www.npr.org/2018/02/18/586475474/how-immigration-couldmotivate-democrats-in-2018]
Immigration appears thoroughly ingrained in the Democratic brand. When the center-left
think tank Third Way conducted surveys after the 2016 election with voters, nearly all of them
pointed to the same thing. "When we asked people what Democrats stood for, immigration was
one of the biggest words that came up in the word cloud that people used to discuss Democrats,"
said Lanae Erickson Hatalsky, vice president for social policy and politics at Third Way.
"[Immigration] was a mainstay of how people saw the Democratic Party."
DA – Deficits
Notes
This CBO analysis was done on HR 2473 which was a bill that passed the
house in 2017 that does the aff plus some extra topical stuff
2AC — No link
0% risk of a link — increasing T-visas would not increase the deficit or spend
a significant amount of money
CBO 17 (Congressional Budget Office, independent non-partisan agency that analyzes the
financial implications of legislation, “Cost Estimate: H.R. 2473 Put Trafficking Victims First Act
of 2017”, https://www.cbo.gov/system/files?file=115th-congress-20172018/costestimate/hr2473.pdf)
H.R. 2473 would require the Department of Justice (DOJ), within three years of enactment, to
undertake several activities to assist victims of trafficking. DOJ would have to initiate pilot
programs to test methods of collecting data on sex and labor trafficking, survey trafficking
victims who have used services available to them, and report to the Congress on certain issues
related to human trafficking. Based on information from DOJ, CBO estimates that implementing
the act would cost about $2 million over the 2018-2020 period for additional DOJ programs; such
spending would be subject to the availability of appropriated funds. Enacting the legislation
would not affect direct spending or revenues; therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures do not
apply. CBO estimates that enacting H.R. 2473 would not increase net direct spending or onbudget deficits in any of the four consecutive 10-year periods beginning in 2028. H.R. 2473
contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act and would not affect the budgets of state, local, or tribal governments. The CBO staff
contact for this estimate is Mark Grabowicz. The estimate was approved by H. Samuel Papenfuss,
Deputy Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.
DA – Coop Good
2AC — Cooperation Good
Lack of obtaining status prior to having to provide assistance makes it that
much harder for victims to effectively aid law enforcement---giving them an
opportunity to settle in the United States makes it comparatively easier to
obtain relevant information
Chakraborti 14 — Aretha Chakraborti, J.D. May 2014, Columbia Law School; M.Phil. 2010,
University of Cambridge; B.A. 2008, Northwestern University, “Article: Alien HumanTrafficking Victims in The United States: Examining the Constitutionality of The TVPA And
INA's Assistance Requirements,” 17 U. Pa. J.L. & Soc. Change 55, Lexis Nexis
Another possible interest is promoting trafficker prosecution. However, discrimination on the
basis of alienage to block certification and federal services receipt unless the alien victim is
willing to testify does not serve this interest either. Without removal from traumatizing ICE
detention or HHS processing, and without healthcare, counseling, English-language
assistance, and other long-term services that can rebuild a victim's sense of security and
individual personhood, how capable or effective can a victim actually be in assisting an
investigation or prosecution? 71 Limiting the care received by an alien victim by hinging
service receipt on [*71] willingness to assist undermines the victim's actual capacity to assist,
72 and thereby does not support the prosecutorial interest purported by the TVPA. Here, the
discrimination contravenes the interest alleged rather than supports it.
Even if the neg wins the rest of the link turn---it’s irrelevant because
subpoenas act as a failsafe if the testimony could be make or break for a
trafficker’s trial
Chakraborti 14 — Aretha Chakraborti, J.D. May 2014, Columbia Law School; M.Phil. 2010,
University of Cambridge; B.A. 2008, Northwestern University, “Article: Alien HumanTrafficking Victims in The United States: Examining the Constitutionality of The TVPA And
INA's Assistance Requirements,” 17 U. Pa. J.L. & Soc. Change 55, Lexis Nexis
As was the case in changing INA language, the better option is that the Court should recommend
the TVPA remove its assistance requirement as a condition for certification and services
receipt. Federal and state investigators and prosecutors can still seek out or subpoena the
assistance of alien and citizen victims. However alien victim services receipt will not be hinged
on willingness to assist, and predictably, post-service receipt aliens may be more willing to
come forward to assist, thereby increasing their likelihood for receiving CP status. In turn,
investigators and prosecutors may receive more information to help fight trafficking, which
could justify increased federal budget allocations toward victim services programs.
Deportation not only is terrifying for the trafficking victim but also allows
them to be re-trafficked into the United States---which only serves to bolster
traffickers
Chakraborti 14 — Aretha Chakraborti, J.D. May 2014, Columbia Law School; M.Phil. 2010,
University of Cambridge; B.A. 2008, Northwestern University, “Article: Alien Human-
Trafficking Victims in The United States: Examining the Constitutionality of The TVPA And
INA's Assistance Requirements,” 17 U. Pa. J.L. & Soc. Change 55, Lexis Nexis
Yet, human trafficking victims often lack the capacity to assist due to the heinous, coercive, and
life-threatening nature of the crimes committed against them and for why the TVPA was
established originally. Thus, hinging services and status grants on victim assistance for alien
human trafficking victims not only prevents aliens from receiving the help that they need, but
facilitates their removal and deportation back to countries where they likely were trafficked in
the first place. The connection between assistance and services or status grants and the low
numbers of T visa grants confirms its harmful effect on the achievement of the TVPA's goals.
Thus, the assistance requirement not only places an onerous, discriminatory burden on alien
victims, but it undermines the TVPA.
Requiring victims to cooperate with Law enforcement puts them in danger
and directly effects their mental health
Gott 5
Lynsay Gott Associate Attorney at Kozoll & Associates Immigration Law PLLC, Senior
Attorney WMR Immigration Law Group, PC, Human Rights USA Acting Executive Director
Human Rights USA, Program Director Human Rights USA, Human Rights USA Staff Attorney
& Equal Justice Works Fellow Human Rights USA, Research Fellow University of Cincinnati
College of Law, (“UNREALISTIC BURDENS: HOW THE T VISA AND ASYLUM LAW
FAIL TO PROTECT MANY VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING”, Immigration and Nationality Law
Review, 2005,
https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/inlr26&div=20&g_sent=1&casa_token=
&collection=journals, Hein Online) EH
Law enforcement officials report that many victims are reluctant to talk about the traffickers.28
Some remain in danger from traffickers in the United States or in their home countries, and
may also fear for their families' safety. Cooperating with the prosecution could prove
dangerous.29 Trafficked people may also have a built-in fear of police, derived from previous
experiences with corrupt officials.3 " Additionally, medical evidence indicates that posttraumatic stress disorder-from which trafficking victims may suffer--causes cognitive difficulties
and memory loss, and discussing their experiences can lead to further trauma.3 Even for
those victims willing to cooperate with law enforcement, acquiring a T visa can remain an
imposing task. Trafficking victims are not provided counsel to assist in the process of applying
for a T visa or the benefits and services available under the TVPA, and many must navigate the
process alone.32 To obtain legal status under the TVPA, victims must still prove "extreme
hardship involving unusual and severe harm" upon removal.3 " This standard leaves less
room for broad judicial interpretation than "extreme hardship" alone; Congress tellingly chose
this over a "well founded fear of retribution" standard.34 Victims who do provide assistance to
law enforcement and then fail to receive a T visa, may find themselves in greater danger
from retribution-seeking traffickers, with no help from the United States.35 The cap on
yearly T visas provides a further limit to its usefulness. Of the 14,000-50,000 victims trafficked
into the United States each year, no more than 5,000 can receive the full protection and assistance
of the U.S. government under the TVPA. Only 136 T visas were granted in 2004, along with 484
grants of continued presence,36 raising the question of how seriously officials have taken the
goal of protecting and assisting victims. Victims whose experiences do not fit the requirements
of the T visa may be powerless to extricate themselves from the danger posed by international
trafficking. Those who cannot get T visas will eventually be subjected to forced repatriation, a
clear violation of human rights norms,37 and traffickers may be waiting for women who return
home.38 The U.S. government has no authority to help victims who suffer retribution after
repatriation or to punish the perpetrators in their home countries. Yet, corruption in their
native country may prevent victims and their families from receiving any assistance from the
local government. Members of trafficking rings are often powerful and influential people in their
communities. 39 Deported victims may also face isolation from their communities because of
their prostitution activities, even being turned away by their families. For example, some
trafficking victims who returned to their native Albania were killed by their shamed
families.4 " Others could be punished by local law enforcement for having illegally left their
home countries.4 1 Finally, people victimized by traffickers wholly in another country who
then escape to the United States would not be eligible for T visas, nor would people who only
fell victim to traffickers after entering the United States. Overall, the TVPA framework
leaves many victims without sufficient access to aid and protection.
2AC — No Impact — Terror
No nuke terror — detection solves and no expertise
Seitz 16 (Sam, Director of Nuclear Security Studies @ the Global Intelligence Trust, “Why
WMD Terrorism Isn’t as Scary as it Seems”
https://politicstheorypractice.wordpress.com/2016/08/26/why-wmd-terrorism-isnt-as-scary-as-itseems/)
Of all the potential WMD terror attacks, nuclear attacks seem to generate the most fear among the public. This is not surprising. After all, nuclear
weapons represent the pinnacle of humans’ destructive potential, and Hollywood frequently utilizes nuclear weapons to drive the plot in movies ranging
from Dr. Strangelove to The Avengers. Fortunately, though, there
is very little risk of terrorists acquiring or detonating
nuclear weapons, particularly in large, Western metropolises. The reason for this is simple; it is exceedingly difficult for
terrorists to acquire and transport nuclear weapons without being detected and stopped. First,
terrorists would have to break into heavily guarded facilities, likely in Russia or the United States, and steal
weapons weighing multiple tons. Then, after securing the weapons, these terrorists would need to escape
while being pursued by elite security forces. Assuming the terrorists are able to escape, they would then need
highly skilled technicians to assemble the nuclear device, as nuclear weapons held in storage are almost always broken
down into their constituent parts so as to prevent unauthorized use. The terrorists would have to do this while being sought
after by the most powerful and well-funded intelligence networks in the world, and would
then need to transport the nuclear device into a major city without being detected. According to
John Mueller, an expert on nuclear terrorism at Ohio State University, the risk of a successful
nuclear terrorist attack occurring is, therefore, less than one in three billion (1). Certain analysts contend that
while the risk of terrorists stealing nuclear weapons is low, it is possible that terrorists might simply construct their own nuclear devices instead. This
Terrorists
would need highly specific blueprints detailing how to construct a nuclear device, access to
highly enriched uranium or plutonium, and a secure, well-equipped site to construct the weapon.
As Mueller points out, the odds of all of these conditions being met are quite low. Moreover, the need for so many complex and
uncommon materials — highly enriched uranium, heavy industrial equipment, etc. — would
raise suspicion among intelligence analysts, increasing the chance of detection. Even if
intelligence agencies missed these clues one of the many middle-men used to acquire these
materials might inform on the terrorist network, either for profit or because of moral qualms (1).
scenario is even less likely than nuclear theft, though, as the production of nuclear weapons is an exceedingly complicated task.
---Trafficking Neg---
--Offcase--
T — LPR
Notes
Sets up the asylum cp
1NC — Shell
Interpretation: Immigration means granting permanent legal status.
IRS 18 (Internal Revenue Service, “Immigration Terms and Definitions Involving Aliens,” 118-18, https://www.irs.gov/individuals/international-taxpayers/immigration-terms-anddefinitions-involving-aliens)
Immigrant An alien who has been granted the right by the USCIS to reside permanently in the United States
and to work without restrictions in the United States. Such an individual is also known known as a Lawful Permanent
Resident (LPR). All immigrants are eventually issued a "green card" (USCIS Form I-551), which is the evidence of the alien’s LPR status. LPR’s
who are awaiting the issuance of their green cards may bear an I-551 stamp in their foreign passports. Immigrant visas are available for
aliens (and their spouses and children) who seek to immigrate based on their job skills. An alien who has
the right combination of skills, education, and/or work experience, and is otherwise eligible, may be able to live permanently in the United States. Per
USCIS, there
are five employment-based immigrant visa preferences (categories): EB-1, EB-2, EB-3,
EB-4 and EB-5. Refer to the USCIS Permanent Worker web site for more details. Nonimmigrant An alien who has been
granted the right to reside temporarily in the United States. Each nonimmigrant is admitted into the U.S. in the
nonimmigrant status which corresponds to the type of visa issued. Aliens in some nonimmigrant statuses are permitted to be employed in the United
States, and others are not. Some nonimmigrant statuses have strict time limits for the alien’s stay in the U.S., while others do not. Each
nonimmigrant status has rules and guidelines. A nonimmigrant who violates one of these rules or
guidelines will fall "out of status." A nonimmigrant who remains "out of status" for at least 180 days is deportable and if deported will
be unable to re-enter the United States for 3 years. A nonimmigrant who remains "out of status" for at least 365 days is deportable and if deported will be
unable to re-enter the United States for 10 years. Each nonimmigrant status has rules and guidelines, which must be followed in order for the
nonimmigrant to remain "in status." A nonimmigrant who violates one of these rules or guidelines will fall "out of status." An nonimmigrant who remains
"out of status" for at least 180 days is deportable and will be unable to re-enter the United States for 3 years. A nonimmigrant who remains "out of status"
for at least 365 days is deportable and will be unable to re-enter the United States for 10 years. See Taxation of Aliens by Visa Type and Immigration
Status for a summary of visa types. Details on the types of nonimmigrant visas may be found on the refer to the Department of State’s Travel web page.
A list of nonimmigrant visa types, along with the corresponding employment authorization provisions, may be viewed at
the Social Security Administration’s Employment Authorization for Non-immigrants web site.
Violation: Sex Trafficking victims receive T nonimmigrant VISAS — this is
distinct from LPR status which they must then apply to get
USCIS ND, United States citizenship and immigration services, “Victims of Human
Trafficking: T nonimmigrant status”, ND, https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/victims-humantrafficking-other-crimes/victims-human-trafficking-t-nonimmigrant-status
T nonimmigrant status is a temporary immigration benefit that enables certain victims of a severe
form of human trafficking to remain in the United States for up to 4 years if they have assisted
law enforcement in an investigation or prosecution of human trafficking. T nonimmigrant status is also available
for certain qualifying family members of trafficking victims. T nonimmigrants are eligible for employment
authorization and certain federal and state benefits and services. T nonimmigrants who qualify
may also be able to adjust their status and become lawful permanent residents (obtain a Green
Card). Congress created this status (commonly referred to as a T visa) in October 2000 as part of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection
Act. Human trafficking, also known as trafficking in persons, is a form of modern-day slavery in which traffickers use force, fraud, or coercion to compel
individuals to provide labor or services, including commercial sex. Traffickers often take advantage of vulnerable individuals, including those lacking
lawful immigration status. T
visas offer protection to victims and strengthen the ability of law enforcement
agencies to investigate and prosecute human trafficking . Under federal law, a “severe form of trafficking” is: Sex
trafficking: When someone recruits, harbors, transports, provides, solicits, patronizes, or obtains a person for the purpose of a commercial sex act, where
the commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud, or coercion, or the person being induced to perform such act is under 18 years of age; or Labor
trafficking: When someone recruits, harbors, transports, provides, or obtains a person for labor or services through the use of force, fraud, or coercion for
the purpose of involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery.
Voting Issue:
1. Limits — expanding the topic to include non-immigrants makes us
debate things like infinitesimally small changes to visas — wrecks clash
since we can’t predict the affs we have to debate
2. Ground — destroys key negative arguments like temporary status
counterplans and LPR bad DAs like deficit spending and brain drain
— decks competitive equity
3. Precision — it’s the most legally predictable definition because it’s
used by the government — best model for policymaking
T — Substantial
Notes
T — Substantial is an awful arg
1NC — Shell
Interpretation — substantial is at least 10%.
Mickels 8 (Alissa, JD Candidate — Hastings College of Law, “Summary of Existing US Law
Affecting Fourth Sector Organizations”, 7-17,
http://www.fourthsector.net/attachments/7/original/Summary_of_US_Law_Affecting_
FS.pdf?1229493187)
Substantial v. insubstantial: Modern courts consider competition with commercial firms as “strong evidence of a substantial
nonexempt purpose.” Living Faith, Inc. v. Comm’r, 60 T.C.M. 710, 713 (1990). Although the tax court has held that the definition of
insubstantial is fact specific, it has found that less than ten percent of a charity’s total efforts is
“insubstantial”, World Family Corp. v. Comm’r, 78 T.C. 921 (1982), where as unrelated business activity generating one-third of an
organizations revenue does not qualify for tax-exempt status. Orange County Agric. Soc’y, Inc. v. Comm’r, 55 T.C.M. 1602, 1604 (1988), aff’d 893 F.2d
647 (2d Cir. 1990). However, this may be changing after an increasing emphasis on commensurate test.
There are 1 million legal immigrants each year!
Wikipedia 18 (“Immigration to the United States”,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Immigration_to_the_United_States)
How many immigrants are allowed in the US each year? Since 2000, legal immigrants to the
United States number approximately 1,000,000 per year, of whom about 600,000 are Change of Status who already are
in the U.S. Legal immigrants to the United States now are at their highest level ever, at just over 37,000,000 legal immigrants.
Violation -- Plan lets in 5 thousand more. That’s only 0.5%.
1AC Welch 17 — Shannon Welch, Juris Doctor Candidate at Duke University School of Law,
“Note: Human Trafficking and Terrorism: Utilizing National Security Resources to Prevent
Human Trafficking in The Islamic State,” 24 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol'y 165, Spring, 2017, Lexis
Nexis, Language Modified*
With the advent of ISIS and the rise of terrorism, human trafficking is now globally used for the
dual purposes of fear and funding these huge groups. Human trafficking is now enshrined by ideology.20 As
many as 5,000 women are now enslaved in the Islamic State, trafficked around the region at alarming rates.21
ISIS uses fear, dehumanization, and violence to oppress women. Moreover, they use human trafficking to systematically target and decimate ethnic and
religious minorities in the region. U.N. reports state that ISIS human trafficking is part of their broader “policy that aims to suppress, permanently cleanse
or expel, or in some instances, destroy those communities within areas of its control.”22 The Islamic State indoctrinates its fighters, as part of its warped
creed, that rape [sexual assault] and sexual slavery are a form of worship, punishing the non-believer.23 Not
only is this market a
clear source of income for the ISIS, but also is deeply imbedded in their ideology. ISIS is one
of the first organizations to create a sophisticated, openly public market for human
trafficking. Zainab Bangura, a U.N. special representative, described the methodical and institutionalized
approach of the ISIS to human trafficking. After attacking a village, [ISIS] splits women from men and executes boys and
men aged 14 and over . . . [G]irls are stripped naked, tested for virginity and examined for breast size and prettiness. The youngest, and those considered
the prettiest virgins fetch higher prices and are sent to Raqqa, the IS stronghold. There is a hierarchy: sheikhs get first choice, then emirs, then fighters . .
.We heard about one girl who was traded 22 times, and another, who had escaped, told us that the sheikh who had captured her wrote his name on the
back of her hand to show that she was his “property.”24 From
capture, to market, to treatment, to resale, ISIS
instituted a ruthless system of human trafficking, sexual violence, and slavery. “Their captors appeared to
have a system . . . of inventorying the women, as well as their own lexicon.25 Women and girls were referred to as ‘Sabaya,’ meaning slave, followed by
their name.26 Some were bought by wholesalers, who photographed and gave them numbers, to advertise them to potential buyers.” 27 Women
are both terrorized and used for lucrative profit, feeding the internal economy of the Islamic
State and rewarding fighters.28 Human trafficking is now being carried out in a large scale,
systematic, public, and institutionalized manner, and must be combatted in a new manner. Rather than
small autonomous and scattered perpetrators, ISIS has built the foundation of their terrorist network on the backs
of human trafficking victims. Human trafficking is now an act of war and must be treated as such.29 While the direct
victims of ISIS’s slave market have not yet permeated throughout the United States, their sale
funds our enemies. There is a very real possibility that ISIS or other terrorist organizations
will use existing trafficking networks in South America to enter across our borders
undetected. Threatening our domestic integrity and international security, the issue implicates public health, labor
exploitation, sexual abuse, counterterrorism, and child welfare concerns. Only a coordinated global approach attacking the
source of trafficking will successfully combat this growing threat.
Voting issue --Limits — They justify an infinite number of affirmatives — there are
thousands of ways the aff could tinker with the scope, target, or means of any
of the thousand immigration mechanisms which makes it impossible for the
neg to prepare.
Ground — Allows them to spike out of any disad by claiming that they’re
only a minor reduction. Forces reliance on generics, prevents topic education.
CP — Asylum
Notes
Net-benefit: deficits, cooperation good, maybe midterms
1NC — Shell
Text: The United States federal government should interpret asylum claims
of victims of attempted trafficking in accordance with:
 the humanitarian concerns that led to the Refugee Act,
 the United Nations, and
 international interpretations of refugee law.
T-visas fail to allow all victims of trafficking — granting asylum status allows
them to stay conditionally
Karvelis 13 (Kelly, BA in English from Washington and Lee, magna cum laude, JD from
Northwestern, is legal council for the Cook County Treasurers office, “The Asylum Claim for
Victims of Attempted Trafficking”,
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1105&context=njlsp
, Language Modified*
VII. CONCLUSION It is clear that victims of attempted human trafficking constitute a particular
social group eligible for asylum under the INA, and sorely need grants of asylum to escape fates
that could entail psychological torture, rape [sexual assault], physical violence, and enslavement.
While most circuits have held that victims of human trafficking do not comprise a specific social
group entitled to asylum under the INA, some of these victims are eligible for Tvisas, which
permit them to remain in the U.S. on the basis of the hardships they have suffered in being
trafficked.159 However, while most circuits have also rejected the social group claim for targets
of human trafficking whose assailants have not (yet) successfully trafficked them, those at risk of
becoming trafficking victims are not eligible for T-visas and have little other recourse if their
asylum claims are unsuccessful.160 By denying the refugee status of victims of human trafficking
attempts, U.S. courts are creating a perverse policy that requires this group to experience the
extreme psychological and physical torment that trafficking induces before the U.S. offers them
any protection. Despite official legislation suggesting otherwise, the discrepancy “between
available domestic protection and the imperatives of international obligation results in a serious
denial of justice to many asylum-seekers.”161 Instead of restricting refugee eligibility so
severely, U.S. courts should carry out the intention to prevent human rights abuses for which
Congress enacted the Refugee Act. Thus, under current U.S. policy, in order for courts to provide
victims of attempted trafficking with an escape from this very real threat of persecution, they
must first be persecuted. Sadly, if these women are trafficked, then ineffective government
prosecution of traffickers and the use by traffickers of violence, threats of violence against family
members, and psychological manipulation to keep these women enslaved all raise doubts that
these victims will receive another opportunity to escape.162 As it stands today, U.S. courts are
applying arbitrarily exclusionary standards that thwart the intentions of the drafters of the
Refugee Act and serve to endanger genuine refugees. Instead, the U.S. judicial system should
interpret the asylum claims of victims of attempted trafficking in accordance with the
humanitarian concerns that led to the Refugee Act and the inclusive U.N. and international
interpretations of refugee law. Only then will the purposes of the Refugee Act be fulfilled and
will victims of attempted human trafficking be able to rebuild their terrorized lives anew in the
United States.
CP — ICC
Notes
Net-benefit: midterms, cooperation good
1NC — Clarification
The International Criminal Court should:
- create a uniform definition for human trafficking,
- prosecute human trafficking as a crime against humanity under the
Rome Statute, and
- incorporate the Palermo Protocol.
Clarification’s key
Kim 11 (Jane Kim, AB Harvard Law, JD from Columbia Law, “PROSECUTING HUMAN
TRAFFICKING AS A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY UNDER THE ROME STATUTE,”
2011, <WMB> Columbia Law, http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/gslonline/files/2011/02/JaneKim_GSL_Prosecuting-Human-Trafficking-as-a-Crime-Against-Humanity-Under-the-RomeStatute-2011.pdf)
To prosecute human trafficking cases, the ICC must confront the challenges of defining
trafficking, the shadow of armed conflict in the ICC’s developing jurisprudence, and the
risk of overlooking the gravity of human trafficking. This paper concludes by urging the ICC to look beyond the
situations to which international law has traditionally applied. To realize the promise of the Rome Statute, this paper
urges the ICC to incorporate the Palermo Protocol, common purpose, and the exceptional and global effects of the
trafficking market in approaching human trafficking as a crime against humanity. I. INTERPRETING THE ROME STATUTE Article 7(1) of the Rome
Statute enumerates acts that, “when
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed
against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack,” constitute a “crime against
humanity.”13 Article 7(1)(c), the “enslavement” provision, is defined under Article 7(2)(c) as the “exercise of any or all the powers attaching to
the right of ownership over a person and includes the exercise of such power in the course of trafficking in persons, in particular women and children.”14
The Elements of Crimes to the Rome Statute explicate that exercising “any or all powers
attaching to the right of ownership over one or more persons” includes, but is not limited to,
“purchasing, selling, lending or bartering such a person or persons, or by imposing on them a
similar deprivation of liberty.”15 Footnote 11 to the Elements of Crimes additionally notes: 13 Rome Statute, Article 7(1). 14 Rome
Statute, Article 7(2)(c) (emphasis added). 15 Rome Statute, Elements of Crimes, Article 7(1)(c) [hereinafter Elements of Crimes]. JANE KIM “It is
understood that such
deprivations of liberty may, in some circumstances, include exacting forced
labour or otherwise reducing a person to a servile status as defined in the Supplementary
Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery of 1956. It is also
understood that the conduct described in this element includes trafficking in persons, in particular women and children.”16 On its face, “trafficking in
persons, in particular women and children,” is clearly included in the text of Article 7(1)(c) of the Rome Statute and in Note 11 of the Elements of
precise definition of trafficking — beyond the attachment of ownership over
a person or similar deprivations of liberty — is not articulated in the Statute. The absence of a
Crimes. However, the
definition of “trafficking” in the Rome Statute creates uncertainty as to the potential prosecution of trafficking as a form of modern day enslavement in
two ways. First, the
inclusion of trafficking under the Statute’s enslavement provision expands
longstanding and traditional formulations of the crime of enslavement. While the phrase “modern
day slavery” is colloquially accepted, some jurists challenge the expansive legal use of the
term “slavery” as rendering it “virtually meaningless” when it covers a wide range of
practices.17 Additionally, the reference to the Convention on the Abolition of Slavery in the Elements of Crimes to the Rome Statute and the
inclusion of the phrase “right of ownership over a person”18 questions whether or not Article 7 of the Statute applies to modern day human trafficking.
Second, differing national definitions of trafficking and the relative youth of the Palermo Protocol question whether Article 7 will only address “severe
forms of trafficking,”19 or if the Statute includes all forms of trafficking recognized by the Protocol.
The Rome Statute is more effective for international application
UNSC 3 (United Nations Security Council, “RESTORING RULE OF LAW ABSOLUTELY
ESSENTIAL FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT, REBUILDING SECURE, HUMANE
SOCIETIES, SECURITY COUNCIL TOLD,” 2003, <WMB> UN,
https://www.un.org/press/en/2003/sc7884.doc.htm)
The restoration of the rule of law was a sine qua non for the sustainable resolution of
conflict and the rebuilding of secure, orderly and humane societies, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Under-SecretaryGeneral for Peacekeeping Operations, told the Security Council this morning as it considered “Justice and the Rule of Law: the role of the United
Nations”. Too often, he said, the
United Nations had failed to give that critical sector the importance it
was due. The issue was first addressed by the Council during a ministerial-level meeting on 24 September, and today’s meeting offered non-Council
member States the opportunity to contribute to the discussion. (See Press Release SC/7880 of 24 September.) “ We can no longer afford to
treat the rule of law as a side activity in which we engage alongside political objectives”, Mr. Guéhenno
continued. In many cases, it lay at the heart of the success or failure of peacekeeping operations. It was essential to ensure that the
rule of law figured prominently even at the early stages of peace negotiations. Citing lessons learned
from Kosovo and Timor-Leste, he said Liberia would be a real test of the United Nations’ ability to move beyond a piecemeal approach to the rule of law,
and lay the foundations for a truly just and peaceful society. As judicial
and corrections mission component costs
were quite small compared with the more substantial costs of deploying a large military
force, support for the rule of law was a good investment, he added. Member States could assist by providing staffing or by serving as lead nation for
assistance to a particular sector. Standby arrangements, whereby Member States committed to provide an integrated package of resources and personnel
as soon as the need arose, should also be explored. As during the ministerial-level debate, speakers stressed the link between justice and the rule of law
and building a peaceful society. Most also saw the Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda as a step towards providing post-conflict justice and
The International
Criminal Court was seen by many to be a remedy for that, not only because of its actual
prosecutorial powers, but because of the provisions of the Rome Statute that prioritized
national prosecution of cases. In that way, the Court was seen as strengthening national systems
of justice and furthering the aims of the Council in maintaining international peace and
security.
ending the culture of impunity, while criticizing the Tribunals’ shortcomings, which many ascribed to their ad hoc nature.
1NC — Palermo
Text: The International Criminal Court should establish a definition of
human trafficking that is consistent with the Palermo Protocol and categorize
human trafficking as a Crime Against Humanity.
It solves – expanding jurisdiction is key to prosecutions
Haraldsen 14 [Janne, executive officer in the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
bachelors in Law from Westminster University 8-22-2014, "Human Trafficking as a Crime
Against Humanity: An analysis of the legal potential to prosecute human trafficking in the
International Criminal Court with reference to the trafficking of Rohingya Muslims in
Southeast Asia," No Publication, https://www.duo.uio.no/handle/10852/40117] lr
Although
the ICC has been equipped with the legal tools necessary to prosecute human trafficking, it
has not yet brought a single trafficking case to the Court. In order to fully comprehend
the bar for prosecution of human trafficking as a CAH at the ICC, the paper applies the CAH
framework to the situation of the persecuted Rohingya minority in Myanmar and Thailand in Southeast Asia. Chapter 1 will briefly introduce the rationale
This paper examines the legal potential to prosecute human trafficking as a crime against humanity (CAH) in the International Criminal Court (ICC).
behind the hypothesis as well as present the limitations of the scope of the thesis. Chapter 2 shall examine the general characteristics of human trafficking including the
universal definition in the Palermo Protocol. Chapter 3 will deal with the CAH framework, including the customary nature of human trafficking as CAH, as well as
conducting an in-depth analysis of the chapeau requirements of CAH in the Rome Statute. Chapter 4 will study the complementarity requirement and the gravity
threshold, two of the most contentious concepts concerning jurisdiction and admissibility of the ICC. Finally, chapter 5 will apply the international law on human
The objective is to analyse whether there is a
prima facie case concerning the CAH perpetrated against Rohingya in Myanmar and Thailand that may justify human
trafficking persecutions by the ICC engaging individual criminal responsibility. 1
trafficking and the CAH framework to the case study on the Rohingya minority.
.
INTRODUCTION Alongside illicit arms trade and drug trafficking, human trafficking1 is one of the three most rapidly growing organized criminal industries in the world. Although the difference may be clear on paper, the three branches of trafficking are
often intertwined. All three illicit trades have devastating consequences, causing deaths and suffering to humans commonly based on the abuse of the imbalance of power, economy or addiction. However, with human beings as its commodities, human
trafficking differs from the other two criminal trafficking industries because the International Criminal Court 2 has jurisdiction to prosecute this branch of trafficking.3 Although the ICC has been equipped with the legal tools necessary to prosecute
human trafficking, it has not yet brought a single trafficking case to the Court. 4 The potential of the ICC to expand the current legal paradigm and include other criminal offences among the Court’s current priorities is underestimated. The extensive list of
crimes included in the Rome Statute allows the Court to place new issues on the agenda and thereby reflect the wide range of offences applicable as the most serious crimes in the contemporary international community. Affecting an estimated number of
near 30 million people worldwide according to international NGOs5 , human trafficking is one of the main challenges in our time. The ICC has already demonstrated independence and capacity to make controversial choices6 and hand down landmark
decisions7 and this paper examines whether the time has come for the ICC to prosecute trafficking in persons as a crime against humanity8 by opening up investigations into the situation of the persecuted Rohingya9 minority in Southeast Asia with a
particular focus on Myanmar10 and Thailand. Following fifty years of ruthless military rule, the Southeast Asian State of Myanmar has opened up to democratic changes with president Mr. Thein Sein. The democratic development includes drastic
economic reforms and the release of many political prisoners, most noteworthy Miss Aung San Suu Kyi’s release from house arrest. 11 However, internal violent conflicts based on ethnic divisions prevail in many regions, in particular in the Arakan state
southwest in the country with borders to Bangladesh. The Rohingya living in Arakan is often referred to as the most persecuted minority in the world.12 The discrimina tion and persecution against the Muslim stateless minority make them especially
vulnerable to human traffickers when trying to escape to neighbouring countries. The Rohingya are also vulnerable for trafficking and extortion in neighbouring countries like Thailand. There is already a wide range of international organizations and
academics that have been claiming for years that Rohingya are victims of CAH, 13 substantiating the claim that Rohingya might be victims of enslavement as one of several enlisted acts under Article 7 of the Rome Statute. Among those alleging that CAH
have occurred against Rohingya in Myanmar is Prof. William A. Schabas, who in relation to his report “Crimes Against Humanity in Western Burma: The Situation of the Rohingyas” stated the following; “Describing the violations as crimes against
humanity raises the possibility that cases against those Burmese officials who are responsible could be referred to the International Criminal Court." 14 Hence, there are already important voices within international law pushing for the involvement of
the ICC in regards to the situation of the Rohingya. The inclusion of human trafficking charges as enslavement under Article 7 supplementing the other potential CAHindictments does therefore not seem far-fetched. The objective of this paper is
subsequently the examination of whether the requisite elements for such a ground-breaking trial at the ICC is present, feasible and credible. 1.1. ARGUMENT AND STRUCTURE This dissertation analyses the ICC framework to prosecute human trafficking
cases that fall within the enslavement category deriving from Article 7 of the Rome Statute, and further examines whether the Court ought to open investigations into the situation of Rohingya in Myanmar and Thailand15 in order to evaluate whether the
The legal concept of CAH was chosen over war
crimes and genocide for two grounds. Firstly, human trafficking is explicitly referred to in
the enlisted act of enslavement under Article 7 of the Rome Statute, making CAH the
natural selection of a legal framework for the prosecution of human trafficking at the ICC.
Secondly, CAH is more suitable and easier to establish for the situation of Rohingya than war crimes or genocide. Although the
Myanmar army is frequently involved in the persecution and sometimes trafficking of Rohingya, the concept of war crimes requires the
existence of an international or internal armed conflict for its application16, and that do not seem to be the
situation reaches the threshold required for prosecution of CAH in general and trafficking in persons in particular.
case neither in Myanmar nor in Thailand. Likewise, regardless of the existing evidence of ethnic cleansing in Myanmar, state policy seem to be more inclined to forcefully
remove the minority group than to exterminate the group as such. Although that may well fall within the scope of genocide, it has been argued that
international tribunals has set the bar high for prosecuting genocide when there is lack of a
clear intention to physically destroy the victimized group in question.
17 In order to assess the legal potential of the ICC to prosecute human trafficking with the aim of an application of law to the
case of Rohingya in Southeast Asia, an analysis of the requirements and obstacles will be carried out in the following manner; Firstly, the elements of human trafficking will be analysed, laying the basis for an application of these components to the case study of the Rohingya in chapter 5. Secondly, the various chapeau requirements to establish CAH will be carefully scrutinized, including the customary nature of enslavement as CAH, to ensure that the case study is taking all relevant criteria into
consideration. Thirdly, the conditions of admissibility to the ICC must be explored as the principle of complimentarity and the gravity threshold may set the bar high for prosecution of human trafficking at the Court. Fourthly, facts on the persecution against- and trafficking of Rohingya will be briefly introduced before the legal findings of the paper will be applied to the case study. The purpose of the application is to demonstrate that Rohingya are victims of human trafficking as the enlisted act of
enslavement as CAH and that the ICC subsequently have jurisdiction to prosecute the perpetrators of these offences together with other potential CAH charges.18 Although interpretation of the Rome Statute is at the core of this paper, other international criminal law jurisprudence, predominantly from the ICTY and the ICTR will be referred to in order to provide clear legal foundations for the analysis. The paper will sum up with some concluding observations on the legal potential for prosecutions of
human trafficking at the ICC with reference to the trafficking of Rohingya in Southeast Asia. 2. HUMAN TRAFFICKING Human trafficking can be difficult to define due to the countless components that make up the crime, and because it is often mistaken for smuggling or illegal migration. Common for all human trafficking, however, is unlawful movement and confinement of one or more persons for exploitation, although the means and methods may vary.19 In the early 20th century, human trafficking was
mainly understood as sexual exploitation of women and children, but the definition has later come to include other forms of trafficking.20 Human trafficking is rooted in slavery and the slave trade and some of the first conventions on the crime referred to the delinquency as white slavery. 21 The campaigning and debate on abolition of slavery was at the core in the collaboration of creating international legal instruments. Despite international efforts to abolish slavery, human trafficking has expanded with
globalization. At present, human trafficking encompass almost all types of forced work or commodification of persons, 22 although it is categorized solely as enslavement in the Rome Statute. As most criminal offences, human trafficking is also considered a violation of human rights, which are “rights and freedoms to which every human being is entitled.”23 While human trafficking has received a lot of attention as a human rights violation internationally, it has not been awarded the same focus as an
international crime by international criminal tribunals. Both the International Criminal Tribunal of former Yugoslavia 24 and the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda25 were frontrunners in their time for the development of gender crimes adjudicating cases involving rape [sexual assault] and sexual slavery as war crimes and even as CAH. 26 With the explicit inclusion of human trafficking in its Statute, the ICC could equally be a frontrunner of its time by prosecuting human trafficking as CAH. 2.1.
DEFINING HUMAN TRAFFICKING The universal definition of human trafficking was ultimately established in one of the supplementary protocols to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime27(UNCTOC) in Palermo, Italy in 2000. The General Assembly adopted the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children28, by Resolution 55/2529 and the Protocol entered into force in 2003 as the first international legally binding
instrument with a commonly agreed definition on trafficking in persons. The universal definition was aimed at the facilitation of cooperation between States in the investigation and prosecution of such crimes, in addition to the strengthening of the protection and assistance to victims of human trafficking taking full account of their human rights.30 Although the Protocol’s main purpose was inter-state cooperation, its clear and precise definition seems equally suitable for interpretation by an international
tribunal. Article 3(a) of the Palermo Protocol, defines trafficking in persons as “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum,
the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs”.31 Upon a closer examination and contrary to the beliefs of many, the Palermo definition of trafficking in persons does not require movement across borders and may subsequently occur within the borders of a State. The definition of human trafficking is widely accepted among states, with 117 signatories and 159 parties to
the Palermo Protocol.32 One of the more controversial issues in the creation of the international human trafficking legislation was defining the victim, and more specifically, whether a victim’s consent to being smuggled across borders or being voluntarily moved to work in industries considered exploitative would be excluded from the category.33 However, the universal definition was construed in a manner such as to avoid defining the victims of human trafficking altogether. Victims of human trafficking
are not defined in the Palermo Protocol, allowing for prosecutors to be flexible and adapt the definition as they see fit. The issue on whether allegations of a victim’s consent would exclude him or her as a trafficking victim have been explicitly addressed in Art. 3(b) of the Palermo Protocol, where it is stipulated that where any of the means listed in Art. 3(a) may be affirmed34; the consent of the victim is irrelevant.35 This provision serves to distinguish traffickers from migrant smugglers in situations in
which the migrant has consented to the non-exploitative conditions. Human trafficking must be distinguished from migrant smuggling. Although the two crimes often overlap or are less clear-cut in practice, there are substantial statutory differences between the two. Migrant smuggling is defined in the parallel Protocol supplementing the UNTOC, namely the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, as “the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other
material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident”36. Hence, in contrast to human trafficking, migrant smuggling do require movement across borders and may therefore not occur within the borders of a State. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, migrant smuggling does not includes an element of control or ownership nor does it include an element of exploitation, as opposed to human trafficking. The distinction between
trafficking in persons and migrant smuggling is important because most states are more lenient to assist victims of trafficking than those who have been smuggled across borders and thus perceived as voluntary, illegal and economic migrants. As previously mentioned, the distinction is less clear-cut in practice, leaving a large number of victims of human trafficking considered as illegal migrants, which, as will be shown, also is the case for most Rohingya refugees in Thailand. Similarly, economic migrants
in search of a better future often aim to prove that they are victims of trafficking in order to obtain protection, visa or residency under the asylum laws of the state of destination. The exploitative component of trafficking in persons is the crucial element for determining the existence of human trafficking. Yet, evidence of exploitation will not alone suffice in the establishment of trafficking in persons, as labour exploitation can often occur in poor societies outside the context of trafficking.37 The
distinguishing factor for labour exploitation outside and inside the context of human trafficking is that a person can consent to poor labour conditions considered exploitative, but no one can consent to being trafficked. 38 The definition of human trafficking as well as its differences from related international crimes is essential for the appreciation of further analysis of the international crime as CAH in the Rome Statute. 2.2. THE ELEMENTS OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING In order to establish the potential of
the ICC to prosecute trafficking in persons as CAH, it is necessary to examine the components of human trafficking in further detail. As will be demonstrated in chapter 5, Rohingya are victims of several of the enlisted acts constituting CAH in article 7 of the Rome Statute. However, for the purposes of this paper, only the elements of human trafficking as enslavement will be examined so as to establish the criteria for which it may constitute CAH and be prosecuted at the ICC. With the aim to include as many
means and methods of human trafficking as possible, the Palermo Protocol had to incorporate numerous elements into its definition. When dissecting the definition from the Palermo Protocol, three key elements may be found to make up the definition. These three components are the act, the means and the purpose of trafficking in persons. 39 Firstly, the acts referred to are enlisted as “recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons”40. Secondly, the crime may be carried out by
means of “threat, use of force, coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or vulnerability, giving or receiving payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person controlling another person”41. Thirdly, the purpose must be exploitation, although the exploitation itself may come in many forms, including but not limited to; prostitution, other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or similar practices, servitude or organ removal.42 Hence, in order to identify a crime as
human
trafficking ought to be prosecuted in the ICC, the inclusion of trafficking in persons as the
human trafficking, at least one of the enlisted acts, means and purposes must be fulfilled.43 For example, the victim can have been recruited (act) due to her vulnerability (means) for purposes of exploitation through prostitution (purpose). The elements of human trafficking are important for the case study examination in Chapter 5. 2.3. HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN THE ROME STATUTE As the paper argues that
enlisted act of enslavement as CAH in the Rome Statute is paramount. Curiously, in relation to the
establishment of the Court, Trinidad and Tobago wrote a letter to the UN Secretary General reiterating the need for an international court with jurisdiction to prosecute
drug trafficking.44 Although their request failed, the Rome Statute did include trafficking of persons, and one might speculate as to why trafficking of drugs or trafficking
of weapons were excluded from the Statute. Though nothing from the Travaux Préparatoires of the ICC Statute45 seems to indicate that human trafficking was included
because of its superior gravity to the other forms for trafficking,
its use of human beings as commodities certainly
makes it different from the other two. Article 7 of the Rome Statute refers to several enlisted acts as CAH “when committed as part of a widespread and
systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack”46. Several of the enlisted acts may occur as direct or indirect results of
trafficking in persons, although they are not equally relevant to this paper.47 Among the enlisted acts is enslavement in article 7(1)(c), commonly referred to as the
“trafficking clause”, with an explanation provided in article 7(2)(c), which explicitly refers to trafficking in persons, in particular women and children in the description
of the crime: “the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over a person and includes the exercise of such power in the course of
trafficking in persons, in particular women and children”48. The article is important as it illustrates the possibility of the Court to prosecute modern slavery including
human trafficking situations where these reach the gravity of CAH. However, the Statute has been criticized for the absence of a definition on human trafficking, arguably
making it difficult for the Court to prosecute such crimes.49 Although the ICC has not implemented the trafficking in persons-definition from the Palermo Protocol, the
“means” element from the definition has been recognised as customary international law and should subsequently be taken into account by the Court.50 Article 7(1)(g)
enlists those additional acts relevant for the prosecution of human trafficking for purposes of sexual exploitation. 51 In general, this subsection of article 7 is mostly
relevant for women and children, often more vulnerable to this type of human trafficking. It seems likely that the ICC will utilize the human trafficking definition from
the Palermo Protocol when the time has come for adjudication by the Court for allegations of this crime as it represents the only universal definition of the crime.
Pursuant to article 9, the Elements of Crimes document 52 may assist the ICC in interpreting and applying articles 6, 7 and 8 of the Rome Statute. The Elements of Crimes
any or all of the
powers attaching to the right of ownership must have been exercised by the perpetrator
over one or more persons.53 This may have been carried out by means of purchase, sale, loan or trade by one or more persons, or through a
document provides three explanatory notes to the requisite elements of article 7(1)(c) on the CAH of enslavement. Firstly, that
comparable deprivation of liberty.54 Forced labour, human trafficking or other forms of slavery are in some circumstances examples of such deprivations of liberty.55
Secondly, it is required that the conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population in accordance with the general
nature of article 7.56 Thirdly, the perpetrator must have known or intended that his or her conduct conformed part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against
is highly consistent with the definition of human trafficking
in the Palermo Protocol, although naturally not as detailed in its description. This is useful as it gives the ICC indications
as to the most important elements of enslavement,
a civilian population.57 The first explanatory note
namely powers of ow nership a s wel l as clea r example s of the mea ns a nd met hods for which the e nslaveme nt is carrie d out. The t wo ot her ex pla natory notes a re less he lpful as it merely re iterate s the ge neral requirement s of article 7 of t he Rome Statute. 3. CRIMES AGAINST HUMA NITY This cha pt er wil l examine the concept of CAH w ith a pa rticular focus on the cha peau requirement s of article 7 of t he Rome Statute. The a im is to l ay a solid ba sis for furt her
analy si s and appl ication of t he CAH framew ork de riv ing from the ICC Statute to the situat ion of R ohingya in Myanma r and Tha ila nd. More ove r, the following subsections wil l take into account rele vant case la w concerning CAH in gene ral, and the e nslaveme nt cat egory in particular, as a me ans to exam ine t he gene ral crite ria for e stablishing CAH. In order to j ustify the appl ication of case law from othe r inte rnat ional courts t han t he ICC, a brief asse ssme nt of t he cust omary nature CAH in ge nera l and of human tra ff icking as e nslaveme nt in partic ula r, will be prese nte d in t he foll owing subcha pter. 3.1. THE CUSTOMARY NAT URE AND DEVELOPMENT OF CAH It is purporte d that w herea s genocide or war crime s ha s cry stalize d through codification in treatie s, CAH has de velope d in c ustoma ry international law 58 (CIL59) and re flects custom. CIL refe rs to State conduct or beha viour practiced ba sed on a fe eling of a legal obl igation to be have in suc h a way. CIL is one of the core sources of inte rnat ional la w prov ide d in
article 38 of the ICJ Statute w here it is simpl y re ferred to a s “evide nce of a ge nera l practice accepted as la w”.60 The tw o re quisite e lement s for dete rmining w hethe r a legal norm has ac quire d cust omary status are State practice and opinio j uris. 61 CAH has subsiste d in C IL for deca des a nd are also esta blished a s CIL in some national courts. 62 T he London Cha rter63, creating the Nurembe rg Tribuna l, was the first lega l instrume nt of internationa l criminal la w that created a writte n codification of CAH.64 As opposed to war crim es committe d by one national aga inst anothe r, the ne w de fined crime in t he London Charte r wa s importa nt beca use it a pplie d to circum stance s where victim s and pe rpetrators sha red t he same national ity.65 This is of partic ula r releva nce to prosecution of huma n tra ffick ing where the v ictims a nd the perpetrators often are nationa ls of t he same count ry, if not statele ss. Ensla vement was a l rea dy included in the London Charte r as a n enl iste d act in art icle 6(c), althoug h the re we re no
specific re fere nces to huma n tra fficking in t he Charte r.66 The definit ion of CAH de rive d from the London Charte r changed conside rably ove r time in various internationa l legal instrume nts suc h as the Toky o (IMTFE) Charte r67, the All ied Control Council Law No. 10 (CCL10) 68, the ICTY69 , the ICTR, as well as by the Rome Stat ute. Historically, CAH was thought to re quire a n arme d confl ict to be applica ble, ill ustrated in t he London Charte r, the IMTFE Charter a nd t he ICTY Charter.70 According t o the ICTY case of Tadic, an armed conflict wa s prese nt “w hene ver the re is a re sort to armed force betwee n state s or protracted arme d viole nce betwee n g overnme ntal aut horitie s an d organized arme d groups or betwee n such g roups wit hin a State”.71 Howeve r, the ICTY Appeal s Cham ber in Tadic hel d that customary inte rnat ional la w is broade r in scope tha n Art 5 of t he ICTY statute and t hat there was subsequentl y no longer a requirement o f a nex us betwee n the CAH and a n arme d conflict.72 In fact, the CCL10 and
article 3 of the ICTR did ne ver require a link to wa r or protracted a rmed v iole nce, and the subse que nt esta blishment of the ICC Statute abol ishe d the crite ria altog ether. T here fore, as oppose d to wa r crime s, there is no re quireme nt of protracted a rmed v iole nce in order t o establish CAH, which may occur in peacetime such as huma n right s violations. The ICTR did, however, re quire t he acts to be carrie d out on discriminatory grounds, alt hough t his was not a crite rion use d by a ny ot her internationa l criminal tribuna l. In terms of the e nliste d acts, the de finition of CAH init ially involved criminal eleme nts suc h as murde r, extermination, enslav ement, de portation, pe rsecut ion and ot her inhum a ne acts, but came to later on incl ude othe r compone nts incl ude d by inte rnational tribunal s. The CCL 10, the ICTY and the ICT R expa nded t he de finition to incorporate the criminal acts of ra pe [sex ual a ssault], im prisonme nt and tort ure.73 The R ome Statute took a furt her step by adding forcible tra nsfe r of population,
enforced disa ppea rance, aparthe id, sexua l slav ery, enforced prostit ution, forced preg na ncy, enforce d sterilization a nd a ny ot her form of sexual viole nce of com para ble severity to its definition.74 Human t rafficking w as al so ex plicitl y incl uded a s CAH for t he first time in hist ory in the R ome Statute. Whe n est a blishing w hethe r enslaveme nt constitute s CIL as CAH unde r the R ome Statute, the ICC may take into account jurisprude nce and inte rp retations deve loped t hroug h case la w from the a boveme ntione d criminal tribunals, a s they al so a re re flections of custom. Henc e, whe n discussing the chapea u re quireme nts, it se ems rea sona ble to re ly on case la w from ot her crim ina l tribunal s. 3.1. 1. ENSLAVEM ENT A S A CUSTOMARY INTER NATIONAL LAW T he de finition of e nslaveme nt in t he Rome Statute w as inspire d by the Slave ry Convention of 1926, whic h is comm only rec ognise d as constituting custom. 75 The prohibition of slave ry or sla very-l ike practices has been recog nized in a num ber of international t reaties
and conve ntions. 76 T hese legal inst rume nts ill ust rate the wide sprea d unde rsta nding of a prohibit ion of e nslaveme nt and forced l abour as CIL.77 The use of force d labour ha s bee n recognized a s CIL falling within t he enslaveme nt category, 78 a nd may constitute a n inte rnat ional w rongful act implicating State responsibility. 79 Alt houg h it is uncle ar w hethe r huma n trafficking const itutes CIL, traffick ing in persons is indisputabl y an eleme nt of the crime of e nsl avement in the R ome Statute. More over, force d labour is usua lly the mea ns for exploitation in tra fficking. Hence, as trafficking i n pe rsons fa ll s wit hin the scope of ensla vement, it mig ht be arg ue d that also tra ffick ing in persons, reaching the l evel of CAH also constitute s CIL. The recog nition of e nsla vement a s CIL sig nifie s that the leg al conce pt applie s to all State s, regardle ss of whet her or not they a re pa rties to the re leva nt legal inst rume nts. Ack nowle dging the customa ry nat ure of both CAH and ensla vement , and pre suming that tra fficking in pe rsons
equa lly constit utes CIL as it fall s w ithin the scope of the crime of enslaveme nt, gene ral case la w from international criminal tribunal s w ill be used for ill ust ration in the a naly sis of t he cha peau el ement s of CAH. In summary, the ICC may prosec ute huma n tra fficking wit hout any nex us to a n a rmed confl ict, without any discrim inat ory g ro und and re gardle ss of the national itie s of t he pe rpet rators and the v ictims. This cha pter w ill subsequent ly discuss t he constit utive eleme nts of CAH throug h interpretation of art icle 7 of the R ome Statute. Howeve r, as the introduction in this cha pter on CA H demonst rated t hat article 7(1) (c) of the R ome Statute re flects custom, the subse quent subcha pters will re fer to internationa l case law. 3.2. DEFI NING CRIMES AGAINST HUMA NITY As alrea dy submitted in Cha pter 2, Art. 7( 1) of the Rome Stat ute lists acts that constit ute a crim e against humanity ”w hen committe d as part of a wide spread or systematic attack directed aga inst any civ ilia n populat ion, with knowle dge of the
attack”.80 The e nliste d acts or actus re us, w hic h is lat in for ‘a g uilty act’, is “the e ssentia l con duct element of a crime that must be proved to secure a conv iction.”81 Art 7(1) (c) refe rs to e nslaveme nt, meaning “the exe rcise of a ny or all of the powers attaching to the right of owne rship ov er a person and includes t he exercise of such powe r in t he course of tra fficking in pe rsons, in part icula r wome n a nd chil dre n”82. Although the decision on the ge nera l criteria of CAH was highly dispute d throughout the dra fting of the ICC Statute,83 the consensua l de finition is re lativel y clear a nd unproblematic . 3.3. THE CHAPEAU ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY In orde r to ena ble the a pplication to the case st udy on t he Rohingya it is nece ssa ry to examine the com pone nts of the Rome Stat ute’s definit ion of a CAH. It was state d in K unarac et al that “the civ ilia n population” shoul d be ide ntified prior to t he examination on w hethe r the attack wa s widespread a nd sy stematic.84 He nce, the chapte r wil l ana lyse t he
element of “an attack directed ag ainst any civil ian population” prior to t he “wide spread or systematic” com ponent, despite the order in w hich t hey appea r in t he CAH definition in article 7(1) of t he Rome Statute. A ge neral a nd brief a p plication to huma n tra ffick ing sit uations wil l be pre sent ed to each one of the foll ow ing interde pe nde nt eleme nts of CAH 3.3.1. A N ATTACK DIRECTED AGAINST ANY CIVILIAN POPU LATION A n attack directed aga inst any civilia n population invol ves tw o component s that must be examine d, “an attack” and “a ny civil ian population”. Art icle 7( 2)(a ), elaborating article 7(1) (a), de fines “a n atta ck” as “a course of conduct involving the m ultiple commission of acts refe rre d to in pa ragra ph 1 (… )”85. Hence an attack may be a ny of the e nliste d crimes, committe d multiple time s, and may re fer to a course of conduct, a campaig n, mistre atment86, or a sequence of eve nts amounting to an ope ration carried out against any civ ilia n population. An “attack” may be e stablishe d w hen it ca n be
proved t hat a collective group is targete d by t he pe rpet rators in their carry ing out of acts of viole nce or ot her crim ina l conduct. It is de fined broadly and is not limite d to a milita ry attack.87 A n attack directed aga inst the civilia n population may be esta blished if the civ ilia n population is t he prima ry object of t he attack.88 It is importa nt to emphasize t hat the huma n trafficking or ensla vement need not constit ute the attack itse lf to be prosecuted a s CAH at the ICC. The criminal conduct of huma n traffick ing or e nsla vement need sim ply form part of a n attack that may comprise of a variety of CAH enl iste d in article 7 of t he Rome Statute. “A ny civilia n population” ge ne rally refe rs to a g roup of people that a re unde r the attack, requiring a population of a col lective nat ure. The g roup of persons should have a common cha racteristic that makes t hem a cognizable g roup or set s them a part from the rest of the society, and it shoul d be inte rpreted broa dl y.89 The civilia n population ca nnot be de fine d exclusivel y by t he
attack, but it may be a factor in determining the visibility of the g roup within t he society. Moreov er, not all membe rs of the civ ilia n populat ion must be under a n attack for the group of pe ople to suffice the crite ria of constit uting a civilia n po pulation. Furthe rmore, the membe rs of the g roup need not k now each ot her or associate with eac h othe r to ful fil t he criteria of bel ong ing to t he same g roup. According to K una rac et al, a sufficient num ber of the population must be subject to the attack.90 Attacks on individua ls may const itute CAH in except ional situations “if it is t he product of a political sy stem based on terror and pe rsec ution” 91 a nd if it is found to have a requisite nex us to the w ide sprea d and sy stematic attack.92 Moreov er, the victim s may be of the same nationality a s the perpetrators or eve n be stateless.93 The fact that some mem bers of t he pe rsec ute d gro up are al so carrying out acts forming pa rt of the attack doe s not exclude the v ictims of the attack from be ing recog nized a s a “civi lia n population”,
as there is no re quireme nt that the attack are t o be carried out aga inst a diffe re nt national g roup or et hnicity. This is partic ularly re leva nt to huma n tra fficking case s where at lea st some of the perpetrat ors tend to have t he same national ity as the victims in orde r to recruit them a nd mainta in communication with t he victims during the ir ex ploitation. 3.3.2. WIDESPREAD OR SYSTEMATIC NATURE Althoug h hist orical ly disag ree d upon, it is now clear that the attack need eit her be wide sprea d or systematic.94 It is im portant to hig hlig ht that it is the attack that must be w ide spre ad or sy stematic and not the specific a cts of the accused. 95 A widesprea d attack implie s that the attack eithe r is directed aga inst a large num ber of people or directed over a la rge phy sical are a.96 T he num ber of pe ople and the ge ogra phical area a ffecte d usua lly ove rla p in practice, as there a re ofte n a large numbe r of people l iving in a large physical area a nd v ice versa. In the eve nt that the attack cannot be prove d to be w ide sprea d, it
would have to be esta blishe d w hethe r or not the attack is systematic of nat ure. A systematic act connotes t hat the acts carried out are fol lowing an orga nize d pattern or strateg y ofte n subject to instructions or an overriding policy. U nplanne d, remote or unsystematic acts fal ls out side the sc ope of qual ify ing a s sy stematic acts. In gene ral, it is more diffic ult to esta blish that an attack is sy stematic as it involves t o a hig her exte nt the involveme nt of t he State or at a minimum le vel an orga nize d entity with de facto control ove r the a ffected a rea.97 Bla skic provides four factors to determine t he sy stematic na t ure of acts. 98 Firstl y, a pol itical objective, pla n or ideol ogy that la y dow n the grounds for which the attack is carrie d out to extinguish or weake n a community is crucial. Secondly, the acts m ust const itute the commission of a large- scale crime against a civilia n group or repeate d persecution of inhuma ne acts. Thirdl y, the level of arra ngement a nd spe nding of public and private re source s may be a determinative
factor. Fourt hly, the inv olveme nt of political, public or m ilitary highranking officia ls in the pla n ning of t he attack is ev ide nce of a certain le vel of sy stematization. As huma n tra ffick ing must be both st rategic and orga niz ed to be successful and ge nerate va lue for t he trafficke rs it is usuall y sy stematic of nature. The bigger the t rafficking net work, the more likely it is that it w ill satisfy the requirement of systematization. Moreove r, huma n tra fficking invol ves a va riety of pe rsons, be ing it traffickers, cust omers, victims, border g uards, pol ice or ot her state official s. The tra fficking involve s t he tra nsfer of victim s from location to l ocation, which im plie s the need for pl anning and st rategie s. The amount of money ge nerate d from tra fficking is a not her indicator for wel l-pla nned ope rations and conscious administration of t he criminal e nterprise. The meticulous detection and v iole nt tactics of ex pl oitation a nd tra nsfe r of v ul nerable g roups of victim s, demonst rates that huma n tra ffic king are ra rely uninte ntiona l or isolated
acts. 99 The strategic rec ruitme nt of ne w human commodit ies w he n curre nt one s st op being profitable for the tra ffickers (for exam ple due to sale or de ath) is anothe r ill ustration of the repeate d and systematic acts that huma n tra ffick ing inv olve s. 3.3. 3. STATE OR ORG ANISATIONA L POLI CY One of the most diffic ult eleme nts to esta blish is whet her t he attack was carrie d out pursua nt to or in furthe rance of a state or orga nizational policy a s stipulated in art ic le 7( 2)(a) of the Rome Statute. Often refe rre d to as t he policy re quireme nt, the criterion is close ly relate d to the requirem ent of the systematic nature of t he attack indicating the leve l of orga nization or pol icy impl icated. An attack can hardly be sy stem atic if not ba se d on a state or orga nizationa l policy but an attack may be widespread regardle ss of the existe nce of a clea r policy. Widel y de bated, the policy criterion has been unde rmined100, wea kene d101 and define d by a w ide ra nge of ca se law. It is howe ver relative ly clear that the policie s directing the
crimina l conduct need not be ex pre ssly specifie d nor inst ructe d to the pe rpetrators of the acts carrie d out.102 Neithe r must the highe st-ra nking state official s sta nd be hind the pla n of the attack. 103 In order to qua lify as subjects of international la w, the de finitions of a “state” or an “ orga nization” m ust be a ddre sse d. A “state” m ust comply wit h the crite rions of publ ic inte rnational law, requiring a functioning government, a de fine d territ ory, a po pulat ion, independe nce and ca pacity to ente r into international relations wit h othe r States.104 To simpl ify this de finition, it is gene rally thought that U N member States qua lifies, alt hough it is not a criterion of statehood as suc h. Othe r gove rnme nts would have to a rgue t hat they ful fil t he enliste d re quireme nts in order to be recog nize d.105 In t he US case Ka dic v Ka radzic it wa s held t hat non-state actors could be he ld l iable for CAH, genocide a nd war crime s, and rule d out that it ha d to be pol icy of t he State itsel f.106 A n “orga nization” is difficult to define because the ir
association and structure is not hom oge nous a nd t heir activ ity may expa nd bey ond nat ional borders.107 The lega l concl usion from Tadic is that CAH can be conducted by an e ntity in de facto cont rol of a n area, meaning that the empha sis will be placed on t he effective rather tha n the j udicial control. The j udg me nt i s importa nt because it all ow s for the prosec ution of criminal network s and orga nisations whet her a ffiliate d wit h the State or not, as l ong as it can be esta blished that t he group in question exe rcise d effective control in t he area. The Nikol ic case na rrowe d the Tadic definit ion by hig hlig hting that alt hough t he gove rnme nt it self nee d not exercise t he policy inst ructing the CAH, sim ple inst ructions by separate individua ls t hemsel ves may not suffice. 108 As t he majority of the huma n traffick ing perpetrat ors are non-State actors, technical difficulties may a rise in term s of the recognition of the group as a n organization wit h capacity to c arry out CAH. However, in ca ses reaching the t hre shol d to qualify a s
CAH, state official s at various le vels a re often inv olve d in the creation of a n unde rly ing state policy enc ouraging, ignoring or denying the involveme nt of e nslavement of civilia ns. 3. 3.4. NEXUS BET WEEN THE ACTS AND THE ATTACKS Article 7 re quire s the crim ina l conduct to form part of the attack on the civilian population.109 Whethe r the tra ffick ing in persons as e nsla vement is forming part of an overa ll attack on a civ ilia n populat ion must be esta blished on the facts of the individual case. Seemingly isolated incide nts of human t rafficking must be reasona bl y relate d to an overal l attack on t he civil ian population under attack to sat isfy this eleme nt. 3.3.5. PERPETRATOR K NOWLE DGE OF I NT ENT The knowle dge or intent re quireme nt dema nds ev ide nce of the pe rpetrator’s k nowle dge of the crim ina l conduct forming part of the attack or a lternatively inte nding the conduct to be part of the attack. This eleme nt wil l have t o be esta blished on a case - by-case basis. The perpetrator must have t he re quisite me ns
rea to carry out the criminal offe nce for w hich he is charge d a nd a dditionall y he must ha ve bee n awa re of the attack on t he civil ian population a nd eit her know n that his offence wa s pa rt of the att ack or at a minimum knowingl y taking the risk of his offe nce being conside red part of the atta ck.110 Althoug h the requirement touche s upon the perpetrat ors aware ne ss of his conduct and its pote ntial consequence s, there is no crite rion that he or she m ust k now about the specifics of the policy or the attack.111 Circum stantia l evidence is crucia l to dete rmine whet her t he pe rpet rat or ha d k nowle dge of the attack and understood under the circum stances t hat his or her actions w oul d be forming pa rt of t he attack. 3.3.6. ENS LAVEMENT AS THE ENLISTED ACT For purpose s of this pa pe r, enslaveme nt wil l be examine d as the e nl iste d act and huma n tra ffic king as the specific type of e nslaveme nt. Kuna rac et al provide the criteria for w hich e nslavement may be esta blished a s “c ont rol of someone’ s moveme nt, control of
phy sical e nvironme nt, psyc hol ogical control, measure s taken to pre vent or dete r esca pe, fo rce, threat of force or coe rcion, duration, assert ion of excl usivity, subjection to cruel treatme nt and abuse, control of sexua lity a nd force d la bour”.112 Human t rafficking, enta iling threats, abductions, deprivation of free dom a nd t he like in order to phy sical ly exploit ot her persons. The traffick ing of m ultiple pe rsons, al beit not all pe rsons of the col lective group in may be hel d to constitute CAH w hen fulfilling the a boveme ntione d crite ria. Notwit hsta nding t he fact that sma ller g roups of the civilia n population a re trafficke d at differe nt points in time, the conduct will amount to pa rt of a n attack if it can be esta blishe d that it is a product of a political system base d on terror a nd persecut ion.113 4. JURIS DICTION A ND A DMISSIBILITY OF THE ICC This cha pter w ill examine the jurisdiction of the ICC to prosec ute huma n tra fficking as CAH and the a dmissibility re quireme nts t hat must be satisfied for such a prosecution to tak e
place. There a re two categorie s of gravit y that must be examined; firstl y, the grav ity of a g ive n crime category over a not her a nd secondly, the gra vity of a give n insta nce of crime. In te rms of the forme r category t he ICC has jurisdiction to prosecute “the most se rious crime s of concern to the internationa l community as a whole” 114. Only ge nocide, CAH, war crimes a nd the crime of aggression115 fa ll wit hin the scope of the jurisdiction of the ICC. The latter cat egory concerns t he grav ity of a part icula r insta nce of crime a nd wil l be decide d on a case by-case ba sis. It is importa nt to emphasize t hat whe rea s the forme r category is mere ly a formality, the Rome Statute re gime is mainly conce rne d w ith the l atter, namely t he grav ity of a part icula r insta nce of the crime in que stion. The re mig ht be categories of crime s that seem sufficie ntly grave prima facie, yet the specific situation may be de minimis a nd subse quentl y ine ligible for prosecution under t he ICC Statute. I n terms of j urisdiction, according to Article 13 of the
Rome Statute, the ICC may only exe rcise j urisdiction if the situation is refe rre d to the ICC by a State Party, by the Security Council or by the Prosec utor of the ICC. If the ICC is given j urisdiction in a pa rticula r case, in accorda nce wit h the indepe ndence of the ICC no ot her a uthority may intervene, except the U N Security Council.116 It is al so importa nt to note that only crime s committed afte r the R ome Statute ente red into force are prosecutable.117 T he Vie nna Conve ntion on the Law of Treatie s 1969 stipulate s in article 34 t hat inte rnational legal instrument s bind only c ontra cting States.118 He nce, onl y states t hat have ratified t he Rome Statute may be subj ected to the court’s power unless the Security Council re fers the situation to t he Court. Finally, the state in que stion has t he rig ht to chal lenge t he jurisdiction of t he ICC or the admissibility of the ca se in accorda nce wit h Article 19 of the R ome Statute. Article 17 stipulate s four sit uations i n which a case is inadm issible for the prosecution by the ICC. Firstly, if
the state wit h jurisdiction over t he situation a re investigating or prosec uting t he pe rpet rators, unle ss t he ICC has evidence of the state being una ble or unw illing to carry out any l egal proce dure.119 Secondly, a case ina dmissible if the State ha s dul y investigate d the situation and ha s decide d not to prosec ute.120 T hirdly, a nd in accorda nce with t he principle “ ne bis in idem”, the ICC will not prosecute if the perpetrators has a lrea dy be en tried for the same conduct in nationa l tribunal s.121 T his principle, named double jeopardy in common law sy stems, re quire s the lega l proce edings t hat ha s bee n carried out to be inde pende nt, impart ial and w ithout intentions to shield t he pe rpet rator from criminal re sponsibility.122 Fourt hly, a s the ICC only have j urisdiction ove r the most se rious crimes whe n they reach the requisite threshold of gravity to j ust ify inv olveme nt by the Court.123 T his pa per wil l elaborate further on t he two most cont rove rsial a dmissibil ity re quireme nts, viz. the com pleme ntarity a nd t he grav ity
principle. 4.1. COMPLEMENTA RITY First, the Court’ s juri sdiction is com pleme ntary to t hat of the nationa l courts.124 The ICC will only t ry case s when the State with custody of the accused is una ble or unw illing to ge nuinely prosecute. Whe n that is determ ine d to be the case, the ICC may claim jurisdiction if either the state on whose te rrit ory the conduct occurre d or t he state of nationa lity of the person accuse d is pa rty to the Rome Stat ute or consent s to the j urisdiction of the ICC.125 A rticle 7(2) of the Rome Statute provides for t hree basic criteria to mea sure a country’s unwill ing ne ss to prosec ute. Firstly, the State is unwilling if its conduct is base d on the a im to shiel d a pe rs on from criminal re sponsibility.126 Secondly, unj ustified delay may similarl y be interprete d as unwilling ness. 127 T hirdly, lack of fa ir, inde pe nde nt a nd im part ial legal proceeding s are a clear indicator of t he ICC’s jurisdiction to prosecute. 128 In term s of a State’s a bility to prosecute, Article 7( 3) set s forth t hat the Court must consider the
availa bility a nd functioning of the dome stic legal system, the State’s a bil ity to get hold of the pe rpet rator( s), as well a s its ca pability to obtain evide nce and t estimonie s. It is alwa ys a matter for t he court to establish a dmissibility of the case base d on an a ssessment of a State’s ge nuine wil lingness a nd unbia sed a bility to prosecute. Alt hough t he court has t o respect the sove reig nty of t he States a ffected, nume rous huma n tra ffick ing cases without a ny State invol vement may eve ntua lly lea d to the ICC’s jurisdiction ove r a sit uation in accordance w ith Art 17, j ustifie d on the g rounds that the State has demonstrated ina bil ity or unwilling ness to prosecute this ty pe of crime. When a state considers victims of huma n tra ffick ing a s il legal immigra nts a nd prosec utes the se rat her t han t he pe rsec utors, this must also be conside red a sig n of unwilling ness to prosecute, w hic h wil l be furthe r ill ust rated in Cha pter 5. According to t he U N, an effective la w enforcement of trafficking requires; deterrence, invest igation, arrest,
prosecut ion, punishment, re storat ive justice a nd a dminist rative sanctions of the tra ffick er a nd demands; preve ntion, ide ntification/ rescue, protection, recovery, re ha bil itation, reintegration, re storative j ust ice and pote ntial ly re patriation or return of the v ictim.129 Alt houg h compl iance w ith all the a boveme ntione d eleme nts hardly can be re quire d of a State to demonst rate ability a nd will ing ne ss, the ICC has recently seeme d more susceptible to exe rcise its complementa rity “ rig ht” whe n a State is fail ing to inte rve ne in violent a nd heartle ss attacks against part s of its popul ation.130 Wherea s the ICC may prosec ute the pe rpet rators of human t rafficking a s CA H in accordance w ith the com pleme ntarity principle, clie nts of the t raffickers ex ploiting the victim s are the responsibility of the State’ s of whose national s are purcha sing huma ns a s commoditie s, whet her it is for purpose s of sex ual ex ploitation or forced la bour. 4. 2. THE GRAVITY THRESHOLD The ICC may only inve stigate and prosecute the m ost se rious
. Human trafficking
will only satisfy the requirement of being a serious international crime in accordance
with article 5 of the Rome Statute if it can be shown that the human trafficking
constitutes CAH provided for in article 7 of the Rome Statute. While it is relatively
straightforward to establish human trafficking as a crime category of sufficient gravity as it is
codified as enslavement in article 7, the gravity of a particular instance of the crime requires further
examination. As the ICC has yet to prosecute a human trafficking case as CAH, there is no precedence on the criteria taken
into consideration by the Court when prosecuting this type of crime. However, there are general factors used by
internationa l crimes of “ sufficient g ravity” in accorda nce with a rticle 5 a nd 17(1)(d) of t he Rome Statute. Howe ver, due to the l ack of a definition of “grav ity” in the Statute, the term has bee n subject to conside rable academic de bate. The threshold is high, a nd tak en that t he ICC has not yet broug ht a single tra fficking case to t he Court it may appear a s if huma n tra fficking risk s fa lling short of t he criteria or t hat it is harder to satisfy t he grav ity thre shol d for tra fficking case s. Althoug h the rea son for t he ICC’s lack of prosec ution of huma n tra ffic king cases may be many, incl uding lack of capacity a nd resources, this pape r arg ues t hat the time ha s come for a n eval uation of prosecution of huma n traffick ing ca ses at the ICC in ge neral a nd of t he sit uation of the R ohing ya in part icula r
the ICC to decide upon the gravity of a particular instance of crime, primarily taking into account the scale, severity and systematic application of the crimes as well as
the impact and number of victims. 131 Moreover, some argues that the Kenyatta case132, challenged for not satisfying the gravity threshold, is an illustration to the fact
that the ICC has lowered the gravity threshold for admissibility to the ICC.133 In the case, the Court found that the gravity threshold was fulfilled, arguing that the postelection violence was “not a mere accumulation of spontaneous or isolated acts” because there was an association between local leaders, businessmen and
human trafficking is generally serious of nature with
human beings as its commodities. The exploitation is usually inhuman, degrading, abusive,
violent and cynical. Human trafficking is often based on discrimination,
politicians.134 Although every situation must be assessed on its merits,
whethe r that is ba sed on ge nder, re ligion, ethnicity or ot her. In the end of the fol lowing cha pter, this pa per’ s case st udy will il lustrate how the abovementioned criteria on com pleme ntarity a nd g ravity ma y be a ppl ied t o a part icula r
instance of crime. 5. APPLICATION OF THE CAH FRAMEWORK T O THE SITUATION OF THE ROHINGYA The main objective of this cha pter is to assess w hethe r Rohingya in Mya nmar a nd T haila nd are prima facie victims of huma n tra ffic king fal ling wit hin the e nlisted act of e nslaveme nt a s C AH enume rated in article 7 of the ICC Statute, giving rise to ICC jurisdiction. Indee d, this c hapte r wil l not aim to carry out a n exha ust ive ana lysis or attempt to make a n objective decision ba sed on t he relev ant fact s at hand, as it is outside the scope of t his pa per. This cha pter wil l int roduce t he most e sse ntia l event s and frictions leading t o the tra ffick ing of R ohing ya a s a CAH. It is important to hig hlig ht that severa l countrie s in Southea st Asia mig ht be invol ved in the CAH against Rohingya, altho ug h this pape r will primarily focus on the attacks carrie d out by Mya nmar a nd T hailand. Partly as a re sult of t he traffick ing of R ohing ya, bot h Thailand and neig hbouring Malay sia are c urre ntly at risk of being dow ng rade d to Tie r 3, the
lowe st category of the a nnua l Traffick ing in Persons Re port issued by the US State Department. Curiously, Myanma r does not seem to be in the same risk. Re port s indicates that a variety of inte rnat ional crime s hav e bee n committed aga inst Rohingya. This cha pter w ill not go into de bt regarding the se crime s, but the y wil l be pre sente d as a n il lustration of a ge nera l attack against Rohingya, w hich in turn wil l stre ngt hen the not ion of CAH be ing a crime committed against Rohingya. More specificall y, the chapte r focus on whet her the human tra fficking of Rohingya reac hes t he le vel of const ituting ensla vement a s CAH. As expla ine d in the introductory chapter, the CAH framew ork was c hosen over war crime s and ge nocide as t here seem to be no ev ide nce of neit her internationa l nor non- inte rnational arme d conflict in Myanma r and Tha ila nd a nd because the ev ide nce is less straig ht -forwa rd regarding the possibilitie s for ethnic clea nsing or ge nocide taking place. The chapte r will be a pplying the le gal analy sis from
Chapter 2-4 to the Rohingya situation. Firstly, the ge nera l sit uation of the R ohingya m inority wil l be introduced w ith a brie f introduc tion of the historical backg round of the ir situation wit h part icula r foc us on the attacks carried out by the Southea st Asian nations of Myanma r and Tha ila nd. Secondly, it will be exam ine d w hethe r the re quisite eleme nts to e stabl ish human t rafficking pursua nt to the Palerm o Prot ocol are pre sent on the facts of the case. Thirdly, the ge nera l context ual re quireme nts e nume rated in a rticle 7 of the ICC Statute will be systematicall y applie d to some of the rel evant facts at ha nd concerning the crime s carried out aga inst Rohingya. Howe ve r, the two latter cha peau el ement s wil l not be examined a s the k nowle dge or intent re quireme nt dema nds ev ide nce of t he pe rpet rato r’s k nowle dge of the criminal conduct forming pa rt of the attack and as the nex us crite ria is de pe nda nt upon conduct of a n individua l pe rpet rator. A s bot h re quireme nts m ust be considere d on a case-by-case ba sis, the
application of the se two cha pea u eleme nts fa ll s out side the scope of this pape r. Likewise, as t he compleme ntarity re quireme nt and the gravity threshold a re cont rove rsial concepts t hat require extensive a nal ysis of both la w and facts of the ca se, the word limit of this pa pe r re nde rs it im possible to prov ide for a meaning ful application of the l aw to the sit uation in Myanma r or T haila nd. 5.1. THE ROHINGYA The R ohing ya ha s attempted to em igrate from Mya nmar to neig hbouring count ries for deca des due to discrimination a nd pe rsec ution in the country. T he minority originat es from a mix bet ween B uddhists, Beng alis and Ara bs.135 Alt houg h there a re disag reeme nts as t o the specifics of the historical backg round of the Rohingya a nd even t heir ex iste nce as a n indig enous minority136, they certainly exist as a mi nority g roup in Mya nmar, primarily residing in the nort h of the underdevel oped state of A raka n wit h significa nt milita ry prese nce. The sout hern State ha s borders wit h Ba ngla desh, whe re a la rge group
of Rohingya now re side in refugee camps. There is al so a m ountain ra nge se parating t he State from the re st of the country. Ac cording to num bers from the UNHCR, it is e stimated t hat approximately 800,000 statele ss R ohing ya remain in the A raka n state of Myanma r. 137 Moreove r, refugee s have fle d to ne ighbouring co untrie s such a s Bang lade sh, Saudi Ara bia, U nite d Ara b Emirate s, Pakista n, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and Ja pa n following pe rsec ution in the country. One of the ma in reasons for the displacement of the R ohingy a is that they are stateless beca use t he gove rnment of Mya nmar doe s not recog nize them a s citizens.138 Moreove r, Rohingya are am ong t hose ethnic minorities t hat are w orst affected by impose d forced l abour by Mya nmar it sel f, throug h its publ ic official s and army. Equall y, Rohing ya are among those ethn ic minorit ies that suffe r most in the ha nds of huma n trafficke rs, a s they a re easy targets w he n trying to e scape persecution in the ir home country by e scaping to neig hbouring
count rie s. Pursua nt to article 7(1)(h) of t he Rome Statute, persecution sig nifies t he intention to seve rely deprive a col lect ive group from the ir fundame ntal right s ba se d on discrim inat ory g rounds. T he following analy sis indicates t he wide spread a nd sy stematic persecut ion and enslav ement of the Rohingya by Myanma r and Thaila nd. 5.1.1. GENER AL ATTACKS ON THE ROHINGYA BY MYANMAR Discrimination against the Muslim ethnic minority is dee ply rooted among Mya nmar c itize ns a nd is subse que ntly reflected in law a nd politics. 139 The government’ s lack of recog nition of the R ohingy a as the country’ s citize ns ha s widespread backing among its citize ns. 140 In particular t hose citizens re siding in A raka n are carrying out hostile discriminatory practice s towa rds Rohingya a nd while many citizens of Mya nmar ack nowle dge s Rohingya as a n ethnic group, citize ns in A raka n often rejects the R ohing ya’s ve ry existence, re ferring to the populat ion as Be ngal is a nd illega l immigra nt s in M ya nmar. The ext reme
hardship the R ohing ya are ex posed to is a n instrume nt by Myanma r aiming for t he discha rge of Rohingya from t he country. 141 The R ohing ya’s situat ion as a statele ss, persecute d minority bega n w ith the e nd of t he British colonia lism whe n the borde r betw een India a nd Burma142 was define d.143 T he de fined borde r left t he Rohingya in-betwe en the two count ries, w ith the majority on the B urme se side of the new borde r. However, the Rohingya wa s not pa rticula rly welcome d in neit her of the tw o countries. Since the coup d’état by Gene ral Ne Win in 1962, R ohingya have strugg led to be recog nize d as citize ns in the country, de spite arg ument s to the fact that some have bee n l iving in Ara kan since the 8t h century.144 I n 1982 a ne w law cre ated tw o citizen classifications145, disqualifying R ohing ya from both categories, w hile incl uding most othe r ethnic groups. The official re ason for e xcl uding the Rohingya from the latter category of “associate citize ns” was base d on their lack of ability to demonst rate
ancestor roots prior to 1948. Fol lowing the e nactment of t he ne w law, the B urme se aut horitie s carried out a populat ion census incl uding citizens in bot h categories a nd t here by re ndering R ohingya statele ss by exclusion. 146 The R ohing ya have bee n forcefully displaced on a number of occasions in recent hist ory. In particular five v iole nt eve nts can be attribute d to the overal l pe rsec ution of Rohingya in Myanma r. One of the first a nd most se rious attacks on the minority wa s carrie d out in 1978 unde r the name “ Ope rat ion Drag on K ing ”,147 lea ding to the forced displaceme nt of almost 200.000 R ohingya e scaping t o Bang lade sh a s a re sult of widesprea d attacks in the form of k ill ing s a nd rape [ sexua l assault]s carried out by the B urme se army. The ope ration wa s orchest rated by the B urme se Head of State, Gene ral Ne Win, as one of the mea sures of his nationa lisa tion programme, “the B urme se way t o socia lism ”.148 Moreove r, due to the poor condit ions offere d by t he Bang lade shi aut horitie s to Rohingya
refugees flee ing et hnic cleansing in Mya nmar, a n estimate d numbe r of 10,000 die d of hunge r and il lne sses.149 The second major viole nt attack against Rohingya took place in 1991 inv olv ing kill ings, ra pe [sex ual a ssa ult] s, torture and force d labour lea ding to an eve n hig her num ber of Rohingya s flee ing Mya nmar for Bang lade sh.150 T he following three violent attack s against Rohingya a re of a low er scale t han t he two former in terms of casualties, although e qua lly im portant w he n considering t he evidence of a wide spread a nd sy stematic attack against Rohingya. In 1995, the Rohingy a were forcefully repat riated back to Mya nmar by Bang lade sh wit h the curious support of the UN. However, security forces on the Mya nmar side of the border did not wil fully rece ive the arriv ing Rohingya and viole nce and ki llings t ook place again. In 2001, viole nce broke out betw een the R ohingya a nd the B uddhist popul ation in Sittwe in Ara kan leading to dea dly viole nce and de struction of m osque s a nd home s.151 In 2012,
fatal battle s erupte d in the sout hern Mya nmar bet wee n Rak hine Buddhists a nd A raka n R ohingya, lea ding to hundre ds of deaths and sev eral t housa nds w ithout homes on bot h side s.152 Those Rohi ngya living in A raka n are t o a large exte nt stil l alive t hanks to inte rnational humanitaria n ag encies. 153 Rohingya who attempt to esca pe Myanma r are particularl y in t he risk zone for tra fficking into prostit ution, sex ual slavery and forced la bour.154 The a bovementioned informat ion wa s not inte nde d as a com plete account of the viole nce against Rohingya in Mya nmar. The objective was to g ive some historical a nd contextual e lement s to the a pplication of the eve nts to the anal ysis in this cha pter. 5. 1.2. TRAFFIC KING OF ROHINGYA IN MYA NMAR Having addre ssed t he gene ral attacks aga inst the R ohingy a above, this subcha pter wil l foc us on the t rafficking of the minority in Mya nmar w ith a special focus on the military pre se nce in A raka n as one of the ma in factors for forced labour and sex ual slave ry. According to
the Special R apporteur on the Sit uation of Human R ight s in Myanma r, the milita ry make use of force d labour, as the y do not receive the necessary a ssista nce and re sources from the government.155 Both t he forced l abour and the sexua l slav ery of the R ohing ya are e ndem ic in the country, and a common factor is the discriminatory inte nt be hind t he commission of the crimes. There seem to be evide nce to the fact that the State Peace and Deve lopment Council (SPDC) 156, the actual governing body in Mya nmar is involve d in t he enslaveme nt and arg ua bly tra fficking of the Rohingya in Myanma r. The mi nority ha s bee n victim s of impose d force d labour by t he SPDC for deca des despite supervision by the Internationa l La bour Orga nisatio n (ILO)157. In fact, the ILO itse lf has examine d w hethe r it ought to a dvise the refe rral of the sit uation to the ICC.158 Of pa rticul ar importa nce to this pa per, the ILO found t hat the CAH frame work wa s predominant ly of relev ance for the widespre ad use of force d labour in
Myanmar.159 Some of the force d la bour in Myanma r qualifie s for constit uting human t rafficking. The fol low ing section w ill a ddress some of the most common forms of forced labour empl oye d in Mya nmar. Cha pter 5.2. will asse ss whic h of t he met hods of forced la bour em ployed satisfie s t he criteria for tra ffick ing in persons prima facie. Rohingya have been forced to co nstruct “model vil lage s” in A raka n.160 The me n and boys a re picked up random ly and are forced to imme diately follow the aut horitie s to the const ruction sites. Rejection of this so-calle d duty of forced la bour results in k illing s, torture and ra pe [sexual a ssault] of ot her family mem bers unle ss t he pe rson concerned pay s fina ncial com pensation to the authorities. 161 Ot her form s of forced la bour subject to the same conditions a bove a re se ntry duty, ag ricult ura l work a nd other ty pe s of construction w ork.162 A s wi ll be see n bel ow, the se facts satisfy t he element s of human trafficking in accordance w ith the Pale rmo Protocol. Rohingya wome n are
mainly subject to a differe nt type of abuse in Mya nmar a s ra pe [sex ual a ssault] a nd sexua l viole nce is w ide sprea d in t he country. 163 Re pre sent ing a minority g roup, Rohingya wome n’s v ul nera ble status without le gal right s make them ea sy target s for tra ffick ing and sex ual slave ry, ofte n qualifying a s trafficking in persons in accordance with t he Palermo Protocol. It is mainly t he milita ry pre sence in Rohingya dominate d area s such as in the northe rn part s of Ara kan who make the w ome n targets for rape [sex ual assa ult] and sex ual v iole nce by t he soldiers and eve n the pol ice.164 It is pa rticularl y the systematic sex ual slave ry of the Rohi ngya wome n at military premises w ho a re of rele vance to this pape r. Some w omen a re abducte d or forcefully take n to the military ba ses by mil itary official s while the ir husba nds, brot hers, fathe rs or sons a re subject to force d la bour, w hile others are ta ken to t he premises for forced la bour w he re they e nd up a s sex slave s for the milita ry.165 5.1.3. TRA FFICKING OF ROHI NGYA
IN THAILAND This subc hapte r will account for some of the incide nts of huma n tra ffick ing of R ohing ya in T hail and. Althoug h the re are ot her crimes committe d against the Rohingya in Thailand, the crime s does not seem to satisfy the crite ria of a wide spread or system atic attack as such. T he repeate d rejections to receiv e boat s wit h Rohingya refugee s by T hai border g uards in 2008- 2009, pushing the boats back out int o the high sea s are among the most se rious crime s committed by Thailand against Rohingya in addition to t he traffick ing in persons. 166 Ne vert heless, the k nowle dge of the perpetrators of the gene ral attack against R ohingy a in Mya nmar should suffice for the purpose s of demonstrating that huma n traffick ing ca n be tried a s a CAH in the ICC prima facie. Ofte n, Rohingya are tra nsfe rre d to the Malay sia borde r upon arriva l by boat to Tha ila nd. Be fore crossing the border t hey are ofte n t orture d and threatene d by T hai official s or Mala y border g uards for mone y. 167 There seem to be evide nce to
the fact that Thai military official s have bee n directly inv olve d in the tra ffick ing of R ohing ya asy lum seeke rs for purposes of force d labour in Thai or Malay pla ntation sites or on Thai fishing boat s.168 According to v ictim’s storie s give n to the new s age ncy Reute rs, se veral hundre d Rohingy a have bee n deprive d of their liberty by trafficke rs a nd tort ure d w hile extorted for money.169 It is a ssume d that human t rafficke rs a re moving the ir illicit ente rprises t o Malaysia as a re sult of Thailand’s new harsh policy to close dow n re fugee cam ps, as well a s imprison and ret urn Rohing ya refugee s to Myanma r. 170 How ever, Tha ila nd denies a ny official inv olveme nt in persecut ory treatme nt of R ohingya, and especial ly any a ssociation in the huma n tra fficking of Rohingya re fug ees. It doe s not de ny the ir existence of dete ntion camps in the country, but al leges t hat Rohingy a are illega l economic immig rant s brought to the country w ith the hel p of human smug glers. The fact that re ports show s that hundreds of Rohingya
were deprive d of their liberty in inhuma ne traffick ing cam ps in the out skirts of Tha ila nd a nd t hat 40.000 R ohingy a temporarily inha bite d the camps only in 2013 seems to have had l ittle effect on the opinion of Thailand. 171 A lthoug h human smug gling al so take s place in T haila nd, the eve nts re ferre d to certainly fa ll s wit hin the boundarie s of traffick ing in persons. Hence, Tha ila nd seem to ha ve a misconception of t he de finition of huma n traffick ing found in the Palerm o Prot ocol, de spite the fact that Tha ila nd sig ned t he Protoc ol alre ady in 20 01. S ome re port s show that Rohingya re fugees were ex pelle d from T hai officials a nd forcefully returne d, sold or tra fficked into t he nort hern area s of Myanma r controlle d by the Dem ocratic Kare n B uddhist A rmy172. The DKB A group is infamous for its inv olveme nt in t rafficking, ill egal logging and extortion of migra nt workers, and many of R ohing ya were there fore victims of re -trafficking o r coercion t o obta in money from their famil y membe rs to save the ir lives. 173
Those who we re una ble to comply wit h the money extortion by the DKBA, w here eit her tra fficke d back into Thaila nd or to Malay sia. 174 It coul d be a ssume d that the Tha i officia ls had knowle dge of the DKBA s re putation prior to their actions, give n the ir re putation. In terms of the t rafficking of Rohingya in Thaila nd one coul d w onder whet her they are more likely to fall in the hands of t rafficke rs tha n re fugees or mig rant s from ot her count rie s arriving in the count ry. Howeve r, whe rea s othe r re fugee s or migra nt s may have a cha nce at give n a legal status as tem pora ry re fugees or migra nts in T haila nd, Rohing ya’s cha nces seem close to zero take n the clea r sta nce by Tha i aut horitie s not to accept Rohing ya as refugees. T he fea r of t he Rohingya to be re patriate d to Myanma r or to be pushe d back out at se a put them in a ve ry diffic ult posit ion w here being trafficke d for forced labour or sexual exploitation seem like the better option. The ab oveme ntione d facts a nd incide nts are onl y a fraction of the crimes
committed against R ohingya in t he two count rie s, and t he aim wa s not to give a n exha ustive back ground into t he traffick ing of R ohingya a s it is outside the scope of this pa per. 5. 2. ESTABLISHING HUMAN TR AFFICKING As al rea dy esta blished in cha pter 2, huma n tra ffick ing is com pose d of three eleme nts, be ing the act, the me ans a nd the purpose of tra ffick ing in persons. Firstly, in terms of the act, in Myanmar, R ohingy a men are recruited or tra nsferre d to site s of construction, agriculture, sent ry duty or othe r form s of forced la bour w hile wome n are recruited base d on age a nd l ooks a nd t hen tra nsfe rre d and harboure d at military premises or ot her sites for forced la bour or sex ual slave ry. In Tha ila nd, Rohingya a re sol d or resold t o Thai, Malay a nd B urme se tra ffickers invol ving the rec ruitme nt, transportation, tra nsfe r, harbouring or receipt of pe rsons. Secondl y, Rohingya a re subject to severa l of t he means enlisted in the Pale rmo Prot ocol in both Mya nmar a nd T haila nd, but in particular the ir v ul nera bility as
a persecuted m inority without citize nship. In Myanma r, Rohingya are take n by force, abducted or threatene d to l ife or tort ure or abuse of famil y members. In Tha ila nd, tra ffickers disg uised a s pe ople sm uggle rs t hreate n Rohingya w ith ret urn to Mya nmar or uses force in tra fficking camps. Thirdly, R ohingya a re de stined t o forced la bour on const ruction sites, in agricult ure, on se ntry duty, in plantations or f
prosecution of human trafficking as CAH at the ICC is feasible
but requires f exibi ity by the Court due to the ack of a definition of human trafficking in the
Rome Statute or the E ements of Crimes Document A hou h hum n k n w h n h o En v m n n
7
o h Rom
u
m qu y
v n o h
m o
u
v y A meaningfu prosecution of human trafficking at
the court requires a broad interpretation of human trafficking to encompass the re evant
crimina conduct
2NC — Solves
Their coordination internal link requires cooperation between local AND
international enforcement.
1AC Gonzalez et al 13 (Elsie Gonzalez, J.D. Candidate, Seton Hall University, 5-1-2013,
“The Nexus between Human Trafficking and Terrorism/Organized Crime: Combating Human
Trafficking by Creating a Cooperative Law Enforcement System”
http://scholarship.shu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1227&context=student_scholarship)
Technical cooperation among law enforcement agencies is essential for investigating and
prosecuting human traffickers. Actress Mira Sorvino, the U.N. goodwill ambassador against
human trafficking, said that there is a lack of strong legislation and police training to combat
trafficking.164 Even in the United States "only 10 percent of police stations have any protocol
to deal with trafficking."165 Yuri Fedotov, the head of the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime,
called for coordinated local, regional and international responses that balance "progressive
and proactive law enforcement" with actions that combat "the market forces driving human
trafficking in many destination countries."166 Human trafficking, currently, is treated as a social
issue rather a matter of national security. Links between terrorists and criminals, which capitalize
upon gaps in law enforcement and weak security structures, are increasingly becoming the norm.
Any successful approach in countering terror and crime will have to address human trafficking.
Both terrorist networks and organized criminal groups take advantage of the gray areas in
the law. Officials need to acknowledge the network structure of terrorists and criminal
groups with human trafficking and fight the networks cooperatively.
ICC solves best — It collapses funding for covert crime.
Kim 11 (Jane Kim, AB Harvard Law, JD from Columbia Law, “PROSECUTING HUMAN
TRAFFICKING AS A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY UNDER THE ROME STATUTE,”
2011, <WMB> Columbia Law, http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/gslonline/files/2011/02/JaneKim_GSL_Prosecuting-Human-Trafficking-as-a-Crime-Against-Humanity-Under-the-RomeStatute-2011.pdf)
Fed by globalization and a culture of tolerance from prevalence, systems of sex trafficking, sex
tourism, mail-order brides, labor trafficking, international outsourcing to sweatshops, and cheap
labor lean on one another136 to produce a $32 billion dollar industry in which at least 12.3
million persons are victimized at any given time.137 Just as terrorism represents modern
armed warfare, presenting new challenges of identifying unlawful enemy combatants and
protecting against intentional attacks on civilian populations, human trafficking constitutes
modern day slavery, representing a silent war where both traffickers and the trafficked are
difficult to identify, prosecute, and protect. For this reason, there is no better forum to address
human trafficking than through the ICC.
CP — Financial Diplomacy
1NC — Shell
The United States federal government should publicly declare support for
and join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.
Joining the AIIB shores up fidip
Roach et al. 15 (Stephen Roach, Senior Fellow, Jackson Institute of Global Affairs. Zha
Daojiong, Professor of International Political Economy, Peking University. Scott Kennedy,
Deputy Director of the Freeman Chair in China Studies, Center for Strategic and International
Studies. Patrick Chovanec, Managing Director, Silvercrest Asset Management. "Washington’s
Big China Screw-up," 3/26/15, pg. online @ foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/26/washingtons-bigchina-screw-up-aiib-asia-infrastructure-investment-bank-china-containment-chinafile)
In 2005, then-U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick famously called on China to be a “responsible
stakeholder.” He meant that China needed not only to comply with its international commitments, but also to provide public goods to the international community. Well,
be careful what you wish for. Since then China has become much more active in global governance . Chinese occupy
leadership positions in a wide range of institutions. In 2013, China helped broker an interim deal in the World Trade Organization’s Doha Round, and in November 2014, China,
the
AIIB is China’s first signature contribution. China certainly could have done a better job of selling
the need for a new development bank. It is still unclear why it would be impossible to improve the quality and quantity of development assistance
along with the United States, made a new pledge to limit carbon emissions, creating momentum heading into the United Nations meeting in Paris later this year. But
in Asia through either the Asian Development Bank (ADB) or the World Bank. The arguments that those banks were un-fixable and not open to a greater Chinese role or that
China deserves pride of place in a new institution given how much it is contributing leave the impression that the AIIB is a vanity piece or a disguised cash register for Chinese
That said, the United States has performed even worse. Although joining the AIIB was not an option since
Congress would not have allocated the funds, the U.S. could have adopted the posture of a friendly outside voice.
Instead, it discouraged others from joining in the hope the initiative would collapse or leave
China with a small coalition of the willing. They argued that the bank would not follow international best practices, but in reality it appears the
U.S. opposed the AIIB simply because it was a Chinese initiative, full stop. Such knee-jerk antagonism gives life to
arguments that the U.S. opposes China’s rise and is bent on containing it. Even more important, American bungling fuels the perception that
China can drive a wedge between the United States and its allies and that U.S. leadership in
Asia is on the wane just when it is needed more than ever. It’s a shame that China did not provide greater reassurances early
state-owned enterprises.
on that the bank would not be a tool of Chinese industrial policy and geo-strategic maneuvering, and that the U.S. did not do more to pursue such reassurances and find a way to
serve as a constructive supporter. The so-called best practices of existing multilateral aid institutions too often have not translated into sustained poverty alleviation and
development. There are many other areas of global governance in need of reform, and we can be sure that the AIIB will not be China’s last major initiative
. Let’s hope
China and the United States learn from this experience and find ways to identify areas in need of change where they
can collaborate or at least not get in each other’s way, instead of being in opposite camps and forcing others in the region and elsewhere to pick sides. Then both countries
will be able to justly claim they are truly acting as responsible stakeholders. Zha Daojiong, Professor of International Political Economy, Peking University: That the
United States is not going to join the AIIB is in and of itself not a surprise. But the level of fury Washington
has put on public display in recent weeks is remarkable in several ways. First, China has offered to negotiate terms as it established
the AIIB. Among other things, Natalie Lichtenstein, a Harvard-educated lawyer who worked at the World Bank for over 30 years, was invited to help prepare the bank’s charter.
That gesture alone is indication that China, too, wants the bank to build on the experiences and lessons of existing multilateral development banks. After all, being the AIIB’s
largest underwriter, China has the greatest stake in seeing the proposed bank start off with a well-conceived institutional structure. Second, the AIIB is but one among a number of
existing Chinese initiatives linking it to the world economy. For example, the pilot Shanghai Free Trade Zone — and subsequent establishment of similar zones into the provinces
of Fujian and Guangdong, and the city of Tianjin — indicates China is serious about further liberalizing its own investment and trade policies. Concerns in the United States and
some allied nations about the AIIB not being an exact copy of the World Bank or the ADB in governance structure are in some ways understandable. But the last thing China and
other founding members of the AIIB want is validation of their critics’ and skeptics’ fears. The real test is not so much who is in the AIIB and who is not. Rather, it is whether or
not the bank can satisfy its customers and shareholders. The real test is not so much who is in the AIIB and who is not. Rather, it is whether or not the bank can satisfy its
If the United States is concerned about the AIIB’s effect on its soft power, the
U.S. can serve itself better by keeping an open mind about the project and looking to collaborate
on specific investment projects in the future. For China, it would be ill advised to see Washington’s disapproval of its allies in joining the AIIB
as an affront. It’s better to listen. After all, no country has money to burn. The Obama Administration has obviously made a major strategic blunder
in resisting the establishment of the AIIB. Many of America’s most loyal allies have rejected
the folly of this intransigence. By opting to join this start-up international lending institution, they will be much better positioned to shape the
customers and shareholders.
governance of the AIIB as insiders, rather than voicing criticism as outsiders, as the United States apparently prefers. Washington’s Cold-War style criticism of its allies for their
“constant accommodation” of China is a new and embarrassing low in the China debate.
That solves terrorist financing
Rosenberg 15 (Elizabeth Rosenberg, Senior Fellow and Director, Energy, Economics, and
Security Program Center for a New American Security, "Could America Do More? An
Examination of U.S. Efforts to Stop the Financing of Terror," 9/9/15, Testimony before the U.S.
House of Representatives Financial Services Committee, online @
financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-114-ba00-wstate-erosenberg-20150909.pdf//)
A critical counterpart to new domestic policies and authorities for CFT are new measures to
coordinate with foreign counterparts on this threat. Indeed, this is one of the oldest and most
robust areas of activity of the Treasury Department’s division of Terrorism and Financial
Intelligence. Former Under Secretary Stuart Levey, the first leader of this division, traveled
extensively to foreign banks and regulators to discuss the threat of illicit finance and the need to
eradicate it from the formal financial sector.11 Additionally, the Treasury Department, and the
U.S. government broadly, have been long-time supporters of, and leaders within, the Financial
Action Task Force (FATF), the global body that sets international standards for AML and CFT
safeguards and works for their international application. This organization is significantly
responsible for helping foreign countries to put in place the policy and legal framework for CFT,
and crafting strategies to actively combat it within their jurisdictions. U.S. officials should renew
and expand their efforts to build capacity among foreign governments to identify,
investigate and go after terrorist financing. Our government should help partners to strengthen
their financial systems and make them more resilient to abuse by terrorists. This includes helping
counterpart policymakers to strengthen their KYC and CDD requirements. Additionally, it
includes the encouragement of greater electronic financial activity, instead of cash-based
economic activity that is more easily used by criminals and terrorists to move money. It also
includes helping partners to strengthen laws that criminalize the financing of terrorism or
support foreign fighters and terrorist activities. Kuwait, which only recently criminalized the
financing of terrorism, one of the last countries to do so,12 can do much more to act on these new
authorities and combat terrorism in its jurisdiction. And Kuwait is hardly alone as a state in need
of much greater action in this arena. When the United States’ foreign partners are more capable of
combatting terrorism financing, they make much stronger partners in investigating international
terrorist financing, sharing information in a secure manner, and collaborating with us in the
targeting of terrorist financiers and facilitators with sanctions and law enforcement actions. When
terrorist groups raise money largely from criminal and terrorist enterprises within their own
territory, a notable practice of ISIS,13 U.S. authorities have limited means to combat illicit
money flows. We are reliant on the capabilities and political will of partners to combat such
threats, and must also resort to physical means to destroy some of their revenue-generating assets.
With ISIS, coordination with foreign counterpart law enforcement bodies, such as Interpol and
Europol; local financial regulatory and law enforcement authorities, in Turkey, for example; as
well as the private sector, can collectively help to hinder the flow of financial support for the
organization outside of its territory. Security cooperation with Turkey, including the ability to
use airbases there, and coordinating bombing strikes on ISIS nodes with other security partners,
can help to target and destroy ISIS’ criminal moneymaking enterprises.
2NC — Solves
Effective financial diplomacy and international central bank credibility is key
to combat terrorism, rogue states, and organize crime
Loeffler 9 (Rachel L was deputy director, Middle East and Africa, of the Office of Terrorist
Finance and Financial Crimes at the U.S. Department of the Treasury, “How the Financial
System Can Isolate Rogues”, Foreign Affairs, JSTOR)
Over the last five years, U.S.
national security policy and the inter national banking system have
become inextricably intertwined. With terrorism and nuclear proliferation at the top of the
United States' foreign policy agenda and few diplomatic or military levers left to pull, Washington has
increasingly turned to the private sector for help in confronting some of its biggest international
challenges. That has meant, above all, an effort to work with banks to put pressure on states and other
international actors that the United States otherwise has little ability to influence. This effort is
defined by a careful dance between the U.S. government and the global banking industry. Through
targeted financial measures, Washington has signaled to banks situations in which it sees
dangerous actors intersecting with the international financial system. Banks, for the most part, have acted
on these signals, and the two most recent chapters in this unfolding story?Iran and North Korea?suggest that using global finance
to shape the behavior of international actors can be remarkably powerful. But financial
measures are only as effective as the banks that implement them. Given the role that banks, rather than
governments, now play as agents of international isolation, policymakers must develop a more sophisticated and accurate understanding of what this
new tool of statecraft can and cannot do. In its bid to curb Iran's and North Korea's destabilizing efforts to develop or expand their nuclear programs, the
U.S. government has, in recent years, financially targeted not only Tehran and Pyongyang but also the individuals,
companies, and as sociations that front their illicit activities. These measures have depended on a diplomatic campaign
aimed at the world's financial centers. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, financial diplomacy meant lobbying foreign governments
to freeze assets. Now, U.S. financial diplomacy increasingly involves global financial institutions in addition to
governments. Traditionally, Washington has worked with compliance departments in global banks to combat terrorism,
weapons proliferation, the narcotics trade, and corruption. Governments issue watch lists that
banks use to block suspected assets and transactions, thereby cutting individuals and organizations off from the
world's financial system. The benefit of compliance strategies is that banks do not have to make the difficult determination about whether to
handle certain clients on their own. Surprisingly, these restrictions have reached beyond the boundaries of legal jurisdiction. Banks outside the
United States often adhere to U.S. watch lists even when they are not required by domestic or international law
to do so. Aware of this response, the United States has begun to pursue high-level financial diplomacy with
global banks directly to foster a shared sense of risk. For banks, this risk often comes down to
questions of reputation. In the global financial marketplace, a brand name is a valued asset, one that takes time to build and virtually no
time at all to destroy. The risk of an alarmist headline announcing that a bank has facilitated terrorism or nuclear weapons proliferation abroad, even
unwittingly, is not worth any potential return for a major global bank. Accordingly, the underlying business imperative of banks?to understand and assess
risk?has begun to encourage cooperation between the public and the private sector against threats posed to global security. In 2007, the United States
accounted for half of the global investment banking and brokerage markets and half of the diversified-financial services market, leading most global
financial institutions to forgo potentially profitable opportunities in other regions before risking a brand-name malfunction in the U.S. market. With
the dollar in steep decline, the dispersion of financial activity away from one center to many, and the U.S. financial
system in crisis, it is very possible that the United States' financial prowess will wane over time . That
makes it all the more critical for the new financial statecraft to foster a shared sense of risk
between U.S. policymakers and global bankers.
CP — Relevant Services PIC
Note
Net benefit is the internal case turn about the negative repercussions for trafficking victims.
1NC — Shell
Text: The United States federal government should only provide visas for
internationally trafficked victims to the United States, via legal immigration,
who would otherwise be excluded based on the law enforcement cooperation
requirement or a narrow definition of human trafficking
The CP PIC’s out of relevant services and protections – avoids pitfalls in the
system that cause negative repercussions for trafficking victims
Cianciarulo ‘7 - Marisa Silenzi, Assistant Professor of Law, Chapman University School of
Law. (“SYMPOSIUM: LatCrit XI Working and Living in the Global Playground: Frontstage and
Backstage: ARTICLE: IMMIGRATION: Modern-Day Slavery and Cultural Bias: Proposals for
Reforming the U.S. Visa System for Victims of International Human Trafficking, 7 Nev. L.J.
826,”) Nevada Law Journal, LexisNexis, Summer, 2007, Accessed 7-25-18, NC)
IV. Proposed Reforms
The cultural barriers present in the T visa system have led to erratic, inadequate
implementation of the T visa, which in turn has had several negative repercussions for
international human trafficking victims and anti-trafficking efforts. First, it sends a message to traffickers and
their customers: trafficking victims are not a priority within the immigration system. Second, this ongoing failure to
provide adequate protection and benefits to "the most helpless and vulnerable members of our
society" further victimizes them and cultivates an environment in which the actions against them
become invisible, and even acceptable. Finally, it contributes to the distrust and fear that
trafficking victims already harbor towards law enforcement, thereby encouraging them to remain
silent rather than to cooperate in the pursuit and prosecution of individuals who are a danger to
the entire community.
To ensure that the victims of international human trafficking - who are brought to the United States to supply an illicit demand for their services - have
access to the protection Congress intended, I propose several reforms to the T visa system. First, the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security
should implement a system in which trafficking victims are exposed to federal law enforcement officers for the least possible duration. Rather than
remain in the custody of and subject to the jurisdiction of law enforcement officers, trafficking victims should be housed in appropriate (i.e., secure but
non-prison-like) settings and have immediate access to immigration officials specially trained to earn their trust and determine whether they are eligible
for a T visa. Second, the T visa regulations should be amended to authorize the waiver of the cooperation requirement upon a showing that such
cooperation on the part of the trafficking victim is more likely than not to result in severe harm to her or her family members abroad. Finally, the
regulations should be amended to specify that poverty and domestic violence may constitute force or coercion.
A. Creating an Initial Interview Process That Responds to the Unique Situations of T Visa Applicants
International human trafficking victims are not similarly situated to the majority of applicants for various immigration benefits. Even when compared to
most asylum seekers, their trauma is often more recent and their likelihood of harm more imminent. For them to access the immigration benefits to which
they are statutorily entitled, the T visa system must have the capacity to respond to their unique situations.
1. Asylum Pre-Screening Officer System ("APSO")
In 1996, in response to concerns that the U.S. immigration system was vulnerable to fraud and abuse, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA"). IIRIRA made significant changes to the U.S. immigration system, one of which was the establishment of a
new deportation procedure by which immigration officers at the port of entry were empowered to deport summarily any individual who did not have a
valid passport and/or visa. This process, called expedited removal, includes a five-year ban on returning to the United States.
Expedited removal does not apply to individuals fleeing persecution. To ensure that individuals who may face harm upon return to their countries are not
subjected to expedited removal, the INS established the Asylum Pre-Screening Officer ("APSO") system to conduct evaluations known as "credible fear
interviews." Officers of the specially trained Asylum Corps conduct the interviews and determine whether "there is a significant possibility … that the
alien could establish eligibility for asylum.
Credible fear applicants often find themselves in situations similar to those victims of
international human trafficking encounter. Having been apprehended by armed U.S. law
enforcement officials for violating the law, they experience language barriers, cultural barriers,
anxiety, and fear for their well-being. Many have experienced torture or other trauma prior to
fleeing to the United States. Like victims of international human trafficking, most credible fear
applicants have been transferred to a prison-like detention center to await further processing. By
the time they have their credible fear interview, many have spent several days or even weeks in
detention. Even if the APSO officer finds them to have a credible fear of return to their country, they often remain in detention
for lengthy periods. The credible fear interview is only the first step in their quest for safety - they must then present their case to an
immigration judge in a contested hearing and meet the higher standard and burden of proof of asylum hearings, often without a lawyer or any logistical
support.
Similarly, victims of international human trafficking are often detained at length. Their initial
encounter with armed law enforcement officers often occurs during the terrifying atmosphere of a
raid. Like many asylum seekers, most have endured or been threatened with horrific treatment
prior to being arrested and detained, and have a deeply instilled fear of law enforcement. That
fear, as well as the conditions of detention, anxiety, and linguistic and cultural barriers, creates a
tremendous risk that potential T visa-eligible victims will not have the opportunity to seek the
relief to which they may be entitled. Developing and implementing a system similar to APSO could eliminate some of
the conditions that may be precluding many international human trafficking victims from accessing immigration relief.
2. Trafficking and Exploitation Victims Assistance Program ("TEVA")
To respond to the unique needs of international human trafficking victims, I propose that CIS create an intervention system that functions similarly to the
APSO program. The Trafficking and Exploitation Victims Assistance ("TEVA") program would employ CIS officers (as opposed to ICE or Customs and
Border Protection ("CBP") officers) specially trained to deal effectively with individuals who have experienced trauma, duress, kidnapping, and physical
and sexual assault. TEVA officers, like APSO officers, would have access to potential T visa applicants as soon as possible after their apprehension by
law enforcement officers.
TEVA interviews would differ from APSO interviews in at least two significant ways. First, unlike APSO interviews, which take place in detention
centers, TEVA interviews would take place in a location more conducive to earning the trust of and learning the truth from trafficking victims. To ensure
that potential T visa beneficiaries gain access to the application process, I recommend that all noncitizen arrestees from brothel and sweatshop raids be
housed in secure but non-prison-like TEVA facilities similar to those where child and family asylum seekers are detained. Like the child and family
detention centers, the TEVA facilities would have social workers and other trained professionals on staff, and offer medical care, therapy, recreation, and
education in a supportive, non-threatening environment. It is in these facilities, rather than a jail, that TEVA interviews would take place.
Second, TEVA officers would be specially trained to deal with victims of the types of trauma common among trafficking victims. Just as APSO officers
receive extensive training in asylum law, TEVA officers must have expertise in the dynamics of human trafficking, as well as expertise in determining
whether a person might be suffering from trauma-related psychological disorders and/or the effects of coercion. Based on the applicant's reported
experiences and display (or lack thereof) of psychological and/or physical symptoms consistent with a victim of human trafficking, the TEVA officer
would make a decision whether to refer the applicant to nonprofit or pro bono counsel for pursuit of a T visa claim.
B. Compliance with Law Enforcement Requests
The T visa regulations currently require that a T visa application be denied "if the Service
determines that the alien has not complied with any reasonable request for assistance … ." In
general, cooperation with law enforcement is a valid requirement and one consistent with one of
the goals of the VTVPA: bringing international human traffickers to justice. However, the failure
to recognize that in some cases, providing such assistance may jeopardize the lives of the
trafficking victims and/or their families, is inconsistent with another principal goal of the
VTVPA: providing protection and assistance to victims of international human trafficking.
To reconcile the apparent inconsistency between these two goals, I propose an amendment to the regulations. The amendment, which would be placed at
8 C.F.R. § 214.11(h)(4), would read:
Waiver of compliance with law enforcement requests. Applicants who demonstrate that it is more likely than not that their participation in a criminal
investigation or prosecution of a trafficker would result in severe harm to the applicants and/or their family members in the United States and/or abroad
are exempt from the requirements set forth at paragraphs (h)(1) and (h)(2) of this section.
The burden would be on applicants applying for the waiver to provide evidence of the likelihood of harm. Such evidence might demonstrate, for example,
that a waiver applicant's trafficker was a member of a powerful organized crime unit that enjoys immunity from apprehension and prosecution in their
home country, and that the organized crime unit has been known to retaliate severely against those who attempt to escape and/or to assist law
enforcement officers. A victim of international human trafficking who meets that burden should still be entitled to the protection afforded by the VTVPA.
2NC — Net Benefit
Inadequate victims’ services destroy protection for trafficking victims
Sheldon-Sherman ’12 – Jennifer A.L., B.A., University of Kansas; J.D., Stanford Law
School. Jennifer A.L. Sheldon-Sherman is a judicial law clerk for a United States District Court
Judge in the Western District of Missouri, (“Article: The Missing "P": Prosecution, Prevention,
Protection, and Partnership in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 117 Penn St. L. Rev. 443,”)
Penn State Law Review, LexisNexis, Fall, 2012, Accessed 7-25-18, NC)
II. Criticisms of the TVPA
Since the enactment of the TVPA over ten years ago, the conversation regarding it has centered around three main criticisms: lack of federal
prosecutions, insufficient state and local involvement in anti-trafficking efforts, and inadequate victims' services. 111 These criticisms track the three
goals of the legislation. 112 An absence of federal prosecutions and state and local involvement hinders apprehension and punishment of traffickers.
Insufficient attention to victims' rights and services impedes successful victim protection and rehabilitation. A lack of all three combines to produce
inadequate anti-trafficking outcomes, undermining the United States' position as an international leader in the campaign to end trafficking throughout the
world.
A. Lack of Federal Prosecutions The first main criticism of the TVPA is that crimes of trafficking under the TVPA are significantly under prosecuted,
evidencing the law's limitations and the country's limited investment in punishing traffickers and protecting trafficking victims. 114 From 2001 to 2005,
for example, the DOJ prosecuted only 91 trafficking cases, and convicted only 140 of 248 defendants. 115 Although there are many reasons prosecutions
may be difficult - trafficking cases are often time and resource-intensive and require prosecutors to meet high standards of proof in showing "severe
trafficking" - insignificant prosecutorial numbers send a message to traffickers, victims, and policymakers that combating trafficking is not one of the
government's top priorities. 116 Critics also argue that prosecutions typically focus on finding and rescuing "innocent victims," meaning those individuals
engaged in the kind of forced labor "not tainted by public fears and prejudices towards certain types of work or workers," 117 such as labor performed by
illegal immigrants or others who appear to voluntarily "choose" their work. Critics and victim service providers argue that this narrow definition of
[*459] "deserving" victims results in high prosecution rates for sex trafficking and virtually no enforcement of labor trafficking. 118 Prosecutorial
numbers reflect this reality. Between 2001 and 2005, the DOJ filed twice as many sex trafficking cases as labor cases and prosecuted three times as many
sex trafficking defendants, 119 even though the International Labour Organization estimates that forced labor occurs nine times more frequently than sex
trafficking. 120 In making moral judgments about which crimes are worthy of investigation and prosecution and which are not, critics maintain that law
enforcement and prosecutors play into public stereotypes, prejudices, and fears that reinforce anti-immigration tendencies and policies. 121 B.
Insufficient State Involvement in Anti-Trafficking Efforts While federal law enforcement has made strides in apprehending traffickers, critics argue that
the TVPA is "topheavy," lacking informed and trained implementers at the local level where traffickers most commonly operate and are apprehended.
123 Many have recognized the critical role of local law enforcement in identifying trafficking cases [*460] and victims. 124 In fact, senior federal law
enforcement officers hypothesize that local law enforcement officers - those most commonly involved in routine investigations that bring them into
contact with the community - may be in the best position to first identify trafficking. 125 Between 2007 and 2008, for example, local law enforcement
arrested 68 percent of individuals eventually charged with trafficking. 126 A review of federal prosecutions also suggests that actions taken by local law
enforcement at the initial stages of trafficking investigations can significantly impact the success of later prosecutorial efforts. 127 Trafficking is difficult
to recognize without proper training. 128 For example, when police approach victims of trafficking, victims rarely indicate their trafficked status for fear
of retaliation by their traffickers. 129 Because local law enforcement officers are more familiar with their jurisdiction and are more likely to have
personal connections within the community, they are more likely than federal law enforcement to be approached by witnesses of trafficking or to come in
first-hand contact with trafficking victims. 130 As such, local officials may be best situated to first identify and uncover trafficking. 131 Unfortunately,
because the TVPA targets federal and not local law enforcement, federal officials are more likely than local officials to have training in trafficking
recognition and apprehension. 132
C. Inadequate Victims' Services
One of the most significant and lingering critiques of the TVPA is its failure to adequately
provide relief and protection for trafficking victims. This critique is relevant throughout all
stages of the victim recovery process, including discovery, apprehension, and release. The first
criticism of the TVPA in this regard is its narrow definition of victimization. Under the TVPA,
only individuals who are victims of a "severe form of trafficking," defined as a person induced by
"force, fraud, or coercion," are eligible to receive benefits including social services and legal
immigration status. While force, fraud, and coercion are integral elements to the definition of
trafficking, defining, identifying, and proving such terms is often difficult. Accordingly, many
trafficked individuals find themselves ineligible for benefits.
The "severe trafficking" restriction has the potential to most significantly impact individuals who come to the United States and work in the sex industry
voluntarily, yet still find themselves living in slave-like conditions. Limiting relief only to those who are innocently coerced into prostitution perpetuates
the discourse of "innocent victims" and noble "saviors," while ignoring the experience of many victims of modern day slavery who may be viewed by
governmental officials as complicit or guilty. Still, while these individuals may have "voluntarily" agreed to commercial sex, they likely did not agree to
be subjected to slave-like working conditions. By constructing victimhood in this limited way and by focusing the discussion on victims rather than the
abuse itself, the TVPA neglects many of those whom it purports to help. Additionally, the line distinguishing force, fraud, and coercion from
voluntariness is vague; thus, interpretation of the TVPA is often subject to the interpretation of the law enforcement officials who may have their own
preconceived notions about the rightness or wrongness of certain acts.
Even if individuals are victims of "severe trafficking," the Department of Health and Human
Services must certify their eligibility for benefits. This process is difficult to navigate, often
taking weeks or months, and, at times, it is stymied by officials who are reluctant to grant what
they believe may be "excessive" certifications. During this process, however, trafficking victims
need services including food, housing, and counseling. Despite the DOJ's institution of a 2004
policy to streamline the certification process, it still certified only 304 individuals in 2010, an
increase from 136 in 2004. While these 304 victims accounted for 84 percent of the individuals
who applied for certification during 2010, they represent certification of less than 1.5 percent of
the United States' estimated 20,000 trafficking victims overall.
CP — States
1NC — Shell
Text: The fifty states and relevant territories should train law enforcement to
include the overlapping nature of immigration and trafficking and adjust
measures accordingly.
The counterplan solves by changing local laws that only aim to punish
criminal activity, rather than investigate potential trafficking
Bushman 13 – Katherine Bushman, S.J. Quinney College of Law from Salt Lake City, Utah.
“Addressing Human Trafficking at the State and Local Level,” 10/23/13.
https://www.law.utah.edu/addressing-human-trafficking-at-the-state-and-local-level//jtsang
Human trafficking is both an international and domestic problem but cries out for state and local
attention. Because the United States is one of the most frequent destinations for international
trafficking[1] and trafficking is most noticeable at local levels, local law enforcement agencies
play a crucial role in identifying and protecting international trafficking victims. Although steps
have been taken at the federal level to promote training of local law enforcement officers about
victim identification and protection, it is certain that many victims are misidentified as
criminals during investigations rather than as victims of a pervasive international criminal
scheme.
In 2000, the United States professed its commitment to combating human trafficking by enacting
the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA). The scheme of the Act includes provisions to
prevent trafficking, punish traffickers and protect the victims of trafficking. It has been updated
several times to establish more rights for victims, new prevention strategies, and grant programs
to help state and local governments address trafficking.[2] The TVPA encourages state
participation in combating trafficking through these grant programs and promotes the
establishment and strengthening of programs “to educate and train law enforcement personnel in
how to establish trust of persons subjected to trafficking and encourage cooperation with
prosecution efforts.”[3]
Despite the federal government’s effort to promote increased training for local law enforcement
officers, victim identification remains difficult in part because many victims are not nationals of
the United States. Local law enforcement may look past what it perceives to be a federally preempted immigration issue[4] in order to charge an individual under a local criminal statute and
avoid a conflict with federal law.[5] What compounds this difficulty is that, in some cities, local
law enforcement practice is to avoid inquiring about an individual’s immigration status unless she
is arrested.[6] Assuming that an officer did inquire about an arrestee’s immigration status, the
inquiry still might end at that point without any further investigation into a possible underlying
trafficking scheme.
For an illustrative hypothetical, imagine that a local officer has arrested a woman for soliciting
sex. This woman has an accent. Some law enforcement officers would be instructed to avoid the
immigration question and attempt to investigate the criminal activity (prostitution) as narrowly as
possible in order to avoid clashing with federal law. To sidestep the immigration question, the
officer is not likely to ask questions pertaining to the woman’s background or inquire any further
than to establish that she has committed a criminal act.[7] Because she has been arrested for
committing a crime, has experienced corrupt police behavior in her home country, and has been
threatened by her trafficker to remain silent about the scheme, the woman is unlikely to volunteer
information to the officer that would suggest that she is a victim. Under these circumstances, it is
not hard to understand why international trafficking rings often remain undetected.
Part of the federal government’s solution to this problem is educating “law enforcement
personnel in how to establish trust” of trafficking victims. Even when officers attempt to identify
trafficking victims, victims “are often reluctant to identify themselves as victims” due to the
intimidation and coercion they have experienced.[8] The trust of trafficking victims, therefore, is
difficult to earn, so the federal policy suggests that local law enforcement agencies should
constantly strive to maintain a trustworthy reputation, particularly within diverse communities
where misidentification of victims seems likely. For an example of an enforcement scheme that
cannot work effectively to identify victims of trafficking, Arizona stands out.
In Maricopa County, Sheriff Joe Arpaio has strongly advocated an anti-illegal immigration
platform since the mid-2000s, to the detriment of U.S. and international efforts to prevent
trafficking, protect victims and to punish traffickers.[9] The result is that the MCSD has garnered
a reputation for being tough on crime and even tougher on immigrants, regardless of their
citizenship status. In addition, Arizona is a state with comparatively mediocre state-enacted
human trafficking laws and, because it borders a country with some corrupt law enforcement
agencies and a great deal of poverty, it is at an increased risk of experiencing international human
trafficking than other states.[10]
Over the summer of 2013, the MCSD initiated its 74th worksite immigration raid in Phoenix.
Because Sheriff Arpaio has claimed support for these raids under Arizona’s laws against identity
theft and fraud, and immigration is technically a federally pre-empted category, his department’s
focus is on arresting individuals who are perceived to be immigrants in violation of criminal
statutes, while these individuals may very well be victims of trafficking and forced labor.[11]
These arrestees, if they are not legally present in the United States, are non-bondable and can
expect to spend time in Arpaio’s uncooled and unheated “Tent City” jail, where the summer
temperature has been documented as high as 145 degrees Fahrenheit.[12] In addition to the
Maricopa County Sheriff Department’s non-prioritization of the investigation of human
trafficking, the department has been at the front of media attention for numerous other shocking
investigative methods such as racial profiling under Arizona’s “show me your papers” law.[13]
The MCSD is a good example of why Congress has encouraged the expansion of training on
trafficking investigation and victim protection. In Arpaio’s 74 raids, certainly some victims of
forced labor have been misidentified and treated as criminals rather than victims. When
reviewing a survey of state trafficking laws, it is evident that there may be a connection between
Arizona’s non-prioritization of trafficking laws and the investigative methods of the MCSD.[14]
What, then, are some helpful measures for victim identification at the state and local level? One
scholar suggests that law enforcement training should include training about the overlapping
nature of immigration and international human trafficking and that procedures and policies should
be tailored accordingly.[15] Because identification failure can occur when law enforcement
perceives an immigration issue during employer raids, this training would ideally include
procedural guidance for conducting such raids where potential victims would be removed from
their threatening environment and “be interviewed in a non-confrontational setting” rather than
face intimidating interrogation by the raiding agents.[16]
The most fundamental change needs to come from state legislatures. Though it appears that there
has been rapid progress among some states to address the increasing need for a complete statebased scheme to protect victims and thoroughly investigate trafficking, not all states are on board
as of 2013.[17] States without a comprehensive human trafficking framework must develop one
that not only addresses the punishment of traffickers and the protection of victims – these
frameworks must include provisions for law enforcement training and trafficking tasks forces.
Arizona, for example, lacks (among other things) statutory provisions for human trafficking
training for law enforcement as well as a provision for a task force on trafficking.[18] If
Arizona’s legislature would make strides to adopt a more comprehensive framework, the MCSD
might use its “identity theft raids” as an opportunity to identify potential human trafficking
victims and investigate larger criminal schemes rather than criminalize victims.
Though the United States has made a commitment to protect international trafficking victims,
punish their traffickers, and take steps to prevent trafficking entirely, this commitment must be
supported at the state level as well. This can be accomplished through state adoption of
comprehensive trafficking frameworks[19] and expanded law enforcement training for victim
identification, procedural change, and awareness of the overlap between immigration and human
trafficking laws.
Continued presence status solves the threat of deportation
Pollock and Hollier 10 – Joycelyn M. Pollock & Valerie Hollier (2010) T Visas:
Prosecution Tool or Humanitarian Response?, Joycelyn M. Pollock started her career in criminal
justice as a probation and parole officer in the state of Washington. Women & Criminal Justice,
20:1-2, 127-146, https://doi.org/10.1080/08974451003641172/jtsang
Continued Presence
When law enforcement officers believe it is necessary, they can ask for a ‘‘continued presence’’
for the trafficking victim (TVPA 2000:x7105(b)(1) (E)(u)). This request allows the individual to stay and
work in the United States but does not confer any right for permanent status. Various mechanisms
for continued presence may be granted, such as a deferred action order, which holds the determination of the victim’s immigration
status in abeyance until the law enforcement agency no longer needs the services of the victim. Another
mechanism used to
ensure continued presence is to grant a parole or a stay of final order. The point is that the
continued presence request merely ensures the presence of the victim; it does nothing to change the victim’s
potential or permanent immigration status. The request is initiated by the law enforcement agency that is
involved in the investigation and prosecution of the case. Usually this is a federal rather than state agency, although state
law enforcement officials may also request continued presence status for their victim-witnesses.
2NC — Solvency
Counterplan solves the case by providing training to local law enforcement
Bachar 9 – Karen Bachar has been a social science analyst in NIJ's Violence and Victimization
Research Division since 2005. “Combating Human Trafficking at the State and Local Levels,”
3/23/09. https://www.nij.gov/journals/262/pages/combating-human-trafficking.aspx/jtsang
As Robert Moossy makes clear in this article, local law enforcement agencies are often in the best
position to identify human trafficking victims. Recent research, however, indicates the difficulty
of uncovering and investigating human trafficking cases is often caused by a lack of training, the
need for enhanced communication between local law enforcement and victim service agencies,
and the hidden nature of this crime. Additionally, human trafficking may take a back seat to other
priorities, such as violence and drugs.
Recent studies funded by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) have revealed a need to better
understand the problem. One study, for example, found that in general, officers, prosecutors and
service providers could not:
Identify types of trafficking (for example, trafficking in sexual exploitation or trafficking in
general laborers).
List elements of trafficking.
Differentiate between severe and non-severe forms of trafficking.
Distinguish trafficking from smuggling.
Differentiate between domestic and international trafficking.
The same study also found communication gaps between local law enforcement and victim
service agencies.[1]
Another NIJ study found that law enforcement agencies participating in the Department of
Justice's human trafficking task forces are more likely to perceive human trafficking as a problem
in their communities and to have training, protocols and specialized units of personnel devoted to
investigating these cases.[2]
These findings highlight the need for additional training for and increased awareness among state
and local criminal justice practitioners to help them recognize and prosecute trafficking cases
either under state statutes or with federal partners. Promoting interagency cooperation remains
vital.
2NC — Fed Fails
The federal government lacks equipment and resources to conduct
investigations
Farrell 9 – Amy, PH.D. School of Criminology and Criminal Justice. College of Social Science
and Humanities. Northeastern University. “State and local law enforcement responses to human
trafficking: explaining why so few trafficking cases are identified in the United States,” 2009.
https://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/full/10.1108/S1521-6136%282009%290000013016/jtsang
Belief that suppression of human trafficking is a federal, rather than local, priority decreases the
likelihood that local agencies will identify and respond. Local officials are generally most
concerned with problems such as violence or property crimes. As one chief noted “local law
enforcement agencies have too many other issues to contend with, so these cases are probably
ignored or referred federally.” Reluctance investigate trafficking is particularly acute in cases of
labor trafficking, where police leaders and officers alike tend to believe that labor inspectors
should regulate exploitive workplaces, not the police.
Even in federally funded task forces, where agencies have voluntarily undertaken antitrafficking activities, officers assigned to task forces must become champions of human
trafficking in their own agency. These officers commonly encounter difficulty securing
vehicles, equipment, space to conduct investigations, and personnel for raids or other special
operations. Believing supervisors would be more supportive if human trafficking was a problem
with local implications rather than merely an external burden to satisfy a federal initiative, some
officers have reported links between human trafficking and other local crime problems, such as
street-level violence and gangs. For example, investigators from the Boston human trafficking
task force developed a research report entitled Girls: The New Drug which described the
connections between gang activity and forced prostitution in the city.
2NC — A2: Enforcement Deficit
Any deficits to the counterplan link back to the aff because they depend on
the states for implementation and enforcement
Farrell 9 – Amy, PH.D. School of Criminology and Criminal Justice. College of Social Science
and Humanities. Northeastern University. “State and local law enforcement responses to human
trafficking: explaining why so few trafficking cases are identified in the United States,” 2009.
https://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/full/10.1108/S1521-6136%282009%290000013016/jtsang
Local law enforcement agencies were believed to be well positioned to identify and respond to
human trafficking cases because they know their communities and are involved in routine
activities which bring them into contact with local criminal elements where human trafficking
may be occurring (Clawson, Dutch, & Cummings, 2006, p. 42). To support this responsibility, the
federal government funded locally run law enforcement task forces to identify victims and
prosecute offenders.
With new laws and a tidal wave of support from the federal government, anti-human trafficking
advocates expected to see results. Eight years after the passage of the TVPA, however, the U.S.
government has certified only 1,379 human trafficking victims and brought fewer than 450
federal trafficking cases forward to prosecution (U.S. Department of State, 2008). As more
funding was devoted to anti-trafficking programs,2 critics began questioning the legitimacy of
these expenditures. In 2005, the U.S. Congress passed legislation requiring the Department of
Justice to provide information on the extent and costs of human trafficking to help justify
continued expenditures. The following year, the GAO reported “methodological weaknesses,
gaps in data and numerical discrepancies” that cast doubt on the reliability of both the United
States and international trafficking estimates (GAO, 2006, p. 2). In the wake of these
concerns, a front page article in the Washington Post suggested the low number of documented
cases of human trafficking victimization did not justify the current U.S. expenditures in antitrafficking programming (Markon, 2007).
These criticisms illustrate a central challenge to the anti-trafficking movement – despite political
will, new legal tools and the commitment of resources, relatively few trafficking arrests or
prosecutions have been made by law enforcement. In light of concerns about under-enforcement
raised by human trafficking critics, a nationwide study was conducted to learn about how
prepared local law enforcement agencies are to investigate human trafficking cases and how often
they investigate them.
2NC — A2: Doesn’t Remove Cooperation Requirement
The plan functionally removes the need for victim testimony by enabling
better police investigations and prosecution, BUT the counterplan competes
by federal cooperation requirement in place
NRC 14 – The National Research Council is the operating arm of the three academies for the
purpose of providing objective policy advice. “Confronting Commercial Sexual Exploitation and
Sex Trafficking of Minors in the United States: A Guide for the Legal Sector,” 10/17/14.
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK253353//jtsang
Police agencies can take several steps to overcome the above challenges. The first is for them to
train their personnel to recognize the existence and seriousness of commercial sexual exploitation
and sex trafficking of minors in the United States, identify victims, and respond appropriately. The Chicago Police
Department, for example, provides roll-call training to its line officers to alert them to the fact that victims can
be found in a variety of settings, such as massage parlors, brothels, escort services, and strip clubs, not just on the street
[17]. And in Dallas, each of the 3,700 officers in the police department has received 3 hours of training in how to recognize and to
identify children and adolescents most likely to become victims of these crimes [4]. Training in identifying victims is also available
online, offered, for example, by Polaris Project [18] and the Department of Homeland Security [19].
In addition, training helps officers feel confident in carrying out a well-conducted investigation.
Absent such training, law enforcement professionals often feel unprepared to initiate an investigation
into commercial sexual exploitation and sex trafficking of minors [7], and such investigations are
therefore unlikely to be conducted [8]. Training is particularly valuable to equip law enforcement
investigators to work with prosecutors to pursue cases against exploiters that are “victim-driven, not
victim-built,” or evidence-based [5, 20]. For such evidence-based approaches to work, law enforcement investigators
must be aware of techniques that can be used to gather additional evidence so that cases are not
completely dependent on victim testimony (see the discussion on page 16).
Finally, training can equip officers to better understand the roles of victim services and federal
law enforcement in trafficking investigations, and to make appropriate referrals for services.
Beyond training, additional steps that police agencies can take include dedicating a unit or
personnel to deal with human trafficking cases [3] and developing policies or protocols for
handling such cases [3, 7]. Participation in human trafficking task forces, mentioned above and
discussed in greater detail in Section 6, also increases the likelihood that an agency will
investigate and appropriately handle cases of commercial sexual exploitation and sex trafficking
of minors.
Finally, state and local law enforcement agencies can use several approaches to intervene with
perpetrators of commercial sexual exploitation and sex trafficking of minors and gather corroborative evidence for
criminal cases so as to minimize the reliance on victims' cooperation and testimony. Investigations
undertaken by the Boston Police Department's Human Trafficking Unit, for example, focus on holding the buyers of sex accountable
by conducting undercover stings and by reaching out to hotels where commercial sexual exploitation and sex trafficking of minors are
taking place [5]. In Chicago, police work closely with staff from the Salvation Army's STOP-IT program, who accompany them on
investigations and help manage street outreach to victims when a “takedown” occurs. Investigators
monitor calls to
victims and others made by exploiters and traffickers from jail and report that some of their strongest
evidence comes from these recordings. They also use wiretaps to gather evidence against buyers,
traffickers, and exploiters under an Illinois law that specifically allows use of this technique in these
investigations [21, 22, 23]. Other possible sources of evidence include
journals, letters, and other written communications between victims and traffickers; information
in police records regarding traffic stops involving victims and traffickers; website ads, including
BackPage or Craigslist postings; bond receipts (useful in cases in which a trafficker may have
bailed out the victim); credit card records and receipts; cell phones with walkie-talkie functions
and chirp phones that can connect a victim to the trafficker; data on cell phones that may show
text or voice messages between victims and traffickers; pretext or “one-party consent” recordings
in appropriate cases; photos of injuries, tattoos, or other branding of victims by traffickers;
clothing, jewelry, or other items provided to victims by traffickers; careful documentation of the
content and circumstances of out-of-court statements made by victims; and financial records,
electronic or otherwise, that may provide evidence of money laundering or a “financial footprint”
indicating suspicious or criminal activity [17, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26].
All of these sources are used to reduce reliance on victims' cooperation and testimony to build
and prove cases against traffickers and suggest areas for specialized training of law enforcement
investigators.
2NC — A2: CP Doesn’t Give Benefits
The counterplan gives continued presence status which qualifies victims for
the exact same benefits as a T-visa
Roby et al 8 – Jini L. Roby , Jennifer Turley & JoAnna Garrick Cloward (2008). Jini L. Roby
is a member of the Utah Bar and an assistant professor in the School of Social Work, Brigham
Young University U.S. Response to Human Trafficking: Is it enough?, Journal of Immigrant &
Refugee Studies, 6:4, 508-525, https://doi.org/10.1080/15362940802480241
For the victims of trafficking in the United States, the TVPA is a doubleedged sword. If
a victim is found to have been
subjected to ‘severe’ form of trafficking, that person can receive benefits including (1) protection
and assistance and (2) continued presence in the United States (TVPA, 2000). However, in order to receive such
benefits the individual must be shown to be a victim of ‘severe form’ of trafficking, and willing to assist, in ‘every reasonable way’, in
the apprehension and prosecution of the perpetrator. This alignment of priorities—requiring the victim to assist in the criminal case as
the prerequisite to their initial and continuing status as victims—is perhaps the most detrimental point of the TVPA as detailed below.
When the victim is eligible and agrees to cooperate with the law enforcement, the victim can then apply for a T-visa or for Continued
Presence status in the United States while the criminal case goes forward against their traffickers. The non-immigrant T-visa allows
holders to live and work in the United States for three years and later apply for permanent residency. The U.S. Department of State
reports that the United States is currently the only country that offers the possibility of permanent residency to victims of trafficking
(“Exchange Program Alumni Fight Human Trafficking in Uzbekistan”, 2005). The application
for Continued Presence
is initiated by law enforcement, when the victim’s presence is necessary to carry out the criminal
case. In addition to the T-visa or Continued Presence, victims of severe form of trafficking are eligible to
receive all benefits that are extended to refugees and asylees, including Food Stamps, Medicaid,
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, Supplemental Security Income, and other benefits,
assuming they meet the program criteria (TVPA, 2000). While we believe this array of benefits is a marked improvement over the old
approach of treating victims as criminals, the victim’s primary claim to continued stay and protection arises out of her witness status,
and her needs as a victim are incidental.
K — Victimization
1NC — Shell
Their conceptualization of victims either renders them without agency or
minimizes protective services – that shreds the plan’s effectiveness and
reinforces gender hierarchies
Lobasz 9 [Jennifer K., Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University
of Minnesota, 5-19-2009, "Beyond Border Security: Feminist Approaches to Human
Trafficking," Taylor & Francis,
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09636410902900020?needAccess=true] lr,
Language Modified*
it
matters how trafficked persons are socially constructed. I argue that this more critical insight should be recognized as one of feminist
theorists’ central contributions to the study of human trafficking. Current constructions of human trafficking rely on gender stereotypes that discount women’s agency. The
conflation of “international human trafficking” with “trafficking of women for sexual
exploitation” reflects gendered notions of agency that frame men as actors and women as
victims—those acted upon.90 According to the GAO, “In most countries where trafficking data are gathered, women
and children are seen as victims of trafficking, and men are predominantly seen as migrant
workers, reflecting a gender bias in existing information. Men are also perceived as victims of labor exploitation that may not be
seen as a crime but rather as an issue for trade unions and labor regulators.”91 Trafficking discourses rest upon stereotypes of men
actively going out into the world to make their way and women passively staying at home unless
duped, seduced, or kidnapped by a trafficker.92 Hence, Melissa Ditmore and Marjan Wijers note that the full title of the UN Trafficking
Protocol is the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children; the emphasis on women and
children upholds stereotypical perceptions of men as autonomous actors and women as
passive victims. 93 Representations of trafficking based upon women’s assumed lack of agency
conflict with how many trafficked women perceive themselves. Mertus and Bertone explain, “The narrative of
individuals labeled as victims in this process, however, often reflects a far more complicated selfunderstanding of their own status, one that is not static and devoid of agency. These individuals stress that
Beyond specific arguments against the prohibition of prostitution, critics of abolitionism make a more general, and perhaps more significant, claim regarding human trafficking:
they were not always victims. At some early state, their involvement was completely willing, albeit tremendously ill-informed.”94 Bindman argues that analyses of trafficking
must recognize that women, like men, make choices and take risks within the international labor market for a wide range of reasons—from the need to financially support
themselves and their families to the desire to seek adventure and new experiences. Bindman elaborates: Looking at trafficking from the perspective of the majority of the women
we are concerned with, it is clear that most women come to Western Europe because they are looking for a better way to make a living. In this sense, they should be seen as labor
migrants. Migration is an age-old survival strategy for men as well as for women. It implies courage and initiative to try to change one’s own or the family’s situation. Certainly,
women who have become victims of trafficking cannot be classified as passive or stupid victims. This may seem self-evident, but ten years of daily work on the issue of trafficking
proves it is still not the case for many people involved in the whole process, such as police officers and the judiciary.95 This should not be read as a call to ignore or downplay the
sense in which trafficking victims are coerced or misled but rather to begin analysis of human trafficking with the recognition that it occurs within a larger context in which labor
inherited notions of trafficking betray a reliance on sex-based stereotypes
of women’s capabilities which create unrealistic perceptions of victims as innocent, pure, and
sexually exploited. Sex trafficking discourses emphasize elements such as sexual innocence and
naїvete, kidnapping, and ´ sexual brutality in order to produce a sympathetic victim who would be
politically unpalatable to criminalize. The commonly held picture of the trafficking victim depicts a young, naїve woman who seeks a better life
migration is a reasonable pursuit.96 These
away from her rural home by answering an advertisement to become a waitress or nanny and then ends up a sex slave, repeatedly rape [sexual assault]d, brutalized, and resold to
The UN’s informational website on human trafficking is indicative of this trope
other mafia pimps.97
,
describing enslaved young women who are beaten, rape [sexual assault]d, and forced to work up to eighteen hours a day, garnering enormous profits for those who sell them.98
Media reports tread upon this same worn ground. In The New York Times, Landesman describes an “epidemic” of sex slavery in the United States, run in part by Mexican crime
families that prey on young girls: The father controls the organization and the money, while the sons and their male cousins hunt, kidnap and entrap victims. The boys leave school
at 12 and are given one or two girls their age to rape [sexual assault] and pimp out to begin their training, which emphasizes the arts of kidnapping and seduction. [These men] troll
the bus stations and factories and school dances where under-age girls gather, work and socialize. They first ply the girls like prospective lovers, buying them meals and desserts,
promising affection and then marriage. Then the men describe rumors they’ve heard about America, about the promise of jobs and schools. Sometimes the girls are easy prey.
Most of them already dream of El Norte. But the theater often ends as soon as the agent has the girl alone, when he beats her, drugs her or simply forces her into a waiting car.99
According to Nora Demleitner, however, the kidnapping of women represents the least likely scenario of human trafficking, as many women willingly leave their homes to join
it is the subsequent enslavement or coercion that constitutes trafficking.100 She argues that
kidnapped women are used as paradigmatic cases because “these women represent the
traffickers;
innocent, the ‘true’ victim, a victim who did not choose to migrate illegally, let alone
prostitute herself.”101 The end result of portraying the referent of security as brutalized young women who are trafficked for sex and lack agency entirely is that
a hierarchy of victims is created. Women who have chosen to work as sex workers, but not as
sex slaves, do not garner the same kind of sympathy, and men and women trafficked for non-sex
labor are easily relabeled “illegal immigrants.”102 For instance, Europol Deputy Director Willy Bruggeman distinguishes between
exploited, deceived, and kidnapped sex trafficking victims, arguing that only kidnapped victims “are sex slaves in the truest sense.”103 Such narratives do
not assist feminists in forcing the state to incorporate human rights concerns into
countertrafficking policies. Moreover, this approach puts sex-trafficked women themselves at a
disadvantage if they cannot portray their status as entirely involuntary or that the conditions of
their exploitation were merely undesirable instead of horrifically brutal. Bindman elaborates: People, including police
officers, prosecutors and judges, can easily identify with women who comply to the stereotype of the naїve and innocent victim, unwittingly forced into prostitution. But the
moment a woman has worked as a prostitute or wants to continue to do so, or even when
she just stands up for herself, compassion turns into indifference or outright hostility.
Common opinion holds that once a prostitute, a woman loses all her rights and is no longer
entitled to protection against violence, exploitation, abuse, blackmail, and being held prisoner.104 Such women fail both the test of innocence and the test of pain:
Claudia Aradau explains that “raw physical suffering” is required to distinguish insufficiently “innocent” trafficking victims from illegal immigrants and prostitutes.105 In other
words, the “legal process may tend to declare any woman not fitting this childlike image—and most victims of unscrupulous traffickers will not conform to this model—as
stereotypes construct an idealized notion of trafficking victims that
is applicable to a small subset of trafficked persons, effectively removing all who do not fit
this construction from rights protections. The definition of trafficking victims as naїve and
innocent is tied up in a stereotyped assumption of the purity of white women and the impurity of
women of color. Historical advocacy against international human trafficking—which was taken to mean the
traffic in women for sexual exploitation—arose in the context of concern for the virtue of white women. Tales of white
unworthy of support and protection.”106 These
women kidnapped and forced into prostitution made their way from Europe to the United States at the turn of the twentieth century, prompting an international campaign against
“white slavery.” The white slave trade was thought to center on virginal and naїve young white women who were deceived, kidnapped, or even sold into slavery by parents for the
purpose of prostitution. Eileen Scully notes that during this time period, approximately 99 percent of sexual trafficking victims were women of color (including Jews, who were
It was the relatively few women of European descent engaged in both voluntary and
coerced prostitution, however, whose condition provoked widespread public outrage.107 Feminists connect
the panic regarding white slavery to “anxieties about changing gender, sex, class, and race relations at the turn of the century. The idea of a ‘white slave’
unconsciously spoke not only to the experience of the white working class laboring under harsh conditions of early industrial capitalism, but also to the
racial fears of an increasingly ethnically diverse population.”108
considered non-white).
The impact is extinction – gender hierarchies result in serial policy failure,
unchecked violence, and structural violence
Clark 4 [Mary E., PhD and professor of biological studies @ Berkeley, "RHETORIC,
PATRIARCHY & WAR: EXPLAINING THE DANGERS OF "LEADERSHIP" IN MASS
CULTURE", http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-4005307/Rhetoric-patriarchy-warexplaining-the.html]
I begin by questioning the notion that patriarchy is a "natural" or "inevitable" form of human
society. By "patriarchy" I do not mean a community or society where males hold political
positions as spokespersons for the whole and often are adjudicators of local disputes. This "male
function" is common in tribal and indigenous societies. But men's power over others is severely
limited and generally held only at the pleasure of the entire group, especially the elder women. (4)
Patriarchies, rather, are those much larger societies where not only is there gender dominance;
they also are highly class-structured, with a small, powerful elite controlling the rest of society, A
short history of these entities is necessary to understand today's dilemma. Rigidly controlled
patriarchies have evolved and disintegrated at many times and in many places in the past few
millennia of human existence-which, being the era of written history, is the condition of
humankind most familiar to us. But, as I have argued elsewhere (5) this was an unknown political
condition throughout earlier human existence, when small, egalitarian, highly dialogic
communities prevailed. Even today, small remnants of such societies still exist in comers of the
planet that escaped the socially destructive impact of Western colonization. Modern Western
"democracies" are, in fact, patriarchal in structure, evolving out of the old, male-dominated
aristocracies of late-Medieval Europe. Those historic class/caste hierarchies were legitimized by
embedded religious dogma and inherited royal authority. Together, church and monarch held a
monopoly of physical and economic power, creating politically stable, albeit unjust, societies.
During the gradual development of the religious Reformation, coupled with the Enlightenment's
concept of the "individual citizen," emerging egalitarian ideas threatened to destabilize the social
coherence of patriarchal regimes. At the same time, principalities and dukedoms were fusing into
kingdoms; kingdoms, in turn, were joining together as giant nation states. The United Kingdom
was formed of England, Wales and Scotland-each a fusion of local earlier dukedoms. City States
of Italy fused rather later. Bismarck created the "Second Reich" out of diverse German-speaking
princedoms in the 1870s. And, adding to this growth in the sheer size of patriarchies there was a
doubling of populations every couple of generations. Nation-states emerged as "mass cultures,"
with literally millions of persons under the control of a single, powerful government. The
centralized physical power possessed by most of these several industrializing European nations
matched or exceeded that of ancient Rome. To achieve coherence of such societies demanded a
new legitimating force to create a broad base of support among giant, diverse populations. The
erosion of the belief that classes were a god-given, "natural" state of affairs was hastened by the
introduction of low-cost printing and rapidly growing levels of literacy (both necessary to
underpin the new Industrial Age). These politically equalizing forces unleashed a host of social
discontents that had to be controlled. The old religious threats of damnation or excommunication
were fast losing their force, and new legal systems circumscribed the absolute powers of
monarchs to control social behavior. This very cacaphony of voices threatened the stability of the
new giant states. The "solution," of course, was to take control of the public dialogue, to define
the legitimate "topics of conversation." This is the primary role of political "leadership" in today's
mass societies, and that leadership uses two major tools to wield its influence: rhetoric and the
mass media. I suggest, then, that the high potential for internal instability in giant patriarchal
states is a primary factor in setting the stage for today's global insecurity and the extreme
militaristic rhetoric that exists both within and between nations. Before continuing this discussion
of patriarchy's dangers, I would note that, although in modern Western patriarchies the
domination of women by men is less evident as women have gained increasing political and
economic status, women with such status tend to assume the "shoulder pads" and "language" of
men when it comes to political and economic institutions. Women like Indira Gandhi, Prime
Minister of India, Golda Melt, Israeli Prime Minister; Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, Reagan's Ambassador
to the United Nations; Madeleine Albright, Clinton's Secretary of State; Margaret Thatcher,
Britain's Prime Minister; and Condoleezza Rice, George W. Bush's Security Advisor, come
readily to mind. (Thatcher cites the following terms the media applied to her: Iron Lady, Battling
Maggie, and Attila the Hen. (6)) The glass ceiling in the corporate world has proved harder to
crack, however, so fewer well-known examples exist there of powerful females. (Katherine
Graham, who became publisher of the Washington Post after the death of her husband, was one
of the few powerful women who to her credit, did not adopt the patriarchal mode.) Hence, I regard
the Western nations' politico-economic world view as very much in accordance with that of historical patriarchies, with
perhaps one or two Scandinavian exceptions. I thus conclude that the language of international politics today
is "gendered" by the political insecurity experienced by leaders of earlier patriarchies, and that the
presence of women in such governments has little effect on the framework of public dialogue. (I
recall hearing Geraldine Ferraro, when running for Vice-President in 1984, assure an interviewer
that she would not hesitate to push the "nuclear button" if necessary.) Hence, it is not our X and Y
chromosomes that are at issue here; it is the gendered world view that underpins our institutions
and frames our behaviors. As long as those in power "think" in this patriarchal box, we will live
in a globally-armed camp, where war-leading even to the annihilation of our species-is a constant,
real possibility.
The alternative is to reject vulnerability as the foundation for policy in favor
of a recognition of individual agency
Brunila and Rossi 17 (Kristiina Brunila, Professor of Social justice and Equality in
Education at the University of Helsinki, Leena-Maija Rossi, senior researcher at the University of
Helsinki, “Identity politics, the ethos of vulnerability, and education,” p. 6-9,
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00131857.2017.1343115?needAccess=true)
doolittle
The critique of the self-sustaining subject at the center of post-Cartesian Western metaphysics has
been comprehensively advanced in poststructural theories and their critical approach to human
subjectivity (e.g. Bordo, 2004; Derrida, 1981; Foucault, 1970; Hall, 2000; Lloyd, 2005). Michel Foucault, whose ideas have been discussed widely
in poststructural thinking, considered the meaning and value of ‘humanity’ as something that is open and shifting. According to him, instead of a theory
of knowing, we should look for a theory of discursive practices. This
does not mean abandonment of the subject but a
reconceptualization— thinking about the subject in its displaced or decentered position (Foucault, 1970;
see also Hall, 2000). It is crucial to understand this notion of subjectivity in order to see how the choices
people make stem not so much from the individual, but from the condition of possibility. The
discourses prescribe not only what is desirable, but also what is recognizable as an acceptable form of subjectivity (Butler, 2008). In education, thinking
in discursive terms provides the opportunity to see how certain discursive constructions in relation to human subjectivity and identity are appropriated
while others are discarded, relegated, and considered irrelevant or even threatening. Only then does it become possible to take up and engage in an
alternative discourse with new ideas and values. We argue that this kind of critical approach, especially if applied in education, could create ruptures in
In comparison to the neoliberal ethos of vulnerability, this
kind of poststructuralist thinking insists that people’s activities are not simplistically repressive or
emancipatory. Instead, a discursive understanding illuminates agency as a subjectivity-in-process
and as the effect and redeployment of power (e.g. Butler, 2008; Davies, 1998; Ecclestone & Brunila, 2015; Foucault, 1970). In
power relations, at least locally, in a certain space and time.
education, this understanding could help teache.rs to keep in mind that it is worth exploring language as a tool for constructing social and cultural reality
through juxtaposition, categorization and hierarchies. This
kind of approach means taking into consideration societal
differences as produced through politics, culture and practices. The practice of critical reading and thinking in
discursive terms can demonstrate the process of cultural and hierarchical construction of the opposing pairs, their mutual dependence and the construction
In order to see identity politics, human subjectivity and education from
a different perspective, we need to be aware of the discourses through which we are spoken about
and speak about others and ourselves. It is therefore crucial to find fault lines and fractures in these discourses, analyze and
deconstruct them, try to find new discourses and thus make new subject positions possible. In analyzing the relationship between
the ethos of vulnerability and the different ideas on human subjectivity, we argue for reconsidering a poststructural framing of identity politics (see also Rossi, 2015, p. 99). It seems that, because of the current
of their meaning through a hierarchical difference.
popularity of the ethos of vulnerability in neoliberal discourses, neoliberalism has found a pervasive way to harness the subject for its own purposes in an
attempt to promote the idea of the human subject as something essential and potential. The neoliberal order and the ethos of vulnerability are both tied to
a notion of an autonomous self, which can discover itself through a fixed identity, by acknowledging its individual faults and deficiencies, getting rid of
psychic and emotional vulnerabilities, and becoming a self-disciplinary agent, flexible when encountering challenges. The illusion of individual
Human potential can be fulfilled when
essential human needs are encountered and realized in the ‘right way’ (cf. Naskali, 2003). This means
addressing human beings as if they were selves of a particular normative type, with
autonomy is created as a consequence of ‘autonomizing’ the self and making it accountable.
individualized subjectivity, but endowed with similar hopes and dreams waiting to be recognized
and fulfilled to their highest potential. As long as this kind of approach remains untouched, it is able to shape people to conform to
it without using force or domination, but rather by enabling them to realize what is supposedly good. In this way, flexibility and self-responsibility or
accountability mean limited opportunities to speak and to be heard, by ensuring that one implicitly learns to find mistakes in, and to blame, only oneself
(Furedi, 2004). In
order to dismantle the neoliberal order and the ethos of vulnerability, there is a
need for an alternative perspective to the rigid notion of identity and subjectivity as
essentialist, stable, individualized and coherent. To open up channels of discourse that allow us to create some distance
from existing normative identities and identifications and their preset meanings and categories, it is crucial to recognize the fault lines of the power
relations related to the ethos of vulnerability. To
undermine the status of neoliberal notions of identities and
identifications, one must question the relations they construct between the subject, agency, and
politics. One way to get this process started is to begin to ask how discursive constructions related to the ethos of vulnerability take hold of the body
and desire, and how certain discursive constructions are appropriated while others are discarded, relegated as irrelevant or even threatening (Petersen,
2008, p. 55). Judith Butler and Bronwyn Davies’s accounts of the subject provide one way of understanding agency as a subject-in-process and as an
effect of power (Butler, 1997; Davies, 1998). Butler has stated that the ‘the subject is neither a ground nor a product, but the permanent possibility of a
certain resignifying process’ (Butler, 1992, p. 13; see also Davies, 2005, p. 1). If the ethos of vulnerability is a regulated performative process of
repetition taking place in discourses and bodily actions, it means that options exist to repeat it differently—for instance in the contexts of education.
Indeed, according to Butler, it is the very constitutivity of the subject that enables her/him/them to act within these forms of power, which are not only
regulating but are also productive. Because the capacity to act is not a possession, there is no need for a pre-existing subject in agency (Butler, 1997). For
example, when involved in the discourse of vulnerability, one is both conditioned by and dependent on the prevailing norms (cf. Butler, 2008 ).
We
find that it is crucial to find a way to talk about identity politics and human subjectivity as sites of
constant negotiation and agency without a fixed or foundational notion of subject or identity,
especially in training teachers and researchers of education. This task had already been taken up by many poststructural thinkers several decades ago, but
it is a project still in progress (e.g. Brown, 1995, p. 75). Working on the question of identity construction would allow educators to see that problems
concerning the ethos of vulnerability are products of different practices, policies and power relations, and therefore, always negotiable and changeable.
This would also have several implications. We
should understand the alliance of the neoliberal order and the
ethos of vulnerability, and look more closely at how they work and what their consequences are,
both in classrooms and in society at large. Davies (2005) makes the point that: It is in our own existence, the terms of our existence, that we need to begin
the work, together, of decomposing those elements of our world that make us, and our students, vulnerable to the latest discourse and that inhibit
conscience and limit consciousness. (p. 13) In the realm of education, as Brown (1995) has suggested, we could also seek to supplant the fixing ‘language
of “I am”’ with the language of ‘I want this for us’ (p. 75)—thus also shifting the focus from individualism toward a more communal notion of identity,
and possible alliances in terms of identity politics. Furthermore, including the perspective of intersectionality in curricula, starting at the level of basic
education, would help the students to understand the complexities of identities, relationalities, networks of power and categorizations. Certain authors
have approached vulnerability as an ontological condition with a transformative potential to promote social justice and human rights (Brown, 2011;
Butler, 2009; Ecclestone & Goodley, 2014). Butler (2009), for instance, argues that the vulnerability of a subject is a question of ontological
precariousness of life. For her, precarity refers to that political condition ‘in which certain populations suffer from failing social and economic networks
of support more than others, and become differentially exposed to injury, violence and death’ (Butler, 2015, p. 33). It starts to be expressed in actual
social situations in which the vulnerability of a subject emerges, relating for instance to the instability of the labor market or changes in political
governance. Unlike
the neoliberal notion of vulnerability, imposed on certain categories of subjects
from above through policies, this notion of vulnerability brings forth a context, or a structure of
relations, or societal conditions, which may be changed through subversive politics. By ‘ontology,’ Butler
does not refer to fundamental structures of being that are distinct from any social and political organization. On the contrary, according to her, this kind of
being is ‘always given over to others, to social and political organizations that have developed historically in order to maximize precariousness for some
and minimize precariousness for other’ (Butler, 2009, pp. 2–3). This
understanding of being is linked to the idea that
subjects are always constituted through norms, which in their reiteration, produce and shift the
terms through which subjects are recognized. These normative but not over-determined conditions produce a historically
contingent ontology. Our capacity to discern and name the ‘being’ of the subject is dependent on norms that generate that recognition (Butler, 2009). For
Butler, interruptions or inadvertent convergences with other networks might produce subversive citations that disrupt the pre-ordained iterability of
subjectivity (Butler, 1997, p. 135). This could be considered to be a way to resist, because in this poststructural discourse on precariousness, vulnerability
and interdependency, these ideas are not meant to turn people inwards or to make them feel weak, unlike in the neoliberal discourse of the ethos of
vulnerability (Kurki & Brunila, 2014). Quite the contrary, they can enable new forms of identity politics and new alliances. According to Stuart Hall,
resistance may be found in the attempt to rearticulate the relationship between subjects and discursive practices in which the question of identity recurs.
Reclaiming of the term ‘queer’ by activists, theorists and LGBTQI identifying people is a good example of this kind of rearticulation. It has thoroughly
changed the way queer now signifies in discursive practices. Or, if one prefers to stress the process of subjectification through discursive practices, and
the politics of exclusion, which all such subjectification appears to entail, the question of identification always remains in process, never completed (Hall,
2000). Accordingly,
re-thought through poststructuralist thinking, the concept of identity in the
identity politics could be considered not as essentialist, but as constructed across intersecting and
antagonistic discourses, practices and positions, relational and positional, without signaling the
stable core of the self. Precisely because identities are constructed within, not outside, discourse, we need to understand them as being
produced in specific historical and institutional sites within specific discursive formations and practices. One may also stress the processual ‘nature’ of
identity by rather talking about identifications as ways of situationally attaching oneself to and/or distinguishing oneself from discourses, practices,
positions, and other subjects (Rossi, 2015). Moreover, according to Hall (2000), identities are constructed within the play of specific modalities of power,
and thus are more like products of the marking of difference and exclusion, than self-identical, naturally constituted unities. Above all, identities are
constructed through, not outside, difference. This entails the radically disturbing recognition that it is only through the relation to the Other that the
‘positive’ meaning of any term—and thus its ‘identity’—can be constructed (Derrida, 1981). Therefore,
identities can function as
points of identification and attachment only because of their capacity to exclude, to leave out, to
render ‘the outside.’ That is, the unity, the internal homogeneity, which the term identity in its
conventional sense treats as foundational, is not natural, but a constructed form of closure. Every
identity names its necessary ‘other,’ which it ‘lacks’ —even if that other is silenced and unspoken (Hall, 1992). However, there is no need to
conceptualize the other through exact (Cartesian) opposition, either. It is possible to see one’s own position as a stranger in this relationship of otherness.
It is just a matter of the point of view, or perspective of identification. Thus, according to Hall, the ‘unified
subject’ is constructed within the play of power and exclusion. It is not a result of a natural and inevitable
primordial totality, but is an effect of the naturalized, over-determined process of ‘closure’ (Bhabha, 1994; Hall, 1992). Also Alcoff (2015) argues that a
realistic form of identity politics is one that recognizes the dynamic, variable, and negotiated character of identity.
2NC — Turns Case/Link
The aff’s victimization of trafficking survivors turns the aff – it homogenizes
narratives and decks agency
Russell 14 [Amy M. Russell, Leeds Institute of Health Sciences, University of Leeds, October
13, 2014, ““Victims of Trafficking”: The Feminisation of Poverty and Migration in the Gendered
Narratives of Human Trafficking,” http://www.mdpi.com/2075-4698/4/4/532/pdf] lr
he idea of a female “victim” of trafficking who is in need of “rescue” and “return” is a pervasive
image that is often conjured up and negates scholarly attempts to establish a more nuanced
understanding of the complexities of trafficking [21,63,64]. I deliberately problematise the word “victim”, as the term
simplifies the issue of trafficking and many individuals prefer to be known as “survivors” of
trafficking. The voices of individuals who have been trafficked are often silenced by their status as
“victims” or sexualised “others” [65,66]. To escape the simplification of the identity of the “victim” it is important to examine how women represent their identities,
subjectivities and decision-making processes in the narration of their experiences in Right to Remain letters. Agency, as I will discuss, is a contentious
and much neglected term in the discourse on human trafficking. This is somewhat surprising, given that its
antonymous notion, “victimization”, forms a fundamental aspect of “the main analytic framework within which trafficking is commonly discussed and researched” [67]. The
“victim of trafficking” is explored as a useful means by which the destination state can diffuse
and subvert the power the undocumented migrant has to expose the fallacy of “the bounded state”
[18]. Although identity is an intersectional process, individuals can, at times, articulate themselves through forms of “essentialized versions of identity”. If we take the
“victim of trafficking” to be an essentialised and static identity, we can respond to its portrayal, as
Anthias [61] has suggested, by questioning what this identity “enables” or “disables”, what boundaries a victim’s identity
reasserts or maintains. Anthias’s question encourages us to look beyond the temporal moment of victim identity, to question what brought a person to enact that
T
identity and to question what purpose that identity serves at that present time. The data presented in this article are from a single moment of time where an identity is enacted for a
specific purpose. Analysing it with Anthias’s enquiry in mind means it can speak to an agentic act of self-narration that critically explores the boundaries of a “victim” identity.
Within the construct of the “victim of trafficking”, there emerges the narrative of the highly
gendered “innocent” or “naive victim”, who is absolved of guilt because of her lack of agency [68].
Standing alongside this initial trope are lesser known, arguably more realistic, narratives, where the situated identities of women emerge as a complex negotiation of familial
responsibilities, reasoned decision-making and responses to neglect or violence that can be seen in the Right to Remain letters. These narratives are accompanied by emerging
hopes and aspirations. Sadly, these alternative versions of discourses about human trafficking are rarely heard and are being rendered invisible by the media-preferred sexualisation
The “dominant story” of trafficking that has emerged
through the media, NGO work and research has primarily been constructed to raise awareness
and shock governments into action [32]. While these aims are laudable, their dominance does lead to other
versions of the experience being silenced. This is problematic, because it can artificially limit help and
support for women who have experienced human trafficking [21]. Kelly [32] reflects that, “the good intentions of NGOs
are rooted in a belief that by viewing women as ‘forced’, this will in turn mean they are seen as
‘deserving victims’ by the community, and reintegration will be unproblematic. This optimism is not supported by what we
know about other forms of violence against women…[it is also to] circumvent the increasingly
ambivalent, if not hostile, attitude amongst Western governments to migrants and asylum seekers.
But ‘special cases’ have to be ‘special’—different from the majority. In the process, some trafficked women will be designated as
‘deserving’ and others less so.” Indeed, Jobe [21] has argued that the way women obtain help is through a repetition of the dominant narrative, whether it
fits their experiences or not. Despite this, the Right to Remain letters do appear to express other forms of resistance, agency
and individuality, which distance the women from the dominant homogenised view of human
trafficking. The figure of the “trafficking victim” can serve multiple purposes. It can facilitate the control of female migration through the representation of “trafficking
victims” in awareness campaigns and media reports, which sends the message to women that they need protection [69]. The rhetoric of colonialism is
evoked through the sentiment that women who are the “other(s)” need protecting from men
who are the “other(s)” [18,70]. To support the logic of limiting women’s mobility, the women involved must be understood as potential victims of
of women who are trafficked for the purpose of sexual exploitation [65].
exploitative forces, because “to depict female agency—especially embodied by women in sex work—would be displeasing to a moralizing position, which must maintain that
The benevolent state protects its citizens by
assisting “victims” back to their country of origin, thus also “protecting” those individuals from
women need protection from ‘trafficking,’ and if trafficked, they need to be ‘rescued’” [71].
traffickers. The label of “a victim of trafficking” also allows a distinction to be made between
undocumented migrants who deserve the state’s protection (who have been victimised) and those “illegal
immigrants” that do not. Women’s status as victims “reinforces the notion that one cannot
engage with citizenship as a process, but only with citizenship as formal legal status
administered by an omniscient state” [72]. The women cannot enact the rights of the citizen; rather, they must passively wait
for the state to rescue them. However, the “victim” identity is also employed by the women writing the letters. This troubles the “chosen/forced” dichotomy
often applied to trafficking [73]. In the Right to Remain letters, many women report experiencing prior neglect, violence or abuse, which they often link to trafficking. Thus, they
do construct themselves as “victims” of their pasts before they were trafficked. For example, Magdalena conceptualises her past as having direct links to her experience of
trafficking. She writes that, “…it all started from my not being able to stay with my father”. One of the letter writers, Hannah, points to the evidence of veiled knowledge about her
sex work, reporting that she was told that she would have, “…a maximum of two or three clients a night”. One way to retrospectively construct hope is to cast her understanding of
the proposed sex work as naivety, which we will see has been employed within several of the letters. Magdalena speaks about the promises that were made to her, saying that she
was made to believe that she would live in a villa with a cook, but “this was all a fairy tale.” However, it is worth noting that she could have used the term “lie”, but instead, she
constructs the misrepresentation of her future work and what she believed as childlike and outside reality. Rather than blaming her traffickers, there is a sense that she feels she
Public opinion also appears to suggest that naivety is part of a trafficked
woman’s socially conceptualised personality. In Russia, public responses to women trafficked
for sexual exploitation “reflect anecdotal research findings on social attitudes that…the girls were
naïve and foolish to be tricked in the first place” [74]. As Kelly’s insights intimate, the construction of an
individual or group victim identity, with the related ideas of innocence and naivety,
naturally promotes an image of helplessness and the responses of “rescue” or “protection”
[32]. These strategies, while removing blame from the individual, also inevitably lead to the restriction and control of
women’s movements.
should have known it was a lie.
In the letters, the authors may desire to represent themselves as individuals who did not deliberately conspire to break the laws of Israel and were either misled, coerced or unaware that any illegality was taking place. There may also be a desire to demonstrate a good reason why they chose to be smuggled in to Israel. These reasons can be seen to be tied into other narratives that appear to comply with certain
gendered understandings of familial responsibility. An examination of the letters supports such inferences. Out of the twelve letters, five women name an ill dependent that needed their help as the reason why they were seeking employment. Four of the women have children, and three of those children are described as ill or as having medical problems. Anja has a niece and grandmother, both of whom she is left to care for, during which time her niece suffers from a fever and loses her hearing. Her niece is given as the reason why she
migrated to Israel to earn money. She reports that she wanted to earn money for an operation for her niece, and thoughts of her niece sustain her while she was working. Lena has both an ill brother and an ill child. References in the letters to a family member is usually presented in the context of, firstly, an attempt to explain how economically difficult her home life was and, secondly, why an ill child or family member creates a justifiable reason to travel abroad to earn money for healthcare, which is not free in her country of origin.
The notion of a woman, especially a mother, leaving her sick child with someone else to go to work in another country can be read as either a betrayal of her role as a mother or it can be seen as the ultimate devotional self-sacrifice. In Laura’s letter,she writes that she, “…was willing to do anything for [her]son’s sake”. This can be seen as part of what Chamberlain describes as female migration narratives, which locate the female protagonist in relation to others, family members, partners, friends [75]. Chamberlain compares this to male
migration narratives, where men present themselves as “autonomous agents” [75]. Chamberlain goes on to argue that her female respondents did not define themselves by their own agency, their own decision-making processes, needs or desires [75]. The paradox of trafficking is that women embody a series of “contradictions and tensions…women try to negotiate and to stay loyal to a set of selves—like mother, wife, or victim—that are usually not compatible with the more dominant narrative of trafficking” [76]. Magdalena and
Hannah report being asked by the traffickers whether they had children or not. Magdalena was told, “…if women didn’t have children, they won’t have the motivation to work”. The traffickers appear to believe that a woman may work harder or tolerate more unbearable working conditions if she works for her child rather than for herself alone. Thus, traffickers are incentivised to recruit women who have family ties. However, despite the truth of this claim, Andrijasevic argues that women who agree to sell sex to support their children
use this as a way to socially distance themselves from women whom they perceive to be “real” prostitutes. Thus, women who sell sex for other, more “selfish” reasons are perceived as examples of women who have strayed farther from their gendered identity [67]. In addition, a focus on alleviating themselves from poverty in the narratives has been suggested as a means to enable the respondents to distance themselves “from sex work migration and hence also from being perceived as prostitutes” [67]. Familial obligations emerge as a
central theme in the Right to Remain letters. These obligations can be direct demands made by family members, feelings of responsibility or a desire for the transformation of their relationships with others, for example to become more economically successful, so that their parents will be proud of them [77]. Anja suggests that there is a direct cause and effect between her niece becoming ill and her entering Israel. She says, “…in the winter, I had a terrible incident after which I ended up in Israel.” Anja does not appear to leave for
Israel for quite some time after the incident happens, and other events take place in between; however, in her narrative, there is a direct cause and effect between the moment (that her niece became very ill) and her arrival in Israel. Hannah records the numerous processes that she went through before she decided to move to Israel, but she never actually mentions an affirmative decision. She pragmatically concludes that: “I knew I didn’t have any other place to go really, and I needed to go abroad [to earn money].” Once again, her
narrative raises questions regarding “choice” and demonstrate how, in this narrative, it is superseded by familial responsibility. Tara clearly positions herself within a family matrix when she writes, “I made enquiries [about work in Israel] because my family needed money. My mother urgently needed to have eye surgery.” Lena is the only woman to express pleasure at the thought of travel, and for this, she appears to retrospectively judge her own “naivety”, which may be her way of enacting a victim identity through the language of
naivety [68]. All of the other women construct the decision to leave their homes as an obligation or a necessary evil, and they must leave their more traditional, spatial position in the home because of extreme or difficult situations. Naturally, it must be assumed that not all women who are trafficked come from a background of violence and/or poverty and elect to be smuggled into Israel based on the premise that their life situation is bleak. However, Dickson’s research has suggested that there is a disproportionately high prevalence of
poverty and previous experiences of violence in the life histories of women who have been trafficked [13]. We should accept the fact that there are some women who are trafficked that are young, independent women who want to see the world, experience what life has to offer and who see recruitment by traffickers as a way to expand their horizons. One woman named Lena said: “They came up to me and offered me money to come with them to work as a maid in a hotel, and they said that I would earn $1000 a month. This was a great
deal of money, and I could not dream of [making as much money] in my home country. I resigned from my work, and within 3 days, I was flown to Egypt. I was even happy that I would get to see two other countries other than my own.” Lena’s ironic self-judgment of “even being happy” leads us to consider that she now understands what she was feeling at the time in a different light. Subsequently, she writes about the reality of her experience with some bleak irony. While Lena’s story is qualified by references to her ill brother and
her child with medical problems, her agency and perception of the future, as well as her hopes are displayed in this quotation. She can be seen as “acquiring mobility as a struggle for new subjectivity” [77]. While there is still no specific decision expressed, she is clearly mapping the path to her future with her actions and expectations. To some degree, she is also escaping from her current life situation, in which she was living with her abusive husband and the rest of her family [44,48]. Magdalena does make the decision to migrate
quickly, and she articulates this in her letter. She says that the decision to leave is tempered by certain qualifying statements in an attempt to reduce her own agency and decision-making power. She writes: “I don’t know why [I decided to leave], but maybe it was because of my father, who I had fights with every day, or maybe it was because of the fact that my step-mother had two kids to take care of, and it was clear that I was a burden on her. But, within a few hours, I decided I will try it.” The “it” she refers to is a decision to move
to Israel to work in prostitution upon the recommendation of a friend. While Magdalena’s narrative, despite its ambivalence, is by far the most assertive about decision making, it is also positioned within a matrix of family, limited options and an inability to exercise agency. “I don’t know why”, she remarks, as if her motives were also unknown to her. She disassociates herself from the decision, possibly to disassociate herself from its outcome. Yet, Sarah, in contrast, explains how she saw an advertisement for work in Israel and says “I
told my sister I wanted to go.” Her sister explained that the job will be working as a sex worker, and she states “I didn’t care at that stage what work I would be doing. I agreed to go.” Yet, even this decision comes after a life history that includes neglect, violence, childhood sexual abuse, motherhood and poverty. Her statement “at that stage” demonstrates she had come to a point where she no longer cared about her life situation due to what she had already been through. She suggests that she “did not care”; this could be read as a
suggestion that she cannot afford the luxury of caring or that things were so bad, she was beyond caring for herself. She may also be deploying naivety in that she had not thought through the consequences of her actions because of her situation, and thus, she uses a form of disassociation from the outcome of her decision through the same mechanism as Magdalena did. However, one might also conceptualise her act as an example of further self-sacrifice within a familial obligation, not only because she needed to earn money for her
child, but also to reciprocate the affective bonds her sister has provided for her by paying for her and her child to live. She says: “my sister could not support my son and I forever”. In Lena’s letter, she looks for work abroad, is approached by “some people” who offered her well paid work as a maid, which she accepted, and “within three days [she] was flown to Egypt.” Her lack of concern about the details about the job, combined with the speed at which she is recruited, suggests a lack of knowledge of what to expect and also a
naivety surrounding the decision that she has made. At no point does she speculate that this was a very quick way to be offered and to accept work abroad. There is a sense that some traffickers generally work quickly in order to keep women interested in the job or, in Magdalena’s case, once the decision was made, she was given a week before she left. She said that, “She lived in a flat that some woman had rented for us; perhaps this was done so that we wouldn’t leave”. In her interviews with women who had been trafficked,
Andrijasevic reports that women, “…systematically glossed over the episodes of violence they were subjected to so as not to undermine their self-presentation as active agents” [67]. Yet, in contrast, in the Right to Remain letters, women report acts of violence and often document several incidents. This can be seen as a difference in the materials analysed and the purpose of the material, as well as a strategy employed by the women to illustrate reasons why the authors were “forced” to migrate and deserve assistance or, once again, to
A lack of choice or a sense that the outcome of the decision was not their fault
because they had no other options can be found in several Right to Remain letters. Often, the options are
.
indicate that they lacked choice and that they are thus not culpable for their undocumented migration
presented to the women, and then, the conclusion to be smuggled to Israel is expressed as the only true option available to them. Hannah writes, “I didn’t have any other place to
The alternative construction of
agency and choice in interviews demonstrates how the Right to Remain letters elicit
alternative narratives when they are compared to other research methods. This suggests that there is
some conformity within the letters with the “dominant narrative” of victimhood and a reduction
in the expression of “choice”, but not necessarily of agency. Yet, agency is not completely obscured
in the narratives; rather, it emerges as a negotiated part of the integration of gendered
commitments to the home, familial obligations and other types of choice, which are located
within the parameters of limited options. 6. Conclusions Changes in the movement and visibility of women in the global labour market have
go,” while Sarah reports, “I left my son at my sister’s home, and I went to Israel because I had no other choice.”
created the idea that we are now experiencing a form of feminisation of migration. Due to the increasing and disproportionate effects of poverty on women throughout the world,
this has meant that many women will seek to migrate either as individuals or to migrate and to send remittances to their family in their home countries. In response to these societal
the “victim of trafficking” phenomenon has risen as an ever increasingly visible
representation of the mobility for women in the world today. The “victim of trafficking” is an
identity that responds to the increased mobility and economic burden placed upon women,
while it simultaneously generates anxiety about the violence experienced by the
undocumented female migrant. In her mobility, she traverses boundaries of gender and of statecontrolled territorial boundaries. Her victimisation and helplessness allow a reassertion of
gendered boundaries. The identity of the trafficked woman portrayed by the media in many ways correlates with the identity developed in the Right to Remain
changes,
letters. However, there are several points of divergence. The writers of the letters show how their pasts are linked to their trafficking experiences and that the violence and neglect
that they faced in their childhoods has an impact upon the decision-making process. They explore the everyday experiences of poverty that have forced them to migrate and expose
them to a network of profit making at work in the form of those individuals who traffic women across borders. They deconstruct the boundaries of the category of “trafficked
woman” by demonstrating that they have a more holistic understanding of their identities, their pasts and the experiences that have brought them to Israel. Yet, they also display a
specifically gendered way of constructing their own identities and decision-making processes, which fall within the parameters of acceptable gendered understandings of the world.
When events or actions compromise these understandings of their world, they then use methods of transgression and disassociat ion to maintain the self-construction of their
Agency is present in their narratives, but it is negotiated through accepted norms and
tempered by a lack of “true choice”. In this way, we conclude that the authors of these letters acknowledge that they must present themselves as
identities.
victims, so that the state may then “save” them.
2NC — Alt — Empowerment
The alt is female empowerment
Rowe 09 (Aimee Carrillo Rowe, Professor University of Iowa, 2009, Subject to Power—
Feminism Without Victims, Women's Studies in Communication,
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/07491409.2009.10162379) doolittle
Is feminist discourse contingent upon a subject that is defined through her victimization? Is it
possible to formulate a feminist theory and praxis that is based not in women's marginality, but
rather in her power? What is at stake in such a move? One of the central tenets of power
feminism is to redefine its subject on the other side of women's victimization in an effort to
counteract the negative force of the victim identity to maintain those very systems which produce
victimization." So what might feminism without victims look [ike? How might we move beyond
victim-based identities without compromising our capacity to theorize and account for relations
of oppression and privilege, subordination and supremacy, if we do away with the notion of
victimization? To answer these questions, [ read Gloria Anzaldua's nepantla state against the Foss
sisters' notion of the "agentic orientation of the originator," as both theories pose a feminist frame
that seeks to break with feminism 's necessary relation to victimization. This reading, in turn,
reveals that feminism without victims requires more than a measure of victimization, but
rather an active remaking of the victimized subject of feminism. If we are to cultivate a
feminism based in women's power, we must not merely skip over those nasty sites of
victimization, or blame ourselves or others whose lives are structured through struggle, but rather
we must attend to the processes which empower us to move through victimization to power (or
rather, to multiple forms of empowerment). Further, these processes must be based in a politics of
accountability, or a politics of relation, if power feminism is not merely to capitulate to its
potential alignment with various forms of supremacy. The question raised by the convergences
and divergences [ find between the work of the Foss sisters and Anzaldua center around an
approach to the subject. Their approaches converge over the sense that alternative visions and
realities can be inscribed by visionary feminist subjects. This is an exciting convergence for it
suggests that there is a movement afoot across power lines, across feminist circles, to cultivate
agency, to wield power to build the kind of world we want, to build connections for radical
change. But the question of the "we " [ too easily inaugurate here may prove to be problematic,
for, as we will see, these theorists diverge over the subject's orientation [award others. The
relative newness and emergent quality of the Foss sisters' text suggests that it is 16 Women's
Studies in Communication open to re-inscription and re-envisioning. Thus, I offer these insight s
in a gesture of solidarity and for the purpose of building a power feminism wide and deep enough
to hold diverse, divergent, and potentially transform active feminist visions.
2NC — Alt — Nietzschean
the alt is to embrace a Nietzschean theory of ressentiment as a way to break
down neoliberal victimization
Stringer 14 (Rebecca Stringer is Senior Lecturer in Gender Studies at the University of Otago
in Dunedin, New Zealand, and is co-editor, with Hilary Radner, of Feminism at the Movies:
Understanding Gender in Contemporary Popular Cinema (Routledge, 2011), 2014, KNOWING
VICTIMS Feminism, agency and victim politics in neoliberal times,
https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781134746019) doolittle
Where the previous chapters have focused on examining the presence of antivictimism in
feminism, this final chapter gives prominence to the second task I have been undertaking amidst
these analyses, that of identifying progressive conceptions of the victim that provide alternatives
to neoliberal victim theory and, as such, might aid in challenging its dominance in contemporary
victim talk. In this light I have discussed, Lyotard’s theory of the differend, the SlutWalk
movement’s campaign against victim-blaming, and anti-racist and postcolonial feminist critiques
of the victim/agent dichotomy in Western feminism, among other examples. In this chapter I
propose that Nietzsche’s theory of ressentiment belongs to this archive of alternative conceptions
of the victim, despite its affinity and current interconnection with neoliberal victim theory. As we
saw in Chapter 3, Nietzsche’s theory of ressentiment is presently a key resource for antivictimism. Nietzsche’s emphasis on character and psychology in the question of morality
dovetails with the individualizing, psychologizing and pathologizing discourses that have
redefined and reframed ‘victimhood’, ‘resentment’ and ‘feminism’ in the neoliberal era. This is
reinforced in the diagnostic approach to Nietzsche’s theory adopted in the theorizations of
feminist ressentiment, which follow what Henry Staten (1990) calls Nietzsche’s ‘official attitude
of condemnation’ (p. 59) of ressentiment. Avoiding the diagnostic approach, in this chapter I
interpret Nietzsche’s theory through the alternative approach of critical exegesis, which
proves fruitful for finding in Nietzsche’s theory significant resources for unsettling,
critiquing and countering neoliberal victim theory, rather than supporting its precepts. Van
Dijk (2009, p. 5) has already observed that Nietzsche’s critique of Christian morality – of the
Christian valuing of ‘what is unegoistic’ and hostility to ‘what is egoistic’ (EH: Dawn, 2)1 – is
relevant to challenging contemporary versions of the Christian ethic of forgiveness that value
‘unegoistic’, forgiving victims and demonize ‘egoistic’, complaining victims. Concentrating on
Nietzsche’s account of the master–slave relation and the origins of the state rather than his
critique of Christianity, my analysis finds further sites of productive intersection with the
Nietzschean critique. In particular, I show where Nietzsche conceives of victim identity as a
source of identificatory transformation rather than fixity; I argue that Nietzsche’s discussion of
asceticism provides a strikingly apt analogy for interpreting the 131 contemporary relationship
between feminism and neoliberalism; and I conclude with a critical interpretation of neoliberal
victim theory as ‘asceticism’ in Nietzsche’s sense
2NC — AT — Victim Status Good
reliance on victim status marginalizes 3rd world feminists and makes the
movement reliant on the state
Kapur 02 (Ratna Kapur, 2002, The Tragedy of Victimization Rhetoric: Resurrecting the
"Native" Subject in International/Post-Colonial Feminist Legal Politics,
https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/hhrj15&id=5)
doolittle
However, an
exclusive reliance on the victim subject to make claims for rights and for women's
empowerment has some serious limitations. The articulation of the victim subject is based on gender
essentialism; that is, overgeneralized claims about women." As Chandra Mohanty points out, essentialism assumes that "women have a coherent
group identity within different cultures . . . prior to their entry into social relations.""" Such genitalizations are hegemonic in that they represent the
problems of privileged women, who are often (though not exclusively) white, Western, middle- class, heterosexual women." These generalizations efface
the problems, perspectives, and political concerns of women marginalized because of their class, race, religion, ethnicity, and/or sexual orientation. The
victim subject ultimately relys on a universal subject: a subject that resembles the uncomplicated
subject of liberal discourse. It is a subject that cannot accommodate a multi-layered experience.
The second problem with a focus on violence against women is that it is a position based on
cultural essentialism. Women in the Third World are por- trayed as victims of their culture, which reinforces stereotyped and racist
representations of that culture and privileges the culture of the West. In the end, the focus on the victim subject reinforces
the depiction of women in the Third World as perpetually marginalized and underprivileged, and has
serious implications for the strategies subsequently adopted to remedy the harms that women experience. It encourages some feminists
in the international arena to propose strategies which are reminiscent of imperial interventions in
the lives of the native subject and which represent the "Eastern" woman as a victim of a
"backward" and "uncivilized" culture. Finally, the victim subject and the focus on violence invite
remedies and responses from states that have little to do with promoting women's rights.
Thus, a related concern is that the victim subject position has invited protectionist, and even conservative, responses from states. The
construction of women exclusively through the lens of violence has triggered a spate of domestic
and international reforms focused on the criminal law, which are used to justify state restrictions
on women's rights--for the protection of women. The anti-trafficking campaign, with its focus
on violence and victimization, is but one example. The government of Nepal restricts women under thirty from traveling
outside of the country without the permission of a husband or male guardian as part of an anti-trafficking initiative." Early feminist interventions
struggled to move away from such protectionist responses through anti-discrimination discourse. However,
the VAW campaigns,
which are contingent on the victim subject, have taken feminists back into a protectionist and
conservative discourse. Furthermore, these interventions reinforce women's victim status. The
exclusive focus on finding resolutions through appeals to the state fails to consider the
relevance to the women's rights agenda of new players in the public sphere who are de-centering the power of sovereign states.
2NC — AT — Perm
the perm gets co-opted – any use of the state leads to the polarization of
women who experience violence
Bumiller 08 (Kristin Bumiller, Professor of Political Science and Women’s and Gender
Studies at Amherst College. She is the author of Civil Rights Society: The Social Construction of
Victims, April 2008, In an Abusive State: How Neoliberalism Appropriated the Feminist
Movement against Sexual Violence, https://web1.dukeupress.edu/in-an-abusivestate/?viewby=title) Doolittle, Language Modified*
In an Abusive State puts forth a powerful argument: that
the feminist campaign to stop sexual violence has
entered into a problematic alliance with the neoliberal state. Kristin Bumiller chronicles the
evolution of this alliance by examining the history of the anti-violence campaign, the production of cultural
images about sexual violence, professional discourses on intimate violence, and the everyday lives of battered women. She also scrutinizes the rhetoric of
high-profile rape [sexual assault] trials and the expansion of feminist concerns about sexual violence into the international human-rights arena. In the
process, Bumiller reveals how the feminist
fight against sexual violence has been shaped over recent decades
by dramatic shifts in welfare policies, incarceration rates, and the surveillance role of socialservice bureaucracies. Drawing on archival research, individual case studies, testimonies of rape [sexual assault] victims, and interviews
with battered women, Bumiller raises fundamental concerns about the construction of sexual violence as a
social problem. She describes how placing the issue of sexual violence on the public agenda has
polarized gender- and race-based interests. She contends that as the social welfare state has intensified regulation and
control, the availability of services for battered women and rape [sexual assault] victims has become increasingly linked to their status as victims and
to counteract these tendencies,
sexual violence should primarily be addressed in the context of communities and in terms of its links to social
disadvantage. In an Abusive State is an impassioned call for feminists to reflect on how the cooptation of their movement by the neoliberal state creates the potential to inadvertently
harm impoverished women and support punitive and racially based crime control efforts.
their ability to recognize their problems in medical and psychological terms. Bumiller suggests that
DA — Midterms
1NC — Unpopular — Caps
Voters want to decrease overall immigration levels – the plan creates
backlash by increasing immigration caps
Kurtzleben 18 (Danielle Kurtzleben – political reporter assigned to NPR's Washington Desk bachelor's degree
in English from Carleton College. She also holds a master's degree in Global Communication from George Washington
University's Elliott School of International Affairs.; Article; 1/23/18; “What The Latest Immigration Polls Do (And
Don't) Say”; https://www.npr.org/2018/01/23/580037717/what-the-latest-immigration-polls-do-and-dont-say; accessed
7/1/18) [DS]
3. Americans are divided on legal immigration levels, but are more in favor of decreasing than
increasing them. For decades, Gallup has asked Americans if they think the level of legal
immigration should be "kept at its present level, increased, or decreased." In recent years,
Americans have been closely split between holding steady (38 percent as of June 2017) and
decreasing (35 percent). The remainder, around 1 in 4, want to increase legal immigration. While
the clear majority want to decrease or hold legal immigration steady, these numbers represent
a longer-term pro-immigration shift — as of the mid-1990s, two-thirds of Americans wanted to
decrease legal immigration, and only 6 or 7 percent wanted to increase it. The Politico/Morning
Consult poll asked it a different way, asking how they'd feel about halving the number of legal
immigrants over the next 10 years. It didn't offer the option for holding it steady, just varying
degrees of support or oppose. Nearly half, 48 percent, strongly or somewhat supported cutting
legal immigration in this way; 39 percent opposed it (the rest didn't know or had no opinion).
Once again, there's no majority here, but more people wanted to cut legal immigration than grow
it. The Harvard Harris poll tried the question yet another way: "In your opinion, about how many
legal immigrants should be admitted to the U.S. each year?" It then provided a series of choices:
zero to fewer than 250,000, 250,000 to 499,999 and so on up to 2.5 million or more. It's hard to
know how to interpret the results of that question without the context of current immigration
levels. As of 2016, the U.S. accepted nearly 1.2 million new legal permanent residents, according
to the Department of Homeland Security. Of those, just over half were new arrivals. The rest of
people received changes in status — for example, some might have been refugees who became
legal permanent residents. The poll found that 72 percent of people chose some number under 1
million, which might suggest that those people want to reduce legal immigration. But then, the
question didn't provide them with current immigration levels. There was no way for many of
them to know what direction they were arguing for immigration to move in. As a result, this is
one way that this poll's results may have been misleading.
DA — Deficits
1NC — Link
Increasing T-Visas allows for more people to access benefits
Still 17 (Alexandra Still, 7-20-2017, Solving Human Trafficking Between Mexico and the
United States, Pepperdine Policy Review,
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://scholar.google.com/&
httpsredir=1&article=1144&context=ppr) doolittle
Both Mexico and the U.S. already have policies in place concerning human trafficking. In both
countries, human trafficking is a crime and is against federal law; however, in Mexico, there are
inconsistences among states regarding enforcing laws and assigning punishments for traffickers.
Looking at recent history, Mexican anti-human trafficking legislation was implemented in 2007
under the name of Law to Prevent and Sanction Trafficking in Persons. Similarly, the U.S.
implemented a policy called the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) in 2000, and has
since had several reauthorizations of this act. The goal of TVPA is to protect victims of human
trafficking and to establish a department in the U.S. government addressing the problems of
human trafficking. Notably, TVPA led to the creation of the “T-Visa,” which gives long term
visas to victims who have been trafficked into the states. The T-Visa can also include access to
social services, healthcare, and medical programs. Both countries have made improvements in
the last two decades to deal with human trafficking, but there is still more work to be done.
2NC — Link Booster
T-visa policy results in many fake cases to immigrate increasing benefits
Still 17 (Alexandra Still, 7-20-2017, Solving Human Trafficking Between Mexico and the
United States, Pepperdine Policy Review,
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://scholar.google.com/&
httpsredir=1&article=1144&context=ppr) doolittle
Furthermore, both countries need to have more measures on identifying trafficking victims and
what to do in a situation of witnessing trafficking. This can be done through a school curriculum
that teaches a series on human trafficking each year. Such a curriculum should also increase
awareness of U.S. T-Visas that are accessible to Mexicans. T-Visas should be included in the
school’s curriculum so that if a young girl falls into a trafficking situation, they know their
options in the U.S. This policy option is extremely beneficial because more education can help
prevent trafficking situations and protect vulnerable persons. It also fulfills all of the established
criteria. A potential downside is the cost of creating and implementing a new curriculum.
Additionally, it will have to be decided if teachers will be provided material to teach this or if a
group, potentially an NGO, will go into schools to teach about human trafficking. Further,
increasing public knowledge on T-Visas might lead some to try to fake a trafficking case in
order to receive a T-Visa and the benefits that often accompany this, such as healthcare or
welfare; therefore, an implementation plan for this option would need to pay thorough attention to
this possibility.
--Case--
Relived violence
1NC — SQ Solves
Squo Solves- Multilateral Institutions are working to stop trafficking in every
part of the globe
US Department of State 18
United States Department of State (“Trafficking in Persons Report, June 2018”, US Department
of State, Available on https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/282798.pdf) EH
MULTILATERAL EFFORTS TO COMBAT HUMAN TRAFFICKING THROUGH GLOBAL
AND REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT UNITED NATIONS (UN) 2017 Political Declaration
Reaffirming the United Nations Global Plan of Action to Combat Trafficking in Persons On
September 27, 2017, the UN General Assembly adopted a political declaration reaffirming
commitments to implement the Global Plan of Action to Combat Trafficking in Persons,
which was adopted by the General Assembly in 2010. The Political Declaration includes a
directive to examine the progress achieved and the continuing challenges for international
organizations and officials at the national, regional, and global levels. The Political Declaration
also strengthens the capacity of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime to collect
information in order to connect and harmonize anti-trafficking efforts across UN programs and
policies. To implement the Global Plan of Action a working group was established to advise and
assist in the implementation of the Palermo Protocol. United Nations Security Council
Resolutions on Trafficking in Persons in Conflict (2016-2017) The UN Security Council (the
Council) adopted its first resolution on human trafficking (2331) in 2016, which called on
member states to investigate, disrupt, and dismantle criminal networks by utilizing antimoney laundering, anti-corruption, and counterterrorism laws. It also emphasized the
importance of international cooperation in law enforcement and strong partnerships with the
private sector and civil society. In 2017, the Council reiterated its condemnation of this crime
by unanimously adopting resolution 2388, which strongly emphasizes its concern in
particular for the heightened vulnerability of children to exploitation and abuse and the
unlawful recruitment and use of children in armed conflict. It also requested the SecretaryGeneral to further explore the links between child trafficking in conflict situations and the grave
violations against children affected by armed conflict, with the view to addressing all violations
and abuses against children in armed conflict. These two resolutions underscore the importance of
collecting evidence to ensure perpetrators are held accountable and the Council’s intention to
integrate an anti-trafficking component into the work of the Council’s relevant Sanctions
Committees. The Council stressed the importance of cooperation in enforcing international law in
the investigation and prosecution of trafficking cases and further emphasized that peacekeeping
and political missions can support the efforts of host states in combating human trafficking.
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS) In March 2018, at the Fifth Meeting of
National Authorities of the Americas on human trafficking, OAS member states reviewed
progress made in the implementation of the Second Work Plan to Combat Trafficking in
Persons in the Western Hemisphere (2015-2018), the only region in which every country is
party to the Palermo Protocol. Member states shared best practices and national experiences,
discussed challenges, reaffirmed the region’s commitments to combating trafficking in persons,
and adopted the Hemispheric Efforts Against Trafficking in Persons (Declaration of Mexico) to
extend the current Work Plan to 2020. The declaration, among other things, promotes
psychological, social, medical, and legal assistance for victims; calls for the update of national
anti-trafficking legislation to define and criminalize the specific acts, means, and purpose of
human trafficking as required by the Palermo Protocol; and calls for cooperation with the
private sector and civil society to combat trafficking. The Second Work Plan recommends
activities between OAS member states and provides mandates to the General Secretariat of
the OAS in the areas of prevention, protection, and prosecution (the "3Ps"). The Second
Work Plan also underlines supply chains, not previously highlighted in the first work plan,
encouraging codes of conduct to ensure the protection of the human rights and fundamental
freedoms of workers. ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN
EUROPE (OSCE) In 2003, the OSCE created the Office of Special Representative and
Coordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings to promote a victim centered and
human rights-based approach to combating human trafficking and to assist participating
states in implementing effective policies. The OSCE Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in
Human Beings (2003), which is grounded in the Palermo Protocol, addresses the participating
states’ implementation of their commitments across the OSCE’s three dimensions of security
(politico-military, economic and environmental, and human). Of note is the 2013 Addendum to
the OSCE Action Plan, which includes commitments addressing domestic servitude in
diplomatic households, internal trafficking, and the prevention of human trafficking in the
tourism industry and in supply chains. In 2017, the OSCE Ministerial Council adopted new
commitments addressing preventing human trafficking in government procurement supply chains,
as well as strengthening efforts to combat child trafficking. The OSCE is currently working on
strengthening its policies to prevent human trafficking in its own institutional procurement
of contracts for goods and services. In addition, OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and
Human Rights has an Adviser on AntiHuman Trafficking Issues who provides technical
assistance to participating States on best practices and on their national referral mechanisms.
THE BALI PROCESS ON PEOPLE SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS AND
RELATED TRANSNATIONAL CRIME (BALI PROCESS) The Bali Process is a nonbinding forum for policy dialogue, information-sharing, and practical cooperation to assist
countries in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond to address shared challenges on a regional basis.
It raises awareness regarding migrant smuggling, trafficking in persons, and related transnational
crimes. It also serves to encourage cooperation and coordination among member states, the
private sector, and with other regional and global initiatives to address effectively these crimes.
At the 2016 Ministerial Conference, Ministers confirmed the main objectives and priorities by
endorsing the Bali Process Declaration on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons, and Related
Transnational Crime, which supported comprehensive strategies to address member states’
interests, such as engaging with the private sector to promote and apply humane, non-abusive
labor practices throughout supply chains and implement transparent and fair recruitment
processes. The Bali Process Government and Business Forum, which launched in 2017, is a
business-government partnership to combat human trafficking that highlights the critical role of
the private sector in preventing trafficking in supply chains. The Bali Process has also established
a Regional Support Office, which supports an ad hoc working group on human trafficking and
strengthens practical cooperation to combat trafficking in persons, among other issues.
1NC — Institutions check
Here’s a list of anti-trafficking organizations which solve
CNN 18 [CNN, 6-13-2018, "How to help: Anti-trafficking organizations around the world,"
CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/05/world/anti-trafficking-organizations-around-theworld/index.html] lr
If you are looking for a way to help fight against human trafficking, here's a list of global antitrafficking organizations, as well as organizations active in specific countries. Many accept financial donations, but also recommend other ways you can
help them by donating time or spreading the word. Global Organizations 3Strands Global 3Strands Global works to combat human trafficking through prevention
education, various engagement initiatives, and creating job opportunities for survivors and those at risk. You can donate, get involved in an event or volunteer. AntiSlavery International Through Anti-Slavery International you can donate financially, become a campaign member, start up a student or local anti-slavery group,
run for freedom, organize your own events, or become a volunteer or intern. Catholic Relief Services CRS works on issues including the refugee crisis, human
trafficking and modern slavery. ECPAT International ECPAT International accepts financial donations, but also urges you to join the campaign by spreading the
word or by applying for an internship position. Free The Girls Free The Girls helps reintegrate victims of trafficking and provide them with economic opportunities
(CNN) –
through selling new or gently used bras. You can donate bras or money to help survivors start their own businesses selling bras in their local second-hand clothing markets.
Free the Slaves With Free the Slaves, you can donate, host and event, become a member, or volunteer your time. Global Modern Slavery
Directory An interactive, publicly searchable map and database of organizations and agencies across the globe that address the issue of modern slavery and human
trafficking. International Justice Mission International Justice Mission accepts financial donations and provides great ideas as to how you can get involved.
Maiti Nepal Maiti Nepal, run by Anuradha Koirala, 2010 CNN Hero, works on the border between Nepal and India to prevent the trafficking of young Nepalese girls. In
addition, the group works to provide justice as well as a safe haven for these girls. You can help by donating or sponsoring a child. Not For Sale Not For Sale, based in
California, accepts donations and has many suggestions as to how you can help, including ideas for students, artists, etc. Orphaned Starfish Foundation
Orphaned Starfish programs address the challenges facing orphans, victims of abuse and at-risk youth by providing them with technology training. Plan
International A children's development organization working in 50 developing countries across Africa, Asia and the Americas to promote child rights and lift millions
of children out of poverty. Polaris Project You can donate to the Polaris project, organize fundraisers, attend their events, volunteer your time, or sign one of their
petitions against human trafficking. Ricky Martin Foundation The Ricky Martin Foundation is based in San Juan, Puerto Rico and accepts financial donations
as well as hosts events. Salvation Army The Salvation Army works to prevent human trafficking and support its victims. You can donate to their cause or become an
intern. They also provide manuals for teachers who want to include the subject of human trafficking in their classrooms and ideas for faith-based help. Save the
Children With Save the Children, you can join the fight against human trafficking by donating financially or by sponsoring a child. UNICEF UNICEF accepts
donations and provides training manuals on the subject of human trafficking. World Hope International World Hope International accepts donations and
provides many ideas as to how you can get involved. World Vision You can donate financially to World Vision, as well as help keep a child safe and their family self
sufficient in many other ways.
1NC — AC
Trump’s tough immigration policy and barriers structural to the TVPA
limits out survivors - the aff does nothing to solve because it is intrinsic to
immigration policy
Dahlstrom 18
Julie A. Dahlstrom Clinical Associate Professor of Law BA cum laude, Boston College JD cum
laude, Boston College School of Law, Julie Dahlstrom directs BU Law’s Immigrants’ Rights &
Human Trafficking (IRHT) Program,she was appointed by Governor Deval Patrick to the
Massachusetts Human Trafficking Task Force, chaired by the Attorney General, and she has
served as the co-chair of the Victim Services Subcommittee and a member of the Labor
Trafficking Subcommittee. (“Trump's harsh immigration policies are a gift for human
traffickers”, The Hill, 07/12/18, http://thehill.com/opinion/civil-rights/396781-trumps-harshimmigration-policies-are-a-gift-for-human-traffickers)
In a dramatically ironic summer marked by vivid scenes of family separation and heartwrenching pleas from immigrant parents, Ivanka Trump and Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo,
stood smiling before a packed pressroom on June 28th to release the 2018 Trafficking in Persons
Report. Trump and Pompeo’s lavish display stood in stark contrast to the administration’s harsh
policies targeting undocumented immigrants — some of whom are survivors of trafficking and
many of whom (especially children) are extremely vulnerable to human trafficking. The
contradictions were palpable, as the Trafficking in Persons Report directly references the
vulnerability of migrants and children to trafficking without mention of recent U.S. policies
that increased family separation and detention. This dissonance is not new, although recent
events have been particularly egregious. Since his inauguration, President Trump has espoused
strikingly different — and dramatically inconsistent — approaches to immigration and human
trafficking. In the context of immigration, he has labeled entire immigrant communities as
“criminals, “rapists,” and “traffickers,” while mobilizing immigration enforcement efforts to
root them out and deport them with no concern for due process. On the other hand, the Trump
administration has repeatedly insisted that ending human trafficking is a major foreign
policy priority. Indeed, in April 2018, Trump set off much debate by saying that
"[t]rafficking is probably worse today than at any time in our history” — a fact
unsupported by existing anti-trafficking data. In a further flourish that now appears, at best,
profoundly cynical, he told trafficking survivors, “[y]ou are not alone.” And yet, immigrant
survivors in the United States have never felt so alone. Despite the administration’s occasional
rhetoric about protecting survivors of trafficking, the brutal fact is that indiscriminate
targeting of undocumented immigrants, including trafficking survivors, has sown chaos and
fear in immigrant communities. This makes survivors much less likely to cooperate with law
enforcement, and more likely to be targeted as victims. Under the Trafficking Victims Protection
Act of 2000, immigrant survivors of trafficking may qualify for special forms of immigration
protection, known as T visas (for trafficking survivors) or U visas (for survivors of certain
crimes, including trafficking). However, the path to immigration status is far from immediate or
easy. Of 5,000 available visas, only 672 T visas were issued in fiscal year 2017. It often takes a
year or more for the visa to be granted, and during this time, most survivors have no
protection from deportation and no ability to work lawfully. In fact, on June 28, 2018,
USCIS issued a new policy memorandum specifying that any survivor who applies for T
visas — and is denied — will be placed in deportation proceedings. This is a dramatic shift in
USCIS policy, which for many years, has refused to place T visa applicants in deportation
proceedings for fear that it would have a dramatic chilling effect on the filing of applications from
immigrant survivors.
2NC — AC
Tons of other factors maintain SQUO violence and prevent victims from
seeking help in the first place.
ASPE 2008 – “IDENTIFYING VICTIMS OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING: INHERENT
CHALLENGES AND PROMISING STRATEGIES FROM THE FIELD. WHAT ARE THE
CHALLENGES AND BARRIERS TO IDENTIFYING VICTIMS?” – 1/20/2008 – The Assistant
Secretary for Planning and Evaluation (ASPE) advises the Secretary of the Department of Health
and Human Services on policy development in health, disability, human services, data, and
science; and provides advice and analysis on economic
policy.https://aspe.hhs.gov/report/identifying-victims-human-trafficking-inherent-challenges-andpromising-strategies-field/what-are-challenges-and-barriers-identifying-victims
Nature of the Crime The
most common and perhaps obvious challenge to identifying victims of human
trafficking for those in the field is the hidden nature of the crime. Many international victims are
brought into the country illegally; with traffickers using their illegal entry as a form of control. Such victims are
usually unaware of their rights as victims, do not understand the laws of the United States or the language spoken;
all factors helping to control the victim and keep the crime (and the victim) hidden. Both international
and domestic victims are often kept isolated, with no freedom of movement. Contact with the outside world is controlled by the
trafficker and often limited to those working for the trafficker, other victims, and in the case of sex trafficking, the johns. Victims
become dependent on the trafficker and may not even consider themselves to be victims; another factor making identification difficult.
"Use of the internet by traffickers to 'recruit' victims, advertise to johns, and move girls has made it even more difficult to fight this
crime." Law enforcement officer It was also reported that traffickers
rely on a victim's fear as a way to keep the
victim hidden. This includes fear of law enforcement and an inability to trust those in
positions of authority; fear of retaliation against the victim or his/her family; and fear of anyone
finding out what has happened to the victim (e.g., shame to self and family). Awareness/Understanding of the
Problem While the hidden nature of the crime is a major obstacle, law enforcement and service providers acknowledge that a lack of
awareness of the crime of human trafficking confounds the problem. That is, even
if victims were more visible,
respondents report that most of the general public would not recognize a victim if they saw one.
The experiences in the field suggest that, across communities, most people do not believe that human trafficking exists in today's
society and in particular, in their communities. Even in those areas where attempts have been made to raise awareness, there
remains confusion regarding who is a victim. The stereotype presented earlier regarding international sex trafficking
exists not only among the general public but among some law enforcement and service providers. That is, victims are viewed as
foreign born, young females forced into prostitution. It was evident, especially when talking with providers working with domestic
runaway and homeless youth, that there is an overall lack of knowledge and understanding that human trafficking can occur
domestically. Specifically, the fact that the prostitution of U.S. minors likely constitutes human trafficking is not well understood by
most providers or even law enforcement. Many involved in the study point to recent popular
media portrayals of human
trafficking crimes and high profile cases as possible explanations for the lack of a comprehensive
understanding of the crime of human trafficking and its victims. Specifically, the lack of focus on domestic
victims (e.g., U.S. citizens or legal permanent residents), male victims, and labor trafficking (especially single victim domestic
servitude cases) is recognized as a contributing factor to the misconceptions surrounding this crime. It
was clear that even
though awareness of human trafficking has in fact increased such a full and complete
understanding of human trafficking remains a challenge. Perceptions of Victims Two primary reasons given for
why victims who come in contact with those who can help them (e.g., law enforcement, shelter providers, and outreach workers) often
go unidentified include: 1) victims do not identify themselves as victims; and 2) others do not view victims as victims. Many
victims, whether international or domestic, do not believe that they are a victim of a crime. This is
often due to their lack of education and understanding of human trafficking and their lack of awareness of their rights as a victim. But
according to law enforcement and service providers who have worked with victims, victims
are also frequently told by
their traffickers that they are to blame for their circumstance and that they are the criminals
who will be deported or arrested if caught. And due to their past and current experiences, many victims
believe this portrayal of reality presented by the traffickers. In other situations, the victim has come
to depend on her trafficker and views the trafficker as her protector or in some cases, boyfriend. Service providers equate
this to the Stockholm Syndrome experienced by prisoners of war. In these cases, the victim not only does not see him/herself as a
victim but they do not believe their trafficker has done anything wrong. When a victim does not view him/herself as a victim, the
interactions with law enforcement and others trying to help them are often negative and sometimes hostile. According to law
enforcement and some shelter providers, this was especially the case with domestic minor victims of sex trafficking. But it is not only
victims that do not always view themselves as victims. Another
challenge to identifying victims is the lack of
acknowledgement by some law enforcement and service providers that someone is a victim of
trafficking. There were examples given of victims who were viewed first as undocumented, or illegal, immigrants and treated as
criminals and subjected to deportation hearings. In other cases, victims were viewed first as prostitutes and charged
with solicitation and placed in jail or detention (even in cases involving minors). These cases serve to
reinforce the message of traffickers that the victims will be treated as criminals if they come to
the attention of authorities, buttresses the perception of victims that they are to blame, and
enhances the power and control of traffickers over their victims. "Getting law enforcement, in particular ICE
agents, to consider that an illegal immigrant may be a victim or getting a Vice cop to consider that a prostitute may be a victim will
not happen overnight. It is similar to what we saw in the domestic violence field. It has taken us decades to view domestic violence as
a crime and to recognize that there are victims of this crime. We can't expect this same type of change to occur with trafficking over
night." Victim service provider While law enforcement and service providers both acknowledge that more education is needed to
address these challenges, they recognize that the solution to this barrier requires something more akin to a paradigm shift in how we
think and do business (see insert on this page, above). Law enforcement and service providers fear that many victims are falling
through the cracks and going unnoticed. Those in positions to best identify victims may not realize it. Resources There has been a lot
of criticism of law enforcement and others regarding the relatively small number of victims of human trafficking that have been
identified to date in relation to the estimates of victims that exist. In addition to the challenges already identified, all those involved in
the study point to a lack of resources as a significant factor limiting their ability to identify significant factor limiting their ability to
identify victims. This includes limited officers to investigate cases and interview potential victims; limited resources for direct
outreach by service providers and advocates to educate and identify potential victims; and limited resources for targeted training and
ongoing technical assistance to those agencies in positions to help law enforcement identify potential cases and victims. " Even
if
we could overcome all of these other barriers, we just don't have the manpower or resources to
investigate these cases. Trafficking cases take a lot of time and few officers are dedicated just to
working these cases. It becomes collateral duty for most of us. Until human trafficking is made a priority, we
will never find more victims." Law enforcement office
Visas don’t solve the reasons why trafficked immigrants aren’t going to
courts in the first place and can reify the problem.
Pollock 2010 – “T Visas: Prosecution Tool or Humanitarian Response?” - Joycelyn M. Pollock
is a full professor teaching courses in the areas of women in the criminal justice system, ethics,
law, and corrections at both the undergraduate and graduate level J.D. University of Houston Law
Center (1990) Ph.D. Criminal Justice, SUNY-Albany (1982) M.A. Criminal Justice, SUNYAlbany (1979) B.A. Sociology, Whitman College (1978)
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/08974451003641172?scroll=top&needAccess=tru
e
A number of procedural hurdles make the visa difficult to use, including the cost of application and the fact that
victims must apply for it themselves (or with nonofficial assistance); and The T visa, as written, does not meet the needs of trafficked
victims for a number of reasons, including the fact that many
victims are too fearful to cooperate with law
enforcement. It seems to be the case that the 5,000 cap on the number of visas to be issued was not based on any evidence of how
many would be required (Dalrymple 2005 Dalrymple , Joyce. 2005 . “Human Trafficking: Protecting Human Rights in the Trafficking
Victims Protection Act.” Boston Third World Law Journal 25 : 451 – 465 .). Certainly the range of estimates regarding the number of
trafficking victims indicates that the scope of the problem remains somewhat unclear. Furthermore, there was evidently a sense that all
trafficked victims would want to stay in the United States, but that does not seem to be the case. It is also the case that some victims of
trafficking are citizens and do not need the T visa. In the first report on trafficking cases as identified and submitted to a new national
database, the Bureau of Justice Statistics reported that slightly more than half of all victims were U.S. citizens and that, of victims of
confirmed cases, about a third were U.S. citizens and another 6 percent were qualified aliens (Kyckelhahn et al. 2009 Kyckelhahn ,
Tracey , Allen Beck , and Thomas Cohen . 2009 . Characteristics of Suspected Human Trafficking Incidents, 2007–2008 . Washington
, DC : Bureau of Justice Statistics . ). The second explanation for the small number of T visas issued is that there are a number of
procedural challenges associated with the process. Note that although law enforcement officials apply for a continued presence visa
and government agency officials provide the certification to get benefits, only NGOs or private attorneys can help victims apply for a
T visa. Nel (2005 Nel , Sasha. 2005 . “Victims of Human Trafficking: Are They Adequately Protected in the United States?” Journal
of International and Comparative Law 55 : 2 – 32 . ) suggested that the actual application process for the T visa may be a reason
victims are not willing to participate. For instance, many victims do not speak English, are not familiar with American culture, and
have little money. Therefore, the 17-page application and $250 fee to apply for a T visa may deter a potential T visa candidate.
Furthermore, it takes 4 to 12 months to process the T visa if it is granted (Bales et al. 2005 Bales , Kevin , Laurel Fletcher , and Eric
Stover . 2005 . “Hidden Slaves: Forced Labor in the United States.” Berkeley Journal of International Law 23 : 47 – 108 . ). However,
professionals point out that the fee can be waived and that the process may be no more burdensome than any immigration application.
As one seasoned advocate put it, “Everything about immigration is bureaucratic and burdensome.” In other words, the T visa is not
appreciably more difficult than any other immigration process, according to this professional. It seems to be the case that those victimwitnesses who are brought to the attention of authorities in areas where there are coalitions and task forces of NGOs and immigration
advocates can find willing and able assistance to help them with the T visa process. This, of course, begs the question of what happens
when such victims are in those vast swaths of the country that have no advocates to assist them. Another set of explanations involves
the idea that the
T visa does not meet the needs of the victim. For instance, requiring cooperation with
law enforcement ignores the fact that many times these victims come from countries where law
enforcement is corrupt and it is literally dangerous to trust officers, who may be in league with
traffickers. Advocates and attorneys for trafficked victims observe that many victims do not wish to cooperate with law
enforcement because it is not a priority for them. They may fear retaliation, or they may fear retaliation against their family. In fact,
one of the reasons for including the option of bringing family members to the United States under the T visa is because of documented
cases in which family members in another country were attacked or killed as retaliation for a victim testifying against traffickers
(Bales et al. 2005 Bales , Kevin , Laurel Fletcher , and Eric Stover . 2005 . “Hidden Slaves: Forced Labor in the United States.”
Berkeley Journal of International Law 23 : 47 – 108 . ). Although the T visa is designed to help protect against retaliation, it may take
years to complete the application process, and in the interim the United States has no ability to protect family members in foreign
countries. Even
if victims do not fear retaliation, they may not want to testify about the ordeal they
went through, which may have included repeated rapes by their captors. Advocates report that only about
half of victims agree to testify or cooperate with law enforcement (Bales et al. 2005 Bales , Kevin , Laurel Fletcher , and Eric Stover .
2005 . “Hidden Slaves: Forced Labor in the United States.” Berkeley Journal of International Law 23 : 47 – 108 . ; Rieger 2007 Rieger
, April. 2007 . “Note: Missing the Mark: Why the Trafficking Victims Protection Act Fails to Protect Sex Trafficking Victims in the
United States.” Harvard Journal of Law & Gender 30 : 231 – 256 . ). Furthermore, in many cases, there
is no prosecution
of offenders. For instance, in one report of trafficking in one state, it was reported by survey respondents that government
prosecutors decided not to prosecute in 60 percent of the cases (Busch-Armendariz et al. 2008 Busch-Armendariz , Noel , Laurie
Heffron , Karen Kalergis , Neely Mahapatra , Monica Faulkner , Leila Voyles , and Sharlene Eaton . 2008 . Human Trafficking in
Texas: A Statewide Evaluation of Existing Laws and Social Services . Austin : University of Texas at Austin, Institute on Domestic
Violence and Sexual Assault . ). It is still possible to obtain the T visa in these cases, but it is less likely that victims will be able to
obtain the necessary endorsement of law enforcement that they are “cooperating.” In the same report, the researchers concluded that a
myriad of problems existed with the services available to prosecute traffickers and protect their victims, not the least of which was the
multitude of agencies that were involved (Busch-Armendariz et al. 2008 Busch-Armendariz , Noel , Laurie Heffron , Karen Kalergis ,
Neely Mahapatra , Monica Faulkner , Leila Voyles , and Sharlene Eaton . 2008 . Human Trafficking in Texas: A Statewide Evaluation
of Existing Laws and Social Services . Austin : University of Texas at Austin, Institute on Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault . ).
Although federally funded task forces have improved the lines of communication between agencies tremendously, these task forces do
not exist in all areas, and there is a great deal of turnover in the personnel assigned. Furthermore, what seems clear is that
trafficking is a very difficult type of case to prosecute. Even in the best case scenario it may take months or even
years to prosecute these cases. The immigration status of the victim is a continuing problem in that it may
prevent the victim-witness from working or moving or creating a stable life. The fear of
deportation is always present. Some victims fall through the cracks and struggle to survive
without services; some are left alone and eventually disappear or even go back to their trafficker
(Busch-Armendariz et al. 2008 Busch-Armendariz , Noel , Laurie Heffron , Karen Kalergis , Neely Mahapatra , Monica Faulkner ,
Leila Voyles , and Sharlene Eaton . 2008 . Human Trafficking in Texas: A Statewide Evaluation of Existing Laws and Social Services
. Austin : University of Texas at Austin, Institute on Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault . ). Srikantiah (2007) suggested that
removing the connection between the T visa and law enforcement and prosecutorial cooperation may help to increase the possibility of
victims gaining assistance and may even increase the likelihood of victims cooperating. The
dichotomy between the view
of the T visa as a service for the victim versus a tool of the prosecution seems to be a continuing
theme in the literature and among professionals in the field.
1NC — LE Fails
Lack of training for law enforcement results in police traumatizing
trafficking victims as prostitutes – aff doesn’t solve.
Farrell and Pfeffer 15 – “Police perceptions of human trafficking” – Amy Farrell is an associate professor at
Northeastern University, Ph.D. Law, Policy and Society. Rebecca Pfeffer is an assistant professor at the University of Houston –
Downtown. January 2015 - https://www.researchgate.net/publication/273163823_Police_perceptions_of_human_trafficking
Absent training in specialized human trafficking investigations, investigators
tasked with identifying these cases often
employed traditional vice strategies to investigate human trafficking cases. An investigator
describes how one agency that received a federal grant to support a human trafficking task force began their work. He explained,
“We had nothing. No background. No training, we had nothing. We kinda started centering it around, you know vice
and prostitution and went into areas where we thought, you know, we could recover victims” (South, Comprehensive Legislation, Law Enforcement 3).
To both better understand and investigate cases of human trafficking, officers strategically drew
parallels to other crimes, particularly prostitution. In this way, law enforcement was able to shift their current workload to
include new priorities and expedite successful outcomes, without having to develop entirely new investigative routines. In addition , investigators
approached trafficking cases as they would traditional prostitution cases, often utilizing traditional vice
investigative strategies such as undercover operations that resulted in the arrest of potential trafficking
victims for prostitution-related offenses. The police put pressure on victims to ‘flip’ them once they are arrested. Ideally, then
victims would then disclose information about their exploiter in exchange for reduced or dropped charges. The challenges of this investigative strategy
have been documented elsewhere (see Farrell, Owens, and McDevitt 2014). For the purposes of the present analysis, it is important to note that while
equating human trafficking with prostitution garnered rapid buy-in from law enforcement and
generated a readymade strategy for investigating these cases, it did so at the expense of identifying a wide range of
human trafficking offenses and, sometimes, re-traumatizing victims. While those advocating the
passage of new federal and state human trafficking laws believed that legal change would prompt
the police to begin identifying previously hidden groups of victims, such as workers exploited
for their labor and foreign sex workers exploited in closed, ethnic commercial sex markets,
human trafficking laws have primarily been employed by local law enforcement to address prostitution of
US citizens, particularly the commercial sexual exploitation of minors. A supervisor for the unit tasked with human trafficking investigations discussed
the challenge of trying to fit human trafficking into a traditional vice investigation model.
2NC — LE Fails
Law enforcement misperceptions surrounding trafficking result in cases
being misfiled under other crimes or harming victims for being complicit in
their own victimization.
Farrell and Pfeffer 15 – “Police perceptions of human trafficking” – Amy Farrell is an associate professor at
Northeastern University, Ph.D. Law, Policy and Society. Rebecca Pfeffer is an assistant professor at the University of Houston –
Downtown. January 2015 - https://www.researchgate.net/publication/273163823_Police_perceptions_of_human_trafficking
Effective identification of human trafficking cases is both critical to ensure successful arrests
and prosecutions of perpetrators and guarantee the restoration of victims. Incorrect
perceptions by law enforcement about what human trafficking is – and where it occurs – can
affect the way that human trafficking laws are interpreted and implemented (Farrell, McDevitt,
and Fahy 2008). A 2008 study on law enforcement perceptions of human trafficking indicated that even if law enforcement
personnel was familiar with the federal definition of trafficking, they frequently had difficulty
putting the definition of severe forms of trafficking into practice (Newton, Mulcahy, and Martin 2008). This
study found that it was common for law enforcement officers to have difficulty in distinguishing
between human trafficking and smuggling. Although respondents sometimes noted that human trafficking could
involve both US citizens and foreign victims, they commonly associated human trafficking with persons who lacked legal status in the
USA. Furthermore, local
law enforcement officers are unlikely to understand the scope and magnitude
of human trafficking in their communities and many believe that it is a problem outside of their
jurisdiction (Farrell, McDevitt, and Fahy 2008; Newton, Mulcahy, and Martin 2008; Wilson, Walsh, and Kleuber 2006). Despite
the fact that local law enforcement officers are likely to encounter victims and perpetrators of human trafficking in their daily
operations (De Baca and Tisi 2002), they
commonly perceive human trafficking as a matter for federal law
enforcement (Clawson, Dutch, and Cummings 2006; Wilson and Dalton 2008). A sustained belief that human trafficking is not a
local problem allows local law enforcement agents to avoid developing a sophisticated understanding of the elements that distinguish
trafficking as a criminal offense. In fact, one study found that when law enforcement officers believe human trafficking is of little or
no concern in their communities, their knowledge has often been acquired through a sensationalized, mediainformed lens (Wilson,
Walsh, and Kleuber 2006). Incorrect
notions about what human trafficking victims look like are common
among local law enforcement officers in the USA and can lead to misinterpreting or mislabeling
human trafficking cases as other types of offenses (Srikantiah 2007; Farrell and Fahy 2009). Unfamiliarity with
legal definitions of human trafficking further contributes to misperceptions about what human trafficking is (Newton, Mulcahy and
Martin 2008). Law
enforcement may categorize victims as offenders, blaming them for being
undocumented, being involved in prostitution or otherwise being complicit in their
victimization (Farrell, Owens and McDevitt 2014). These skewed perceptions affect how law enforcement
understands and implements new human trafficking laws and can significantly impact the number
of trafficking cases identified and officially recorded by the police. Even when law enforcement
agencies prioritize human trafficking, they often focus on a very specific type of human
trafficking, typically sex trafficking of children who are US citizens (Farrell and Pfeffer 2014). Explanations for this trend are
numerous, but research has found that community interest in the specific problem of trafficking, as well as the political will to
prosecute these types of cases, impacts whether law enforcement will prioritize the policing of human trafficking. While
other
forms of trafficking may be controversial, the commercial sexual exploitation of a minor is
generally uncontested as a crime by the public and easier to prosecute in court. Also of
importance is which investigative unit of a law enforcement agency is assigned responsibility for investigating potential human
trafficking cases, if any (Farrell et al. 2012). If a vice unit, for example, is tasked with investigating cases of human trafficking, they
may come across cases of sex trafficking through the course of their established investigatory routines, but are less likely to encounter
labor trafficking situations. In other words, existing
formal and informal policing routines impact the
likelihood that a case involving human trafficking will be properly identified by law enforcement.
1NC — Visas Fail
Visas are ineffective, so many other problems with the process remain post
plan.
Reilly 2015 – “Human Trafficking: A Crime Hard to Track Proves Harder to Fight” – Caroline
Reilly is a law student at Boston College Law School and a legal intern with If/When/How –
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/what-is-human-trafficking-and-why-is-it-so-hard-tocombat/
While a variety of legal protections exist for trafficking victims, they can be difficult to secure. The main protection, the
T visa,
grants temporary legal status to undocumented victims for up to three years, at which point they can apply
for permanent legal status. Victims can also seek continued presence, which offers temporary residence to anyone who law
enforcement identifies as a victim of trafficking. But
obtaining a T visa or continued presence can take
months or even years, according to the Urban Institute study, which blamed the lag, in part, to a lack of communication
between the agencies involved in the approval process. “The agencies do not communicate with each other, and
even within the agencies there’s very little communication from the headquarters, for example, to
the officers on the ground,” said Collupy. The study also found that the Department of Labor was
rarely involved in identifying labor trafficking victims, or investigating trafficking cases.
However in April the agency announced it would expand visa certification for victims of human trafficking and additional “qualifying
crimes.” The challenge in obtaining a T visa or continued presence was reflected in this week’s report from the State Department.
According to the report, T
visas were granted to 613 victims and 788 eligible family members in 2014,
down from 848 and 975 respectively in 2013. DHS issued continued presence to 130 victims who
were “potential witnesses,” a 24 percent drop from 2013. U visas are another protection available for
undocumented victims of sexual abuse and domestic violence. But obtaining a U visa can likewise prove
problematic. By law, there are only 10,000 U visas awarded each year, but in 2014 alone more
than 45,000 people applied, including victims and their family members. This type of disparity shows,
said Collupy, that when it comes to combatting human trafficking, the need outweighs the resources available. “There’s not
enough pro bono attorneys to help all of the victims currently in immigration proceedings,”
she said. “And that leaves people in a situation where they might not even know what they’ve gone
through would give them an immigration benefit.”
1NC — Causes Trafficking
The U.S. is no place for victims of trafficking to seek refuge—immigrants are
most likely to be targeted
Safia Samee Ali 17, NBC News Journalist, Attorney, Indiana Division of State Court Administration,
Foreclosure Prevention, Feb.05.2017 / 2:34 PM ET, “Human Trafficking Increased in 2016, Organization
Reports”, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/human-trafficking-increased-2016-organizationreports-n717026
The National Human Trafficking Hotline found that 7,500 cases of human trafficking were
reported in 2016 — up from 5,526 in the previous year, based on the group's data. The hotline,
which is run by the nonprofit organization Polaris, maintains a resource center for victims of trafficking and aggregates
statistics based on incoming reports and phone calls. It also reported that California
and Texas are again among
the most egregious states for human trafficking. California bore the lion’s share with over
1,300 incidences of human trafficking last year, almost double any other state, the nonprofit
reported. "As a diverse cultural center and popular destination for immigrants with
multiple international borders, California is one of the largest sites of human
trafficking in the United States," said the California Attorney General's office in a report on human trafficking.
Texas, another border state, followed behind at 670 cases and Florida came in third
at 550 cases, according to the hotline. All three states, which also topped the same list last year, experienced
a rise in trafficking crimes from just one year prior, according to the report. Ohio, New York, and Georgia followed. "Left
unchecked, human trafficking will continue to flourish in environments where
traffickers can reap substantial monetary gains with relatively low risk of getting
caught or losing profits,"the National Human Trafficking Hotline said on its site. According to the group,
Vermont, Rhode Island, and Alaska had the fewest cases of human trafficking were — each with less than 10 total cases. A
majority of victims were trafficked through the course of domestic work or within
hotel- or motel-based employment, according to the report. Agricultural work was
also identified as one of the top industries harboring human trafficking.
2NC — Causes Trafficking
The plan results in rampant trafficking—immigrants are uniquely vulnerable
upon arrival
The Global Slavery Index 18, the fight to end modern slavery continues. “United
States”,https://www.globalslaveryindex.org/2018/findings/country-studies/united-states/
Migrants, and especially migrant women and children, are particularly vulnerable to
modern slavery in the United States due to their “lower levels of education, inability to
speak English, immigration status, and lack of familiarity with U.S. employment protections.
Further they are vulnerable because they often work in jobs that are hidden from the public
view and unregulated by the government.”35 Industries that are particularly at-risk for labour exploitation in
the United States include domestic servitude, agriculture, fishing, carnival workers, and travelling
sales crews, among others. Those working in the agriculture sector are vulnerable due to insecure immigration
status, debt created from payment of transportation and recruitment fees, isolation, poverty, and a lack of strong labour
protections.36 Increasingly restrictive immigration policies
have further increased the
vulnerability of undocumented persons and migrants to modern slavery.37 A survey of service
providers conducted by Coalition to Abolish Slavery & Trafficking (CAST), Freedom Network USA, and Polaris in 2017 found
that new immigration enforcement policies and practices are increasing their clients’ vulnerability to human trafficking. 38
Nearly 70 percent of service providers, for example, believe that survivors will
remain with their traffickers longer given the recent political shift, with survivors
highlighting their concerns that they will not be believed and then will be arrested,
detained, or deported.39 Children are a particularly vulnerable group to modern slavery in the United States,
particularly those outside of a supportive environment. 40 Runaway and homeless young people without a support network
can become vulnerable to exploitation.41 This vulnerability can increase once they enter the child welfare system, with local
studies showing there is a high incidence of trafficked children and young people who have been part of the child welfare
system.42 This is in part due to the fact that those in the system are the victims of abuse, which makes them more susceptible
to exploitation, including sexual exploitation. Traffickers have been known to target children and young people transitioning
out of foster care, taking advantage of the individual’s low self-esteem and history of abuse.43 LGBTQI individuals, including
children, experience a higher rate of vulnerability to sex trafficking, which stems from family rejection, abandonment, or
emotional and physical abuse. LQBTQI young people represent high numbers of those who are homeless and are targeted by
traffickers.44 These vulnerabilities are exacerbated by systemic discrimination in education, health care and justice systems. 45
In states where there is no minimum age for marriage, girls are also vulnerable to forced marriage, in part due to the
perception that an early marriage is in the girl’s best interest, especially if the child is pregnant. 46 Adults and
children who have survived violence and trauma remain vulnerable to future
exploitation. Traffickers often target and exploit these vulnerabilities in “victims of
domestic violence, sexual assault, war and conflict, or social discrimination.”47 Male
victims of exploitation have difficulty locating shelters and assistance and can remain vulnerable to trafficking and further
abuse as well. Many male victims have difficulty identifying as victims and can believe that the exploitation and abuse that they
have endured is a result of “normal consequences of labour migration.”48
Global Crime Syndicates
1NC — VBA Fails
Victim based approaches can’t solve terrorism---being overly focused on
prosecution or protection devastates prevention efforts
Welch 17 — Shannon Welch, Juris Doctor Candidate at Duke University School of Law,
“Note: Human Trafficking and Terrorism: Utilizing National Security Resources to Prevent
Human Trafficking in The Islamic State,” 24 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol'y 165, Spring, 2017, Lexis
Nexis
The United States needs new strategies to tackle the growing threat of human trafficking as it
becomes the favorite tactic of the Islamic State (“ISIS”). Trafficking traditionally was the
localized crime of choice for gangs in underdeveloped countries. Now it is one of the largest
sources of income for ISIS. Trafficking serves the needs of terrorists both as a fear tactic and a
source of profit. Human trafficking is both an issue of human rights and a larger threat to national
security. The porous borders traffickers move through are equally as porous to terrorists, disease,
weapons, and more. The “3P Paradigm” used to combat human trafficking—prevention,
protection, and prosecution—falls short of dealing with human trafficking executed by known
enemies of the United States. Victim-centered approaches emphasize the protection and
prosecution efforts, while prevention falls by the wayside. True, there are millions of victims of
trafficking that desperately need help. But with the advent of systematized and institutionalized
human trafficking within terrorist organizations comes an opportunity to use preventative,
national security based tactics. Human trafficking networks must be uprooted using counterterrorism resources and intelligence.
1NC — Credibility — Alt Cause
US pulled out of UN HR council—massive alt cause
Nebehay 18 (Stephanie Nebehay, June 20, 2018, Senior Reuters reporter in Geneva mainly
covering the U.N., including crises, health and human rights, as well as Swiss news, “U.S. retreat
from U.N. Human Rights Council is ‘bad news’: council members,”
https://globalnews.ca/news/4286365/un-human-rights-council-bad-news/)
China, Britain and the European Union lamented on Wednesday Washington’s decision to
withdraw from the U.N. Human Rights Council as Western countries began looking for a
substitute for the coveted seat. The United States withdrew on Tuesday from what it called the “hypocritical and self-serving” forum
over what it called chronic bias against its close ally Israel and a lack of reform after a year of negotiations. Washington’s retreat — officially notified to
the world body on Wednesday — is
the latest U.S. rejection of multilateral engagement after it pulled out of
the Paris climate agreement and the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. The U.S. delegation’s seat was empty and the nameplate
removed at the end of the day. “ It is bad news, it is bad news for this council, it is bad news I think for the
United Nations. It is bad news, I think for the United States, it is bad news for everybody who
cares about human rights,” Slovenian President Borut Pahor told the 47-member forum in Geneva
where the U.S. seat was empty. The European Union, Australia and Britain echoed his comments. “We have lost a member who has
been at the forefront of liberty for generations. While we agree with the U.S. on the need for reform, our support for this Human Rights Council remains
steadfast, and we will continue to advance the cause of reform from within its ranks,” Britain’s ambassador Julian Braithwaite said. Bulgaria’s
Ambassador Deyana Kostadinova, speaking on behalf of the EU, said the United States had been a “strong partner” at the talks. Its decision “risks
undermining the role of the U.S. as a strong advocate and supporter of democracy on the world stage,” she added. China’s foreign ministry expressed
regret, with state media saying the
image of the United States as a defender of rights was “on the verge of
collapse.” Diplomats have said the U.S. withdrawal could bolster Cuba, Russia, Egypt and
Pakistan, which resist what they see as U.N. interference in sovereign issues. The Tibet Advocacy Coalition,
whose activists seek to raise attention to the situation in the autonomous region, said in a statement the U.S. decision “will allow
China much more room to obfuscate and undermine the U.N. human rights system.”
1NC — Failed States — Alt Cause
Alt cause — Climate change creates instability
Broder 11 (John Broder 2/15/11 “Climate Change Drives Instability, U.N. Official Warns”
New York Times. http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/02/15/climate-change-drives-instabilityu-n-official-warns/?partner=rss&emc=rss)
The United Nations’ top climate
change official said on Tuesday that food shortages and rising
prices caused by climate disruptions were among the chief contributors to the civil unrest
coursing through North Africa and the Middle East. In a speech to Spanish lawmakers and military
leaders, Christiana Figueres, executive secretary of the United Nations climate office, said that climate change-driven
drought, falling crop yields and competition for water were fueling conflict throughout
Africa and elsewhere in the developing world. She warned that unless nations took
aggressive action to reduce emissions causing global warming such conflicts would
spread, toppling governments and driving up military spending around the world. “It is
alarming to admit that if the community of nations is unable to fully stabilize climate change, it will threaten where we can live, where and
how we grow food and where we can find water,” said Ms. Figueres, a veteran Costa Rican diplomat and environmental advocate. “In other
words, it will threaten the basic foundation — the very stability on which humanity has built its existence.” Rising food prices were a factor
in the January riots that unseated Tunisia’s longtime president, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, although decades of repression and high
unemployment also fed the revolution. The
link between food and resource shortages and Egypt’s
revolution is less clear. But Ms. Figueres said that long-term trends in arid regions did not look promising unless the world took
decisive action on climate change. She said that a third of all Africans now lived in drought-prone regions and that by 2050 as many as 600
million Africans would face water shortages. “On
a global level, increasingly unpredictable weather
patterns will lead to falling agricultural production and higher food prices, leading to food
insecurity,” she said in her address. “In Africa, crop yields could decline by as much as
50 percent by 2020. Recent experiences around the world clearly show how such
situations can cause political instability and undermine the performance of already fragile
states.”
1NC — ISIS Funds
ISIS’s money comes from oil — not trafficking
Napoleoni 14 (Loretta, the author of Maonomics, Rogue Economics, Terror Incorporated and
Insurgent Iraq. She is an expert on terrorist financing and money laundering, and advises several
governments and international organizations on counter-terrorism and money laundering. As
Chairman of the countering terrorism financing group for the Club de Madrid, Napoleoni brought
heads of state from around the world together to create a new strategy for combating the
financing of terror networks. “Islamic State ‘is a completely different model of terrorist
financing’”, 9/10/2014, https://www.worldfinance.com/videos/islamic-state-is-a-completelydifferent-model-of-terrorist-financing-video, sab)
Loretta Napoleoni: Well in
the past, the smuggling of drugs and people was the number one revenue for
terrorist organisations. Things have changed since the rise to power of the Islamic State. It’s a
completely different model of terrorist financing. Before 9/11, about one third of the money that terrorist organisations
generated came from legitimate businesses. PLO actually controlled the production of textiles from the occupied territories in Palestine, and used those
But today, in the case of the Islamic
State, the so-called legitimate business is actually much more than one third. Some of the aid near
the borders in Turkey, in Iraq, and in Kurdistan — part of that aid is taxed by the Islamic State,
which controls those borders. We can say the same about the oil fields. The Islamic State is in
business with the local tribes in Syria, in order to sell the oil to the Damascan government. “There are
revenues to fund its terrorist organisation. So, one third is roughly what it was before 9/11.
suddenly new sources of cash, and that’s a very terrifying prospect, and a very difficult thing to counter” World Finance: William, do you have anything
We have
a terrorist organisation that’s basically taken over the second largest city in Iraq. Reports say that
their raid on the large bank in Mosul pocketed them $430m. Well that’s quite a lot of money to hold in cash. It’s not
something we’ve ever really seen in international terrorism before: the ready access to that amount of cash. When you couple that again
with them holding 35 percent of territory, they’ve now got all of the oil fields in the north of
Syria. There are lorries full of oil going into Turkey. There are all of the antiquities that were held in the Middle East: there
to add? William Willson: In terms of the rising star of international terrorism, the Islamic State, we’ve got a completely new situation here.
seems to have been quite a large outflow of them, again raising tens of millions of dollars. There are suddenly new sources of cash, and that’s a very
terrifying prospect, and a very difficult thing to counter.
2NC — ISIS Funds
Terrorists don’t get money from human trafficking—charities and illegal
businesses provide more money
Kaplan 6 (Eben, is a senior consultant at Control Risks and information security consulting
services and its marketing, April 4, 2006, “Tracking Down Terrorist Financing,”
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/tracking-down-terrorist-financing)
As the U.S.-led "war on terror" nears its fifth year, efforts to dismantle terrorist financial networks remain an essential part of Washington’s strategy.
More than $140 million in terrorists’ assets have been frozen across some 1,400 bank accounts worldwide, but experts say
terrorist groups
have become increasingly adept at eluding detection through use of cash, sophisticated laundering
operations, or legitimate front companies. Monetary practices embedded in Muslim culture, such as donating to charities and
informal money-transfer centers, have compounded the difficulty in tracking down terrorist financial links. Law enforcement efforts are further
confounded by the fact that devastating attacks can be accomplished at relatively low cost. Where do terrorist organizations get their money? Charities .
Donations were once the largest source of terrorist funding, coming mostly from charities and
wealthy individuals. For years, individuals and charities based in Saudi Arabia were the most important source of funds for al-Qaeda,
according to a 2002 CFR Task Force Report. A 2004 update to that report shows Saudi officials have taken steps to disrupt terrorist financing in their
country, yet charities continue to play a role in the sponsorship of terrorist groups. "In the Islamic world, there
are tens of thousands of charities," says Robert O. Collins, coauthor of the new book Alms for Jihad. While as few as a hundred may sponsor terrorism,
"these are some of the wealthiest charities," Collins says. Experts say some of these organizations raise funds with the express intent of supporting
terrorists; others seek to promote Islam through legitimate programs, but can be coopted by jihadists who then use the funds to promote their own radical
cause. Illegal Activities. Loretta Napoleoni, an
expert on terrorist financing, says the largest source of terrorists’
income is the illicit drug trade. Many terrorist groups have supported themselves through other illegal commerce as well. In his book,
Illicit, Moisés Naím explains that the terrorists behind the 1993 World Trade Center bombing raised money by selling counterfeit t-shirts on New York
City’s Broadway, and the perpetrators of the 2004 Madrid train bombings sold counterfeited CDs and trafficked
drugs to support their
activities. Hezbollah, the Irish Republican Army, and the Basque ETA are also believed to have
generated revenue through counterfeiting scams. In 2002, federal agents broke up a methamphetamine ring in a dozen U.S.
cities that, according to officials, funneled proceeds to Hezbollah. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia(FARC) has long used the cocaine trade
to finance its operations. Afghanistan’s flourishing poppy crops, which the United Nations says are responsible for as much as 86 percent of the world
opium supply, are widely believed to be a major source of terrorist funding. Al-Qaeda reportedly profited from the Afghan poppy trade before fleeing the
country when the Taliban-led government was ousted in 2001. Front
Companies. Many terrorist organizations attempt to
operate legitimate businesses, which generate their own profits and can also be used as a front for
money laundering. Ties to terrorism have been found amid the trade of livestock, fish, and leather.
Businesses involved in agriculture and construction have also been found to support terrorism. In
2001, the New York Times reported that Osama bin Laden owned and operated a string of retail honey shops throughout the Middle East and Pakistan. In
addition to generating revenue, the honey was used to conceal shipments of money and weapons.
1NC — ISIS Hacking
ISIS doesn’t have tools for cyber attack
Moore 17 (Jack Moore, International Security and Terrorism Correspondent, citing Kyle
Wilhoit, senior security researcher at security conference DerbyCon, 9-26-2017, "ISIS cyber
jihadis are "garbage" at hacking, top researcher says," Newsweek,
http://www.newsweek.com/isis-cyber-jihadis-are-garbage-hacking-top-researcher-says-670972)
doolittle
Hackers aligned with the Islamic State militant group (ISIS) are “garbage” at coding, hacking and protecting
their whereabouts, according to a top cyber-security researcher. The group has used the internet to spread its propaganda
across the world, recruit thousands of foreign fighters and to communicate with one another, but
its cyber operations are less sophisticated than other areas of its operations. The cyber operatives
are producing hacking programs and tools that are easy to infiltrate and prevent, Kyle Wilhoit, a senior
security researcher at DomainTools, told security conference DerbyCon. "ISIS is really, really bad at the development of
encryption software and malware," Wilhoit said, tech news outlet The Register reported. "The apps are shit to be
honest, they have several vulnerabilities in each system that renders them useless." In response to the
failure of their cyberattack capabilities, pro-ISIS hackers are now turning to other online services such as
encrypted app Telegram, to talk to one another and share attack code. Wilhoit looked at three
different programs created by hackers from the ISIS-affiliated United Cyber Caliphate, or UCC,
and found they have numerous bugs. "As it stands ISIS are not hugely operationally capable online,"
Wilhoit added. "There's a lack of expertise in pretty much everything.” The attacks by the group’s cyber
wing have largely been limited to de-facing several websites. But, more unnerving for Americans, ISIS-linked
hackers released hit lists with the names and addresses of thousands of civilians, as well as diplomatic and
military personnel, in 2015. The militant group's strategy of releasing such lists was started by one of its
members, prominent British hacker Junaid Hussain, who the U.S. coalition killed in an August 2015 air strike.
The hackers encouraged ISIS supporters to carry out attacks in their home countries with any method possible. The group’s late external operations chief
and spokesperson Abu Mohammed al-Adnani launched the call on foreign ISIS supporters to commit individual attacks in an audio statement released in
September 2014. He urged ISIS followers to "kill a disbelieving American or European—especially the spiteful and filthy French—or an Australian, or a
Canadian...in any manner or way however it may be."
1NC — ISIS Rise
ISIS won’t rise again — precautions.
Cockburn 18 (Patrick Cockburn, award-winning writer on The Independent, specializes in
analysis of Iraq, Syria and wars in the Middle East, January 1, 2018, "After a string of defeats in
Iraq and Syria, this is what 2018 means for Isis," Independent,
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-defeat-syria-latest-iraq-2018survive-a8107891.html, Accessed 07-01-2018)
Could this happen again? People
in Baghdad are pleased that Isis has been defeated on the battlefield, but
wary of celebrating victory too early and nervous that Isis may not be quite as dead as its leaders
claim. The caliphate may have been destroyed but the caliph, Mohammed Baqr al-Baghdadi, is still alive. After the loss of Mosul, Isis did not make a
last stand in any of its remaining strongholds such as Tal Afar and Hawaija; likewise in Syria after the fall of Raqqa, it did not fight to the last man in
But a second resurrection by Isis will be
much more difficult that the first because local, regional and international forces will not want to
be caught napping a second time. It has lost the advantage of surprise; its adversaries will see it
coming and take precautions. In 2014, Isis looked like a winner to many Sunni Arabs in the Middle East who briefly imagined that its
blitzkrieg attacks would capture Damascus and Baghdad. But today these victories, which Isis publicised as being
divinely inspired, are but a memory and all Isis has to offer is hard-fought defeats.
Deir Ezzor, acting as if it was determined to preserve some of its combat strength.
2NC — ISIS Rise
ISIS is done for — they don’t have much land, everyone is fighting against
them, they lack control over their own land
Micallef 18 (Joseph V. Micallef is a best-selling military history and world affairs
author, and keynote speaker. 6-11-18, "Op-Ed: An Assessment of the Islamic
State in 2018," https://www.military.com/daily-news/2018/06/11/op-edassessment-islamic-state-2018.html LJB)
By all accounts, the war against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is virtually over -- save for a few
mopping-up operations. In December 2017, the Iraqi government declared that, after almost
four years of fighting, ISIS had been defeated and no longer controlled any Iraqi towns.
Russian President Vladimir Putin has made the same declaration and announced that some Russian troops
will soon be withdrawn from Syria, although it does not appear that any withdrawal has yet
occurred. U.S. President Donald Trump has also announced, on several occasions, that he will soon withdraw the roughly 2,000 U.S. troops and
special operations forces from Syria, although the Pentagon continues to claim that there is no specific timetable for a withdrawal. THE WAR AGAINST
THE ISLAMIC STATE According
to the Pentagon, ISIS has been expelled from 99 percent of the
territory it controlled in June 2014. As of June 2018, ISIS controlled a small triangle of territory south of Deir ez-Zor and to the
west of the Euphrates Valley; a pocket in Iraq west of Al Hadar; and a third pocket east of Al Suwar, along the Syrian-Iraqi border. In addition, much
of its senior leadership, including many of its most experienced field commanders, have been
killed or captured, although its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, remains at large. His death has been
announced on several occasions, most recently by Russian military forces but, in the absence of any confirmation, he is presumed to still be alive.
According to unconfirmed reports, the Pentagon has been given six additional months, possibly longer, to finish final operations against ISIS in eastern
Syria. It's estimated that the ISIS militants in the two remaining pockets number several hundred fighters. With little prospect of escape, they are expected
to fight tenaciously. In the meantime, over the month of May, the
Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) renewed
their offensive against ISIS militants along the Syrian-Iraqi border. Called Operation Roundup, the
operation is designed to capture or kill jihadist fighters in the ISIS pocket that abuts into territory
controlled by the SDF in eastern Syria. At the same time, Iraqi forces have moved in to seal off the Iraqi border area, and Iraqi air
forces have launched attacks across a 30-mile front along the Iraq border. French special forces have also been deployed to support the SDF. The
offensive occurred while Turkish military forces and Kurdish militia were at a standoff over Turkish plans to take control of the town of Manbij and
while Turkish military units, supported by various affiliated militia units, were taking control of the Kurdish-controlled canton, or district, of Afrin. The
transfer of some Kurdish fighters to Afrin led to a temporary suspension in the SDF's campaign against the Islamic State. Notwithstanding the above
progress, however, Islamic State forces retook some territory in May that had been previously seized by Syrian military forces around the city of Deir ezZor. Four Russian soldiers and 43 insurgents were reported killed as a result of those attacks. There were conflicting reports on the scope of the
casualties, however. The Britain-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights placed the death toll at 76 Syrian Army troops and 25 ISIS militants. The
international coalition against the Islamic State has also made significant progress in
shutting down ISIS' propaganda machine. Although these operations are conducted by civilian police forces rather than the
military, they are an important component in the continuing war against ISIS. In April, a joint U.S.-EU law enforcement
operation conducted by police forces from the U.S., U.K., Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, France, the
Netherlands and Romania took down a range of Islamic State media outlets and the servers they
use to distribute their propaganda across the internet. Among the targets were Amaq, the ISIS media outlet used to
broadcast confirmation of attacks, as well as other media channels such as Bayan radio, and the Halumu and Nashir news services. The operation
also resulted in identifying domain registrars and domain names used by ISIS as well as the
administrators behind its media outlets. The operation, the third such strike against the Islamic State's internet presence, was the
most extensive so far. Notwithstanding its success, however, ISIS has shown a remarkable resiliency and, in the past, has succeeded in restoring its web
presence. The cyber war against the Islamic State is as relentless and as long term as the ground war against its militants.
ISIS has been defeated — defeats in Syria.
CBS 18 (CBS News, May 22, 2018, "Assad's forces say ISIS out, capital city ‘completely
safe’,” No Byline, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/syria-bashar-assad-retake-damascus-suburbsisis-capital-completely-safe/, Accessed 07-01-2018) NG
Syria's military said Monday it had retaken the last neighborhoods in southern Damascus held by
the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and declared the Syrian capital and its surroundings
"completely safe" from militants for the first time in nearly seven years. Reading an army statement on Syrian
TV, Gen. Ali Mayhoub said the army captured the former ISIS strongholds in the Palestinian Yarmouk camp and Hajar al-Aswad after a month-long
campaign. He
said the army operations were "concentrated and successive," leading to the extremists'
defeat in the city. The gains by President Bashar Assad's troops bring greater Damascus -- including the capital's far-flung suburbs -- fully
under government control for the first time since the civil war began in 2011. "Damascus and its surroundings are completely
secure," Mayhoub said. State TV earlier said that government forces resumed an offensive at noon after a group of civilians was evacuated
from the area overnight. Two hours later, the TV said troops captured ISIS' former stronghold of Hajar al-Aswad and broadcast images showing troops
waving the Syrian national flag in the heavily destroyed neighborhood. A
war monitoring group said some 1,600 people,
including hundreds of ISIS gunmen, left the area on Saturday and Sunday, heading toward the
desert east of the country following a deal with the government. The Britain-based Syrian Observatory for Human
Rights said government forces were now clearing the nearby Palestinian refugee camp of Yarmouk, a built-up residential area, of the last remaining ISIS
fighters. It said the month of fighting left scores dead on both sides.
ISIS is inevitably doomed — Too many factors check their expansion and
they won’t collapse states.
Walt 15 (Stephen M. Walt, Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Affairs at the
Harvard Kennedy School, "ISIS as Revolutionary State," December 2015, <WMB> Foreign
Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/isis-revolutionary-state)
Despite these efforts, some
individuals will still succumb to ISIS' allure, but even 100,000 foreign recruits
would not be enough to shift the balance of power in its favor. Only a tiny fraction of the world’s billion-plus
Muslims are interested in submitting to the group’s brutal discipline, and many who rush to join it today will become disillusioned and eager to leave or
end up isolated in a landlocked country and unable to cause trouble elsewhere. To be sure, some foreign fighters have already returned home and carried
out terrorist acts, and foreigners inspired by ISIS' propaganda have staged “ lone
wolf” attacks in several countries. Such incidents will not
disappear, but they will be too few and too small in scope to topple a government. According to The New York Times,
since September 2014, groups or individuals claiming some connection to the Islamic State have killed roughly 600 people outside Iraq and Syria—a
violence on a
comparatively modest scale will not expand the Islamic State’s sway. ISIS' ideology will also
limit its ability to grow. Although the group’s leaders believe that their vision of a new caliphate is irresistible, it is unlikely to capture
total dwarfed by the 14,000-plus people murdered in the United States in that same period. All these deaths are regrettable, but
enough hearts and minds. The ideals of liberty and equality embodied in the American and French Revolutions resonated around the world, and
ISIS' puritanical
message and violent methods do not travel well, and its blueprint for an ever-expanding
caliphate clashes with powerful national, sectarian, and tribal identities throughout the
Middle East. Using Twitter, YouTube, or Instagram won’t make its core message more palatable to most Muslims, especially after the novelty
communism’s vision of a classless utopia appealed to millions of impoverished workers and peasants. By contrast,
wears off and potential recruits learn what life in the Islamic State is really like. In any case, a version of Islam that is anathema to the vast majority of
Muslims will certainly not gain a following among non-Muslims. If one were trying to invent a revolutionary credo devoid of universal appeal, it would
be hard to beat the Islamic State’s harsh and narrow worldview. Finally, should
an Islamic State—like movement manage
to gain power outside Iraq and Syria—as could conceivably occur in the chaos of Libya—
that group’s leaders would follow their own interests rather than slavishly obey Baghdadi’s
commands. Outsiders often see radical groups as monolithic—especially if they take the revolutionaries’ own rhetoric too seriously—but such
movements are notoriously prone to infighting. Deep schisms divided Girondins and Jacobins, Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, Stalinists and Trotskyites,
and Khrushchev and Mao. ISIS' tendency to treat minor disagreements as acts of heresy punishable by death makes such disputes inevitable. Indeed, it
has already led to serious quarrels with al Qaeda and other extremist groups. Critics
might find this assessment too sanguine.
They might contend that neighboring states are more fragile than commonly thought and that ISIS' example might shake the foundations of the House of
Saud, Jordan’s Hashemite Kingdom, or Egypt’s military dictatorship. Given the fragility of the Middle Eastern order and the widespread discontent that
this worst-case scenario is
highly unlikely. If it were easy for radicals to topple foreign governments, it would happen
far more often. Existing governments do not have to be especially capable to ward off
revolutions, and ISIS' potential targets have money, organized security forces, support from
influential religious authorities, and sympathetic foreign backers. For all these reasons,
ISIS' emergence does not herald the beginning of a revolutionary tidal wave.
sparked the Arab Spring, could ISIS be an exception to the rule that revolutions rarely spread? Perhaps, but
1NC — Cyberwar
Zero impact to cyber-attacks - overwhelming consensus of qualified authors
goes neg
Gray 13 (Colin S., Prof. of International Politics and Strategic Studies @ the University of
Reading and External Researcher @ the Strategic Studies Institute @ the U.S. Army War
College, April, “Making Strategic Sense of Cyber Power: Why the Sky Is Not Falling,” U.S.
Army War College Press, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1147.pdf)
THE SKY IS NOT FALLING
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
¶ This analysis has sought to explore, identify,
and explain the strategic meaning of cyber power. The organizing and thematic question that has shaped and driven the inquiry has been “So what?”
Today we all do cyber, but this behavior usually has not been much informed by an understanding that reaches beyond the tactical and technical. I have
endeavored to analyze in strategic terms what is on offer from the largely technical and tactical literature on cyber. What can or might be done and how to
go about doing it are vitally important bodies of knowledge. But at least as important is understanding what cyber, as a fifth domain of warfare, brings to
national security when it is considered strategically. Military history is stocked abundantly with examples of tactical behavior un - guided by any credible
semblance of strategy. This inquiry has not been a campaign to reveal what cy ber can and might do; a large literature already exists that claims fairly
convincingly to explain “how to . . .” But what does cyber power mean, and how does it fit strategically, if it does? These Conclusions and Rec
ommendations offer some understanding of this fifth geography of war in terms that make sense to this strategist, at least. ¶ 1. Cyber can only be an
enabler of physical effort. Stand-alone (popularly misnamed as “strategic”) cyber
action is inherently grossly limited
by its immateriality. The physicality of conflict with cyber’s human participants and mechanical artifacts has not been a passing phase in
our species’ strategic history. Cyber action, quite independent of action on land, at sea, in the air, and in orbital space, certainly is possible. But the
strategic logic of such behavior, keyed to anticipated success in tactical achievement, is not promising. To date, “What if
. . .” speculation about strategic cyber attack usually is either contextually too light, or, more often, contextually
unpersuasive. 49 However, this is not a great strategic truth, though it is a judgment advanced with considerable confidence. Although
societies could, of course, be hurt by cyber action, it is important not to lose touch with the fact, in Libicki’s apposite words, that “[i]n
the
absence of physical combat, cyber war cannot lead to the occupation of territory. It is almost
inconceivable that a sufficiently vigorous cyber war can overthrow the adversary’s government
and replace it with a more pliable one.” 50 In the same way that the concepts of sea war, air war, and space war are fundamentally
unsound, so also the idea of cyber war is unpersuasive. ¶ It is not impossible, but then, neither is war conducted only at sea, or in the air, or in space. On
cyber warfare
would be very unlikely to harm human beings directly, let alone damage physically the
machines on which they depend. These near-facts (cyber attack might cause socially critical machines to behave in a rogue manner
the one hand, cyber war may seem more probable than like environmentally independent action at sea or in the air. After all,
with damaging physical consequences) might seem to ren - der cyber a safer zone of belligerent engagement than would physically violent action in other
domains. But most likely there
would be serious uncertainties pertaining to the consequences of cyber
action, which must include the possibility of escalation into other domains of conflict. Despite popular
assertions to the contrary, cyber is not likely to prove a precision weapon anytime soon. 51 In addition, assuming that
the political and strategic contexts for cyber war were as serious as surely they would need to be to trigger events warranting plausible labeling as cyber
war, the
distinctly limited harm likely to follow from cyber assault would hardly appeal as
prospectively effective coercive moves. On balance, it is most probable that cyber’s strategic future in war will be as a contribut ing enabler of effectiveness of physical efforts in the other four geographies of conflict. Speculation about cyber war, defined strictly as hostile action by
net - worked computers against networked computers, is hugely unconvincing. ¶ 2. Cyber
defense is difficult, but should be
sufficiently effective. The structural advantages of the offense in cyber conflict are as obvious as they are
easy to overstate. Penetration and exploitation, or even attack, would need to be by surprise. It can be swift
almost beyond the imagination of those encultured by the traditional demands of physical combat. Cyber attack may be so stealthy that it escapes notice
for a long while, or it might wreak digital havoc by com - plete surprise. And need one emphasize, that at least for a while, hostile cyber action is likely to
be hard (though not quite impossible) to attribute with a cy - berized equivalent to a “smoking gun.” Once one is in the realm of the catastrophic “What if
. . . ,” the world is indeed a frightening place. On a personal note, this defense analyst was for some years exposed to highly speculative briefings that
hypothesized how unques - tionably cunning plans for nuclear attack could so promptly disable the United States as a functioning state that our nuclear
retaliation would likely be still - born. I should hardly need to add that the briefers of these Scary Scenarios were obliged to make a series of Heroic
Assumptions. ¶ The
literature of cyber scare is more than mildly reminiscent of the nuclear attack
stories with which I was assailed in the 1970s and 1980s. As one may observe regarding what Winston Churchill wrote
of the disaster that was the Gallipoli campaign of 1915, “[t]he terrible ‘Ifs’ accumulate.” 52 Of course, there are dangers in the cyber domain. Not only
are there cyber-competent competitors and enemies abroad; there are also Americans who make mistakes in cyber operation. Furthermore, there are the
manufacturers and constructors of the physical artifacts behind (or in, depending upon the preferred definition) cyber - space who assuredly err in this and
more sophisticated—usually meaning complex—the code for cyber, the more certain
must it be that mistakes both lurk in the program and will be made in digital communication.¶ What
that detail. The
I have just outlined minimally is not a reluc - tant admission of the fallibility of cyber, but rather a statement of what is obvious and should be anticipat ed about people and material in a domain of war. All human activities are more or less harassed by friction and carry with them some risk of failure, great
or small. A strategist who has read Clausewitz, especially Book One of On War , 53 will know this. Alternatively, anyone who skims my summary
version of the general theory of strategy will note that Dictum 14 states explicitly that “Strategy is more difficult to devise and execute than are policy,
operations, and tactics: friction of all kinds comprise phenomena inseparable from the mak - ing and execution of strategies.” 54 Because of its often
widely distributed character, the physical infrastruc - ture of an enemy’s cyber power is typically, though not invariably, an impracticable target set for
physical assault. Happily, this probable fact should have only annoying consequences. The discretionary nature and therefore the variable possible
characters feasible for friendly cyberspace(s), mean that the more danger - ous potential vulnerabilities that in theory could be the condition of our cyberdependency ought to be avoidable at best, or bearable and survivable at worst. Libicki offers forthright advice on this aspect of the subject that deserves
to be taken at face value: ¶ [T]here is no inherent reason that improving informa - tion technologies should lead to a rise in the amount of critical
information in existence (for example, the names of every secret agent). Really critical information should never see a computer; if it sees a computer, it
should not be one that is networked; and if the computer is networked, it should be air-gapped.¶ Cyber
defense admittedly is difficult
so is cyber offense. To quote Libicki yet again, “[i]n this medium [cyberspace] the best defense is not necessarily a good offense;
it is usually a good defense.” 56 Unlike the geostrategic context for nuclear-framed competition in U.S.—Soviet/Russian rivalry, the
geographical domain of cyberspace definitely is defensible. Even when the enemy is both clever and lucky, it will be
to do, but
our own design and operating fault if he is able to do more than disrupt and irritate us temporarily. ¶ When cyber is contextually regarded properly—
which means first, in particular, when it is viewed as but the latest military domain for defense planning—it should be plain to see that cyber performance
needs to be good enough rather than perfect. 57 Our Landpower,
sea power, air power, and prospectively our space systems also
to be capable of accepting combat damage and loss, then recovering and carrying on.
There is no fundamental reason that less should be demanded of our cyber power. Second, given that cyber
will have
is not of a nature or potential character at all likely to parallel nuclear dangers in the menace it could con - tain, we should anticipate international cyber
rivalry to follow the competitive dynamic path already fol - lowed in the other domains in the past. Because the digital age is so young, the pace of
technical change and tactical invention can be startling. However, the mechanization RMA of the 1920s and 1930s recorded reaction to the new science
and technology of the time that is reminiscent of the cyber alarmism that has flour - ished of recent years. 58 We
can be confident that
cyber defense should be able to function well enough, given the strength of political, military,
and commercial motivation for it to do so. The technical context here is a medium that is a constructed one, which provides airgapping options for choice regarding the extent of networking. Naturally, a price is paid in convenience for some closing off of possible cyberspace(s),
but all important defense decisions involve choice, so what is novel about that? There is nothing new about accepting some limitations on utility as a
price worth paying for security. ¶ 3. Intelligence is critically important, but informa - tion should not be overvalued. The strategic history of cyber over the
past decade confirms what we could know already from the science and technology of this new domain for conflict. Specifically ,
cyber power is
not technically forgiving of user error. Cyber warriors seeking criminal or military benefit require
precise information if their intended exploits are to succeed. Lucky guesses should not stumble upon passwords,
while efforts to disrupt electronic Supervisory Con - trol and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems ought to be unable
to achieve widespread harmful effects. But obviously there are practical limits to the air-gap op - tion, given that control (and
command) systems need to be networks for communication. However, Internet connection needs to be treated as a potential source of serious danger. ¶ It
is one thing to be able to be an electronic nuisance, to annoy, disrupt, and perhaps delay. But it is quite another
to be capable of inflicting real persisting harm on the fighting power of an enemy. Critically
important military computer networks are, of course, accessible neither to the inspired amateur
outsider, nor to the malignant political enemy. Easy passing reference to a hypothetical “cyber Pearl
Harbor” reflects both poor history and ignorance of contemporary military common
sense. Critical potential military (and other) targets for cyber attack are extremely hard to access
and influence (I believe and certainly hope), and the technical knowledge, skills, and effort required to do
serious harm to national security is forbiddingly high. This is not to claim, foolishly, that cyber means absolutely
could not secure near-catastrophic results. However, it is to say that such a scenario is extremely improbable.
Cyber defense is advancing all the time, as is cyber offense, of course. But so discretionary in vital detail can one be in the making of cyberspace, that
confidence—real confidence—in cyber attack could not plausibly be high. It should be noted that I am confining this particular discussion to what rather
idly tends to be called cyber war. In political and strategic practice, it is unlikely that war would or, more importantly, ever could be restricted to the
EMS. Somewhat rhetorically, one should pose the question: Is it likely (almost anything, strictly, is possible) that cyber war with the potential to inflict
catastrophic damage would be allowed to stand unsupported in and by action in the other four geographical domains of war? I believe not.¶ Because we
have told ourselves that ours uniquely is the Information Age, we have become unduly respectful of the potency of this rather slippery catch-all term. As
usual, it is helpful to contextualize the al - legedly magical ingredient, information, by locating it properly in strategic history as just one important
element contributing to net strategic effectiveness. This mild caveat is supported usefully by recognizing the general contemporary rule that information
per se harms nothing and nobody. The electrons in cyber - ized conflict have to be interpreted and acted upon by physical forces (including agency by
physical human beings). As one might say, intelligence (alone) sinks no ship; only men and machines can sink ships! That said, there is no doubt that if
friendly cyber action can infiltrate and misinform the electronic informa - tion on which advisory weaponry and other machines depend, considerable
warfighting advantage could be gained. I do not intend to join Clausewitz in his dis - dain for intelligence, but I will argue that in strategic affairs,
intelligence usually is somewhat uncertain. 59 Detailed up-to-date intelligence literally is essential for successful cyber offense, but it can be healthily
sobering to appreciate that the strategic rewards of intelligence often are considerably exaggerated. The basic reason is not hard to recognize. Strategic
success is a complex endeavor that requires adequate perfor - mances by many necessary contributors at every level of conflict (from the political to the
tactical). ¶ When thoroughly reliable intelligence on the en - emy is in short supply, which usually is the case, the strategist finds ways to compensate as
best he or she can. The IT-led RMA of the past 2 decades was fueled in part by the prospect of a quality of military effec - tiveness that was believed to
flow from “dominant battle space knowledge,” to deploy a familiar con - cept. 60 While there is much to be said in praise of this idea, it is not
unreasonable to ask why it has been that our ever-improving battle space knowledge has been compatible with so troubled a course of events in the 2000s
in Iraq and Afghanistan. What we might have misunderstood is not the value of knowledge, or of the information from which knowledge is quarried, or
even the merit in the IT that passed information and knowledge around. Instead, we may well have failed to grasp and grip understanding of the whole
context of war and strategy for which battle space knowledge unquestionably is vital. One must say “vital” rather than strictly essential, because relatively
ignorant armies can and have fought and won despite their ig - norance. History requires only that one’s net strategic performance is superior to that of
the enemy. One is not required to be deeply well informed about the en - emy. It is historically quite commonplace for armies to fight in a condition of
more-than-marginal reciprocal and strategic cultural ignorance. Intelligence is king in electronic warfare, but such warfare is unlikely to be solely, or even
close to solely, sovereign in war and its warfare, considered overall as they should be. ¶ 4. Why the sky will not fall. More accurately, one should say that
the sky will not fall because of hostile action against us in cyberspace unless we are improb - ably careless and
foolish. David J. Betz and Tim Ste vens strike the right note when they conclude that “[i]f cyberspace is not quite the hoped-for Garden of Eden, it is also
not quite the pestilential swamp of the imagination of the cyber-alarmists.” 61 Our understanding of cyber is high at the technical and tactical level, but re
- mains distinctly rudimentary as one ascends through operations to the more rarified altitudes of strategy and policy.
Nonetheless, our
scientific, technological, and tactical knowledge and understanding clearly indicates that
the sky is not falling and is unlikely to fall in the future as a result of hostile cyber
action. This analysis has weighed the more technical and tactical literature on cyber and
concludes, not simply on balance, that cyber alarmism has little basis save in the imagination of the alarmists.
There is military and civil peril in the hostile use of cyber, which is why we must take cyber security seriously, even to the point of buying redundant
capabilities for a range of command and control systems. 62 So seriously should we regard cyber danger that it is only prudent to as - sume that we will
be the target for hostile cyber action in future conflicts, and that some of that action will promote disruption and uncertainty in the damage it will cause. ¶
That granted, this analysis recommends strongly that the U.S. Army, and indeed the whole of the U.S. Government, should strive to comprehend cyber in
context. Approached in isolation as a new technol - ogy, it is not unduly hard to be over impressed with its potential both for good and harm. But if we
see networked computing as just the latest RMA in an episodic succession of revolutionary changes in the way information is packaged and
communicated, the computer-led IT revolution is set where it belongs, in historical context. In modern strategic history, there has been only one truly
game-changing basket of tech - nologies, those pertaining to the creation and deliv - ery of nuclear weapons. Everything else has altered the tools with
which conflict has been supported and waged, but has not changed the game. The nuclear revolution alone raised still-unanswered questions about the
viability of interstate armed conflict. How - ever, it would be accurate to claim that since 1945, methods have been found to pursue fairly traditional
political ends in ways that accommodate nonuse of nuclear means, notwithstanding the permanent pres - ence of those means.¶ The light cast by general
strategic theory reveals what requires revealing strategically about networked computers. Once one sheds some of the sheer wonder at the seeming
miracle of cyber’s ubiquity, instanta - neity, and (near) anonymity, one realizes that cyber is just another operational domain, though certainly one very
different from the others in its nonphysi - cality in direct agency. Having placed cyber where it belongs, as a domain of war, next it is essential to
recognize that its nonphysicality compels that cyber should be treated as an enabler of joint action, rather than as an agent of military action capable of
behav - ing independently for useful coercive strategic effect. There
are stand-alone possibilities for cyber action, but
they are not convincing as attractive options either for or in opposition to a great power, let alone
a superpower. No matter how intriguing the scenario design for cyber war strictly or for cyber
warfare, the logic of grand and military strategy and a common sense fueled by understanding of
the course of strategic history, require one so to contextualize cyber war that its independence is
seen as too close to absurd to merit much concern.
2NC — Cyberwar
Cyberwar isn’t an existential threat - best studies prove
Healey 13 (Jason, Director of the Cyber Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic Council, "No,
Cyberwarfare Isn't as Dangerous as Nuclear War", 3/20, www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/worldreport/2013/03/20/cyber-attacks-not-yet-an-existential-threat-to-the-us)
America does not face an existential cyberthreat today, despite recent warnings. Our
cybervulnerabilities are undoubtedly grave and the threats we face are severe but far from comparable to
nuclear war. ¶ The most recent alarms come in a Defense Science Board report on how to make military cybersystems more resilient against
advanced threats (in short, Russia or China). It warned that the "cyber threat is serious, with potential consequences similar in some ways to the nuclear
threat of the Cold War." Such fears were also expressed by Adm. Mike Mullen, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in 2011. He called cyber "The
single biggest existential threat that's out there" because "cyber actually more than theoretically, can attack our infrastructure, our financial systems."¶
While it is true that cyber attacks might do these things, it is also true they have not only
never happened but are far more difficult to accomplish than mainstream thinking
believes. The consequences from cyber threats may be similar in some ways to nuclear, as the Science Board concluded, but mostly, they are
incredibly dissimilar. ¶ Eighty years ago, the generals of the U.S. Army Air Corps were sure that their bombers would easily topple other countries and
study of the 25-year history of cyber conflict, by
shown a similar dynamic where the impact of disruptive
cause their populations to panic, claims which did not stand up to reality. A
the Atlantic Council and Cyber Conflict Studies Association, has
cyberattacks has been consistently overestimated. ¶ Rather than theorizing about future cyberwars or extrapolating
from today's concerns, the history of cyberconflict that have actually been fought, shows that cyber incidents have so far tended to have effects that are
either widespread but fleeting or persistent but narrowly focused. No
attacks, so far, have been both widespread and
persistent. There have been no authenticated cases of anyone dying from a cyber attack. Any
widespread disruptions, even the 2007 disruption against Estonia, have been short-lived causing no significant GDP loss. ¶
Moreover, as with conflict in other domains, cyberattacks can take down many targets but keeping them down over time in the face of determined
defenses has so far been out of the range of all but the most dangerous adversaries such as Russia and China. Of course, if the United States is in a
conflict with those nations, cyber will be the least important of the existential threats policymakers should be worrying about. Plutonium
trumps bytes in a shooting war.¶ This is not all good news. Policymakers have recognized the problems since at least 1998 with little
significant progress. Worse, the threats and vulnerabilities are getting steadily more worrying. Still, experts have been warning
of a cyber Pearl Harbor for 20 of the 70 years since the actual Pearl Harbor. ¶ The transfer
of U.S. trade secrets through Chinese cyber
espionage could someday accumulate into an existential threat. But
it doesn't seem so seem just yet, with only handwaving estimates of annual losses of 0.1 to 0.5 percent to the total U.S. GDP of around
$15 trillion. That's bad, but it doesn't add up to an existential crisis or "economic cyberwar."
1NC — Failed States
no impact to failed states
Patrick 11 (Stewart M, senior fellow, director of the program on international institutions and
global governance at CFR, 4-15-2011, “Why Failed States Shouldn’t Be Our Biggest National
Security Fear,” http://www.cfr.org/international-peace-and-security/why-failed-states-shouldntour-biggest-national-security-fear/p24689) lr
In truth, while failed
states may be worthy of America's attention on humanitarian and development grounds, most of them are
irrelevant to U.S. national security. The risks they pose are mainly to their own inhabitants.
Sweeping claims to the contrary are not only inaccurate but distracting and unhelpful, providing
little guidance to policymakers seeking to prioritize scarce attention and resources. In 2008, I collaborated with Brookings Institution
senior fellow Susan E. Rice, now President Obama's permanent representative to the United Nations, on an index of state weakness in
developing countries. The study ranked all 141 developing nations on 20 indicators of state strength, such as the
government's ability to provide basic services. More recently, I've examined whether these rankings reveal anything about
each nation's role in major global threats: transnational terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international
crime and infectious disease. The findings are startlingly clear. Only a handful of the world's failed states pose security concerns to
the United States. Far greater dangers emerge from stronger developing countries that may suffer from corruption
and lack of government accountability but come nowhere near qualifying as failed states. The link between failed states
and transnational terrorism, for instance, is tenuous. Al-Qaeda franchises are concentrated in South Asia, North Africa, the
Middle East and Southeast Asia but are markedly absent in most failed states, including in sub-Saharan Africa. Why? From a terrorist's
perspective, the notion of finding haven in a failed state is an oxymoron. Al-Qaeda discovered this in the
1990s when seeking a foothold in anarchic Somalia. In intercepted cables, operatives bemoaned the insuperable difficulties of
working under chaos, given their need for security and for access to the global financial and communications
infrastructure. Al-Qaeda has generally found it easier to maneuver in corrupt but functional states, such as Kenya, where sovereignty provides
some protection from outside interdiction. Pakistan and Yemen became sanctuaries for terrorism not only because
they are weak but because their governments lack the will to launch sustained
counterterrorism operations against militants whom they value for other purposes. Terrorists also need support from local power
brokers and populations. Along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, al-Qaeda finds succor in the Pashtun code of pashtunwali, which requires hospitality to
strangers, and in the severe brand of Sunni Islam practiced locally. Likewise in Yemen, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has found sympathetic tribal
hosts who have long welcomed mujaheddin back from jihadist struggles. Al-Qaeda has met less success in northern Africa's Sahel region, where a
moderate, Sufi version of Islam dominates. But as
the organization evolves from a centrally directed network to a diffuse
movement with autonomous cells in dozens of countries, it is as likely to find haven in the banlieues of Paris or high-rises of
Minneapolis as in remote Pakistani valleys. What about failed states and weapons of mass destruction? Many U.S. analysts worry
that poorly governed countries will pursue nuclear, biological, chemical or radiological weapons; be unable to control existing weapons; or decide to
share WMD materials. These fears
are misplaced. With two notable exceptions — North Korea and Pakistan — the world's
weakest states pose minimal proliferation risks, since they have limited stocks of fissile or other
WMD material and are unlikely to pursue them. Far more threatening are capable countries
(say, Iran and Syria) intent on pursuing WMD, corrupt nations (such as Russia) that possess loosely secured nuclear arsenals and poorly
policed nations (try Georgia) through which proliferators can smuggle illicit materials or weapons. When it comes to crime, the story is more
complex. Failed states do dominate production of some narcotics: Afghanistan cultivates the lion's share of global opium, and war-torn Colombia rules
coca production. The tiny African failed state of Guinea-Bissau has become a transshipment point for cocaine bound for Europe. (At one point, the
contraband transiting through the country each month was equal to the nation's gross domestic product.) And Somalia, of course, has seen an explosion of
maritime piracy. Yet failed
states have little or no connection with other categories of transnational crime,
from human trafficking to money laundering, intellectual property theft, cyber-crime or
counterfeiting of manufactured goods. Criminal networks typically prefer operating in functional countries that
provide baseline political order as well as opportunities to corrupt authorities. They also accept
higher risks to work in nations straddling major commercial routes. Thus narco-trafficking has exploded in Mexico,
which has far stronger institutions than many developing nations but borders the United States. South Africa presents its own
advantages. It is a country where “the first and the developing worlds exist side by side,” author Misha Glenny writes. “The first world provides
good roads, 728 airports . . . the largest cargo port in Africa, and an efficient banking system. . . . The
developing world accounts for
tax revenue, overstretched social services, high levels of corruption throughout the administration, and
7,600 kilometers of land and sea borders that have more holes than a second-hand dartboard.” Weak and failing African states, such as
Niger, simply cannot compete. Nor do failed states pose the greatest threats of pandemic disease. Over the past decade, outbreaks of SARS,
the low
avian influenza and swine flu have raised the specter that fast-moving pandemics could kill tens of millions worldwide. Failed states, in this regard, might
seem easy incubators of deadly viruses. In fact, recent fast-onset pandemics have bypassed most failed states, which are relatively isolated from the
weakest states — particularly in sub-Saharan Africa
challenges are
endemic diseases with local effects, such as malaria, measles and tuberculosis. While U.S. national
security officials and Hollywood screenwriters obsess over the gruesome Ebola and Marburg viruses, outbreaks of these
hemorrhagic fevers are rare and self-contained. I do not counsel complacency. The world's richest nations have a moral obligation to
global trade and transportation links needed to spread disease rapidly. Certainly, the world's
— suffer disproportionately from disease, with infection rates higher than in the rest of the world. But their principal health
bolster health systems in Africa, as the Obama administration is doing through its Global Health Initiative. And they have a duty to ameliorate the
poor performance by developing countries
in preventing, detecting and responding to infectious disease is often shaped less by budgetary and infrastructure
constraints than by conscious decisions by unaccountable or unresponsive regimes. Such deliberate inaction has
occurred not only in the world's weakest states but also in stronger developing countries, even in promising
democracies. The list is long. It includes Nigeria's feckless response to a 2003-05 polio epidemic, China's lack of
candor about the 2003 SARS outbreak, Indonesia's obstructionist attitude to addressing bird flu in 2008 and South Africa's
denial for many years about the causes of HIV/AIDS. Unfortunately, misperceptions about the dangers of failed states have
transformed budgets and bureaucracies. U.S. intelligence agencies are mapping the world's “ungoverned spaces.” The Pentagon
challenges posed by HIV/AIDS, which continues to ravage many of the world's weakest states. But
has turned its regional Combatant Commands into platforms to head off state failure and address its spillover effects. The new Quadrennial Diplomacy
and Development Review completed by the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development depicts fragile and conflict-riddled
states as epicenters of terrorism, proliferation, crime and disease. Yet such preoccupations
U.S. national security
reflect more hype than analysis.
officials would be better served — and would serve all of us better — if they turned their
strategic lens toward stronger developing countries, from which transnational threats are more likely to emanate.
1NC — Middle East
Middle East war won’t escalate — balanced alliances, Chinese nonintervention, and cooperation prevent great power draw-in
Mead 14 — Walter Russell Mead, James Clarke Chace Professor of Foreign Affairs and
Humanities at Bard College and Professor of American foreign policy at Yale University, Editorat-Large of The American Interest magazine and a non-resident Scholar at the Hudson Institute,
2014 (“Have We Gone From a Post-War to a Pre-War World?” Huffington Post, July 7th,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/walter-russell-mead/new-global-war_b_5562664.html)
The Middle East today bears an ominous resemblance to the Balkans of that period. The
contemporary Middle East has an unstable blend of ethnicities and religions uneasily coexisting
within boundaries arbitrarily marked off by external empires. Ninety-five years after the French and the British first parceled out the lands of the
fallen Ottoman caliphate, that arrangement is now coming to an end. Events in Iraq and Syria suggest that the Middle East could be in for
carnage and upheaval as great as anything the Balkans saw. The great powers are losing the ability to hold their clients in check; the Middle East today is at
least as explosive as the Balkan region was a century ago. GERMANS THEN, CHINESE NOW What blew the Archduke's murder up into a
catastrophic world war, though, was not the tribal struggle in southeastern Europe. It took the
hegemonic ambitions of the German Empire to turn a local conflict into a universal conflagration.
Having eclipsed France as the dominant military power in Europe, Germany aimed to surpass Britain on the seas and to recast the emerging world order along lines that better
the rising power was also insecure, fearing that worried neighbors would gang up against it. In the crisis in the Balkans, Germany
both felt a need to back its weak ally Austria and saw a chance to deal with its opponents on
favorable terms. Could something like that happen again? China today is both rising and turning to the sea in ways that Kaiser
Wilhelm would understand. Like Germany in 1914, China has emerged in the last 30 years as a major economic power , and
it has chosen to invest a growing share of its growing wealth in military spending. But here the analogy begins to get complicated and
even breaks down a bit. Neither China nor any Chinese ally is competing directly with the United
States and its allies in the Middle East. China isn't (yet) taking a side in the Sunni-Shia dispute, and
all it really wants in the Middle East is quiet; China wants that oil to flow as peacefully and cheaply as possible. AMERICA HAS ALL THE
ALLIES And there's another difference: alliance systems. The Great Powers of 1914 were divided into two roughly equal military blocs:
Austria, Germany, Italy and potentially the Ottoman Empire confronted Russia, France and potentially Britain. Today the global U.S. alliance system
has no rival or peer; while China, Russia and a handful of lesser powers are disengaged from, and in
some cases even hostile to, the U.S. system, the military balance isn't even close. While crises between China and U.S. allies on its
periphery like the Philippines could escalate into US-China crises, we don't have anything comparable to the complex and finely
balanced international system at the time of World War I. Austria-Hungary attacked Serbia and as a direct result of that Germany
attacked Belgium. It's hard to see how, for example, a Turkish attack on Syria could cause China to attack
Vietnam. Today's crises are simpler, more direct and more easily controlled by the top powers.
suited it. Yet
1NC — Terror — Cyber
No impact to cyber-terror --- countermeasures, system patches, deterrence,
and deferral.
Chuipka 17 (Adam, Junior Policy Officer at Transport Canada (the Canadian equivalent of an
Assistant Secretary at the US Dept. of Transportation and a MA in Public and International
Affairs from the University of Ottawa, January 11, 2017, “The Strategies of Cyberterrorism: Is
Cyberterrorism an effective means to Achieving the Goals of Terrorists?”
https://www.ruor.uottawa.ca/handle/10393/35695)
These cases illustrate that the
threat from cyberterrorism is real but can be vastly overstated. Most of the damage
or disruption caused by the cyber-attack was quickly undone, therefore the potential threat could
be considerable but the actual threat is significantly lower. While attrition has proven to be the
only likely strategy that cyberterrorists could pursue, its overall effectiveness is unconvincing
and counterterrorism measures could make it even less effective. First, cyberterrorism attacks
are unlikely to be repeated as the vulnerabilities from that specific attack are patched up, making
future threats of cyberterrorism less credible. Second, if a terrorist attempts to threaten
cyberterrorism, governments can immediately search for vulnerabilities and patch them,
essentially making the attack fail — this may be easier said than done in most cases though warning always provides the chance to
gain an advantage. In some cases you can simply go offline since an established connection is required for
cyberterrorism to ultimately work. Third, Cyberterrorism is only possible because of vulnerabilities,
by hardening systems and patching vulnerabilities — the chances of cyberterrorism occurring
is decreased. This is one of the ongoing efforts by governments around the world. Fourth, it is also critical
that governments are constantly removing zero day vulnerabilities from the market to prevent
terrorists from obtaining them — they are key in a successful surprise cyber-attack. Fifth, if worst comes to worst and a
cyber-attack has proven successful, one of the most effective strategies against cyber-terrorism is
simply denying that the event was caused by terrorism. Regardless of a terrorist organizations
claim, if the cyber-attack is downplayed by governments as just a “glitch” in the system, it can
take away the desired impact of terrorists and deter future attempts at cyberterrorism. Even if a
terrorist successfully conducted a cyber-attack and claimed to be the perpetrators, cyberattacks
have yet to demonstrate they can actually cause terror — an essential element for a terrorist attack
to be considered a success. Given that high-level cyber-attacks capable of being violent requires
vast resources, intelligence, skill, and time — ultimately too much can go wrong in conducting
a cyber-attack and the costs-benefit analysis weighs heavily towards terrorist use of kinetic
weapons for the time being.
1NC — Terror — Nuke
No nuke terror — detection solves and no expertise
Seitz 16 (Sam, Director of Nuclear Security Studies @ the Global Intelligence Trust, “Why
WMD Terrorism Isn’t as Scary as it Seems”
https://politicstheorypractice.wordpress.com/2016/08/26/why-wmd-terrorism-isnt-as-scary-as-itseems/)
Of all the potential WMD terror attacks, nuclear attacks seem to generate the most fear among the public. This is not surprising. After all, nuclear
weapons represent the pinnacle of humans’ destructive potential, and Hollywood frequently utilizes nuclear weapons to drive the plot in movies ranging
from Dr. Strangelove to The Avengers. Fortunately, though, there
is very little risk of terrorists acquiring or detonating
nuclear weapons, particularly in large, Western metropolises. The reason for this is simple; it is exceedingly difficult for
terrorists to acquire and transport nuclear weapons without being detected and stopped. First,
terrorists would have to break into heavily guarded facilities, likely in Russia or the United States, and steal
weapons weighing multiple tons. Then, after securing the weapons, these terrorists would need to escape
while being pursued by elite security forces. Assuming the terrorists are able to escape, they would then need
highly skilled technicians to assemble the nuclear device, as nuclear weapons held in storage are almost always broken
down into their constituent parts so as to prevent unauthorized use. The terrorists would have to do this while being sought
after by the most powerful and well-funded intelligence networks in the world, and would
then need to transport the nuclear device into a major city without being detected. According to
John Mueller, an expert on nuclear terrorism at Ohio State University, the risk of a successful
nuclear terrorist attack occurring is, therefore, less than one in three billion (1). Certain analysts contend that
while the risk of terrorists stealing nuclear weapons is low, it is possible that terrorists might simply construct their own nuclear devices instead. This
scenario is even less likely than nuclear theft, though, as the production of nuclear weapons is an exceedingly complicated task. Terrorists
would need highly specific blueprints detailing how to construct a nuclear device, access to
highly enriched uranium or plutonium, and a secure, well-equipped site to construct the weapon.
As Mueller points out, the odds of all of these conditions being met are quite low. Moreover, the need for so many complex and
uncommon materials — highly enriched uranium, heavy industrial equipment, etc. — would
raise suspicion among intelligence analysts, increasing the chance of detection. Even if
intelligence agencies missed these clues one of the many middle-men used to acquire these
materials might inform on the terrorist network, either for profit or because of moral qualms (1).
Modeling
1NC — No Model
Pressure based modelling theory is wrong---it ignores spatial dependence
data and makes one shot actions like the plan meaningless---their studies are
confounding by the simultaneous introduction of the Palermo protocol
Cho et al. 11 — Seo-Young Cho, University of Goettingen, Axel Dreher, University of
Heidelberg, University of Goettingen, CESifo, KOF Swiss Economic Institute and IZA, Eric
Neumayer, London School of Economics, “The Spread of Anti-Trafficking Policies: Evidence
from a New Index” Discussion Paper No. 5559 March 2011, http://ftp.iza.org/dp5559.pdf
7. Conclusion In this paper, we have introduced new measures of countries’ policies aimed at
combating international trafficking in human beings. Our aggregate policy index is finegrained and based on the consistent coding of a wide range of informational sources, while
our disaggregated measures capture the three different fundamental dimensions of antitrafficking policies, namely prevention, protection and prosecution. Scholars may wish to use
the aggregate index if they are interested in overall policies, but we strongly recommend that
future research analyzes the different dimensions of overall policies separately and in greater
detail than we could do here. For example, protection policies mainly protect victims, while
prosecution policies mainly target the perpetrators. Why countries choose to pursue one type of
policy rather than the other deserves closer scrutiny. Besides introducing novel data to the still
recent, yet burgeoning literature on human trafficking, we have also contributed to the analysis
of anti-trafficking policies by analyzing the effect of spatial dependence in this policy domain,
which the extant literature has so far neglected. Domestic policies, we have argued, will be
affected by policies abroad because of 24 pressure, externalities, learning or emulation effects.
Our results only partly corroborate these hypotheses. On the one hand, we find no evidence for
anti-trafficking policies diffusing via pressure exerted by destination countries onto their
major transit or origin countries. Our results suggest that anti-trafficking policies are an area
where destination countries seem unwilling, or, even if they are willing, are unable to pressure
the countries where the majority of victims of human trafficking come from or are channeled
through, to change their policies. On the other hand, we find consistent evidence for externality
effects – with the exception of protection policies, for which one would not expect such an effect.
We thus find that stricter policies in contiguous countries, or sometimes in major trading partners,
are followed by stricter domestic policies as well. The most likely explanation is simple: Stricter
policies create negative externalities on neighboring countries and trading partners,
exacerbating their problems in dealing with human trafficking as a result. Contiguity and trade
might also partially capture learning or emulation channels of diffusion. In fact, we find robust
evidence that countries look towards those with similar political views, as proxied by our
connectivity variable of voting similarity on key issues in the UN General Assembly. This is
also the case for countries sharing similar cultural values, as proxied by our connectivity variable
measuring civilizational belonging. All in all, we find robust evidence that countries do not
operate in isolation when deciding on anti-trafficking policies, being affected by the prior choices
of other countries on which their policy choices spatially depend.
2NC — No Model
TVPA sanctions fail---the US just targets countries that will comply--disregard their statistics for data bias---and sanctions aren’t significant
enough to meaningfully effect the countries that actually have high trafficking
numbers---like India or China
Hendrix 10 — Mary Catherine Hendrix, Candidate for J.D., Cornell Law School, 2010; B.A.
in Journalism and Psychology, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2005, “Enforcing the
U.S. Trafficking Victims Protection Act in Emerging Markets: The Challenge of Affecting
Change in India and China” Cornell Int’l L.J. 173 (2010),
http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/research/ilj/upload/hendrix.pdf
IV. Why is the TVPA Ineffective in Emerging Markets like India and China? The problem of
enforcement is one that often arises in international law; in many cases, “observance must
depend more heavily on . . . extralegal sanctions” than on actual enforcement.214 The TVPA
relies on two forms of extra-legal sanctions: (1) naming and shaming with the Tier Placement
system,215 and (2) economic penalties in the form of sanctions on non-humanitarian, nontrade related foreign assistance.216 As illustrated in the above discussion of the continuing
problems in India and China, the traditional threat of economic sanctions and reliance on naming
and shaming are not always successful in influencing noncompliant countries to change their
behavior. This Note argues that the failure of traditional extralegal sanctions as enforcement
mechanisms is based on the delicate relationships that the United States must maintain with
emerging markets such as India and China and the United States’ hesitance to apply
sanctions to those countries. A. The Failure of Traditional Naming and Shaming: Problems with
the Tier System Often in international law, the group designated to monitor observance of a
certain law relies on the ability to publish violators’ lack of observance, thereby shaming them
into compliance.217 The idea is that, where there is a widely held norm, like the norm against
slavery, and a monitoring body can highlight the fact that a country violated this widely held
norm, the rest of the international community collectively will condemn that violator’s
actions.218 The international community’s stigmatization of that violating country will
encourage that country to alter its behavior, as well as discourage other countries from violating
the same norm.219 Using this kind of naming and shaming to encourage a country to change its
behavior requires that the country express concern over its reputation, which many countries do,
and that there is a widespread acceptance of the norm that was violated.220 Naming and shaming
has proven successful in other areas of human rights, such as with the International Campaign to
Ban Landmines (ICBL).221 The ICBL was able to motivate change in landmine use by raising
awareness of landmine issues with the help of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and then
using that awareness to create a direct campaign of stigmatization and shaming for the countries
and companies involved in land mine use and trade.222 The campaign was successful in
persuading a global audience to change their behavior and their regard for other countries
involved in landmine use.223 This kind of model has been suggested for many other agendas,
such as outlawing child soldiers or shaming countries into more responsible environmental
standards.224 One of the requirements to make such a system work is that the monitoring body
must deploy shame effectively against the norm violators.225 There are, however, arguments that
naming and shaming is decreasing in efficacy, particularly in countries with increasing
economic growth.226 The circumstances in India and China support that proposition, as the
consistent naming and shaming of those countries for many years has not been successful in
influencing them to bring themselves within the minimum standards required by the
TVPA.227 Some critics argue that with the rise in states’ sophistication about their images, pure
reputational sanctions are no longer effective.228 Additionally, the results of the only largescale
econometric analysis of the success of naming and shaming were not encouraging.229 This
enforcement mechanism has been particularly ineffective in countries like China and India,
where rapid economic growth has caused increased competition for raw materials.230 This
competition makes it very difficult for wealthy states to ignore states with an abundance of
natural resources, regardless of the human rights abuses taking place in the country.231 Also,
even when the U.S. government sanctions a country for violating human rights norms, there is
often still the capital mobility for U.S. companies to put money into the sanctioned country in
search of a profit.232 Therefore, countries with deplorable human rights track records can
still attract investment and development assistance from private companies while they are being
sanctioned by the government.233 B. Why the Unilateral Sanctions Have No Real Teeth The
other form of enforcement used by the United States in the TVPA is sanctions on nonhumanitarian, non-trade related foreign assistance.234 These unilateral sanctions, which are
imposed without authorization by agreement between the member countries, are a common
mechanism to encourage states to comply with international law and norms.235 The United
States has had success using this tactic in many different areas, and it serves the purposes of
punishing the violating country and improving future compliance.236 The hope is that economic
sanctions promote respect for human rights and modify behavior by helping states to internalize
certain norms,237 in addition to serving punishment and deterrent functions.238 There are
proponents of the idea that unilateral sanctions by the United States that are “consistent with
international law and that promote recognized human rights standards play an important and
legitimate part in [the] transnational legal process and the promulgation and internalization of
fundamental human rights.”239 There are, however, many potential problems with the use of
unilateral sanctions and with the United States’ deployment of them as an enforcement
mechanism for the TVPA. First of all, there is the issue of whether the United States has
jurisdiction to impose unilateral sanctions and whether imposing them violates state
sovereignty.240 Many critics feel that the use of unilateral sanctions by the United States displays
the “hegemonic actions of a global ‘hyperpower,’ which violate state sovereignty and the
principles of the U.N. system.”241 While the United Nations Charter and customary international
law do not bar unilateral economic sanctions, there is the question of whether the United States is
bypassing multilateral enforcement mechanisms and enforcing rules to which it does not itself
have to submit.242 In dealing with these critiques it is important to note that the economic
sanction employed by the United States in regards to the TVPA is the withdrawal of assistance
that was voluntarily given by the United States in the first place.243 Even so, critics feel that the
United States uses its sanctioning power to “selectively and hypocritically enforce human and
labor rights,” by enforcing its own human rights standards instead of international
standards.244 Furthermore, there are doubts about the effectiveness of sanctions.245 Many
critics feel that when the United States uses economic sanctions, it is the innocent population of
the sanctioned country that suffers instead of the government that the United States is attempting
to influence.246 All unilateral economic sanctions by the United States are subject to presidential
waiver “based on a finding that certain circumstances exist, such as improved human rights
conditions, ‘extraordinary circumstances,’ or simply a finding that waiver is in the U.S. national
security interests.”247 Critics of the sanctions say that instead of issuing blanket sanctions based
on behavior, the United States picks and chooses which countries to sanction, ignoring ones that
are strategically important to the United States, like China.248 They claim that the United States
targets countries it already sanctions for other reasons, like Cuba and Iran, or those in which
the United States has little economic strategy, like Burma and Haiti.249 Out of the fourteen
countries on the Tier 3 List in the 2008 TIP Report, former President George W. Bush only fully
sanctioned Burma, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Syria, Cuba and
Iran, with partial waivers for DPRK and Iran.250 Additionally, as only Tier 3 countries can be
sanctioned, there has been some debate over whether countries that should be placed in Tier 3 are
instead placed in Tier 2 to fit United States’ interests.251 For example, in 2007, when India was
placed on the Tier 2 Watch List instead of the Tier 3 list, CNN reported that there was a heated
debate between former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and former Deputy Secretary of State
John Negroponte in which Rice overruled Negroponte’s wish to place them on the Tier 3 list due
to “concern about alienating the Indian government.”252 The Indian and Chinese governments’
knowledge that there is such a small chance that sanctions would ever be used against them
could negatively impact the efficacy of the sanctions as enforcement tools.253
1NC — No Russia Model
Russia won’t model---empirics from the first attempt at solving human
trafficking proves
Dean 14 — Laura A. Dean, Ph.D. and M.A. in Political Science from the University of Kansas,
Currently an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Millikin University, “Beyond the Natasha
Effect: Determinants of Human Trafficking Policy Variation in the Post-Soviet Region”
Dissertation,
https://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/bitstream/handle/1808/23981/Dean_ku_0099D_13631_DATA_1.p
df?sequence=1
State Commitment to Anti-Trafficking Efforts Even authoritarian countries adopt new policies,
and so there has to be some level of state commitment to the issue in order to have any
legislation on it in authoritarian regimes such as Russia. In fact, the only policy Russia has
adopted on human trafficking came at the request of the presidential administration. Even
though there was significant pressure on Russia to adopt a policy from the United States and
the international community, this pressure was rebuffed and instead a solution from the
presidential administration was adopted. Johnson (2009) argues that instead of accepting the
policy recommendations of feminists and a working group created to formulate the legislation,
Putin introduced his own weaker version of the human trafficking legislation that offered no
monetary weight, social services for the victims, or safe houses (Johnson 2009, 134). Thus, there
was evidence of political will in the presidential administration to make human trafficking
illegal in Russia, and this significantly influenced trafficking policy adoption in Russia.
2NC — No Russia Model
Err neg---our data comes from Russian insiders which you should prefer over
data or speculative theories because it is a source that far up the food chain
Dean 14 — Laura A. Dean, Ph.D. and M.A. in Political Science from the University of Kansas,
Currently an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Millikin University, “Beyond the Natasha
Effect: Determinants of Human Trafficking Policy Variation in the Post-Soviet Region”
Dissertation,
https://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/bitstream/handle/1808/23981/Dean_ku_0099D_13631_DATA_1.p
df?sequence=1
United States InfluenceBuckley argued that pressure from U.S. government was productive in
the development of the 2003 criminal code amendments over time but not instantly as politicians
and the government disputed that the problem was even occurring in Russia (2009b, 127). I
have found that influence from the United States on human trafficking policy development has
hindered the government from adopting human trafficking policies. Russia was downgraded
from Tier 2 Watch List to Tier 3 in 2013 in the U.S. State Department’s Trafficking in Persons
Report for failing to comply with the U.S. minimum standards (2013, 310). This also meant that
economic sanctions could be utilized on Russia and the U.S. government could withdraw nonhumanitarian and non-trade-related foreign assistance from the country (TIP 2013). Russia was
ranked on the watch list for nine years in a row and granted two consecutive waivers165 from
the lowest tier because it had a written plan to bring itself into compliance with the minimum
standards for the elimination of trafficking (TIP 2013, 310). This downgrade was published in
June 2013 and was mentioned by several of respondents as negatively affecting U.S.-Russian
relations. Yelena said that when the Americans put Russia in the third tier of countries, it caused
only resentment.166 Alexander said the following: Human trafficking is political. The U.S. TIP
report does not help our work. On the contrary, it makes everything very hard. Although as a
researcher I respect the effort. I can understand how much work it is to gather that information, to
analyze, to double check, to contact your embassies abroad, to contact NGOs, to contact the
experts…I think the tier rankings are not helpful.167 In addition to frank discussions about TIP
report rankings, respondents also discussed the monetary support of anti-trafficking programs
until the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) office in Russia was
closed in September 2012, after Russian authorities asked them to cease operations in the country.
Until that time USAID has sponsored numerous prevention and awareness campaigns and study
visits. Although the influence of the U.S. government can be seen with the 2003 criminal code
adoption, this influence has depreciated over the years. Oleg said “when Russia finally does get
an action plan or better policy on human trafficking it will be a Russian policy and not based
on anything else or any other model.”168
1NC — Kazakhstan — Inevitable
Putin will use the same strategy in Ukraine to take over Kazakhstan — crime
is irrelevant
Birnbaum 15 (Michael Birnbaum — Brussels bureau chief covering Europe, Yale University,
BA in history; Deep Springs College; Article; 5/2/15; “In Kazakhstan, fears of becoming the next
Ukraine”; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/in-kazakhstan-fears-of-becoming-thenext-ukraine/2015/05/01/10f7e73c-e878-11e4-8581633c536add4b_story.html?utm_term=.8f926a7a497e; accessed 7/1/18) [DS]
A volatile mix building in Kazakhstan contains the same ingredients that ignited in
Ukraine: a Russian minority that says it fears being under siege, rising anti-Russian nationalist
sentiment and pressure on the Russian language. Last year, Russia used that explosive combination as
a pretext to annex Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula. Now, many here in this city on the steppe fear that Kazakhstan’s presidential election last
ASTANA, Kazakhstan —
Sunday may have been the last peaceful one the former Soviet republic will have and that the country may be next in Moscow’s cross hairs. President Nursultan Nazarbayev won
98 percent of Sunday’s vote, but the 74-year-old leader has done little to prepare for a successor amid widespread speculation that this term will be his final one. Kazakhs and
a quarter of Kazakhstan’s citizens are ethnic Russians, and
many have the same grievances as their compatriots in Ukraine. Some say they feel pressured to
speak Kazakh, the use of which has spread in recent years. Few Russians are represented in state
leadership positions. Some ethnic Russians are ­already calling on the Kremlin to send preemptive,
peaceful aid, even as they voice their effusive support for Nazarbayev, a former Soviet apparatchik. The Kazakh leader, meanwhile, has promised to crack down on
Russians alike worry about strife when he leaves office. About
anything that smacks of ethnic division. “We will harshly punish any form of ethnic radicalism, no matter from which side it comes,” Nazarbayev said shortly before the election at
a state-run congress of ethnic groups intended to build cross-cultural unity. In the past year, he has stiffened punishments for advocating separatism and upped efforts to move
Putin stoked Kazakhstan’s
fears last year when he gave the country’s leader a double-edged compliment: Nazarbayev “has
performed a unique feat,” Putin told a group of pro-Kremlin youth activists. “He has created a state on a territory
where there was never a state.” Putin has vowed to protect Russian-speakers around the world.
Kazakhstan is by far the world’s biggest uranium producer. Russia also views its neighbor as a
buffer against an increasingly active China, which is rapidly expanding into parts of Central Asia that were long part of the Russian Empire.
“After Nazarbayev, we will have a transition period, a very dangerous transition period,” said Dosym Satpayev, the director of the
Kazakhstan Risks Assessment Group, who said he feared a repeat of the conflict in Ukraine,
where pro-Russian rebels in the east have seized stretches of territory. “There will be a strong fight about what happens
ethnic Kazakhs to where most of the Russians live, in the north of a nation as big as Western Europe. Russian President Vladimir
next.” Kazakhstan is a fragile patchwork of ethnicities, the legacy of Soviet deportations that used the region’s wind-blown steppe as a dumping ground for political prisoners and
ethnic groups deemed insufficiently loyal to the Kremlin. Nazarbayev, the only leader independent Kazakhstan has ever known, used pressure, coercion and savvy diplomacy to
steer away from ethnic conflict when his country gained its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991.
1NC — Central Asia War
No Central Asian war
Boboev 17 (Nodir Boboev, Ph.D. candidate in International Relations at the School of
International and Public Affairs (SIPA), Jilin University, China, 4-5-2017, "Why Central Asia
Won't Go to War," Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2017/04/why-central-asia-wont-go-to-war/)
lr
Despite tensions, the idea that war in Central Asia is likely can be challenged if one takes a
closer look at multiple factors. First of all, before going to a war for resources or land, the regional countries
will have to challenge the greater geopolitical dynamics and forces. Russia and China — the two
foremost actors engaged in Central Asia — will find it quite contrary to their interests if there is any war in this
region. Both these major powers have their respective (and to some extent common) interests in maintaining
stability in the region. Russia has developed an undeniably strong influence over the region, which once used to be an integral
part of the Soviet Union. At a time when its relations with the West have plunged to a new low, Russia can hardly afford any agitation in its backyard. In
fact, such a scenario would seriously undermine Russia’s standing vis-a-vis the United States at global level. On the other hand, China
has major
economic stakes in the region that Beijing would not like to see imperiled by any crisis. Its economic clout in
the region is no less than that of Russia. With the initiation of the “One Belt, One Road” project, stability in
Central Asia has acquired a new significance for China. In reality, one of the top sources of
income for Central Asian countries are either massive energy-related exports to China or
trade and investment ties with that country. Under these circumstances, any problem would be a direct cause of displeasure
for Beijing.¶ The Central Asian countries (with the exception of Turkmenistan) also share a common strategic
platform with Russia and China, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Even if Russia and China have not taken any direct
measures to resolve the long-standing issues between these countries, they will find it quite unappealing to let these dispute escalate into a direct war. ¶
Second, the aspect of domestic politics cannot be ignored. For several reasons (but mainly because of lowering
energy prices), Central Asian economies over the last few years have suffered from a slowdown. War can help an authoritarian regime muster domestic
support for the time being but in the longer run, it will prove to be a double-edged sword that can undermine the grip over power. And the Central
Asian countries would have even fewer reliable options to jumpstart economic recovery in the
case of a serious war. The truth seems to be not lost on the heads of these states, who have retained grudges
against each other but shown little courage for crossing the line. ¶ In addition, several of these countries are in the process of
a political transition, which is not perfect timing for a war-like crisis. Uzbekistan recently elected
a new president after the death of its strongman Islam Karimov. Karimov had to use brutal force in Andijan in 2005 to quash threats to his rule;
it will likewise take the current president a long time to establish his control. Meanwhile, Kazakhstan is in the early stages of
preparing for a power transition, as 76-year-old President Nursultan Nazarbayev is now the only Soviet-era leader still in control of a
Central Asia government. Similarly, Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon held a referendum in May last year to lower
the age requirement for president so as to pave the way for his son Rustam to succeed him. It should
be remembered that many of the conflicts in the region involve Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, whether bilaterally or involving a third country as well. Going
to war would mean inviting future difficulties for maintaining power. ¶ The
Central Asian countries, with all their mutual conflicts and
maintained a delicate balance of stability at the regional level. That is another
important counter argument. Cross-border skirmishes are not rare but have never exploded to the extent of
derailing the tacit understanding about larger normalcy. In this sense, these authoritarian regimes — while sticking to their
domestic issues, have
conflicting claims and demands but avoiding a total war — have proven to be more rational than might be expected on the basis of conventional
wisdom.¶ There is no denying the fact that Central Asia region has many forbidding challenges to deal with. But these problems are not the only variables
in play, nor will they take on an overriding role in influencing the decision-making process at state levels. To predict the future of ties between these
countries merely on the basis of existing disputes would be falling victim to the trap of oversimplification. These
governments have
many reasons to think twice before committing any full-scale aggression. In order to sustain the smooth
running and longevity of their regimes, Central Asian governments might in fact be even less attracted to the idea of war in the future.
2NC — Central Asia War
Great power cooperation is high and checks instability
Chang 13 (Su Chang, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, “Great powers help keep Central
Asia stable”, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/801950.shtml#.Uiffr8bENSI)
As Central Asian leaders constantly call for the support of big powers given numerous threats and challenges the region faces, these countries need to
Economic cooperation between China
and Central Asia has been deepening, which has become a powerful engine for the region's
economic development. Meanwhile, Russia has been playing a key role in the region's development
and stability. For example, a customs union between Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus has been introduced to promote regional economic
find the partners that can benefit themselves most in terms of politics, economy and security.
integration. Russia also helps to maintain the security situation through the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, especially in
maintaining Kyrgyzstan's stability. For
the US, Central Asia is the most important channel to withdraw troops
from Afghanistan, making it powerfully invested in regional stability European countries have
been dedicated to helping the region's economic growth, scholarship and cultural heritage, as well as
coordinating disputes of water resources among member states. Due to the complexity of the
international situation, a win-win mode has been accepted by all. And only with this mode
can challenges be met.
1NC — Accidental Launch
No accidental launch
Williscroft 10 (Six patrols on the John Marshall as a Sonar Technician, and four on the Von
Steuben as an officer — a total of twenty-two submerged months. Navigator and Ops Officer on
Ortolan & Pigeon — Submarine Rescue & Saturation Diving ships. Watch and Diving Officer on
Oceanographer and Surveyor. “Accidental Nuclear War”
http://www.argee.net/Thrawn%20Rickle/Thrawn%20Rickle%2032.htm) lr *we do not endorse
problematic language
Is there a realistic chance that we could have a nuclear war by accident? Could a ballistic
submarine commander launch his missiles without specific presidential authorization? Could a
few men conspire and successfully bypass built-in safety systems to launch nuclear weapons? The key
word here is “realistic.” In the strictest sense, yes, these things are possible. But are they realistically possible ?
This question can best be answered by examining two interrelated questions. Is there a way to launch a nuclear weapon by accident? Can a specific accidental series of events take
place—no matter how remote—that will result in the inevitable launch or detonation of a nuclear weapon? Can one individual working by himself or several individuals working
in collusion bring about the deliberate launch or detonation of a nuclear weapon? We are protected from accidental launching of nuclear weapons by mechanical safeguards, and by
Launching a nuclear weapon
takes the specific simultaneous action of several designated individuals. System designers
ensured that conditions necessary for a launch could not happen accidentally. For example, to launch a
missile from a ballistic missile submarine, two individuals must insert keys into separate slots on
separate decks within a few seconds of each other. Barring this, the system cannot physically
launch a missile. There are additional safeguards built into the system that control computer
hardware and software, and personnel controls that we will discuss later, but—in the final analysis—without the keys inserted as
described, there can be no launch—it’s not physically possible. Because the time window for
key insertion is less than that required for one individual to accomplish, it is physically
carefully structured and controlled mandatory procedures that are always employed when working around nuclear weapons.
impossible for a missile to be launched accidentally by one individual. Any launch must be
deliberate. One can postulate a scenario wherein a technician bypasses these safeguards in order to effect a launch by himself. Technically, this is possible, but such a
Maintenance procedures on nuclear
weapons are very tightly controlled. In effect always is the “two-man rule.” This rule prohibits
any individual from accessing nuclear weapons or their launch vehicles alone. Aside from obvious qualification
requirements, two individuals must be present. No matter how familiar the two technicians may be with a specific
system, each step in a maintenance procedure is first read by one technician, repeated by the
second, acknowledged by the first (or corrected, if necessary), performed by the second, examined by the first,
checked off by the first, and acknowledged by the second. This makes maintenance slow, but absolutely assures that no errors
launch would be deliberate, not accidental. We will examine measures designed to prevent this in a later column.
Exactly the same procedure is followed every time an access cover is removed, a
screw is turned, a weapon is moved, or a controlling publication is updated. Nothing,
absolutely nothing is done without following the written guides exactly, always under twoman control. This even applies to guards. Where nuclear weapons are concerned, a
minimum of two guards—always fully in sight of each other—stand duty. There is no
realistic scenario wherein a nuclear missile can be accidentally launched...ever...under any
circumstances...period!
happen.
Turn — Cooperation
1NC — Trafficking
Victim Testimony is a legal necessity in prosecution of traffickers
Farrell et. al. 14
Amy Farrell, School of Criminology and Criminal Justice Northeastern University, Boston,
Colleen Owens, Urban Institute, Washington, Jack McDevitt (“New laws but few cases:
understanding the challenges to the investigation and prosecution of human trafficking cases”,
March 2014, Crime, Law and Social Change Volume 61, Issue 2, pp 139—168,
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10611-013-9442-1) EH
Necessity of victim testimony Although credible victim testimony is important in most criminal
prosecutions, victim testimony is virtually an absolute necessity in most human trafficking
cases. Because of the hidden nature of the crime, often few witnesses to the victim’s
exploitation are available. When witnesses do exist (such as buyers of commercial sex or cheap
labor), they have a vested interest in keeping the victimization hidden. Investigative
techniques such as electronic surveillance and undercover operations that might reduce reliance
on victim testimony are not commonly used in these investigations. Once a victim is identified,
police and prosecutors are reluctant to put them back in a situation to gather evidence. The
chances of further victimization are too high. As a result, the police rarely find first-hand
witnesses to human trafficking victimization. Instead, they have to depend on statements of
victims about their experiences. One investigator explained: You may get lucky and stumble onto
a victim that comes crashing out of a house. These aren’t like drug cases that have tangible
evidence you can lock away in an evidence locker and break it out for trial. You have a live
human being that the foundation of the case rests upon them. And they’re your evidence.
(Comprehensive Legislation, Northeast, Prosecutor) Evidence to help corroborate victim
statements, such as the instruments of prostitution (i.e., condoms, lubricant, clothing, money,
customer ledgers, photographs, and digital files), was collected in 66 % of the cases we reviewed.
Even when collected, corroborating evidence often is insufficient for prosecution. Police
officers explained that they would be reluctant to refer a case to the prosecutor unless they
were sure the victim would be willing to testify. Prosecutors confirmed this perspective. They
refused to file charges or they dropped charges when victims could not be found, or had run
away or refused to provide information. As one prosecutor noted, “Victim testimony is not
just a necessity. It’s a legal requirement. If I don’t have her, I got no case.”
2NC — Cooperation key
Law enforcement cooperation is a key issue that prevents trafficking
investigations from beginning
Fahy et al. 08
Stephanie Fahy Senior Research Associate Northeastern University, Center for Criminal Justice
Policy Research, Scott Decker Nancy Rodriguez Arizona State University Vince Webb Sam
Houston State University Nikos Passas Northeastern University (“UNDERSTANDING AND
IMPROVING LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSES TO HUMAN TRAFFICKING,”
Northeastern Institute on Race and Justice, Prepared for: National Institute of Justice, June 2008)
EH
. Challenges of Identifying and Investigating Human Trafficking Cases 1. Issues in
Investigating/Prosecuting Cases of Human Trafficking There are numerous challenges
associated with investigating cases of human trafficking. To gain a better understanding of the
most common challenges facing law enforcement investigators who have had experiences with
human trafficking cases, agencies were asked “How frequently does your agency encounter
the following issues when investigating and prosecuting cases of human trafficking?”
Respondents were provided with a list of possible challenge and could answer “frequently”
“occasionally” “seldom” “never” or “unsure.” Figure 3.6 displays the combined responses of
frequently and occasionally for each challenge associated with investigating trafficking cases.
The most frequent challenge faced nearly 70 percent of law enforcement agencies was lack
of victim cooperation. As we noted earlier, one of the most important indicators that alerts law
enforcement to the possibility of human trafficking victimization — victim non-cooperation —
is also the most serious challenge to investigating cases of human trafficking. Language
barriers or lack of adequate translators were the second most prevalent challenge (63 percent).
Interestingly, lack of preparation including many of the preparatory steps discussed earlier in this
report, was the next most common issue or challenge. Respondents cited a lack of resources (62
percent), a lack of training (53 percent) and a lack of policies and protocols (45 percent) as
frequent hindrances to investigating and prosecuting human trafficking cases. Only 13 percent of
agencies indicated that they encountered resistance from the U.S. Attorney or District Attorney to
pursue human trafficking cases. Other challenges identified by law enforcement agencies include
resistance from mental and physical health care providers to assist trafficking victims and lack of
shelter for juvenile sex trafficking victims. Encouragingly 67 percent of reporting agencies
indicated on a separate question that they had relationships with service providers who were able
to meet the immediate support needs of trafficking victims. 2. Challenges Presented by Human
Trafficking Victims As was discussed above, lack of victim cooperation is a major obstacle for
law enforcement in investigating human trafficking cases. To help understand what agencies
may do to overcome this challenges agencies were asked “In your opinion, how frequently do
each of the following reasons decrease victim willingness to cooperate with law enforcement?”
Respondents could answer “frequently” “occasionally” “seldom” “never” or “unsure.” When we
combine responses of frequently and occasionally we find 83 percent of law enforcement
agencies believe victims do not cooperate due to fear of retaliation to themselves or their family
as well as a lack of trust in the criminal justice system (Figure 3.7). Lack of knowledge about
law enforcement’s role, fear of deportation and lack of knowledge about victim’s rights
were also commonly cited reasons for non-cooperation. Recognizing these challenges is an
important first step in that securing victim testimony which is often critical in prosecuting
cases of human trafficking as well as providing victims benefits afforded under the TVPA,
including Continued Presence or a T-Visa.29
Victim Cooperation is vital to correctly identifying and convicting human
traffickers
Reid 13
Joan A. Reid, Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology University of Massachusetts
Lowell USA, (“Rapid Assessment Exploring Impediments to Successful Prosecutions of Sex
Traffickers of U.S. Minors, Journal of Police and Criminal Psychology, April 2013,
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11896-012-9106-6#Footnotes) EH
Quantitative information gathered during the assessment revealed that approximately 400 minors
had been arrested and adjudicated for prostitution statewide since the passing of the TVPA in
2000 until 2007. In this metropolitan area, from 2000 to 2007, fewer than ten cases of domestic
minor sex trafficking involving prostitution were investigated by those interviewed during this
study. Only one of those cases resulted in the successful prosecution of the trafficker. No arrests
or prosecutions of those facilitating domestic minor sex trafficking (i.e., hotel owners, strip club
managers) were reported. Although law enforcement agreed that all cases of sex trafficking of
U.S. minors, including those involving prostitution, should be treated as a high priority, they
reported significant obstacles to collecting evidence and prosecuting sex traffickers of U.S.
minors. First and foremost, the cooperation of the minor victim is needed to identify the
trafficker. One investigator of cyber-crimes against children reported, “Victim testimony is
very powerful and needed in the courtroom to provide evidence of the crime and the
detrimental effect on the victim. Without that testimony, the likelihood of a conviction is slim.”
Another law enforcement investigator stated that “without victim cooperation there was
little interest in pursuing a sex trafficking investigation.” The few U.S. minor victims
identified as victims of sex trafficking by the study participants since 2000 had been unwilling to
assist with an investigation of their trafficker.
Prosecution of traffickers must be shown that the victim was coerced— only
way too do that is to have victim cooperation— it is required for a confirmed
incident of trafficking
Layton 16
Abigail Layton is a Deputy Attorney General in Delaware and Chair of the Delaware Human
Trafficking Council; Kristen Schultz is a Maryland State Prosecutor; and Ayn Ducao is an
Assistant United States Attorney for the District of Maryland and the Chair of the Maryland
Human Trafficking Taskforce. (“The Battle Against Human Trafficking”, Summer 2016, Hein
Online, Delaware Lawyer,
https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.barjournals/dellwy0034&div=15&g_sent=1&casa
_token=&collection=barjournals) EH
Ms. Young: People often read the papers and wonder why the massage! prostitution cases are not
prosecuted as trafficking cases. How difficult are these cases to make? Ms. Layton To prosecute
a trafficking case, the State must show the adult victim was coerced or deceived into the
forced labor or sexual servitude. Victim cooperation is critical. It is difficult to develop
prostitution cases into trafficking cases as many of these individuals do not identify as
victims and report that they are acting independently and willingly. Some of the challenges
in working with trafficking victims include: determining who was a victim from the onset,
language and cultural barriers, ability to obtain "truthful" testimony from the victims given their
fear of the trafficker, lack of trust of law enforcement, and safety concerns for the victims' family
members. Traffickers are skilled manipulators and have deep psychological holds on many of
their victims. In the digital era, many traffickers have captured compromising images and videos
of their victims, which they threaten to share to the world so as to further alienate and isolate the
victim by severing any last strands of connection with family or supportive outsiders. We must
continue to develop better relationships between the victims and law enforcement by
providing more support to trafficking victims, beginning at the investigation stage. In
particular, housing is crucial to stabilize victims if we hope to gain their cooperation. We also
must be able to cross the language and cultural barrier; languages with an array of different
dialects have proven to be an issue
2NC — Stats
After the TPVA was implemented, convictions rose by over 518%
Kappelhof 08
Mark J. Kappelhof, Mark J. Kappelhoff is the Chief of the Criminal Section of the Civil Rights
Division of the U.S. Department of Justice. In that position, Mr. Kappelhoff supervises and
manages DOJ attorneys involved in the investigation and prosecution of federal criminal civil
rights violations, including hate crimes, law enforcement misconduct, and human trafficking. Mr.
Kappelhoff joined the Criminal Section in 1998 and served as a Trial Attorney and a Deputy
Chief where he prosecuted the full range of cases handled by the Section, (Federal Prosecutions
of Human Trafficking Cases: Striking a Blow Against Modern Day Slavery, 2008, University Of
St. Tohmans 6 U. St. Thomas L.J. 9 (2008).
https://ir.stthomas.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1173&context=ustlj) EH
IV. SUCCESSFUL FEDERAL PROSECUTION PROGRAM The Department has put the
TVPA to good use. In recent years, the number of trafficking investigations and prosecutions
has increased dramatically. From fiscal years 2001 to 2008, the Division and United States
Attorneys’ Offices have prosecuted 531 defendants, compared to 95 defendants charged during
the prior eight years, representing a 455 percent increase; secured 518 convictions and guilty
pleas, a 581 percent increase over the 76 obtained over the previous eight years; and opened
1,005 new investigations, about 628 percent more than the 138 opened in the previous seven
years.13 In fiscal year 2008, the Department’s Civil Rights Division, in partnership with U.S.
Attorneys’ Offices, prosecuted more trafficking cases than ever before. In fact, the Department
has experienced three straight years of record trafficking prosecutions.14 This increase is a
result of the Department’s comprehensive program to address the issue, including enforcing
enhanced criminal statutes and victim protection provisions, raising public awareness
through law enforcement training initiatives and programs introduced by the TVPA, and
dedicating resources to combating human trafficking. The Department has also implemented a
number of internal changes to further enhance the effectiveness of the federal government’s antitrafficking program. For example, in 2007, the Civil Rights Division created the Human
Trafficking Prosecution Unit (HTPU) within the Criminal Section to consolidate the expertise of
some of the nation’s top human trafficking prosecutors. HTPU prosecutors work closely with
Assistant United States Attorneys and federal and state law enforcement agencies to streamline
fastmoving trafficking investigations, ensure consistent application of trafficking statutes, and
identify multijurisdictional trafficking networks. The Bureau of Justice Assistance has also
funded forty-two Human Trafficking Task Forces to bring together federal, state, and local law
enforcement authorities, government agencies, and nongovernmental victim service providers in a
multidisciplinary approach to identifying human trafficking crimes, assisting human trafficking
victims, and prosecuting human trafficking cases.
Massive increases in prosecutions happened right after the TVPA was passed
Sherman 12
Jennifer A.L. Sheldon-Sherman, B.A., University of Kansas; J.D., Stanford Law School. Jennifer
A.L. Sheldon. Sherman is a judicial law clerk for a United States District Court Judge in the
Western District of Missouri (“The Missing “P”: Prosecution, Prevention, Protection, and
Partnership in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act”, Penn State Law Review, 12/11/2012
http://www.pennstatelawreview.org/117/2/117-2-Article_Sheldon-Sherman.pdf, )EH
Since the TVPA was first enacted in 2000, Congress has issued three reauthorizations that
strengthen the original provisions, provide more support for state and federal law enforcement,
and allocate additional funding to victims’ services organizations.194 While the United States
still has significant progress to make in strengthening its approach to trafficking, the following
section highlights some of the legal and practical responses to prior criticisms of the TVPA.
Though these advancements represent progress to date, they do not negate the numerous
criticisms of the TVPA, nor do they suggest that further improvements are unnecessary. A.
Federal Prosecutions While many argue that the TVPA in its current form is insufficient,195
U.S. Attorneys’ offices across the country have utilized it in hundreds of cases and a variety
of situations to successfully prosecute traffickers. An article by Mark Kappelhoff, Chief of the
Criminal Section of the Civil Rights Division (“the Division”) of the DOJ, provides some
evidence of this success.196 From 2001 to 2008, U.S. Attorneys’ offices, in conjunction with
the Division, prosecuted 531 defendants.197 This statistic represents a 455 percent increase
from the prior eight years during which the federal government prosecuted only 95
defendants.198 In the same period, the government increased convictions by 581 percent
(from 76 to 519)199 and increased new investigations by 628 percent (from 138 to 1,005).200
In 2010, the United States pursued 103 trafficking cases, bringing 181 charges of trafficking
and obtaining 141 federal trafficking convictions.201 In 2011, the DOJ obtained 151
convictions—the highest number in any year—in 125 human trafficking cases.202 During
that time, the United States also had 337 pending human trafficking investigations.203 While
these numbers represent a significant increase from the years prior to the enactment of the TVPA,
they still represent protection of only a small fraction of the DOJ’s estimated number of
victims trafficked into the United States each year.
1NC — Terror
Plan decks counterterror efforts — human traffickers exploit the legal
immigration system to infiltrate the country — San Bernadino shooting
proves we need more cooperation with law enforcement, not less
Homeland Security Today 16 (nonprofit association media outlet dedicated to informing
and supporting the efforts of public, private, nonprofit, and academic organizations and
practitioners engaged in the homeland security mission, “Human Traffickers Exploiting US Visa
System” January 12, https://www.hstoday.us/channels/federal-state-local/human-traffickersexploiting-us-visa-system/, accessed 7-1-18, HSS RH)
Although January is National Slavery and Human Trafficking Prevention Month, the month kicked off with a startling report revealing that
human
traffickers are exploiting the US visa process to smuggle victims into the country. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) and US Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) data from 2005 to 2014 indicates that work and fiancé
visas were the predominant means by which more than half of the human traffickers known to federal law enforcement legally smuggled
victims into the United States, according to an audit by the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Office of the Inspector General
(IG). The IG also determined that 274 subjects of ICE human trafficking investigations successfully petitioned
USCIS to bring 425 family members and fiancés into the United States. ICE could not say exactly how many
visa petitioners were human traffickers; however, 18 of the 274 had been arrested for trafficking-related crimes, including sex trafficking, labor
trafficking, peonage, and involuntary servitude. The IG’s report explained that fiancé visas are used to lure human trafficking victims to the US as part of
marriage fraud schemes. The traffickers confiscate the victims’ passports and often subject them to psychological and physical abuse, such as forced sex
and/or forced labor. The auditors determined that ICE and USCIS could improve data quality to better identify instances of human trafficking. Lack of
communication between ICE and USCIS also created vulnerabilities in the visa process. “ICE had to extensively manipulate its system to provide us with
reasonably reliable data for our data matching and analysis,” the report stated. “ USCIS
did not always collect names and
other identifiers of human traffickers that victims had provided in their T visa applications.
Due to incomplete data, we were limited in our ability to match, analyze, and draw conclusions from the components’ databases.” The IG made three
recommendations: Recommendation 1: Develop and implement procedures to capture the names and other identifying information on human traffickers
found in victims’ statements, which are submitted with T and U petitions, in USCIS information systems. Recommendation 2: Collaborate with ICEto
institute a mutually acceptable procedure for transferring USCIS data on alleged human traffickers to ICE. Recommendation 3: Collaborate with USCIS
to identify a mutually acceptable procedure for obtaining names and other identifying information on alleged human traffickers that is available in USCIS
systems. ICE and USCIS concurred, saying they would address the IG’s recommendations. Each year, millions of men, women, and children are
trafficked from countries around the world, including the US. ICE, which is one of the primary federal agencies responsible for combatting human
trafficking, describes human trafficking as one of the most heinous crimes it investigates. A recent statement from ICE indicates that in Fiscal Year 2015,
Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), the investigative arm of DHS, arrested 1,437 individuals for human trafficking. From those cases, nearly 400
trafficking victims were identified and offered critical services. Since 2010, HSI has arrested over 7,000 individuals for human trafficking-related
offenses. “Our special agentswork tirelessly to disrupt criminal trafficking networks and help their victims, but there is still so much to be done,” said ICE
Director Sarah R. Saldaña. “While the efforts of law enforcement are crucial to the cause, educating the public to recognize signs of trafficking and
The IG’s report emerges
amid a heated controversy over the exploitation of loopholes in the US visa process by
terrorists. Just recently, it came to light that one of the alleged shooters in the San Bernardino attack, Tashfeen
Malik, came to the US on a fiancé visa. The FBI determined both Malik and her husband, Syed Farook, were radicalized years before
supporting the organizations who work to make victims whole are also important parts of our overall strategy.”
Farook brought her to the US. “We’re also looking at flaws in the [K-1] Visa process, and whether there are gaps or loopholes that need to be plugged,”
one of the federal counterterrorism officials involved in the investigation recently told Homeland Security Today’s Anthony Kimery on background. In
addition, House Committee on the Judiciary Committee Chairman Bob Goodlatte (R-Va.), who reviewed Malik’s immigration file, commented, “It is
clear that immigration officials did not thoroughly vet her application.” From
the San Bernardino shooting, the worst act of
terrorism on US soil since 9/11, to the exploitation of the visa process to smuggle human
trafficking victims into the US, the ramifications of failing to properly vet visa petitioners can
be devastating. “The United States is a nation of immigrants and we have a proud tradition of welcoming people from all over the world
seeking opportunity and freedom. But since 9/11 we have learned that terrorists have and will continue to exploit our
legal immigration system in order to cause harm to Americans and threaten our way of life,”
Goodlatte said. “As terrorists continue to adapt and evolve in order to carry out their heinous plots, we
have a duty to strengthen the security of our immigration system so that we keep bad actors out of
the United States.”
2NC — Terror
terror smuggling across the border’s a key strategy — enforcement is key
Grantham 17 [David Grantham, Senior Fellow at the National Center for Policy Analysis,
holds a PhD in history from Texas Christian University and holds a Master of Science in
International Relations from Troy University, a veteran, having served in both Iraq and
Afghanistan, 5-23-2017, "The Threat From Terrorism and Human Trafficking in Latin America,"
InsideSources, http://www.insidesources.com/threat-terrorism-human-trafficking-latin-america/]
lr
Hypothetical, if unproven, scenarios often dominate the storyline of possible collusion between organized crime and jihadists in Latin America. But the
growth of illicit networks and successful human smuggling operations poses a known and
immediate threat to U.S. national security. Complicated networks of fringe supporters, associate
funders and full-time operators help connect criminal and terrorist elements from hot spots
around the globe. Hezbollah works with powerful Colombian and Brazilian drug syndicates to
move tons of cocaine into Africa and Europe. Networks of loosely affiliated criminal organizations
facilitate the paid covert transfer of terrorists over international borders. The fluidity of these
networks, however, poses a problem for counterterrorism and interdiction efforts. Navy Adm. Kurt Walter Tidd
explained that “what’s true about (a network) today … isn’t necessarily true tomorrow.” Understanding the complexities of the international connections
linking organized crime with terrorist organizations can be confusing since they remain in constant flux, he said. Terrorism expert Douglas Farah offers a
more static picture of networks, breaking them down into three essential elements: fixers, super fixers and shadow facilitators. Local fixers are business
elites that profit from connecting seedy organizations to otherwise difficult-to-penetrate local financial networks, while the super fixers do something
similar on a regional or global scale. The shadow facilitators, Farah writes, specialize in moving weapons and commodities, in addition to having access
to fraudulent documents and money-laundering services. Networks
rely on these outsourcing operations. And that
outsourcing has provided lesser-known actors capabilities once generally reserved for nationstates. This makes a relatively inexpensive operation, like human smuggling, accessible to virtually anyone.
The small-time Islamist thousands of miles away now becomes a significant threat. The problem for U.S. security is that networks in Latin
America specialize in human smuggling and have known connections to countries of concern in
the Middle East. According to the Arizona attorney general’s office, a disproportionate amount of wire transfers come from the Middle East or
from individuals with Middle Eastern names to specific border cities in Mexico. The majority of wire transfers arrive in
Tapachula ‒‒ a city on Mexico’s southern border and a major hub for human smuggling. The
second-highest amount goes to the northern city of Nogales, just over the border from Arizona. Neither city appears to have a notable immigrant
population, which might otherwise warrant such significant transactions. In August 2014, four Turkish men who claimed to have ties to terrorist
organizations were detained after crossing the border into Texas. The four flew directly from Istanbul to Mexico City, and a Turkish-speaking contact
sheltered them in a safe house for a month before their cross-border transit into Texas from Reynosa, Mexico. Each man paid a mere $8,000. Putting that
cost in perspective: Hezbollah
operatives have laundered as much as $200 million a month in
cocaine revenue for some Latin American drug cartels. Judicial Watch sources reported in 2015 that cartel
associates had willingly and knowingly smuggled ISIS members through the weakly
manned corridor between Acala and Fort Hancock, Texas. ISIS member Mahmood Omar Khabir ‒‒ a former alQaeda instructor expelled from Kuwait for extremism ‒‒ claims to have traveled back and forth across the border from his hideout in northern Mexico
near El Paso to scout targets with the help of the Sinaloa Cartel. Sharafat Ali Khan pleaded guilty in April 2017 to smuggling illegal immigrants from
Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh through an elaborate underground railroad that originated in Brazil. One of those smuggled Afghans was later tied
to a plot to attack the United States and pleaded guilty in April 2017. The
confusing overlaps between criminal and
terrorist activities within the networks create uncertainties of jurisdiction for the military and law
enforcement. Trying to stop the range of illicit activities of one criminal organization should
change to emphasizing a specific type of operation. The U.S. government could concentrate on
human smuggling in Latin America and counter the activity rather than the actor.
Framing
1NC — VTL
Trafficking —
There’s inherent value to living.
Coontz’1
Phyllis D. Coontz, PhD Graduate School of Public and International Affairs University of
Pittsburgh, et al, JOURNAL OF COMMUNITY HEALTH NURSING, 2001, 18(4), 235-246 – JStor
In the 1950s, psychiatrist and theorist Viktor Frankl (1963) described an existential theory of
purpose and meaning in life. Frankl, a long-time prisoner in a concentration camp, re- lated
several instances of transcendent states that he experienced in the midst of that terri- ble suffering
using his own experiences and observations. He believed that these experi- ences allowed him
and others to maintain their sense of dignity and self-worth. Frankl (1969) claimed that
transcendence occurs by giving to others, being open to others and the environment, and coming
to accept the reality that some situations are un- changeable. He hypothesized that life always has
meaning for the individual; a person can always decide how to face adversity. Therefore, selftranscendence provides mean- ing and enables the discovery of meaning for a person (Frankl,
1963). Expanding Frankl's work, Reed (1991b) linked self-transcendence with mental health.
Through a developmental process individuals gain an increasing understanding of who they are
and are able to move out beyond themselves despite the fact that they are ex- periencing physical
and mental pain. This expansion beyond the self occurs through in- trospection, concern about
others and their well-being, and integration of the past and fu- ture to strengthen one's present life
(Reed, 1991b).
Death outweighs value to life claims- there is nothing to assign value if we are
all dead
Wapner ‘3
Leftist Criticism of "Nature": Environmental Protection in a Postmodern Age, Wapner, Paul, associate professor and
director of the Global Environmental Policy Program at American University, Dissent50.1 (Winter 2003): 71,
http://search.proquest.com.mutex.gmu.edu/altpresswatch/docview/227259976/365B5D1D0A1A4369PQ/1?accountid=
14541
All attempts to listen to nature are social constructions--except one. Even
the most radical postmodernist must
acknowledge the distinction between physical existence and nonexistence. As I have said, postmodernists
accept that there is a physical substratum to the phenomenal world even if they argue about the different meanings we ascribe to it. This
acknowledgment of physical existence is crucial. We can't ascribe meaning to that which
doesn't appear. What doesn't exist can manifest no character. Put differently, yes, the postmodernist should rightly
worry about interpreting nature's expressions. And all of us should be wary of those who claim to speak on nature's
behalf (including environmentalists who do that). But we need not doubt the simple idea that a prerequisite of
expression is existence. This in turn suggests that preserving the nonhuman world--in all its diverse embodiments--must be seen by ecocritics as a fundamental good. Eco-critics must be supporters, in some fashion, of environmental preservation.
Preventing death is the first ethical priority- it’s the only impact you can’t
recover from.
Bauman ‘95
Zygmunt Bauman, University of Leeds Professor Emeritus of Sociology, 1995, Life In Fragments: Essays In
Postmodern Morality, p. 66-71
The being-for is like living towards-the-future: a being filled with anticipation, a being aware of the abyss between future
foretold and future that will eventually be; it is this gap which, like a magnet, draws the self towards the Other,as it draws life towards the future, making
life into an activity of overcoming, transcending, leaving behind. The
self stretches towards the Other, as life stretches
towards the future; neither can grasp what it stretches toward, but it is in this hopeful and
desperate, never conclusive and never abandoned stretching-toward that the self is ever anew
created and life ever anew lived. In the words of M. M. Bakhtin, it is only in this not-yet accomplished world of anticipation and trial,
leaning toward stubbornly an-other Other, that life can be lived - not in the world of the `events that occurred'; in the latter world, `it is impossible to live,
to act responsibly; in it, I am not needed, in principle I am not there at all." Art, the Other, the future: what unites them, what makes them into three words
vainly trying to grasp the same mystery, is the modality of possibility. A curious modality, at home neither in ontology nor epistemology; itself, like that
which it tries to catch in its net, `always outside', forever `otherwise than being'. The possibility we are talking about here is not the all-too-familiar
unsure-of-itself, and through that uncertainty flawed, inferior and incomplete being, disdainfully dismissed by triumphant existence as `mere possibility',
`just a possibility'; possibility is instead `plus que la reahte' - both the origin and the foundation of being. The hope, says Blanchot, proclaims the
possibility of that which evades the possible; `in its limit, this is the hope of the bond recaptured where it is now lost."' The hope is always the hope of
being fu filled, but what keeps the hope alive and so keeps the being open and on the move is precisely its unfu filment. One may say that the paradox of
hope (and the paradox of possibility founded in hope) is that it may pursue its destination solely through betraying its nature; the most exuberant of
energies expends itself in the urge towards rest. Possibility uses up its openness in search of closure. Its image of the better being is its own
impoverishment . . . The togetherness of the being-for is cut out of the same block; it shares in the paradoxical lot of all possibility. It lasts as long as it is
unfulfilled, yet it uses itself up in never ending effort of fulfilment, of recapturing the bond, making it tight and immune to all future temptations. In an
important, perhaps decisive sense, it is selfdestructive and self-defeating: its triumph is its death. The Other, like restless and unpredictable art, like the
future itself, is a mystery. And being-for-the-Other, going towards the Other through the twisted and rocky gorge of affection, brings that mystery into
view - makes it into a challenge. That mystery is what has triggered the sentiment in the first place - but cracking that mystery is what the resulting
movement is about. The mystery must be unpacked so that the being-for may focus on the Other: one needs to know what to focus on. (The `demand' is
unspoken, the responsibility undertaken is unconditional; it is up to him or her who follows the demand and takes up the responsibility to decide what the
following of that demand and carrying out of that responsibility means in practical terms.) Mystery - noted Max Frisch - (and the Other is a mystery), is
an exciting puzzle, but one tends to get tired of that excitement. `And so one creates for oneself an image. This is a loveless act, the betrayal." Creating an
image of the Other leads to the substitution of the image for the Other; the Other is now fixed - soothingly and comfortingly. There is nothing to be
excited about anymore. I know what the Other needs, I know where my responsibility starts and ends. Whatever the Other may now do will be taken
down and used against him. What used to be received as an exciting surprise now looks more like perversion; what used to be adored as exhilarating
creativity now feels like wicked levity. Thanatos has taken over from Eros, and the excitement of the ungraspable turned into the dullness and tedium of
the grasped. But, as Gyorgy Lukacs observed, `everything one person may know about another is only expectation, only potentiality, only wish or fear,
acquiring reality only as a result of what happens later, and this reality, too, dissolves straightaway into potentialities'. Only
death, with its
finality and irreversibility, puts an end to the musical-chairs game of the real and the potential - it once and
for all closes the embrace of togetherness which was before invitingly open and tempted the lonely self." `Creating
an image' is the dress rehearsal of that death. But creating an image is the inner urge, the constant temptation, the must of all affection . . . It is the
loneliness of being abandoned to an unresolvable ambivalence and an unanchored and formless sentiment which sets in motion the togetherness of
being-for. But what loneliness seeks in togetherness is an end to its present condition - an end to itself. Without knowing - without being capable of
knowing - that the hope to replace the vexing loneliness with togetherness is founded solely on its own unfulfilment, and that once loneliness is no more,
the togetherness ( the being-for togetherness) must also collapse, as it cannot survive its own completion. What the loneliness seeks in togetherness
(suicidally for its own cravings) is the foreclosing and pre-empting of the future, cancelling the future before it comes, robbing it of mystery but also of
the possibility with which it is pregnant. Unknowingly yet necessarily, it seeks it all to its own detriment, since the success (if there is a success) may only
bring it back to where it started and to the condition which prompted it to start on the journey in the first place.
The togetherness of
being-for is always in the future, and nowhere else. It is no more once the self proclaims: `I have arrived', `I have done it', `I fulfilled
my duty.' The being-for starts from the realization of the bottomlessness of the task, and ends with the declaration that the infinity has been exhausted.
This is the tragedy of being-for - the reason why it cannot but be death-bound while
simultaneously remaining an undying attraction. In this tragedy, there are many happy moments, but no happy end. Death
is always the foreclosure of possibilities, and it comes eventually in its own time, even if not brought forward by the impatience
of love. The catch is to direct the affection to staving off the end, and to do this against the affection's nature. What
follows is that, if moral relationship is grounded in the being-for togetherness (as it is), then it can exist as a project, and guide the self's conduct only as
long as its nature of a project (a not yet-completed project) is not denied. Morality, like the future itself, is forever not-yet.
(And this is why the ethical code, any ethical code, the more so the more perfect it is by its own standards, supports morality the way the rope supports
the hanged man.) It is because of our loneliness that we crave togetherness. It is because of our loneliness that we open up to the Other and allow the
Other to open up to us. It is because of our loneliness (which is only belied, not overcome, by the hubbub of the being-with) that we turn into moral
selves. And it
is only through allowing the togetherness its possibilities which only the future can
disclose that we stand a chance of acting morally, and sometimes even of being good, in the present.
1NC — Util + AT PIA
Risk analysis —
Utilitarianism comes first – approaches can only be ethical when they
consider externalities — answers PIA
Chandler ‘14
(David Chandler is Professor of International Relations at the Department of Politics and International Relations,
University of Westminster – “Beyond good and evil: Ethics in a world of complexity” – International Politics, Vol. 51,
No. 4 (2014), pp.441-457 – #CutWithKirby - Available at: http://www.davidchandler.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/10/International-Politics-Evil-PUBLISHED-2.pdf)
Self-reflexive ethics redistribute responsibility and emphasize the indirect, unintended and relational networks of complex causation. Collective problems are reconceived
many radical and critical voices in the West are drawn to the problems
of 'side effects', of 'second-order' consequences - of a lack of knowledge of the emergent causality at play in the complex
interconnections of the global world. The more these interconnections are revealed, though the work of self-reflexivity and self-reflection, the more
ethical authority can be regained by governments and other agents of governance. We learn and learn again that we are responsible
for the world, not because of our conscious choices or because our actions lacked the right ethical intention, but because the
world's complexity is beyond our capacity to know and understand in advance. The unknowability of the outcomes of our action does not
remove our ethical responsibility for our actions, it, in fact, heightens our responsibility for these
second-order consequences or side effects. In a complex and interconnected world, few events or problems evade appropriation within this
framing, providing an opportunity for recasting responsibility in these ways. The new ethics of indirect responsibility for market
consequences can be seen (observed) clearly in the idea of environmental taxation, both state-enforced through interventions in the market and as taken
ontologically: as constitutive of communities and of political purpose. This is why
up by both firms and individuals. The idea that we should pay a carbon tax on air travel is a leading example of this, in terms of governmental intervention, passing the burden of
such problems on to 'unethical' consumers who are not reflexive enough to consider the impact of package holidays on the environment. At a broader level, the personalized ethicopolitical understanding that individuals should be responsible for and measure their own 'carbon footprint' shifts the emphasis from an understanding of broader inter-relations
between modernity, the market and the environment to a much narrower understanding of personal indirect responsibility, linking all aspects of everyday decision making to the
problems of global warming (see, for example, Marres, 2012). The shared responsibility for the Breivik murders is not different -ontologically - from the societally shared
our actions and inactions we collectively constitute the
frameworks in which others act and make decisions -failing to raise our voice against 'borderline racism' or extremism in a bar makes us indirectly
responsible for acts of racism or extremism in the same way that failing to save water or minimize air travel makes us
indirectly responsible for the melting polar ice caps.
responsibility for global warming or other problematic appearances in the world. Through
1NC — Deontology Bad
Ethical obligations are tautological- the only coherent rubric is to maximize
lives
Greene ‘10
Joshua Greene, Associate Professor of the Social Sciences Department of Psychology Harvard University, 10, “Moral
Psychology: Historical and Contemporary Readings, “The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul”,
www.fed.cuhk.edu.hk/~lchang/material/Evolutionary/Developmental/Greene-KantSoul.pdf
What turn-of-the-millennium science is telling us is that human moral judgment is not a pristine
rational enterprise, that our moral judgments are driven by a hodgepodge of emotional dispositions,
which themselves were shaped by a hodgepodge of evolutionary forces, both biological and
cultural. Because of this, it is exceedingly unlikely that there is any rationally coherent
normative moral theory that can accommodate our moral intuitions. Moreover, anyone who claims
to have such a theory, or even part of one, almost certainly doesn't. Instead, what that person probably has is a moral rationalization. It
seems then, that we have somehow crossed the infamous "is"-"ought" divide. How did this happen? Didn't Hume (Hume, 1978) and Moore (Moore, 1966) warn us against trying to
derive an "ought" from and "is?" How did we go from descriptive scientific theories concerning moral psychology to skepticism about a whole class of normative moral theories?
The answer is that we did not, as Hume and Moore anticipated, attempt to derive an "ought" from and "is." That is, our method has been inductive rather than deductive. We have
inferred on the basis of the available evidence that the phenomenon of rationalist deontological philosophy is best explained as a rationalization of evolved emotional intuition
Missing the Deontological Point I suspect that rationalist deontologists will remain unmoved
by the arguments presented here. Instead, I suspect, they will insist that I have simply misunderstood
whatKant and like-minded deontologists are all about. Deontology, they will say, isn't about this intuition
or that intuition. It's not defined by its normative differences with consequentialism. Rather, deontology is about taking humanity
seriously. Above all else, it's about respect for persons. It's about treating others as fellow rational creatures rather than as mere objects, about acting for reasons rational
beings can share. And so on (Korsgaard, 1996a; Korsgaard, 1996b).This is, no doubt, how many deontologists see deontology.
But this insider's view, as I've suggested, may be misleading. The problem, more specifically, is that it defines
deontology in terms of values that are not distinctively deontological, though they may appear to be from the inside.
Consider the following analogy with religion. When one asks a religious person to explain the
essence of his religion, one often gets an answer like this: "It's about love, really. It's about looking out for other
people, looking beyond oneself. It's about community, being part of something larger than oneself." This sort of answer accurately captures the
phenomenology of many people's religion, but it's nevertheless inadequate for distinguishing
religion from other things. This is because many, if not most, non-religious people aspire to love deeply, look out for other people, avoid self-absorption, have
(Harman, 1977).
a sense of a community, and be connected to things larger than themselves. In other words, secular humanists and atheists can assent to most of what many religious people think
religion is all about. From a secular humanist's point of view, in contrast, what's distinctive about religion is its commitment to the existence of supernatural entities as well as
formal religious institutions and doctrines. And they're right. These things really do distinguish religious from non-religious practices, though they may appear to be secondary to
the standard deontological/Kantian selfcharacterizatons fail to distinguish deontology from other approaches to ethics. (See also Kagan (Kagan,
1997, pp. 70-78.) on the difficulty of defining deontology.) It seems to me that consequentialists, as much as anyone else, have respect for
persons, are against treating people as mere objects, wish to act for reasons that rational
creatures can share, etc. A consequentialist respects other persons, and refrains from treating
them as mere objects, by counting every person's well-being in the decision-making process.
Likewise, a consequentialist attempts to act according to reasons that rational creatures can share
by acting according to principles that give equal weight to everyone's interests, i.e. that are
impartial. This is not to say that consequentialists and deontologists don't differ. They do. It's just that the real differences may not be what deontologists often take them to
many people operating from within a religious point of view. In the same way, I believe that most of
be. What, then, distinguishes deontology from other kinds of moral thought? A good strategy for answering this question is to start with concrete disagreements between
deontologists and others (such as consequentialists) and then work backward in search of deeper principles. This is what I've attempted to do with the trolley and footbridge cases,
If you ask a deontologically-minded person why it's
wrong to push someone in front of speeding trolley in order to save five others, you will getcharacteristically
deontological answers. Some will be tautological: "Because it's murder!"Others will be more
sophisticated: "The ends don't justify the means." "You have to respect people's rights." But, as we know, these answers
don't really explain anything, because if you give the same people (on different occasions) the trolley case or the loop
and other instances in which deontologists and consequentialists disagree.
they'll make the opposite judgment, even though their initial explanation concerning the footbridge case applies equally well to
Talk about rights, respect for persons, and reasons we can share are natural
attempts to explain, in "cognitive" terms, what we feel when we find ourselves having
emotionally driven intuitions that are odds with the cold calculus of consequentialism. Although these
explanations are inevitably incomplete, there seems to be "something deeply right" about them because they
give voice to powerful moral emotions. But, as with many religious people's accounts of what's
essential to religion, they don't really explain what's distinctive about the philosophy in question.
case (See above),
one or both of these cases.
1NC — Bostrom
Even ethical frameworks would conclude we should prevent existential risks
Bostrom ‘11
Nick Bostrom, Professor in the Faculty of Philosophy & Oxford Martin School, Director of the Future of Humanity
Institute, and Director of the Programme on the Impacts of Future Technology at the University of Oxford, recipient of
the 2009 Eugene R. Gannon Award for the Continued Pursuit of Human Advancement, holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy
from the London School of Economics, 2011 The Concept of Existential Risk,” Draft of a Paper published on
ExistentialRisk.com, Available Online at http://www.existentialrisk.com/concept.html
We have thus far considered existential risk from the perspective of utilitarianism (combined with several simplifying
assumptions). We may briefly consider how the issue might appear when viewed through the lenses of
some other ethical outlooks. For example, the philosopher Robert Adams outlines a different view on these matters: I believe a
better basis for ethical theory in this area can be found in quite a different direction—in a commitment to the
future of humanity as a vast project, or network of overlapping projects, that is generally shared by the human race. The aspiration
for a better society—more just, more rewarding, and more peaceful—is a part of this project. So are the potentially
endless quests for scientific knowledge and philosophical understanding, and the development of
artistic and other cultural traditions. This includes the particular cultural traditions to which we belong, in all their accidental
historic and ethnic diversity. It also includes our interest in the lives of our children and grandchildren, and the hope that they will be able, in turn, to
have the lives of their children and grandchildren as projects. To the extent that a policy or practice seems likely to be favorable or unfavorable to the
Continuity is as important
to our commitment to the project of the future of humanity as it is to our commitment to the
projects of our own personal futures. Just as the shape of my whole life, and its connection with my present and past, have an
interest that goes beyond that of any isolated experience, so too the shape of human history over an extended period of
the future, and its connection with the human present and past, have an interest that goes beyond that of the (total or
average) quality of life of a population-at-a-time, considered in isolation from how it got that way. We owe, I think, some loyalty to
carrying out of this complex of projects in the nearer or further future, we have reason to pursue or avoid it. …
this project of the human future. We also owe it a respect that we would owe it even if we were not of the human race ourselves, but beings from another
existential catastrophe would either put an end to the
project of the future of humanity or drastically curtail its scope for development, we would seem to have a strong prima
facie reason to avoid it, in Adams’ view. We also note that an existential catastrophe would entail the
frustration of many strong preferences, suggesting that from a preference-satisfactionist perspective it would be a bad thing. In a
similar vein, an ethical view emphasizing that public policy should be determined through informed
democratic deliberation by all stakeholders would favor existential-risk mitigation if we suppose, as is
planet who had some understanding of it. (28: 472-473) Since an
plausible, that a majority of the world’s population would come to favor such policies upon reasonable deliberation (even if hypothetical future people are
We might also have custodial duties to preserve the inheritance of humanity
passed on to us by our ancestors and convey it safely to our descendants.[24] We do not want to be the failing
not included as stakeholders).
link in the chain of generations, and we ought not to delete or abandon the great epic of human civilization that humankind has been working on for
thousands of years, when it is clear that the narrative is far from having reached a natural terminus. Further, many theological perspectives deplore
naturalistic existential catastrophes, especially ones induced by human activities: If God created the world and the human species, one would imagine
that He might be displeased if we took it upon ourselves to smash His masterpiece (or if, through our negligence or hubris, we allowed it to come to
irreparable harm).[25] We might also consider the issue from a less theoretical standpoint and try to form an evaluation instead by considering analogous
cases about which we have definite moral intuitions. Thus, for example, if
we feel confident that committing a small
genocide is wrong, and that committing a large genocide is no less wrong, we might conjecture
that committing omnicide is also wrong.[26] And if we believe we have some moral reason to
prevent natural catastrophes that would kill a small number of people, and a stronger moral
reason to prevent natural catastrophes that would kill a larger number of people, we might
conjecture that we have an even stronger moral reason to prevent catastrophes that would kill
the entire human population.
1NC — Yes War
No war —
Great power war is likely – so many flashpoints
Kofman and Sushentsov 16 (Michael, Andrey, Senior Research Scientist at CNA
Corporation, EASI-Hurford Next Generation fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace focused on Russian policy toward Ukraine and the future of RussianUkrainian interdependence, April, “What Makes Great Power War Possible”,
http://valdaiclub.com/files/10683/, Accessed: 7/7/17)
The likelihood of war between great powers continues to increase in the present day
international environment, and more worrisome is the high probability that it could emerge
unexpectedly. In NATO the focus has been on a possible conflict with Russia over the Baltics,
while few predicted the possibility of a Russia-Turkey clash in late 2015. Similarly, a series
of proxy wars between Saudi Arabia and Iran continue to spiral out in the Middle East,
destroying Syria and Yemen in their wake. Iraq remains unstable, Libya has imploded and
stability appears unlikely in Afghanistan’s future. China’s conflicts with its neighbors, many
of which are U.S. treaty allies or partners, are only increasing. The steady militarization of
the island dispute in the South China Sea, recently highlighted by China installing HQ-9 air
defenses on one of its islands, is a trend likely to have consequences. The current military
balance is rife with asymmetries and uncertainties which will only increase with time as
regional powers and major powers continue to modernize their militaries. The implications
and consequences of modern day conflict remain unknown, the stuff of tabletop wargames
instead of experience. Their implications are such that a conflict is unlikely to be localized,
since its very pursuit would require horizontal and vertical escalation at the outset in order
for either power to secure success. As such, how any nuclear power can hope to manage
escalation dynamics is uncertain at best. Yet the present day confrontation between Russia
and NATO, military exercises, long range bomber overflights, and the like demonstrate a
high tolerance for risk - one that is unwarranted.
war is likely
Beckman 17 (Milo Beckman – FiveThirtyEight staff writer, 5/15/17, “We’re Edging Closer To
Nuclear War”, https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/were-edging-closer-to-nuclear-war/, accessed
11/2/17, DL)
Nobody’s going to wake up one morning and say, ‘Gee,
today would be a really great day for a nuclear war,’
These scenarios account for a tiny
sliver of the probability that nuclear weapons will be launched at civilian targets. The real risk,
is accidental strikes Amidst the chaos of an international crisis, global catastrophe
could arise from a mere technological error — it only takes one falling domino to trigger an
avalanche of self-defense responses
conflict has the potential to escalate
quickly
When we have huge arsenals on high alert, accidents can happen that can be very
dangerous
There have been a shocking number of close calls, where a faulty reading or hardware
malfunction nearly provoked a nuclear response. Now swallow this: There’s nothing built into the
system that has caused the coin to always come up heads so far We were prepared — and are
When you imagine state use, though, don’t think of a red-faced Trump or Kim launching a petty revenge strike. “
” Bunn said.
embarrassingly enough,
.
, Bronson said. “We know the history. We know that
,” she said. “
.” If this sounds more like “Dr. Strangelove” than reality, you may want to take a spin on the Wheel of Near Misfortune, where the Union of Concerned Scientists shares stories of instances where the world only narrowly avoided a nuclear
strike.
.“
still prepared — to use [nuclear] weapons at a moment’s notice
The fact that we didn’t
is not necessarily proof that the system works so much as proof that we got very lucky
we
have reason to believe we won’t always be so lucky All of those incidents occurred during
peacetime, so there were lots of indications that this is not normal
If those kinds of
incidents happen during a crisis, where everything is ratcheted up a few notches, and you’re
already feeling kind of edgy, then not only are you perhaps convinced that it’s a real attack
— as opposed to a glitch of some kind — but your system is geared to respond all the more
rapidly.”
,” said Schwartz. “
.” If anything,
.“
,” said Schwartz. “
Wright gave a more specific example: “If you couple … a conventional conflict that is escalating with an attack on U.S. satellites, so that the U.S. loses important communications and surveillance systems, those war games frequently go
nuclear.” Three recent international trends have raised the risk Humanity’s best recourse, if we (prudently) assume that accidents are inevitable, is to back away from the edge of the cliff until we can afford a stumble or two without falling off. But we have not done this
Nuclear disarmament is the only way
to get rid of the threat
That is simply not happening right now the last two years
have seen a sharp resurgence in ethnic and religious nationalism across the West, with
several countries deprioritizing postwar liberal values of international cooperation,
pluralism, and freedom of trade and migration in pursuit of national might and a coherent
national identity.
— quite the opposite. The experts I spoke to pinpointed three interlocking trends that they believe have brought us closer to the brink than we were in 2015. “
,” said Kane. “
.” First,
Marine Le Pen, president of the right-wing French nationalist party National Front, described these competing visions last November: “The model that is defended by Vladimir Putin is radically different than that of
Mr. Obama. As for me, the model that is defended by Vladimir Putin — which is one of reasoned protectionism, looking after the interests of his own country, defending his identity — is the one that I like.” Opinions vary on the domestic merits of this political shift,
nationalist governments might
“take measures to increase their survivability in ways that would not be particularly conducive to
global security
far-right parties
brings an instability into the
situation that people are greatly worried about
The
recent political shifts are “certainly not conducive to the architecture we’ve worked within for the
last 70 years or so,”
I do think this is a much more dangerous world
but the experts I spoke to were unanimous in condemning this strain of anti-globalism and anti-multilateralism from the perspective of nuclear security. The main concern is that
,” said Narang. “There is a reassessment of the security politics,” said Angela Kane, former high representative for disarmament affairs at the United Nations. “When you look at [the election of President Trump], particularly
coupled with the Brexit decision last year,” and the growing electoral strength of
“in the Netherlands, France, Germany — all of this
.” International peace, after all, rests on a number of treaties and assumptions that are now being called into question.
Bronson said. “
.”
Solvency
1NC — AC — Entry
Post-aff, the US becomes a destination country- alt causes like lack of
criminalization for traffickers and purchasers - allowing trafficking victims
in can’t be the only step
Seideman 15 Christina Seideman is the Division Editor and a Humanities professor at
Pepperdine University. She also is a co-director at Seideman Labs at Harvard Medical School
which is a research base for a human molecular genetics program. “The Palermo Protocol: Why It
Has Been Ineffective in Reducing Human Sex Trafficking," Global Tides: Vol. 9, Article 5.
Pepperdine University, Published 2015.
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&ht
tpsredir=1&article=1152&context=globaltides
Unsurprisingly, many trafficked victims emigrate from
underdeveloped countries seeking economic prosperity in a wealthier country. Political or social turmoil,
population growth with an insufficient job market, and cultural bias against women are factors that make a country likely to become a sex slave supplier.18 Trafficked
persons, therefore, travel from underdeveloped countries to “destination” countries, which are states that
attract trafficked victims and/or their traffickers due to their wealth, opportunity for an improved life, and demand for sex workers. A country can also become
a destination country if there is a mass migration movement from a neighboring country. For example,
Israel increased in popularity as a trafficking destination due to migration from the East to the West after the Soviet Union collapsed.19 Although the United
States is portrayed in media and culture as having an enormous sex trade and being a popular
destination country, the United States contains less than one percent of the world’s sex trade.
Therefore, the many other countries that contain the international human sex trade must be
scrutinized. Countries that have legalized prostitution, such as Italy, and countries with recent,
rapid economic growth, such as Thailand, have a much larger issue with trafficking than the
United States does.20 Fortunately, some of these well- developed destination nations have the greatest legislative success against trafficking, primarily because they
DESTINATION COUNTRY RESPONSIBILITIES
have the financial resources to create effective legislation.21 These countries have the obligation to construct effective laws because they have the means to do so. By contrast,
impoverished countries that supply the trafficked victims may lack the financial and legislative
ability to create effective anti-trafficking laws. Destination countries that lack financial stability may also have difficulty funding the
creation of and enforcing effective anti-trafficking legislation. It may be debated whether countries that lack the means to develop such laws should be given grace, allowing them
to have noncompliant legislation. However, these countries can simply copy the Article 3 definition verbatim into their laws to effectively maintain compliance; therefore,
there is no excuse for countries to have noncompliant anti-trafficking legislation.22 Additionally,
destination countries should expand their focus from finding trafficked victims to also
prosecuting and convicting the traffickers and the male clients who provide the demand for sex
slaves. Participating in the sex trade industry is currently a low-risk, high-reward endeavor. The low-risk atmosphere is caused by a lack of community and healthcareresponder awareness of trafficking warning signs, ineffective and unenforced anti-trafficking laws, and uninvestigated and unprosecuted trafficking crimes. Without the
threat of arrest or conviction, there are no deterrents for trafficking propagators. For example, Israel has a
deterrence issue. Their lack of enforcement regarding anti-trafficking legislation only encourages
perpetrators to continue, while inappropriately light sentences given for sex trafficking offenses do not motivate perpetrators to stop such activities.23 Also,
the human trafficking industry is a largely prosperous one, as billions of dollars are earned
annually by traffickers worldwide.24 One factor that may drive trafficking profits up is the underground nature of the market. The inconvenience of
discretion and secrecy for traffickers can justify demands for higher commercial sex prices, which patrons are willing to pay. Furthermore, many traffickers may attempt to
maximize their profits by reducing production costs, which leads to further victim abuse due to a lack of basic needs.
2NC — AC — Entry
Italy and Thailand are alt causes
Seideman 15 (Christina A. Seideman specializes in human trafficking and writes @
Pepperdine, 5-26-2015, "The Palermo Protocol: Why It Has Been Ineffective in Reducing Human
Sex Trafficking," Global Tides,
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&a
mp;httpsredir=1&amp;article=1152&amp;context=globaltides) //JackH
Unsurprisingly, many
trafficked victims emigrate from underdeveloped countries seeking economic
prosperity in a wealthier country. Political or social turmoil, population growth with an insufficient job market, and cultural bias
against women are factors that make a country likely to become a sex slave supplier.18 Trafficked persons, therefore, travel from
underdeveloped countries to “destination” countries, which are states that attract trafficked
victims and/or their traffickers due to their wealth, opportunity for an improved life, and demand
for sex workers. A country can also become a destination country if there is a mass migration movement from a neighboring country. For
example, Israel increased in popularity as a trafficking destination due to migration from the East to the West after the Soviet Union collapsed.19
Although the United States is portrayed in media and culture as having an enormous sex trade and
being a popular destination country, the United States contains less than one percent of the
world’s sex trade. Therefore, the many other countries that contain the international human sex trade
must be scrutinized. Countries that have legalized prostitution, such as Italy, and countries with
recent, rapid economic growth, such as Thailand, have a much larger issue with trafficking than
the United States does.20 Fortunately, some of these well developed destination nations have the greatest legislative success against
trafficking, primarily because they have the financial resources to create effective legislation.21 These countries have the obligation
to construct effective laws because they have the means to do so.
1NC — ID
They can’t guarantee no deportation for victims — insufficient screening
procedures
Reilly 15 (Caroline, frontline reporter for sexual abuse, June 29, 2015, “Human Trafficking: A
Crime Hard to Track Proves Harder to Fight,” https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/whatis-human-trafficking-and-why-is-it-so-hard-to-combat/)
GAPS IN SCREENING Another challenge, say victims rights advocates ,
is a lack of sufficient screening procedures within
federal agencies to identify immigrants who have been trafficked. This gap, they say, can leave victims who would
be otherwise eligible for federal protections instead open to deportation. A 2014 study from the Urban Institute, for example, found instances
where human trafficking victims were placed into deportation proceedings, threatened by
immigration officials or arrested and then placed into a detention center for being unauthorized. Of
the victims in the study’s case data, 14 percent were jailed or put through the deportation process instead of being identified as someone who had been
illegally trafficked. There
are a number of agencies that can become involved in identifying victims and
prosecuting traffickers — including Homeland Security, Border Patrol and the Department of Justice — and this can
sometimes complicate the process. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE), a division of the Department of Homeland
Security has two departments that could potentially engage with human trafficking victims. The office of Enforcement and Removal Operations is
charged with apprehending and deporting illegal immigrants, while Homeland Security Investigations works to combat criminal organizations within the
immigrations system — including human traffickers. However according to an ICE spokeswoman, there
is no standard system in
place where the two offices communicate regarding the screening and identifying of human
trafficking cases. If Enforcement and Removal Operations encounters an obvious case of trafficking or a victim self-identifies, it is possible that
the departments would communicate, said the spokeswoman.
1NC — Modeling
Modeling fails- standardization forces criminalization, makes the
underground market worse
Seideman 15 (Christina Seideman is the Division Editor and a Humanities professor at
Pepperdine University. She also is a co-director at Seideman Labs at Harvard Medical School
which is a research base for a human molecular genetics program. “The Palermo Protocol: Why It
Has Been Ineffective in Reducing Human Sex Trafficking," Global Tides: Vol. 9, Article 5.
Pepperdine University, 2015,
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&ht
tpsredir=1&article=1152&context=globaltides)
Many NGOs have accused certain governments of focusing on prosecuting criminals
rather than trafficking itself
This incomplete prosecution results
in lighter punishments for the convict
such “easy prosecution” reduces trafficking risks and, therefore, might
increase the human sex trade.
If the anti-trafficking laws of a country make such
convictions a barrier to justice, then prosecutors must speak up
for trafficking-related offenses
, and contend that these governments do so because legislation for other crimes is firmer.
.46 Using alternative or additional crimes as a prosecution technique, due to the difficulties of convicting someone under hu man trafficking legislation, has not
improved the trafficking situation or increased protection.47 In fact,
Instead of merely prosecuting sex traffickers based on trafficking- related offenses, such as illegally smuggling foreigners into the country or abusing human rights of women in brothels or
prostitution houses, prosecutors should try to convict the perpetrators for the trafficking offenses themselves.
in order to influence legislative change. However, transit countries (states that are neither
destinations nor suppliers, but rather a human trafficking thru-way) should receive grace for convicting traffickers for trafficking-related crimes. Often, these governments have trouble sentencing traffickers because trafficking and exploitation have not yet taken place,
the Palermo Protocol is ineffective in reducing
global human sex trafficking due to disagreements on wording, inaccurate reporting, and the
UN’s inability to enforce compliance
Many countries have definitions differing
regarding victim consent, transport, and compensation.
most countries have developed
narrower definitions that instead reduce the number of trafficking convictions
so they can only convict the trafficker for applicable crimes, such as smuggling. CONCLUSION This paper has demonstrated that
from Protocol signatories.
Protocol
from the Palermo
However, all countries that have signed the Protocol are obligated to adopt the Article 3 human trafficking
definition, per Article 5. Even though some countries have adopted broader trafficking definitions than that of the Protocol, which allows for greater prosecution of traffickers,
. These countries are not sanctioned for lacking
Protocol-compliant definitions of human trafficking because cooperation is unenforceable. Additionally, many countries that do not have compliant definitions for human trafficking actually report full compliance to NGOs, IOs, and governments collecting data for
analysis. This may be due to financial or cultural pressures that motivate certain administrations to hide their lack of anti-trafficking legislation and exaggerate their number of trafficking- related convictions. It is worth noting that the regulation of the prostitution market
This international standard, although
understandable, hurts attempts to standardize global legislation against prostitution and
trafficking. In addition, some countries are worried that entirely criminalizing the sex industry,
including voluntary prostitution, would drive the market even further underground, making it
even harder to regulate and control
the Palermo Protocol has been unsuccessful in creating a unified, internationally-recognized
trafficking definition that is enforced by its signatories
In
order for these organizations to collect dependable statistics, countries that have signed the
Protocol are obligated to voice concern
and industry within a country is strongly connected to state sovereignty. Because of this, states can create their own criminal legislation.48
.49 Therefore, because prostitution-related legislation is in the control of individual states, no international body can force countries to criminalize prostitution. Clearly,
. Reliable data should be collected by IOs, NGOs, and governments to better fight the global human sex trade.
regarding the human trafficking definition so that improvements can increase the Protocol’s effectiveness. Furthermore, educating businesses and the public will
help people better identify trafficking victims and situations so they can actively participate in reducing the global sex trade. Additionally, countries should focus on legislation that both criminalizes prostitution to reduce the supply of sex industry participants, and
Ultimately, the enforcement of anti-trafficking legislation is crucial to
the reduction of the human sex trafficking market.
incriminates traffickers and clients to reduce the demand for such services.
1NC — Victim Coop
Victim-centered approaches are dependent on cooperation
1AC Shoaps 14 (Laura L. Shoaps, J.D. Candidate, 2014, Lewis & Clark Law School, B.A. in
Sociology and Political Science from the University of Michigan, “Comment: Room for
Improvement: Palermo Protocol and The Trafficking Victims Protection Act,” 17 Lewis & Clark
L. Rev. 931, Lexis Nexis, Language Modified*)
The Trafficking Protocol grew out of a criminal law framework rooted primarily in concern for combating transnational organized crime syndicates
rather than an independent assessment of what is needed to prevent human trafficking. As a result, the international community not only developed a
narrow response focused primarily on criminal law measures, but its anchoring of antitrafficking law in criminal law concepts subsequently served to
marginalize other vital perspectives.137 While the Protocol may be supplemented by international human rights instruments on an international
level, this does not permeate the Protocol's effect on national implementation. "The Protocol, and the domestic legislation it has engendered, have
moved the antitrafficking agenda firmly into the sphere of criminal law enforcement [,]" 138 and consequently the protection of victims has taken the
back burner to law enforcement priorities. The Protocol's imbalance is mirrored by the United States' approach of addressing human trafficking.
The United States
signed the Palermo Protocol on December 13, 2000 and ratified it o n November 3, 2005. 13 9 The drafters of the Palermo Protocol acknowledged that prior to its creation there was "no un iversal ins trument that addressed all aspects of traffickin g in person s … [and] in the absence of such an instrument, pers ons who are vulnerable to traffic king w ill not be s ufficiently protected." 140 T he Palermo Protocol was intended to fill th is in ternational vo id by facilitatin g a comprehensive approach to combatting human traffickin g. 141 Wh ile the TVPA was enacted one month before the Palermo Protocol became open for signature, 142 they share the similar flaw of prioritizing prosecution over prote cting v ictims and preventin g trafficking. The Protocol's wea k provisions relating to the protection of victims and prevention of trafficking required the United States to ta ke no further steps to create a more balanced approach in addressing trafficking. T he Protocol ultimately falls short of its in tent to "sufficiently protect" victims, because it fails to require nation states to prior itize the
welfare of the victim above the prosecution of the trafficker. The drafting of the TVPA was partially instigated by the U.S. go vernment's inadequate and belated handling of landmark cases that [*95 3] drew the United States' attention to the problem of labor trafficking. 1 43 In Sep tember of 1995, police con ducted a raid in a garment factory in El Mon te, Californ ia where they discovered "seventy -two Thai nationals wor king in slave-like cond itio ns," w ho had been trafficked into the United States to wor k 18 hours per day , seven day s a week for less than $ 0.6 0 an hour, restrained by threats and vio lence. 144 T wo y ears later the New York City Police Department discovered 62 deaf-mute Mexican immigrants who were trafficked into the Un ited States and were forced to beg in the s treets for 18 hours per day , seven day s a week. When they failed to meet their $ 600 per week qu ota they were subject to phy sical beatings, electrocutio n, mental abuse, and molestatio n. 145 A nother case arose in 1996, when Miguel Flores' labor camps in Florida, Georgia, and Sou th Carolina
were discovered after the camps had been operating for y ears, where Flores had enslaved between 400 and 500 people. 146 T his had firs t become apparent in 1992, when members of the NGO, Coalition of Immokalee Workers (CIW), were approached by six laborers who informed CIW that they had not b een paid for their work at the camp and that their bo ss sho t a wor ker. 147 The Department of Justice delay ed taking actio n until 199 6 when an ind ictment was brough t in U. S. District Court again st M iguel Flores, h is partner Sebastian Gomez, and two of their recruiters, all of whom enter ed a guilty plea the next y ear. 148 The delay in prosecution indicated that "the go vernment simply wasn't prepared for modern slave ry , and the result was hesitation, confus ion, lack of interest, and cons tant misunderstan dings on the go vernment's part in pursuin g it, as we ll as the inordinately long time it too k to bring the traffickers to justice." 149 These cases, and others like them , magnified the "general concern that available criminal punishments wo uld n ot be severe enough to f it
the crime." 150 This realization was "in strumental in br ingin g about the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act in 2 000, with its sets of definitions, charges, and penalties for dealing specifically with cases of sex and labor slavery in the United States." 15 1 [*954] The TVPA's statement of purp ose is "to combat traffickin g in person s, a contemporary manifestation of slavery whose victims are predominantly women and children, to ensure just and effective punishment of traffickers, and to protect their v ictims." 152 Implementation of the TVPA mirrors the Palermo Protocol's imbalanced focus on prosecution over victim protection. Yet despite the focus on prosecution, fewer than 1% of traffickers within the U.S. have ever seen a courtroom. 153 This priority imbalance is most exemplified by the provision wh ich allows for the "assets seized from convicted traffickers [to] go into law enforcement's budget, not into helpin g the s laves rebuild their lives. " 154 A t a Con gressional hearing held a y ear after the drafting of the TVPA, Rep. Chris Smith who
introduced the bill s tated that its "essential principle" was to ensure that: Cr iminals who knowing ly operate enterprises that profit from sex acts invo lving persons who have been brought across international b oundaries for such purp oses by force, fraud or coercion, or who force human beings into slavery should receive punishment commensurate with the penalt ies for kidnapp ing and forcible rape [sexual assault]. T his wo uld no t only be a just punishment, but also … a powerful deterrent. 15 5 Rep. Smith then poin ted out that the "log ical corollary to this pr inciple is that we need to treat victims of these terrib le crimes as victims who desperately need our help and our protection. " 156 Cons truing v ictim protection as supp lemental to the prosecution of traffickers rather than as a principle in its ow n right indicates the TVPA's imbalance as mirrored in the Palermo Protocol. Despite the prioritization of pro secution ev ident in b oth legal ins truments, the rhetorical focus of the anti-trafficking movement was still "on the three Ps: protectio n, prosecutio n, prevention ." 157 The
even if the state does not go
through with prosecution, the victim's ability to receive benefits is contingent upon law enforcement recognizing them as victims. Even with victims
that escape on their own, approaching law enforcement to receive certification is understandably intimidating. The Polaris Project has supplemented
the provisions within the Department of Justice Model Law to bring more attention to meeting the needs of the victims. 160 Some programs have been
created that create new points of entry for victims who are hesitant to approach law enforcement but still need to rebuild their lives. 161 Organizations
like Polaris are crucial to the development of legislation that meets the needs of the victims, especially since the current laws in place are not doing
enough to secure the rights of the victims, aside from facilitating prosecution of traffickers. In order to encourage victims to assist law enforcement, the
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act created the nonimmigrant visa categories for internationally trafficked victims, the T visa and the
U visa. 162 The purposes of these visas was to "strengthen the ability of law enforcement agencies to detect, investigate, and prosecute cases of domestic
violence, sexual assault, [and] trafficking of aliens … while [*956] offering protection to victims." 163 These visas were designed to serve
prosecutorial interests by "encouraging law enforcement officials to better serve immigrant crime victims and to prosecute crimes committed
against aliens."
United States ind icates its focus on prosecution thro ugh its enaction of the TVPA, and encourages this approach to be implemented on a state level as well. T he Department of Justice created a Model State An ti-Traffickin g law that specifically states, "prov ision of such services [*955] s hall no t be contingent on the trafficked person's immigration s tatus or on the prosecution of the traffic king victim's trafficker." 15 8 However, the State Model Law requires: Certification of Elig ibility for Trafficked Persons [to occur w]ithin 96 hour s of a state or local official hav ing iden tified the presence of a trafficked perso n … [and then the official w ill] issue a letter of certification of eligib ility or other relevant document entitling the traffic ked person to have access to [State] Crime Victim Compensa tion funds and other state benefits and services. 159 T herefore,
164 The T visa is specifically designed for victims of traffickin g, whereas the U visa is available for victims of certain crimes. 165 The Immigration and Natio nality Act (INA) was amended to recognize victims falling in to these tw o categories as nonimmigrants. 16 6 The requirements for eligibility under T visas and U visas are different, although bo th can be issued to trafficking v ictims. In creating the T v isa, the INA s tates that an alien is eligible to apply for the T visa if four criteria are met. First, the Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney Ge neral determines he or she is or has "been a victim of a severe form of trafficking in perso ns, as defined in [the TVPA]." 167 Second, the indiv idual must also be "p hy sically present" in the Un ited States "o n account of such traffic king. " 168 T hird, the s tatute requires victims (un less under the age of 18) to have "complied with any reasonable request for assistance in the Federal, State, or local investigation or
prosecution of acts of traffic king or the inves tigatio n of crime where acts of trafficking are at least one central reason for the commission of that crime." 169 Las t, eligibility requires a showing that the traffic king v ictim "wou ld suffer extreme hardship involving u nusual and severe harm upon removal." 170 While there are broad waivers available to trafficking victims who may be inadmissible to the United States based on o ther immigration inadmiss ibility grounds, if the ind ivid ual is a traffic ker themselves they are ineligible for a T visa. 171 Women frequently play a prominent role in human tra fficking, and "female victims may evolve into traffickers as a way to escape future exploitation. Given the importance for traffickers to gain a victim's trust, [*957] women, particularly when recruiting po tential sex traffickin g victims, may at times be m ore effective than men." 172 Althou gh the indiv idual is still a v ictim of trafficking, th is could pose an ob stacle to receiving T v isas, as he or she may still be cons trued in the ey es of law enforcement as being a trafficker him or
herself. Accordingly , this presents a s ituation where the U visa could be a more appropriate solution . The T visas, while they have more benefits, are also more politically infused and are therefore more difficult to ob tain. The U v isa is availab le to no n-citizens meeting a number of criteria, including a s howing that the Secretary of Homeland Security has determined that the indiv idual has "suffered substa ntial phy sical or mental abuse as a result of havin g been a victim of [certain] criminal activity " which vio lated United States law or occurred in the United States. 173 The v ictim's eligibility to receive a U visa also requires that he or she p ossesses inf ormation concerning the criminal activity and "has been helpful, is being helpful, or is likely to be helpful" to law enforcement officials, local prosecutors, or local authorities in vestigating or pro secuting the criminal activity . 174 In addition, victims must submit a "U Nonimmigrant Statu s Certification" signed by a certified official, statin g that the applicant ass isted w ith the criminal investigation. 175 U v isas grant v ictims
By anchoring human trafficking in a criminal law
framework, victims' ability to receive protection is more or less contingent upon their
cooperation with law enforcement. The funding available to victims is allocated through the
Department of Justice, which "narrowly defines the type of victim on whom this funding may
be used [as] one certified by law enforcement." 178 Victims' ability to access services are
highly contingent upon their cooperation with law enforcement, as most non-governmental organizations rely
four y ears of non-immigrant status, and ty pically after three years they are able to apply for residence in the United States, as lo ng as their original certifier shows that they have not refused to cooperate with law enforcement throughout the past three y ears. 176 Derivative protection is also availab le with U visas, which allows v ictims to app ly for their parents and underage siblin gs to come to the United States. 177
on federal grants for their funding, and are then left [*958] unable to help victims who are not certified.
179 When victims are eligible to apply for either a T or U visa, the T v isa is preferable because the individual then q ualifies for social benefits. 180 Bo th T and U v isas grant the v ictim work au thorization. 181 The v isa statu s under a T or U visa is us ually limited to fo ur y ears unless the indiv idual has sough t to adjust h is or her status to a
legal permanent resident and the adjustment is pendin g. 182 However, even fewer victims receive benefits through the nonimmigrant visas because the visas are vastly underutilized. T he number of visas available to victims is capped, with 5 ,000 T v isas and 10 ,000 U v isas available per y ear. 183 Despite th e overwhelming number of victim s trafficked in the United States, in 200 9 there were only 222 applicants for the T v isa, and 186 of these were approved. 184 Over the past seven y ears, there have not even been 5,000 applicants for the T visa. 185 Th is is tho ught partially to be due to the evidentiary burden associated with the T visa; if victims d o not have certification from law enforcement it is much more difficult for them to acquire documents to pro ve that they meet the criteria necessary for eligibility . 186 While law enforcement certification is n ot mandatory , it vastly improves the likeliho od that a v ictim will be elig ible for a T visa. 187 The TVPA has been r eauthorized throug hout the y ears, 188 and the reauthorizations have gradually improved conditions for
victims of trafficking. For example, the 2008 reauthorizatio n eliminated the requirement that v ictims comply with law enforcement's reasonable request for cooperation in order to be eligible for a T visa, by stating that requests from law enforcement would be "unreasonable" if "a traffickin g victim, due to psy chological or phy sical trauma, is unable to cooperate with [* 959] a request for assis tance." 189 Other advancements have been made which serve both prosecutorial and victim protection interests, including the creation of a private right of action for victims to commence civil charges against their traffickers. 19 0 Alth ough these advancements reduce obsta cles to victim protection, "these changes do not, h owever, alter the fundamental balance of the law, which still prioritizes prosecution over victim protection." 191 At the time of th is orig inal writing, the TVPA had not been reauthorized since 2008 , and expired at the end of 201 1. 192 On March 7, 2013, President Obama signed the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauth orization Act, empowering anti-trafficking
as we recommit ourselves to end modern slavery, we should take a moment to reflect on how far we have come, here in our country and
around the world, but how much farther we still have to go to find a way to free those 27 million victims and to ensure that there are no longer any
victims in the future. Hillary Clinton (U.S. Secretary of State) 194 While the TVPA is by no means a flawless mechanism for handling the problem of
human trafficking, its sanctions regime has the potential to encourage nation states throughout the world to enact their own domestic laws addressing
human trafficking. 195 The sanctions regime was [*960] built into the TVPA based on the United States' policy to refuse to provide non-humanitarian,
nontrade-related foreign assistance to any government that "does not comply with minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking" and "is not
making significant efforts to bring itself into compliance with such standards." 196 Based on the level of compliance with the "minimum standards,"
nations throughout the world are ranked on various "tiers," and nations on the third tier may face economic sanctions. 197 The Trafficking in Persons
(TIP) Report, and the extraterritorial fiscal consequences that flow from its categorization, has been interpreted as providing the "teeth" that the Protocol
lacks. 198 The "minimum standards" for eliminating trafficking that are taken into account when making a tier designation include: The government of
the country should prohibit severe forms of trafficking in persons and punish acts of such trafficking. For the knowing commission of any act of sex
trafficking involving force, fraud, coercion, or in which the victim of sex trafficking is a child incapable of giving meaningful consent, or of trafficking
which includes rape [sexual assault] or kidnapping or which causes a death, the government of the country should prescribe punishment commensurate
with that for grave crimes, such as forcible sexual assault. For the knowing commission of any act of a severe form of trafficking in persons, the
government of the country should prescribe punishment that is sufficiently stringent to deter and that adequately reflects the heinous nature of the offense.
The government of the country should make serious and sustained efforts to eliminate severe forms of trafficking in persons. 199 While some argue that
the use of unilateral sanctions is problematic because it "undermines multilateral definition and enforcement of international human rights law," 200 the
Palermo Protocol has not framed the issue of human trafficking as one governed by human rights law. Rather, human trafficking is internationally
addressed (for better or worse) within a law enforcement framework. What becomes problematic is the perpetuation of problems within the United
States' framework applied on a global scale. Here, the minimum standards stress the need to address sex trafficking but do not specifically mention
different forms of trafficking. By taking on a leadership role, the United States assumes additional responsibility to ensure that its own legislation is
effective in addressing the broad scope of trafficking, before holding other nations accountable to its standards.
programs for the next four y ears. 193 IV. Global Leadership So,
[*961] The Office to Mon itor and Combat Traffickin g in Persons (OM CTP) is respon sible for making the determination of nation s' levels of compliance with these minimum standards. 201 Pursuant to the TVPA, the OMCTP cons iders the following factors in making such
a determination: "whether the go vernment of the country vigorously investigates and prosecutes acts of severe forms of trafficking," 20 2 "protects victims of severe forms of trafficking in persons and encourages their assis tance in the inves tigation and prosecution of such trafficking ," prov ides legal alternatives to removing v ictims to coun tries where they would face retribution, and ensures v ictims are not inappropr iately incarcerated or penalized. 203 Ad ditionally , whether the government "cooperates with other governments in the in vestigation and prosecution of severe forms of trafficking, " 204 includ ing p ublic officials who participate in or facilitate trafficking, 205 is taken into account. The OMCTP further considers whether the government extradites peop le charged with acts of severe forms of trafficking on subs tantially the same terms as those charged with other seriou s crimes. 206 The OM CTP also factors in whether the government "monitors immigration and emigration patterns for evidence of severe forms of trafficking in persons and w hether law
enforcement agencies of the country respond to any such evidence" in a way that is "consistent w ith the vigorou s inves tigation and prosecution of acts of such traffickin g, as well as w ith the protection of h uman rights of v ictims and the internationally recognized human right to leave any country , including one's own, and to return to one's own country ." 207 Finally , the OM CTP loo ks to whether the g overnment "has adopted measures to prevent severe forms of trafficking in persons, such as measures to inform and educate the public, includin g potential victims, about the causes and consequences of severe forms of trafficking in persons." 208 Once these factors have been taken into account, the OM CTP publishes an annual Trafficking in Persons Report, rating each natio n's level of compliance with the standards, and economically sanctionin g noncompliant nation s accordingly . 209 The Repor t places nation s among four tiers. 210 T ier 1 indicates that the country 's government fully complies with the TVPA minimum standards. 2 11 Acquirin g a Tier 1 ranking d oes
[*962] not indicate that the country has eliminated the problem of human trafficking with in its borders, bu t rather that the coun try has continued demonstrating progress toward combating human trafficking. 212 Tier 2 indicates that the country 's government does not fully comply w ith the minimum standards, but is making "sign ificant efforts" to comply with the standards. 213 The "Tier 2 Watch List" appl ies to a country where the government does not fully comply with the minimum standards, but is making "s ignif icant efforts" to comply , and the absolute number of victims of severe forms of trafficking is very significant or is significantly increasing[,] … there is a failure to provide evidence of increasing efforts to combat severe forms of trafficking in persons from the previou s y ea r[,, or] … the determination that a country is makin g sig nificant efforts to br ing itself in to compliance with minimum standa rds was based on commitments by the country to take additional s teps over the next y ear. 214 Finally , Tier 3 applies to countr ies whose governments do not fully
comply with the minimum standards and are not making "significant efforts" to comply . 215 Co nsequently , natio ns that fall under the th ird tier may be subject to economic sanctions whereby they would not receive non-humanitarian and nontrade-related aid from the United States. 216 In addition to with h olding aid from the United States, "the U.S. President reserves the authority to d irect the heads of internatio nal financial in stitutions such as the World Ban k [and International Monetary Fund] to deny nonhumanitarian, non-trade-related and non-human rights-related assistance to T ier 3 countries. " 217 T ier 3 countries also are forbidden from receiving funding for government employ ees' participation in educatio n and cultural exchange programs. 218 The TVPA allo ws for a "waiver of sanction s if necessary to avoid sign ificant adverse effects on vulnerable populations, including women and children." 219 In past y ears, some have argued that the discretion ass ociated with sanction s has resulted in po litically -infused len ience toward Tier 3 nations. 220 Between 2003
and 2009, 45 cou ntries were categorized as Tier [*963] 3 nations, and 12 were subject to sanction s. 221 E ight of these natio ns were already subject to U.S. sanctions, s o the TVPA sanctio ns had little to no monetary effect. 222 Nineteen natio ns to o k sufficient steps followin g their designation as Tier 3 to av oid sanctio ns. 223 The remaining 14 countries received U. S. waivers of sanction s on the basis of U. S. national interests. 22 4 More recently in 2011, U. S. Chairman to the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health and Human Rights, Rep. Chris Smith, expressed concern that President O bama determined 12 nations sh ould remain for an additio nal y ear on the Tier 2 Watch List. 225 Through its reauthorization of the TVPA in 2008, Congress added a requirement to the Tier ranking sy stem that the President either downgrade or upgrade any country that has been on the Tier 2 Watch List for tw o consecutive y ears, and that if it has been on the Tier 2 Watch List for two consecutive y ears without improvement, it will automatically be downgraded to Tier 3. 226 In practice,
some countries, such as China and Russia, have been on the Tier 2 Watch Lis t for seven or eight y ears, respectively . 227 In the 2011 Report, Smith no ted that of the 23 countries on Tier 3, o nly three countries received the full sanction s. 228 Seven countr ies received partial sanctions and 13 countries faced no traffickin g sanction s. 229 Smith stated that: [While s]ome may argue that being on T ier III is punishment enou gh, … Congress env isio ned tangib le repercussions for countries on Tier III. Those who wor k o n the front lines of human [*964] trafficking know all too well that a law is useless and diminished at the very least, unless fa ithfully implemented. 230 The long-term effectiveness of unilateral sanctions as an enforcement mechanism has been debated, and Janie Chuang draws upon previous reports to concoct her framework for workability when unilateral sanctions are most effective. 231 Chuang argu es that sanction s regimes have the potential to "con tribu te to in ternational anti-traffickin g norm development and internalization" if the follow ing criteria are
met: (1) the sanctions imposed should "promote righ ts that are mutually binding on both the United States and the target state;" (2) "the United States s hould loo k to in ternational s tandards in app ly ing its dom estic sanction laws;" (3) "the documentatio n and condemnation of v iolations sh ould be as evenhanded as possib le;" (4) "the sa nctio ns regime should be structured to permit and encourage broad participation of a variety of transnational actors" (includin g but not limited to nongovernmental organizatio ns, private enterprises, and intergovernmental organization s). 232 Chuang s tresse s that the effectiveness of unilateral sanction s ultimately turns on "whether the decision to is sue sanction s is based on clearly defined and consistently applied pr inciples, rather than p olitical calculation. " 233 T he TIP Report has been criticized for deviatin g from the Palermo Protocol's stance on prostitution in relation to sex traffickin g, thu s hold ing nations accountable to the Un ited States' own definition of trafficking , rather than the in ternational s tandard for trafficking. 234 In defin ing
"exploitation " the United States inclu des "commercial sexual exploitatio n," wh ich was purposefully left out of the Palermo Protocol so that the trafficking definition cou ld be applied more universally without hinging upo n how s tate parties addressed prostitution d omestically . 235 Regardless of s pecific definition s, the TIP Report plugged a gap in enforcement that the Palermo Protocol was not cut out to fill. Lac king a monitoring bo dy , the Palermo Protocol's capability to ensure compliance was inherently limited. In recent y ears, the TIP Reports have sought to compensate for international error by focusing more on protection. 23 6 [*965] The TIP Reports have also righ tfully included the United States w ithin the ambit of coun tries analy zed regarding compliance with the TVPA. 237
leader in the fight against human trafficking has continued and strengthened
The United States' role as a global
throu ghout the Obama administration, most recently manifested at the Clinto n Global Initiative in September of 2012. 238 In add ition to rhetorical commitments to the fight against h uman trafficking at both the Clinto n Global In itiative and before the General Assembly , 239 President Obama also released an Executive Order Strengthening the Protections Against Trafficking of Persons in Federal Contracts. 240 President Obama discussed the initiation of multiple programs that are designed to create a more compre hensive
approach in addressing human trafficking is sues. 24 1 The Executive Order is a measure that issues sanctions to employ ers who are engaging in trafficking in their su pply chain. 242 Specifically , the Executive Order prohibits contractors and s ubcontrac tors from engaging in specific trafficking-related activ ities, applies new compliance measures for contracts requiring wor k performed abroad that exceeds $ 500,000, calls for train ing to improve agencies' abilities to identify trafficking, and identifies indus tries that have a history of trafficking and calls for the adop tion of safeguards in tho se areas. 243 The Executive Order acc omplishes these tas ks by amending the Federal Acquisition Regu lation (FA R), which is a set of regulation s is sued by federal agencies that governs the "acquisition process" of go vernment contracting. 244 While the amendments to the FAR d o not directly affect private companies, the amendments affect the contractors and subcontractors the government chooses to engage with, wh ich could include private actors. 2 45 While the Executive Order
regulates United States government actors, its sanctio ns have both domestic and in ternational [*96 6] consequences, as it app lies to con tractors and subcon tractors existing outside the Un ited States. The s pecific sanction at issue here is contract termination, w hich is held to the standard set forth by the Traffickin g Victims Pr otection Reauthorizatio n Act of 200 3 (TVPRA). 246 The E xecutive Order makes reference to "activities that w ould justify termination under section 106(g) of the TVPA" 247 as the threshold for behavior warranting sanctions. Section 1 06(g) was added by the TVP RA of 2003, an d address es the "termination of certain grants, contracts, and cooperative agreements." 248 It estab lishes that: The President shall ensure that any grant, contract, or cooperative agreement provided or entered into by a Federal department or agency under which funds … are to be provided to a private entity , in who le or in part, shall include a condition that auth or izes the department or agency to terminate the grant, contract or cooperative agreement, without penalty , if the
grantee or any subgrantee, or the contractor or any subcontractor (i) engages in severe forms of trafficking in persons or has procured a commercial sex act during the period of time that the grant, contract or cooperative agreement is in effect, or (ii) uses forced labor in the performance of the grant, contract, or cooperative agreement. 249 The Executive Order essentially enforces this section of the TVP RA by amending the FAR. Specifically , the Executive Order requires contracting officers to notify officials if they be come aware of "activities that would justify termination under § 106(g)" or under "any other applicable law or regulation estab lish ing restrictions o n trafficking in persons," an d then requires the agency responsible to "cons ider whether suspension or debarment is necessary in order to protect the Government's interest." 25 0 While the latter portio n of the Executive Order introduces an element of discretion, the required no tice of traffickin g activity holds po tential for progress by bring ing the problem of trafficking to light. O ther sections of the Executive
Order require that an awareness program is created to inform employ ees about the policy of ensuring that employ ees themselves do not engage in trafficking of persons or related activities, an d establish actions to allow employ ees to report instances of trafficking related activity . 251 T he reporting process is also anchored to the TVPRA § 106(g) language, and allows employ ees to report, without retaliation, actions that would jus tify termination under that prov isio n, in [*9 67] addition to violations of "any other applicable law or regulation establishing restr ictions on traffic king in persons. " 252 The Executive Order seeks not only to establish reportin g procedures but als o monitorin g procedures. These a re designed to "prevent subcontractors at any tier from engaging in traffic king … and to mon itor, detect, and terminate any subcontractors or subcontractor employ ees that have engaged in such activities." 253 Th e Executive Order requires that by September of 2013 the President's Interagency Task Force to Mon itor and Combat Trafficking in Persons s hall "join tly
establish a process for evaluatin g and identify ing, for Federal contracts and subcon tracts performed substantially with in the Un ited States, whether there are industries or sectors with a history (or where there is current evidence) of trafficking related or forced labor ac tivities described" in § 106(g) and that "safeguards, guidance and compliance assistance" will be adopted in these areas. 254 The Executive Order also establishes train ing of federal employ ees and the inclusion of internal controls and oversigh t procedures to "investigate, manage, and mitigate" trafficking violatio ns in these contracts. 255 The Order effectively seeks to bring situatio ns of trafficking to lig ht throughou t the su pply chain where the United States federal government is invo lved, and estab lishes procedures for safeguards to protect particu larly vulnerable sectors. The safeguards implemented are designed to "increase stability , productivity , and certainty in Federal contracting" 256 and ho ld the po tential for long term efficiency in addition to protecting h uman dignity . The poten tially problematic
distinction between traffic king-related activities and forced labor appears in the Executive Order. By mentioning forced labor in the discuss ion of po licy , the Executive Order defines traffickin g as "sex traffickin g … or the recruitment, harboring, transportation, prov ision, or obtain ing of a person for labor o r services, through the u se of force, fraud, or coercion, for the purpose of subjection to inv olun tary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery ." 257 The repetition of "traffickin g-related activities and forced labor" through out the Executive Order is po tentially problematic because it theoretically frame s labor trafficking as separate from "human trafficking" which has been predominately thought of as sex traffickin g. However, the inclu sion of forced labor in addition to trafficking-related activities cou ld cons titu te an attempt by President Obama to include a broader range of activity that might have diff iculty meeting the Executive [*968] Order's standard of "su bjection to in volun tary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery ." 258 Th is Executive Order became
effective on September 25, 2012, 259 and represents the most recent form of sanctions associated with human trafficking. While there are som e inherent differences between the Executive Order and the TIP Reports - mainly that the TIP Reports involve d irect funding to nation state go vernments, and the E xecutive Order represents funding toward contractors and s ubcontractors benefitting the econom ies both of the Un ited States and o ther nation s tates - the un ilateral sanctions analy sis is compellin g in b oth cases. The United States' termination of its contracts for human traffickin g essentially forgoes funding into nations through economic channels ou tside of d irect foreign aid. Creating awareness of trafficking exis ting both in the labor supp ly chain and by employ ees who are engaging in trafficking-related activity is essential to find ing an effective way to curb trafficking. While Chuang's four-pronged framework is designed to assess the efficacy of unilateral sanctions again st nation state g overnments, 260 the merits of the prongs are useful to ols of analy sis to
The United States is the "largest
single purchaser of goods and services in the world" 262 and appears to be harnessing its potential to influence actors within the economic market to
make socially responsible decisions.
determine the potential efficacy of the Executive Order. Contractors and subcontractors are not subjects of in ternational law, 2 61 and consequently the commitments required of nation states are distinct from commitments required of employers. As the TIP Report serves as a diplomatic to ol to mon itor nation states' compliance with U. S. human trafficking legislatio n, the Executive Order serves as a self-check to eradicate human trafficking from federal contracts. The Executive Order has the consequence of holding contractors a nd subcontractors bo th within and outs ide of the United States accountable to the domestic standards set forth by the United States. The termination of contracts has the sanction effect of eliminating Un ited States funding on the project that the contractor or subcontractor was orig inally hired to perform.
First, the Executive Order applies to su bcontractors and contractors both w ith in and ou tside of the United States, and in th is respect hold s a mutual obligatio n upon both companies within the United States an d companies operating ou tside of the United States. The Executive Order varies from the TIP Reports in the sense that the crux of the o bligation is on the Un ited States federal government to ensure that the appropriate agencie s act in compliance with the Executive Order to impose sanctio ns [*969] when traffickin g problems become exposed. The Executive Order is structured in such a way that the sanction s (terminating of the contract) are imposed to "promote righ ts that are mutua lly bind ing," 263 on both the United States and foreign contractors and subco ntractors. 264 Second, the rig hts laid ou t
in the Executive Order address in ternational s tandards encapsulated within the Palermo Protocol. The Protocol requires that States Parties take actio ns to "adopt or strengthen legislative or other measures … includ ing thro ugh bilateral and multilateral cooperation, to discourage the demand that fosters all fo rms of exploitation of persons … that leads to trafficking. " 265 By creating measures to help monitor that the United States go vernment is not con tributing to the demand for labor traffickin g in the supp ly chain, the United States is moving toward its commitment to this section of the Palermo Protocol. While the effect that the Executive Order has on other nations is ind irect, it presents a modified multilateral approach, because the consequences affect compa nies that contribute to the economies of other nation s tates. Chuang's third prong of effectiveness for unilateral sanctions is that "the documentation and condemnation of vio lations shou ld be as even-handed as poss ible." 266 The extent of this effect has y et to be seen, as the consequences of the Executive Order
are still in their infancy . The fourth and final prong states tha t "the sanctions regime shou ld be structured to permit and encourage broad participation of a variety of transnational actors, includ ing, among others, nongo vernmental organizatio ns, private enterprises, and intergovernmental organization s." 2 67 In regulating the Un ited States' federal agency response to human trafficking alon g the su pply chain, the Executive Order ind irectly engages private enterprises. Apply ing Ch uang's framework to the Executive Order, it appears that these un ilateral sanction s of contractors and subcon tractors hold the poten tial to be effective in the fight against h uman trafficking. In combination with the TIP Repor ts, the Un ited States is usin g its international clou t to h old nations and employ ers within nation s accountable to anti-human trafficking standards. In addition to these instruments, President O bama has called for human trafficking training and guidance for federal prosecutors, law enforcement officials, immigration judges, and other professionals so that they may be "better
equipped to detect traffic king w herever it exists, and to help en sure that victims are alway s treated as victims and not [*9 70] criminals." 26 8 The inclu sion of these measures to help with the iden tification of victims is an important s tep toward securing and pr ioritizing their pro tection. President Obama has also called for increased resources for victims of human trafficking, and the development of the "f irst-ever federal strategic action plan" to strengthen services for victims. 269 T he Obama Administration has s ought to "augment the wor k of bus iness, no n-profits, educational in stitutio ns and foun dations to co mbat trafficking," 270 and this comprehensive approach is necessary to glean a more in-depth understanding of the problem and, from there, how it can be alleviated. V. Conclu sion Before the adoptio n of the [Palermo] Protocol more than ten years ago, several countries did not have any legislation addressing traffickin g in person s … . T he situation has changed dramatically over the last ten y ears. 2012 UNODC Re port 27 1 The international community has come
a long way since the adoption of the Palermo Protocol and the TVPA in 2000. There is no do ubt that these in struments have increased awareness surrounding the prob lem of human trafficking and have g iven the in te rnational community standards by which nation s may more effectively address this crime. Although the Palermo Protocol is rooted in the criminal law framework and prioritizes prosecution abo ve attentio n to v ictims' human rights, it has resulted in the imple mentation of mechanisms that hold perpetrators accountable for their actions. T he Palermo Protocol has [*971] encouraged global criminalization of trafficking, wh ich sends a message to the international community that trafficking v iolates h uman rights and will n ot be to lerated. Our globalized world is increasingly focused on human rights, and bringing attention to the problem of trafficking and prov idin g guidelines for addressing it increases the likelihood that victims' needs will be met. Despite this move ment forward, there is subs tantial room for improvement in both the Palermo Protocol and the
where the victim is properly identified, his
or her human rights remain more or less contingent upon their willingness to cooperate with law enforcement. Due to the Palermo Protocol's lack of a
TVPA. While both instruments address pro secution of traffickers and protectio n of victims, they are similarly constrained within the "perfect victim" model and con sequently fail to accord human rights to a subs tantial number of victims that fall o uts ide the scope of the model. The v indic atio n of human rig hts depends u pon being recognized as a victim, and the slan ted perspective applied to victim identificatio n has prevented a grave number of victims from escaping their traffickers, let alone atta ining justice. The human rights pro tections that the Palermo Protocol and the TVPA do afford to victims are undercut by this restricted construction of victim identity , which not o nly hinders victims' ability to be protected but also misallocates resources. In cases
proper enforcement mechanism, the TVPA has become a standard by which the United States holds other nations fiscally accountable for their
actions. While the TVPA attempts to supplement the Palermo Protocol's lack of enforcement, the identification and imbalanced priorities present
within the TVPA perpetuate the same problems existent within the Palermo Protocol. The United States envisions itself as a global leader in the fight
against human trafficking, 272 and yet does not take on this leadership role in a way to resolve many of the identification and prioritization flaws
within the Palermo Protocol, but rather fiscally enforces this flawed approach both nationally and on a global scale. While the TVPA may provide
human trafficking standards with the "teeth" that the Protocol lacks, it is important that the standards the international community is being held to
are those that encourage comprehensive solutions. Ultimately, the Palermo Protocol and the TVPA do not live up to their alleged victim-centered
approach. With new initiatives coming forward, the strengthening of measures to properly identify victims, and then prioritize their protection is
essential. In terms of identifying victims, the focus on protecting one category of victims cannot be done at the expense of another. The imbalance and
identification concerns [*972] present within the Palermo Protocol cannot continue to be perpetuated on the international and national levels if progress is
going to be made in eradicating human trafficking. As the United States and the global community move forward in efforts to combat human trafficking
it is important to acknowledge and address these deficiencies within the Palermo Protocol. The 2012 Report focused on analyzing current flows of
trafficking, 273 which is a positive step toward understanding the gravity of human trafficking and identity of victims. President Obama's speech and
Executive Order drew attention to the problem of trafficking, particularly the coexistence of internationally trafficked victims and domestically trafficked
victims within the United States. 274 Continued collaboration among and within nation states is essential to closing the identification awareness gap and
acknowledging various types of victims. Effective implementation must deviate from the prosecutorial framework within which the issue of
trafficking is situated, hold nations accountable, and create a more multi-faceted and victim-centered approach that truly protects all victims,
regardless of gender and birthplace.
Victims won’t cooperate with law enforcement — fear, distrust, cultural
differences, and protection of traffickers
DHHS No Date (Department of Health and Human Service, “Resources: The Mindset of a
Human Trafficking Victim,”
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/orr/understanding_the_mindset_of_a_trafficking_victi
m_1.pdf, National Human Trafficking Resource Center, Accessed 7-1-18, NC)
The following points illustrate how victims of trafficking may see themselves and their situations.
It highlights the challenges that you may face as a law enforcement officer when interacting with
potential victims. • Victims are taught by their traffickers to distrust outsiders, especially law
enforcement. They have a sense of fear and/or distrust toward the government and police
because they are afraid they will be deported. Sometimes they feel that it is their fault that they
are in this situation. As a coping or survival skill, they may develop loyalties and positive
feelings toward their trafficker or may even try to protect them from authorities. • Victims of
human trafficking are hesitant to come forward because of their fear of being deported. While
many of these victims are women and children who have been beaten and/or rape [sexual
assault]d, their current situation may still be better than where they came from. • Victims come
from different social and ethnic backgrounds than the investigating officers. There may be
significant cultural differences between the victim and U.S. law enforcement officials. • Victims
may be completely unaware of their rights or may have been intentionally misinformed about
their rights in this country. • Many victims do not self-identify as victims. They also do not see
themselves as people who are homeless or as drug addicts who rely on shelters or assistance.
Victims may not appear to need social services because they have a place to live, food to eat,
medical care and what they think is a paying job. • The victims may fear not only for their own
safety but also for that of their families in their home countries. Some traffickers threaten that
they will harm their victims’ families if the victims report their situation to, or cooperate with,
law enforcement. • Criminal prosecution should empower the victims and should facilitate their
healing process so that they see the crimes committed against them condemned and the people
who harmed them punished.
Download
Related flashcards
Create Flashcards