University of Pennsylvania Law School
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship
Summer 2001
Reframing Impunity: Applying Liberal
International Law Theory to an Analysis of
Amnesty Legislation
William W. Burke-White
Univ of Penn Law School, wburkewh@law.upenn.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship
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Social Change Commons
Recommended Citation
Burke-White, William W., "Reframing Impunity: Applying Liberal International Law Theory to an Analysis of Amnesty Legislation"
(2001). Faculty Scholarship. Paper 882.
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/882
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VOLUME
4 2 , NUMBER 2, SUJ\fMER 2 001
Reframing Impunity:
Applying Liberal International Law Theory
to an Analysis of Amnesty legislation
\l(!illiam \V. Burke-\Xfhite
Over the past two decades, as dictatorships gave way to democracies across
the globe, countries faced the dilemma of holding former regimes liable for
human rights abuses while facilitating transitions of power. The goal of po­
litical transition bas come into conflict with the goal of providing account­
ability for past crimes. On the one hand, former dictators are understandably
loath to leave office if they fear prosecmion for their actions. 1 On the other
band, national and international interest groups have good reason to demand
the accountability c1nci resignation of former dictators. Amnesty legislation
has attempted to solve this dilemma in countries ranging from Chile to
Croatia, South Africa to Bosnia by immunizing both dictators and regimes
from criminal and civil liability for past atrocities.
Amnesty legislation appears to offer attractive transitional expediency, fa­
cilitating non-violem surrender of power by former dictators. Such legisla­
tion has eased recent power transitions, while avoiding recourse co either
domestic unrest or international political imervention. However, amnesty
rests on moblematic foundations. First, it is often enacted bv selfle2:islation
(.___1
""
l_
serving dictators. Second, it may conflict \vith the subject state's domestic
law
co
or
constitution. Third, it often violates a state's international obligations
prosecute certain cnn1es and to provide citizens with specific rights of
redress.
\l(!hi!e many considered amnesty an over-studied phenomenon in che
1980s, it has recently taken on renewed importance. The trend coward in­
creased extraterricorial prosecutions under the principle of universal jurisdic­
tion� suucrests
that in the years ahead, numerous states
ou
'
' ;\.B .. ! !arv;crd Unl\c:rStr\. I ')')S: 1\l.Pht!., Cambricl_c:e Un
ic:'l'l'ClCcl .2()11::'); Ph.D., C:amhrid,l!t Urlr\CfSir\· (cxpened
..:'(I(J,j).
mav
J
need to derer-
1 ')')') : J D. !-Llrvard Lm School
Tht· aurhor wishes
w
thank Ken r\nder­
son, Collttn Burke·. Thornas Chene:. ;\m\· Chu;l. Sr;cnln" l-luffmccnrl, Marrha \frllCJW, ,"".ndrcw Mor;c,·csrk.
r\nnc-1\Lmc SLlLI_c:hrtr. :1Lcrc \Vc-lln. and I<.a(lt \Vhc"t"lbctr,c:cr fur prov1c!rnc: ,l!llldanct" and ed,rorial cJSsts­
Lllllt.
c
and rhc Eumpt;tll Cemn i(Jl· 0.lrr1Urir\· Lsuc·s fm t'undrn_c:.
l. Sec. <._[; .. M,clucl P
)
m/1.1;!;<'1 T1x
Sec
Sclur{ Su<�j•f'm�
h11LJ 1.\-')(1')')o)
P.t!"rru ,. Uow Srrccr l\lcrro]'Ultt;l!l Sr1pendrary ;1Lt_c:rsrrccre.
c\
p,;r!c
Pinochu
(i\Ju. i) l 1\ c:. 1 j: 11 l.L. .211()11) 1L !<..); lZ!DIU'SS T!zL,T. LiN!Vl!ZS.\1 .Jr.IZIS!JICTION IN EL!Z<WI. C!ZL\11t\(;_-\1:'-:.��T llL-,\1.-\>:rTY, Tl">IZTl'I\L,
><,.\I_ PJ-�()."-;r-:cl:Trc)><:� 1:-\ Er J\<JPL �;t:--<cx 1 99() FOIZ \\1.\IZ Crz�:\:L:< CIU.\1
Harvard lnterncttioncd Law}ourna!
468
I Vol. 42
mine whether to accord such legislation extraterritorial validity. Moreover,
as the international community has become more involved in the process of
post-conflict reconciliation, amnesty bas re-emerged as an important politi­
cal and legal cooP
Much of the past debate over amnesty legislation has been circumscribed
by three mental paradigms: retribution, sovereignty, and expediency. Adher­
ents co retributive justice have argued chat amnesty laws are per se invalid
and chat perpetracors must be punished.4 Supponers of these laws have often
argued that states have a right to grant amnesty on grounds of state sover­
eignty. Consequentialists have taken a middle ground, finding amnesty valid
when it leads to expedient political transitions. In light of the renewed im­
portance of amnesty legislation, chis Article seeks co transcend these limita­
tions with a new theoretical approach. By imbuing liberal international law
theory with cenain normative values, this Anicle construCts a new deon­
cological framework for the analysis of amnesty legislation, which simulta­
neously accepts the potential value of amnesty legislation and respects the
objective nature of international law. Amnesty legislation does have a place
in the international system and can be an effective tool for social reconcilia­
tion. For amnesty laws to carry domestic or extraterritorial validity, however,
they must be narrowly tailored and legitimately enacted.
This Article expounds a fLmdamemally new view of amnesty legislation
(and potentially other types of legislation as well). \'{!bile past studies have
been based on realist models and have assumed that the governments en­
acring such legislation were unified entities, chis Anicle applies liberal in­
ternational law theory to the study of amnesty and, in parcicular, co deter­
minations of the validity and the scope of amnesty legislation. Liberal inter­
national law theory is itself void of normative values. To construct a theo­
retical platform for an analysis in which the preferences of individuals and
social actors are meaningful variables in determining che validity of an am­
nesty law, chis Article overlays a set of value preferences on the disaggre­
gaced-state model of liberal international law theory. In addition, this Arti­
cle provides textual sources for and analyses of recent, often unstudied, am­
nesty laws in countries including Bosnia, Croatia, Fiji, and Guatemala.
This Anicle speaks primarily to three audiences: academics, drafters, and
enforcers. for academics, it seeks to reenergize che debate over extraterrito­
rial validity of domestic laws by providing a new theoretical approach.
Bridging the often irreconcilable gap between legal academics and political
sciencists, this Article draws on both bodies of literature and grounds its
analysis in the methodologies of both fields. For praccicioners
.-\:---; [) G l'NOClllL ( 1 99':)).
_). s<'t'. e.g..
,2()(11 ' ;I[ A 1
C:aduua Gall,
tn
states con-
litgr;_dc!L' Parltdll!tl/1 PaJ<'t.f rlll!lft'li)' fil· )dilal l(ll.\11/'uTi, N.Y. Tt.\IL:'. Feb. 1'.
·l. Set'.'·.�-- S[c:n·n 1\a[nc:r. i\'ut Dui/ll(l'.lc'iu. (Jfd fl!rot"il!c': All lll!fli!!T ill lrt!ruurir1!UI L.c!li. �\7 Cu1. L.f.
-117 ( I SISJ9); i\ltchael P. Scharf. Fb.: ;\i/11/i'.il\' l'.\.<tjl/tl,l! /'1/bL' flllcm,i!irllu! Crilf!!i!.il Com'i. _1.2 CCJH.'-11.'1.1. IYr'l.
LJ '.itl'7
(1 ')')')1
200 1 I Refrmuing Impunity
469
sidering enacting amnesty legislation, chis Article employs comparative
analysis to assist legal drafters in crafting enforceable laws with extraterritO­
rial validity. For practitioners in states enforcing amnesty legislation, chis
Article provides a framework for analysis of the validity of such legislation,
and argues that the judiciary is, in face, capable of making nuanced determi­
nations of legitimacy and scope .
Pare I of this Article develops the theoretical basis by incorporating cer­
tain normative values into liberal international law theory and applying the
resultant model in the amnesty context. Legitimacy and scope are presented
as the two key axes of this model. In Pare II, the axes of legitimacy and scope
are utilized ro construct a framework analyzing the four categories of am­
nesty legislation: (1) Blanket Amnesty; ( 2 ) Locally Legitimized, Partial Im­
munity; (3) Internationally Legitimized, Partial Immunity; and (4) Inter­
national Constitutional Immunity. Part II goes on tO present a broad survey
of recent amnesty legislation and, through detailed case studies, to define
the characteristics of each category of amnesty legislation.
Part III examines recent domestic and international challenges ro each
category of amnesty legislation. Cases before both domestic courts and the
Inter-American Commission are reviewed, and the effects of these judg­
ments are considered. The Conclusion begins to operationalize the frame­
work for determinations of extraterritorial validity developed in this Article,
demonstrating that judiciaries are capable of applying this framework.
l. TOWARD A NORiviATIVE REPOSITIO NING OF liBERAL INTERNATIONAL
L'\W THEORY
liberal internacionallaw theory provides a consistent, comprehensive, and
conceptual foundation for analyzing an apparently divergent body of am­
nesty legislation. Since the mid-1970s, at least fourteen states on four conti­
nents have declared amnesties and/or enacted laws immunizing past regimes
from accountability and liability.5 These amnesty laws have ranged from
cliccacorial decrees co legitimate aces of parliament. In scope, these laws vary
from encompassing all aces of previous regimes ro covering only a particular
and imernacionally limited subset of crimes. Some of these laws have imnlu­
nized from prosecution an encire country's population. Ochers have granted
immunity only to selen groups. A n ew theoretical approach is therefore
needed co allow systematic study of chis body of legislation.
This Anicle takes as its starring point liberal international relations the­
ory as applied co incernmional l aw.c' Anne-Marie Slaughter lirst articulated
5
Tht l1sr includes r\rgunina. Uruguav, C:hdt, l3razil, Peru. Gu;!ltmaLI. [I Sal,·,1dor. Honduras.
r1.
for
N;cu·;J.l!Ll<L Ha i ri . h·"n· CnciSL ;\n,l!oLi. Togo, and Somh r\frica. s,., IZacnu.
a
'lt/"d
nort ,j_
.22-20,.
S,·r;,,;o/y: A Libu·.t! Then;) o/ I!!!U'!Id­
S I 1:--;T'r. Oi(l;. 5 I 1. 516-21 (1')97). Ai':DJ(L\\" i\lnJt-1\"C.'IK, THL C:HOI<T f<JJ( [LI(OPE.
rllJII<Ii lc1w rhtorv· IS basL·d, St:t: Andrt:w iv[uravcsd..:, 7;tki11g
!;,n;.J/
ar 7
more du:1ikd d<SUISSI<HI ,r l ibcr;JI Ill[(crnarir!llal relar1UI1S rhuH1·, upun ,,.iJich rl11s IrHnna­
f>olirl<,,
.:.'-i-.:.'7, :i-1 (I')')�) (;IPI'I' iil,!C a v:mam of this rheor1·
w ;1
S[Ud\· of Lun>J'can lnte,c:rarioll).
Haruard lntenwtionc:d Lau'}o11rna! I Vol 42
470
c h i s approach , desc ri b i n g i t as "bo ccom up . . . rather chan cop d ow n . "7 Ac­
cord i ng to Jose A lvarez, c h i s approach " l eaves the rea l i s e c ri t i q ue to och e rs . "s
I n Slaugh ter's word s , i t " req u i re[s} us co focus on the prec i s e i nterac t ions
between i nd iv i duals and 's cares . "'<) This t heory p res umes that s t a te funct ions
depend on " i nd i v i d ual c h o i ces . " 1 11 It d isaggregates the s tate i n to its compo­
n e n t part s , foc u s i ng on i nd i v i d uals and organ i zat ions to pred i c t and i nter­
pret state behav i or.
L i beral i n ternational law t heory alone, howeve r, is but a posi t ive model . I t
m akes p red i c ti on s , not j udgmen ts . I c g i ves u s cools t o unders t a n d outcomes
based on i n terac t i o ns betwee n c i t i zen s and the s tate, but ic does not prov i de
values on w h i ch to make normative d i s t i nc t i o n s between chose i n terac­
c ions . 1 1 Posi t ive t heory has been s ubjec t co t h e cri t i c i s m that i ts u t i l i ty i s
l i m i ted . I t i s a pred i c ti ve mec h a n i s m of pol i ti cal s c i e n t i s t s , not a normative
bas i s upon w h i c h c i t izens and courts can make judgments about another
state's leg i s lation .
T h i s Article i ncorporates a set of norms and values i n to l i beral i n terna­
t i onal law theory, g i v i ng m ean i ng and app l i ca t i o n to a t heore t i c a l construct
ot herwise devoi d of val ues . O nce t h i s is done, l i beral i nternati o nal law t he­
ory i s transformed from a pos i tive theory i nto a n ormat i ve coo l for judges
and poli c y makers . App l y i ng t h i s normative, l i beral i n ternational l aw t h eory
co the anal ys i s of am nes ty l eg i s l a t i on, c h i s A r t i c le p ropos es two axes of
analys i s-leg i t i macy and s cope-upon w h i c h a framework fo r d e term i n i ng
c he ex tracerri corial val i d i ty of leg islat ion is b u i l t . Leg i t i macy add resses do­
mes t i c and i n ternati ona l sources and resu l ts of a m nesty laws; s cope refers to
the c r i mes and i n d ividuals covered by these l aw s .
A l iberal test for leg i t i m acy, based o n a d i saggregation o f t h e s care and an
evaluation of the s upport of c i t i zens and i n terest groups , is part i c u l arly u se­
fu l for eva l uating amnes ty l e g i s lacion . There are, admi ttedly,
a
num ber of
sicuat ions in ·whi c h a rea l i s t , b i l l i ard-ba l l app roach to s tate a c t i o n may be
more appropriate. For example, when a l eg i s l a t u re passes, or an execu t i ve
enac t s , a b i lateral m i l i tary procurement agree men t , co nsideration o f rhe
prefere nces of the ordinary c itizens may no t furth er un ders t a n d i ng of t h e
state's behavior. I n g ran t i ng amnesty, however, t h e scare cedes part i c ular
c i t i zen r i g h ts, w h i c h are ens h rined in internac i onal treat ies and d o m es c i c
,_
AnrH:c-i\Llril· Slaughrn, A Li/;,·rul Tf>,,ny u(/lltm!tllio'"'l L111·, ')-\ A�r. Soc:·y [;'(·(!. L PRoc. 2-\0, 2-� I
(_)[)()())
0.
Jos�
E. r\h·artz, Cu11m
�;(S!"Ic.>i(.'ml/u 'if H.11c: /.(.\.1''"' Ji'r!iil 1?11',1!1</d,
'\f1:d1·ze rhc· Si,'-!lllricancc of lure
(I ')')9) (using a "'1rianr of libcr:d rhtnn· ro
nal prosc:curion).
')_ Slaut:hl<:r,
.111/1!',!
norc·
' , <!(
.!-I!
illLJlllrl.
I ll. i\nrlc·-i\l:mc SLru_t;hrer·, [;J!cnidf!,,;u//_,!/t
I ')')5L
I I
) () ) , _)05
l)oL. SCI. R�ev. S l')_ S_)_! (Dec. _!()()())
'1nd ll()(ill,!.! rhar "popular prtssurcs c1n and somtrimes do
have drsrrnn consequc:ncts" t(,r sr,rrc: ht:iJ,r,·im).
t
Y.�I.E J. l.Yr'l. L
Sn J/_,,, Beth A. SrlllllW!lS, fll!cmctlint/ti! !.dll ,/1/J Sralc /3chuT!"I"
(nllllllilillcilfai/C/Crrll!j'/i,n;.-c i11 lll!cm,lfiolh!l tll,llcil!IT cl/i;lir•. ')1 r\,\1
('rcknowlcclt:ing rhc- 1·alidrn· of such
2-\
crimes fi:Jr rmcrnarional crimi­
!II"
\r·;n-U ,,/ !_il�t·r"/ S!dh.l,!) E1 I(
Sn id err') I ) (norrn,!.! rhar "rhc J>osrriVc· mock! crnnm irsc·li' t:rn· rrst·
w
.J. h·r'l L.
)(I;_ 5 I ')
norm,rrivv Jlrfli'osrrions")_
200 1 I Reframing lmjmnity
471
l aw, to b r i ng j ustice to past wrongs . 1 2 Si nce a gram of am nesty e ntai l s a re­
l i nq u i s h m e n t of t h ese c i t i zens' r i g h t s , d i saggregati o n of the state and con­
s i deration o f t h e rel a t i o n of t h ose c i t i zens to th e state t h ro ug h a l i beral
analys is o f l e g i t imacy i s part i c u l arly appropriate.
A . Legitimacy
Determ i nations of the l eg i t i macy of a po l i t i cal reg i m e are a lways co n uo­
vers i a l . I n order t o avoi d the c o n c roversy surround i ng normative determ i na­
t ions of gover n m e n tal l eg i t i m acy, the Wes tphali an system o f c l as s i cal i nter­
national l aw offers a pos i t ive test for th e recog n i t i o n o f s tates . States m us t
h ave a permanen t population, a d e fi n e d terri to ry, a governm e n t , and " t h e
capac i ty to encer i n co rel at i on s w i t h other s tates . " 1 0 C l as s i c a l i n ternational
law pub l i c i s t s , who focus l argely on t h e " ex i s tence of an effective and i nde­
pendent govern m en c , " have appl i ed this pos i t ive test w i t h o u t exam i n i ng
c haracteri s t i c s of the govern m e n t i ts e l f beyond t h e q ues ti o n o f m e re effec­
t i veness . 1 '�
L i beral i n ternational l aw theory offers a new l e n s th rough w h i c h to v i ew
gove r n m e n t behavior. Liberal schola rs exam i n e the s tate fro m a bottom-u p
perspective to i d e n t i fy t h e " seam of i n d iv i d u a l-s tate i n terac t i o n . "1 5 Th e pos i ­
t i ve m o d e l says not h i ng about t h e natur e of a l eg i ti mate govern men t . T h e
t heory presen ted i n t h i s Arti c l e , however, f�1s h i o n s the pos i tive m o de l i n co a
norma t i ve one by i ncorporati ng normative values i n to t h e posi t ive m od e l .
T h i s , i n turn, al lows one not merel y co make pred ic ti ons about t h e natu re o f
govern m e nt , b u t also t o u t i l i ze l i beral i mernatio nal law theory co test t h e
val i d i ty o f am nesty and other types o f leg i s lation . T h i s norm ati ve model
looks not j us t to the ex i s tence of seams of i nt eraction between i n d i v i d uals
and govern m en t s , but
to
the very nat ure o f those seams to de term i ne how
t hey compare with these chosen normative val ues .
The value set t hat t h i s Article overlays on l i beral i nternati o n a l l aw t heory
i s that che "w i l l of the people is
I .2. Tht·se rights
ru
Judicial p roces s
,ue
co
be the bas i s of the authority o f govern-
guaranrecd tn,
i!l!u·
c�l/{/, The lnrernational C:oven,ltH o n Ctvtl
and Political Rights, which guarantees that tach Sratc·-Parrv w tl l "ensure that any person
freedoms as herttn recogni z e d at·c noLtted slul l han· an tli'tcuve rtmech-
C:ivtl and P o li ti ca l Rights, Dec. 10, 11)00. cll/tlt'd !Ill'•
17'1
\vhtlc crimtnal p rosec ur i o n tn rht Untttd Statts
·
i\far. 21, 11)70, arr.
tS
wh os e
rights
or
fntern,Htonal Covenant on
2U), ')99
U.N.T.S. 171.
an acr of the txecmtve, in so m e comtntntal
s1·stems, tndt,·idual rights co prosecution are dlccruatcd throu,;.;h the jJ:niie-(1/J/c system, by which tndt­
nst the perperr,Hor as a kind of co-p rosccuror. See. e..�.,
n du al s lllcll. brin,c: crimtnal clCtions cltrenlv
Rtchard S. Fraser, Cr,J!!f'amfllt CmiJ!IJa!J;r,fJ(c
ri' :1
G111t!c
!o
;\1//i:iHtlll L111 l�cj;;riJJ: 1-lnll' the Fru;cb !J,, /1.
/-loll' \lie Cm1 Fi11J ();;!. rmcl \Vby \V( Sb<!ltld Cc� ;·c < 7S C1 1.. L. F.
tion of tlw French prusccuwr and rhe rtghts of nuims w tile
IV.
S .)9. h 1.) ( 1 990) (d tscusstn,;.;
c h arg e s
l he
cl tscrc­
dtrculyJ.
I ) . Momc·1·tdeo Convent tun on the Rtghts ctnd Duttcs uf Stcm·s, Dec. 2h, 19 1.). arr. I, -+') Star. )Ill)/,
l () S U . N . T S . I 9;
l i
15
Jet
BIZ0\\'.;/11',
af.,o LII" BIZCJ\\
'I!Jira
SLtughter, _�;;j;rc� note l II,
"rqHeSllllcltl\'C' ttl\[l[UtillflS ,!S
,tJs ctnd ,c:roups
an:
I"
!.II . P1u I"CI PI I � 01 PU\1 IC: I I"TI 1('.;,\TI(Ji':,\1 LI\V 'IJ-Ti ( 1l)9S)
note 1.), ar ')!
11
ell
2-11:
'""
c�icr) ,\lcll·,t,·csJk.
,;;j>u
nmc h, at SIS (notli\C: the tlll]-'Ortanct·
l\f.
.[LlnSflltSSiOn be: It' ln· \\.lllch tht· prcfl'rl'I!CCS and SDCicJl ]'01\LI' o( trtcltvtcllt­
translated tmo scare i'"ltc'l'. .. I.
Harvard Interncttional Law Journal
47 2
I Vol 42
men t . " 1 6 T h i s fundame n tal value ch o i ce l eads to t hree d i ffere n t q uestwns
upon w h i c h the con s i derati o n of a l aw 's l eg i t i m acy i s based : (1) D i d the gov­
e r n m e n t s uperv i s i ng t h e l aw's enac t m e n t base i ts authority o n t h e w i l l of t h e
people? ( 2 ) Was t h e p rocess by w h i c h the l aw was passed reflective of t h e
peopl e a s the u l t imate source of authori ty! ( 3) Was t h e process b y w h i ch t h e
l aw was appl ied reflective of t h e people's w i l l? I n consi d e r i ng l e g i t i macy,
t h i s A r t i c l e looks to each of t hese t hree quest ions derived fro m t h e app l i ca­
tion of t h i s fun dam en tal val ue j udgem e n t .
Resolvi ng t h e fi rs t o f these q uestion s , concern i n g the s tatus of t h e gov­
e r n m e n t e nact i ng the l eg i s l at i o n , requ i res a determination of w h e t h e r t h e
gover n m e n t i n q uestion was a democ racy. Democracy t h us s e rves a s a "seam "
to con nect i n d i v i d ual preferences and gover n m en t a l acti o n . T h rough fai r,
period i c elections , gover n m e n t beh avior can be l i nked to t h e collective ex­
pression of i nd i v i dual preferences . This transformation fro m a pos i t ive to
normative theory is aided by a grow i ng body of i nternational l aw/ i n te r national
relati on s l i terature emphas i z i ng i nd iv i d ua l rights to parti c i pate i n e lectoral
p rocesses . Thomas F ran c k , for exa m p l e , recog n i zes a " ri g h t to d e m oc racy,
. . . the r i g h t of peop le to be consul ted and to parti c i pate i n t h e p rocess by
w h i c h poli t ical values are reconci l ed and choices made . " 1 7 As de m ocracy has
become a bas i c norm , govern men ts have recog n i zed that t h e i r l eg i t i macy
depends upon com p l y i ng w i t h that normY' Th e not ion of d emocratic enti­
t l e m e n t 1 l) p rov ides a bas i s for t h i s A rt i c l e's normative val u e c h o ice: govern­
m ents s hould be cons i dered l eg i ti mate and t h e i r leg i s l at i on ex t raterri torial l y
v a l i d on l y to the extent that t h e gove rn m e nt i n q uestion i s d e m ocra t i c .
Tes t i ng t h e l e g i t imacy o f t h e enac t i ng government by app l y i ng n ormative
l i b eral i n ternat ional law t h eory l eads to the concl us ion that t h e l eg i t i macy
and power of the s tate rests sol e ly on the actual source of i ts au thori ty : the
aggregated preferences of i n d i v i d uals w i t h i n i r . This rest m oves beyond clas­
s i c a l d efi n i t ions of a state's l egal persona l i ty and l eg i t i m acy, transferri ng t h e
16.
U;;n encd Dcd,m;t;u;l u j Hi!i!ltlll 1?1ghu. G.A. Res . ..! 17 A (I l l), U.N. GAOR, '!d Sess., an. I Lo. at
71, U.N. Doc. A/N \1) (l l).\NJ;
>Cf
al•o James
til/{/ tbc Budy uj llltewatiuJJti/ Lent.
Crcl\vford,
111
Du!OCJ(c\TIC: GOVU(C-J,\:--JCE ,\C-JD IYITI(['.:,\TICJ'\,1! Ll\\' ')l, ')2 (Gregorv H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eels.,
..! ()()())
]7. TH0;\1,\S M. hZ.Ii"C.K, F.\l!(C-JLSS 1'\ hn:lh.HIUC.:.\1 Lw:· .\Nil lc.:STITLTIOC'S S .) ( I ')') 5). Sec ,dru
i'vf.N.S. Sc:llers. Scj�tll't!IIJ'III c/1/{1 the
Delll•nTtlli(
L!!rit/u;lml i!l /;;!cJ'I!:IIi•Jihtl Lall',
')2
A,\1.
SueY
116, 117·-19 ( 19')S); Crawford, .wf' r<� n o te I Ci, at').' (d,scussll1g "the dem ocratic Jclect").
IS. Sec Thomas J\1. Franck, Tbc
R1gbt
lu Ocil!ocTtlfi(
c;,;i'cJ'I!di!Cc, S6 1\i\J.
lc.:r'r L. P1uX ..
). ]'\ r'L
L '!Cl, -iCi
( l')')2) ("(G}overnmems re c og ni ze tlut chu r lc,c:,tllllcJCI' depends "n meeung a 110rmacive expectation of
the communJt)' of scctccs. Th1s recogn1cion has kd rc> rhe cmngence of ci communJC\' cxpenacicJil: th,n
chose who sttk the v al i dat i on of then UlljlOwcnncnt j'CHtll(ly govern Wl[h tht· constJH of the guvtrntd."!:
,t!JD Cre,c:ory ill. Fox, The Ht,�h;;r, P•;/;rlu!l Pt!U!t!f'rt/i•,JI
·I'.U:
.11'.\l
1:-\TLI('J,\TJ().'\,11. Ll\\, .11'/il'd IWle lel.
{I(
111
l!!!cm,t/i()l/til Lru, iii DF,\ICJUZciTIC CU\'l'IZC.:·
-\S, S') lt�rgulll,C: thac .. ll'ht·n the will or rlK j't'll]'lt IS
the has1s ot chc .turlwrJc\· uf government, rtgllllh rktt rhwan che 11ill of che pcuplt: will lack l c,c:JtJ·
[ITI1
a
r c c t ! JS[ UICICJLIC tJr' the dt·fllJKTalll
Bl(,\[1 l\CJTJ-LCOVII(.'\,\IIC.:I.\1
I '). Tlwmcts i\1
t'lllll i clllt'il(
ciUCpcs much ur thiS t�rgumt·nc. See
li.!I(;JTI,\1.\() l'l ic.:lll('\1110'\11 L\\\'(I'J')l))
F rct nc k , Fhe Oc·i!IIJeratic· l:!!!i!lcii!UI! . ..!') U 1\ic:Jl L. l\1
\
I . 1-2 ( I ')')5 ).
473
I Reframing Impunity
200 l
source of a state's i nternati on al authori ty to th e peopl e . � 0 I n many way s ,
however, t h i s t e s t j us t begs another q u es t i o n : w h a t really i s d e m oc racy 1
De fi n i t i ons of democracy abo u n d . J oseph Sch u m perer's c lassi c procedu ral
defi n i t i o n serves as the bas i s of m u c h democrat i zation l i terature . 2 l W h il e
t h i s A r t i c l e accepts rhe neces s i ty of a procedural defi n i ci o n , Sch um perer's
defi n i c i o n of d em oc racy, sec m erely i n terms of elec t i o n s , i s c learly i n ­
s u ffi c i e n t . 2 2 T h e mere fac e c har e l e c t i o n s have occurred , even i f t h ey are free
and fai r, is nor e n o ugh co d e m o n s t rate t hat the w i l l o f rhe peopl e i s th e basi s
o f t h e authority of t h e governm e n t .
T h i s Art i c l e accepts t h e bas i c fram ework o f proced ural d e m ocracy, but
go e s further, scrut i n i z i ng a gover n m e n t's co n t i n ued respon s i ve ness to t h e
w i l l o f i ts c i t i zens . 2 ) Robert Dah l 's d e fi n i c i o n o f de mocracy c o m e s c l osest to
c his idea, star i ng ch at "a k ey c haracteri s t i c o f dem ocracy i s th e c o n t i n u i ng
responsiveness of t h e gove r n m e n t to th e prefe re nces of i r s c i t i z e n s , consi d ­
e re d a s pol i tical e q ual s . " �-4 Accept i ng Dah l 's d e fi n i c i o n , c h i s A n i c l e fi r s t con­
si ders d e mocracy in terms of free and fai r e l e c t i o n s , and proceeds t o l ook to
t he ong o i ng responsiveness of t h e governm en t based on the spec i fic p o l i t i cal
con text i n w h i c h t h e am n es t y l eg i s l at i o n i s enacted .
Such determinations of d em oc racy, made eas i l y when spea k i n g i n more
abs t ract term s , may appear a m b i g uous in app l i ca t i o n . I n app l y i ng the first
test of l eg i t i m acy-whether t h e enac r i ng governm e nc reflects the authority
of the w i l l o f t h e peop le-c h i s A r t i c l e d raws lessons fro m pos i t i ve l i beral
theory, w h i c h s uggests that " representation in the l i beral view is not s i mply
a fo rmal atri b me of scare i ns t i t u t i o n s , b u r i n cl udes ocher s ta b l e characteris­
ti cs o f the pol i ti cal process , fo rmal and i nfo rmal, that priv i lege part icular
c'
soc i e tal i n teres r s . This A r t i c l e t h e refore looks closely a t the h i s to ri cal back-
2 0 . Str F o x . _wpr<� n o c t· l l:l ,
ctr
') ll ( n o r i n .� r h a r r h t " n t n t r t c m h cun u n· c o n c c p u o n o f r h e S ra r t h a s u n ­
cl e rgo n t a s u b s r a n r i a l c h a n g e : i mc rn a r i o n a l n o r t o n s o f l e g i r i m a cv a r e no l o n g e r olw i o u s ro r h t o r i g m o f
govt rn m e m s , b u r ha1-e co m e ro appro x t m a r e q ll l r t c l os e l v r hose d o m t s r i c conceprions o f popu l a r sover­
ei g n ry ").
21.
Jos EPH
S.-1 .\ I L E L
i\ _ S c H L ,I ! P UT I \ , CwrL� I . I S � I , SoC J .-I L ! S M ,
.-1 :\ D
D t: o i OCILICY H)') ( :2d eel . 1 9-4 7 ) ;
P I-l c c-: T J i'iCTO i'i . TH I ' Tr-I I JW \V.-w t : : D I ' .\ I OCJLITJZ,I T J o �
·'""
llfJ,,
1 0: T H t-: L1 1T '[\\ T N T J E T H C t-: N T U RY 7
( I ')') I ) ( cl c: li n 1 11g cl t m oc r ac l- as base-d on " fa t r, h o n c-s r , clllcl p e r i od i c t l tu i o n s " )
22.
1-l u n l l n g ro n h i m s e l f ctd m i rs r h ! S , n u t t ng c lu r " [ r } o s o m e people d c: m u c rac y has o r s h o u !J have
m u c h m u rc s w t·tp t tlg and i d c:o l o,c; i c a l con n o w r i o n s . To r h t m . · r r u t: cl emoc rclL I. · means
;;i;f .
.. H u c-;T I :--: c ;T O i'i ,
2 5 . S l a u g h rer,
Jlljlra
'iifir"
n u r c 2 1 , ar l) .
liberlt:. e,�c�litf. ji·c�ttr-
nme I ( ) , ar '5 l l . As S l a u g h rc: r 1)\l t ms u u r , l i beral d c mo cr ctcv " d e norts s o m e r( Jrm o f
rc p n:st n r a r i vc: govn n m c t n s c: c u rL"Ll b 1 · r h e separa r i on o f powus, con s u r u r t o n a l g uaramees o f c i v i l a n d
p o l i r i c a l r i g h r s , J ur i d t c a l e q u a l i [ l·, tlnd a fu n c r i on t ng J U d t c 1 a l wsrem
2- i . Ro i \ J ' Jn ,\ . D.\H L . PoJ.Y.�I\CI I Y : P,l l n i U I'--IT JCl'-:
;1 :\ D 0 1' l 'OS I T I OI'
· !d.
1 ( l ')i l ) . T h i s r\rr i c l t does nm
req u i re t h ar Dah l 's ideal poh-cu-c h 1· ( " rt g i mcs r h ar ha1-e been s u bs r cm r i a l l y pop u Luiztd cllld l i bera l i zed ,
r h a r i s , h ig h h- i nclusive and open ro i' u b l i c cuinesrtn i o n " ) bt mu fu r a
racr- ! d. a r S_ N on t r h t l es s , c h i s 1\ m cl c c o n s i d e r s rhc
comesra l l o n a n d r h e r i g h r
r h i s A r r i c k l ou!-.:s
w
w
Da h l ' s
pct rr i c q, a r c . .. /J a r 5
cuilCL' r l l S
rwu
sccuc w
be cons iducd a dtmoc­
d t m t n s i o n s Dct h l deems s i g n d i c a n r , " p u b l i c
I n d u t r m i n i n g w h c: r h n a S Lt r c- t S a d e m o c racy, r h c- n .
c h a r c t [ I Z L' t l S l u,·e " u n t lll } 'Cl i rc:cl o p po rc u n t r t cs : I . To to r m u Ln t t lll' t r
p re fe r e n c e s , .:! 'J(J s t g n t h· r h c t r p re fercn ct·s c o c h e t r td l mv u r i 1. c n s tllld r h c :C: l J\' C r t l l l l CJ t r h1 · t n c l i ,· i d u a l a n d
.
'I(, h: l l c r h c i r prc·ftrL· n ces w e t g h u l u l u " l l y 1 11 r h c C U l l c l u n u i r h c .� u ,· c: rn m c m . " ! d . a r
-,
u d l cc r l \' t: an ton . �)
Harvard Interncttimzcrl Lau •}o!tnzai I Vol. 4 2
474
g ro u nd of t h e regime i n q u es t i o n . F reedom H ouse democracy scores p rovide
add i t ional evidence as
the q ual i ty o f dem o cracy in eac h s tate s mdied 26
w
F reedom House scores are n o t , h owever, taken as defin i tive b e n c h marks .
These scores o n l y s upplem e n t and confirm th e overa l l analysi s d eveloped
t h rough h i storical i n q u i ry. \"\7h e n cons id ered in conju n c r i o n with a n h i s tori­
cal analys i s , however, Freedom House scores allow for rough judg m e n ts
about the s tme of democracy.
The no rmat i ve value t hat t h e w i l l of t h e people s h o u l d govern l ead s
w
th e
appl i cat i o n of the s e co n d rest for l egitimacy- l eg i t i m acy o f process . T h e
q u es t i on raised i s whether t h e process by w h ich th e law w a s enacred
reflected the auth ority o f the w i ll o f the peop l e . In order chat a n a m nesty l aw
carry l egit i macy, t h e gove r n m e n t m us t represent the pop u l a r w i l l ,27 as evi­
d enced t h rough free and fai r e l e c t i o n s , cmd it m us t enact t h e l e g i s l at i o n i n
q uestion t h rough p rocesses approved by the peo ple. 2 8
I n determ i n i ng w h eth er a n am nesty l aw i s enacted t h r o u g h l egit i mate
p rocesses , this Article looks
w
two g u i d e l i nes p roposed by F ra n c k . F i rs t , a
l aw m us t have coherence o r " c reat l i ke cases ali ke . " 29 Seco n d , it m us t dem­
o n s t rate ad herence, " from i ts h av i ng been made in accordanc e w i th t h e p roc­
ess estab l i shed by t he constit ut i o n , which i s the u l t i mate r u l e o f recog n i -
2 !1 . F IUc HJU.\ 1 1-l O U S I: , A illtlir:l Smny o/ Frmlot/1 Colli! II) Su,rcJ
I 'J 7l -- .3 lu 1 ')'}l)-0(}.
h t t p : //w w w.
Crced o m h o u st: . ur,c:ir<l t i n.ss ' i nd ex . h r m ( v i s i n:cl Feb. 2 6 , 2 0 0 1 ) . T h e scores a re nk<t s u red on a ont> to-sc:ven
s c a l e . " w i r h one represen t i ng rhe h 1 g h esr d egree of fr eedom and seven rile lmves r . " The tirsr n u m ber
p rese n r ed rep1·es e n r s pul i r i cll r i g h t s , r he second c 1 v i l ! 1 bt: r r i e s . " C o u nt r ies w h ose c o m b i n e d ;l\'(: r;tgL·S t(Jr
pol 1 r i cd r i g h t s ;lllcl c i v i l l i be r [ ] e s Ld l between 1 . 0 and 2. 5 ;tre d c: s i g n a r ecl ' free ; ' b e t ween .'> . U and
· p a n · l y fre e ; ' a n d buween
1-[ 0 L' o; l ·: .
Sit!'/
5 5 a n d 7 . 0 ' n or fre e . · lei. F o r
:\ I dbodl)lu.�y.
e)
a d i s c u ss i o n o f t hese cHcg o r i e s ,
5.5
see F R E!: I )O,,I
h r r p : / / w w w . freed o m house . o rg/ rcsearc h i frC" e w u r l d ! 2 1 ) () ( ) / m e r h od u l u g y h r m I
( v 1 s 1 t td Feb. 2 () , 2 < H l 0 ) . Desp i te somt: derracrors, Freedom H o use scores ;trc ofcen used i n d t m o c ra c i za c i o n
l ! tcr a c u r e . s('(',
,·.
g . , 1-l u ,..; T I N(;TO N ,
fi!/Jra
n ot e
D l . \ 1 . 2 0 , 2 .'> n. I I . C o u r t s h;we been ;lb l e
ro
2 1 ' a t l I ' Larrv D i a m o n d .
/.i tbe Third \V{m: O t t'!'.:- , 7 . ,0, J
Sci'. ex , iVk l e n d tz - f l u res v.
re l y on Freedom H o use s c u rcs .
I . N . S .. I 65 F..)d ) 5 , ''":' _:; ( Me m o rand u m , l) c h C i r. I ';)';)S) ( no t i ng c h a c che I NS had " tol i l e d co s u b m i c r h e
Frtcdom l l uust report o n w h i c h
i t r t l t e s l ll W e v i d e n c e " h 1 n d e r i ng ;l J U c! L c i a l c l ue r m 1 n a c i o n o f r h e
po l 1 r i c a l S ] [ U ;l f i n n 1 n E l Sal v a d o r )
2 7 . Sec
T!Z U T H
v.
<'.
g . , r\ m y G u c m a n n $:. De n n i s Thom pso n . Tb£' , \ f orrd
/'o;mdt�ti•Mi r;(
Tmtb CotJ!ii!IU iotl.i.
111
2 2 , '> 5-.) Cl ( R obc:rr I . Roc berg $:. De n n i s T h o m pson eel s . , 2 U I J() ) ( n ot 1 n g r h e l m pu r ­
j USTI CI' .
canc<: o f rec i procal del i be r a c i v e d e m ocracy i n g i v i ng r r m h co m m 1 s s i o n s m o r a l lc:g i c i m acy ) .
2 0 . hanck e x p la i n s c h i s sec o n d . process- bc1sed rcqll l rc m e n c , s c a r i ng c h a r " [ w ) h t n 1 t i s a s s e r ted c h a c a
r u l e or 1 ts ai' P I I L <lC I Oll 1s l c:g i r i m ar L· , cwu r h i n,c:s arc i m p h cd : r h a r
tt
i s a r u l e m a d e o r a p p l i e d 1 11 ;Lccor­
(lanct \\' i c h a r i ,l dl t process, and c h e ref(Jre. chac ir ou,c d l t ro l'ro m o c e ,- o l u n cary co m p l 1 a nct bv chose ro
w h u m 1 t I S ;�cldrt:sstd . . . F I\,\ 'J C : K . Jitf'rc� n o t e I 7 . at 2 !1 . Set ,;!,�,, P h i l l i p R . Tr i m b l e , C/o/;,;/j�,lli,,il. IIIIUI!r i­
il''ihil / ;W illtli•;l!i. i!l!c l tbt f:'ro.i/o/1 o/ Nti!lolltil Sot ti'l'l,l!,lll) dllcl Oeli/IJ(I"d<) . ') 5
( l l)97)
M ! U-1 L.
R L V. I l)-i - i . I �J- i l)
2 ') . F !C·I C.: CI .; , 1 //jlr<� nort· 1 !1 , cH _'> S . Accor d L L \L: r o F r a n c k ,
[ a } r u l e- i s c o h e rt: n c \\' h t·n 1 t s a p p l 1 c a r i o n r rears l d-:e cases ;l l d..: t a n d w h e n r h c ru le- rtLnt·s 1 11 a p l·i n c i ­
p l cd h s h i o n
co
o c h e r r u ! t: s i n r h c s a m e w s r e m
1 11CIX [ 'O rcltl' p r i n c i p l es of g C" n C" ra l ;q> p l l cH i o n
Jd
. T h e l tg i c i m;K\. of r u l c·s
to;
a u g m t-t H l'd \\· ht'n r h n·
C nl u a l ;l p p i L c a r i u n req u i rts n o t o n l 1· r h ctt l d-.:b are
t rt"arcd a ! t ke .
e ll
:i 0 . i I . T h h h , r m u l a r i t l l l I S S 1 m d a r r u r h a c p u r fo rwcucl h 1 · C ur m J n n c t n c l T h o m l>su n . \\' h o <lr,L: L I L' c t
k,c: L t i m,trc a m t1c·q,· Ll\\'
h
u n c c h a c " c a n n o r he !Tas< J l l ;l b h· reJ ected lw a l1 \· u r 1 zt: n c " rn l l 1 1 l l t'd rc, d c m ocrac\·
hl'CILISt' I t rL'll ll l !'L·S O f l J \· r i l a r l'<ICh J'USOfl SL·ck Cel'lllS oi- CUOj)l'r<l f i U i l c h a r rt'SI1LL'[ a l i
Zt'11.S .
(; u r m a L i n
,\:
T h o m pso 1 1 ,
'II fir,;
n o r c . � - . ·. t r ) - .
<!S
fret' C l i l d L'l l l l a l C i [I ­
200 I I Reframing Impunity
47 5
c i o n . " 30 W h i l e t h i s Article does not r i g i d l y appl y F ran ck 's c r i t e r i a , or any of
the purely procedural defi n i tions of d e m ocracy, cohere nce and ad herence are
helpfu l in consi de r i ng the l eg i t i m ac y of the enac t m e n t process .
The exploration of l eg i t i macy h e re i n i s based l argely on th e app l i cat i on of
these fi rst two questions: was the s tatus of the government reflect ive of the
popular sovereignty and was the l aw e nacted t h rough a process reflect i ve of
that sovereign ty. I n add i t ion, this A r t i c l e looks to the t h i rd q uest ion noted
above : was the law appl i ed in a m a n ner reflective of the u l t i m ate authorit y of
the w i l l of the peop l e; To resolve t h i s t h i rd q uestion , the A r t i c l e looks aga i n
to h i s torical a n d jud i c i al sources for evidence o f how a given l a w was ap­
plied.
The l i beral approach advanced b y c h i s A r t i c l e h a s based dete r m i nation s of
l eg i t i m acy l argel y on dom e s t i c consideration s . A second l evel of analysis­
t he i nternational perspect i ve-is also n ecessary. A l i beral theory of i n terna­
t i onal law takes i n to con s i deration t h e i nextricable l i n ks between th e domes­
t i c and i nternational contexts. Li beral t heory depends not onl y o n i nd i v i d u­
als i n terac t i ng w i t h t h e i r own governm e n t , b u t also on i nd i v i d ual s and
groups i nteract i ng " t h rough govern m e n ta l i ns t i tut ions with t h e i nd ivid uals
and g roups of ocher states . " 1 1 T h u s , t h e i n terac t i on between t h e c i t i zens of
one leg i t i mate democracy and t h e i r government m ay cause that gover n m e n t
to i nteract w i t h the gover n m e n t of another s tate enac t i ng an a m nesty law,
e i the r in s upport of or agai nst t hat l aw. 1 2 In a wor l d of l i beral s tates , " th e
basel ine assum p t i o n i s that governments w i l l i n terac t w i th one anoth er
wit hin a we b of i nd i v i d ual and g roup comacts i n transnational c i v i l soc i ­
ety. " '-' \Vhe n t h i s A rt i cl e 's nor m at ive val ue jud gmen ts are over l a i d o n l i beral
i nt ernat i o nal law t heory, s uch w i despread and s i g n i fi cant i n terac t ions wi t h i n
t h e t ransnatio nal pol ity become t h e root authori ty o f i me rn a tional law and
t h e refore affect the val i d i ty of the l aw in q uestion. The preferences of t hese
i nd iv i d ual s, a ni c ul ated t h roug h a gove rn m e n t , s h ou ld t herefore h av e bear­
i ng on the i nternat ional legi t i m acy and extraterri ro rial val i d i ty of am nesty
leg i s la t ion .
The role of i n te rnat ional actors and aud i e nces i n the a m ne s t y process var­
i e s . In some cases , the amnesty law may be u n i versally condemn ed . In such
i n s tances , the i n rernati onal com m u n i t y may be vi ewed as h av i ng rej ec ted
the val i d i t y of t h e leg i s l a t ion . In other cases , t here may be no i n ternational
i n vol ve m ent whatsoever. In t hese latter cases, an analysis o f i n ternat i onal
l eg i t i m acy i s u nava i l ing , and d eterminations m u s e be made sol e l y o n the
-) ( ) _ f i(;I :'--' C K . _1/1,/lrii
110Ce
l 0 . ac
s i n g it:: p r i man· r u l e of <lbl 1 g a c l l l n
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Han;ard Interncltional Lau '}011rnal I Vol 42
476
bas i s of domes t i c leg i t i macy. A l ternatively, t he a mnesty law i n q ues t i o n m ay
garner w idespread i nternational s upport , conferr i ng o n i t some i n ternational
leg i t i macy. In o t her cases , the a mnes ty law may be part o f a m ul t i - lateral
t reaty or even sanctioned by a UN Security C o u n c i l resol u t i o n . W here am­
nes ty i s conferred by a Sec u r i t y C o u n c i l reso l u t i o n , states may even be ab­
solved of pre-ex i s t i ng i n ternati onal d uties ro prosecute certai n c r i mes .
Determ i nations of i nternational leg i t i macy can be d i fficu l t . \X'h a t level o f
i n ternat i onal s upport i s s u ffic ient r o confer leg i t i mac y ) H o w s h o u l d cases be
resolved where an am nes ty l aw has popular s upport in the enacti ng s tate b u t
i s wi dely condem ned i nternati o n al l y ) D o d o mes t i c actors carry g reater
wei g h t in t he determ i na t i o n o f leg i t i macy t han do actors in t h e l a rger i nter­
national soc iety? Nei ther the pos i ti ve l i beral t heory o f i n ternat i o na l law nor
t h i s Article's normat i ve t ransformat i o n thereof h as yet been appl ied to help
reso lve t hese q uesti o n s . T h i s A rt i c le beg i ns the app l i cation process , conced­
i ng from the s tart t hat q ues ti o ns of leg i t im acy w i l l not be ful l y reso lved .
Such u n reso l ved q ues t i o n s , however, m ay be i ll u m i nated by t he sec o n d ax i s
of anal ys i s : scope.
Before t u rn i ng ro scope, i t i s worth pau s i i1g co consider a second p o tent ial
theoreti cal ground for leg i t i m acy-conseq uen t i a l leg i t i m acy. Co n sequen t ial
leg i t i m acy g ro unds a l aw 's leg i t i m acy in i ts effect s . Advocates o f t h i s ap­
p roach contend t here m ay be a dynam i c rel a t i o ns h i p between effo r ts to es­
tab l i s h a stable democrat i c s tate and leg i t i macy. Accord i ng ro t h i s teleo l og i ­
cal argumenr, i f a law does , i n fac t , help estab l i s h democracy, i t s h o u l d carry
l eg i t i macy, i ndependent of the fac rors d i scussed above. '-i Th e goal o f j us t i ce
i n t h i s sense is not reui b u c ive o r reh ab i l i tati ve , b u t res tora t i v e . Ques t i ons o f
t he leg i t i m acy of a law s h o u ld focus on " i ts com m i t m e n t to reconc i l ia­
t i o n . " -'5 Given the value j ud g m e n t that i n d i vi d uals s h o u l d be the s ource of
authority of govern m e n t , a tes t fo r l eg i t i m acy c hat l ooks to w h e th e r a law
reconci les a soci ety and reasserts t he popular sovere i g nty, w o u l d s eem ap­
peal i ng . The framework presen ted in c h i s Art i c l e leaves room fo r t h e c i t i ze n s
of s tates enac t i ng a m n es t i es to for m u late and arr iculace a preference that
certa i n c r i rT1 es s h o u l d , i n order to bci l i cace reco n c i l i at i o n , be am nes r ied
rat her chan p rosecu ted . H owever, w h ere such p references have n o t been ar­
t i c u lated by i nd i v i cl ual s , or w here c hose p refere nces have n o t preva i l ed i n
for m u l at i ng s tate pol icy, cbe c.ld�1U i t r u l e s houlcl b e the t h i n p re fe ren ce o f t he
trans nat i onal pol i cy i n f�wor of prosecu t ion over am nes ty. Co n seq u e n t i a l i s t s
have g i ven n o compel l i ng reason why, abse n t c l ear preferences of i nd ividuals
.'>-L For a n a rr i c u l a r i on u f r h 1 :> ,· i e 11·.
S l: "L"
g t n tr: d h· ,-\ zan J<IIl Peo p l c: ·s O r,!.! a n t s;n i o n . I ')')() ( :') ) B C J . I\ I 0 ! 5
( C C ) : i\ L�JnH .-1 i\ [ J :--< 0\\·, 13 1:"1 \\' L I ·: c-: VE " l( ; J ' .-I c-: Ci c .� c-: l l Fn t;td V I' '-ii'S::' ( 1 '!:-: S ) : ,f S rcn: n
rc�o, ! . ()/J ;\ !i '" ! lh ! , 07 C r o .
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200 1 I Reframing Impunity
477
i n the enacti ng s tate, amnes ty, not p rosecut i o n , shou l d b e the defau l t rule.
I f, i n the fut ure, empi rical evi dence emerges or pos i t i ve i n ternational rela­
t ions t heory can demonstrate that am nes ty does , i n fact , l ead to s table t ransi ­
t i o n , i t i s pos s i ble that t he defau l t p reference of the t rans nat i onal poli ty
coul d change, and w i th i t the background rule. Absent s uch evi dence, how­
ever, rhe current i n ternat i onal p reference i n favor of prosecut i on preva i l s .
Even w here t he i nd iv i dual s i n a scare deem am nesty p referable on conse­
q uential groun d s , the s t rong preferences of the transnational poli ty i n favor
of prosecut i ng certai n hei nous cri mes may l i m i t t he freedom of t he nati onal
pol i cy to am nes ty t hose cri mes . Therefore, t h i s Art icle acknowledges , b u r
nei t her accep t s nor appli es , the tes t o f teleolog ical leg i t i macy o f am nes ty
leg i s lation .
B . Scope
T h i s normative vers ton of l i beral i nternat i o n al law t heory g i ves r i se to
scope as a secon d axi s of analysi s . Scope con s i ders the coverage of amnesty
leg i s lation: who i s i mmu n i zed from prosecution and wh ich acts are i m m u ne.
The word i ng of mos t amnesty l aws g i ves clear textual ans wers to the q ues­
t i on of scope, and when the text is nor speci fic, one can deter m i n e co whom
rhe law app l ies ei ther t h rough a con s i derat ion of j ud icial dec i sions or
t hrough q uan t i tati ve data on the law 's application .
Whi le scope i s trad i tionally expressed th rough a real i s t , s tate-focused
analys i s , ch i s A r ticle does nor v iew scope t h rough a real i s t lens . Rat her, i r
also ap plies l i beral i n ternational l aw t heory t o the con s iderat ion o f scope. As
noted above, i nt ernational t reat i es and cus com general ly l i m i t the potenc ial
scope of am nes ty laws . F rom a l i beral perspect i ve, these t reat i es represent
the agg regated preferences of i nd i v i d uals who, act i ng th rough governments ,
have created a reg i me chat forb i ds certa i n acts and proh i b i ts s tates from e i ­
ther comm i t t i ng o r faci l i ta t i ng s uch acts . l i beral theory accoun ts for s uch
preferences of the i n ternat ional com m un i ty and "ass un1es that the pattern of
i merclependem s rate preferences i m poses a b i n d i ng cons rra i n t o n s tate be­
hav i or. " ;(,
Those b i n d i ng constra i nt s are referred co here i n as "scope l i m i cat ions" and
shou l d be concei ved of as part of an i n ternat ional con s t i t u t ional orclerY
S uch a g lobal order recog n i zes an emerg i ng i nternational cri m i nal law re­
g i me, created by i nd i v i d u als and c ransnac i onal g rou ps expres s i n g condem na­
t i on of certai n cri mes , wh ich res t r icts t he scope of amnesty leg i s l a t i on . 18
Co n s i d e r i ng these t rea t ies as a k i n d of i n t e rn at i o n a l cons t i t u t ion proves
analyt ically usefu l . An emerge m , t reacy-basecl i nc e r n a t ional con s c i w t ion ans
l i ke a domes t ic con s c i c m i on, sett i ng a u n i versal ce i l i ng on leg i s l a t i ve and
) ( J . )\ [urcl\T S l k , ' lt/JJ .• i
_, , .
! l U l L"
G . ar 5 � 0 .
i\Llrl \Vt l l t: r has a n , c u Lr r td r h 1 s r d c-a 1 n l1 1 s r rc·am1L" n r r n" r h L
[\ l .-I JU: \V i · L l . ll ( , TH ! C lu s l s � � l< o � m·o -'S-- ."> 1 ( \ LJ ':J LJ J
.� s . s � e.
l'.,'-!, . ,
S L! u � l H l' l",
j
.l'li } } '( / J1 U [ t'
1 0 : �lt S :) ( l .
a n d KusCJ\'U c r i sts. Sec
478
Harvard International Lmuj ournal
I Vol 42
exec u t i ve power and arci c u l a c i ng the l i nks between t hese l i m i ta t i o n s and t h e
t rans national pol i cy. >':! A s c h i s emerg i ng i n cernati o nal cons t i t u t i o n p laces
checks and balances i n the s ys tem , i t " c u rb[s} the abuse of power" 'i l l or, fro m
t he perspective of ch i s A r t i c l e , i t provides an o bjecti ve test for w hen a n am­
nes t y-enac t i ng national leg i s latu re or exec u tive has exceeded the power re­
tai ned by t he c i t i zens of a s tate and t hei r national governmenc i n rel at i o n to
the i n ternati onal con s t i t u t i o n and the transnat i o nal pol i ty. S uch res tr i c t i o ns
serve to l i m i t t he per m i tted scope of am nes ty l eg i s lati o n , n ot w i t h s tand i ng
t he domes t i c leg i t i macy o f t h e l aw.
T h i s normative ve rs i o n of l i beral i n ternati o nal l aw t heory may be c r i ­
t i q ued on g rounds t h at i t s ubjec t i v i zes i ncernati o nal l aw. A fter al l , i n terna­
t i onal l aw trad i t i onal l y looks to objective res t s , such as the ex i s tence of a
defi ned territory, and speaks i n terms of clear, fi n i te o b l igat i o n s . T h i s A r c i ­
cle's normative theory ad m i tted l y raises s ubject i ve q ues t i o n s about the
qual ity of i n terest representation i n a parti c ular cou n t ry. T h i s m odel , how­
ever, s t i l l p rotects t he objective nature o f i n ternat i o nal law. Scope d e term i ­
nations are o b j ec t i ve by nat ure and can override s ubjective d e term i n a t i o n s o f
govern mencal l eg i t i m acy. E ven i f an am nes ty l aw b as ful l d o m e s t i c l eg i t i ­
m acy, th e re may be cri m es for w h i c h a s tate s i m pl y cannot absolve i n d i v i d ­
ual responsi b i l i ty. For example, th e )111 cogem pro h i b i t io n o f g e n oc i de-1 1 o r
g rave breaches of t he Geneva Convemi o ns-1 2 i mp ose cmt dedere cl!tt jlldicare
(prosecu te or extrad i te) req u i re m e n t s and woul d i nval i date any d o m es t i c l aw
t h a t seeks to gram am nes t y fo r c h ese crimes . I n t hese i n stan ces , t h e e m e r­
gent i nternat i o nal cons t i tu t i o n w i l l force c h e rejection of an a m nesty o n o b ­
j e c rive, s u bs tant i ve g ro un ds .
T h i s Artic le's i nq u i ry i m o scope addresses the bread t h of a p a r t i c u l a r
g ram o f i m m u n i ty. Spec i fi cal ly, th e A r t i c l e a s k s w h e ther t h e s c o p e o f t h e l aw
L1l ls w i t h i n a scare's perm i s s i b l e range of competen c i e s , e i t h e r as l i n< i te d by
rhe state's own popu lation t hrough the do mes ti c cons t i t ut i o n or by the
t ra n s natio nal pol i ty t h ro u g h the i n t e rn a t i o n a l const i t ut i o n . The ava i l ab i l i t y
of al ternate modes of r e c o urs e for
victi ms
i n a parti c u lar state i s a l s o c o ns i d ­
e red . H
Th i s anal ys i s of scope seeks boch
g e n e rate gene ral t h e mes as
to
w
the
: n i z i n (__.I
l.': t h at s uc h o b l i L:_) a t i o n s are
oerm i ss i b l e reach o f anmesty, w h i l e re c m
(_j
__
(
.1
coumry - spec i fi c a n d cl eterrn i n ed i n l a rg e part by t h e pan i c u l ar c reaty o b l iga-
_) ') . icl. cr t 5 _'\ 5 ( r 1 m 1 11,� t h a t " a w m l cl o (
I t \·· · ) .
ill
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-i I . S"'
gc l/eu/h Rcscrl cH I ! >llS ru r h c
l . CJ 1 5 ( 1\ Lll' .:' 0 )
.�ci/er.;/(] Gu r l'V<l Conn· n uon
Forces r 1 1 c h t F i e l cL ,\ u!' · l .! .
C e noudc l '! 5 1
i .:' . Sn
r n i\ m1cd
c o u rs e fo r \' ! C t l nl � , S u c h
l l O [L'
s r cn cs
C :onn· m 1 < >11
on
< > p t t l l r > rl l
c o u ld lx c o n c e p r u cd i z ed
as
cts cr
r r a n s ru t i o n ,d pol ­
rhe P n: 1 t n r i o n and P u n i s h lllt:IH uf r h c· C : r· i m l' < >f
i \ n· r l k ,-\ rn t l l ! > r a r i u n of rhe C u n d r r ro n of r h c \Vu u ndcd a 11 d �) , l'f;
I ll i ' ! .
a rc
) ( I _ (, L :; T _:, l l L :; l - i r1 . 7 5 U . N T S :; 1 . (<'
J n or h c r \\ · ur•J s . r h r: scO J't: < > f e� m n c·s r 1· rn ,_·cr ! s \\" I K t h c· r r h c·
i _;
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C i \· i ! CU111 f)t· J I � < U l � l l1
ur ; t ( C CS �; CO J
srarc
l'ro,·idcd cd rcrnarc nK;lJ1S ot.
c r u t h CU rll!1l i S S i O n . Sl't'
o - i ; l'rw; u ! l . .·\ [) _ l LIY'' I : I ( , l..J �'-' 1 ' 1-: ?. l-. .. \ l \ l _i T!( L T H � : C:u:\ F I{ ( J '.; T ! 0 C ST.-IT ! ' Tt' !( l((")!(
J
( Ll l scus�; I Il ,� r h c -.·a r i o u :; fu rn1s �uhl ruk� l ) ( i rLi l h cnnl in i s s H . J l l S ) .
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200 1 I Reframing Impunity
47 9
cions chat a state has assumed. Such a country-specific i nquiry is beyond the
reach of chis Article. Suffice ic co say here chat there are certain crimes char
scares are obligated either co be prepared co p rosecuce or to in fac e p rosecuce
and for which they can not grant amnesty i n conformity with the emergent
international conscicucion.'1-1 Such c ri mes inc lude genocide, grave breaches of
che Geneva Conventions, cormre, and crimes against humanity.-1 5 \'\!bile an
analysis of particular state obligations is saved for future study, the emergent
international constitution p laces c lear and objective limits on che scope of
any scare's amnesty gram. Basic norms of customary and treaty law would
bar any legislation which sought co gram amnesty in relation co che afore­
mentioned ac es, even in che face of overwhelming domestic and interna­
tional support for the amnesty.
Before applying chis normative liberal international law theory, it is
worth recasting the conclusions of the p receding section. This theory can be
seen as an international constitutional system with a federal structure. In
determining the validity of an amnesty, normative liberal theory defers co
the preferences of individuals i n the state enacting the amnesty. A standard
of presumptive deference is applied co these national policies, subject to the
limitations of scope created by the i nternational policy and articulated by
the international conscicucion. \)(!here the preferences of the national policy
cannot be determined or che state has been " captured" by interests not repre­
sentative of the will of the people as che u ltimate source of authority, che
c h i n incernacional consensus in favor of prosec ution incervenes to invalid ate
any g ra m of impunity.
II. A rl\'V O - A X E S FRA M EWO IZ K FOI<. ANALY S I S
B y u ti l i zing an analytica l framework c o n s cruc ted with the axes o f legiti­
macy and scope, <lmnescy legislation can be classified into four broad catego­
nes: ( l ) B lanke t Amnesty; ( 2 ) locally legitimized, Parcial Immunity ;
( 3 ) I nternational l y Leg i t i mized, Partial I m munity ; and (4) IncernatiomJ
Conscicutional I m munity. f\clmitteclly, the bound aries between these catego­
ries are p e r m e ab l e . I n faet, s o m e legisl ation may not fie chis model at a l l ,
while o c h e r Lnvs rn ay slide be t':v e e n t h e s e categories. Acknowledging i m p re­
cision , c h i s t w o -axes fra m e w o r k n e v e r t h e l e s s affords u n d ers t a n d i ng as i t al­
c l ass i fication of a m n es t y leg i slation and
i m e c n a t i o n a l v a l i clity of a m n esty laws.
lows for s y ste mat i c
l ocal as we l l as
cl e c e r m i na t i o n of
· 1 - i . E l :>t·\l· hcrt· . rhc aurhor has clc,·c·lopc·d L"<tC<.:cc:uric:s of scree obl i .>: <H i u n r u l' rusc:L" l l C l' u n t! e r r i ll' l 'ri ncip<d
c i u n i ,·erscrl J l r r·r:;cl r c r i o n . T h l' t h ree ClCt).! u r i e s o f s c a re u b l i .>: a r i u n s c:rn strn· as rhc has r s t( n <Ill arl< r i l· :; r s ol.
u b l i cc: a r r o n s n o r r o .c: r·cuH ;\ll l l l t· s t l' as w e l l \V h c n S C <H t·s l;r<:t· " h ! r .� <l r i o l l S o f " p rcp<lr<tWIT u n r l· t· rs;rl J u r i scl r c ­
C I O I J . . ( S U r t· s
l l 1 lh l bt· a b iL-
[U J ' l'<l:>t ( L I [ l' ) ( l r
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< l l l l llr:S C\" \\' ( l lJ lc! b l' t u t l r i . l ll1t' l l [ ; t i h· i rl ( l llll J 1<l [ i b le . F l l r < l t k L l i iL-cl d t S t' L I S S l l ! ll ,
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Harvctrd International Law}ourna! I Vol 4 2
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Charc 1 maps these fo u r categories g raph i ca l l y. B lanket A m n e s t i e s , o n t h e
l o w e r far rig h t , have the w i d e s t scope a n d the l east leg i ti macy. loca l l y l e ­
g i t im i zed , Par t i al I m m u n i t i es have somewhat g reater l eg i t i macy o n a local
level and are often characteri zed by a more res tri cted scop e . I n ternat i o n a l l y
leg i ti m i zed , Parci al I m m un i t i es carry l eg i t i macy conferred b y t h e i n terna­
t i o nal com m u n i ty and are somewhat l i m i ted i n scope . F i nall y, I n ternati o nal
Const i t u t i o nal I m m u n i ty, i n th e upper left , has s i gn i ficant i ntern a t i o nal
s up po r c , often i nc l u d i ng UN i nvolve m e m , and the m os t res tricted scope .
Chart
2
p lots examples of am nesty case studies w i th i n t h i s framewo r k . A
m o re d eta i led expl ora t i o n o f each cacegory fol l ows .
A . B lanket A llnmty
B lanket Amnes ty, the fi rs t type of am nesty l eg i s l a t i o n to appear i n th e
m od ern i n te rn a t i onal sys tem , i s u s uall y e nacted th ro u gh the decrees o f o u t­
g o i ng d ic tators , w i t h n e i ther d o m e s t i c nor i n ternational approva l . B la n ket
A m nesty, as the name i mp l i es , h as an ext rem e l y b road scope and g e neral l y
seeks to i m m u n i ze a l l agen ts o f t h e state fo r any and a l l cri m es t h ey com m i t ­
ted d ur i ng a spec i fied period . B lanket A m nesty u s u a l l y does n o t d i ffe re n t i ­
ate between co rT1 m o n c r i m es , p o l i t i cal c r i m e s , and i nt erna t i onal c r i m e s , nor
d oes i t con s i d er the m o t i ves o f th e c r i m e . This category is b road and sweep­
i n g , often effect i ve l y e ras i n g a decade or m o re of abuse, repress i o n , and v i o­
lations w i t h the s t roke of a pen . Such l eg i sl a t i o n has been p art i c u l a r l y c o m ­
m o n i n Lat i n A m e r i c a , o ften enacted long before a n eg o t i ate d t r a n s fe r of
power, h e n ce obv i a t i ng the need to p lacate the mo s t v i o lated d o m es t i c i n e e r­
T hese a l l ­
e n com p ass i n g i m m u n i ty laws appe a re d i n t h e lace 1 97 0 s and early 1 9 8 0 s ,
before t h e i nc ernat i onal c o m rn u n i c y had d eve lop e d a s i g n i fi c a n t p ra c t i c e of
est
g ro up s
who
m ig h t
e v e n t ua l l y
d em a nd
a c c o u n t a b i l i t y.
e n fo rc i ng i nt ernational cri m i nal l aw ob l i ga t i o n s . M o reo v e r, e n a c t i n g re­
g i m e s were nor c h a ra c t er i ze d by the k i n d o f p o l i t i c a l freed o m s thar c o u l d
have g i v e n t h e l eg i s l a t ion d o m e s t i c l eg i t i m acy. l''f o t s u rp r i s i n g l y, s uc h a m ­
n es t i es have been w i d e l y cr i t i c i z ed .
ih
The fi rst a n d forem ost ex a m p l e o f B lan k e t A m n e s t y i s t h e C h i l ean l aw of
Apri l
1 8 , 1 97 8
(" c h e C h i l ea n Law " ) . ' ' A p p l y i ng che c r i t e r i o n o f l eg i t i m acy,
t h e Ch i le a n law has no d o m e s t i c l eg i r i m ,K y.
by severe
an d
c h e C h i l ean
After
a
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rec u r rent v i o l a t i o n s o f h u m <H1 r i g h ts and i me rn a t i o n a l
n or m s ,
j u ma , u nd e r rhe l e a d e r s h i p o f G e n e ra l A u g u s to P i n oc h e t Ug---- --------------------
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,,:
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T h o mpson , .tlljn·" n o r t· -' ' · ell .�S-YJ k x t• l a i n r n ,c: c h a r · · [ Y ] i CC I IllS
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r n o r:i l d i sa,c: rc c m e m w i l l I ll l l ,c: rctnr b L t r l k c r a lll ilL S r l· · · ) .
Lcm l l f i\ ll1 iH·s r l·. f\ o . .2 . 1 ::; 1 ( r\ p r. I .'-' . 1 l) I S ) ( C: h r l c- ; [ h nt: r n afrn C : h r l t c t i l Lm ] .
\V-sTr : t l . l-1 1 ,1 1 . 1 � 1\ i c ; H T"
1 i': · .s
"(
t· L I J I W il l t ! t· u n r h c r r d r s:t !c' r t:cllK I H \\" I r h f 'L I" f 't c i·awrs < > 1 . r n j u s r r c c u r i l c.s s rhv
J 'l
( { ) [11 -
r\.\ I I IZ I -
.-\ .': n T H I : · · p o ! I T I < : -; ! l F ,\ C ! ( I T .\ I I : :< T < : C t- 1 1 1 L D l - l{ J � c ; P " i ' :-> 1 \ l l ·: c-;T
i\Y i . ­
2001 I Reframing lmpmzity
483
arte , 18 i s s ued a self-serv i ng amnesty decree, cover i ng a l l acts comm i tted
s i nce t he overthrow of the de mocrati c governmen t of Salvador A llen d e on
Septem ber 1 1 , 1 97 3 . ·1 9 Stu d i es s uggest that , d ur i ng t h i s period , more than
2000 c i v i l i an s were k i lled and coun t less more became the v i c t i m s of tort ure ,
detention, relocation , and other serious cri mes . 5 ° Many of t hese cri mes were
com m i tted by t h e Nat ional I n t e l l igence D irec torate (DINA) to e l i m i nate
me m bers of the pol i t i cal oppos i t i on . 5 1 Most v i c t i ms were m e m bers of the
Soc i al i s t or Com mu n i st Part ies and were targeted for t heir pol i t i cal v i ews . 5 1
A s i g n i ficant problem w i t h t h i s l aw i s that i ts l egal basi s comes from th e
j un ta's de facto aut hori ty. The l aw h a s n o effective l i nk to th e C h i l ea n peop l e
a n d does not represent t h e i r preference s . A fter the d issolut ion of th e C h i lean
D I N A in 1 97 7 , the P i nochet gover n m e n t i s sued the amnesty law. I t was
nei t her passed by a democraticall y chosen par l iament nor s ign ed by
a
demo­
cratically elected head-of-s tate . The Freedom House score for C h i l e in th e
period of 1 97 7 co 1 97 8 w as a 7 , 5, w h ich translates i nto a " not free " state.
W h i l e its score i m proved co a 6, 5 in 1 97 8 and 1 97 9 , C h i l e was st i l l
clas s i fied as " not free . " 5 1 The s i t uation was one of extreme repression . A s one
comm entator puts i t , " the keys co [ P i nochet 's} s uccess were m as s i ve repres­
s i o n and econom i c i n novation . " 5 1 The I nter-American Com m i s s ion on H u ­
m a n R i g h t s [ herei nafter t h e I n t er- American Com m i ss i on} deemed t h e am­
nesty l eg i slation an " arbi trary act taken by t he m i l i tary reg i m e . . . . It is che
a c t t herefore of authorit i es w h o lacked a n y leg i t i m acy nor rig h t , since they
were not elected or appo i n ted in any man n er. " 5 5 Nonetheless, the j u n ta's de
fac co comrol over C h il e was s u c h t hat the am nesty decree w as given l egal
.:iS. For a derai led d i scussion or rhe prusec u r i o n and e x r r,1cl i r i o n of General Pi nocher, set \Vi l l i am
Aceves, L i/;crali.rm t!l/{l i lllt"rild!iolhtl /..,g,t! Sd,ofanhijJ: The Pillo(he/ Ct.rf t!l/(1 the tl l orc To1card
Sy.r h'l/1
o/ Trt lll'lld//IJ/hll L i l l ' Liti.�dlioll, -\ I 1-I A RV. [ t-;·(1. L.J. 1 2 ') (:! 0 0 0 ) .
r1
U 11irenal
-\ ' ) . f o r a d i scuss i o n o f r i l e h i s ron· or. r h t r u l e o f L!w r n (h i l t and r h e cr i m es u nd e r G e n e r.d P i noc h r:: r ,
stt
Rc,bert Q ll l n n , \Viii rbc f.ll!ic o / {,, / // E11cf.:' Cbt�llm.�illg Grc!II/J �/ A IIIIIc.ctl
Cllllr '.l s,'{/ ' I I odrl, (,� f OIW H .\ ,\ 1 L [� L V. ')0 5 ' 9 H I- L 7 ( l ')')4 ) .
o(i! P ri or
50
thr !Ittllh/11 /?;,r:,/JIJ \ l; ul,;tit!ll.>
( 0,\ 1 I S I (J N N .\ CI I I N.·\ 1 . D 1 : Vun M ll Y R t :CO N U I . I .\C I ( J "( , l l' FO I< � I E R r:r11c; a p p . 2 ( I ')')l ). lrlill.> l<�tul
111 CCL \ 1 1 S I ( J i'i N .-ICI O i'J .-1 1 . I l l : \'i iW:I I l Y R I:C O N C I L J . I CI (J 0: , R U'01n
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OF
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T1nn H ,\ N i l I\ 1 : U r 'J t : I I . I-IT I O '. a p p . 2 ( P h r l l r p E . B e r r y m a n r ra n s . U . of l\ o r rt [),llllt P rc·ss
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C 1 i 1 1 . 1 : 1 2-i-
2 5 ( I ')')_) ) ( n u r i ng rhar wrrurc "·as usecl lw r i l e J U nr a as a mc·ans ro consul i d arc puwn and t l u r m u rcc r h a n
Y. 2 7 ') ptoplt
51
52
\\ efe
k r l lt d u ndc·r m i l i ra n· r u l e ) .
0 1' 1' 1 C N H IC 1 ,\ I . '"fn .t norc: 5 0 . ar I Y. S
Set: Q u l l l l l . _, ltjn.r r w r c -1'). a r ') 1 5
) _) . S,,. Fi( l : i-: I J< l,\1 1- 1 < ! 1 S l ·: . !11/'l'tl ll i l [ L· 2 h .
5 -\. " " P .r u l \\; D t. r k c
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484
Harvard International Law]o!!rnal
I
Vol 42
effect 5 6 and e n forced by the C h i lean courts . 5 7 Wi t h i n t h i s A rti cle 's anal y t i ca l
framework, h owever, the law i s c l early void o f domestic l eg i t i macy ro o ted i n
t h e i nd i v idual authori ty o f C h i l ean c i t i zens Y' The C h i l ea n Law also lacks
any i nternational l eg i t i m acy. 5 9
A c lose analysi s of t h e text of th e C h i lean Law i l l us trates i ts sweep i ng
b read t h . The l aw g rants am nesty to " a l l persons who c o mm i tted , as perpe­
t rators , accomplices or conspi rators , c r i m i na l o ffe nces . . . between Sep t e m ­
b e r 1 1 , 1 97 3 a n d March 1 0 , 1 9 7 8 . "60 I t app l i es t o b o t h ac tual perpetrators
and acc omp l ices before and after th e fact . The law does not d is c ri m i nate
based on the m o t i ves for the cri m e . It app l i es eq ual l y, no matter i f th e
c n m e s were com m i t ted o ut o f personal a n i m os i ty or i n furtherance o f s tate
p o l i c y.
5 6 . The desuucrion of represen wr 1 ve gove r n m e n r m Ch i le was so complere rhar such l e g i s l a r i o n could
be i m p le menred wnhour any recou rse ro rhe popular w i l l . C usack observes rhar ''[r}he violcnr e l i m i na­
t i o n of rhe e lected governmem and rhe reprcsenrari vcs o f w e l l over a r h nd of rhe popuLu i o n meanr rhe
end of uusr i n r h e sysre m . ·· D AVI D F. C uS.>\C: K , R E V O I . L T I O N A :'-I D R E A CT I O N : TH E I N T L I < N c\ L DYNA,\ I I CS
OF CONFLICT A N D CONFRONTATI O N I N C H I L E 97 ( 1 97 7 ) . The a mnesry decree of 1 9 7 7 was passed before
rhe reforms o f rhe new 1 9 8 0 Cons r i ru r i o n , w h i c h , w i rhom redemocmr i z i ng C h i l e , cal l ed for a fu r ur e o f
" p rorecred or aurhori rarian democracy. . . O P P I' N H E I � r . JII/'W nore 5 0 , ar 1 20 . N u r h c r o f r h e proposed
reforms of P i nocher's Chacar i l las Speech o f J u l y 1 97 7 ( parri a l l y e lecred leg islarure, evenrual c i v i l ian r u l e )
h a d b e e n i mp lemcnred ar r h e r i me of r h e a m n e s t y decree. Even i f rhe decree were analyzed i n l 1g h r of r h t
n e w cons r i w r i o n , i r lacked leg1 r i macy, l or r he 1 980 Cons r i rur10n nself has been characrni zed a s " a fu n ­
clamema l l y u ndemocrat i c d o c u m e n r whose purpose w a s ro p ro l o ng P i nocher's r u l e
[ a n d } severe ]\·
l i m i r popubr par r i ciparion.
" /d. ar I .'\ 6 .
5 7 . I n o n e nureworrhy case, v 1 c r i ms' re larives b ro u g h r s u 1 r m 1\ ugusr 1 97 1-i against G e neral M a n u e l
Sepu lveda, D i recror of r h e D I N A , a l l c/,: I IJ_c; v i o la r i o n s of r\ r r i c l e 1 -'1 1 o f r h e P e n a l Cod e o f C h i l e , r e la r i ng
ru I l l egal <lrresrs and d i sappearances. The courr d ec l r ned J U r i sc! I c r i o n , n u r i ng char rhe accused was s u b j tcr
co m i l i rary law, a decision aftirmed b y r h e Courr uf A p pea l s o f' Sam i a,c; u. I n D t c e m h u 1 ')S') , r h e Sc·cond
M i l nary Tr i b u n a l ordered d i s rn iss<t! of rht case, purs uant to rhe C h i l ean Law. H e rmos d la , Case I 0.8 L1 ,
1 nr c r - A m C . H . R . 1 5 6 , 9[ 2-5 ( 1 ') ')6 )
5 S. The lack of l eg i r i mare connecuon (If l a w s J>assed by rhe P i nocher gove rn rn e n r I n rhe lace 1 9' l l s r u
rhe p o p u la r w i l l i s I ncl i cared furrhcr by r h c p o w c: r brokers of r h e P i nocher reg i m e , rum e l y "cap r r a i i s r s .
rech nocrars, and . . . r h e rn i l i rary, " rat her t h a n r h c sovc:rugn w i l l of r h e pe o p l e . Drake & Jaks i c , .\lljl!d noel·
5 4 . I n rhe legislarive p rocess, rhe m d r rary ti r m l y r e fu s ed ru neg o r i are w i t h rhe opposi t i o n or rake I mo
acc o u m popular senr i menr. !d. A ft e r rhe 1 9 7 ) overthrow of rhe A l lende governmem. " [ l } i be r a l d t· m uc ­
racy came co an encl . " C us.� C K , 111jJrr1 norc S o , ar 7 ') . The onh elcnion held d u r i ng rhe !are 1 97 0 s was rhe
pltbisc i re of 1 97 1-i , in which P i nochn's amlwn ry was nom i na l l y su pporrcd . b u r even rh1s meas u re was
" r o r a l l y conrro l l ed by rhe gove m m e n r . .. Drake & J a k s r c , l!!jlrc! nore 5 1 , ar 5. \V h d e P i nocher was nm
o m n i pore m , h i s power was l i m ned u n l v by rhe m d i rary <Inc! rhc s care I ts e l f, i ns r i r u r io n s char, rhough
somewhar responsive w s o c i e ta l pres s u r e s , d r d nor s peak d i rccr l y for or reprtsem l eg i r i m a r t pup u Lrr
<lLi thori ry. See A rr u ro Valenzuela. Tl't
111 P'JI/ 'er: The Co;n tju/atiri)/ lj O!!t ,\ ft.?JI f\11/c iii TH I' S T ! t u ; ­
G L L FOR D E I- I OUtM:Y I N C H I U : , .wpra nore 5 1 , at _! 1, 2 _! The l ac k u f l eg i t i macy of rhe am nesty d ec ree i s
e v i d e n ced by r h e scare's " u nprtcedemed degree of a u r o n o m 1· fmm mgan r zed c i 1· r l i<lll r m e r-es ts a n d p rc:s­
s u rc-s. · !d. ar 2 .) . The ner rcs u l r was t h er e r h e l) i n oc h cr rc,c; I nl t' was able w 1 m p l emem l [ S l t ,c; I s Lrr r o n " w r r h
.
m i n i m a l concern f(:;r r h e r e a cr i o n o l clf ! c c c t d g ro u ps . . I J Ste t � f,r, C t J � A C : K , ' iijlrc � n o r t 5 6 , <lC ') -l , 9 5 . I n
shon , " c i v i l ian p o l r r ical bchav l ( ) r a n d parr1· po l i t i C S
. were
e ! I m i nared . .. O I'PF N H I' I \ 1 , .\ 1/j!r,J n o t e S l l .
ar I 1 7.
5 9 . \V h i lt rhc L!rl l ted Suets tincr n c i <r l h· s upporrl'cl t h t P i nnchu reg J !ll(' ir>r the fi rst fe-w \'Cars clftu r l l l'
1 LJ 7 .) coup and the C J A was ac r r 1 c 1 1 1 r i l e
rhe r n rernariunal com rll U ll i C)' t o r r h c l'" l r r r cd s 1· s r e n 1 u r t h e <rm ikSfl' l a w 1 11 p a r t J c u Lu C: L : .S AC K , ' l!f'rr;
nurc S 6, at I 2 I .
G ll. C: h r l ca n L a 11· , ,� ;;jn ·c� n ot e 1 - . ,t r t
200 1 I Reframing lmp�tnity
48 5
A rt i cles 3 and 4 of t h e C h i lean law establ i s h a narrow range of excep t i on s
ro the amnesty. F i rs t , A r r i c l e 3 exempts s o m e common c r i m es i n c l u d i n g
robbe ry, d r u g t raffi ck i n g , a n d arson fro m th e amnesty, and many c r imes
aga i n s t the s tate such as tax frau d , e m bezz l e m e n t o f p ub l i c securi t i e s , and
s m ugg l i ng . 6 1 The exemp t i ons h ere are paradoxi cal s i nce am nesty i s exp res s l y
w i th h e l d for c r i m es agai nst the s t a t e , the v e r y c ri m es t hat a state l ik e l y has
stand i ng ro fo rg i ve . The o n l y i nternati onal c r i m es arguabl y excluded fro m
t h e a m nesty are p l under and rape a s c r i me aga i n s t h um a n ity, d e l i neated i n
t h e A r t i c l e 3 exemption a s " t h eft" and " rape . " Other serious i n ternational
c ri mes , such as genocide, torrure, and cr i mes agai n s t h u m an i t y are n o r i n­
c l uded i n the exemption and t h us are s u b j ect to the amnesty g ra n t . 6 2
The C h i lean law i s noteworthy i n that, on i ts face, i t does n o t d i ffe re n t i ­
a t e between perpet rarors ac t i ng w i t h s tate authori ty an d m e m bers o f th e
oppo s i t i o n wh o com m i tted s i m i lar c ri m e s . Rather, it appl i es equa l l y r o " al l
persons who . . . com m i tted c ri m i nal o ffences , " both th e m a j o ri ty and th e
m i no ri ty. c; :; One comm entator poi n ts o u t , however, th at many gover n men t
opponents were unab l e t o benefi t fro m th is l aw as t he y " had al ready been
k i l l e d, d i sappeared , or [were} in exi l e . "6 'i Moreover, the l aw was appli ed by
m i l i tary t ribu nals that had j u r i s d i c t i on over m os t cases d u r i ng this period ,
and were l ik e l y to favor t h e gover n m e n t , the m i l i tary, and t h e pol ice. De­
s p i te the release o f several h u n d red persons i m p ris o ned w i th o ur trial after
r h e law 's e n t ry i nro fo rce , c; 5 i t i s fai r ro say t hat the B lanket A m nesty appl i ed
pred o m i nan t l y ro government and m i l i wry fo rces . 6!1
The scope of the C h i lean Law is fu rther c haracter is tic of B l anket A m nesty
as it d oes not estab l i s h any a! tt rnare m eans o f red ress for v i c t i m s . It has no
prov i s i ons for an i nvestigatory body ro cons i der the a m ne s t i ed aces in a non­
c r i m i nal comex t . Nor does it p rovide a means o f c i v i l red ress for v i c t i m s to
seek pec uniary compensat i o n , ei ther from the perpe trator o r from th e s tate.
I ns tead , the l aw fu l fi l s t h e t ru e e t y m o l og i ca l roo t o f am nesty, w h i c h , l i k e
a m nes i a , derives from t h e G reek " a m n e s t i a " o r forgetfu l ness a n d o b l i v i o n . 6�
The goal of a B lanket A m nes ty, and that of r h e C h i l ean j unta, was
rhe c r i m es of the pas t . It
was
ro
forger
nor u nt i l Pres iden t Ay l w i n came to power i n
1 99 0 chat a Nati onal Co m iTt i s s i on o n Tr u t h and Reconc i li a t i o n was c reated
ro
i nvest igace past abuses _ c;s
1 9 9 5 , Peru fo l l owed C h i l e 's example an d enaccecl a
B l an k e t A n1 nes r y, fo rget t i ng past auoc i cy. I n res ponse ro escal a t i ng attacks
JVIore rece n t l y, in
{; J
1J ell" ( . ) .
(, 2
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(, ) ld
() . j _ Qulllll , -'11/'U
(, � .
(;.�l ii!t',
noce
i ') , '1c ') I S .
/\ .\ I I : I U C : . \ � \V. \H . l-1 . .CII/1!':!
rHJ CL'
LJ
(, :--; _ S,·, I I .�Y :-.: r : r ; _
2 5 ) ' . 2 5 j ) n. l
'"��/"'· '
nucc· 1 _:; ,
CI C
i _:;
:\ (�"1;//1//1·: F/Jc / J/// )
s�'( L ) i a n c ()rt· n t l i c h c r.
\ ( ) 1 ) Y.-1 1 1.
.j(,_
1
"r
( \ '!') \ )
_) ) .
(II
Prrn"e(i!h" 1-/;;;;;.u;
Harvard lnternationcd Law]onrncd I Vol 42
486
by g uerri l la g roups , such as the Sh i n i ng Path and the Tupac A m ar u Revol u ­
t i o nary Moveme n t , t h e Peruvian government i n early 1 98 3 t ra n s ferred th e
counter- i n s urgency operati o n s fro m th e po li ce ro th e m i l i tary. 69 T hereafter,
A m nesty I n ternat i onal (AI) and o t h e r h uman r i g h ts organi z a t i o n s began ro
receive n umerous compla i n t s , docu m e n t i ng over 4000 d i sap pearances and
5 0 0 extra-j udicial exec u t i ons between 1 98 3 and 1 99 2 .70 In order t o preve n t
p rosec u t i o n of t h e perpe trators o f these ab uses , t h e Peruvian Co n g ress passed
t h e fi rs t of two amnesty laws ( " th e F i rs t Amnesty law " ) , law No. 2 64 7 9 , o n
J u ne 1 4, 1 99 5 . 7 1
The Peruvi an legislat i o n g rants w ide-ran g i n g i m m u n i ty. T h e F i rs t A m ­
nesty law, l i ke that of C h i l e , grants a B lanket Am nes ty. I t i s , h owever, even
m ore far reac h i ng than the Ch i lean law in that it app l i es both " ro c o m m o n
o r m i l i tary c r imes , whether w i t h i n the j urisd i c t i o n o f c i v i l o r m i l i tary
c o ur t s . "7 2 A l l crimes rangi ng fro m m u rder and rape to robbery a n d fraud are
i nc l uded. The o n l y l i m i tatio n on th e grant of amnesty is t hat t h e c r i m es
" de rived , o r i g i nated fro m ,
or
[were} a conseque nce of th e fi g h t aga i n s t ter­
ror i s m . . . between May 1 98 0 " and J u ne 1 9 9 5
n
As appl i e d , the o n l y
s i g n i ficant res t r i c t i o n o n the am nesty i s temporal . A rt i c l e 4 o f t h e F i rs t Am­
nesty law further extended the am nesty rerroac tively, mand at i ng th e "a n ­
n ul [ m e m } of all pol i c e, j ud i c i a l , and c ri m i nal records . . . [and th e} release o f
t hose pardoned wh o are cu rre n t l y under arrest . " 7 1
W h i le the scope o f crimes covered by th e F i rs t Am nesty law i s b roader
chan that covered by i ts C h i lean c o u n terpart, the Peru v i a n law is tai l o red ro
be n efit only the m i l i tary reg i m e i n power \v h en the am n e s t i ed c r i m es ocG <J . For a b r i e f rev iew o f c h e h i s c o n· ( l c h e S h 1 n i ng P <t c h m o v e m e m , see C a r l os han D eg r eg o r i , Sbntmg
Patb d!ld Cot/11/erittJI!IYfll()" SlrCitcg)'
SiiiCf
rbc
r\ rrut o/ ;\ /;itt/(fC! Gl!�ll/cl/1 , itl P l ·: H u
[))
C IU S I S : D I CTATOI\ S H I P
Ol\ D L ,\ I OCI\;I C Y ' s l ' o 2-0-l (j oseph S . Tu l c h i n & Ga r v B LIIld eel s . ' 1 99 5 ) [ h e c e i ll <l f"c e r P uw I N C IU S I S } .
7 0 . A ,, t :--.: r :STY
l :--.:-rT H !'..: .�T ro:--.:.� r . ,
P r: !( c :
L1\\·s
A ,, r ,..; �:sTY
C o N so r . r DATE
L \ l P C f' ITY
FO R
1-! u ,, t A :.l
1\ t C H T S V I O UTIO'-'S ( 1 9l) G ) [ h t r t i nafc e r i\. \ 1 1\ E STY LI\\"S (Oi'JSO I . I DAIT l i\ I I' U :" I T Y } , h c c p : / / w w w. w e b .
<t m n escy. o rg ( v i s l [td F t b . .2 1 . .::' ( ) ( ) I ) ;
.�ec
,t!so Deg rego r 1 ,
i!;jn d
.
n o c t G 9 , a c 9 .::' (contend i n,c: c h a c , fro m l 9S S
u m i l 1 99 1 , P e r u h ad the world 's h 1 ghest ra ct: o f d i sappearances ) .
7 1 . f 1 rs c A m ncs c y La w of J u n t l -1 , 1 9 9 5 , N o . 2 G -'i 7 9 ( 1 995 ) ( Pe r u ) [ h e re i n a fter f i rs c i\ m ne s c y Law ] ,
! iwulated i11 A ,\ ! N ESTY L1ws C o c; S U I . I D .�-rT I.\ ! P U :.l rTY,
7 2 . F 1 rs c t\ m n esty Law rt<Jcls 1 11 perr 1 ne m p<H C :
A r t i c l e I . Gra n c a g en e r a l
am neslv CJ>
"
i lljl r : t
.
nott 7 0 .
t h t il·! i i J tary, P o l l e t or C i v i l 1an personnel
fo rnul cump L t i n c , J n ves c i g a c i o n , c r i m i n a l c h a rg e , r r i ,d . o r c u n v i c c i o n t ( J r c o m m o n o r m i l 1 r a n ·
n i m c s . w h crhcr u n d e r c h e J U r i s d i c c i o n o i" c h c· c i v i l or m i l i cary c u u r r s , i n n:-Ln i o n
or ori g i n <ttecl fro m ,
or
co
a l l tH: n cs d e r i ved
a conse:q u e nu: of, t h e tig h c a,c: a i ns t tc- r m r i s m . and w h i c h m a 1· have bce:n co m ­
m i rrcd t 1 c h c r i nd 1 v i d ua l l y or by r w o ur m o re perso ns buwt<:n i\by 1 90 0 a n d c h e clare on w h i c h c h i s
l aw i s pro m u l gac<: d
A r t i c l e 5 . The 1\ l i l i cm·, Pu l i ce:
d t u <d p r oc e s s
or
or
( i ,· J ! J a n pers o n n e l who (tee a formal
co m p l a i m ,
<IS reg u Lt c c-d b1· Lt\1· N ·' .:' S , G 5 9 . i s txc l u d �:d fru m chc p rm· i s t o n s in c h t s l a w .
A r c t c l c G . T h e t\·l: n c s
or
c r i mes
cm· e r c d
b y c h 1.: a m n c sc y Ll\\· , ,t \ \ r u l 1 n g s i n l·a,·or of d t: h n J c i ,·e l l· c l osw J ll\"eS l l ,L: <l C i o n . i n q u i n· or s u m m a n· p ro n:nl­
1 11,!' <l J u c l i c i a l p rucc.; s . <lnd <KlJ U I C Lt l s . a r1.: nor s u b jecc
t n ,c: s ; a i i J u d i c i<il casc·s. \l" h J.:C h cr l l l\L: O i ng
!cl. a r c s . I , 5 .
- .1 . IJ a r c . \ .
- -i
ld a rc . - i .
i tl \"cs r i g �t c i u n , J U ­
com· i c [ l u n l ( > r r h t: cr i m e s o i " I l \eg,t \ D r uc: Tmi"lic k i n g , of Terro r i s m a n d of Tre-ason
or
vxcc u c t d . rt·nu i n t ng d e li n l [ i v t h· c l osed .
487
200 1 I Refrctming lmjmnity
c urre d . T h e F i rs t Amnesty law i s spec i fi ca l l y formulated ro exempt m e m ­
bers of the res i s tance from t h e amnesty, g rami ng i mm u n i t y o n l y ro " t h e
M i l i tary, P o li ce , or C i v i l ian person n e l . " 7 5 As s u c h , t h e amnesty appl ies o n l y
t o m e mbers of the gove rnmem (and t h e i r subordi nates) w h o e nacced i t . B y
tai loring t h e am nesty o n l y r o b en efi t t h e governmem , th e F i rs t Amnesty
law ne i ther m eets t h e test of coherence nor respects th e peopl e as th e source
o f g overnmemal amhori ty.
The pol i t i cal c i rcumstances under w h i c h the law was passed further sug­
gest t he l eg i s la t i on 's lack of d om es t i c l eg i t i macy. I n the years precedi ng the
enactmem o f the amnesty law s , Pres i d e m F u j i mori s everely curta i l e d Peru's
de mocrati c p oli ti cal i ns t i t u t i o n s . 7 r, The " reforms" of F u j i m o r i 's s e l f-coup
s i g n i ficaml y underm i ned the governme n t 's capabi l i ty c o enact de mocra t i ­
cal l y l eg i t i mate law s , a s congres s i onal represe ntat i o n was d ec reased77 a n d th e
j ud i ci al system emaciated . ' s M oreover, evidence suggests t h at t h e Peruvian
congress often , and parti cularly i n th e case o f the am nesty l aw, fai led ro con­
s i der or debate the l eg i s l at i o n , b ut rather " rubber s tamp[ed} legi s l a t i o n i n i ­
t i ated b y t h e execm ive . " 7� The m i l i tary was also able r o w i e l d extensive
i n fl uence on t h e p o l i c i es of t h e F u j i mori govern m e m . so
7 5 . /c/. a r c . l .
7 (J . For exa m p l e , o n A p n l 5 , I SJ 9 2 . t h e P res i d e n c · · s u s p e n d e d t h e cons t J t u t i o n , d i ss o l ved t h e Cont' ress
a n d t h e J Uch c i a ry, p l ;lced several
c
o n g re s s i o ru l kad t rs u n d er h o u s e an·e s c , a n d 1 m pusecl t e m porary b u r
h a rsh censors h i p o f c h c press . . . Caro l G ra h a m , llltrucil!<"liou: Ouii''""<�'Y ill
ill P I ' I{L!
1 '-J
crt:<H i nt'
<1
C R I S I S . .iii/JI"<I nme 69,
<\[
Cri.ri.r cmcl tb� lutenlt!IIf!!MI l?rJ/'''"-''· ·
I ' 5 . \XI h i le some or c h e p res i d t n c 's a c t i o n s boosted h i s pop u Li r i t \',
k i n d of F u 1 i m o r i person a l i ty c u l c , c h e y d i d so u u c s i d e i n s t i t u t i o n s of d e m o c ra t i c l eg i t i macy .
"/. a t (, , and l a rg e l y w i t h c h e su pport or c h e rn i l i ra ry. Sur f e r n a n d o Ruspig l i os 1 ,
De!!Io<ra,y:r
.co·e
B !ud2 P ru.�pe<!.i.
P t' l< U I <" Clus1s, .fllj ii'Cl noce 09. a c -i O , .'! .2-:l o . i\l i l i tarv s u p p o r c , howevt-r, was " c o u p l e d w J t h a cons i d c :r­
ablt deg ree or q u ecs t i o n i n g o f t h e kg l t i macy o f d e m oc raC\· by chc m l i i wry, [ m a k i ng) a cl emocra c i c rtg l m e
u nsustai nable . . . /d. ac -i S . F u j i mo r i p roceeded co d r,l fr <1 new cons c i c u c i o n , w h i c h was rac i lied in a n a t i o n a l
111
reftre n cl u m i n Ocwbtr l 99."> See C O I . I ·: T'L� A . Yo U :< ( ; uzs. D L U J N STKLCT I '-J G D t.:. \ I OCI{ A C Y : P EIUJ U :--: ­
D L R P IU ' S I D E I" T A I. I \ EI\TU F U_i l \ 1 0 1{ 1 l) ( .2 0 0 ( 1 )
77.
E l t·cwral c lunges l e J co " s i g n i li c a n c l y l ess u f c h e Peru v i a n pop u l a t i o n e n j o y i n g reprcsc mar i o n I ll
C o n g rcs s , a n d hence recl uc[cd] t\"t:ll fu r c h e r r h c s e n se of accou n c a b i I i c y
J l!jn·< l
nmt 76, ac 2 1
.
co
c he e l tccoracc· . " YcJL; :" < ; 1: R o; ,
ror e xa m p l e . 1 11 1 990, c h e C<mg rtss h a d 2 - i O me mbers, ont for each
.20,96_)
,·uctr.i .
H owc-H:r, ac c h c C l llle c h e f i rs t A m nooS t )' L\\v was p<lSStcl i n I 9 9 5 . Congress was c o m p r i sed of o n h· l _' ( )
m e m be r s . w i r h o n e reprts e m a c i ,·e f()f each 1 0 .2 , 5 _\ 7 vorcrs. /d. Tht· nee res u l t w;1s " a fu r c h t r · d i v i ck be­
r wt t n m u s e Peruv i a n s and c h e po l i t i ca l p rocess, and s r rc n g c h [ e n e d } ;H t i wdts a m o ngst c h c pop u b c J Oil
I a r,;.; e c h a r govt r n rn t n c dun nm r a k e I t S 1 n ccrtsrs
7:-l.
From t\ prd 1 99 2 co .J u n e I SJ96, P e r u Licked
abo l i s h ed Lw c h e se l f-coup and
nut
'1cco u m . " · IJ
1 11 to
<H ­
h i g h c o u r t . The Con s r i w t 1 o n a l Tr1 b u na l HSt l f \\ <lS
a
rt i n s ca cc:cl u n c i ! I )JSJ{j_
lei.
ac .29
E v e n c h t reafcer c h t: Tri b u na l s c- ffc·c ­
t i ventss \l ·a s l i m i t ed . t\ il\· ptl l t i n n s f()l' rev i e w ot. lc,l! I s l a t l o n l u d w be prtsc med w H h i n s 1 x m o m h s . T h e
res u l t w a s dft·n i n· l y cu p ro h i b i t lllL"<lil i ll,t;fu l J U d i C i a l
IT\" J C W.
IJ Tht Tr 1 b u n a l a lso factd c o n s i cltra h l t·
p rt s s u r t . c h rtcl [ S , a n d 1 11 [ l m i cl ci t J o n , fu r t h e r res t r 1 n i n g 1 ts trL·L· d u m . /d. at :) 0 . A n u m ber of l o w e r-co u rt
j ud g c·s 11·cre J ll \'t:Sugaced or cl J s ll1 1 SSc·d a fr c r r u l m .l! at' a i n s c r h t: govc rn m en r . It!.
�)a�;b l i & i\lax }- kma nclt:z. ThL" Cri.�i.• o/ (, ut ,·m.Ia,·, , i11 P L H L 1 -..: C:IU:) I :',
' 9 . Yr > L." -..: c uz s , .l!rj•r<�
c: r ,· ,; s
,
I u s tc:ntkd
ckb;Ht ;Inti
w
n m c·
� (j _ a t .2 :
J ft
Sat'<l S i i
0:
:'dc1x. 'il/' � "il
! \ ( l [ t:
.'
1/f ! '< l
;![
n o te 69.
.) 1\
;![
.rn
.If., o Frc1 n c i sco
.2 2 , _' i .
7 :-; , a r .2 2 -.2_) ( a r,t; U l il _l! c h a r " C ( I l ! ­
q u i c k k a p p ro Y c icJ\I'S p u r fu rward h 1 · r h c exec U C J \"C h rcm c h , S t l ill t C l m ts \l· i r h l i [ l l t·
n.� n m m a l p rl lLHi u rc·s ' ' J .
.'i l l . S n E m i q u c· ( ) b ;I n d " . T/;,· 1-' ,, u " · o / l'er!i .' .-\ m�cd f- ,,r<n . 1 11 P L IU.' 1 -..: ( IU S I S . .1//jn ·,/ n o t e b )l .
I I _)- 1 S I I H >t 1 rJ_;.; t h<H Fu J l muri · , rc l 1 a nee ( Ill c h t· i l l i 1 1 L i n· w l i l l l ' k lllc·n c h i s I '" I I u t s ) , I 0 5 rig . :-l . I
;J t
Iill .
Harvard International Lazu}ournct! I Vol. 42
488
F reedom House , in i t s 1 994-9 5 and 1 99 5 -96 s t u d i e s , rated F u j i mo r i 's
Peru a 5 , 4 (par t i al l y free) . 8 1 Though s l i g h t l y bener than C h i le 's 7 , 5 rat i ng
( n o t free) , Peru's scores are s t i l l far from th e
2 1;2
benc h m ar k of fre e do m .
Taken c o l leccivel y, F u j i m o r i 's c u l t o f personal power and h i s d e s t ruct i o n o f
democrati c i ns t i tutions h ave been c haracteri zed as " a d i s m a n tl i ng o f t h e ba­
sic i ns t i tu t i o nal s t ruccures of democrat i c governance , "82 w h i c h , t herefo re ,
d en y the am nesty l aw d o m e s t i c l eg i t i macy.
L i ke i t s C h i l ean counterpart , th e F i rs t A mnesty Law p rovid es no a l ternate
means of recourse or i nves tigat i o n . I n fact , Art i c l e 6 of th e F i rs t A m nesty
Law g uarantees absol ute i m m u n i ty by ensuri ng t hat aces covered b y t h e l aw
are " not s u b j ec c co i nves t i ga t i o n [or} i n q u i ry. " 8 ) A l l l i ab i l i ty, b o t h c i v i l and
c r im i na l , i s thereby exti n g ui s h ed . I nd i v i d ua ls , v i c t i m s , and society at l arge
were den ied any means of seekin g t r u t h , reparat i o n s , and co l l ec t ive h ea l i ng
of nat i on al wounds . 84
The appl i cat i o n of amnesty i n Peru d e m o n s trates t hat even a n e m ac i ated
j ud i c iary has fou n d t h e l a w trou b l i ng . I m m ed iately after th e F i rs t A m n es t y
Law came i nto force , J uclge A nt o n i a Saq u i c i ray, i n ves t i gat i ng t h e 1 99 1 B ar­
r i os A l tos massacre , rul ed t h e F i rs t A m n es t y Law i napp l icabl e to that case.
Wh i le the case m ad e i ts way t h rough the j ud i c i al syste m , th e Peruv i a n C o n­
g ress passed the Second A m nesty Law, exten d i ng ch e scope o f i m m u n i ty a n d
e n s u r i ng the e n forcement of t h e orig i nal orcler. 8 5 T h e Seco n d A m n e s t y Law
removed the F i rs t Amnesty Law from the real m of j udic ial revi ew. 80 \"<< h e ther
S I . F!UT D0,\ 1 H o L.:S f: ,
n o t e .2() .
at I ; .1ee C//.ro Sa_gasti & H e rn;mclcz . .utj >rc� n o t e 71) , at .! ' ( <lf,S U l n,s t h a t
t h e " c hecks a n d ba l a nces thar a r t essenr i a l ro a v i able and work l n _s d e mocracv a r e nor i n pL1ce i n Peru ,
;mel r h e prospects fo r i m p r o v i n g cle m uc rar i c ,;,:overnancc: tn P e- r u <lppL·ar u ncert a i n a n d prob l t: m a r i c " ) ; .rce
a/.rn R os p i g l t os i , _r;;;"·" note- 7 6 , ar 4 2 ( n o t i ng r u p mo r i was '\\· t i l i n g ro g o \· e m w i r h o u r rhe ' b u rd e nsome
d e r a i l s ' of t h e p;n l i a m e nr and the j ud iciary" ) .
:) _) . Fi rst A m n e s t \ · Law, wj;rd n o t e 7 1 , a r t . 6 .
s l. \
i b r r h a M i now descri bes r h e 1 m porrance of t hese al rc-rn;nive means oC recou rse, not i ng c h a r " t h e
process uf s e e k i n g repara t i o n , a nd o f b u d d i n g c om m u n t t i e s o f su pport w h t l c s p read i n g k n o w l ed g e of r h t
v i o la r i o n s and r h e t r m e a n t n g s i n pt'opl c's l t vts m a y be mort v:t l uab l t , u l r t m a r c l y. t h a n an\' spec i ri c v i c tory
S .! . Yo c " G E I\ S ,
or
.lllj>rc�
illj >rct
n ot e 7 G ,
offe r of remedy. " !v{ J 'JO\\' , .wprrl n o t e _)4.
ar
9 .'>
0 5 . See A :- I N ISIY L�\\ s C O i' S O J .ID,\TF h!I' U N ITY, .lilf'r,; note 7 1 1 . at .2 .
;';(i_ S t·co n d A m ncsry Law of .J une .! S , l 99 5 , N ° . 2 6 . -i ') .! ( 1 9 9 5 ) ( P e r u ) ( o n l i l e w i t h H arvard l nt e rn ;lr i onal Law Journal ) [herei nafter Second A m n es t y Law ] . Tht' Second A m nesty l .aw reads in p a r r :
A r t i cle I .
t h e :tmnesty g r:uHtd by L a w Nc .2 6 .4 7 9 d oes n o r con s t i t u t e an i n r trftrenct 1 11 r h c
fu n c r i o n i n!' of tht' J u d i c i a r:·, n or clot's 1 r underm i tK the d u n · of r h t· Sr:ttl' to respecr and guara ntee
r h e fu l l c n i'o r c t m e n r of t h ose h u m a n r t g h rs as recog n i zed h 1 · :trt i c l t- - 1 - 1 o f t h e Cun s r 1 t u r i o n and b y .
a nwn,L: u r h c r h u m :t ll r i g h ts Trear i e s . i\ r r i c l e I , S te t l o n I , ot t h t A m n i e:tn C:onvc· m i o n o n 1- l u nun
r i g h ts .
,-\ rricle .1 . ,\ m ( l c I. or Ltw N ' 2 6 . - 1 7 ') is to
be i n t erprt: r ed I l l
the
sense t h ;n a l l
u n d e r the o b l t ,t: a t t n n to a p p h· r h c ,�.: e n e ra l am ntsry w a l l n·t: n t s d er i v e d
or
J u d i C i a l Bodies ;tre
or a c o n ­
o r i ,�.: 1 n a ted f ro m ,
st· q u e n<:c uf. t h e h ,L: h t ag a i n s t t e r ro r i s m , w h e t h e r c u m l ll l t t ec ! t n d l \' l c l u,d l ,· "r h\· ( \\'O or m o r L· persons
bc:t\\·ecn ;-, L ll'
1 -i . 1 99 5 . and whet h e r o r n o r t hL· m i h r<tn·, j'O ! I Ct: o r c i v i 1 1 an person1kl
a fo rmal c o m p l ai n t , 1 1 1 \'CS t t g a t i r l l l . is s u ll J c c r w U l lll l ll : t l p ro c t·td i i\L: S . m has he-en
colW I U td : :t i l J U d t l u l case s . w h c: r h e r on,sotng u r c::-:ecu tcc l , rc· I n a i n d c h n t t l \·t·h· c l ust·c l 1 11 ;tccurd;IIK L·
\\· i r h a rt i e it- (i or r i t e- a hO\'t: 111l' n t i Ol l t'd Ll\V
/J <trl S . I . " ·
I ')SO and J u ne
1 rn p h u t c d . Etcc
489
200 1 I Refrcmzing lmjJ!mity
s uc h a non-rev i ewabl e l a w was perm i s s i b l e under the Peruvian Cons t i t u t i o n
was q ues t i o nable ,87 b m t h e Peruvian Congress sought to i m bue t h e Second
A m nesty Law w i t h consti t u r io nal l eg i t i macy by i nvoki n g A r t i c l e 1 02 , Sec­
t i o n 6 of the Cons t i t m i o n , accordi ng t o w h i ch " amnesty . . . is a r i g h t o f
grace . . . w h i c h c an o n l y be g ra nted exc l us ively by Congress . ··�� Given t h e
l ac k of a con s t i t ut i o n a l t r i b u n a l t o revi ew the l aw, h owever, i ts con s t i t u t i o n ­
al i ty was l argely acad em i c . T h e Second A m nesty Law effectiv ely overturned
J udge Saq u i c i ray's rul i ng an d extended amnesty to th at cas e . In add i t i o n ,
t h e Second A m nesty Law expanded t h e temporal scope o f t h e a mnesty t o
cover cri mes com m i t ted between May 1 98 0 and J un e 1 5 , 1 99 5 , b u t n o t
reported un t i l after J un e 1 5 , 1 99 5 . s9
The Peruv i a n C ong ress seems to have been aware of t h e p roblems w i t h
t h e scope and l eg i t im acy o f t h e F i rs t A m nesty Law. \'V h i l e expand i ng t h e
scope of the fi rst l aw, t h e seco n d decree seeks to l eg i t i m i ze t h e F i rs t A m ­
n e s t y Law and b r i ng i t i nto c on formi ty w i t h Peru's i nternat i onal obl iga­
t i o n s . The Second A m nesty Law declares t hat the F i rst A m nesty Lavv " does
not unde rmi ne the duty of the s tate to respect and g uaran tee those h uman
r ight s as recog n i zed by . . . t h e Cons t it u t i o n . . . an d h u m an righ ts trea­
t i e s . "9D W h i l e the net res u l t of the Second Amnesty Law is s t i l l to expan d
the appl i cab i l i ty of the prev i ou s d ecree, a s t r i c t l y texmal read i ng of t h e l aw
suggests that the fi rs t law s h o u l d be i nterpreted narrowl y as to co mply w i t h
i n ternational h um an r i g h ts o b ligat i o n s . T h e c o n t rad i c t i o n s between t h e
c l ear i n ten t of t h e Second A m nesty Law and i ts s c r i c t tex t u a l i n terpretat i o n
h ig h l i g h t t h e t e n s i o n s i n the Peruv ian exec u t ive-j udicial eq u i po i s e and cast
d oubts u pon the l eg i t i m acy of the legi s la t i o n . S i nce t h e re have been n o
m ea n i ngfu l opport u n i t ies to chal l e nge the Peruvian am nesty laws, h owever,
the i nt erpretation of the two laws as app l i ed appears broad . They gram a
w i d e- rangi ng am nes ty, are exem p t fro m j ud ic i a l review, and l ack m ean i ngfu l
i nd icarors of d o m e s t i c l eg i t i m acy.
Many o c her s tares in Lat i n i\. merica and el sewhere h ave fo l lowed t h e
m odel of B lanket A m nesty estab l ished b y C h i l e a n d ut i l i zed b y Pe ru . A r-
� � - Second r\ m n � s r 1· Lctw . .llijlr. r
S<). !).
' ! 11. IJ
�1 n .
ctr-r.
_J .
I
llfJ [ L·
:-: () , cUT. .,
490
Harvard I ntenwtional Laze} Ol!l?Zcti I Vol. 42
g em i na,Sl l E l Salvador,9 2 N i caragua , 9 1 Sri lanka,9-4 and U ruguay95 h ave a l l
passed or enacted B lanket A m nesty i m m un i z i ng pol i t ica l , m i l i tary, a nd p o ­
l i ce officials for a l l sig n i ficant c r i mes comm i tted d u r i n g a s e t peri o d . W h i l e
these laws d i ffered s l i g ht l y, t hey have a l l b a d l i t t l e , i f any, d o m e s t i c l eg i t i -
9 l . F u l l Scop Law. N o . 2 .1 . 4 9 2
( 1 98 6)
( A rg . ) (on fi l e w i t h Harvard f m e rn a t i o n a l law J o u rn a l ) ; Due
Ob ed i e nc e law, No. 2 .3 . 5 2 1 ( 1 98 7 ) ( A rg . ) ( o n fi l e with Harvard I m e r narional law J o u r n a l ) .
<) 2 . L a w o f G e n e r a l A m nesty fo r t h e C o n s o l i d at i o n of Pe<lCe, Decree N o . -186 ( 1 9 9 1 ) ( E I Sal) (on fi l e
w i r h Harvard I n ternational L a w J o u rnal ) . I n p e rt i n e n t p a r t t h e law rea d s :
A r t i cle 1 : A broad , absolute and u n c on d i t i on a l a m nesty is g ra n t ed i n bvor of all c h ose w h o tn one
W<lY or a n ot h e r part i c i pated in p o l i t i c a l c r i m e s , c r i m es w i t h p o l i r i c1 l ra m t fi car i o n s , or c r t m ts c o m ­
m ! t r ed by no less t ha n twe n ty p e op l e , before J a n uary l , 1 99 2 , r eg ard l es s of w h e r h e r p roceed i ngs
agai nst t h em fo r t h e perpetra t i o n of t h ese c r i mes have com men ced or nor , o r
c e t v ecl a sen tence as a consequence . .
whether they have re­
,\rr i c l e .1 : Those who w i l l not be fa v ore d by rht a m nesty are:
( a ) Those who i nd i v i d ua l l y or· c o l l e c t i v e l y p a n i c i p ared tn r h e c r i mes t y p i fied i n rhe second i r t m of
Article 400 o f r h e penal code and carritcl ou r t h ose c r i mes w i r h a v i ew ro p ro fi t , wherher or nor rhe
person i s se rv i n g rime i n p r i son as a co n s e q u e n c e : and
( b) T h os e w h o t n d i v i d u a l ly or co l le c t i v e l y part i c i pated tn r h e c r i m e s t y p i fi ed i n A rt i c l es 220 a n d
2 5 7 of rhe p e nal c o d e and r h o st i n c l uded i n rhe l a w r e g u l a t i n g d rug r e l a re cl acr i v i r i es .
!d. a rrs . l , .) .
( l ')90) ( i\: i c a r ) ( o n file w t r h
') ) . Law of General A m nesry a n d N a t ional Reconc i l i a t i o n , N o . S l
H a rv<trd I nr ern a r i onal law
J ou rn a l ) .
The releve n r passages r ea d ·
A r t i c l e I : A ge n e ral and u n cond t t i o n a l a m n e s t y is h e reby g r a n t ed
ro
I . A l l N i c a r ag u a n s . . . , who com m i t ted c r i mes aga i n s t r h t p u b l i c orde r a n d rhe t n rernal and ex­
rcrnal sec u r i t y o f t h e s tare a n d or h e r rcla red a c e s .
2.
A l l c i v i ! t a n <tnd m i l i rary N i c a r ag u a n s who may h a v e c o m m t t r ed i n fra c t i o n s 1 11 c t r ry t n g o u r o r
i n n: s r i g a r i n g c ri m i n<1l a c r s cltsc r i bcd i n r h c p roc e e d i n g parag ra ph .
,\ m e l t 2 . The a m n es t )' rc:ferred
1 ')7 <) up
lrl a r r s . l - 2 .
ro
ro
t tl r h e p re c e d 1 ng p a r ag rap h i n c l u d es r h t p e r 1 0 d fro m J u n e 1 9 ,
t h t d a rt on w h i c h t h e c u rrent Ll\\' g oe s t n w e ffe c t .
')- ! . l ncl e m n i ry Law t(Jr Sc:c u r i r y
l nr c: rnct r i o n a l Ll\v .J o u rna l ) . The
2 . N o ct c r i o n
or mher
Fo r ce Perso n n e l ,
law r ead s 1 n p a r r :
N o . 2 0 ( I <)S 2 ) ( S r i Lank<l) ( o n li l t w i r h H a rvard
l e ga l p m c e ed t n g wl1<1 r soc-vcr, w h c- r h e r c i v i l
<1111' c o u r t of law fi:>r or on acco u nt o f or i n re spe c t o f
cmv
ac r ,
or
c r i m t n <t l . s h a l l be: t llSt t ru rc:d t n
m a t t l: r or t h i n g
, w h u h e r ltgal o r o t h ­
e r w i se , d o n e o r p ur p or r ed ro be c l o n e: w i r h a v i ew ro res t o r i n g Ltw a n d u r d e r d u r i n g r h c p e r i o d
A u g u s t 1 , I <) 7 7 ru [ 2 0 1\Iav l <) S 2 } . i f cl o n e i n g ood fa i t h . Lw
a
i\I i n i s r c -r . D e p u r \· i\I i n t s r c: r
h o l d i n g office u nder or e m p l oye-d i n any ca pa c i r y w h e r h e r nava l , m t l i r a r y . a i r t(Jrct. p o l i ce
or
or
p e rs o n
c i ,· i l ,
or
b\· a n y person acr i ng t n go o d fa i r h u n d e r r h e a u r h or i ry u f a cl t rtu i o n of a lvf i n i s r e r , Dqn t rv i"v[ i n , s r c r
or
person h o ld i n g offi ce or s o e m p lovcd <tncl d o n e or p u rporrc:cl
d u r v n r for r h c e nfo r c c m e m o f L l w a n d ord e r
or
ro
be: d o n e t tl r h e e:-;cc u r t o n o f h i s
fo r t h e p u b l i c safe r v u r u r h t r \\' ise t n r i t e p u b l i c t n ­
cncsr .
ld ctrr . 2 .
l) ) . Law N u l l 1 fy i ng r h e Srcuc·s C Lt t m
''' ' t h I- h r,· a rd l n r e rn a r i o n a l L1 ,,.
A. r r i c l t 1 :
J uu r tu l ) .
w
P u n i s h C:crcc1 i n C n m e s , N ·
T h e reJ c-,·a n r po rr i o n r e a d s :
l 5 . S- 1 S ( l ') S (J ) ( U r u ) ( o n fi l e
lr i s reco).: n i zed c ha r as a c o n s e q ut:tKe of r l t t l og t c uf t h e
t"IT ll t S
stL· m tll t ll.� fro m r h c·
cl g rt·t· m c nt b n w e e n rhe pu l t r i ct l parr i e s a n d r h e: A ml t: d Fo rces t il A u ,c: u s r I 'JS · i cu>cl
1 11
urcl c r
rtl
cum­
p l c r e rht· r ra n s i r i o n ro fu l l c o t t s r i r u r ional u rd t r . r h c S c a r e rc l i ncJ U I Shts rhe cxcru s t· o f pcnct! <K t i u ns
,,. t r h rcsptn
w
c r t mts com m i r r t d u n t i l ;\ [a rc h I . l 'lS S . b, · m i l t t <HY el m! p u l tcc ollt c t a l s e i t h e r for
po l t t i ci l rcclsuns t l r in fu l fi l l m e nt uf r h c t r fu n c t i o ns and t il ubn· , ng o rd e rs from S U !'c r i o rs d u r i ng r h e
de Ltet l l pci·tocl .
,\ r r t c l c .2 · T h e: ab"''C A rr t d e d ues n " r C l lv n :
IJ
b J n i m ,·s
em.
I
rltar
m :n· h<l\ e b u · n com m i r rtd l � n I'L·t·sunctl c·cotw m i c ).:<t t n
or
t i l bcndi r a r l t i ,·d p<t r r l·
200 1 I R.efrctming Imp11nity
491
macy, n o i nternati o nal l eg i t i macy, and a b road scop e , effec t i ve l y barri ng th e
p rosecu t i o n of government autho r i t i es for mos t serious cr imes .
The A rge n t i ne amnesty represen t s a tran s i t i o n from B lanker A m nesty to
Local l y Leg i t i mi z e d , Par t i al I m m u n it y. Its scope i s s t i l l b road , b u t it has
s i g n i ficantly g reater domestic l eg i t i m acy. The A rge n t i n e am nesty leg is lat i o n
was passed i n t h e wake of a peri od of t r i a l s o f th e former m i l i tary j u n tas i ni ­
t iated a t t h e outset of the A l fo ns fn reg i me , % w h i ch u l t imately led to t h e
c o nv i c ti o n of five of the fo rmer j un t a m e m bers .97
The A rge n t i n e amnesty con s i s ts o f two separate laws : the F u l l S top Law o f
December 24, 1 9 8 69ei an d th e Due Obedi e nce Law o f J un e 4 , 1 98 7 . 99 Th e
9 6 . I m mediately after co m i ng ro power i n 1 98 .) , t h e A l fo ns i n govern m c: n r revoked t h e m d i r a ry
j u n ra·s s e l f-amnesty laws and a l l owed rrials again s t t h e leaders of the Process of National Reorg a n i za t i o n
ro com mence. See David P 10 n - B e r l t n & Ernesro Lopez, ,\ HO!m Oiz ·,dul: Cri.ric. C!et� z ·age. a11d c,,,,ji,ct i11 t!x
;\ ;:�mtilla A r111y, in TH E N E w i\ 1\G E NTI:\: E D E ,\tOCI\ACY: TH I·: S t : ,\ 1\ C H F O R A Succ E S S F U L F O H I- t U LA 6 _) ,
70
( E d ward Epstein eel . , 1 99 2 ) [herei nafter TH E N E\V A I\G t : N T I N E D b\IOCRACY} (not i ng that the
.. democ ra t i c governm e nt rook the offens ive by a nn u l l i ng the m d i t,try's s e l f-am nesty'' ) . Both Argenti ne
amnesty laws were passed i n response to the February 1 4 , 1 9 8 4 , Law N o. 2 _) . 0 4 ') r har al lowed rhe Su­
preme Counc i l of r h e A rmed rorces ro h c:a r cases o f certa i n crimes com m i t ted by the m i l l t,try. See ROG El\
G I<.W I L ,
\V EESTu :--;c;
\V I T I·I
THE
PAsr H u ;\ 1 .-1 :\ R I G H TS A'-:D ST,I B I LITY IN A L ro :-.: s fN · s A I\G t : i': T I ;-o; ,.\ l i
( l l)l) 5 )
Under t h i s ear l ier law, a number of cases were b ro u g h t i n both c i v i l i a n and m i l i tary courts. I ll ·
elud i ng s i g n i ticam o n es b r o u g ht b y rederal P rosecu ro r J u l i o C . Srrasscra aga 1 n s r m e m bers o f t h e fi rs t
J U n ta of l l)/G. See id. at 1 5 ; J tt ahu G,\l{Y \'(/. \'(/y ;-..- 1.-\, A l{ C I.: "! T l t--; A : I I .I.USIO:\:S ,\ :'< D R F .-\ I . I T I L S i i-i..:i-85
( 1 9i-i 6 ) . ln order to p l acate the m i l i tary, rhe A l fonsln Government issued a series of i nstruc t i o n s , IIIJ'Irll< ·
cirme.r a! Fi,,'t!/ Ce11u·rd del Coll.rtj" Sllj>rtlllfJ de lm F!ltr:,u A r111adr1.r, w h i ch l 1 m i rc:d t h e: l i abi l i ty of subord i ­
nates. Sec LI U I\.1 Tt : D t : SCO, D t : ,\ I OCILICY I N A ill; E N T r N,\ 1 2 2-2 .'> ( 1 9 9 ') ) . Then:ahcr. s o m e m e m bers o f
tht· r\ rgenune j ucl i c i ,lrv r h n:aren tcl w rcs 1 g n , cbi m 1 ng t h e i n s rrucrions "constr ttHtd a h i d d e n amnesC\·. . .
lei. ,tt 1 2 ) . r\ l fons in then cod 1 fitd chat a m nesrv t h ro u g h rhe Full S ro p Law. S,c ; d . a t 1 2 2 -2-� .
') 7 . See P 1 0 n - Bn l i n & Lopez, .r;tj>rc� nort <)() , at / l l . T h o u g h t h e J uch c ian· worked overt i m e a,t; a i n s r t h e
t· xec u r 1 v c's a n d the rn d i wry's ! m p l 1 c i r 1 nsrrucr ions ro c l ear h,1ck cases bdcJre t h e F u l l S r o p Ll\v c a m e 1 n w
e lltcr , m a n v cases wert n o r bmughr or resolved i n r i m e . Sec Tt: D I:sco, !ltjn·" n o t e 9 6 , at 1 2 .'\-2-'i .
9 8 . F u l l Stop Law .r11ji r t� note 9 1 . J n per t i nem parr the law rtacls:
r\ rriclt 1 : C r i m i na l prostc u r i o ns aga 1 ns t anv perso n . based on h i s a l l eged parr i c i p,u i on , of a n v na­
t u re, 1 n rht c r i mes referred r o i n A r r i c le lt J oC 2 _) . 0..\9 a re ext i ng u i shed b1· operation of law, u n l ess
such pc:rson
r s r nd i c red lw a court of co m p t r e m j u risd i c tion w i t h i n s i xty calenci<u· d ays of t he
dart of p ro m u lgar ion of t l 1 1 s law.
U nder rhe s,tme cond i r ions s h a l l be extl f\l: U i s hecl all c ri m i nal prosecu t i ons aga i ns t any person who
has p a r r i C ! parcd u p ro or before Dece-mber l 0 , l l) .'l .'> 1 n r h t cumm1ssion o f C t 1 111es relartcl w rhe usc
ul· v1olem means of pol i t ical au i o n .
A r t i c l e 5 T h e l a w docs n o r app l y to c r ! m l n,ll prosec u t i ons l(n· t he- c r i m es o f change: of c i ,· i l sra[l!s
a nd k 1 d n a p p 1 ng and h i d i ng o f m i nors.
A. r r r c k (i : Tht excep t i o n estab l i shed i n A rr i cl e l d ocs nor p rt, e m rhc h l r ng of a c i v i l c l a i m .
IJ. arts. 1 . ) .
')':) . Due: Obe d i ence Law, .r11pra note l) l . t i l ptrr i m:nr P'l rt rl·ads:
r\ 1T iclc: l : l r is prc:su mtcl . w 1 r lwur proof to rhc com r:trv lx·i n,l: ad m i [ ( c:cl , r lu r those who ar the r i m e
o l . rhc p e r ['C: r r a r r o n o f t h e a c r s had t h e· rct n k u�· c h 1 c f officers. su borcl r n a re o fficers . o fli c i a l s . and s o l ­
d i ers t i r h e 't rmed �-o rces. po l 1 c e . a n d IXISOn l(lrcc-s. <t r(· t·xtm p t from p u n 1 s h m c n r l( > r t h e c r i mes n.-.
fc. rrnl t l J 1 11 r\ r r i c l c: I l l , t i rsr parc1praph o f Liw i'( , l 2 .) . ( ) . j l) bv \ i rt u c· o t h av l ll!,: fu l l owc·d ord ers . l 11
r h t >SC c·ascs i t s ha l l he· clcc·mnl h1· o p c ra r r o n of Ll \\' r ha r r h c·sc 11trS < JtlS a c r ed u ndn d u ress. i n s u hord r ­
!Ll r r o n r o a s u p n l l l r a u r l w r i r y 'l llcl �(l l l o w l l\l; orders . 1\· i r lwur luv1 11:,: t i K pr >ss i b i l l tV , , [· rvs i .' l r n,t; m
rd.u s r n.t: w fo l l ow those· orclns and of o: am 1 11 i ll,l; rhc· 1 r Ll\vl'u l nc:ss.
Harl/ard International Lml/]ournal I Vol 4 2
492
fo rmer sets a sixty-day s tatute o f l i m i tations for t h e prosec u t i o n o f any
c ri mes comm i t ced
as
part o f the " d i rty \Var, " effectively prev e n t i ng prosecu­
t i ons after that peri o d. When this proved i ns ufficient i n ful ly i m m u n i z i ng
the past reg i m e , a second l aw was adopted , estab l i s h i ng an i rrefmabl e pre­
s um p t i o n that any member o f th e s tate s e rvices, with the excep t i on o f t h e
highest-level commanders , acts i n furtherance o f comman d- o rd e rs a n d 1s n o t
i ndependen t l y l iable . 1 00
The scope of t h e A rge n t i n e law s , w h i l e s t i l l sufficien tly broad to m ee t t h e
overall criteria of the category o f B lanket A m nesty, d i ffers fro m t h e P e ruvian
and C h il ean l eg i s lat i o n . A r t i c l e 5 of th e F u l l Stop Law speci fical l y excl udes
ki d nappi ng and d i sappearance of m i nors fro m the amnesty. 1 0 1 This i s a
s igni ficant excep t i o n g iven t h e n umber of d i sappearances w h i c h o ccurred . 1 02
F urtherm ore, A rt i c l e 6 o f t h e F u l l Stop Law c learly i n d i cates t ha t t h e a m­
nesty d oes not preclude c ivi l mean s o f redress . 1 0 1 Yet , th e laws s t i l l prov i d e
s weepi ng i m m u n i t y fo r m a n y serious cri mes , i nc l ud i ng m urder, torture , a n d
s o m e cases of d i sappearances . Moreover, th e irrefu table p re s u m p t i on i n t h e
D u e Obedi ence Law makes many prosecut ions i mposs i b l e an d , a s a res u l t ,
wi dens t h e effective scope o f t h e amnes ty.
The l eg i t i m acy of th e A rgen t i ne amnesty laws represents a t ran s i t i o n
from B lan ket A m nesty to Locall y Leg i t i m ized , Par c ial I m m u n i ty. U n li k e th e
g rams of am nesty i n C h i l e and Peru, th e A l fonsfn g overnm e n t had a demo­
crat ic pol i t ical m andate . 1 1) 1 The reach and power of democra t i c voices during
A l fonsfn 's ten ure , however, \Vere q uestionabl e . 1 05 F reedom H ou s e rated A r­
gentina a 2 , 1 i n i ts 1 9 8 6-8 7 s tu dy, j us t barel y c l as s i fy i n g i t as fre e . i O(; I n
relati o n t o t h e passage o f t h e am nesty legis l a t i o n , t h i s score s e e m s to b e roo
A r r i c l e 2 : The pres u m p r i on l'Srab l i shed i n r h e rrC'vious a r r i c k sha l l nor app l y ro c r i mes of r'1pe.
k i d n a p p i n g . and l 1 1 d 1 ng o f m 1 n ors . c h a n g e
e x ron ! l l n .
111
c i v i l s ra r u s , an d ap prop r i a r i o n o f i m m o v a b l e s r h ro u g h
lei. a r rs . 1 -.:2 .
I ( )() !d. a r r . I .
1 () l . F u l l S r o p Law,
/
J ll ' l ·a
not e )J l , a r r . 5 .
I 0 .:2. I s r i mares o f r h e roLd n u mbers of
a bd ucted
or Ill l Ss i ng persons vary from 8960 ro m o re r h a n
.'i O , U U O . Su: G ltW I I . , mpra noce ') 6 , a r 1 .'> . F o r 1\ U st·fu l s w d y o f A rg e m i n t l i r era r u r e " narrau ng [ r h t ) h e l l "
of r ht " [ p ) rocess o f ( n ) ar i o n a l ( r korgan i za r i u n . . .
s c: C'
L I H I .� [V.·I � C ; I' l! S T.A , Voru:s
OF
n-I l' S U I\ V I V O H S :
TI::STL\ I O i': Y, M o U I \ --:
. 1 :'-i C , el i': !) M F ,\ l ( J!( )' l i': PosT- D I C'iX['(')[{S i l l l ' r\ 1\ c ; r ·: N T !t'>: r\ I 9 :-1 .) - l )J)J 5 , - i-:j ( ) ( R t n zo
Llmemt r r,ul S . , l ')') :-1 ) .
I o .:; F u l l S w p L1w, <llj>w n m cc 9 I , a r r . G ;
.
·" " n r i n t Tr u r h Com m ission ) .
I 0--1. Stc G ICW I I . , ;!tf'r<� nml'
s u u n d i n g nun d ,nt·
s rt l ll ,
/),·iti>Jt'l',!l} i u
w
))6,
.rcc
c�f.,,, l--L�.L� I : I< ,
j
<lt nd
n <Ht: --i .) . a r .) )-5 --i ( d i scuss i n g rhe ;, r­
ar ) , 2 1 l i nd i ca [ l ng r h 1n r h e Onobtr _', 0 , 1 9 :-l _'> e l e c r i o n s gavt ,l re­
l\ a u l A l fo n s i n w i r h 5 \ . "' �:r u f rlw V < > t t fu r h i s !Ctd i cd l)arry ) ;
;cc
<tho
E d w,trd I p ­
;\ > :�cii!III<i , Iii TH r : i'� l ' \\ A r< c ; r: :-; T I N I : D l ·: .v JuU\ .-IC.Y, <11jlr:� nmt 9 6 , a r I , () rbl . 1. . .:2 . T i l t·
r\ i fo n s i n g o v t" rn m t m w a s , a t r c r ,t \ 1 ,
a
w e lc u m l:' c h a n g e fmm r h e r h 1-ec: m l i r ra r v J U IHas r h a r r u l t:d from
l\brch l ') i 6 u m i l _j u l i· I ') S .? . Stc C ILIV I I . , .>//jlr< l nott· ')(j , a r .2 .
I OS
O n e schuLtr o f r h c A r,c: c m i n l:' po\ , r i ca l process p u 1 m s r u " r h t· w,·,!k nt·ss u f r h t m a J o r pol i c i c a l p a r ­
r i es a n d r h e rt· Lt r i \'l' S l l't· n g r h ol: I IE e rccsr g ro u p s . l n s rt·acl of <l).:.S '·e,c: a r i r\c: ( a nd mod e ra t i n g ) contl , c r i l l C:
,
i n rcrtsr ,c: ruu 1 1 cl a i ms_ p a r r 1 es scr1·e L1 rg e h · as c: l t c ( ( J r,i l n· h 1 <:ks i ·o r r h r· s r m n,c: l 'trson,l l l r i e s w h o d o m i n a r t
r h t m a nd r h c J ' o l l [ ic:il s v :;rem 'ts a ,,· h u ! t . . . E j' S t e l n , ' 11/', ." n o rc I ( ) . j . a r 1 .> ThE " r·cs u l r l ll_!.: c k m ocran· [ 1 n
r\ r,"! e n r i n : t ] :lj1J'l''"·s bmh poor l v i ns r i w r i n n a l i z ,:d ,1 1 1 cl l n h cr t· n r h· u n s r, , h k . . !d :H :; .
I I H)
F IU I : I l0 .\ 1 H r ) I . < L . ,;;/'' · '
r w r t·
,:' (i
200 1 I Ref1"a11ling Impunity
493
ge nerous . A fter 1 98 5 , t h e A rgen t i ne democracy began t o u n rave l . T h e A l ­
fon s fn government declared a " war eco n o my" and launched t h e A u s t ral P l a n ,
w h i c h made t h e p resident t h e " c e nt ral do mi nant focus o f th e p o l i ti cal sys­
tem . " 1 07 In t h i s comex t , t h e passage o f the Due O bed i e n c e Law is the mo­
ment when " P res i d en t A l fonsfn lost h i s declared pos i t i o n as g uaran tor o f the
b reak w i t h t h e pas t by reneg i ng o n h i s p u b l i c l y g iven word not to y i e l d to
m i l i tary pressure . " 1 08 The s ig n i ficant defeat o f th e A l fonsfn reg i m e in t h e
elections of September 6 , 1 9 8 7 , s o o n after th e laws passed , creates more
doubt abou t the l eg i t i macy of the am nesty l eg i slati o n . 1 09 Mo reover, th e
sweep i ng presumption of t h e D ue Obed i ence Law was m ore a response t o
t h reats by t h e m i l i tary authori ti es , angered by previous conv i c t i on s , t h a n a
reflec t i o n of t h e authority of t h e peop l e 's w i l l . 1 1 0
B . Locally Legitimized. Partial Immunity
Loca l l y Leg i t i m i zed , Partial I m m u n i ty is characterized by a s ig n i ficam i n ­
c rease i n leg i ti macy and a marked reduc t i o n i n scope . I n terms o f scope, t h i s
c ategory o f am nesty excludes from the gram o f i m m u n i t y both common
c ri mes and crim es com m i ned fo r personal m o t i ves . The A rge n t i n e am nesty,
d i scussed above. d oes n ot, t h erefore, q u al i fy. Locally Leg i t i m i z e d , Part i a l
I m m u n i ty m u s t also a l l o w for s o m e mean i ngful ad j u d i cat i o n o f th e a m ­
nesty's scope. 1 1 1 The existence of an alternate means o f redress for v i c t i ms ,
I 0 7 . i\ l arcelo Cavaro z z 1
0:.
l\·!a r L1 G ross i , ;\ rgelllill(' P.HI!rl l!!lder ;\ ((;;1/J/11: !-"mill Dullo,·rafic l?eilll "tii!Joll
Pol!! �c"cd Di!dille ami H)j'I!J"IIIjl<�tioll . i11 T! I I ·: N 1 : w ;\ 1\C 1: NT! N L D t: ,\ ! OCIC-\CY,
.111j1ra
n o re 9 6 , ar I 7 .'J , I 0 0 .
I O S . Marce l o Cwarozzi & Oscar Lan d i , p,,firiwl Pt�rtm 1111tler r\ lj;;"-'/" rn1d J\ l we111:
I!;
Tbe r:_jj�os o / Srare
Jlljlr" nme 9 6 ,
Sbri11ki11g am/ thi! Du ·dlllatioil o/ DwJoO"tffic" PoliricJ, ill TH E N E\\' A R G E I' T ! l\: 1' D I : :- IOCI(ACY,
a r :2 0 _7 , 2 1 2 . I n so d o i r\L; - A l lo n s ln brukt r h e i m p l i ed p a c t w i r h r h e A r� t n r 1 ne c r r i ze nr\· upon w h i c h h i s
l e g 1 r i macy d e p e n d e d . " T h 1 s pace was d t h nt"d, tor r h e m o s r p a r r , b y r h e d es i re c h a r r h t r ra u m a r i c pasr o l-­
c r i s i s and pol 1 r ic a l v i o l ence nm reoc c u r, as we l l as by t h e reva l u i ng of 1 nd i ,· i d u a l r i g h rs and l i bt r r i es . " ld
ar .2 0 1l . T h i s per i od a l s o mar ked a s r eacly cl e c l 1 n c in r h e p u b l i c cred i bi l i r v of p o l i r i c i a n s 1 n A rg e n r i n a fro m
5 1 '/( cred i b i l i ry rar i ng bdurc t he passage of r h e cl m n esry laws
ro
a
m er
e .'J O 'i( creJ i b i l i ry ra r r ng i n Ap r i l
.
l 9 S8 a ft t r r h e rwo l a w s had been passed and r h l' rac r r pace broke n . See Ed ward C . E p s re i n , Colldmi>JII­
TI>e 1'\eu · ri iXellfille DtJIIocran : Tbe Sum !> ji!l ·
111jira
n o re 96, a r .2 4 -'1 , 2 5 I rbl I ( ) .2
I 0 9 . See G H .-\V J L ,
.I!Jji rd
a
Sl!cce.ujiJ! For111llia , i11 TH r : N i :\V A I{G F N T I :-.: E D r ·: ,\ I OCIL\CY,
n o t e <)(i _ ar 2 1 ( n m i n,c: r h t Pe ro n i s r s · s u ccess
1 1 0 . T h i s coercive p ress u re , m a ; n l v from t h e m i l 1 t a n·.
IS
1 11
t h ese e k c r i o n s ) .
e\·icl t: ncecl by a series o f o p e n relw l l 1 o n s . r n ­
p mres r _ i11/!:r alic�, r h e t r i a l s r h t n t a k i tl ;j p lace before r h e t n a c r m t m o f
c l ud i ng "Opera t i o n D i g n 1 C\·,"
w
r he D u e Obed i e nce Law. O n e
c o m rl l c n r : l r o r
d e s c r i bes " t h e C<llll p a i g n aga i n s t r h e L1w" a s " w i l d , borh
h o m e and a b road , res u l t i n ,c: ; n e n or m o u s po l r r i cal cos r s fo r r h e ,A, l f( m s l n ·s
,s o n· rn m e n r .
"
;H
Car l os S. l\: 1 no ,
Tbe Dllt)" ''' P1111isb Pt1.11 A /;1!.\e_< o / Hl!il!dl! l? igbts P11r l llfn Cmte.\"t: The Ca.\£' 'lj" ,-\ ;:�ellfiii,J, 1 ( ) ( ) Y,-\ 1 . 1 ·: L_J .
2 6 1 9 , :2 6 2 S-_'J () ( l l)9 l ) : ,,·c al-' " G ICW I I . ,
<llf> ril
n o r e 9 6 . ar 1 7 : E p s t e i n .
Jltj> u
r h e !\-Jay 1 9 S 9 r i o r s ) : P i o n - B n l r n & L6pe z , Jl!f!u n o r e 9 6 . c1r 6 � ; Tl! J I : �c:u,
d i sc uss i ! l n of t h e- c u n n ec r i o n a m o n ,c: r i l L" F u l l S t o p Law, r h t
sec id. , ar 1 .2 _)-::! h .
I l l
m
n or c: 1 0-i. ar _'i ( r t l-e r r r n g
J !if'rt!
m m· l) h , ar 1 2 7
i l i r a r y rn·o l rs , and r h t D u e Obed i e nce La\\',
Con rras r , fu r c·�cr m p l t , r l 1 L· S w 1 r h A h- i c < J n Tru r h a n cl R cc u n c r l 1 a r i on C: o m m : s s i o n
ror\' c1 u r lw r i r y a n d i !l\·ts r i ,c:cl r i ,·c· p o w ers , Ste
'
s
e � re n s i ,· t· s r cr r u ­
r e � r <lCCo m p a n \· r n,c: n o r t s 1 .2 0 - 1 .::' 5 . w i r h r h c r\ r,c:t: m r n c
l J uL· O bed i e n ce- L;-, w, "· h 1c l r ser an l [ rc· fu Li b l c J'res u m p r ion r h < J r cr i m e s wnt l'ol r r i ca l and c� rrrr:d
l"' ll l-sucrnr
rn m
i l r r a r y mdns . Su·
J!if>r<t
ro
Fm a
r e :-: r acc u m p a rw i n ,c: n o res ;J�- 1 0 .::'
om
HartJctrd International Lcm·jo;mwl I Vol 42
4 94
t h rough c i v i l cases or ocher forms o f reparati o n s furth er d e m o n st rates t h e
mo re l i mi ted scope o f am n e s t i e s i n c h i s category. 1
I .:?
O n the axi s of l eg i t i m acy, Locall y Leg i t i m i zed , Parcial I m m u n i ty carries
s upport from a m o re s i g n i ficant domes t i c co n s ti tuency c ha n does B lanket
A m n esty. For an amnesty c o fie i n chis category, the gove r n m e n t m u s t , ac
leas e in part , respect th e authority o f th e w i l l of ch e peop l e , o ft e n t hrough
e i t h e r a pop u l arly e lected gove rn m e n t or a nat i on al referen d u m .
The most p rom i n e n t examp l e of a Locally Leg i t i m i z e d , Partial I m m u n i ty
i s South A fri ca. So ut h A fri ca's Truth and Reconc i l iati o n A c e [ h erei n after
Reconc i l ia t i o n Ace} estab l i sh ed an i ndep e n d e n t q uas i - j ud i c i al bo d y w i t h t he
power to gram amnesty for p o l i t i cal crimes . 1 1 " The am n e s t y g ra n t e d by th e
Tru c h an d R econ c i l i a t i o n C o m m i s s i o n i s g ro u nd ed in s trong d o m es t i c legal
authority, a n d the Com m i s s i o n i tself was amhorized by a popularly elected
dem ocratic govern m e n t . Th e South A fri can I n terim C o n s t i t ut i o n of 1 99 3
req ui res chat "amnesty s h a l l be g ra nted i n respecc o f aces, o mi s s i o ns a n d o f­
fe nces assoc i ated w i t h p o l i t i cal o b j ec t ives and co m m it t e d i n c h e course o f
the conflicts of t he pas t . " 1 14 I t speci fically summons t h e l e g i s l ature
to
pass a
law that p rov i des fo r s uch a n amnesty and c reates a t ri b u na l fo r ad j ud ica­
t i o n . Th i s manclace was ful fi l led i n J u l y 26, 1 99 5 , w h e n the Par li am e n t
passed t h e " P romot i o n o f Nati onal U n i t y a n d Reconc i l ia t i o n A c e " 1 1 5 as part
of the I merim Cons t i tu t i o n . Th e amnesty provi s i o n in che I n terim C o n s c i c u ­
c i o n was eve n t ual l y tran s fo rmed i nt o the ProiTl O t i o n of N a t i o n a l U n i ty a n d
e l ec te d
Reco n ci l ia t i o n A c t , w h i c h was passed by a de m oc rac ical l y
menc 1
lh
p a rl ia ­
and s ig ned b y P res i de n t L',Telson Man d e l a , whose personal h i s tory as
a v i ctim of t he apar t h e i d reg i m e gave h i m u n i q ue cred i b i l i ty
to
i n s t i tute a n
am nesty. The process o f d ev e l o p i n g t h e Tru th and Reco n c i l i a c i o n C om m i s­
s i o n i nvolved extensive c o n s u l tat i o n w i t h i n d i v i d u a l s , com m u n i ty group s ,
a n d pol i t i cal part i es , culm i n ati n g i n forty-seven heari ngs across S o u t h A fri ca
i n 1 9 9 6 . 1 1 7 T h i s com b i n a t i o n o f s t rong g rass roots i nvolve rT1 e n c and s upporr
1 1 2 . M a n y s r arcs r h a r t n acre d l3 1 a n k u I\ m nts t i ts a l s o ueart:d r r m h com m i ss i o n s . These com m i s s i o n s ,
lwwcvt:r, a l t h o u g h s u cct s s fu i a t d oc u m e m i ng s o m e a b u s t s
and n.:para u o n s fur \' l c r i m s . S"" .�t!ler< �llr 1-LIY \: EJ( ,
.1/tf'rd
note
suffcrL"d , d i ll n ot
·U . a t I ( 1 7 -o ') .
p n "· i ck m e a n i n g fu l red rtss
I I .> . As n u m erous a u t h ors h a v e c o n s i d e red t h l' Somh A frican Tru th and Rccunc i l i a c iun Com m i ss i o n
[ h c r c i n;li'tn r h e Com m 1 s s i o n ]
1 11
e x t t l l S 1 'C t d e ta i l , t h i s ,\rc i c l c w d l n o t prov i d e a cum p rr·hens ive r rt·a t ­
m e m . 1\.ct c h n. i t l ooks a t h o w t h e C:u m n l l S S l u n !"i r s 1 nc u t h 1 s r\ r t i c l e "s fra m e w o r k . 1 : u r
t h t h i s toncd bac k,c: ruu n d ;ln d work o i ' r h e C:o m m 1 ss i u n .
:itT
d era i kd
an a l y s i s o f
g t n er;d h· S . r\ Fi(. TH r:TH ,1 :--J J.) 1\ i : C O :--J U I . I .� ­
T I U ,\: C:o \ 1 ,\ l · '; , Ti( LTH ,\ \: D R IT! J :-J CI I . I .� T I O C-i Co,\ l .\ 1 · � O F S o L T H A F IU C : .� ii. I YOin ( I ')')') ) :
Ti( L: 'i ' H
,\1, 1 1
Ti( L T H
,1 \: ll
S . A F IL
F.. � : c : o c.: u i . LH I C J f\ C:o,\ L \ I . N . S o u T H A I · I W >I \ H L '. I.I \: S I' I IZ I T' ,1 :-.; O iZ -1 1. i\fi . : , I O I Il C J I' T H I
lZ L U J :.- U I . I AT I C J f\ C: o ,, I :, I I S � I O :"< ( 2 1 ) ( 1 1 1 1 : ,\ u: :\ B r J IZ.-1 1 :\ 1 : , r\ C o L :-.: T I(Y L \: .\ I .�S K L D : S n V J I-1
A l· luc� · , THL .. TH ..I .'< IJ R I :Co\:U LL�T I O \: Co,, f ,\ l f :;s!O\: ( 2 0 0 1 1: i...: F.\: \: L T H C: I I IZ J .� TI I . Ti l L Sor·n 1 A. F fl. r ­
<.-1 \:
. TIW T I I C:l.l.\ 1 ,\ l hS I U .'; ( 2 0 0 0 ) : A L LY R L ' SS L L L . Ti l L Ti : t T H � \: 1 ) R H . O \: ( l l . I .Yi l < )\: C:O.\L\ l i S S I O \: .
L J : r d S I . .c�r r c H , P 1( C 1<J SS. A � l l L V,\ L L: ,IT I C 1 :.- O l ' L\ I P ..I C T i i ';J') t l ;: D i : .\ 1 . 1 �-; c , \V I T I ! . 1 . 1 1 1 . P. I .S T: Ti'. L TI I .\ �: l l
1\ u : o \: U I . L \ T I < 1 �
I J.j
1 15
1 '-'
So L T H r\ 1· 1( 1 (..-\ ( r\ l e:\ B u ra l l ll'
<:r
;d . cc k . 1 ') ') -, ) .
S. r\ F i( 1 \: T I · H I .\ 1 C :O 'SI'. ( A n .2 0 0 . 1 99 .'\ 1 . Nott 1 o 1 u i l J n ] [ l' ;uld t\ ,·c onc i l � ;n i , J n l)ru,· , s i u n .
P w n l < l t i l l l l uf �'i a t i u n a l U n H1· ;end Rr·cu n c i l � e1 t l l > l l ,-\ n . i'J o . . ; ..j ( I 'N 5 1 1 :; . r\ l r. ! [ h r: rc· 1 1Ufrcr Tr u c h
" " '! l\L·C o l l C I I "' t i u n t\ cr ] . h r t p : / , w \1'\v. t r u r h . ur," . !." ( v i S i t <:d r'l f ' r. -' I . .' I i l l I
I I (, . Scl' ,\ l i \:U\\ . ilt/'1'.1 norc· .1-J , a t 5 .1 : H ,\Y\: 1 : 1{ . .> ttjl! 'd
I I-
St-� !JL· rc:r A SL- h e � ·
cr
l l U ( t'
1 .1 .
;\t
.j I .
a l , :LI.Irr.'Yiil.'!_ filtiih!if N i,'-!,hl.' /\ /;;;.' : .' : Tri!tli
1.
(__ ,,;;; :;;/.l.li,,J/_1
. ; :;J tbt \ crlllt
��/ /\ i;;�
49 5
I Reframing lmpmzity
200 1
from l eg i t i m ate domestic amhori t i e s s uggests a greater deg ree of l ocal le­
g i t i m acy t h an that fou n d i n B l a n ket A mnesty. The F reedom H o use scores
support c h i s assess m e n t , g i vi ng S o u t h A frica a 1 , 2 ( free) i n i ts 1 99 6-97
smdy. 1 1 :-: The South A fri can am nesty is a l so noteworthy for i ts coherence .
The am nesty app l i es equall y to c r im es of aparth e i d and a n t i -aparthe i d ,
cri m es b y t h e govern m e n t , a n d crimes by ordi nary c i t i ze ns . 1 1 ':!
A nalyzi ng th e Truth and Recon c i l i a t i o n Com m i s s i o n and i ts u nderlyi ng
legislat i ve framework, w h i c h s ets for t h the Comm i s s i o n 's d u t i es an d obl iga­
t i o n s , reveals the m ore l i m i ted scope o f the i m m u n i ty. The Reconc i l iat i o n
A c t c reated t h e C om m i ss i o n , t h e fun c t i o ns o f w h i c h i n c l ude faci l i ta t i ng i n ­
q u i ry i n to "gross v i ol at i on s of h um a n rights , " " th e i d e n t i ty o f . . . persons
. . . i nvolved i n s uch v i olati o n s , " and the " acco un tab i l i ty . . . for any such
violatio n . " 1 10 The Reconc i liation Act created a Com m i ttee on H uman R i g h ts
Violat i o n s , to w h i c h i t g ran ted a c l ear i nves t igative mandate . 1 1 1 l i kew is e, a
C o m m i t tee o n A mnesty w i t h b ot h i nvestigati ve and ad j ud i cat ive po\vers
was c reated . 1 2 2
The Recon c i l i a t i o n Act provi des fun c t i o nal g u i d e l i nes for th e Co m m i ttee
on A m nes ty, ensuring s r r i c c substantive and temporal l i m i ts o n the scope of
a m n es ty. Cr im es m us t be " associ ated w i t h a pol i t i cal o b j ective"' an d comm i e­
ted between March 1 960 and December 1 99 3 . I nd iv i d uals see k i ng am nesty
m us e apply to t he Com m i ttee on A m nes ty, w h i c h , in t ur n , d e c i d es based on
a case-by-case i n q u i ry whether the c ri m e was com m i tted in fur t h e rance o f a
pol i t ical o bj e ct i ve . 1 2 ' The Com m it t ee o n A m nesty m us e exc l ud e any acts
co m m i t ted for personal gai n or o m of personal m al i c e . 1 -' i \Y/h i le t h i s l i m i ta­
t i o n m ay exc l ude common c r i m es or personal c r i m e s , i c does allow the
C om m i ttee o n A m nesty co gran t a m nesty, even fo r g ross v i o l a t i o n s o f h u man
r i g h ts and of i me rn a t i o nal h un1 a n i tarian law l i n ked to po l i t i cal o b j ec tive s . 1 2 5
1/e.,l ) . I ')
\VH !TT! Eil
L. R 1 :v ) .2 5 . .1. 2 9 (
l ')LJ 7 ) ;
H ,W :\ Eil , .>!if'ra nor<: - H , ar -i I ; 1\ [ 1 '-iO\\ ,
>itf' rtt
n o r e -' -i . ar 5 5
( !l J J [ I Il_C: · · r ht· \·a l u t o ( r h t [ ' I"IKL"SS u f p u b l i C d c l i lx-rar i CJrJ i n c rea r i n,t; l t ,t; J l l llU(\" i " m r h e u n d n r ,tl--: i n g " " ) .
I I S . See F IU T ilCJ.\ f H < l U � I : .
j
Jlt l! "d
n m c ]. (, _ A ft t r r h c r ra n S J r i o n o f puw<er r u r h e A fr i c a n N a r J o i L l i Con-
,li i"L"SS ( t\NC J ,t;un: r n m t m . Soll [ h Afr,ca·s FrL"td o m !-!oust s c o re i m p rmTd from '' 5 .-l
l l ') . Sec. e. g. , Tr u r h '"1 d R c c o n c i l � <H I Oil A c e , .111j'r" nore 1 1 5 : M i :---i < J\\ · . ' ''/'�""
1 ..2 0 . Tr u r h and RL"cu n c i k l r i u n 1\n .
1 ..2 1
'11/'1",1
nme I 1 5 ,
ch . .2 . a r r . cj _
ac
w
_1 -1 .
i" l ( ) [ l'
a l ,J.. Set iJ
ld. a c c h . 1 . a r r . l .2 .
1 ..2 .2 . The Co m m iss i o n cuns i s r <:d o( s i xrcen m e mbers. mosr of w h o m arc- ·· re LH i ··:c l \· 1 111 p a r r i a l fi ,!.! U res ..
from a c a d c· m i a ·.u1d r i ll " h u ma n r i � h rs
U l !ll lll l l il l l ) ",
a nw n ,t; u r h c: r
areas.
Sec Sch c,-
cr
-� _2 () _
1 .2 _1 . I n m a k 1 11p chi s c l c rnnl l n,lt l < >l l . rht: Co m m 1 r rec- on f\ n H l t·sry s h o u l d look
i"a c r u a l n a r tm: . o b j c c r i \'tc :md c o ll l l l l , u l d '' u r l l l l c 1 r1· ot" r h t
I I '5 .
ar
1 .2 I
1 .! '5
t h . -i . ,
See id
arr.
'1[
211.
ch. i ,
arr.
an.
ru
ll l J C <::
1 1 7 . ar
r h e il l l l l l \"t·. comc�: r ,
_l ( l( ) )( i I
,� Lt n r c d , n Lt n y tn rc l a r i l l l l ru :\c r i u u :-i �1 n d
C , r.i!!!ul ;\ ti!!h >l ) . Tl(l.. T I I
. i"llf'rJ
Src Tr u rh ''ncl R ,·C O I K i kl r l o i l r\ n . >!!/''"<� nore
'](, dare m o re c h a n -! 'S i lO a p p l i c a r 1 o n s for a m n es c \· h : l \· c bc·en iikJ :1 1 1 d
c· c-: a m r ' k . E u,t: em· D e· I...: ock
:d . .
''- " S
.-1 '-." 1 >
S ) · -� r c nl �H J C
� l": l l l [L·d a il l l kS l l fo r
l l l l ll l <:"ruus
c r i n1 es a[-.:;I J n s c h u n1 � 1 ! l ! t i--L.. I n
counrs
a l l l llt"S r i t:s
r c-Lr�· ! J r c . t s c
fu r
u l· ''";a u l r , ,thd u C l i J ' Il . 'l l l c l m u rd n .\, , [),. f\," fi
Jl. I -: < .< > :" C I I . i .-IT I I > :.; Co:'- l .\ 1 · �; P R l>-" !I. L! . I '.. \ S I '. :'.
t l·u r h . < l l",t; . za m d 1 a. p r i mk - x . h un l ( \ I S > rul 1\ h r. l l l . _) ( )( ) I ) .
u ! H:
_l u ;lt"
.2 . .2 t H J I I . h r r p : \nnv.
Harvard International Law}ottnzctl I Vol. 42
496
S i g n i ficant to t h e South A fr ican examp l e i s th e mandatory c o n fess i o n r e ­
q u i rement . 1 26 App l i cants m u s t make " fu l l d i sc losure o f a l l relevant fac t s " t o
t h e Com m i t tee o n A m nesty before i t beg i ns to consider amnesty. 1 27 T h i s
m andatory confess i o n p rocess e ns ures t hat, a t a m i n i mu m , a record o f past
atro c i t i es i s kept . 1 2 8 S i g n i ficant l y, d i sc losure req u i rements may p rovi de a
built-in
s t ructural
limit
on
th e
amnesty's
scope,
s i nce
only
c r ime s
speci fical l y confessed are i nc l u d e d . The pote n t i a l h u m i l iat i o n fro m p u b l i c
adm is s i on s o f personal culpab i l i ty m ay d i scourage i nd i viduals fro m s e e k i ng
am nesty for s om e h e i nous cri m es n o t d i rectly related to p o l i t i ca l c r i m e s .
T h e Reconc i l i a t i o n A ct does n o t roral l y b a r v i c t i m s from redres s . I n cases
w h e re am nesty i s d e nied , stan dard cr i m i nal o r c i v i l cases may e n s u e . 1 2 9 I f
am nesty i s g ranted , both c ri m i n a l and c i v i l l iab i l i ty o f r b e perpetrator a nd
r b e s tare ar e exri n g u i shed . 1 30 Vi c t i m s m ay s r i l l app l y, h owever, t o t h e C o m ­
m i ttee o n R eparat i o n and Rehab i l i ta t i o n for rel i e f. T h e g o a l o f s uc h rel i e f i s
n e i th e r t o i mpose c r i m i nal san c t i o n s o n r h e persecu tors n o r t o p ro v i d e eco­
n o m i c compensat i o n to th e v i c t i m , but rather to " restore th e h u m a n and
c iv i l d i g n i ty of [the} v i c ri m . " 1 ·" 1 Such rel i ef may come in a var i e t y o f fo rm s ,
i n c l ud i ng n on-pec u n i ary al ternat ives t o repara t i o n s , bur bas rarel y been
avai lable i n any form . 1 " 2
A second example o f Loca l l y Leg i t i m i zed , Partial I mm u n i t y i s r h e am­
nesty enacted i n F i j i d u r i ng th e s u m mer of 2 0 0 0 . After gai n i ng i ndepend­
en c e in 1 98 7 , a government d o m i nated by F i j i ans o f I nd i a n descent assumed
power. The new gove r n m e n t was topp led two weeks later b y the e t h n i c ­
F i j i an army. E nac t m e n t o f a n e w co n sr i ru r i o n i n 1 99 7 , \vh i c h " g ra nted equal
rights to the large m i n ority o f F i j ian ci tizen s w h o are o f eth n i c I n d i a n de­
sce n r , '' 1 " ' i nc reased ethn ic ren s i o n s . 1 ·" -'i E l ec t i o n s in 1 999 brough t to power a
m ul r i - rac ial gove rn m e n t under Mahe n d ra Chaudh ry, 1
'5
bur t e n s i o n s be­
tween I nd o - F i j ians and eth n i c F i j i ans i n c reased . Geo rge S pe i g h t , a " fa i le d "
b u s i nessman , became well k n o w n fo r p rotests i n favor of an e t h n i c - F i j ian
d o m i n ated governmen t . 1 y,
1 .:2 6 . Tru r h a n d R econc i l 1 a r i o n i\c c ,
I 2 7 . lei. a r c h . 4 , a r r . 2 (} ( 1 )(c).
Jllj Jra
nmt 1 1 5 , ar c h . :\ , a rc 2 0 ( c ) .
l 2 S . Srr TE UTH .-\ '!
. D R I :CO'i CI LIATIO� (0,\ 1 ,\ r ' N O F S o u T H A F IU C\ R t: Po rn,
l ll,l;
a corn p re h e n s i ve rcpon o f rhc work o f r h e C o m m i ss i o n ) See M r NOW .
r ll,H o n e of r h e goa l s nf r rm h co m m i ss i o n s i s r o
a u r h m i r a r i v e a c c o u m of rht
d d i n i r i ve r r m h ) .
1 2 9 . Trmh a n d R cconc i l i a r i o n r\c r ,
I � 0 . id a r c h . -\ ,
1 .� I . ld ar c h .
-L
,m .
arr.
..wri
evems ). C/ HAYi\ I : R ,
2 0 1 7 ).
_itt}'r<� n m e
1 1 5,
,ll
norc
-d, a r
1 13
( rwvid­
w
tsrab l i s h a n
6-7 ( n m i ng r h a r r h e re m ay be no
c h . -\ . arr . .:2 l ( .2 )( a ) .
2 ()( .) ). For a d i sc ussion or· rcsror,H i ,·t· J llsr icc- , s e t K i s s , .rttf'ra nme '\ 5 , a r 7 ':) .
1 .1 .) . G w y n ne Dyer, S}'oght iii )(//!. l311t H11 lclu!l Stl!!
1 7 . 2 0 0 0 . a t () .
I :; '!, See A. m v L C h u ,l . Thf P,traJJ.\
h · r · r . . L.l 2 8 7 . ) (i') i :::' l li H I )
I Yi
}
.itt 'ra n o r e
nore .q . a r 6 0 ( a rg u i n g
re r h c h 1 srur1· o f w h a t happened . . a n d
J lljir<�
I .'\ 2 . See H.-\Y.'! F i\ . .w}'r:� nme -1 .3 . a r -\ 5 . 1 7 1 .
( N . L: . ) , ,\ u !-!
>11/' W
.
o( !'u:c 1\ Lnlu
Dvcr, .rttjll·c� nnrc I .'> .) .
1 ', (, . Sc·e E l 1 zahc: r h F c i z k h a h , l'i;i T.:!.l.:u
11
Sh<11
111
1 11
Pr,..r-CI)II}' F1p , S O U T H I.,\ N i l
Tl.\ l l c ,.;
Dt�l/t)l i c'/<]': P.,rhi!i�i!l:.; Du c/r,piiiml PrJin, i I H .-\ 1\V.
P,<�<r. T! ,\ f L
( S u u r h Pac· i ti c ) , r\ u ,!.! .
7,
20110.
ar
5 ') .
2 0 0 1 I Refrcmzing Impunity
497
O n May 1 9 , 2 0 0 0 , Spei g h t and m e m bers o f h i s Counter- R ev o l u r i on ary
Warfare Movemen t s tormed che parl i amen t i n S uva , cak i ng Pr i m e M i n i s ter
Chaudh ry and h i s cab i net hos tage and abrogati ng the F i j i a n Cons c i c u c i o n . 1 37
Deman d i ng that " a new government be i ns ta l l ed in w h i c h all powers are
res erved for e t h n i c F i j ian(s } , " Speight h eld twen ty-seven m e m bers of th e
government hostage i n t h e par l i a m e n t fo r fifty -s i x days , U R i n v i o lati o n o f the
I nternat ional Convention Against the Taki ng of Hostages . 1 3 9 W h i le Spe i g h t 's
acts d i ffe red from chose of t h e S o u t h A frican apartheid reg i m e or the terror
i n P i nochec 's C h i l e , h i s d ete n t i o n of governm e n t perso n n e l was , nonetheless ,
an i n ternati o nal c r i m e . A fter nearl y two m o n t h s of nego ti ati o n s , d ur i ng
w h i c h the Chau d h ry govern m e n t was d i sm issed , Speig h t released h i s h os­
tages o n July 1 3 , 2 000 as part of an overa l l po l i t i ca l s ettl emen t . 1 40 The cor­
respond i ng settlem e n t agreement calls fo r the release o f hostages , 1 4 1 the " res­
torati o n of law and order, " 1 !\ 2 and a return of arms to th e m i l i tary, i n ex­
change for an amnesty to Spei g h t and his acco m p l i ces . 1 4 3
Spe c i ficall y, t h e Spei g h t am nesty "grant(ed} i m m u n i ty to a l l persons who
al legedly com m i t ( te d } t h e o ffence of treas o n in connection w i t h the ac t i o n s
o f t he GSG (George Spei g h t Group} . " 1 4·1 The Muani kau Accord called upon
the governm e n t to extend i m m u n i ty to " o t her persons who allegedly com­
m i t ted o ffences covered by the meani ng o f 'pol i t i ca l o ffences . "' 1 15 The actual
a m nesty decree , w h i c h came after the release o f the hos tages on J u l y 1 3 ,
2 0 0 0 , g ranted b road c i v i l and c ri m i nal i m m u n i ty to Spei gh t and h i s fol low­
ers for a wide range of p o l i t ical and c o m m o n crimes connected w i t h " th e
u n l aw fu l seiz ure of govern men t powers . " 1
1 _) 7 .
! ()
S<e F i J i Cons c i c u c i o n R e vo c a t i o n Dc:cree 2 0 0 0 , I nt e r i m M i l i rcuy G overn m e nc Decree N o .
l
( :' 0 0 0 ) ( F i j i ) , rejn i!ltecl i!l F I J I Govu\N,\ l E N T GAZETT E , vo l . l , n o . 2 6 , May 2 9 , 2 0 0 1 ) C revo k 1 ng c h e Con­
s r i r m ion i\ m e nd m e m Acr 1 99 7 ) (on filt wich Harvard f nr e rnar i u n a l Law J o u rn a l ) ; Cons r i r u c i o n Abroga­
r ion-lme r i m iv[ i l i rary Governmem and F i nance Decree 2 0 00 , l nr e r i m M i l i rary Gov e rn m e n c Decrc:e N o .
) ( 2 0 0 0 ) ( f- i j i ) , rcpr111ted i!l f- IJI GovE R N ,\ ! l e N T G .AZETT L , vo l . I , n o . 2 6 , J u l y I ) , 2 0 0 0 ,
po w er w
r h e m d i C a ry governmem) (on h i t w 1 c h H a rvard l nc c r n a [ l o n a l Law J o u rn a l ) .
I :\ S . r\ 111m.rty Tbmzc11 011t
tiJ
Jllj>r{/
( g ra n c i n!,:
Speigbt a11d 1-iw<'hlllw Cbmged ll 'itb hem r!ll , i\( ; E '-i C t ·: F H . P IUcSS I ' . A ug . l l ,
2 00 0 , m tti!aMe at L E X I S , News L i b rary, i\gtnce Fr. Pre:;sc: F i le [ h e re i n afctr ;'. llllll'JIJ Tbmzm 0111].
l .'\ 9 . J m e r n a r io n a l Convemion i\gai n s c r h t Tak i n g o f H os rages, Dtc . I :-:> , 1 97 9 , arc. 1 , 1 .) I (i U . N.TS.
2 0 5 . A r r i c l e 1 c r � m i na l i zes, i11ter alia, rht d e r c m i o n of · a n o c h t r person
parry . . . co do or a b s c a i n fro m d o i ng a n y ace as an txp l i c i r
hosrage . . . !d.
1 4 0 . Set A ill!/f.ll)' Tbrou·11
1 4 1 . h,i :r Ntll'
Pmc'e
011t, Jllpr<�
noct 1 ) :)
r\ (nmi Ginr Collj!
Plot!tn 'f i,ta!
or
tn order
co
compel
ct
c h i rd
1 m p l 1 c i r concl i r i on for r h e rel eJ.se of r h t
A ll/l!t'.IIJ , i\ ( ; J o i' C E rl\. PIUcSS l c , J u ly 9. 2000,
< � z m /,tl;/e "' L E X IS, News L i b rary, i\gencc f-r. Presse F i !t: [ h c r e i n a fr c r Ftji �' Sezc Pe.:t<'e
l -'1 2 . !d. T h t s is fu r r h u bc i l i r arecl by r h e a p po i nr rn e: n r of an 1 nr n 1 m
civ d 1an
1\ ((tnd}.
govern m e m , led bv
an
1 nr e r i m prt's i d e m a n d v i et prtsi d e n r , who a r e nom 1 tuced ctnd c l cued by r i l e G rea r Cou n c i l o f C h i e fs rc 1 r
a
rwtm1· - fo u r- m o n r h cerm .
1 -'1.1 . Set l m m u n i r v D e c ree lOOO. Dente No. I S of 2000 ( 2 000) ( F q i ) , rcjn illtcd i11 r i.J I C ov r 1� "' '' 1 1 : :-.: T
C .V.ET T I ' . v o l . l . n o . 2 6 , .J u l y U . 2 0 0 0 ( o n fi l e w i r h H a rvard l me rna r i n n a l L a w
; \ c ·, ,,,.J,
-''��/'�'·' n o r t 1 -\ l .
l j.j
9 . .2 0 0 1 1 ,
1 -1 5
T h e {\ l u a n 1 k a u
< t rr .
ld
r\ ccord Fm r h e R e l t·ase of H os r c1pes f-k l c l
ell
J ou rna l ) ; l'l1i:r !Yt'll' Pra<'c
r h t P a r l i a m e nc Com l ' l t >: Ve 1 u w , ,J u l 1·
.'i [ h e r t 1 11afrer M ua n 1 kau r\cc o rd ) ( o n ti l e \\' i c h H a r vard l m cr n a r i o n a l La"' J o u rncd ) .
] .J {i . I m m u n i l \· Decree 2000, -' "/"'' n o r e ! .:\ _-\ . sen ion ·" reads in pan
Hcn"l/ard Internatiorw! Lmi'}ourna! I Vol 42
49 8
S i n ce the F i j i a n gove r n m e n c was i ncapac i tated at the time of the am n e sty
and the amnesty was demanded as a ransom fo r th e rel ease of t h e h o s tages ,
there is strong evidence t h at th e F i j ian amnesty l acks local l eg i t i m ac y. 1 17
The w i l l of the people does n o t appear to have been t h e basi s for t h e author­
i t y of govern m e n c at the t i m e th e laws were enacted . Nor has t h e w i l l o f th e
i n ternationa l com mu n i ty been used as a source o f aut h o r i t y ; i n fac t , t h e am­
nesty has been widely condem ned . 1 ·1:-: Yet , th e F i j ian amnesty theore t i c a l l y
fi ts w i t h i n t h i s category because o f th e s i g n i ficanc res t r i c t i o n s o n t h e scope o f
t h e amnesty.
The scope of t h e F i j ian amnesty i s l i m i ted ro a n arrow subset of p o l i t i cal
cri mes . The Muanikau Accord g rants amnesty to " a l l persons w h o al l eg e d l y
com m i t[ ted} the offence o f t reas o n i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h th e act i o n s o f th e
GSG ( George Speight Group) o n 1 9 th May
2 000
[r o } [s i c} 1 3 t h J uly
2 000
(both dates i nclusive) and a l s o to cover other persons who a l l eged l y c o m m i t ­
ted offences w h i ch are covered w i t h i n the m ean i ng of 'po l i t ic a l o ffen c es . " ' 1 '1 9
T h i s clause fi rst g rants amnesty o n l y for acts of t reas o n co m m i t ted b y mem­
bers of Speigh t 's group. I t th en b roaden s th e scope to i nc l u d e all p o l i t i cal
offences . Sign i fican t l y, i t excl udes common cri mes and any serious c r i mes
agai n s t h uman l i fe t hat are not po l i tically m o t i vated or connected to t h e acts
of the Speight group. As s uc h , the ta k i ng of hostages by S pe i g h t and h i s
fol l owers is i nc l ud ed i n th e i m m u n i ty, but numerous other o ffe nces are ex­
c ludeci . 1 5 1 J In add i t i o n
to
these s tandard l i m i ts on scope, t h e a m n es t y also
contains a contractual l i m i t o n i ts app l i cat i o n . Two spec i fi c c o n d i t i o n s m ust
G eo rt:t Spe i g h t , t h c L e a clc r of r h e C i v i l i a n G ro u p , a n d m e m bers o f h 1 s Group "· ho rook p a rr i n r h e
u n l a11·fu l ra kcuv t r o f r hc C l >�'"t r n m e m cl e m o c ra t i ca l l v e l e c r c d u n d e r t h e I ') ') -:" C: on s r i r u t i o n o n r h e
l ') t h of l\hv , .2 () ( ) ( ) and r h t s u b seq u e m h u l d i n t: o f r h c hos tag es u m i l t h e l .) r h d a y of J u l y ,2 ( )()() s h a l l
b e 1 111\ll u ne !·rom c ri m 1 1u l prosec u t i o n u n d e r t h e P e n a l Coclt o r the bre,Kh o f a n y l a w of F i j i and
c i v i l l i ,1b i l i t1· of a n v d a m ag e u r i n j u r y ro p roper t y
or
person conneuecl w i t h rhe u n lawfu l sei zure o f
Gove rn m e n t powe1·s. t h e u n Lt w fu l d t t t m i o n of ct:rLt i n m e m bers o f t h e House uf R e p rest n ra t i ves
and a n y o t h e r pers o n and n o c o u r t s !M l l e m e r r a i n
g ra n r a n 1· re m edy o r
rel i e-f
c1 m·
anion
m a k e am· d ec i s i o n o r o rd e r . or
1 11 anv p roceedi nt:s i ns t i t u ted aga i n s t G eorge Spt:i,>! IH
or
anr
m c: m be r
of
i l l s G ro u p . . . The d e c ree d oc:s nor enend m a n y o t h e r person who com m i t t ed a n offe nce u n d e r a n y
ld
l aw .
� ).
1 4 7 . Thou.':!h F r eed o m H ouse, i n i rs
1 9')9-2000
swdy. rated r i 1 i a .2 . .'> ( a free s t a t e , t h o u g h bare l v ),
t h 1 s score is nut rdkc r i v c of t h e ac t u a l l e v e l of fr ee d o m i n F i j i d u r i n !,: t h e s u m m e r o i " .2 1 ) ( \ 0 because i t w et s
g e n e rared b e fore t h e c o u p. The a m ncsry a� ree rn e n t was s i � n e d d u ri ng t h i s c o u p b1· t h e Cu m rn a ncl e r a n d
H ea d ol t h e l mer i m .\ -f d 1 t a ry Go v e r n m e n t of F i j i , Com modore .J . Voreqc Ba i n 1 m ara m a . w h o h a d assumed
exec u r l l·c a u t h o r ! (\" on ,\ fay .2 ') . 2 0 0 0 , alte r Pres i d e n t Raru S i r K a m i sese i\Ltra clccLHtd a S t a t e o r e m e r ­
g e n C\: a n d d i s m i Ssed t h e C: h a u d h ,· y govcm m c m . Sec ;\ ;;mc.�ty Tbmm1 011t, u;jlr.; n m e
l 4 S . /3ritalil "Di! llhl \ l'ir
,t/;/e
1 .) :-i .
; \ ii/1/i'!t ) j;,r ri;i Ho.� tage- Faken . Ac; " C! C l r l( . I)IU: � � I · . J u l y I ) . ,2 ( ) ( ) ( ) ,
{1/'( 1/1-
L E X I S . Ne11·s L i b r a rr. A g e n L C Fr. Prtsse F i l e ( q u m i ng a t( l rt i g n office s ta t e m e- n t r h a t 13 r i ra i n wets
r!l
"cl i s lll,l\·cd
Fl.c/llgc
<If
!u
..
r h ct r r h e h o s rctgt: t a k cr s appt· a r e cl
tu
have been .� ranred 1 m m u n \ [ \ · ) ; Sc u Zc,tlili!il \l"'i,;t/d 0!/er
l'i;i Coli/' \ "i,'!iiil Ch.111dbrr. D ITT�C : H L Piu; � s i ; - ;\ C t: :--! T U I( , j u l 1· I I ,
.J I)( J i l .
. ! l .?d tl;/c
111
L E X IS.
N e ws I.tbran·. ;'(ews C ru u p F i le ( nl H l ng t hat A u s t ra l i a , New Zea l a n d . a n d t he L; n i ttd States had con·
c l e m m·d the s i r u c1r i o n 1 11 F i j i l . \'{.' h d e r h tsc c o u n t r i es c o mkm m· d the Cllll l KS t\· ct l t d the C:rHn m o n wc,t l t h
t e m po ra r i i l· s u sp c n d n l F t p · s m c· m hns h 1 p . t h ere w a s n u d 1 ren ' n r cr , u r ' " n ' t l i ll \· u l n· n w i H 1 n r i l L· �llll l l CStl·
I i ' ) . l'iji :O ·\·u1 fJidi'L . \ (('IIJ
I
'1 0 .
.'11(1'".!
note 1 4 1 .
Tc: kj•honc ( \l (l"("\' i nv 1\' i t h J R . J< o n ror,· . Pcrnuncnt Secre ta!"\ or" !-l i J ml: ;\ l L i rs, R L·p u h i ! L ol Fi j i
( S c p r . 2 ' , .' ( ) ( ) ( ) )
200 1 I Reframing Impunity
499
b e mer for amnesty to attach : firs t , th e h os tages m u s e be rel eased o n J ul y 1 3 ,
2 000 and , seco n d , Spei g h t and h i s fol lowers m us e d i sarm . 1 5 1 The narrow
scope of t he F i j ian am nesty, w h i c h is restricted o n l y to cover pol i t i cal crimes
and i s i nappl i cable co serious i n ternati o nal c r i mes, p l aces th e F i j ian amnesty
in t he Locall y Leg i t i m i zed , Parti al I m mu n i ty category.
The Sourh A frican and F i j i a n A m nes ti es map as local l y leg i t i m i zed , Par­
c i a l I m m u n i ty. The South A frican amnesty bas g reater domestic l eg i t i macy,
bm l eaves q uestions of scope open for ex-pose determi na c i o n by c b e Com ­
m i ttee on A nw es ty. The F i j i a n am nesty h as o n l y t he mo s t l i m i ted forms o f
domestic l eg i t imacy b u r has a s i g n i fican t l y rest ricted scope i n h erent i n t h e
cext o f the am nesty d ec ree .
C. Internationally Legitimized. Partial Immunity
I nternati onal l y leg i t i m i ze d , Part i al I m m u n i ty is charac teri zed by en ­
hanced legi t i m acy conferred t h rough i nternat i onal i nvolve m e n t , as we l l as
further restri c t i o n s on che scope of i m m u n i ty. O n c b e ax i s o f leg i t i macy, I n ­
cernac ionally leg i t i m i zed , Part i al I m m u n i ty usually, buc n o t alway s , e m ­
bod i es t h e ki nds o f local l eg i t i macy d iscu ssed p rev i o usly an d , i n add i t i o n ,
carries t h e s upport of a pol i t ical l y s i g n i ficant coal i t i on o f s tates , reg i onal
powe rs , 1 5 ] and/or the i n ternati onal co m m u n i ty. 1 5 1 On the ax i s o f scope, such
i m m u n i ty i s ei ther l i m i ted t o " po l i ti cal " c r i m es ad j u d i cated by a q uas i ­
j ud ic ial organ (as i n the case o f Locally Leg i t i m i ze d , Parcial I m m u n i ty) o r
resuicted c o certai n defi ned c r i me s , o ften t hro u gh retere nce to i n te rn a t i o nal
t reat i es and/or cus com ary hl\v.
An example of I n ternat i o n a l l y leg i t i m i zed , Parc ial I m m u n i ty i s the a m ­
nesty affo rd ed to the H a i t ian m i l i tary a s pare o f the re t u rn co power o f
P re s i d e nt Jean-Bertrand A r i s c icle i n 1994. The po l i t i cal background o f t h e
H a i t ian a m n e s t y demons trates s t rong i n ternati o n al s u pport a n d , ac leas e ,
q uas i -d omestic
I 5 I
fiJI .-' i'\ w
leg i t i macy
Pec�(e ;\ ((r)rd. mjrr11
for t h e
meas u re .
n o c t 1 -i l .
1 5 2 . T h e p o t t m 1 e1 l fo r t h e s u pporc o f rtc� i on a l po w er s
r 1 u r be l mcrp rnc:cl as a revcrs i u n
he ,· i c·wcd
1 11
a l i b e r a l ;,c:nse.
<IS
ru
w
In
Dec e m b e r
1 990 , Jean-
c o n fe r l tg l t i mc\C\. o n a n a m n c: s c y � r a n c s h o u l d
r c a l 1 s c p o w e r p o l 1 c i cs . T h e s u pport u f a re� ] ()rul po w e r s h o u l d m e re l y
r h e e x p r e s s i o n of r h e prtcftren ces o f t h e c r t i zl" ns 1 11 c h a t S L I C e t(Jr c o l l t·c r 1 v e l y
fo r m u Lned 1 me rn a t 1 o n a l n o r m s . D u l"
1 11 cluc: r m l l l cl C i lli1 S of c h t· lc,� i r i macv of
w
C�ll
r h l" l r prux l ll l l tV, re,;; i o n a l powers a rt ofcc·n
m or e
l d..: e i l·
w
cn � agc:
a rn n t:scy � r a m .
[ ) .) . S u c h l lwoh·e m e n t of t h t: 1 11 C t: rncn l oncd corn m u n 1 C I'
Cl \1
c o m t: 1 11 lll < l f l \. fo r m s . 1 11 C i u d 1 ng n o n ­
h i n d l ll� U N rr:sol m i on s . i n v o l n· m t l l t of s 1 g n d i c a n c re� i o nc1l o r ;; a n i z a c 1 o n s s u c h < b r h c· O rg a n i za t i o n o f
,
Sc:c u r i C\· a n d Coopera t i o n 1 11 E u ropt ( 0 . S . C . E . ) . c h c O r,;; a n i za c i o n of r\ m t r i ca n Scares ( () . r\ . S . ) . o r c h t:
A ssoc i a r i un of Suu c h E a s e As 1 a n !\:a[ l o n s ( A . S . E . r\ . N . l . H!li\"C:Yl:l". 1 f a b 1 11eh n � LH\ St·nm c l· Cou n c i l rtso­
l u c i on u n d e r a C:hcl p c c r V I I manda [(: is
1 1wnl·:t:d .
r l 1 L· <l m n e s c )· w o u l d l d..:c h· m m·c
l n c n n C�C i l >!U l Cuns t l t ll l l u n a l l m nH I ! l i C \ · . l r is 1 m pu r c c u n
ru
1 11 ro the c a c t: t:Orl· o f
,
n o t e c h a r c h t· ,.,l r l o u s [( 1 1· m s of l nt nn a r i u n a l
S l l ['l'l >rl L O i l r.n m a rked I I· d 1 lfcrun c i L-,c.c rLTS o f k,t: l f l lllal\'. r \ L N Sc·nm r 1· Cuu n u l rt:S< l l u r l r > n . l:o r tc:; am p l t: .
c a r r i c·s ' ' ci l t't trerl l w r: l ,t: h r fro m c h ·, lt of r i l e· S L l l UllUll o f l J ! l c u r e1·t· n
a
s nu l l c.: ro u p o l i.o rt: l ," ll s c cl t t:s . F o r r i l e
J-' l ". l '"sc:s o f c !1 1 s i\ r t 1 c l t: . Co r l ll t c m a c l l lllC�i S LI [-' l'Orc C l J be s i g n i l·i ca n r , a q u cd l c C� c l v c J u d g m c m \l · i l l l 1 c made
hc!Sccl on ( I ) c h c: Co r m o l . l r H c: r l l C� l l l l llcd 1 11 \ ' U l v t: m c n c : ( .:! ) r h L· n u m bc·r o f s r C�cc·s S l l [ ' l'" r c i n ," r i l e: a \1 1 1 \ L"S CI' , <lild
( .) ) ,.,· i d e m t c h cl [ c h ost· S L ! r c·s rcprcscm c h e p rc fc r c i H. c·s ol. r i l c i n t c- r n cr C I I > I l cd c u m m l l l l l t\·.
Harvard International Lmujournal I Vol 42
500
B e r c rand Aristide became H a i t i 's fi rs t d e mocraticall y e l ec ted p res id e n t . 1 5 4
H i s overw he l m i ng popularity i nd i cates chat , desp i te c h e i nadequac i es o f t h e
Hai tian pol i t i cal syste m , A r i s t i d e was a " man o f t h e people . " 1 5 5 I n A ug u s t
1 99 1 , h owever, he was deposed i n a m i l i tary c o u p , w h i c h was fol lowed by
m ass i ve human rights v i o l at i o n s , i nc l u d i ng th e m urder of at least 3 00 0 c i ­
v i l ians 1 5 6 a n d extensive deporta t i o n s , arrests , and d i sappearances . 1 5 7 W h i l e
President Aristide rem a i ned i n exi l e , th e m i l i tary j un ta o f Li euten an t G e n ­
eral Rao u l Cedras consoli dated power a n d extended the reig n o f t er ro r. T h e
i n ternational com m u n i ty, u nd e r the leaders h i p o f the U n i ted Nati o n s a n d
t h e O rgan i zation of A merican S tates ( O . A . S . ) , responded b y appl y i ng
s i g n i ficant p ressure on t he de facto H a i t i a n governm e n t , i n c l ud i ng a freeze o n
al l assets a n d an e mbargo o n o i l a n d arm s . 1 5� A fter nearly two years i n exi l e ,
from J u n e 2 7 , 1 99 1 t o J u l y 3 , 1 99 3 , A r i s t i d e , w i t h t h e ass i s tance o f t h e
U n i ted Nat i o n s , forced t h e j un ta t o n egotiate o n Governors I s l an d , N e w
Yor k . The negotiation led to a proposed power cransfer based o n a U . S .
agreem e n t call i ng , inter alia , for a n "am nesty granted b y the Presi de n t o f th e
1 5 4 . A fter temporary r u l e by a trans i t i o n a l gover n m e n t , t h e H a i t i an Coun c i l of State s e t pres i d e n t i a l
a n d par l i a m e n tary e l ections fo r December I 6 , 1 9 9 0 . See A I . E :\: D u P U Y, H A I T I I N T H E N r w \'(/ORLD O R ­
D E le TH E
LI�I ITS
O F T H E DEl\lOC RATIC R E V O I . L T I O N (iS
t h e marked 1 ncrease
Ill
decl ared h i s cand i d acy. A s o ne
c o m m c nr a w r
by A r i s t i d e e nte ri n g rhc race for the
1 n d icarcs,
p res i d e n cy·. ..
cand idacy as d i v i ne l y ord a i n e d , Jee id. at S S-89,
Poji11lar Dell/1!(/"alic RnolllliiJ!l i11
M · iD
( 1 99 7 ) .
i\ risride"s pop u l a r i t y w a s e v i d e nced b y
voter reg i s t ra t i o n from 2 5 '/i tO 9 0 '/i o f e l i g i b l e voters i n t h e days after h e had
Predc:;;m,Tatit'
rl
""
t h e re
i s n o doubt that t h i s [ i nc re<lSe] was caused
/d. a t 8 5 . t\ r i s r i c l e , who cast h i mself as a prophet and h is
w o n t h e po p u l a r \'Ote w i t h G7 . 5 '/f .
Sooi!ly: The Ca.'r: o( Uaiti,
See Robert Pasror, A
H A I T I R E N I � W ED : P O L I T I C A L
Iii
EcoNO � I IC P R OS P E C TS 1 1 8 , 1 2 1 ( Robert 1 . R o tberg eel . , 1 997 ) [ herei nafter H A IT I R E N EW E D ] . T h e
e l ec t i o n marked a m o m e n t w h e n ""the p o p u l a r w i l l t r i u mphed-m o m e n t ar i l y-w i t h l i t t le v i o l ence or
repres s i o n . " K i m l vcs, The Laualc�.r A ll�clll(e P mpd.r A riJticlt
4 1 , 4 5 (Dei rdre McFayden & P i e rre LaR a m ee eel s . , I 99 5 )
See J . P.
! 55.
lo
Pou er, in H.·'.!TI D,-\1'-i GEROuS C R OSS ROADS
Slavi n , A ristide: t\fa!l u/ the People, 111 H A IT I O ..I N G F I \O U S C R OSS R O ,-\ DS , Slljira narc ! 5 4 , a t
4 7 , : 1 7 -4 9 . This A r t i cle d o e s not s e e k
w
e n�age i n t h e d e b a t e o f w h e t h e r A r i s r i d e w a s a ""good " or even
""ben i g n " leader. E v i dence to the com rary abou n ck See G reg C h a m b e r lai n , f-!aiti 'J "Set'o;id flldepuulmce ":
A ri.uicle'J
Stl 'el/ 1\l ollth.r i!l Oj}ia, i11
H AI T I D,-\ N (; E I\ O u S C IWSSRO.-I DS, Slljlra note ! 5 4 , ctt 5 I , 5 2 . Nor docs i t
c l a i m t h a t H a i t i was a n id ea l mod e l o f d em oc ra t i c govern m e nr . R a t her, t h i s A r t i c l e c l a i m s o n l y that
t\ r i s t i cl e ac h i eved s i g n i tl c am
popular support and
a
s u ffic i e n r l y rob u s t elt:croral
v 1 c to ry ro b e c o n s i d e red
l eg i t i mate a n d capab l e o f e n a c r i ng leg i t i mate leg i s l a t i o n . ]-l i s ct b i l i t y to t: ngage the H a i t i cm people 1 s
I nd i ca t i ve t he 1·eof: " A r i s t i d e 's e l ec t i o n a s pres 1 d e m gave most Hai rians a rare a n d exh d a rat i ng sense o f
par t i c i pat i on i n t h e i r savag e l y d iv i ded cou m r y 's pol i t i ca l
l i fe . . . C h a m b e r l a i n , Jitf'ra, at 5 1 . I n a speech
before the U n i ted Nations o n Septe m b e r 2 5 , 1 99 I , A r i s t i d e o u t l i ned ""t::-n d e m ocrat i c c o m m a n d m e m s , "
w h i c h s uggest a bas i s for l eg t t i m ate ru l e . Sec D U P U Y .
.fltjlrlt n ot e 1 5 · i , at 9·1 ;
see
a i.l o Robert h u r o n J r. , The
R ise. ! 'all. al!{/ /?wmwtiUII of Prrmlmt 1\ riJtuk, i11 H.-\ITI R E N E\X T D , .r11p ra note ! S ci ,
t hat
"A
r i s t i cle 's brief
fi rs t pres idency marked c h e freest cllld
rn o s r
;H
1 3 6 , 1 42 ( a rg u i n g
hopefu l per i od of 1:-l a l t i 's pol i r i ca l h i s ­
wry " ) .
1 5 6 . J o h n Shar t u d .: , i\ ss i s t a n r Sec rt rarv t ( J r De m oc rac y. I I u m a n R 1g h t s . and Labor, t\d d ress at
a
D ep.u r mtn r P ress B r i efing (Sepr . ! _) ,
N e w s Li brarv, i'\tws Group F i l e .
See
State
1 99·4 ). i11 Federal News Serv 1 c t , S ep t I .'> , 1 994. m ·, ni<�Mt " ' LEXlS,
<�IJII D U P U Y . .> llf'rrl n o t e 1 5 '1. at 1 .1 9 ( mcl ica t i n g r ha t b e t w een October
1 9 9 1 a n d Septe mber 1 9 9 4 , " " [ :l ] n e S t i mated i( ) ( ) ( J ptOJl l t were k i l l e d , cuo u n d .1 0 0 , 0 0 ( ) beca m e 1 nr c: r n a l
rctug e e s , . . . a nd
mo1·e r han (,0 ,0()0 [soug h r ] as y l u m
1 11 rhe U n 1 recl Scares " " ) .
1 5 7 . Sci .�.:1/,'l"itl!y The: C r i s i s in H a i t i , U . S Depa r t rn c m o i S r a r e D i sp a r ch ( S e p t . 1 9 , 1 994 ) , , n ·. tildU!
L E X I S . News L i b raf\·. News G r u u Jl h i e ; J . P. S l a v t n , n,,
H ..\ I T I D,-\ \: C I : I\O L S
C J(USS I(U.-\ DS.
[/i�c·, f( e z ·cll �r:
Ibe
, \ l i/;trny Cr,;;p u/
iil/'l"d norc I 5 ·1 . ar 5 '7 -. () I (c i :l l m i n g c h a r as m:u1 \· as 5 0 0 c i v i l u n s
k i l led h1· the m d l taf\· in the week fu l l o w i ng rhc c o u p ) .
I SS. S e e Sch:t rf. !lt/IJ"t� IWte l , at 7; D L: P U Y , .ittf'r.t n o r c· I 5 ·' 1 , ct r I .i S .
111
/ l) LJ J , i11
,,.CIT
50 1
200 1 I Reframing Impunity
Repub l ic . " 1 59 I n add i t i o n to rece 1 vmg d i rect U . S . s upport , th e agree m e n t ,
i n c l u d i ng t he am nesty c laus e, was e nd orsed by th e U N Securi ty Counc i l . 1 60
Despi te t he Governors I s land Agreeme n t , the H a i t i a n j un ta refused th e
A r i s r i de/UN proposal ro a l l ow t h e peacekeep i ng fo rce to land and Pres i den t
Ari s t i d e r o ret u r n . Then the Sec u ri t y Counc i l authori zed a m u l t i lateral i nva­
s i o n o f H ai t i on J u l y 3 1 , 1 99 4 . 1 6 1 O n September 1 8 , 1 99 4 , t h e day before
the plan ned i nvas i o n , a d el egat i o n , l ed by P re s i d e n t Carter162 and authori zed
by P resident C l i n t o n , met w i t h the H a i t i a n m i l i tary j unta for d i scussions.
These d i scussi o n s culmi oared i n the Carter-] on assain t Agree m e n t , which
confi rmed t he p lans for a "gen eral amnes ty" and averted the i nvasi o n . 1 63 The
i n i tial language of the amnesty clause, t herefore, m i rrored that c o n tai ned i n
t he Carter-J onassai n t Agreemen t and i nvoked t h e language o f Security
Counc i l Reso l u t i o n 9 40 . 1 6 1 U . S . Secretary of S tate Warre n C h ri stopher pro­
vided an i n terpretat i on of t h i s c l ause at a Septem ber 1 9 , 1 9 94 n ew s briefi n g ,
prai s i ng i t a s " a b road am nesty for a l l th e m e m bers o f th e m i l i tary. " 1 6 5 Even
befo re t he H a i t i a n am nesty l aw was i ss ued , it had received U . S . and UN
s upporr . 1 66 W h i l e s uch s upport does nor alone rel ieve Hai t i o f any i n terna­
ti onal o bl igations it may have face d , it d i ffere n t i ates t he Hai t i a n experience
from that of t h e other examp les . D i rect i nvolvem en t in th e a m n es ty process
by the U n i te d Stares and s upport by the U n i ted Nat i o ns s ugges t that t h e
am nesty reflects t h e w i l l of a s i g n i ficant portion o f th e i n ternat i o na l com­
m u n i ty as t he basi c s ource of i n ternati onal aut hori ty. Assistance provi d ed by
1 5 ';) . See Fbe SJtllatiOII
of Do!Jocrac; dlld f-!tt!IIC/11
R igbts i11 Hc�iti:
l?eporr o/ t b e
Seoda!J Ge11eral, U . N .
C A O R , lt 7 r h Sess . , A g e n cl c\ ! rem 2 2 , U . N . D o c . A /4 7 / 9 7 5 -S / ?. 606_) ( 1 '-) l) ) ) ( i n c l u d m g r h t: rexr o f rhe
Covernors I s l a n d r\greern e n r ) . ror
Agree ment ,
a rhorou,c: h d i s c u ss ion
of r h e
bcickground
ro
r h e Governors Is land
s e e D,wm J\1 ,\ I .O N E , D F U S I 0 2' -M M: . I :--: c; I N T H I ·: U N S F C U I\ I TY C o u N C I L : TH E C A S E O F
l-1.-\ I T I , 1 990- 1 99 7 , o cJ-')7 ( 1 99 8 ) .
1 60 . See S C R e s . o 6 1 , U . N . S C O R , 4 :-i r h S e ss . , ."> 2 7 1 s r m r g . , U . N . D o c . S IR ES/H 6 l ( 1 9 9 _'\ ) . I n a
n u mber of resolut i on s i m mediately fol lmvi n g the Governors I s L!nd A g reement , rhe UN Sec u r i rv Cou n c i l
Signaled 1 t s support for r h t agrctmenr , i nc l ud ing r h e suspension of sanctions against H ai t i . See id: .rte
gmerally £--1.-\LO N E , Jilf'ra nott:: 1 5 9 , at 89-9 2 .
1 6 1 . See S . C . Res. 940, U . N . SCO R , i 9 r h Sess . , ) -1 ! .3 r h m t g . . U i\: . Doc. S/R ES/9-10 ( 1 994) W h i l e
t h i s resoluti o n d i d i nvoke a Chapter V J I r h re a r ro i nt e rnational ptace and sec u r i t y ro a u t h o n z e an i nva­
s i o n , i r did nor ment i on che i n c l u s i o n o f ct n am nescy in rht pe-ace <l,l! rte m e nr for rhe pol i t i ca l backgrou nd
ro c h e a d o p t i o n of R e s o l u tio n 940, seoe i'vL\ LO :--J L , JiljJrct n orc· 1 5 9 , a r I 0 7 - 1 U .
1 62 Carter's ntgor�e1 t i n ,l! ream i nc luded , a m o n g o c h e rs , r h e former Chairnun o f r h e J o i nr C h i efs o f
Scaff and prc:sem S e c r e t a r y o f S ca r e , C o l i n P o w e l L as wtl l as Senaror Sam N u n n . See D u P U Y , Jitf!r,t n o t e
1 5 4 , ac 1 5 9 .
1 6 3 . Cirte r-J o n cissa i n r t\gre e m e n r . Sep t . 1 o , 1 9 9-\ , U . S . - H cu c i , a r r . .3 ,
:\ 'i D :\I I I . IT.-\1\Y 0 l' I RA I ! U i': S , T H I :
:I N D
_} U DG I :
rejlrJll!ed 111
f- ( I I TL-\ RY O P r R.-ITI O N S I N l-L-\ I T I . 1 9 9- i- 1 ')9 5 : lx�sn:--: :; L E A I\ N J ', I) FOI\
( 1 9 9 5 ). See .;!J,, i\L1 LOi': E. i!tf"·" nore 1 5 9 , at 1 1 2 .
I o-1. Sec .\Li l .ON E , J!l/lld noce
C r : i': T I' R FO I\ LI\V
r\ LWOC XIT G I: N L IL·\ L, � S C H O O L , U N I T U) STA! t: S A l i i\ I Y, Ll\\'
_) LDCI r\DVOCATES
1 82-S .'>
1 5 9 , at 1 1 2 .
1 0 5 . Secre rar\· n f Start \Varrcn C h r i sw pher, \Vhire [-l ouse P re-s s B r i c h ri,!,: o n l Lt i t i ( S e p t . 1 9 , 1 99 -1 ) ,
L . S . N e \\ . S\\'IiT, S e p r . ! ') , l ';) l)- 1 , cmn/,;/;/e 111 L E X I S , N e w s l . dxar y . 'N e- w s C ro u p F i l e , orcd i11 Schcu -f, JJt,tn . t
Jl ( J ( C 1 , clt I
1 (J (j_ A n u m b e r of tctrl l c r JK·act a,t; rn· m c: n rs : t ! su l ll C i u d c d a11 c l lll n t: s C \· g rcl nt . for cxamplt. L a w r e n c e
Pezszu l lo , C l i n to n 's Spcc u l E n \ · r > \ w 1-l a i r i , u ffned c i d e a l ro r h c· j u n r a 1 11 M el\ 1 9 9 o , w h i c h l it c l uded .. rhc
'
.
rc·s r g n a t w n o f rht . n m \· h i g h com mcind afl(]
: 1 broad ci m nc s r \· t o r r h t· m i l i tary. . D u PtjY, .iitj>r<� n o t e­
I S L ar 1 4 -1 .
Harvard Interncttionai Lml 'journcti I Vol 42
502
the U n i ted States to th e fl ee i ng Cedras reg i m e i s further evide nce of U . S .
s upport fo r t h e am nes ty. 167 L i k e w i s e , t h e i nvolvemen t o f t h e U n i ted Nat i o ns
i n resol v i ng the cri s i s , al b e i t not d i rectly i n th e amnesty process , 1 60 c o n fers
further i n ternat i onal l eg i t i macy.
The Haitian am nesty leg i s lation also evidences domestic leg i t i m acy. I n i ts
1 994- 1 9 9 5 bench marki ng , F reedom H o use rated Hai t i a 5 , 5 (parti a l l y
free). W h i le c h i s n um ber d o e s n o t s uggest the s a m e k i n d o f d o m es t i c le­
g i t i m acy seen in South A frica, it i s a d ramatic i mprovement fro m H a i t i 's 7 ,
7 ( n ot free) score i n 1 99 3-94 d u r i n g th e Ced ras j un ta . 1 69 T h e H a i ti a n law
was passed by t h e H ai tian Parl iament o n October 6, 1 994 , after t h e i nsur­
gents were deposed . 1 70 I t s orig i ns can be t raced back to a d e m oc ratically
e l ected body, t h e newly res tored parl iament . 1 7 1 The text of the am nesty leg­
i s lation was d rafted by Pres i d e n t A r i s t i d e , Hai t i 's fi rst democrati c a l l y elected
pres i d e n t . Whi l e t here i s evidence that th e legi s latOrs m ay not h ave ful l y
u nd e rstood o r analyzed t h e text o f t h e law, 1 7 2 t h e fact c hat t h e law came
from these two bodi es-t h e o ffice of th e democrat ical l y elected P res i d e n t
a n d the l eg islature-rather t h a n fro m th e outg o i ng reg i me , c o n fers a d eg ree
of domestic l eg i t i macy on the leg i s la t i o n . The am nesty leg i s l a t i o n also d e m ­
o ns trates ad h erence, one of Fran c k 's prereq u i s i tes for leg i t i m acy. 1 7 ' I t was
wri tten to com p l y w i t h A r t i c l e 1 4 7 o f rhe 1 98 7 Hai tian C o n s t i m t i o n ,
w h i c h l i mi ts amnesty ro p o l i t ical cri mes . 1 7 1
The scope of t h e H a i t i a n a m nesty law is res tri cted s u c h c har t h e g rant of
i m m un i ty app l i es only tO certa i n po l i t i cal cri mes and associ ated aces . Stay­
i ng w i t h i n cons t i tu ti onal b o u n d s , the law l i m i ts an y am nesty co " c r i m es and
m i sdemeanors agai nst the s tate , i n ternal and external sec uri ty, c ri m es and
m i sdemeanors affec t i ng p u b l i c ord er, and accessory cri mes and m is d e mean-
1 (,7 . P r e s i d e m Cl i nc o n and the O . A . S . soug h t ass i s w n c e from P a n a m a n J cl11 Prts J d t nc E m e s co P e rccz
G ,t ! l ad a res
co
g ra m asy l u m
ro
Panama.
See
will ing
co
m ,tl..:c
order
1 11
ro
Cecl ras , and a U . S . m i l i ra n· <t i rcrafr p rov i d e d rrans p o r r a r i u n t{JI· the For m e r
MALO:-.J J ·: , Jltj>ra n o r e 1 5 9 , at 1 1 5 . The concess ions r h e C l 1 n con cld m i n • s cra t i o n was
re g 1 111e
to
s e c u re r h e l ll ll ta"s d e p a r c u rc from H a i r i , beyond mne
a m n e s r 1·. J n c l u d td c t s t i pe n d a n d u n r"rtc:z • r\ s o f o v e r
J!tf>ra nmc 1 5 ·1 ,
<H
S79
for r h e
1 60 .
1 (, S . T h e C a r r e r-J on<tssa i m A g re e m e m pro1·ecl c o n r rov e r s i a l i n pare because i r
.1ttjlrtt
'''<lS e n ac r e d
he1·ond r h e
c h e rt"Sl !-' n a r i o n of D<liHe Cap u r:J, r h c U l'·� Speu a l E n vm· r( l r H a 1 r i
nort ! 5 9 , a r I I � . T h e a�recmtm may ,,·e l l have c i rc u nwemcd r h e LJ n i ccd N a t i o n s
a U S )) i c c s o f U n l [cd N a r i o 1 1 s a n d l e d
Sec M .\ 1 .01" 1 : .
,·erh<ll su pport
m d l i u n i n ass e t s h e l d Lw r h c· m i l 1 ra rv. See D u P U Y .
w
because r h e H a i ri a n j u nr a r r u s recl " \\ic1sh i n !-' ro n m o re c h a n r h e U . N . ( w h i c h r hu· lx- l i n· ed w a s m ort:
s u pporuvc of A r i s r i d e ) . . . D u p u · ,
.' l!f'ri!
l (,SJ Sec F JUT I X J ,\ l H o u s t : . Jttj>ra
nmt: 1 5 -:i . a r l · i 2 .
n o t e � (, .
1 ' 0 . T h e Ch a m b e r o f Depu t i e s Wlrcd 5 0-.2
d c n r A r i s r i ck Sec Scha rf,
IiI
.lttj>u I H J f C
1 . ac 1 )
I ll
T h e C h a m hc·r u t· Dc')lll t i ts l'·tssccl r i H: L1w
(\ LI ! Jl 0. 1 : .'itjll'i!
•
llOtt
1 5 '). ar ) ] .i_
L1vul· of r h e l eg i s l a t i o n c h a r lud bt:en d •·afr u l b y P rcs l ­
011
Oc cobcr (, , 1 9 9 · 1 ct n d r h c - Stn<t r c o n Onolll'r
] 7 2 . Sec Sc h ar·f. .lltj>r: r nore I . ar 1 (, ( no r i ll,l! r h e l t-� i s l a r or s · a m b i l·,dcnct <111d
n·u1
r c· x r of r i l e· a m n e s r 1· ) .
7 . S"·
con fu S J o n ctbom rile
1 - .i . F r <J n c k , mjn·<� n u r. t· I S.
,J t -I I
l ' - 1 . i\ r r i c lc 1 - 1 - u!" dlt: 1 9�: - C o n s r J t ll t l o n . . S l l )'ll l ct r t:s c h a r a m n e s r y t<lll o n l 1· be 1-'rct !llt:cl · , n r h t: I)O l l t J ­
cd tic 1 d <� n d i n h·cpl ll!-' w ! r h r h c law ··· Su- �·I.\ 1 .0 :-.J F ,
d rclh eel
en
ll1L'C'r r hcsc· fL'LJ ll l re m t· m s .
.lttj>r,, n o r <:
1 5 9 . a r I 1 - ! Tht:
alll llL"Sll
,,·as S)'c·c i ticd h·
200 1 I Reframing I mp�tnity
503
ors. " 1 7 5 The fi rs t three clauses prov i d e for a narrow, c i rcumscri bed g rant of
i m m u n i ty. A mnesty i s confe rred upo n pol i t i cal crimes " agai n s t the s tate , "
s uc h as treas o n , of which t h e former j unta was l i kely g u i l t y. 1 76 A s these
cri mes were commi tted " agai n s t the s tate , " rather than parti c u lar i nd i v i d u­
a l s , the state appears co have appropriate s tand i ng co grant amnesty fo r them
wi thout i n fr i n g i ng on che rights of i nd i v i d uals or b reach i ng i n ternati o nal
o b l igat i o n s .
W h i l e these fi rs t cl auses were d rafted c o avoi d a grant o f amnesty fo r
c r i mes com m i tted agai nst t h i rd parti e s , as opposed c o the s tate, the fi na l
c laus e , l eaves m ore room for i n terpretat i o n a n d pote n t i a l l y expands t h e
scope of i m m u n i ty, a s i t extends amnesty co "accessory c r i m e s and m i sde­
m eanors , " w i thout p rov i d i ng speci fi c g u idance as to w h i c h cri mes should be
de e m e d " accessory. " The q ues t i o n for a co urt i n such a case i s " whether t h e
n e x u s between the c r i me and t h e p o l i t ical a c e i s suffici e n t l y c l ose for ch e
c r im e co be deemed pol i t ical . " 1 77 I c s eems l i kely ch at mo s t n o n -po l i ti c a l
crim in al ac t s , s u c h a s serious c ri m es agai n s t human l i fe ( rape , c o r c u r e , and
m u rder) , would not have suffi ci en t nexus to a pol i ti cal ac e . W h i l e chis nexus
rest may i nc lude certa i n serio u s cri mes agai n s t human l i fe , it does prov i de
the j ud i c i ary a marg i n of appreciation to determ i ne w h i c h cri mes are pol i t i ­
cal .
The Ha itian amnesty law seeks co balance the i m mediate need of pol i t i cal
trans i t ion w i t h the goal of p ro v i d i ng fo r che accoun tab i l i ty o f ch os e who
cotTl m i ned n o n -po l i ti cal cri mes . 1 7� Th e end-result o f ch e fi n al c lause i s co
l eave
co
the j ud i cia ry, and co remove fro m the pol i t i cal debate, the future
determ i nac i o n of l i abi l i t y for q uas i - po l i t ical a n d accessory c r i m e s . G i ven t h e
dearth of case- law re l ated co t h e amn esty, t h e j u dici ary's i ndependence a n d
effec t iveness i s s t i l l q uescionab l e . 1 ' 9 Nonethe less , even w i th t h e w i d es t pos­
s i b l e j ud i c ial i n terpreca c i o n , i ts scope re mains l i m i ted . Such l i m i ted scop e ,
together 1.v i th t h e law's i nc e rnat i o nal s u pport a n d reasonable l e v e l o f d o mes-
1 75
L a w R c l a r i vc
ro
H<�iri, O c r . 1 0 , 1 99 - t
r\ rn ntsry ( 1 ')').:\) ( H a i c i ) , jl!lb/i.rhu/ i11 T!Jt· , \ l ollitr;J: 0(/iual fr;!m!al
of r!x l?ef'"(;/"
of
1 7 6 . l r i s s i.s n d i ct m ro n or c h e re r h e l a n g u <t g t u f " ctg a J n s r r h e s care . .. \'V' htrtas n u mt:ro u s a m n ts r i cs .
s uc h a s r h ct r 1 n Sou r h r\fr i cct, h ave rtq u t rtcl c r i m ts
co
b e l i n ktcl
co
p o l i r i c a l o b J t C C J I'C'S. r h e H a J C I<lll a m ­
n e s r y rc- q ll l rcs c h a r pn! J c i ca l c r i m es be c o m m J c c e d aga i n s c r h c s w r e . C r i mes ag ct i n s c c h J rcl p a r r ies. cvu1 1 f
p o l H i ca l , art' cxc l u clecl .
l
77.
S c h a rf. Slljlr c l n o r ec l , ar l 6 .
l 7 S . T h ee m osr ,l,; rin·ous orft n cl c rs w e re J n s u la re d from p rostcc u r i on a s r h n· were g 1 v e n cts1· l u m
1 11
Pcm­
a m a . N o n n h c l cs s . 1 mc r p re r i n.s rht Ja,,· 1n l i ,c: l n o f s r a r t m c nr s b1· A r i s r i cl t . s u c h as, " Yes ro rtc o n c i l i a r J o n ,
1\o
ru
,· i o lt- nct·. i':o
w
v �.: n g t·anct. N o r o i m p u n 1 r y, Yes
r i o n . D L P l ' Y. .wj>u n m t 1 5 - 1 . <\C J ..j.j
w
J us r ice . . . su.sgesrs a n J mt m i on ro [�\ \·or prostc u ­
[ 7 ')_ T h e re h<ll'l' hten rc: lar i vc l v rl-11· prosec u r i o n s a r rc m p r ed a i'rcr c h i:' a m n cs r 1· was c:: nacrcd and r h e
an
sco pL· o f rhc a l l l Jll' S t l· has. r h tJ·efurc . n: r
r h a r h L· h,td no " p Lt n s
co
ru
pro.s ccuct: m e m hus of r h e stc u r i r 1· f mces a n d r h c 1 r a l l J L · s " w h o m 1 g h r have (O lll­
lll l r tnl <lUS l i l i [ S l tl t r . i' r h L· A m lll' S l l' rl. r J S ll r k d 1 d . h u 11·L. ,·L·r. p rl JSt'C L I C t
g rl J u p s fo r r !l t' Jll l l l'clns < 1 f h 1 s s u p p o rc e 1·s . Sc,' SchcJrf, .Citj•r<� ll < J Ct' I . a r 1 7 :
111
! .�;;. ,
Fl r hT< h
ex­
he d c r c· r m J ncd . For e x a m p l e . P1·cs i d t nr A r i s r 1 Lk d c· c l a rL·d
'1
few m c m bns o f p a r< t m J I J rclr\·
, ,., < f ;_,n
jl!d,-,.
S u; t cl/:', .1' 1 -+ l l<iill. lil.<
C IC l \ 1 1 : . St: J l C . .! "' , 1 9 9 5 . ar -1 ( d i s c u s s i n,c; r h c l'tlll i' J U J < J n o f l\ ! J c he l F r<lllC:l J J S , C h i e f "f
fJl J ! J c· c i l f Por r - a u - P r 1 n e<::, and I _) o r i H.:rs c·hctr,c:cd \\' J [ h :lSSctss i n ct r l l l,l: ;\ n [ ( ) J JW l z m c: r1·. a fnv c m S \ 1 [ 1 J lOrrcr ot'
Arist Jdc)
Harvard lnternationctl Law}o11rnal I Vol 42
5 04
r i c l eg i t i macy, p laces the Haitian amnesty leg i sl at i o n in the category o f I n ­
ternational l y leg i t i mi zed , Part i al I m m u n i ty.
The prov i s i o n of alternative means o f recourse fo r v i c t i m s als o typi fies
amnesties categori zed as I n ternat i onal l y leg i t i m i z ed , Partial I m mu n i t i e s . I n
Hai t i , c h i s al ternate recourse rook two forms. F i rs t , Pres i d e n t A r i s t i d e es­
tabl ished the Nati on al Tnuh and J us ri ce Com m i s s i o n , whose m a n date was
EO
" i nves tigate and docume n t " cri mes com m i t t ed d u r i ng h i s e x i l e . 1 80 The
Com m i s s i o n i s empowered to gather evidence in relation
EO
all eged c r i mes
and to i ss ue reports , i nd i cati ng partic ular perpe trators and violari on s . 1 8 1 The
Comm i s s i o n , w h i l e nor as i n fl ue n t i a l as i t s South African c o u nterpart ,
h e lped ensure that , al th o ug h many po li t ical cri m i nals were pard o n e d , l i m ­
i red i mm un i ty would not become B lanker A m nes ty. I n add i t i o n , A r i s t i d e
c reated a fun d for the compensation o f v i c t i ms . 1 82 Tho ugh lac k i n g adeq uate
resources and poorly coord i nate d , this fu n d p rov i ded civil red ress for some
v i c t i ms . 1 8 '
A second exampl e o f a country enac t i ng a n I nternationall y leg i t i m i z e d ,
Partial I m m u n i ty i s Guatemala. The Guatemalan am nesty law ( " t h e Guate­
malan law " ) ev idences all three c harac teristics o f chis type o f i m m u n i ty.
F i r s t , i t has some domes t i c l eg i t i m acy. Second , t h e Guatemalan peace proc­
ess received s i g n i ficant i nrernat ional s uppor r. T h i rd , the Guatemalan law
i tself provides for a s i g n i ficanr - l y rest ric ted scope of i m m u n i ty.
O n December 2 9, 1 99 6 , th e Guatemalan govern m e n t , led by P res i de n r
Alvaro Arzu and the Guatemalan National Revolmionary Union ( U . R . N . G . ) ,
s i g n ed a peace accord , end i ng t h i rty-six years o f v i o l e m c i v i l war. T h i s ex­
t e nded period of v i o l e n t confl i c t took a severe roll on Guatemalan soci ety.
O n e report d iscusses over 5 2 , 000 h u n1 an rights and h u man i tar ian law v i o la­
t i o n s , i nc l u d i ng over 2 5 , 000 m urders , 4000 v i c t i ms of to rt ure , and a n equal
n um ber of forced cl i sappearances . 1 8·i
The domes tic l eg i t i macy of t h e Guatemalan law rests i n part on t h e 1 99 6
elec c i o n o f Alvaro Arzu as pres i den t o f Guat e mala and the v i cto ry o f h i s
Parry for Nat ional A c h i evement [ PA N } i n congres s i onal e lect i o n s , m a rk i ng
the beg i n n i ng of reco n c i l iat i o n . \V h i le Arzu o n l y na rrow l y preva i l e d i n th e
r u noff elec ci on agamsr R i os M o m t , w i t h 5 1 . 2 % of th e voce, h e i n fac e re-
l i-> 0 .
Scharf, Jil/lr<l
n O(( o
l , :tr l S . I n
December
I ':J'Yi . r\ r i s r i d t i n i r urecl a n ·· J IWts r t s a r i o n i n ro rhc m u r ­
d e rs of r h ousancls of H a i r i a n s co m m 1 r red d u r i ng r h t m d t r a n· rct g n . " I RW l :--< P. S I 'O'IZKY, S I I. E l' C J '-I G T H L
G c :--< s 1 :--< H .� I T I : TH t: P R O \ I l S E O F D u. J H E R .H I V E D t::- J OCIL-ICY
Nar i onal Tru r h a n d
sume
J usrice
I S I . C la u d i o I�
I S2.
Tht rt;lfrtr. he appo i nr c:cl r h t
,
pa ra m d i ra ry leaders. !d.
r\ 11/ih'.'l) 1111d iii
5 0 ( I ')') 7 ) .
Com m is s i o n and en·n sou c: h r t n runa r i o n a l ass i s rclnct i n rhc prosec urion o f
S a n r o r u m & A n r o n i o l\b l d o tudo. Pdit�c·,;/
;\jlf!ltt'atirm iii Selct'!t'd C n t.i,
See Scilat{ .i!tjli'li n o r e I . c\r I ::: .
I S 1 . .\n· Sclll W r u m �"- iVl a l clanad o ,
l?n·ou,·i!MiiotJ
2 H L: .\ 1 . l� T.� . l:l iU I F 1 5 , I S ( I :J') ) ) .
.tlljl l 'd n o rt·
"�'
f,,;;�il '<il,_i.i jl11· :l i !lrdu·---
I S I . <ll I 5 .
I S - \ . Su· R E M H I . C u arcnuLl i'\ n e r A t' a i n ! : T h e: Ofli c � <d R t· p u r r of r i l e: H u m;lll R i g h rs O Hi c t . A rc i l ­
d t octst o f G ua r e m aLt
� 89-91J
(
l SJC)') ) :
sec
,�tllfi'itlly
G L . I T D LI L. I : i\ [ H I O I( Y I l l' S l l . lc N < T , R L PO IZT
C0 ,\ 1 .\ I I SS I U :--; 1 0 1( H ! q'l)I( I C.\ 1 . Ct ..-\ I( I I ' I C\1' 1 ( ) :--; ( :! ( 1 () ( 1 )
OF
T i l l:
200 1 I Reframing Impunity
505
ceived a maJ o n c y o f che voces i n the eleccion . 1 85 These elec c i o ns have been
descri bed as free and fai r, 1 80 though voter curnom was relatively low, w i th
o n l y 4 7 % of regi s tered voters cast i ng ball o ts . 1 8 7
I n a s t r i c t sense, c h i s election i nd icates the exi s t e nce o f a proce d u ral de­
m ocracy. T here were free and fai r elec t i ons contes ted by at l eas e seven d i ffer­
em parties . 1 88 However, g iven the ex traord i nari l y c lose res u l c s o f che elec­
tion, t he low vocer t urnout , and che l ack of an overwhelm i ng pop u l ar man­
dace for c he Arzu government, closer scruci ny o f che scace o f Guatemalan
democracy along l i nes d i c tated by che pos i tive l i beral i nternatio nal relac i ons
theory is warranted . The 1 99 5 elections represented an i mportant s h i ft i n
c h e dynamics o f government-civi l sociecy relat i o n s , s i g n al i ng c h e open i ng o f
n e w popular d iscourse and grow i ng i nt e racti o n between c h e govern men t an d
the peop l e . For exam p l e , t h i s election was the first d ur i ng w h i ch non­
governm ental o rganizations " carried out civic education and s uperv i s i o n o f
t h e pol l ing " a nd local o rganizations m o b i l i zed . 1 89 T h i s n ew c i v i c engage­
ment
was
accompani ed
by
c he
c reac 1 o n
of " new spaces
for c i t i zen­
g ove rnment d ialogue empoweri ng civil socie cy. 1 9° " [T}he expans i on o f po­
l i t i cal parti c ipation and a democrat i c p o l i tical c u l cu re i n G uatemala" d ur i ng
the m i d - 1 990s , gave r i se co opport u n i ti es for a boccom - up co ns o l i d at i o n of
cl emocracy. 1 'J 1 This expans i o n has , in wrn , " b roade n[ed} pol i t i cal parci c i pa-
1 0 5 . O n November 1 2 , 1 9 9 5 , r h t fi rs t round of r h e: c l e u i o n d i d nm _l! i v t a n abso l u rt m a J o r i t y
cctncltclart. l t ad J !lg
w
a r u n - ofT on
J an u ary
w a ny
7 , 1. 996, in w h i c h A rz u preva i l ed w i r h 5 1 . 2')i of r h e v o c e . I n
r h t )\;o v e m h c r 1 2 b a l l o t i n g , A rzu 's Parry of N a r i o n a l Ach i e n: m e n r ( PA N ) w o k a n ,1 bso l u re m a j o r i t y o f
se,l ( S
1 11
Congress
(-i,=J
of � 0 ) . Mon r r 's Guate m a l a n R e p u b l t c a n From w o n o n l y rwemy-ont sears . A n u m ­
b e r of s m a l ler p a rr i e s wok r h e re ma i n l n,t: stars. Sec Clt<lhilltila: Delllll<hi<J a11J Hm11a11
ll·ww. u n t g e . c h /h u m a n r r s / i nsiguaremala_de m oc h u m rrs_9 7 . h r m l
n o r i n g c h a r A rzu owed h i s v i crory p r i m a n l y ro
a
( v i s i ted
Ftb.
:.' 0 ,
l?!jltJ
2 l J( ) I ) .
Ic
I 0 . h r r p :!/
tS
worrh
s wtep o f r h e c1p i r a l , w i n n i ng o n l y 4 o f r he 2 2 voun g
clt:parr mems acmss rht: c o u m r y. TA <'i L� E� L E " C: I ,� P ll A I.lO & D,\Vll) H O L I DAY, TO\\'.� I(DS ,, N L\\ ' R o u: FOil
C I V I L SOC : I loTY I '-i TH E D t:,\IOCIL\TIZATIO:"
I 06. See G'llateli!CIIa: Dri!IIJ<hl<)
01'
{!)ld E-illlllt/11
G L'.IT I : �L� L·I -- \U ( Ptrer l:'e l d s r e i n t ran s . , l
N igbiJ,
I 0 7 . !d. (desc r i b i ng rile t l e c r w n as " c l ea n " ) .
1 0 0 . See P l l ,I DO & H O I.I D.W,
r h t: 1 9') 5 congres s i o n a l e l e c t i o n ) .
l S')
See
id.
i!!pra
>!tpr"
')96).
nore I 0 5 . a r 1 0 .
nort I ::> 5 , ar i O ( rw r i n g the seven po l r r i c a l parr i es w i n n i ng SC:<HS r n
a t ) ') . \'V h t l e a 5 .'/)r v o r e r a b s t e nr r o n rare: 'lppt:,lrs h ig h , t t w a s acrua l l y " l t s s t h a n tx­
pc:c rt:d , " cl ue in p an co a new c i v i c
e n g ag t m e nr .
T h i s new tn,l!ag t m e n r was fu r t h e r suggested by a n on-r
60','( i nc rease tn the n u m ber of reg i s t e red c r v i c com m i t rt:es w 1 60 bcrwet:n [ ')') _) and 1 9') 6 . !d. ar .'l o .
"
C:o m n1t' n r ,t rors have descri bed c h i s new c i v i c e ngagem t nr a s
o n e:
o f t h e most pos i r i ve d e v t l o p m t n r s
l il t S e knoral p r o c e s s . l r gave c i v i c orga n i n r t o n s an opp r m u n 1 r1· ro rt,lssen t h e i r r i g h r
d e c i s i ons . . . ! d . a t _) ') .
1 ')0 . See S u s .1 " N E
jO:-.JAS,
J u n a s r w res c h a r
t h e p e ac e process .
w
1 11
1 n tl u e n c t p u b l t c
OF ( E NT.o\ lJ I(S .� :-.J D D o v 1 : s : G u .n i : ,\ 1 :\ U · s P t: .. ICE P R OCESS 4- -i , ! 0 _) ( 2 0 0 0 ) .
. retlecrtcl r h c t m t:rac r i o n s berween r h e ne,l! O t i a r i o ns ptr se <tnd r il e ope- n i ng o f
ckmocra r i c s pace s 1 n G uatem a l a n so c i e r 1· as '\ w h o l e: . L l l l m arelr, the pt;\Ct process b e ca m e r h e po­
l r r l ctl r n r·,t i n on w h t c h c o m p c r i n g '1g e n d a s ,tbu u r t h e
·
c o u n r r y' s
tm urt: w e re b e r n .� p Ltred o u r
T h t: lxg t n n r n g o r c h e peace ne g o t i a r r o n s o p e n e d up new spaCl'S c > u t s i dc: r h t e- l tcru r,tl a r e n a , a n d even­
c tu l h·
!d. :
'l
!Iii
guzcrrr i rw :: r,tu i c. .n dnTioped b c r w et:r1 c l t c r i n ns ;t n d llc!,!or 1 1H l O ilS r h a r d t m o c ra t l ztd pu­
l t r t Ct l r rctns i t iu n .
·' ' "
c�f.,,; i\ l a rcu Funsc:ct.
Pc �udigill.t 1)/
.r11rl
/ ),..: ;,;r;(r.!/ i_�.;tio;f
l-' 1 ' ..1 1 { , '5 7 , G :-; ( L i t sa L. N o r t h &. r\Ltn B . S i m m o r t s e e l s . . I ')')') ) .
1 ') 1 .
k;tsr
ju i': .·l� .
u 1 1 •:
111 (ilt.r!utu!:�,
iii . J C> li l\ i'o: l o Y )
UF
.• llf'r" n o r <: I ')U , at 1 0')- 1 0 ( n o u n g t h at b1 1 99 7 . ' :-;';: o f res p on de nr s pa r r i c r pa t cd r n a r
mga n t z,t t i o n o f c i ,· i l soc i cry kduect t i o n a l . r.: l 1 ,� r u u s . and com m u n r t y d c , T i op m c l \ l g ro u ps ) ) .
Harvard International LawjoJtrna! I Vol. 42
506
t w n i n t h e cou n try. " 1 92 These p rocesses o f expand i ng c i v i l soc i e t y and c o n ­
sol i dati ng p roto - d e m oc rati c i ns t i t ut i o n s b o l s t e r t h e leg i t i m ac y o f t h e 1 99 6
e lection a n d suggest an ongo i ng seam of c i v i l -gove r n m e n tal i nt e rac t i o n .
T h i s seam o f i n teract i o n i s fur t h e r reflected i n F reedom H ouse's s c o re o n
Guatemala for 1 99 6-97 o f 3 , 4 , fin d i ng i t par t i a l l y free a n d n o t i ng a mean­
i ngfu l i ncrease in freed o m fro m t h e p revi o us year's score o f 4 , 5 (part i a l ly
free) . W h i l e Guatemalan d e m oc racy is far fro m i d eal , i t d e m o n s t rates t h e
l eg i t i m acy characte r i s t i c o f procedural d e m o c racy and suggests t hat prefer­
e nces of t h e c i t i ze ns were , i n fac t , determ i n i ng gove r n m e n t p o l i cy.
The leg i slative h i s tory o f t h e Guatemalan law i nd i cates t h a t t h e l a w 's e n ­
ac t m e n t respects t h e w i l l o f t h e peop l e a s t h e source o f g o ve r n m en tal
a u t h o ri t y. The Guatema lan law was t h e fi nal act in a series o f accords s ig ned
between the govern m e n t and the reb e l forces . Each of these accords , beg i n ­
n i ng w i t h t h e C o m p reh e ns i ve H um an R i g h ts Accord of March 1 994 and
i n c l ud i ng t he 1 99 6 Accord on Streng t he n i ng o f C i v i l Pow e r a n d the F u n c ­
t i o n of the A r m y i n a Democra ti c Soc i e ty, m oved Guatemala b a c k i nt o t h e
co m m u n i ty of democrat i c n a t i o n s , l i m i t i ng the rol e o f t h e a r m e d forces and
c rea t i ng
room
for c i v i l
d ialogue . 1 9 >
These
accords
"laid
the
bas i s
fo r
fu l fi l l m e n t of t h e bas i c r i g h t s t h a t h ad e x i s t ed o n paper s i nce t h e 1 98 5 C o n ­
s t i t u ti o n and, i n t h i s sense, were t h e necessary coun terpart t o t h e C o n s r i t u ­
t i o n . " I 'J-! O nce these r i g h ts w e r e i n s t i tu ted a n c.l refo r m s u n d e r t ak e n , t h e l e ­
g i t i macy o f the Guatemalan govern m e n t , and spec i fical ly i ts c o n g ress , to
enacc an a m nesty was en hanced . 1 Y 5
After the sig n i ng of t h e fi n a l accords between the Arzu govern m e n t a n d
t h e U. R . N.G., the congress passed t h e Nat i o nal Recon c i l i a t i o n l a w o n D e ­
c e m b e r 1 8 , 1 9 9 6 . Thoug h m e m bers of t h e N e w Guate m a l a D e m oc ra t i c
F r o n t wal ked o u t of the debate before the v o t e , 1 ')C.� t h e Nat i o n a l R e c o n c i l i a­
t i o n Law passed by s i x t y - fi v e to e i g h t , w i th seven abst e m i o n s . 1 'J7 Des p i te i ts
l ') 2 . R .\ C H F I . M . M c C J . L\ 1( \', D I C'!AI I !" ( ; D D ! C J C ILICY: G i. i .Y J ' I : ,s J .\ 1.;1 ci :--: D
R EVOI.UTIC l �
TH
J: [ !" D
OF
YI O I . L � T
1 ')-\ ( 1 99'1)
l SJ ) . See H u g h B y r n e , 'f'/Je Gl!atell!t!lall Pwce ;\ ((1!/i/.r: A.r.<cJ!'Jih l/1 , / 1/d fil!jl/i(dtiiJI!l jfn · tbe Pl!tl/l'e. \V OLi\
B I( ! J ' J'. M a r c h 2- ) , l ')')7 . \\! h i l t i r i s n u t c h a r r h tst accords wt:rc: i n r h t l lll lll l'cl i a r <:: r t r m " m o rL· a p ro m ­
ISe
r h a n a rC",d l r )·," r h t y c o m a i ned " i m po rr a m a n d m·ccssa r1· p rov i s 1 o n s r o m ovt ww;trd a d e m ocr<u i c , l a w ­
b,lscd soc i e r y. .. !d. ar .'\ .
l SJ i . .J o � ,\� . .r;tjlra norc
I ') 0 ,
< l [ � -\ . l m ponam rc· forms 1 nc l ud t:d s r reng r h e n i ng r h e J U s r i ce s y s te m , p ro ­
ii.:ss i O n <l h z l ng r h e c i v i l s c rv i n: , a n d i m p ro v i ng r h e " l tg , r i nu c y " :llld " r Llll s p a n: n c y " o f c o n g ress . !d.
.
I ') 5 !J <H S') ( n o t i n g c h a r r h t co n s r l [ ll [ l u n a l ,·efcm11s . 1 11\'(J I \'l:d [XI J t( , u n d c h <l l\t.:t:s 1 n t h e s rc1 rt: app<tra­
t u s a n d 1rs rc·L1 r 1 o n ro G ua r e m a l a n suci n v " ) .
I ') () . Sec Lun· R o h rer, Cll,t/('}!J,ti.lll i\ llmn t r i.1 r\pjm!/'ed Oi'tl (Jf!!"'""'Jt.r ' 06;u tiotJ.r. N . Y. TI \ J J : S , Dec. I ') .
l 'J ')(,. ar J\ l :; , I .
I l)7
Sec r.l(/1
Iii/
rile .
\'\10!\ I . D
N F \\'� ] ) [ ( ; . Dtc
,:; I ' I ')l) h ,
ill ') () ' ) ,
J\ I
T h e l a w \\'CIS s u pp t > ITl'd L w
r\ rzus N t w C uarunala Dtmucr a r i c F ro m , r h t C u arcm<i l <l ll l� C jl u h l 1can F ro m . a n d r h c· (] m s r i a n D c m u ­
C:L· I 1 n a /. u hltts;t, (,,,,grc.'.l ,·\i'fil·o z ·.t! o/ r\ onh·.<i l (;rn rul ll 'i!b )t'CI'J , J:..: Tu; P1u : s � S J : I\V I < T . Dt· c . I ') ,
I ') ') (, . T h e· l c ,c; l s l ,r r i o n , r h o u,c; h u J n r ro v n s l a i . rtcel v,·d s u pp1 1 r· r from " b ru.rd s p t u r u m uf C u ·, l t l' ll1i!L111
nars.
S U L I U \',
i n c l u c l 1 1 1 g r hr.: C u .u t m ; i \ a n ,\ r m td F o rcc·s a n d r h<: C u m L· ll1<1 Lu ; N a t i Uili l i R n· o l u r i o 1 L t 1·1· l · n , r \·
i\ l mTnlC' !l l . s,., Cli.tfell!, llc/11 ;\ .<.lt'lltMr ;\j>jll 'ol 'c.< f l il! ll !·.rt r 1.<�11', FT. \Vo1c1 1 1 ST,·I J( TF I . J : C I U ,\ 1 . Dec. l l) . l l)')h,
il[
5
200 1 I Reframing Impunity
5 07
detractors, l 9S the l aw demonstrates adherence, as i t was passed th rough l egal
p rocesses and in conformi ty w i t h t h e Guatemalan Const i tuti on . 1 99
The Guatemalan Law also demonstrates s i g n i ficant i n te r nati o nal l eg i t i ­
macy. Throughout t h e 1 9 90s, t h e so-cal led " Group o f Fri en ds "-Mexi c o ,
No rway, Spa i n , the U n i ted States, Venezue l a , a n d Colombia-faci l i tated t h e
peace process , i nc l ud i ng the even t ual amnesty g ra n c . �00 The U n i ted Nat ions
also played an i mportan t rol e i n the process . � 0 1 B y ch e beg i n n i ng of 1 994 ,
" bo t h parties [the G uatemalan government and the U . R . N . G . } . . . h ad be­
come convi nced c hat a h i g h level U . N . role was essential , " a role w h i c h the
organ i zation accepted i n part . 202 The parti es themselves agreed that the
peace process and the amnesty woul d n o t have been poss i b l e w i thout i n ter­
nat i o nal s uppor t . 20l The Acuerdo Marco ( Framework Accords) g ranted the
U n i ced N acions the offi c ial role of " m oderator" and formali zed t h e fac i l i ca­
tion role o f the Group of F r i e nds . w
: i Eventual l y, the peace t reaty, which i n ­
corporated t h e g ran t o f am n es ty, was sig ned i n O s l o a n d w i t nessed by U N
Secre tary General Boucros B o u tros-Ghal i a n d v i s i r i ng pres i d e n t s of several
s tates , conferri ng on the e n c i re p rocess i n ternatio nal support and en hanced
l e git i macy. 2 1 1 5
O n the axi s of scope , the act contains important l i m i tations c hat place the
l aw w i t h i n the category of I n ternat i o na l l y Leg i t i m i zed , Parcial I m m u n i ty.
A rt i c l e 2 of t h e law "ext i n g u ishes penal respons i b i l i ty fo r p o l i t i ca l c n rn es
c om m i tt ed i n the i n te r n a l armed c o n fl i c t " 206 and i n s tru c ts the j us t i c e m i n i s -
1 9 8 . Set. e. g . ' F ran C I S C O Gold m cl n ,
( a rg u i n g t hat t h e
Ill
Gttci!CIIId!a A ll i.. r,!/g()//e/1, i'� '( TL \ [ [ o S , D e c .
l aw ·· , s esse m i a l l y a p o l i t i c a l ace
rep u t a t i ons and p e r q u i s i t es, not
s ea kd
2 .) ,
1 996 , at A 1 5
by a kw i n d 1 v i d u a l s concerned w i t h t h e i r o w n
m e m i o n t h e i r poss i b l e l e g a l v u l nerabi l i t y " ) .
ro
1 9 9 . See G u a t e ma l a n Law o f N a t i o n a l Reco n c i l i a[ I O !l o f D e c e m b e r I Ci , 1 9 9 6 ( E r i ka A lx a h amsso n
t ra n s . , on ti l e w 1 t h Harvard l nr e rnat i o n al La w J ou rn a l ) [ htrt i na i'ter G u a t e m a l a n Law} (" [ ! ] n confo rm 1 t y
w i t h t h e Po l i t i c a l C o n s t i t m i on of
the
R e p u b l i c of G u a t e m a Ll , i t
t h e R e p u b l i c . w h e n ck m a n d ecl by p u b l i c conven i e nce,
res po n s i b i l i t �·. " ) . fd a r t . I .
w
IS
wi th i n
t h e power of t h e
Congress
of
tXtll1j)t po l i t i c a l a n d r e l a t e d c r i m e s fmm p e n a l
200 . See Jo:--; .� s. JlljJJ'd ncHe 1 90 , 4 .) . 6 .) n . 8 ( d i scuss i ng t h e, ro l e of each
co m r y i n r h e process ) . Mexico,
Norway servtd as an " h onesr broker .. a n d hosrecl r h e 1 994
\V/e s te r n Europe . .. The U n i r t d S rarc:s acrecl as a " h eavy - w e i g h t . ..
ror exa m p lt , convened nu merous m e e t i n g s .
accord s . S p ai n sen·ed as a " l ia i s o n
ro
p u s h i ng t h e a r m y ro ctccepr c i v i l i a n c o n r ro l . !d. ar 6 .'\-Ci-'1 , n . S .
20 1 . O n
S e p r e m be r 1. 9 , 1 99 4 ,
r h ro u g h U . N . Ge n e ra l Assc m b il· R e so l u r 1 o n -'! S / 2 Ci 7 , M I N UG U A w a s
firsr r e a m or UN oHi c i ,liS, l e d by Leo nardo F rclnco, began o pt:r a t io n s i ll G u at e m a l a .
1·cars m u rc rh,ln U . S . S .'\ 5 m d l i o r t was l ll V esred in opera t i C JllS 1 11 G ua r e m a la . Sec S r e p h e n
es cab l l s h ed and t h e
O v e r r h t n e x t rwo
B a r a n \' ! , :\ !<1.\illli�iilg rbr
Bmcjit.r u/ U 1\-
[1/ l di 'tl!ltlll
111
tbe Clt<lit'llici!t l ll
7 oi, 78 ( L i i s a L. N o r t h & r\ l a n Jj . S i m m o n s eel s . 1 9 9 9 ) .
2 0 .2 . J oc.;.�s. wjwc� n n r e 1 90 ,
at
f' p,(c'J.I .
i11 ]OLI< N I-: Y�
The leadn of r h c· U . R . N . G
1 11
has
Guarc: m a l a " ) .
com mtmed t h a t
"[11 k
co u l d n · c
J u l "t P rc:s r o n ,
"/.''' _ j o !' ,IC'. 'llf>ra
_' l l · i
_' 1 1 5
F hl l<
h a v e been i m poss i ­
; \ U. 1\'. Sll<"<'c.\.1· Sron . Gll<i!ctltalc!ll i\ /;;rc,,, 1-'.d/, N Y. T! :\ 1 1 ' � . i\ i a r. 2 � , 1 9') 0 . a t ,\ S .
nott
I ')0,
at
H
h a v e kt·pr i r a l i Ve il ll10ilg G u a ­
t t m a Ll n s . . . . \\f i r h u u r t h e pers i s renct:: o l . t h e U n i red l'-.i a r i on s t h e· pe:lU: p wcess w o u l d
h l t- . ..
OF
5 7 ( i n d , c a r i ng that rhc: U n i t ed i\i a ( l ons too " be c a m e con v i nced chat
shou l d become nwre seriously i rw o h· e d
20.'>
Pwa
·'"
'i S .
S,·r J o '. .\ � . ,;;j>ra n u t e I C) l l . a t 7 1 .
IJ
_' O il . T h e· J ' C rt l ll t ll t pa r r ,
<h
a rn c n c kc l , rc:a d s :
P c· l t:d rc:sporl S l h i l l f l. w i l l be w r ; d h· e :-.: r i ng ll ! s l wd 1-m !'c : l i r i c,d lr l l l l L ' c n m rr1 1 r r cd
111
t h e I IH n n ,d
,tr med c u n rl , n ,,· h i c h ( ) r i .� 1 n a rcd ·' h 1·c,1rs cl,t.: u . u m d t h c: c: Hc·cr i ··:c d a r e o t. r ! J , ., Ia\\', a n d 1 r w i l l he:
un-
Harvard International Lmu}ourna! I Vol 42
508
c ries ro abstai n from acti o n in t hese cases . Li kewi s e , A rticle 5 exti n g u i she s
p en al responsi b i l i ty for an y pote n t i a ll y cri m i n al act s by gove r n m e n t aut h o r i ­
t i es com m i tted ro s uppress t h e cri mes a m n e s t i e d i n A rt i cl e s 2 a n d 4 . 2 0 7
A m nesty i s t hereby gran ted r o borh c i t i zen s and g overnm e n t o ffi c i a l s for
pol i t i cal and related cri m e s , m ee t i ng the test of coherence prev i ou s l y ar­
t i c ul ated . W h i l e Art i c l es 2 and 5 may appear to g ive broad i mm u n i ty, the
scope of this am nesty i s n o ne t heless curtai led ; crimes m us e be p o l i t ical and
comm i tted in t h e i nternal armed confl i c t .
Article 4 of t h e Guatemalan Law provides amnesty for c ertai n related
c r i m e s . 208 Whi l e t h i s gran t expands the scope of the am nesty, two i mportant
l i m i tations are i nc l uded . F i rst , related cri m i n al acts mus t co rresp o n d co a
series of crimes i n t h e Guatemalan penal cod e , primar i ly com m o n a n d petty
c r imes . �09 Second , the text of th e l aw i tself provides a strict d e fi n i c i o n of th e
related crimes as " those acts com m i tted i n th e i n ternal con fl i c t , w h i c h d i ­
rec t l y, objectively, i n te n t i o nal l y o r coi ncidenta l l y have a n y relat i o n r o th e
com m i s s i o n of pol i t ical cri mes and i n respec t r o matters for w h i c h personal
m o t i ve can not be demons c rated . " 2 1 0 Article 3 p laces the bur den of p rov i ng
personal mot i ves on the prosec m i o n . The m e re exis tence of s u pe r i o r orders
de rscoocl c ha t t h e au t h o rs , acco m p l ices, or consp i rators, of t h e c r i mes aga i n s t t h e sec u r i ty of t h e
State, aga i n s t t h e I ns t i tu t i onal o r d e r , a n d aga i n s t t h e p u b l i c ad m i n istration, referred
ro
1 11 A r t i c l e s
_) 5 9 , 3 60 , 3 6 7 , .) 6 � . .) 7 5 , 5 � 1 , .'1 8 5 - 399 , 108- i i O , 4 1 -'i-4 1 6 , o f the P e n a l C o d e 'He i n c l ud ed .
. In
t h ese cases the P u b l i c M i n i s t e r w d l absta i n fro m exerc i s i ng t h e p e n a l a n i o n and t h e j u d i c i a l
authority w i l l decree r h e proced u re t o be fo l lowed.
G r1atema l a n Law,
.wpra
note 1 99 , a rc . .:>
.:2 0 7 . A rt i cl e 5 reads i n i ts e n t i ret y :
P e n a l respons i b i l i t v w i l l b e t o ta l l y ext i ng u i s hed fo r c r i mes m o t i vated b y t h e i nt e rn a l armed conf1 1 c t
which, prior
to
t h e e ffec r i vc d a c e of c h i s bw , authors, acco m p l i ces o r conspi m cors, t h e auth o r i ( les o f
the S care, m e m bers of 1 t s i n s t i tu t i o n s ,
or
any o c h e r i nvolvement by the M i n i s t ry o f J us t ice wou l d
have b e e n c om m i t t e d co prev e n t , i m p ed e , p ur s u e or rep rc·ss rhe pol i t i c a l c r i m es a n d related c r i mes
co
w h ich A r t i c l es .:2 and - 1 of t h i s Law refc.r . The n i m c:s fo r w h i c h penal respo n s 1 b i l i ry is ex[ l n ­
g u i s h ed b y t h e current ' m i c l e also are cons i d e red o f a pol i t i cal nawrc. l n t h ese cases t h e j u d i c i a l
aut hority w i l l declare t h e d e fi n i te proced u re ro be fol l owed , w i t h i n t h e proced u re establ i s hed i n
Ar­
t i c l e 1 1 o f t h i s l a w , u n l ess 1 t c a n be estab l i s hed c lue t h e pol i t i cal nexus between t h e s u p posed d l e g a l
act and the referrul e n d s d o c s nor e x i s t or t hat the act fo l l owed a personal m o t i v e .
/d. a r t . 5 . T h i s art i c l e i s S 1 g n d'1culr because 1 t g rants a w i d e a m nesty r o governm e n t oHi c 1 a l s w h o com­
m i t te d t·ven common cri mes 1n a n attempt ro s u p p ress the rebe l move m e m . The r e x t of t h e l aw s u ggests
th<lt chis a m n e s ty
to
govc rn m e ll t offi C J a l s is broad e r than t h e amnesty g ra n ted the rebe l s .
2 0 8 . A r t i c l e 4 rea d s :
P e n a l respons i b i l i ty w i l l h e ro u l h· e x r i n,� u i shed o f the re l a ted c r i mes, vv· h i c h i n confo r m 1 t v w i t h
t h i s law a r e re l a ted
to
pol 1 r i c a l m o t i ons 1 n t h e second an· i c l t co m m l ttecl p r i o r
c h i s l a w an d w h i c h cor respond
.:2 87-.2 :-\ ') . 29.:?-2 9 5 .
lei art . .'! .
12 1
.
co
to
t h e e ffec r i vt: cbre o f
t h o s e c r i mes t)' p 1 ficd by t\ m c l es 2 1 ·� - 2 1 6 . 2 7 S , 2 7 ') , 2 N .:2-2 S 5 ,
.'> 2 5 , ) ) () , _:),) ), _) ) 7 - .1 .1 9 , .'!00-10 2 , .'!0-i , - i Oo--'1 0 7 o f r h e P e n a l Code:
2 0 9 . 5,< .�o:lltm!ly C() J J I ( ;O P L i':.·I L [C: P. ] ( G u,lt) .
.:2 1 0. G ua t e m a l a n Law, A r t i c l e 3 . rea, l s 1 n 1 ts e nt i ru v :
R e l a ted cri mes w i l l b e cl tti ne d for t h e c Jfecrs of t h i s L a w a s c hose acts com m i ( (td 1 1 1 t h e Hl ternal
cunrh n . w h i c h d i rc· n h· . u b j c c r i n· h . i mc n r i on,d l 1·
S 1on
o f p o l 1 r i ct l C f l rll l'S and
1 11
rl'SJ•tct w
or
m a r c us
c o i n c i ck nr a l h· have anv re l a t i o n ru r h c: c o m m i ,; ­
fo r w h i c h pcrso ncll m u r 1ve
er n
rwt
be· d e m o n ­
s r rartd . The c o n 11 ec t i o n w i l l nor be 'l i'l' l i ca b l t:: 1 f t h l' nontxistenct uf r h t 1 n cl 1crred 1-eLu i o n i s cl e m o n ­
s r ra rtd .
C u a r e m a l a n Law.
,11/'l'<i
note 1 9 S ,
an.
_) .
200 1 I Reframing Impunity
or a pol i tical connect i o n
to
5 09
t h e c r i me i s i ns uffi c i e n t to remove l i ab i l i ty. As
l o ng as the prosecu t i on shows some personal motive, eve n as a secondary
m ot ive, am nesty w i l l not be g ra n te d .
T h e Guatemalan Law goes beyond th e p rocedural l i m i ts o n am nesty i nd i ­
cated above and d i c tates s trict substantive l i m i ts based o n t h e co un try 's i n­
ternational l egal obl igat i on s . The first vers i o n of the law d rafted i n congress
had a broade r scope, espec i all y in re lati o n to c ri mes com m i tted by arm y
officers . However, s i g n i ficant p ressure from h um an rights o rga n i zations l e d
t o s ubstant i ve restrictions o n amnesty i ncorporated i n A r t i c l e 8 . 2 1 1 The
ori g i nal vers i o n of Arti c l e 8 d e n i es a m nesty fo r those crimes " for which the
extinction o r exemp t i on of penal respons i bi l i ty i s n o t perm i tted by i n ternal
law or i nternat i o nal t reati es approved or rati fied by Guatemala. " 2 1 2 Th i s
would h ave precluded amnesty for war crimes,2 1 1 genoc i d e , n � and torture . 2 1 5
The Guatemalan leg i s lature amended th e law at the t i m e o f i ts i n i t ial pas s ­
i ng t o further restrict the g ra n t o f a m nesty for i n te r nati o n a l cri mes . Th e
revised vers i o n of Article 8, am en d ed u nder pressure fro m i n ternational civi l
soci ety, adds spec i fic language i n d icati ng that th e amnesty i s n o t " app licable
to t he crimes of genoc i d e , torture, and forced d i sappearan ce . " 2 1 6 The res u l ­
t a n t art ic l e makes exp l i c i t t h a t am nesty w i l l not appl y w h e re Guatemala i s
under a n i n ternational ob l igati o n to prosecute t h e c r i m e . No r w i l l am nesty
attach co t he c r i m es of genoc i de , torture, and forced d i sappearances . B y i n ­
vo k i ng i n ternational law and i n terna t i o nal treaties ge neral l y, t h e G uacema-
2 1 1 . See id.
2 1 2 . !d. an . .3 (before amencl m e: n r ) .
2 1 _) .
A ug .
See. e. g. , G e n e va Coiwtm i o n IV R c Lt r i ve co c h e Prot c: c c i o n of C i v ilian P e rs o n s 1 11 Ti m e of \Var,
1 2 , 1 94 9 , 75 U . N .T.S . .2 S 7 . G u at e m a l a rar i fied the Geneva Conve n c i o n s on A u g u s c _) , 1 9 5 4 . G i v e n
c h a r r h e Geneva Convemions req u i re che p rosecu c i o n or exrrad i c ion o f t h o s e w h o com m i e g rave breaches,
see, for e xa m p l e , id. a r r . 50, A r c i c l e H o f c h e G u a c e m al a n Llw m us e be read not co g ra nt a m nescy for
g rave breaches of rhe Geneva Convem ions . See. cg. , Ge neva P rorocol I I A d d i r ional to rhe G e n e va Conve: n ­
rions of A u g . 1 2 , 1 9-1 9 , a n d Relar i ng co c h e: P rorecrion of VIc r i m s of Non-Imernarional A rmed C o n f-l i e r s ,
Dec. 7 , 1 987, 1 1 .2 5 U . N .T. S . 6 0 9 . Guarem ala rari fied borh adcl i c ional protocol s o n Apr i l 1 2 , 1 91-l9 For
an a rg u mem c h a r c h e Add i t i onal Prowcol s and r h e Geneva Convemions req u i re p rosecuc ion ot' cri mes
even 1 11 non-Imernarional armtd cont-l i c r , see:, for e x a m p le: , \XI ! ' L L EI\ & B u R K E - \VH I T E , .i!tf'i"tl n o c e -\..\ , ac
ch. 2. See <i/.(t; S u b m i s s i o n o f r h e G ov e r n me m of rhc U n i rtd Scares Conce m 1 ng Cert<u n A rg u m e m s i\hcl e
by C o u nc i l for t h e Acc used i n c h c C a s e of The P rosecuro r of t h e Tr i bu n a l v. D usan l'ld i c , J u l y 1 7 , 1 99 5 ;
P r o st c u ro r v. Dusku Tacl i c , 1 CJ9') J CTY N o . 1 T- 94 - 1 , a r 80 (_J u l y 1 5 ).
2 1 -i . Conn·nc ion t(J r r h t P rev t n r 1 o n and P u n i s h mtiH o f· rhe C r i m e of Genoc i d e , J a n . 1 .2 , 1 9 5 1 , 7 S
U . N . T S . 2 7 7 . G u a t e m a l a accedtd w c h e G e n oc i de C o n ve n e ion on J anuary 7 , 1 9 5 2. G u <nt m a l a h a s I m ­
p l e me n t ed t h i s convcnc ion i n I t S domes r i c bw. See C(J O I G O P I : Nri L , w !rcl noce 2 0 9 , ar c . .7 7 6 ( i m p l e m c: n c ­
l l l_t; por t i o n s or the G e n o c i d e Conve n t i o n I ll [() t h e G u a re n u L l n C r i m i na l Law).
2 1 5 . Convencion ,\g a i n s r To rt u re <Ind Othe- r Crue l , I n h u m a n , ot Deg racl 1 ng Tre a r m t nc ur P u i l i sh me n c
[ iH:ru iufre:r Tor r u re Con,·emion], J un . .2 0 . 1 98 7 , I \ 6 5 U . N .T. S . 8 5 . G u atemala rar i tied t h t: Tort u re
Con1·emion on Apr i l 1 5 , I ';) 8 7 . i\ r r i c l e 5 of rhe Torrurc Conve n t i o n I m poses a prosec u c e: or cxrr;Id l rc
.
j
C<.:Cj U i rcmc:nt a n d bars :Im nesC\·.
.2 1 6. Gu a t e m a l a n L1w. A r r 1 c lt: i-3, as a m e n d ccl . reads
1 11
1 ts t n r 1 r n y :
The ex(lncrion o f pt n;tl I-c-spu n s l b i i i t \' t " ,,- h i c h r h 1 s l a w re: r'c rs w i ll n o r be app l i ca h k
C c n o c idt, Torture:, and l_.urced D i s;l[>pe:Ir;m c e , J U S t :IS i r w i l l n o r a p p h·
ro
cu
rht: c r i mts o f
r h u s l' cr i m c:s w h 1 c h a rc I Il ­
;l l i enable o r for w h i c h r h e e:-;tin c c 1 on o r exe m p c 10 n o f pc· n ,l l re s p on s i b i l i t Y I S n or pc:r m i r r ecl
t(J rll1 1 C )' w i t h rhe I nr t riul l:1w or i nr c m a r i o n a l
( ; uartmalan Law,
'llf'ra
no
r e l 'J 9 . arr . S .
r r t:H i tS
a pp ro v e d or
ra( l iied b1· G u a r e m :l i a .
1 11
cun ­
Harvard I nternationai Law J ourncti I Vol 42
5 10
lan law ensures that the most serious v io latio n s o f h uman r i g h t s and i nter­
nati onal h um an itarian law can s t i l l be p rosec uted i n Guatemala , a n i n terna­
t i o nal forum , or a t h i rd state. l i kewise, the general reference to i nternat i o nal
law l eaves room for future deve l op m e n t and expan s i o n o f i nternational
crim i nal l aw norms .
Taken col leccively, the l i m i tations contained i n Articles 3 , 4 , a n d 8 o f th e
Guatemalan Law ensure t h a t , w h ile am nesty i s granted for p o l i t i cal c r imes
c om m i tted d uring the armed confl i c t , the amnesty w i l l be c o n s trued ex­
tremely narrowl y. Amnesty o n l y appl i es to related crimes i f t h ey are com­
mon cri mes and no personal m o t i ves can be d emo n st rate d . A p e r s e rule,
forb i d d i ng amnesty for torture, genoci d e , and forced d isappeara n c e , ensures
chat the most serious i n ternat ional c r imes w i l l not be am nesti e d . I n case of
further doubt, the Guatemalan law c o n c l udes w i t h an i nstruc t i o n t hat th ose
cri mes to wh i c h amnesty does not app l y " w i l l be p rosec uted . "1 1 7 Desp i te
potential for j ud i c i al i n terpretati o n s that b road e n the amnesty, t h e l aw ap­
pears to h ave been narrow l y i nterpreted . 2 1 K
I n both Hait i and G uatemala, t h e i nvolve m e n t o f t he i nternati o nal com ­
m un i ty i n the am nesty p rocesses bas accorded th ose processes i n ternati onal
leg i t i m acy. l i kew i s e , both countries' l aws h ave a s i g n i ficant l y restricted
scope , complying w i t h m os t i n ternatio n al o bl igat i o n s .
D.
International Con.1 tit!ttioncri lmmmzity
I n ternaci onal Con s t i tu t i onal I m m un i ty is t h e mos t narrowly t a i l ored fo rm
of amnesty and has the g reatest legi t i m acy, b a t h d o m e s t i c and i n ternat i onal .
Th ree defi n i ng e l em en ts of I n t e rnati o n a l l y C o ns c i c ur i o nal I m m u n i ty are :
Ji rs t , that the leg i s l a t i o n co nforms w i t h a state's s tatus as an i nt e rn at i onal
cons t i tu ri o n a l e m i ty ( i . e . that it i s enacted th rough l eg i t i mate g o ve rn m e n tal
p rocesses representi ng the voice o f the peop l e ) ; seco n d , that t h e leg islation
compl ies with t h e scope l i m i tations i m posed by th e i n ternat i on al con s t i tu ­
t i o n ( i . e . chat i t appl i es o n l y to th ose cri mes w h i c h a s tate d oes n o t h ave a n
i nt e rn a t ional d ut y
to
p rosecute); a n d th i rd , t h a t t h e legislat i o n be app roved
by the i nt e rnational com m u n i ty, e i t h e r t h ro ug h a UN Secu r i ty Counc i l
reso l ut ion or
a
wi dely s ubscri bed m u l t i - l a t e r a l c reaty. T h i s m o s t res t r i c t ive
c lass of am n es ty i s an extre m e l y recen t deve l o p m e nt , and
to
ela t e , n o s tates
have fu l ly confo r m ed to t h is model . The am nesty laws enacted in B o s n ia &
21
I
C ucl l t lll<i l ctn LI\\'. a r [ l c l t I I s r cirts :
The U i llltS w h 1 c h ted I oms i d c
rhe
I n r t m a r l o n a l ( l"ta r i cs <lf'provtd
I l l.
scope ot' rhe c: u r renr bw
r > r r h osc·
c h a r a r c l ll<I l i c· n ctble
or
r h a r f(n
w h i c h r h t t x r 1 n cr i o n of pen<l l rcspo ns i b i i i r l· i s n o r pe:rm i r rccl 1n c o n Cm m i rl· w i t h rhc- I n t e r n a l fa \\' u r
rcn i ticcl b v C ua r c nu l a \\' i l l he· ) HIJs e c u r ccl 1 n l l > n t'm m i t )' w 1 r h r h c
m t r hud L·s r cth i i s h t•.l Ln- r h e Code ot' Pcn,, l Proced u r e .
!d a rc . I I
21S
l)rc·s i d C ll l ol r h c C u a r c m a Lm Con� rc: s s .
,t: c· n e ra l a m nc.' l l. <l ild
. .
1\ l v a r o
nor p ro v i cl [ i i\t: } prorec r i o n fu r
r\ r w . Lkscr 1 bc·d r h L· I a \\' as " n or ccd l [ I n � } t( , r <l
c·l \ lll ll l O I I
n i nll: s . ·· Ech,·arcl H t:)� S r ro m . C;ulclll. d.i
fJlm <11'/�<! 11' l"rn.1 , H < > l S I 'C l C.: C t l l\ l l :"< . . Dl'l. . i S . I ') ') h . a t ,·\ I
200 1 I Reframing lmp!!nity
511
Herzegov i n a and Croati a d o, h owever, approxi mate t h e reg u 1 remenrs o f I n­
ternat i onal Cons t i tu t ional I m m u n i ty.
To p lace t h e B os ni an amnesty l aws i n contex t , i t is i mportant co note
chat, s i nce the Dayton Peace Accords o f 1 9 9 5 ( herei nafter Day co n Accords } ,
the stare of B o s n i a & Herzegovi na has been comprised of two consti t uent
e n t i t i es-Th e Federation of Bosnia & Herzegovi na and
c h e Republ i ka
Srpska. Each of these enc i t ies has a s eparate leg i s lative proces s . T h e refore,
t h e Bosnian am nesty legislation consists o f two separate law s , t h e A m nesty
Law of the Federat ion of Bosnia & Herzegov i n a and the A m nesty Law of t h e
Repu b l i ka Srpska . 2 1 9 ( P re-ex i s t e n c am nesty laws , each lega l l y i nval i d , i nap­
p l icab l e , and d iscussed here i n onl y in t h e foo motes , further c o m p l icate t h e
contextual background to t h e s e t w o laws . )22 1 1 The Federat ion a n d Srpska
Laws only gra m i m m u n i ty fo r a narrow s ubset of crimes l i nked to s peci fic
prov i s i o n s i n the penal cod e, namely crimes agai nst the m i l i tary forces ,
propagation of false i n forma t i o n , and possession o f weapons . :>:' t T h us , i n e f2 1 9 . Am nesty Law, 1 9 96,
rejlri11ted 111 Ojli<'ial Gazette u./ B n.r11ia & Her::;egom/{1 ( 8os & H e rz . , federa t i o n
o f Bos n i a & H e rzegovi na) (on ti l e w i t h H a rvard J merncH i on cl l Law J o u rn a l ) [here i nafte r Fed era t i o n Law} ;
Am nest\ Law, 1 99 6 , rejirillted i11 Ojfioal Gtizet!e of l?ej)ff /ilika s,p.�ka ( J3os. &. H e u , Repu b l i ka S rpska) ( o n
li le w i th H arvard I nt e rn a t i onal Law Journal ) [here i nafte r S rp s k a Law } . F o r a d i scuss i o n of the cons t i tu ­
t i onal s tarus o f t h e cons t i t uent e nt i t i es o f B o s n i a & Herze g o v i n a , see genera l l v T H E Yt:GOSI .AV C R I S I S I '.'
l 0 T J : RNAl i O N A I. LA\\. ( Da n i e l Buhlehem &. Marc \ve l k r eds . , 1 9 9 7 ) .
2 .2 0 . T h e fi rst i nvali d , pre-ex i s t i ng l aw, the Decree w i th tht Power uf Law o n A.m nesty, was passtd b y
t h e ctu t hor i t i es of the Croatian Republic of H e rzeg - B osn ia. However, A r t i c l e I C) ) of the Cons t i t u t ion o f
Bos n i a &. H erzegovi na does n o c 1·ecogn i ze t h e "Croa t i an Repu b l i c o f Herzc-g- Bos n i a " a n d " therefore t h e
l a ,,·s a d opte d by 1 ts o rg a n s a r e n u l l a n d voi d . " U . N . H . C. R . Sara J evo, ; \ Ji/1/t.ll\' L n i'J i11 BIJJ I!Jd dl!d f-!tr::fgo­
, ;ll. t . h t cp :/iwww. refugee s . nu/i.·n/doc/amnesty. h c m l ( v i s i t e d .l\ !ar 2 2 , ] ( I ( J l ) . Th i s law l'llSts p ro b k m s fo r
r w o .� roups: I . " ( l ) n cl ! v i d u a l s l i v i n g In C roat ad m i n is cered ctrc:as h u e a m nestied u ndt:r the Federation
Law . . a n d .2 . J n d i v i d u cl l s am nest i ed u nder r h e Croa t i an R e p u b l i c u f H e rzeg - ll os n i cl " b u t stayi ng 1 n ocher
pares o f the Federat i on . " ! d . TheorttJcl l l y, l llcl i vl cl uals t�d l i n g i n che f·(Jrmer clccgorv s h o u l d be i m m u ne
from prosec u u o n cts tht Federa t i on Law hc1s v a l i d i tv i n C rocH-conc ro l l cd areas. b ur 1 nd i ,· i d ua l s 1 11 c h t
second Cctttgory w o u l d he s u h j ec r co prosec u t i o n as t he Croat ian R e p ub l i c of 1-f nze .� - B os n i a had n o law
mak i ng power a t the t i me the leg is la t i o n was passed . !d. See a/.f!; The Dayron Peace A ccord s , A n nex lli
( C o n s r i c m i o n of H os n i a &. 1 -l e rzt·.�o,· i n a ) a r c . [ ( . ) ) ( l i s u n g the cons t i r uem enu r i es of Bos n 1 a and H e r zeg o ­
,· i na). h t t p : //www.stare.godw wwi reg i ons/euribosnia/bosc1g ree. h c m l ( v i s i ced J\hr. .2 .2 , 2 00 I ) . T h e· second
i m·a l i cl , pre-exis t i ng l a w I S r he R ep u b l i c o f B os n i a and J-1 t r z eg o,· l n<l Law on i\ m nesty [he rei na(cer F.t­
p u b l i c Law) . It was passed by rhe ,\s s e m bh· of the R e p u b l i c of Bosn1a & H e rze,!,;0\' 1 11<1 o n February 1 .2 ,
1 9 S}il, and wets l ll i t ia l lv t me n d ed ro appl y thmughout c ht rerri wry of Bosn 1 a & H e rze.s ov i n a . However,
rhe r<:xr was adopred afrer tht s i g n i n ,s of che Daywn A c c o rds o n December 1 -i . I S}')5 <It che Par i s Confcr­
UlCC Thar agretmem m ade chc 1\c:publ i c of Bosn 1 a & .Herzegov i net a legctl mti l i ty. As rht UN H tg h
C o m m i S S i o n e r 's o ftice e x p l a i n s : " Thl' l a w ador)[ed I ll February 1 9 ')6 b)· t h e Par l t <lfllt'IH or c hc: R B H [ R l'­
l ' l l h l i c o f B os n i a & H e rztgov i na] is u n cons c l c u t i o ru l s 1 ncc I t wc1s a clo p ct d lw a ltgl s l a t i ve body n or c o m ­
pttc n t to pass s u c h kg i s l a r i o n . .. !J See ai.>IJ The Dayron Peace r\ ccurd s , .'11,/'; -c�, <lt I\ n n c x l l J , arc. I l l ( I ) ,
( .) )( a ) . ( rc: s t r v l l1 g w t h e cons ti cuenr e nt i t i ts a l l n o n - t n u m c :rclted l c-g l s l a t l \ t powers ) . \V h i l t the Consr i tu �
c ional Court of B o s n � <t &. H c:rztp D v i n a has nor rc:mo,·ed c h i s ta rl i c:r la w from rhc srctt mts by dee m i ng 1 r
u n con s r i t m i on a l , <l!lllleS(I' Ius been g r<tmed b<tsed on the Fcdt: r<ttion Let\\' rathl'r thclll rhc· n. e p u h l i C Law
s i nce ) u nt l ':.!9CJ .
.2 2 1
Ft:dna c i o n Law, r\ n i c l e I , rc:ad s :
A m rKSr\· 1 s <! [> p l i ed c o al i r'ersons w h o I t a \(: lw Dt·ct: m be r 2 .! . I <Jt) ) co m m i t ted n i m i iU l ctcrs <�.t:<l i nsr
c h t fo u llC L t t l t > r h "f snc u l s 1 · s t v m a n d s e c u n c 1 · uf llosn t<t <tncl l·l e rzt·gcJ\· I n <l�Chcl]' t l 'r 1 5 . <l ,l! a i n s t c h e
rn
i-uru:s�Ch :q>tt'i' .2 1 ) o l. c h c: C : r i !ll l r u l ;\u cctkc:n O\'l'J' fru m 5 F IZ) , ccr l l o n r e " S c<t n C l' a s l ' t'f A r ­
l i C l t _) ( ) I . prop<�,l! a r i oll o f L1 l sc: t n t< J r m a t l u n as per A rr i c l t 2 1 h . d l c,>.!<d pussr·s s 1 t > l l of weapons ·,1nd ex­
I ' I < I S I \'t'S cts p n r\i·c r c l c 2 1 . .' f ( > resccn 1 1 1 r h e cor res pond I n.� C:1· i m 1 na l r\u "I'J' I I ccl 1 1 1 r h c r c r r i r o n· of t i l l'
l't·du:I C i tl ll ol. B os n i a a n d 1-k rzt·,'-' u'· l n :l [ h tr t l n a fcer " c h e l'ederat ion " ) . as we l l as t h e· c r i lll l n al acr of
Hctrvctrd International Law}ournal
5 12
I Vol. 42
fee t , the Federation and S rpska laws reverse the excl u s i o nary w o rd i ng o f a l l
am nesty laws p reviously considered i n t h i s A r t i c l e . Previous a mnesty l aw s
granted general i mm u n i ty and t h e n prov i ded a l i s t of excep t i o n cr i m es to
w h i c h am nesty d oes no t appl y. Th e Federa t i o n and S rpska laws never grant
a general amnes ty, i ns tead e n umerat i ng an excl usive l i s t of cr i mes i n rel a t i o n
t o w h i c h amnesty does appl y.
The two laws i mpose an add i t i onal s ubs tant i ve l i mi tat i o n . A mnesty i s
o n l y granted t o " c r i m i nal acts again s t the foundations o f t h e s o c i a l sys­
tem . " 222 The crime m us t h ave been com m i tted agai nst t h e s tate, e n c o m­
pass i ng both the social s y s tem and the m i l i tary. n-l A m nesty i s n o t granted to
c rimes aga i ns t i n di v i d uals and t h u s , serious v io latio n s o f i n ter nati o na l lm­
manitarian l aw d i rected at parti cular persons are excluded . W h i le these seri­
ous i n ternat ional cri mes are not exp li c i t l y excluded fro m t h e two amnesty
l aw s (as they are in the case o f the Guatemalan law ) , the fac t th at t h e Fed­
erat i on and Srpska l aw s grant amnesty o n l y in relati o n to an exc l u s i v e , e n u ­
merated l i s t of cri mes excl udes i nternat ional crimes from i m m u n i t y. These
l aws thus comply w i th B o s n i a & H erzegovi na's i n ternati onal o b l igati o n s and
d em ons t rate legi t i m i z i ng coherence. 224
The 1 99 6 Croatian amnesty law ( " the Croati an law " ) provi d es a second
example of an I nternat i on al Cons t i t u t i onal I m m u n i ty. The Croat ia n law
ach i eves s i m i lar scope res tr ic t i o ns to that o f i ts B os n i a n c o u nterparts ,
thoug h through a d i fferent textual mechani s m . The Croatian law beg i n s
w i t h a "gen eral amnesty . . . to t h e perpetrators of cri m i nal acts com m i tted
d ur i ng . . . armed confl i cts . . . in the Repu b l i c o f Croati a . 2 2 'S A r t i c l e 3 o f the
n o r re s po nd i n g co a m i l i car y ced i a n d avo i d i ng o f m i l i rarv s e r v 1 ce b1· m ak i ng l1 1 ms e l f i n c a pa b l e o r b y
1 m pos r u re a nd v u l u n c a ry l e av i n g a n d e sc a p e from a r m e d fo rces fo r e s e e n 1 11 A n i c l e 8 o f A p p l i c ar i u n
An of C r i m 1 m l An of t h e R e p u b l ic of B o s n w and H e rzegov i na a n d C r i m i n al An ( ' ' O fti c 1 a l G a z e r t e
of R B H , No 6/9 2 , l l / 9 2 , a n d 2 1 / C) 2 ) , i f t h e p u b l i s h m e n c [ s i c } of r hese pers o n s i s fo re s ee n bv c h i s
An or
or h e r
A p p l i ca r i o n A c t a p p l i ed on r h e t e r r i t o r y of r h e Fe d e ra t i o n .
Federar i o n L aw , wpra note
2 1 9,
arr. I . S rp s k a Law, A r t i c l e I , rtad s :
T h i s L a w s h al l g ra n c t h e i m m u n 1 r y from a prosec u t i o n ,
(Jt
who l l y
or
p a rr i a l l y acq u i r ca l o f a s c n r e n ce
[ s i c ] o r a n o n - e n fo rced pan o f se n c en c e [ h e re i n afrer the a m n es t y } , w a l l p e rs o n s who helve, berween
J an u a ry 1 , 1 99 1
a n d Decem b e r l · ' L 1 9 9 5 co m m i t ttd c r i m i n a l ac e s ag a i n s r rhe t(JLm d a r i o ns o f soc i a l
s y s t e m o f R e p u b l i k a Srpska u n d e r C h apr e r
XV, or c r i m m a l a c r s ag ai n s t r h t m i l 1 tary [() rc e s o f R e ­
p u b l ! ka Srpska fo reseen 1 n rhe C n m i n a l Code of R ep u b l i ka S r p s k a , and c r i m i n a l aces of p r op ag a t r ng
o f Ldse I n fiJfma t i o n as p e r t\ r r i c l e 2 0 3 and I l l e g a l possess i o n of -.veapons and e x p l o s 1 ves as per i\ r r i c l c
2 1 3 of t h e C r r m l ll a l C o d e of R t p u b l i ka S r ps ka � sp e c i a l p a rr .
S rps ka L aw . wpra n o t e
2 1 C),
arc . 1
.2 2 2 . Federar i o n L a w, .111/Jra n o t e 2 1 () , a r c . l . T h e S r p s k a Law
rcspec r . Srpska L a w,
r11prt�
n n r c 2 1 ') , a r c . l .
.2 2 .'\ . U . N . H . C R . Sara J evo,
Cr,;;;;;lf};!di).'
IS
s r m dar
co
r h c- F c d c ra r r o n Law i n r h i s
Lmn 111 l3rn 11ic1 c111d
. h r r p :/ l w w w. rcr'ugce s .
n e r itn /cluc/el m n cs r y. h r m l ( v i s i rccl J'vL tr 2 2 , 2 ( )( ) l ) .
_:> .2 4 . T h e S r p s k a La,,· h a s b e e n 1 n c o n s i s r en r h· a p j ' L e d . The p u b l 1 c pro s e c u ro r of B a n k;r L u k 11 , r i t e· cap i ­
r a l of t h e Repu b l i ka S r p s k a . has norcd c h a r c as e s n o r covered b1· t h e l aw. t h o u g h r e p u r· r e cl . a rc often n o r
!Jill ! 111 f l u_, llid t!l!d
proscc med . a p os 1 r i o n scco nclccl h y r h c p rosec u to r of Vi sc-.� rad Sec
,ppra
Il O t t
re s u l t e d
2 ::! 5
w
1 11
.2 2 0 . The S rps k;t Law d ots , h o w e v e r. I nc l u d e an e x p l r c i r e x e- m p t i o n t( ; r " u r m r n .d aces r h a r
p r t m ec! I ra t tcl m u rd e r. " S r p s k a Law, .!11/J m Ilore ::! l :J .
Law on C e n e rcd 1\ m n c s r y
I l h H a rv a rd I mnn a u o n ,; l
cMcd ) [ h nt· l n <Iftn C ro a r 1 a n
1 ';!')6
( C: me r r i a ) .
;liT
2
0/fi,MI C:cd!c {)( :In
Ln\· J o u m a l ) I n· pog rapl t i cal
L 1 w ] . The o pcreH I V t r\ r [ l c l ts
';( C. n'< I!U
Jlil.
8U ( o n ti l e
corrcc u o n s from u n o i'ti u a l u·;m s l a r i o n n o r i 1 1 d I ­
I a n d 1 o f t h e l a w r·eacl :
513
2001 I Reframing Imp11nity
law c he n provides an exten s i v e l i s t o f exempt i o n s from amnes ty, w h i c h i n­
c l udes " the most flag rant v i o lations of i nternational h u m a n i tarian law" and
"war c r i m es . " 2 26 These except i on s are eac h t i ed ro articles o f the C roat i a n
Penal Code227 a n d range from genocide ro s lavery, and d i s c ri m i nati o n r o ter­
rori s m . This extensive l i s t o f excep t i o ns bri ngs the C roat i a n Law i nto com­
p l i ance w i th most i n ternati onal obl igati o n s . Nonetheles s , a gen eral amnesty
fol l owed by a l i s e of exceptions it is nor as effective a scope l i m i tatio n as an
exp l i c i t , e n um e rated l i s t of c r i m es ro which amnesty attach es , such as c hat i n
the B osnian Law. For exampl e , emerg i ng i n ternatio nal c r i m e s , s u ch as rape
as a war c r i m e and as a crime agai n s t h umani ty,228 are notabl y m i ss i ng from
rhe l i s t o f except i o n s in the C roat i an Law. \Xlh i le Croatia m ay n o t bear
spec i fic o b l igat ions t o prosec u t e t hese crimes , a tru e I n ternati o nal Consri m -
B y t h i s Law a g e neral a m nesty i s g ranred
w
t h t ptrperrarors o f c r i m i na l acrs co m m t r tt d d u r i n g t h e
aggres s i o n , a r m e d rebe l l i o n or a r m e d c o n tl i c c s , o r i n rel a t i o n co che aggres s i o n , cu med c o n ti i c r s , or
armed r e b e l l i o n i n c h e R e p u b l i c of Croat i a .
T h e am nescy shall also a pp l y
ro
t h e execuc ion o f a valid verd i ( [ pro no u n c ed r o t h e p e rp e t ra to rs o f
c r i m i n a l aces from paragraph I of c h i s A r c i c l e .
The A m nes t y fro m cr i m i n a l pro s e c u t i on a n d proceed i ng s s h a l l a p p l y
t he pe ri o d of A ugust I 7 , l SJ90
co
Aug u s c 2 3 , I 9 9 6 .
A r r i c l e 2 : No c r i m i na l prosecut i o n s h a l l be u n d e r taken a n d
Cll ttd against t h e peqxtrarors of c n m i n a l aces re fe rred
ro
no
co
che aces CDm m i r ttd d u r i ng
cri m i n a l p ro ce e d i n gs shal l b e i n s t i ­
i n A r t i c l e I of t h i s Law.
C r i m i n a l prosecu c i on al r e a d y u ndercaken shall b e can celled and c ri m i na l p r oceed t ngs a l readv u n ­
clc- rwa y s h a l l be termi nated
!d.
ex
n(/ioo b y
r h e courc ·s ru l i n g .
An arrested person ro whom r h e a m n es t y u n de r p a rag r a p h I of t i l l s A r c i c l c a p p l t es s h a l l be r e l e as ed
free bv rhe courc·s ru l t n g .
a r c s . 1 -2 .
22o.
r\ r c i c l e
_) of r h e C roar ian Law read s :
E xe m p te d fwm c h e a m n c s r 1 · referred c o t n A r t i c l e 1 o f c h i s Llw s h a l l h e ptrp c r m ttns of t h c m o s r
rlat: ranc vi o l a t i on s of h u m a n i t a r i a n Ll\v h av i ng c h t c h a ra n e t· of war c r i m e s . S]Kc i fi c d h · ; Acts of
Genoc i d e ( A rt i c l e 1 1 ') ) , \'Va r C r i m es A g ,1 i n s r rhe C i v i l � a n P o p u l a t i o n < A rr i c k· 1 .2 0 ; 1 ) \'Va r C r i m o:s
1\� a i n s c t h e \'V o u n ded a n d S i c k ( A m c l e 1 2 1 ;I) \'V ar C r i mes A ga i n s t P r i s o n e rs o f \'Va r ( A r t i c l e 1 2 2 ) ;
O rg a n i za t i on and I nst igation o f Genoc i d e a n d \'V a r C n mes ( A r r i c k 1 .2 .) ) , U n l aw fu l K i l l i ng a n d
\'Vo u n d i ng of r h e E n e m y ( A r t i c le 1 2,1 ) , I l l e g a l S e i zu re of P o s s es s i on s from K i l l ed a n d \'V o u n cled o n
r h e B a t c l e fi e l d ( A r r i c l c 1 .2 5 ) ; Use o f P ro h i b i ted Co m b at Mecms ( A r m l e 1 2 6 ) ; V i o l a t i o n of E n vo y s
( A rt i c l e 1 .2 7 ) ; C r u e l T reac m e n r o f t h e \'V o u ncled , S i c k a n d P r i soners of \Va r ( A rt i c l e 1 2 :-i ) , U n ­
J US t i fied Deby i n R e p,H r i ar i o n of th e P r i so n e rs of \�' ar ( A r r i c l e 1 .2 9 ) ; D t s c r u c t w n of C u l r u rcd a n d
H t srortc H e r i tage ( A r t icle 1 .'1 0 ) , l n sr i .�<H i o n of t h e \'Va r of Agg ress ion ( A r t i c le 1 .'\ 1 ) ; i\ busc of I nt er­
n a t i o n a l S igns ( A r t i c l e 1 1 .2 ) ; Jbc i a l and orher D i s c ri m i na t i o n ( 1\ rt i d e 1 .1 3 ) ; I m po s i t i o n of S l a ve ry
<lncl T r ,l ns po r r of E n s l av ed Persons ( A r t i c l e 1 .'1 4 ) ; T n r e r na r i o n a l Te r m r t s m ( A rt i c l e 1 .'\ S J : E n d a ng e r ­
m c n r of P e rs on s U n der I n r u n a r i o n a l P r o t e ct i on ( A r t i c l e I �) o ) ; T a k t n�; 1-Ios t<l,!.; es ( r\ m c l e 1 .'\ 7 ); of r h e
B as t e P e n a l C o d e of t h t R e p u b l t c o f C ruat i <l ( O ffi c i a l Gazer rt· No .
I ON/9 5 . a mi 1 6/ )! 6 ) and c r i m i n a l a c ts o f terro r i sm p u rs u a n t
ro
.; l! 9 .o-rcv i sed rt x t , .1 5 / 9 .1 ,
t h e pro1· i s i o n s o f i n t e rn a t i o n a l l a w .
r>e r p e r ra ro r s of ocher c r i m i nal a c t s d e ti ned i n t h e Ba s i c C r i m i na l L a w ot r h t R e p u b l i c of Cro a t i a
( O ffi c i a l G ,tzercc N o . :; 1 ! 9 ')-I"L"V i s e d t e x t . .) 5 / 9 .1 . I
ON/9 5 . a n d I o / 9 6 ) .
at:,s rt s s i o n . cl r m t d rebt l i J o J l o r a r m e:cl cun R i c r s o r i n rt l a r t O n
ro
nor
c om m t t t cd d u ri ng r h t
r ht a,c;,c; rcss i o n , a r m ed re be l l i o n u r
armed cc m H i c rs i n r h t rr: p u b l t c tlf' C:ro,H i a s h a l l be e xe m p t e d from am n e s t 1· .
! d . a rt . 5
� � 7 . Sc�· Penal Code of [ he R cp u b i 1 L of C rotu i a , (/tt:d i11 \VE L L E f\ 0.: B L JU ...:. r - \\;/ l i i T F , .1/tf'rt� n o r c . j .l_ ar
ch 2 .
2 2 :-i . r\
rcct· n r
d t·c i s i u n o f r h c· l n t tr n a t i n n a l C r i m i n a l Tr t bu n a l !·or Yut: os la v t a h cl S f< J u n d rcli)C:
c r t m c a mi a c r i mt· clt: a i n s t l w m c1 n t r 1·. Sec Prosc· c u tor
a
11·a r
D ra t: o l j u h K u n ct ra c . et a l . � ( ) ( I I I C TY \! o . I T- 9 0 ,
� .:; . c t r -'i .) (,--'1 ()�1 ( Fc h . � .2 ) . I t i s u n c l e a r . h 1 m cn:r. w h t r h n r<l pt W< J u l d q ua l t f1 · c l S c t 11·ar c r i m c ct,c;ct t n s r r h c·
v.
( l \· i l t ct n pnl'll la r i n t l u n dtr /\ r t i c l t 1 2 0 ui' t h e C : rncu i ,ln P e n a l c, ,cJe <llld r h erd)\' he l'X<:Jl1[)[ from t h e a m ­
nest \·.
Harvard Intenwtional Lmc}o!!rnal I Vol 42
5 14
tional A m nesty would not allow i m m u n i ty for such u n i versal l y c o n d e m ned
and i n ternationall y prosecuted c r i m es . Paragraph 2 o f Article 3 o f t h e C roa­
tian Law i s also n oteworthy. I t exem p ts crimes not com m i ned " d ur i ng the
agg res s i o n , armed rebe l l i o n , or armed confl i cts or in relat i o n c o t h e aggres­
s i o n . " The use of the "or" c o n j u n c t i o n allow s amnesty to app l y i f even the
l east res trictive contemporane i ty test is m e t , rather than req u i ri ng the more
res tricti ve rel at i on rest to be met. Th erefore, w h i l e the Croatian Law i n ­
c l u des s i g n i ficant restrictions o n t h e scope o f i m m u n i ty, i t i s t o o i nc l u s i ve r o
q ual i fy perfectly as an I nternati onal Co nsti tuti o nal A m nes ty. N o n e th eless ,
o n i t s face the l aw demonstrates coherence as i t app l i es equal ly r o everyone
w i t h i n i ts j ur i s d i c t i o n _ n c;
T h e domestic l eg it i m acy o f t h e B os n ian a n d C roatian Laws approac h , b u t
d o nor m e e t , the req u i re m en ts of I nternat i onal C o n s t i t u t i onal I m m u n i ty.
Freedom House gave Bos n i a a score of 5 , 5 (partizJly free) fo r 1 9 9 6-9 7 .
W h i l e t h i s represents an i mp roveme n t from prev i o us scores of 6 , 6 ( n o t
free) , i t s uggests t h a t B o s n i a & H e rzegovina lacked t h e k i nd o f free d i scourse
and pol i t i cal expression that c haracteri zes I nt ernat i o nal Co n s t i t u t i onal I m ­
m u n i ty. 1 1() Nonetheless , a t least proced ural democracy ex i s ted i n B o s n i a
w h e n the amnesty l aws w e r e passed . The Federat ion Law w a s pas sed b y the
Federation of B os n ia & Herzegov i na on J une
3 0 , 1 99 6
purs u a n t c o the C o n ­
sti t u t i on of the Federati o n o f B o s n i a & Herzegovina, an d t h e S rp s ka L a w was
passed by the S rpska parli a m e n t p ur s uan t co the Repub l i ka Srpska Co nsr i tu­
t i on . 1 1 1 The pa r l iament o f t h e Federa t i o n , w h i c h prom ulgated the Federa­
t i on Law, " i n c luded represe n tat i ves e l ected i n the 1 990 e l e c t i o n s fo r the
Parl iament of Rep u b l i c o f B o s n i a and Herzegovi na fro m the terri co ry o f the
Fed erat i o n . " 2 1 2 On Septe m ber 1 4 , 1 9 9 6 , after the passage of t h e two l aws ,
new electi ons were h eld p ursuant to the Dayton Accord s , fu r t h e r i n d i ca t i n g
a s uccessfu l d emoc rat ic trans i t i o n . -' ' ' F u rther m o re , at th e t i m e the laws were
2 2 9 . l r musr be noreJ , however, r h cH r he Lnv
kn·c: complai ned
u nder r h e
rhar
some of rhem
have
IS
nor
a l wa)'S appl ied 1 11 a cohet·em m a n n er a n d "Serbs
u nder c h a r� es whtch should be: a m n tsr i e d
been a r resrc·d
l a w. . . \\ie.rtem Oj]it'ial.r Vi.ril V11 k u/'[ /r
ro
!Jz er.ret Purt'e Agrw11m1, A c ; t-: :---: < : E F ie Pla' ;; S I' , i\by 2 0 ,
l 99 S , m ·i lilable c�! L E X I S , Nexi s L i b rary, A ,;.: e n c e France P resst f i l e . T h e l a w hcts, h o wever, been appl ied
s u ccessfu l l y w some
Serbs, such as Dragan Lapcc:,· i e , who was released p u r s u a n r ro che a m n esry afrcr
c r i mes c h a rges. CJSCE (,· it •eJ Ne•,;J'I'd \VeleoJJN lo Za.�re/ /, F(,)i<�te Plai!J,
A l; L N CI' F i t . P i(ESS F , t\ p r. l . 1 9 9 S , d l 'r Ji!aiJ/e dl LEX l S . N n i s L i b rary. Agence F t- P resse f i l t:. A c c o t- d t n g
w c h e Republic of C roar icl, by Sepctm be r 1 5 , l 99 o . ll l il t rl·- fnur Serbs had be:cn re lcas<:d p u rs u a m : u cht
law. l-'!!ri/Jer l? ej�<!l't ()JI Sil!!alii!JI o( f-l lll!!t!ll 1\ig/Jt.i 1.11 C>ua!irl Pl!l'.i l!d!ll /1! !?e�rJ!Ifir,;t I () I ') ( 1 9 9 5 ) . M 2 P R b:;­
\\'lln: . Dec . 1 0 , 1 99 6 . rrrailrrble a! L E X J S . Nexis L t b ra rl , Nt:w:> F i le .
b e t ng raken i n w c u s ro cl y o n w a r
2 .1 l l . See Fiu: t : D0,\ 1 I-! O L: S E , J llj!J'rl noce 2 6 .
� :) l . T h i s seu i o n foc uses prcd u m t nclceh· on r h c: donws r i l· l t:)2 J r i rnac\' u t ' l a,,·s t l l clcrl·d by r i l e· Fecl na­
rJon .
\'\lh i l e prog ress rended
ru be s l ower in r h <: R c:p u b l i kc1 Sq,s k a . rhc
elentons
d e s cr i bt:cl mji·<� app l y ru burh C < l llS C I C U e n r c nr i r i t:s o l - Fl u s tl l cl & H c rzt g u v i n cl .
and
c: leu ion
ccrr i ti c a r i on
� .1 2 . l'ulera!ioJI o( !3rnl!id <111d f-! c r:;ugon;u. h r r p : -' 1 \\· ww.busnta nemhc!Ss\·. mg ,.. rb i h h r m l ( v t s t rt·d \
, !a r. 2 2 .
200 I ) . \V h d e rhest t: lt: c r i o n s han· hec:n c< > n s i d c rl'd cl .. L1i l u rc· o f d <: m oc ra,:1· . .
l' 'l-v-.ti kcl , c h e 1· were " r i lL· o n l y Cree c- l u: c i "ns
F.-I K I N ( ; D E\ I < 'CI(.IC : Y r\ FT I
1 1 1 r h a r n cH I <H l ;d i s r p a r r i es
l'1 o s n J ;J .. lxfort· Dct\· w n . [).·\\' I l l C1 ! .� -...: l l l . l ' " · f\ C l :; :--J l .-1 :
; ( D.WT( ) _-..; 29 ( 1 ')9')).
R r ;C E I , TH I [l i U ' . I k l' F < H . Y 1 co:; I . .-IV I.\ . 1 :---: D n-1 1 -: \'\'- I I(
occurr<:d a fc e r r h c i'''iSScJ_L;L' t >f r h c la\\·s 1 11 l J lll'S l l l > l l . r h c-1·
2 _) _1 . s,, C1 1Z0 1 L
c h c;L· c l e n i u n s
111
I P.:
Bo_, '- il .·l - I ( I ') ') S ) . \'\f h i l e
c\· t ,!l'fllt' , ,r c h c
d u s e r ve ciS
515
200 1 I Refrctming Impunity
passe d, the OSCE cen i fied t hat "cond i t i o n s existed for c h e e ffe c c i ve hold i ng
of elec c i o n s . " 2 Y1 This fi n d i ng i nd i cates char c here existed i n B os n i a & Herze­
govi na a pol i t i cal c l i mate " i n w h i c h i deas could be open l y come s eed and i n
w h i c h i ndependenc oppos i t i o n groups were encouraged . " 2 -1 5 T h i s i s not co
say chat democracy in Bosnia & H erzegovina was ideal or ful l y e n c rencbed i n
1 99 6 , o r even coday. The po i n c i s merely that by m i d - 1 9 9 6 , B o s n i a & Her­
zegovi na was movi ng toward t h e k i n d of represencaci ve d e m ocracy w h i ch
respeccs the w i l l of the people as the u l c i mace source o f govern men tal
auchority.
The Croatian Law carries a s i m i lar l evel of domes t i c l eg i t i m acy. F reedom
H o use gave C roat ia a score o f 4, 4 ( part ial l y free) in i ts 1 99 6-97 s urvey.2'0
L i ke Bo snia & Herzegovi na , c h i s score does noc s uggest chat open and free
d is c o urse exi sced . B u t agai n , C roati a was at l ease a proced ural democracy.
Ins tead of s i mp l y b ei ng d i c tated by a presidential decree, c h e Croatian am­
nesty l aw was passed by both h o uses o f the Croatian Par l i a m e n t o n Septem­
ber 2 0 , 1 9 96. 2 ·) 7 Though Tud j m a n 's governmenc has been c r i t i c i zed for i cs
"au thoritarian style of rule, ".:>3:> t he parl iament that: prom u l gated t h e Croa­
t i an Law was elecced i n open el ec t i o n s i n October 1 9 9 5 . D ur i n g those elec­
t i o n s , cbe oppos i t i o n cooperated and was able to pm forward a mean i ngfu l
age nda. 2 1'J The q ual i ty o f t h ese elections confirm the existence o f procedu ral
democ racy ac the time the C roatian Law was passed .
s c rtngc hc: n i ng of d e mocra t i c i ns c i w c i on s and gove rn m e n c a l resp<H1 S i vc:ness
n o ted c h a r , d ue
w
the fr ag i l e peace, loc a l e l e u i o n s h ad
b,d l nc box sw fli n g , we-re reponed . /d. at 7 1 -7 :2
w
w
t h e p u b l i c w i l l . I t m u s t be
be p o s t p o n e d and vm i n g I r reg u l a r i t i es, s uc h as
N o n e c h e l t s s . c h est· e l e c t i o n s s ra n cl as e v 1 d e n c t that " t h e
co n ro u r s o f a n I ns r i r m i o n a l fra mework for B o s n i a a n d H e rz ego v i na [ wt· re} e m t rg 1 n g . .. Eco:-�o,\ I I ST l i" ­
T I C LI . I <., ! : V. I
U i" rT , TH � e Eco:--; o., r r sT 1 :--; T � e L u c r: :--; u ; U i': I T C O L l" TJZY R F PI J Jns -h
H
Q u.A WI TIZ
I
':! 9 0 .
( 1 996) . T h e most s i g n i licam of t h e s i x separate t l ec r i ons
o( December 1 99 6 . for our purposes, were the eltc r i n n o f 1 -'10 m e m be rs to rhc H ouse o f Rep rese n ca r i ves
BOS'< I .-\ - H uzzr;c ;OV I :o-; A . Cr<O.-\TI.A, SLOV I C '< I A
0
nt. the f'c d n ar i on of B o s n i a & H e r zegov i n a and of t i g h ry - r h re e m e m l1l: rs w the N a t i o n a l A s se m b l v 1 l t h e
R e p u h l i ka S r ps b . <lS t h ese a r e t h e
) 1 : .-\ " I ' T E X I ' I . , TH I :
r w u e n t i t i e s w h i c h p a s s e d r h e am nesty laws . See H ,-\ N S S c H ,\ I L LT:; .-\ '\ U
1 99 0 BOSi" l .-\ - l- ! E!ZZEUJV I:,L-\ E L EC : T I O !': S : A !': £\ '< .A I .Y S I S I J I ' H I ! : O l lS EIZV.AT I CJ :--. S 1 5
( 1 ':!9' ) ( n ot 1 n g t ht b reakdown of t h e voce a m o n).! S t t ht: pan i t s i n t h tst two e l ec t i o n s )
� -) -\ . SC H i\ J ITTS A C.: D E x u.,
Jlljlrt�
note :2 .1 .) , at 1 1 ; Jtt t�IJo T h e Danon Peace Agreem ent , N ov. ::' I .
I ')1) 5 , R os n 1 a &: H e r z . -Cro<l t . , a t A n nex .'i , h r r p :l/www. s r a r t . gov/w w w he g i ( ' n s/eu r.' bos n l a/ day<�n n .') . h r m l
( ,· i s i red .\ Lt r. 2 2 , 2 U i l l ) ( n o t i n g t h e rol e o f t h e O . S . C . E . a s a m o n 1 tu r ) .
� .) 5 . C I I .-\ '< D I . L I Z ,
J !ijlra
note :2 .) � . at I I ') .
:2 .'> 0 . See F IZ I T I JC.J,\1 Hu L s t : , .111jn ,, n o t e :2 6
� .'> 7
CrrMI Pt�rftc!llltlll /{"! ijin A,·(/Jrtf tcilb !3e(�r,"k. /\nJtJ ;\ 1111/t.\i) f.t �tc, D 1 : UTSC H t : P1z L S S I : - A c ; t: i" T l!Z .
Se p t . � U . 1 99 0 . N o n e t h e l e s s , r h t ra r i fy i n g a c r of a [)'l r l i a m e nt , i f nm per(cu. i s of g rear s i ,c: n i ricanct
� ) � . E e o :o-; o ,\ I IST h T I : J . L I C I : C.: C I: U N IT, Ecu :--; u .\ J i q h ! T L L I C I : :--; CI : L i" I T Cc J L; :o-; nz Y P IU J F I J . F S 1 ')9-;-­
'):-l, llns:o-.; 1 ,1 - H I · !VI:t.;o v l '-i .-\ .-I '< D ( !{ C >XI ' I .-\ . ') -'\ ( 1 999). Tu d J m ,l n ·s gu , · t· m m c n t W<lS f,H frum a m o d e l de­
ll1UCLlCI. a n d t h t p<u l i <lll1CIH
In
q u e s t i o n was n m ntct·s sa r i l v n : p res t n t <l t i n· . f n Etc t , n u m t ro u s W<\r c n m t s
w e r e co m m 1 r rtd 1 11 C ro,n i a b e fo re t h e A m n e s t y, somt· q u i rt poss i b l y 11· i r h Tucl p11 a n ·s k n o w kd.t:e o r a c q u i ­
.\ [orco,·er, n u m c: rou s <ll l egauons th rou.� lw u r 1 9()6 suggested r ha r Tu d p 11 a n mav lun: Lx·tn g u i l t 1 ·
.
of " a h u s c o( pmver . t(Jr, lllfu · rt!ld . fo1 i l i ng to c o n l i r m r h c ass(·m b l v s cll'l'l " m m e nr s 1>t' m a n l r :> . E u J :--; ( J \ I I � T
cSll' IKt· .
l '\ T I : I . I . I ( ; I .''.! U
G '< I T . Ti l l : ECO!': U ,\ I I :;T h T I : I . I . I C; I · C.: ( I
H l >.:-c .-..: I :\ - H I !VI l ;u\· 1 !':"1 , ( I( ( L\T I.-\ . S t .u\T " L\ 1 !l ( l ') ')(i J
..' .) ')
L C.: I T C l l l ' .-..: T I ( Y R il'( l l{'l .' 1 .:-c T ( ) l ',\IZT I : I( I ')') G .
S"' Eco".: O ,\ I IST I 0: T U. U l; I : c.: u : U :--; n , TH t: E u J i" O .\ I IST I !' T I : L I . I c ; l
1'( > I ( I :; I S T ( ) L:\1\ I I : I( 1 990.
111/'�'"
nort 2:) 0 . at I (> .
:--; u
L '< I T Cl > L i :-J T I ( Y l\ 1 : -
Harvard International Lawjournal I Vol. 42
516
The cen tral reaso n fo r p lacing the B o s n i an and Croat ian laws u nder t h e
category of I nternational Co n s ti t u tional I m m u n i t y i s t h a t b o t h demonstrate
a h i g h degree of i n ternational approval and l eg i t i macy. Each law t races i ts
source ro a m u l t i -lateral peace t reaty, t h e Day ton Accords , t o e n d t h e war i n
t h e B al kans , w i t h exp l i c i t U N Security Cou n c i l approval . T h i s i n ternational
approval serves two pu rposes : ( 1 ) l i m i t i ng the scope o f i m m un i ty and
(2) enhanc i ng i nternati onal legi t i m acy. A s n oted , t h ese laws fi rst took s hape
in t h e Dayton Accord s , w h i c h called upo n t h e parties to g ra n t amnesty t o
a n y "returning refugee or d i sp laced person c harged w i t h a c r i m e , o c h e r c h an
a serious violation of i n ternati o nal h u m a n i tarian l aw as d e fi ne d i n t h e Stat­
ute of the I n ternati onal Tri bunal fo r t h e Former Yugoslav i a s i nce January 1 ,
1 99 1 or a com m on cri m e unrelated ro t h e confl i c c . " 240 S tates-Parties were
t hereby req u i red ro i n clude w i t h i n t h e i r amnesty l eg i s l a t io n m o s t cri mes
com m i r red by d i splaced person s , but ro exc l ude t hose v i o l a t i o n s o f i nt erna­
t i o nal h umani tarian law w i t h i n the j urisd i c t i on o f the I n ternati o nal Cri m i ­
nal Tri bunal for the Former Yugoslav i a (ICTY) , nam ely g e n o c i d e , crimes
aga i n s t humani ty, and war c r i m es . 2 i 1 The need for carefu l d raft i ng o f am ­
nesty legislati o n was further r ei n forced by U N Sec urity C o u n c i l Reso l u t i o n s
establi s h i ng t h e Yugos lav Tri bu nai242 a n d t h e Statute of t h e Tri b u na l i ts e l f,
w h i c h em powered the Tri bu n al to prosecute "persons resp o n s i b l e for serious
violations of i n ternat i onal h u man i tarian law com m i r red i n the terri rory of
the former Yugoslavia s i nce 1 99 1 i n accordance with the prov i s i ons of the
pres e n t Stat u te . " 2-1 1 A n y grant of amnesty t hat i n c l uded c r i m es w i t h i n the
j ur i sd i c t i o n of the Tr i b u nal w o u ld have been i n violation o f the Dayron Ac­
cords and the Sec u ri ty Coun c i l Resol u t i o n s .
T h e fact th at the B o s n i a n a n d Croatian laws origi nated fro m an i n terna­
t i o nal l y s uperv ised peace process en hances t h e i r i nt ernati o n al leg i t i macy.
The Dayron Accords , w h i c h i nc l ude amnesty provisi ons of A n nex VII , were
i ni t ialed by the P res i clem s o f B o s n i a & H e rzegov i na , Croat i a , and Serbia2 i i
2 4 0 . The D<l y w n Pe cl C C Agreemem, Jltj>ra n o t e 2 3 4 . at A n nex V I I , a r t . 6 . A r r i c k 6 reads 1 11 fu l l :
Any rerurn i ng re fu g e e o r d i s p l ace d person c h a rged w n h a c r i m e , mher than a serious v i o l a t i on o f I n ­
ternational h u m a n i ranan l a w as defined i n the Stature of the l n rernar ional T r i b u n a l for t h e Fo rmer
Y ug o s l av i a s i nce Jm uar y I , 1 9 9 1 or a c o m m o n c r i m e u n related to t h e confl i c r , s h a l l upon re t u rn
Cll J O)' an a m n e s t v . I n n o C<lSe s h a l l c h a rg es t(Jr c r i mes b e i m posed for p o l i t i c a l or m h e r 1 n ap p rop n a r e
reasons o r r o c i rcu m v e n t t h e clpp l i car i o n of rhe a m n t: s t y .
!d. an. 6 .
2 4 1 . Stature o f t h e l mernational Cri m i nal Tri b u nal for t h e former Yugosla' i a ( 1 9').1 ) ,
ref'I!Misbul i11
B .-\ SIC Doc u ,, I E :-iTS OF T H E I N T E RNATIO:,L·\ L C IU � I I :--i ,-\ 1 . TJn n u N,\L F o l\ Yu; osi ..W L-\ I ( 1 9')S ) ( here maf-­
rcr fCTY S t a t u r e ) .
U . N . SC:C)R , - I I I S r h m rg . at I , U . N . Doc. S i R t·s/SUS ( 1 9 9 ) ) . (affi r m i ng r l u r '" a l l parr i es are
242
bound ro co m p l ,· w i r h o b l i g a r i o n s u n d e r 1 nr e rn a r i o rw l h u m a n t ra r i a n Ltw . . ) ; U . N . SCO R _'l 2 1 7 r h mrg. ar
I , U.N.
[ i t} .
Doc. S .t R es/8 2' ( 1 99 3 ) , (l:srabl i s h i ng rht Tri bu n a l and rtq u 1 r i n ,g r h ar s ta res · · fu l l y CUO]x:rare w 1 r h
. (b,· r a k i n g ) a n y measures n ec es s a rv u nder t h e i r domcs r i c l a w r o 1 m p l e m c n r t h e p m v i s t U i l S o f r hc­
rresem res o l u t i o n ·c1 wl r h t S t a r u r l: .. ) .
2-i )
f C:TY S c cmm· . .Ill/""" nc > re 2 1 1 . a r t . I .
2 1i :i . T h e- ctccurcls \\ ere l !l l r i a l c:d by P re s i cl e m l zc-rlxgov 1 c . for r h c R t J'u b l l c o f B os n 1 a
P rts i c l c nc Tucl j ll1a n . for r h e Re p u b l i c of C ro,H i a . P res 1 d t m i\[ i losev i c , tor rlw
f'tcleral
,'\:
l l t rztgov i ncl.
Rtpu b l ic oC
Yu.eo­
s la v � <l and t; , r the !Z c p u b l i b S rpsk<'. and P rc s 1 d t m Zubak , t-o r chc federa t i o n o f Bos n i a & l l c rzcgo' i n a .
200 1 I Refrcrming Impunity
5 17
and w i tnessed by members of t h e C o ntact Group : B r i ta in , F rance, Russi a ,
t h e U n i ted S tates , Germany, an d I taly. T h e Accords received exp l i c i t supp o r t
from the Day t on Co nferen c e's th ree co-ch a i r m e n , U . S . Secre tary o f State
Warren C h r i s toph er, E U representative Carl B il d t , an d R us s i a n Deputy F o r ­
e i g n M i ni s t e r I g o r Ivanov, a s wel l a s fro m P residents C l i n t o n and Yel ts i n . 2 4 5
Soon after t h e s i g n i ng of t h e Accords , the U N Sec u r i t y C o u nc i l , acting u n ­
d e r Chapter V I I o f t h e U N C harter, i ssued a reso l ut i o n " (a}ffi rm - ( i ng} t h e
need for t h e i mp l e m en tat i o n of th e Peace Agree m e n t i n i ts e n t i rety, " a n d
cal l i ng " upo n t h e parries t o ful fi l , i n good fai t h , th e comm i t m e n ts e ntered
i nto i n that Agreeme nt . " 1 1 6 The Secur i ty C o u nc i l s i m i lar ly called upo n
C roati a to i mplement i t s am n e s ty law.24 7 The ex ten s iv e i nternational i n ­
volvement i n the Dayton peace p rocess and the exp l i c i t U N s upport for t h e
peace agreem e n t s , i nc l ud i ng t h e amnesty p rov i s i o n s , i m bu e th e B o s n i a n an d
Croa t ian Laws w i t h i nternational l eg i t i macy. I nternati o nal i nvolve m e n t i s
s uffic i e n t t o conc l ud e t hat t h e w i l l o f the t ra n s na t i o na l p o l i ty a s the u l t i mate
source of authority has approved th e am nes t i es i n these cases .
The goal of the Bos n i an an d C roati an Laws appears to h ave been to e ns u re
protecti o n of m i no r i t i es from arb i t rary p rosec ut i o n , w h i l e s i m u l taneou s l y
fac i li tati ng accou n tab i l i ty for severe violat i o n s o f i nternati onal h u man i tarian
law. The C roatian and B o s ni a n Laws balance th e d ua l d i ctates of the Dayt o n
Accords-a g u aranteed am nesty fo r m o s t cr i mes and l i ab i l i ty fo r v i o l a t i o n s
of i n ternat i o nal h u m an i tarian l aw. The C roat ian a m n e s t y leg islation h as
been i nvoked by a n u m be r of C roatian Serbs suspected of m i no r c r i mes
during t h e war in t h e fo rmer Yugoslav ia. 2 1x Ye t , the l e g i s l a t i o n h a s n o t p re­
vented t h e I CTY from prosec ut i ng t h e perpetrators o f serious violations o f
24 5 .
See
R I C H A I{ \) H O Ul l(()O K E ,
To E � D c\ \Xf.\R
_) 1 1 - 1 2 (Mode r n L i brary 1 9 9 9 ) ( l 9') i:l ) : R e m ar k s a r
r h e l m r ia l i ng o f r h e B a l ka n P r o x i m i r y Peace Ta lks Ag ree m e n r : Re marks by U . S . Sec reL\r}· of Scare \V'a r ­
r e n C h ristopher and Presiclenr M i l osev i c of S e r b i a , Pres iclenr Tucl j man of Croa r i a , Pres idem fzerbcg o v i c
of Bos n i a- H e rzegov i n a , Represe n r a r i ves o f r h c E u ropean U n i o n , r h e C:onracr G ro u p a n d Negor i ar i ng
Team M e m bers, Nov. 2 1 , I 995 , h r r p ://www l . u m n .ed u / h u m a n rrs/ic ry/clayron/dayro n rtmarks . h r m l ( v i s ­
i red M a r. 2 2 , 2 0 l l l )
2 -1 6 . U . N . S C O R _) 6 0 7 c h m r,L; . a c 1 , U . N . Doc. S I R E S / I ll_', 1 ( 1 99 5 ) . R es o l u c i o n 10 ."> I fu r c h e r s r ressed
" c h e p a rr i es ' c o m m 1 r m t nr
co c h e
r i g h r o f a l l refugees and d i s placed persons free l y
of o r i g i n in safe c y " r h r o u g h a l i m l(t:c\ amnesry d e c r ee
co
w
r e r u rn
ro
r h e i r h o mes
prev e n r reral i a r o rv prosec u r i o n o ( rci'ugecs .
2 4 7 . U . N . SCO R .) S O l r h m r g . � 7 , U . N . D o c . S / R es/ 1 1 2 0 ( 1 997 ) The R e s o l u r i o n
[ u )rges c h e Gov e rn m t n r o f r h t R l' p u b l 1 c o f C roaria
r h e am ncsry Ll\v , a n d
ro 1 m p l c m e n r
w
e l 1 m i 1ure arnbigl! l c i ts 1 11 t m p l t m t n r <u i o n o f
1 r fa i r l y and o b j ec r i ve l y i n accord a n c e w i r h 1 n r c rn a c i o n a l s r a n ­
clard s , 1 n p a r r i c u b r b y c o n c l u cl 1 n g a l l 1 n ves r i ga r i o n s of c r i m e s cowred b v r h e a m nesrv and u nd e r ­
r ak i ng an i m m e d i a ct and c o m p rehens i \'tc rev i e w w i r h U n i recl Nar i ons and local Serb pa n i c i pa c i on of
a l l charges ourscand i ng aga i ns r i ncl i v icl u cds fo r serious v i o l ar i o n s of i me r n a c i o n a l h u ma n 1 r a r i a n law
w h i ch are nor co,·ered b1· r h e a m neo> r ]· in o rd e r
w h o m r h <::rt 1s 1 n s u i'ti c i c n r
ro
e n d proceed t ng s a g a i n s r a l l i n d i v 1 d u a l s a cl! cl i n s r
c v 1 d c n cc: .
ld : ' "" ,;/_,,, S ccu e m e nr , , r' rhc U . N . S e c u r m· Cou n c i l Prtos i cl e nr , S e p c . 2 0 , l 9 9 G . <'iter!
.\ i i!ttil!rlll o/ fltlli/.111 1\igh/.1' i11 C ' ·"c�ri,; Ptn•;;,u![
''
'
J(, , ,JIIIIiull 1 0 / ') , y;;pr{/ nore 2 2 9 .
111
r11rtber
lo!cf>''rt
011
2 - I S . D ra g a n La p ct·l· i c , fo r e x ; l lll j> l t - , w a s re lt-c\SC:d o n A j.• r· i l I , l 9 9 S a fc e r 1 n vok i ng r h c Lt11· ;tnd h a v 1 n g
h 1 s a r r e s r w a r r ct n r clfl l1 U i l cd . O S C E (;n ,, !(,.,d! 'cd \h·IL"tiilh' fiJ Zagrcl <r l?e/ll_<cc Plm1.r, .'!ifir,t
m o re r h a n I
', ,OU( J Serbs 11· e r e
norc
2 2 ';! . I n ro c a l ,
pardom·d u nd e r r h c l cg i s l a r i o n b y l\Ltrch I 9 9 8 . Crm:nliih'lll ·''' j;n· Pctrd01Jo'd
Ff>r,Jn t l iidJ r,(Soi;jimll \\':n·-J(,/,;ro:d C�ur�u , ,-\ ssoCI XI'E D P R L:ss, i\ l a r. 1 0 , ! 9 9 S .
Harl/ard International Law J ourncd I Vol 4 2
5 18
i n ternationa l h um an i tarian l aw .?49 C roat i a a n d B o s n i a & H e rzegov i na have
.
secured i nternat i o n a l s uppore and l eg i t i m acy b y fi n d i ng che m i dd l e g round
o f amnesty for some and accou n t ab i l i ty for o c he rs .
B y exami n i ng l eg i t i macy and scope, c h i s A rt i c l e has dev e l op e d a frame­
w ork for anal yz i ng am nesty l e g i s l a t i o n w i t h i n fou r c learly d i s t i ng u is h a b l e
categories . T h e boundari es o f t hese theore t i ca l categories are p er m eabl e .
W h i le n o t every am nesty l aw fi r s perfect l y i n to a category, t h e two-axes
framework h i g h l ig h ts i mporeant systematic d i fferences between the l aw s .
P a r e II has esse n t i al l y co n s t r uc ted a framework . Part III beg i n s t h e p rocess o f
operac i onal i z i ng the fram ework by s uggest i ng how co ur ts h av e i mp l i c i t l y
appl i ed i t i n the pas t .
I I I . C H A L L E N G I N G I M M U N ITY
The effec t of these fo u r categories o f am nest y-B lan k er A m nes t y ; Loca l l y
Leg i t i m i zed , Par t i a l I m m un i ty ; I nternati o n all y Leg i t i m i zed , P a r t i a l I m m u­
n i ty ; and I nternati on al C o ns t i t ut i o n al I m m u n i t y-depends as m uc h o n
t h e i r app l i cation a s o n the actua l t e x t o f the l aws . So far, c h i s A r t i c l e has fo­
cused predom i na n t l y o n a p u r e l y t ex t ua l read i ng of am nesty l e g i s l at i o n . Part
I I I turns to the appl i ca t i o n o f t hese l aws by exami n i ng rec e n t c h a l l e nges to
them in a variety of for um s . Legal ch al l enges to the val i d i ty o f am n e s t y l eg ­
i sl a t i o n genera l l y have t a k e n t w o fo r m s : pet i t i o n s t o the I n t e r- A m e r ican
Com m i ss i o n on H um a n R i g h t s [ h e re i nafter the I n ter-Am e r i c a n Com m is­
s i on } a n d cases b roug h t befo re the h i g h co ur ts o f che s tates t hat e nacted t h e
l eg i s la ti on . Th i s Part s u p p l e men ts th e analy t i ca l framework deve l oped i n
Pare I I by eva l uat i ng the j ud i c ia l i n te rpretat i o n and app l i ca t i o n s o f these
a m nesty l aws .
A considera t i o n of t h e j u ri sp ruden ce of cour ts e n fo rc i ng a m n e s t y l aws i s
of parei c ul a r s i g n i ficance, a s i t a l l ow s us c o t e s t t h e anal y t i ca l framework
d eveloped i n Part I I . W h i l e avai l ab l e case law is s t i l l l i m i ted , the res u l ts are
c lear. B lanket Am nesty is accorded no excracerri corial val i d i ty a n d o n l y some
recog n i t io n by s ubseq u e n t reg im e s in enac t i ng states . Loca l l y Leg i t i m i z e d ,
P a r t i a l Am nes ty l i kewis e receives l i t t l e i n ternati onal recog n i t i o n , t h ou g h i t
i s m ore often accorded domes t i c authori ty. I n ternational l y Leg i t i m i zed , Par­
r i a l l nmm n i ty tends to be upheld boch domes t i ca l l y and i n ternat i o na l l y.
U n foreu narel y, the body of case law i n t h i s area remai ns smal l and i s n e i t h e r
b ro ad n or cons i sten t e no ug h to prov i de preced e n ti a l v a l ue. I t does i nd icace ,
however, that courts h ave , even i f unknow i ng l y, app l i ed a fram e w o r k not
un l i ke c h a t devel oped i n c h i s A rt i c l e .
� I SJ . s�t CIJ{ t l"l!lilt'J/1 ·''' f n· P,;)"JIJiitd '{j;fJ/1.\,IJ!d\
,1- ScJl.i Jj"()i/1
c h a r b\· I ')'):-; e l l � ! C T Y ILod t n d i n cd r "·cn r y - ti n- C:r(Ja c i , i n
\Ln·-f?t-lt!lt.:J Cb.n;::,LI- .
s u s peers
_\ft/'1'.{
ll U ( C"
� - i ;-) ( l) ( lf l fl_�
sr•c·c i ticd l )· t �c m p r td t·r u m a m n c s c \ ) .
519
2 0 0 1 I Reframing Impunity
A . Application of Blanket A llmesties
B lanket A mnesty h as been t h e s u b j ec t of c o n s iderab l e j ud ic i a l a t t e n t w n
by t h e I nt e r-American C o u r t and t h e I n ter-A meri can Com m i s s i o n . B ecause
many of the B lanket Am nesty l aw s p r o m u lgated d ur i ng the 1 9 7 0s and
1 9 80s were of Lat i n America n o r i g i n , these two i nter-American i ns t i t u t i o ns
have been w el l s i t uated to c on d u c t j ud i c ia l i n q u i ry. � 5 0 The m a j o r i ty of t h i s
body o f case-law h as n o t dea l t w i t h t h e ac tual v ali d i ty o f am nesty l eg i s l a­
t i o n , but rath e r th e r i g h t s of v i c t i m s to adequate means of redress for g rave
h uman r i g h t s v i ol at i o ns . H owever, t here h ave been a few excep t i o ns . 2 5 1 I n
each of t h e fol low i ng cases , a n i n ternational t r i b u n a l fou n d B la n k e t A m ­
n e s t y l aws i nval i d a n d u n e n forcea b l e . The t r i b u na l condemned t h e e nact i ng
s tates and fou n d each amnesty t o be a fun damen tal v i o l a t i o n o f i n ter n ational
l aw. These cases s upport th e p roposi t i on th at B la n ke t Am n es ty l acks val i d i ty
and should n o t be e n forced d om e s ti c a l l y or ext raterri tori a l l y.
The vast m a j o r i t y of pet i t i o n e rs before th e two In ter-A mer ican i ns t i t u ­
t ions have based t h e i r c l a i m s o n r i g h t s e n s h r i ned i n th e I n te r-Ameri can
Conve n t i o n o n H um a n Rights ( " t he I n te r-Ameri can Convent i o n " ) , 2 5 2 w h i c h
requ i res states to upho l d t h e " ri g h ts a n d freedoms recog n i ze d " i n t h e I nter­
Am e rican Conve n t i o n , i n c l u d i n g t h e r i g h t to j ud i c i al perso n a l i ty, the r i g h t
to a fai r t r i a l , and th e r i g h t to j ud i c ial protec t i on . I n fro n t o f th e I n te r­
American Court and Comm i s s i o n , t h ese t reaty-based rights h ave giv en r i s e
to c l a i m s t ha t B lanket A mn e s ty laws en acted i n Lat i n Amer ica v i o late s tate
obl igat io ns to v i c t i m s . \'Vh i l e the Court 's an d th e Comm i s s i o n 's scope of
i nq u i ry are ad m i t t e d l y l i m i te d , t hese cases prov ide the o n l y s i g n i ficant a n d
systematic cons i d e ra t i o n o f t h ese i ss ues by an i n te rn a t i o n a l t r i b u nal to elate.
The I n t e r- A m er i can j ur i sprudence begi ns w i th th e
Velc!Jqmz R odrfgmz
Cm e , brought aga i n s t H o n d uras befo re th e I n t e r- A m e ri can C o u rt i n 1 98 8 .
was n o t , h owever, a d i re c t ch al l enge
Velchqmz R odr<�mz
to
a n a m n e s ty l aw,
b u t rathe r a complai n t on behalf of t h e relat ives o f Manfredo Vetis q u e z , who
b ad been i llegal l y d etai ned b y mem bers of th e State I n format i o n S e rvice and
eve n tu a l l y became one of the " d i sappeared . " R e ferring
to
A r t i c l e 1 ( 1 ) of th e
I nt e r-American C o n v e nt i o n , t h e Court fo und " that [the} prac t i ce [o f} torture
and assas s i n a t i o n w i t h i m p u n i ty i s i ts elf a b reach o f t h e d ut y to preve n t
v i o l at i o n s o f the rights t o l i fe a n d p h y s i cal i n tegrity o f t h e p e rson . " � 5 1 The
Court went on
s tates
.l S U .
"
co
b o l d t hat A r t i c l es 8 and 25 of th e Convent io n obl igate
to mves t i gate every s i t ua t i o n i n volvi ng a v i o l a t i o n of the rights pro-
See
C: h a r r c r 1 1 !
ch�
Or g cm i z :H t nn of A m e r i c a n
Sccues,
1\pr. _) I I . I ')
1 .'-i .
I I ') U l\ . T. S . 1.
:rr
c h . :) , a r c .
-i .
.! 5 1 . l ' u r
:t
d t S C L I S S t u r t 1 1 f r ! r c· l m n- I\ m cr i c :tr r l-I u n u tl l\ c g h r s
Thl \\" /i(J;,, Tri!tli di!d
1 _: ru ;
-' 5 -'
25 1
91 1 ' 5
h 1 1.
F)!/! r!1t 7}·;;/b: --rr!l!b ci))//JI!/_1-_\-jl))/_\.
LJ
s1·s c�m.
Vc: Lis q u c z - l\ od r r ,LC tt lZ Cas c. J ud g m t n r
l .L\l
l 1· J u . i\ 1 . P:bq u a l u cc i ,
_ ; ;/{/ l/iL' /;;!er-l\ Ji!Cri(r !l/ f-litli/c!ll
1 � 1 1 I 'J'.! h
A rn n r c a n C : ( l !l \'l'l1 l t o n un l l u m J n R 1 ,� h r s , J u h . I S 1 9 7 S , I I
;;; .JS
sc·c
?. ') I ( l l) S ') J
of _j u l 1
i i U N.TS.
?. 9 , 1 9 S S , l nrn- r\ rn
I "\ ) ,
ac
tlr.2, arc. S.
C l-1 R . i Sc r C) N u \ ( l l) S S ) ,
Hc:zrz;ard International Law Jol!rnal I Vol. 42
520
tec ted " i n the Conve m i o n . 25-'i The Coun co nc l uded th at H o n d u ras h a d
b reached i t s obl igati o ns " to carry out an i nvestigation i nto the d isappearance
of Manfredo Vel as q uez , and . . . [to} ful fi l . . . i t s d u t i es to pay compensati on
and p u n i s h t h ose respons i b l e . " 2 5 5 States-Parries r o th e Conve n t i o n t h u s have
an affi rmati ve dmy t o t h e i r c i t i zens to preven t and p u n i s h serious h u man
rights v i o lations . 2 S 6
The I n ter-American system also considered th e val i d i ty o f B lanket A m ­
nesty i n cases before t h e I nter-A m e r i can C om m i s s i o n , a " q uas i - j u d i c i a l
body" w i t h t he authority r o i s s ue reco m m e n d a t i o n s , b u c w i t h o u t e n force­
m e n t power. 1 5 7 The cases before th e C o m mi s s i o n fal l i nto cwo categories­
t he earl y j ur i sprudence of 1 99 3-94 and the m o re recent C h i l ea n case of
1 99 7 . Develop m e n t of t h i s j ur i sprudence i nd i cates a grow i ng c o n d e m n a t i o n
of B lanket Am nesty.
The 1 99 2-9 3 cases befo re th e I nter-A m erican C o m m i s s i o n a l l fou n d chat
states have a d m y to i nvestigate human rights v i o l at i ons and to e n sure com­
pensati o n for v i c t im s . --' 5 8 In i t s October 1 9 9 2 repon in Consuela v. A rgen­
tina , 2 5 9 the C o m m i s s i o n c o n fronted an amnesty law, 260 w h i c h a l l owed for t h e
p rosecmions of t o p m i l i tary com manders a n d c reated a n i nves t i gatory
m ec h a n i s m to record past atroc i t i e s . Nonetheless , th e Com m i s s i o n fo u n d th e
am nesty l aw i ncompat i b l e w ith the s tate's o b l igations under t h e I n te r­
American Conve n t i o n , i n terpre t i ng th e righ t to a fai r e ri a l u nd e r A rt i c le 8 . 1
to app l y to v i ct i ms and perpetrators al i ke . 2 r; 1 Wi t h respect to " access co j ud i ­
c i al protec t i o n " u nder Arti c l e 2 5 . 2 o f the I nter- Ameri can C o nve n t i o n , th e
C o n1 m i s s i o n not ed a d uty to " e n s ur e t hat a n y person c l ai m i n g s u ch remedy
s ha l l have his rights d e term i ned by the compete n t authori ty p ro v i ded for by
the legal system . " --'(,--' F i n a l l y, che Co m m iss i o n c i ted th e
VelrfJq11ez Roddgmz
j ud g me n t : " s tates m us t prev e n t , i nvest igate a n d p u n i s h any v i o l a t i o n of the
rights recog n i ze d b y the C o n ve nt i o n . " 2 (, ; In a s i m i lar reporc fo r !vlendoza
1.1.
Umg!!ay ,26 i the C om m i s s i o n reached a nearly i d e n tical co n c l us i o n , fi n d i ng
.2 5 - t ld � l 7 G
.2 5 5
I d. � l 7 8 .
.2 5 G . Rekva n r S w res-Parries ro rhc C:n1wemion :111d r h c i r respec r i ve d ares of ra r i fi c a r i o n of rhe Convt n ­
r i o n a r e : A rge n r i n a ( .2 / .2/84), C h i le ( 1 1 / .2 .2 /6<) ) . E l Salvad o r ( l l / .2 .2/69), Guartma l a ( 1 1 /.2 .2/69), H a i r i
( <)! 1 -i / 7 7 ) , H o n d u ras ( I I / .2 .2/(-,9), N i caragua ( l l ! 2 .2 16<) ) , P e r u ( 7 I 2 7 / 7 7 ) , a n d C r u g m y ( I l l 2.2 / 6 9 ) .
� 5 7 . R ubert 0 . \Vt i n c- r, Tr)ill,� t o ; \ ! ,tkc [;;dr , \ l ed: l�n o;;cilillg the Lclli · i!lld Prt�mce
IICJ!ieJ, :2 6 ST. M,\ I{Y · s
LJ
of f-11111/d il
/-( igbt.> ;\ i/1-
8 5 7 , 8 6 5 0 99 5 )
.2 5 S . Stt D o ug l as s Casse l , LeJJ''''·' jiw11 If,, ,-\ 1}/erit<t.>: C11ulelillc.r _1;,r llltenh!fllllhif Re.>jio11.re to ;-\n/1/e.>tieJ ;;,r
:-1 rmotiu, 5 9 L. & Co :--: n.: ,\ I P. P ROilS. 1 9"7 . � 1 .2 ( 1 99G)
.2 5 9
Case 1 0 . 1 �1 7 , l n re u\ m . C . H . R . -I I , O L\ .\u L: V : I I 8 ) , d o c . 1 - i ( l l)9 _) L
.2 6 0 . F i n a l Au ( r\ r,':' . ) a n d D u t Obc:cl i c n c c Ltw . .l ltjl!·a
2 6 l . See C o n s u t l o
c! J s p u red m e a s u r e s
v.
\\';!S ru
.2 6 2 . /J 9[ _) S(a)
:2 6 .1 . !d.
( Sc r
9i
C ) 1'\ u --i ,
w e a k e n rhe v i c r 1 m ·s r i!; h r
ca s e
91.
w
9[
_:; _:; ( n o r i n .'; " c h c tffe c c s o f c he
b r i n,<: a n i iTl J n a l a n i o n 1 11 a
c u u rr
of· [a,,- - - ) .
-i O ( q uo[ ) n g YcLis q u tz - R od r lg u e z Case . .J u d ,<: m c n c o f J u l y 2 <) . I l) S S . l nrn-t\ m . C.l-1 R .
91
I 0 Ci . )
� 6 4 . J\ [ e ncluza ' - U r ui..: ua \ . Case
I n chis
nore
A rg t n r i n a . Case I ( I l \ - I nr e r- A rn _ C H . I \ . - i l ,
I ll
< 1 2 <) . l nrn- r\ lll . C . H . R . 1 5 - i . O E r\ i sc r L! V/ I I S ) _ d o c. 1 - \ ( 1 99 1 )
c h e C o m m 1 s s i o n acl d re s st:cl r h e Lhugua1·an
:t m l i c S r l ·.
b u r lefr c i ,· i l remechts ! IHac r . Sec C1,;se l . r11j>r.t nor<:· 2 5 :--> ,
:ll
w h 1 c h Lurr·ccl a l l c r i m 1 11:rl prusec u r 1 u n s
� I I . F o u r ptr i r i oncrs h a d denuuncc-d U r u -
200 1 I Reframing Impunity
521
the i nvolve d am nesty l eg i s lati o n t o have v iolated t h e v i c t i m 's r i g h t to a fai r
trial and t h e state's o b l i gat i o n t o i nvestigate. The Com m i s s i o n d i d n o t deem
all amnesty l aws de facto v i o l a t i o n s of the I nter-American C o n ve n t i o n , but
rath e r i nd i cated t h e n eed t o " w e i g h t he nature and gravi cy of th e even t s
w i th w h i c h t h e l aw concerns i ts e l f. " 2 6 5
From t hese t h ree cases , one can c o n c l ude c hat th e Com m i s s i o n was d i s ­
mayed by t he amnesty l aws i n A rgen t i n a a n d U ruguay. Yet , d ue to bo th i ts
no n-b i nd i ng authority and i ts awareness of th e pol i t i ca l rea l i t ies of Lati n
America,266 t h e Comm i s s i o n was n o t i n a pos i ti o n to make a defi n i t ive
s tatem e n t on t h e i nval i d i ty o f a l l B lanket Am n es ty laws u n d e r th e I n te r­
American C o nve n t i o n . Rather, t h e Com m i s s i o n i d e n t i fied certai n aspects o f
t he l eg i s l a t i o n c h at were i n b reach of t h e C o nve n t i o n and p roposed a lternate
acceptabl e s o l u t io n s . The Comm i s s i o n 's fin a l recomm endat i o n s focused o n
ne i ther the i nh er en t i ll egali ty o f am nesty l aws n o r o n th e o b l i g at i o n c o p u n ­
i s h perpetrators , b u r rather on t h e r i g h t of v i c t i m s to " j us t compe n sati o n for
che v i ol a c i o n s . " 2 67 The Com m i s s i o n was i n th e awkward p os i c i o n of s i m u l ta­
neous l y co ndem n i ng am nesty l aws w h i l e g iv i ng g uidance as to what c o u l d
l eg i t i m i ze s uch a l aw. T h i s d i ffi c u l t y arises because the C o m m i s s i o n based
i ts analys i s on v i c t i ms ' r i g h ts to redress rather than on t h e l eg i ti m acy o f the
leg i s l at i o n . This may be u nders tandable on th e grounds that, s i nce th e laws
had been passed by effective, recog n i zed governmen t s , the C o m m i s s i o n
fo und i tself unab l e d i rectly to q uest i o n th e l aws ' vali d i ty. Had t h e Comm i s ­
s i o n been w i l l i ng t o d i saggregace t h e stare an d base i ts cons i de ra t i o ns d i ­
rect l y o n t h e l eg i t i macy of t h e l eg i s l at i o n , i t m i g h t have reach ed far more
cohere n t and j u r i spruden t i a ll y cons i s te m res u l ts .
The I n ter-American Com m is s i on took a seep i n c h i s d i rect i o n i n a m ore
recent report of October 1 5 , 1 9 96 i n the case o f Hermosi!la
v.
Chi!eY''" T h i s
report affi rms an o b l igat i o n to prosec u te pe rpetrators o f s erious v i ol a t i o ns o f
the Conve n t i o n and c on d em n s t h e C h i lean leg i s la t i o n . The C o m m i ss ion
notes that C h i l e h as " recog n ized i ts obligations to i nves tigate previous v i o la-
g u ayan l aw No. 1 5 . ::>..:! :--\ as a pp l i e d , a rg u 1 ng
rhctr 1r v i o L!reJ r i g h t s e n s h ri ned in rhe l nr t r- A m c r i cm Con­
v c n r i o n . Mendoza, Case 1 0 . 0 2 9 , l nr c r- A m . C . H . R . 1 5 ..:! .
2 6 5 . l ei. 91 .1 8 . I n r h e r h i r d
ca s e
fr o m r h e t,trly 1 99 0 s , r h e C o m m i s s w n cons i dered r h t a m n ts r y l e g t s Lt ­
r i o n 1 n E l Sa lvador and a g a i n re.1ch ecl a s i m i Lt r concl u s i o n , bm n o r e cl t hat an a m n es t y n o r preceded by an
i nd i v 1 d u a l acknow l edgmenr of respons1 b i l J t )' was part i c u larly problema t i c . See Report on r h e S i r uarion of
H u man R i g h t s in E l Salvador, l n r tr-1\ m . C . H . R . O E A/ E s r/L!V/l l . S 6 ( 1 99 -1 ) .
2 6 6 . See Cass e l ,
Jllj!ra
nor e 2 5 8 , a r 2 0 9
2 6 7 . See C on s u e l o , Case I O . l -i 7 l nr t r- A m . C . H . l\
4 1 , a r Reco m rn e ncla r i o n s . 91 2 ; M e n d oza, Case
l lU l 2 9 . l nr er-1\m. C. H. R . 1 5 ·-1 . ar Reco m mendations, 91 2. One c o m nwn raror suggtsrs rhar rht Comm i s ­
s ion
w o u l d l i keh· appro,·c o f an a m n t: s r v c h a r m e r r h e lcl l l ow i ng co nd i r i o n s : r lu r i r d tcl . . n o r p rec l u cl t:
J il c l i v t cl u,ll i n vcs r i g a r i o n , r h a r i r cl t d
nut
1-'rt" J ml i c c rht n c r i m "s opport u n i t y
ro
seek ,t n d o b r ,t i n rcpar<l­
r i o n s , .. and r h a r ir did . . n or prc·c l ud e p u b l 1 c ack n! J\v l ed g e m t lH or" r he bcrs . . . \Vt i n e r , .'ltf'u n o r c 2 5 ! . ar
0' 1
.:' 6 0 . Cast I
U . S-\.'> ,
l m e r- r\ m . C. H R . l ) 6 . O L \istr.! L V 1 I J . SJ 5 d u e . 7
rht p ro b l e m of t m p u n J t l· 1n C h i l e tc1 r
'
re1·.
( l 9 9 6 ) . Tim
case
rhose rt"spon s i b k I�Jr the ,u-res r '1ncl d t sappecHcli1Ct u f
c u n s , c!cred
S tl· t n r l·
tndl­
1 d u a l s . The pe u r i on c rs had sou g h t dumcs r i c recourse i n C h i l e b u r had r h t i r cast d i s m issed f'Ursuanr
r h e ,\nHl t:: S t \· Decree Law :2 I 9 1 . See
cl t s C Lb S I O n of
w
r h e C h i l e a n Lill" . .fltjil"c i , rt;;r accu m p <t n i· J n g nmes i / -6- .
Harvard International Law}ournal I Vol. 42
522
t i on s of h u m an rights " t h rough a trmh c o m mi s s i o n .- � 69 N o n e t h e l e s s , th e
Com m i ss i on b o l d l y s tate s : " the app li cati o n of a m nes t i es renders i neffect ive
and worth less t h e o b l i gati o n s that S tates -Parties have ass umed under . . . th e
Conve n t i o n . " 270 The C h i l ean gove r n m e n t is n o r mer ely i ns t ructed r o com­
pe nsate victi m s , bur i s also condem ned for a " fai l ure to amen d o r revoke th e
de facto Decree Law. " 27 1 M o reover, Ch ile i s i ns tructed ro " i d e n c i fy t h e g u i l ty
parties , estab l i s h t he i r respo ns i b i l i ti es and . . . prosecute . . . and p u n i s h . . .
t h em . " 2 7 � HermoJilla t h u s clar i fies th e extent of a s tate's dut y u nd e r t h e I n ter­
American Conve n c i o n to i nvestigate v i o l a t i o n s , i d e n c i fy perpetrators , and
p u n i s h the g u i l cyY 3 No amnesty law, n o matter h ow carefu l l y tai l ored ,
could conform to the d i c tates of HermoJilla .
W h i l e the Com m i s s i o n consi dered th e actual amnesty l e g i s l a t i o n i nvolved
in Hermosilla, i t wenc coo far by c l ai m i ng chat no amnesty law cou l d be per­
m is s i b l e . Accord i ng to t h i s A rt i c l e 's analys i s , C h i l e m ay be unable to pass a
val i d am nesty l aw because i ts govern m e n c does not reflect t h e k i nd of l e ­
g i t i m acy developed i n P a r t I I , n ot because a n y amnes ty, n o matter h ow nar­
rowly tai l ored or h ow l eg i t i mate l y enacted is per se i nval i d . By tak i ng a d i f­
ferent starting poi nt-th e l eg i t i macy of the l egislat i o n , rat h e r t h a n v i c t i m s '
r i g h ts-the analy t i cal framework devel oped i n t h i s A r t i c l e provides concl u­
s ions m o re subtle and n uanced than th ose offered by t h e ! mer- A m erican
C o m m i s s i o n , under w h i c h am nesty leg i s lation is e i ther per s e val i d o r i nva­
l i d . T h i s framework accouncs for the varyi ng deg rees of l eg i t i m acy and t h e
range of possi b le scopes of am nesty l eg i s lat i o n . Nonethel e s s , th e C o m m i s ­
s i o n 's j ur i sprudence i n d i cates t h a t B l an ket A m nesties , s uch as t h o s e a d opted
i n Lat i n A m erica, are i nval i d and w i l l n o t be e n forced by i me r n a c io na l t r i ­
b u nals . W h i l e the C o n1 m i ss i o n was correct to i nval i date t hese laws , i t s rea­
so n i ng may h ave been s e l f- l i m i t i ng , rath er t ha n s tandard sett i ng .
B lanket A m nesty bas also been chal lenged i n domestic for u m s , n a m e l y i n
the h igh courts o f the vari ous scares i n w h i ch th e laws were e nacted . O n th e
whol e , these couns have been t�u m o re l i k e l y co recog n i ze a n d e n fo rce a m­
nesty l aw s , eve n B la n ket Amnes ty. The m o s t recent cases , h o wever, suggest
that d o m es t i c courts may be m ov i ng toward n o n - e n force m e n t of B l an ket
Am nesty.
The cases of domes r i c recog n i t ion and e n forcement share a few c o m m o n
trend s . F i rs t , p e t i t ion ers before th e h i g h court of a state h ave g e nerall y
clai med chat t h e amnesty l aw i n q ues t i o n v i o l ates a right esta b l i s hed i n the
const i t u ti on of chat s tate, rath er than i n a treaty o b l igat i o n o r customary
i n rernacional norm . U n l i ke the I n cer- A me r ican Com m i ss i o n , n a t i o n a l courts
do have b i n d i ng a u th o r ity and h ave tended
.:>(,�
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aries have often y i elded to l eg islative and exec u t i ve aut h o r i t y, c m ng i mpor­
tant policy reasons behi nd t h e am nesty l aws . As i s the case i n the I n ter­
American sys tem , domes t i c courts have rarely co n s i dered l eg i s lat i o n i n l ig h t
of i nternati onal c r i m i nal ob l i g at i o n s . Domestic ch all enges , t h e refo re , do n o t
reso l ve q uestions of i nternat ional l egal val i d i ty of amnesty l eg i s l at i o n , but
m e re l y prov i d e g u idance as t o the app l ication o f amn es ty laws by e nact i ng
s tates . The most s i g n i ficant d o m e s t i c cha l l enges co B lanker A m nesty have
occurred i n A rge m i na, 27'� C h i le , 2 7 5 and E l Salvador, w h i c h w i l l be analyzed
below.27 6
I n 1 9 8 7 , the Arge n t i ne Due Obed i e nce Law was chall e nged i n the A rgen­
tine S upreme Court. The pet i t i oners claimed that th e D ue Obedience Law,
w h i c h created an i rrefutable pres u m p t i on chat s o l d i ers acted pursuant to
command o rders, "preve nted courts from exam i n i ng i s sues w h i c h ar e o f t h e i r
excl usive c o m pecence . " 277 Wi thout confro n t i ng the q ues t i o n , o r provid i ng
any m eani n gful reason i ng , t h e Court determ i ned that the A rge n t i n e C o n ­
gress ha s the power to enact l aws and pol i cies th at it deems reasonably n ec­
essary. I n t h e eyes of the Court, t h e D ue Obed ience Law was such a reason­
ab l e meas ure. In a concurring opi n i o n , J us tice Carlos Fay e b reaks w i th N ur­
emberg t rad i t i ons of command responsi b i l i ty, w h i c h h e l d superi o rs l i able for
t he aces o f t h e i r i nfe riors whi le s t i l l h o l d i ng i nfe riors l i abl e fo r thei r own
i l legal acts even if fol lowing orders YH J us c i ce Faye argues char " s ubord i nate
o fficers have the legal capac i ty t o veri fy the extri n s i c ch arac ter i s t i c s o f che act
for the purposes of estab l i sh i ng whether or n o r i t i s an o rd e r . . . b u r such
capac i ty to verify d oes not extend to rh e l egal
or
i l legal nawre o f the or­
der. "2 7'J The Court t h e reby upheld the Due Obedience Law, affi rm i ng i m ­
m un i ty for most m e m bers o f t h e m i l i tary and s tate services and even q ues­
t i o n i ng c o m mand respons i b i l i ty.
The c hal l e nge
ro
i m m u n i ty i n E l Salvador sought to i nval i date a B lanker
Am nesty. The j ud i c i al dec i s i o n i nvoked questi onable legal p r i nci ples co
2 7 i . Dec i s i o n on r h e Law of D u e OlxJ itnce. Cast N o . 5 -.\7 , J u n t 2 2 , l 98 7 ( S u p re m e Cou rr of t\r.� e n ­
r i na ) rejn ·imu! I!J T!L\ N S I T I 0 !-'.·1 1 . .J u S TJ c : t : · H o w L \ I I: I((; J !'(; D E � J OC I\ A C I ES R l : t : KO '-: \\TrH FOJC,I ! : I\ R I ­
Cd � I F S
5 0 ') ( N e d
J
K r i r z eel , l 99 5 ) [ h e r e maher T!LI � :) I T I O N .·I I . J uST I C E ) .
.:!7 5 . I n l ') 9 0 , r h e C h i it-an S u p re m e C o u r t u p h e l d r h e va l i d i c y of c h t: l 9 7 S ,-\ m n e s r y Law. Stc E d ward
S. S n y d er, The Oirtr Le.�,;/ ll<n·:
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r h e A m neSr )· La w , Procetd 1 11gs No. l 0-9 .1 , Ma y 2 0 . l 9 9 1 . ( S u p r e m e C o u r r o f ) u s ­
r i ce o F E l Salvad o r ) rr{mlltr,/ ill Ti(A :--.i � I T I 0 0 cl l. J US T I C: L , .IJ!fir" n o c t 2 7 - \ , ar _) -'! ':) , _) -'! ':) .
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[ u } n d t:r [ c ) u sru ma r\· [ i ] n r t rn a r l o n ;d [ l ] a ,-.· . . ) . F u r <tn c- x n : l k n r rt:v i c\\' o f c o m m ;; n cl rcs p t i il S i b i l l r \·, :> teo ,c:c- n ­
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Harziard International Lazujottnzal I Vol 42
5 24
d e n y j ur is d i c t i o n over the c h a l lenged l aw. W h e n cons i d e ri n g a p e n n o n
c h a l l e ng i ng t he 1 9 9 3 Salvadoran L a w of A m nesty and Rehab i li ta t i o n , th e
Supre m e Court of J us t i ce o f El Salvador h e l d that " m atters o f p u re l y pol i t i ­
c a l nature are n o t [wi t h i n ) t h e do ma i n o f t r i b u na ls . "2 80 I n a convol uted d i s ­
cuss i o n of soverei g nty, t h e Court determi ned amnesty t o b e a r i g h t o f th e
s overe ig n , conferred by " d i v i n e g race , " and the refo re a n " em i ne n t l y p o l i ti ca l
act . " I t concluded t h a t th e power to g ran t am nesty had been " c o n s t i t u t i o n ­
a l l y conferred o n t h e Leg i sl ative Asse m b l y " an d t h a t i t was n o t w i t h i n t h e
Court 's j ur i sd i c t i on to revi e w s uc h a pol i t i cal act. T h e log i c o f d i v i n e g race
appears outdated . Even if a m nesty i s solely p o l i t i ca l , it need not be beyond
j ud i cial review. As an apparent afterthoug h t , t h e Court t ur n e d to the m e r i ts
of t h e case, i nvok i ng an oft e n m i scons trued passage i n A r t i c l e 6(5 ) o f A d d i ­
t ional P rotoco l I I of th e Geneva Conventions [ h ere i nafter A d d i t i o na l P roto­
c ol II) to j us t i fy i m m u n ity. 2 8 1 I n i t s cursory treatm e n t , t h e C o u r t i naccu­
ratel y i n cerpreted t h e Geneva C o nve n c i o n s . The Court d i d not c o n s i d e r t h e
fundamencal o b l igati o n s o f th e Geneva Conve n c i o n s , i n l i g h t o f w h i c h th e
am n es t y c l ause of Add i t i on a l P ro roco l I I mus t be i n cerp reted , n o r d i d i t
m en t i on the Red Cross Commentaries, w h i c h l i m i t the read i ng o f A r t i c l e
6( 5 ) . T h e Court y i e l d ed to perce i ved p o l i t i c a l neces s i t y a n d d e n i ed i ts e l f
j l:1ris d i c c i o n .
B o t h of these domestic c h a ll enges to B lanket Am nesty fai led to c o n s i de r
the l eg i t i macy of the enac t i ng gove r n m e nt and the scope o f t h e leg i s l at i o n .
These courts also fai led to g i ve a n y conv i n c i ng reason s fo r u p h o l d i ng t h e
am n es t i es i n q ues t i o n . These cases do n o t u n d e r m i ne t h i s a n a l y t i cal frame ­
work . Rath er, t h e A rge n c i n e an d Salvadoran examp l es reveal t h e con t i n u i ng
i l l eg i t i m acy of t he gove r n m e n ts en ac t i n g the overreac h i ng am n e s t y l a w s i n
q ues t i o n .
B . Locally Legitimized. Partial Immmzity in Applicc:ttion
Two of the Loca l l y Leg i t i m i zed , Parc ial A m n es t i e s analyzed i n Part I I
have been s u b j eC t c o c h a l l e nge i n d o mestic courts . W h i l e th e c h a ll e nge t o
t h e South Afr i can National U n i ty and R econc i l i a t i o n A c t h a s b e e n de c i ded ,
the F i j i a n case is s t i l l pen di ng a t th e t i m e of publ i ca t i o n . �:-: 2 These t wo do-
i11
_l � O . Dec i s i o n on t h e A m n esty Law, Proceed 1 ngs N o . W - 9 ) , i\hy 2 0 , 1 9';)_), ( E l Sa l . ) , P a r r I , rfjlrillltcl
Tt\.-l "iSI Tioxu _j cSTI C E , .illjJra
28 1
nore _1 7 .:\ ,
J\ n i c l t 6( 5 ) c1 l l s u p o n srates
t i c i pa t e d i n r he armed con ti l e r ,
w hether r h e y are i n terned
I 9-19. a n d R e ia t l l\l,:
w
or
or
ro
ro
pers o n s w h o h ave par­
d e ta i n ed . . . See Prmocol r\dd i ( ] onal r o r h e Geneva C o n v e n r i o n s o f r\ u g u s r 1 2 ,
r h e l)ro r c c r i o n of V i c r i m s o l · N o n - l nr c rna( l o n a l A r m l'd Con H i e r s [ h e re i n c1 fr c r Pro­
wcol I I } . I 9 7 7 . a n . {)( ) ) , 1 1 .2 5 U . N .T S . _)
1 11
_) .:\ 9
t h ose d tp n ved of' r h c 1 r l 1 bt r r 1· r(Jr reasons related r o the ,umecl c o n rl i c r .
p ro,· ls lOll a 1 ms at e n c o u r,t g l n,l! c1m nc:s r v .
pcur i c i pa rc:d
,tt
· ' g rctm r h <: hroadesr poss i b l e: cl m n esr y
"The
rr,m·< �ft\
o f [ A m c l t 6( 5 ) ) i n d i ca t e r h cu rim
fo r t h ose detai ned or p u n i s h ed lo1· the
rnne
Ltcr of lu v i ng
hus r i l 1 r i es. l r doc:s n o r a i m ar a n a m ncsr1· for r h os,· h a n n g v i o l ated i ll[ t r n a r i o n a l h u rn a n i ­
rct r i a n L1w . . . Lurer tmrn Dr. To n i P Lm n e r , I It-ad u f t h e
D i \ I S l o n . ! C RC C e m·,· a , r o T h e Prosec u r o r
o r" r h c: l n r t: r n a r i o n a l C l- l lll L IU l Tr i b u n cd ro r r h t F o r m u Yugos l a v i a , A [' l'. 1 5 . 1 9 '-) 7 . ,-ired Iii Clsst l .
n u r e -' 5 :-i .
;tr
2 1 �.
2 S _l . l\ [ i c h a c l 1- i c· l d . /) J iti,b Lcg.d Gl!iiJ 1-/nwl tu
Ofo: i!d Fiji Got ·,-rl/il!t i/1.
>lljlrc/
A c . t : "i u: F R . P tn: s:; l : . A u g .
i.
200 1 I R eframing Impunity
525
m es t i c j ud ic i aries, appare n t l y e n j oy i ng g reater i ndependence t h a n t h e i r A r­
g e n t in e and Salvadoran counterpart s , have app li e d far s tricter s c r u t in y. These
two am nesty l aws have been uphel d i n l arge part because they have greater
l e g i ti m ac y and more restricted s cope chan do B lanket Am nes t i e s .
I n S o u t h A fr i ca, a l aw herei n categ o ri zed a s a loca l l y leg i t i m i zed , Parti al
I m m u n i ty was fou n d consti tu t i o na l and therefore enforceab l e b y th e C o n s t i ­
t u t i on a l Courr . 28" I n t h i s chall enge to the Nat i o nal U n i ty and Reconci li a­
t i o n Ac t [ here i nafter Nat i on a l Reconci l iati o n Act} , pet i t i o n e rs , represe n ted
by t he Azani a n Peopl e 's O rga n i sat i o n , argued that Sec t i o n 2 0 ( 7 ) o f the Na­
t i o na l R eco n c i l i at i on A c t , accordi ng to w h i c h " no person who h as been
granted amnesty in respect of an act , o m i ss i o n or o ffence shal l be cri m i na ll y
o r c i v il l y l iab l e , " was i n v i o l at i o n o f S ec t i o n 2 2 o f t h e South A frican C o n s t i ­
t u t i o n . Sec t i o n 2 2 g uaran tees every person " th e r i g h t to have j us t i c i a b l e d i s ­
p u t e s s e t t l e d b y a court of l aw o r, where appropriate, ano t h e r i ndependent or
i mpar t i a l foru m . " 2 8-i The Court fou n d t hat th e I n terim C o ns t i t u t i o n of 1 99 3
i tsel f mandated an amnesty l aw. l i ke t h e A rgenti n e Court, t h e S o uth A fr i ­
c a n Court p laces g reat emphas i s o n th e h i s torical backgro u n d to th e a m ­
nesty, ope n i ng i ts dec i s i o n by n o t i ng " decades [ o f} deep c o n fl i c t . " 285
The South A fr i can Court , h owever, did app l y a model s i m i lar t o t h i s Arti ­
c l e 's analy ti ca l framewor k. T h e Court fi rst t u rns t o l eg i t imacy, ques t i o n i ng
t he l aw 's adherence, or i ts c on fo r m i ty w i th other leg i s la t i o n and w i t h th e
Cons t i tu t i on i n par t i c u lar. The Court acknowl edges th at " a n amnesty u n ­
d o ubted l y i m pacts o n fundam e n ta l righ ts " p ro tened b y t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n , 2 86
but observes that Secti o n 3 3 ( 2 ) of the C o ns t i tu t i o n a l l ows the C o ns t i t u t i o n
i ts e l f t o l i m i t t h e rights i t g uarantees . 2'" Determ i n i n g t h a t th e epi l og ue o f
the Co ns t i tm i o n ,::>:-;s w h i c h exp l i c i tl y cal l s fo r an am nesty, i s an eq ual part of
the Co nsti mt i o n , the Court upholds the val i d i ty of the Nat i o n a l Reco n c i l i a­
t i o n Ac t .
The South A frican C ou r t t h e n t ur ns co q ue s t i o n s of s co pe v i s-a-v i s i n ter­
n a t i o n a l law. W h i l e t h i s approach conforms to t h i s A r t i c l e 's recom tTl e ndecl
fram ework, the Court's i nternat i o n a l law arg u m e n ts a re c i rc u l ar and i t s con­
c l u s i o ns flawed . Accord i ng to t h e Court :
I n ternati o na l l aw and t h e comems of i n cernaci onal ueat i es to w h i ch
South A fr i ca m ig h t or m i g h t n ot be a party are . . . re levant o n l y i n th e
i nterpretat i on of the Cons t i tu t i o n i ts e l f, o n the gr o un ds t hat th e l aw­
makers of the C o n s t i t u t i o n s h o u l d noc l ig h t l y be pres u m e d to authori ze
2000.
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Sec I ')')G ( S ) G C: L R 1 0 1 5 (CO
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.
. . . ,td Ppc a la w prn·n d i n.� . · il!f<'r :tli, t , lor c h c: ' mtclu n i s m s ,
a m n e s c 1 · s h ,d l be clea ! c w i c h . . . IJ �� 1 -i .
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Haruard International Law Journal I Vol 42
� _7 6
)
any law w h i c h m i g h t co n s c i cute a breac h o f the o b l igat i o n s o f the s tate
i n terms of i nterna t i o na l law. 2�9
The Court clai m s that co ns t i mt i o nal l awmakers can i nfri ng e upon i nter­
n a t i o nal l aw, but t h ey s h o u l d not be eas i ly permi tted to d o so. Yet , the
Court fai l s co dec i de whether a p resum p t i o n agai n s t a breach of i n ternati o nal
l aw should appl y t o a domes t i c law mandated by th e Cons t i t u t i o n . If the
terms of the C ons t i t m i o n s h o u l d not be cas ual ly read co contrad i c t i n terna­
t i o nal law, why i s a domes t i c law exempt fro m s uch a m ore s t ri ng e n t read­
i ng ;; The Court c i tes the C o n s t i t u t i o n i t s e l f for the p roposi t i o n t hat courts
"should have regard to p u b l i c i n ternational l aw appl i cable co the protec t i o n
of r i g h t s e ntrenched i n c h i s C hapter. "29° Ye t , t h e Court argues t hat s uch
scrutiny i s not necessary because th e Consti t u t i o n i tself mandates t h e grant
o f am nesty.
The Courc fa i l s co acknowledge Souch A frica's t reaty or c u s t o mary o b liga­
t i o n s . Even a con s t i t u t i o n a l co urc dec i s i o n does n o t absolve South A fr i c a o f
t hose obl igat ions . The Co ur t ig nores th e Geneva Conve n t i o n s a n d t he i r a d ­
d i t i o nal protocols , noti ng that th e aces i n S o uth A fr i ca were " perpetrated . . .
w i th i n the terri tory of a sovere i g n s tate i n co nsequence of a s t rugg le between
t h e armed forces of that state and o c h e r d is s i d e n t arm ed fo rces . " 2 9 1 The
C our t therefore fi nds th ere co be "no o b ligati o n . .
to ensure the prosecu­
r i o n . "292 A c the very leas t , the Court s hould have considered w h e t h e r Add i ­
t ion al P rotocol I I o b l igates s ra ces to prosecme cr i mes i n n o n - i n ter n a ti o n a l
arm ed con A icts . \X!h i l e it i s t ru e t hat aparth e i d S o uth A frica was n ot party
tO
m os t convent i o ns i m pos i n g a prosecute or extrad i te re q u i re m e nt , 2 'J' w i t h
respect t o genoci de a n d c r i m es agai nst h u mani ty, i t s t i ll bore custom ary l aw
o b l igations . 29 1 B y E1i l i ng
to
c o n s i d e r potential l i m i ts o n the r-...J a t i on a l R ec­
o n c i li a t i o n Act, ch e Court abrogates i ts i n t e r n a t i o nal obl igat i o n s a n d fa i l s to
ful fi l l i ts d ut i e s both to th e i nt e rnati onal com m un i ty and to the c i t i ze n s o f
S ou t h Africa. ·wh i l e t h e Co urt fa i l e d co cak e ful l acc o u nt o f th e ro le o f c h e
c o u n t ry 's i n ternat i onal o b l igat i o n s , i cs actions d e m o n s t rate h o w c h e analy t i ­
cal framework based o n l eg i t i m acy a n d scope developed i n t h i s A n i c l e could
h ave bee n effective and w i l l be appl i cable as a powerful tool fo r ana l y s i s i n
t h e fuc ure .
T h e most rec ent c hal lenge to a tocal ly teg i t i m i zed , Parcial .r\ m nesc y,
w h i c h i s s t i l l o ngoi n g , is t h e j ud i c i a l p roceed i ng s agai nst Geo rge S p e i g h t
and h i s fo l l owers i n F i j i . L i ke th e Azan i a n Peop l e 's O rga n i s a t i on case i n
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o( G t i ] { ) L i d c a n d c h c Ti i r r u r c Curl \. t !l [ [ l ) J l U l1 l l i o ,� wbn
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2001 I Refrmning Impunity
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South A fr ica, th e F i j i a n s i t uati o n s uggest s that domestic courts may appl y a
s t r i c t s tandard of scru t i ny to locall y leg i t i m iz ed, Parti al Im m un i t y t hroug h
a framework s i m i lar to t hat s uggested i n Part I I . W h i l e a fi nal dec i s io n fro m
t he F i j i a n H ig h Cour t i s s t i l l m o n t h s away at the time o f p u b l i cat i o n , pre­
l i m i nary p roceedi ngs have i nvolved h e i g h tened j ud icial scrut i ny and i ncl i ­
cate a s trong l i k e l ihood o f i nval i d at i ng am nesty.
O n J u l y 2 6 , 2 0 0 0 , o n l y two weeks after releas i ng h i s hostages and s 1g n i ng
t he amnesty agreeme n t , Spe i g h t and h i s compatriots were arrested . 295 They
made an i ni t ial appearance i n court i n S uva on August 5 , 2 0 0 0 , c harged
w i t h , inter alicz , " consort i ng w i th people carryi ng fire arms and a m m u n i t io n
between 1 9 May a n d 2 7 J ul y. "29 6 I n t h e p roceed i ngs before C h i ef Mag i s t rate
Salesi Tem o , Assistant Prosecutor Rach el O l u t im ay i m arg ued t hat the am­
nesty " agreement was n ul l and void because th e weapon s h ad n o t been re­
turned and the agreement i ts e l f was s i g ned by [ s i c } m i l i tary u nder d u ­
ress . " 297 B e fore the c h i e f mag i s t rate could ren der a dec i s i o n , t h e c harges
agai n s t Spe igh t were amended to i n c lude treason29::: ' " for i nt e nd i ng to l evy
war' aga i n s t the p res i d e n t . " 2 99 After n u m e rous postponemen t s , J us t i ce Dan­
iel Fatiaki gran ted habeas corpm, remov i ng fro m th e pu rv i ew o f th e m ag is ­
t rate's c o u r t any considerati o n of the val i di t y o f th e amnesty ag ree m e n t , an d
ensuring t ha t " th e q u es t i o n of whether th e I m m u n i ty Decree stands . . . w i l l
b e dec i d ed b y the H ig h Cour t . " o o o
W h i l e the H i g h Court h as yec to rule on Spe i g h t , a test case aga i n s t Isoa
Raceva Karawa , " 1 1 1 one of Spe i g h t 's assoc i ates , bas gone to trial . In the appeal
.2 ') 5 . A lllllt.'!) T!mJII II
0111 . .< llf'r,;
.2 9 6 . R o b i n S u l l 1 v a n .
noce I )8 .
0111 111 f'"r,rce
m
Tahw tu Co;n'!, I 'J D ic P L N D I : N T ( Lo n J o n ) .
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A u g . 5 . .2 0 0 1 1 , ,n ,ulc�IJ/e iii L E X I S , Nc·x i s L i b rary. l nd e p e n d e m ( L o nd o n ) F i l e .
Speight [\ rrin:' 011/J/{Ic Fl;i Co;/1'1, i\C E N C : E F R . P IZ E SS E , r\ u g . 4 , .2 ( ) ( 1 0 , i l l 't ll!aMe a!
.2 9 7 .
L E X IS , Nexis L i b r a ry, Agence Fr. Presse f i l e ; Konrote,
cord s , clm ne s r v w a s c o n ch t i o n a ! o n r h e rc: w r n of a rm s
/
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ro
n o t e 1 5 0 . i\ccord i ng
ro
n otes 1 40- L 5 1 . A s s i S Li n t P rosec u w r R a c h e l O l u t i m a v i m i s a N i ger t a n Iawver ca l l e d
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ru
ass 1 s r P rosec u t or
rhe case S p e 1 g h r a n d h1s associatts arc d e fe n d ed by R a bo ivfareba l u v u , a F i p a n l a w y e r.
Sf't:Jgbt r\rm •t.' Oll!iuk Fi;i Co!lr!, wpra .
2 9 S . Trea son 1s a ctp 1 u l u ffe n s e 1 n F i p , r h o u g h
p e n d e n c e 1 11 I ')7 1 J . See D\·tr, .' llf'r,; n o r e 1 1 1 .
299
the M u a n i kcw t\c ­
t h e F i j i a n A r m y. S e e .\11}'1 '<� text accom pclll v l n g
no
o n e Ius been execmed s i nce F i p ac h i eved I n d e ­
Flji CtJ!l/! P/r,f!cr Sj1eigh! alld Hmdil!lc!J l?u!!d!ldul oll Irun tt!l
, r\c d' N C E F 1 < . P !Z i c S S E . r\ u g . 2 5 .
.2 1 JIJ( ) , lll ilzl<�blc c11 L E X I S , i\itx1s L 1 b rary, A,c; e nce F r. P resst F i l e ( n c m n g c h a r C h i e f M a g 1 s c r a re Tem o d e ­
l ayed a d ec i s t o n u m i l S e p t e m be r -\ . 2 1 l l l l l cu1d r t m a n cled S pe i g h t er a l .
w
r h e i r N u k u l a u I s la n d d ne n ( ! u n
fac i l i r v u n u l r h ;lt C l lll t ) .
) 0 0 . /d. T h e q u e s t i O n of r h c vcd 1 ch r v o f t h e l !lllll ll l1 t r y arose S l !ll u ! t a n to u s l y i n a pcu-a l l e l c a s e a l so he­
fo rt· t h e Htgh C o ur r . R ctceva Kclra\\·a was acq u ! ( r t d tn r h r: 1v!a g l s r ra ( (:·s Courr 1n .J u l y o n c h a r!c-'es o f
s h o o r 1 n!' rwo s o l d i e rs u u r s 1 d e F i ) l .S par l 1 a m e m u n
Met\'
.2 7 , _1 0 1 1 0 . T h t Mag t s r rclre fo u n d h 1 s a c r s ro be
cuvc rccl b\· rhe mHll l! f1 1 t \ g ra n t . T h e Stare r h t n 'l J'pta!td rhe j ud g m e m , ar,c; Ll l ng t ha r rhc l ll l fl1 U ll l r \· WclS
110
l o n,c; t r \· a l 1 d c1s Spu,c: h r hctd n o r m e r r h e rt·q u 1 rc m U 1 r of S L I ITtnck n n g h i s weap o n s . H 1 ,c; l t C u u r r J u s r l ct·
Peen S u rn a m I us vee r o r u k
0 11
w h n h c r n· 1 d e n ce o f r h t a m n esn· I S cl cl m i :; s i b l t , bu r ht· hch m a d e c l e-ar
char " r hc resr cast k1s 1 m p i 1 U l ll lf1S lor a l l u r h e r CISts . . . n a m e h· c ha r uf Spe 1 g h t h 1 m s e l f. r\shc1 La k h a n . Tn t
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� l l I . Karct\\'cl w a s c h a r,c: ccl , i111tr ,;/:<�. w 1 r h r h e ;H l l'fl1 p rtd m u r d e r o f L l t l l l t r Ll!l ( /\sen l<. o k o u t-a. )<lll1l'S
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\
l so,1 lbcn·c1 l<arawa 1 .2 1 1 1 1 0 ) C: r 1 !l1 1 11 a l J u r l :< ch l l i O!l ( h ) l l\b,c: i s r rctrl'·s C o u rr ) ( o n fi l e w i r h 1-L! r\ arcl ! mer-
Harvard International Law}ozmzai I Vol 42
528
p rocee d i ngs befo re t h e c h i ef m ag i strate, Karawa asserted t h e affirmative de­
fense of the I m m u n i ty Decree No . 1 8 of 2 0 0 0 . 3°2 I n repl y, t h e S tate argued
that the defendan t 's act s were not w i t h i n the scope o f the decree a n d re­
quested more t i m e fo r cons ideri ng the scope of the dec ree . 30 1 The m ag is t rate
found t h at
c h i s Court i s commanded by Sec t i o n 3 ( 1 ) and 3 ( 2 ) of t h e I m m u n i t y D e ­
cree No . 1 8 of 2 000 t o d i scontinue t hese proceed i ngs for t hw i t h . T h e
accused i n t hese cases w as act i ng o n t h e d i reC t i on o f George S pe ig h t .
Sec t i o n 3 ( 1 ) above s ay s ' no Court s h a l l e n tertai n a n y proceedi ngs
aga i n s t h i m . ' O n that ground , the accused i s t o be released fo rth w i t h . 104
In a subsequent appea l , h owever, t h e H igh Court took a notabl y d i ffer e n t
approac h , looki ng to t h e scope o f t h e amnesty l aw i ts e l f to q ue s t i o n i ts va­
l i d i ty, rather than merely asking whether the acts o f the accused fel l w i t h i n
t h e decree's scop e . J usc i ce Serman argued that " I cannot accept t h e p ropos i ­
t i o n th a t t h e a l l eged c r i mes o f Attempted Murder and t h e Posse s s i o n o f
F i rearms wi thout l aw fu l excuse can be described a s ' Po l i t i cal O ffences . ' T h i s
would be a d i storted a n d e n t i re l y i nappropriate descrip t i o n . n ; o s A s t h e a m ­
n e s t y only appl i es t o pol i t i ca l o ffences , t h e Court 's find i ng t h a t m urde r can
not be a pol i t ical offence narrows the scope of the am nes ty.
The H i g h Court also q ue s t i ons t h e val i d i t y of t h e law i ts e l f on t h e
grounds that the terms o f th e Muanikau Accord were n o r met and t h e re fore
che am nes ty was never conferred . 3°6 The Court 's i nval idation o f t h e am nesty
s hows that what this Article catego riL:es as Loca l l y Leg i t i m i ze d , Partial I m ­
m un i ty m a y n o t al ways be uphel d .
W h i l e the Karawa tes t case i s certai nl y i m portanc , t h e m o re s i g n i ficant
d e c i s i on w i l l be in t he Speig h t case i tself. I n t h e Spe i g h t cas e, t h e prosecmor
has chal l enged t h e amnesty on t h e grounds that Speight fai led to co mp ly
w i th th e req u i rements fo r amn es ty ag ree m e nt and that t h e amnesty wa s i l ­
leg i t i mate o n i ts face. 10' T h e fi rs t argumem o f non-co mpl iance g i ves t h e
H ig h Cour t legal foor i ng c o s t r i ke clown a Local ly Leg i t i m i zed , Parci a l A m -
n a c i o n a l Law J o u rn a l ) .
) 0 .2 . See Ltgcd S u b m i ss i o n b v c h e Defencb n c , ac _) , S c a c e
_
CcJLl r c )
_) 0 .) .
) 0 -'\
See
Scace's S u b m i ss i o n 1 n Reply, a c 2-3 , S cact
See D i r. of P u b . Pros e c u c i o n s
v.
v.
Y
!sua R aceva Kc1rawa ( F i p M ag i s c ra c e 's
!sua Racc:va Karawa ( F i J i Mag i s crace's Courc).
!sua Raceva K a r a wa ( .2 0 0 0 ) C r i m J il a l Cast N o s . I -'\ 9 .2-9 5 . 5 ( F i j i
Res i d e nc i\-Llg i s c race·s Courc) (on tile w i c h H arvard l nc e rnacronal Law J o u r n <l l l .
_) 0 5 . Scare v . Isoa Raceva KarcJ\\·a ( 2 000) C r i m i n a l Appeal N o . H A ,\ o() l , l I ( F i j i ) ( o n ti le w i c h Hclr­
varcl J mc: rna c i onal Law J o u rn a l ) .
:1 0 6 . The Courc t(.>u ncl c ha c r h e
M u a n r h:au Accord a n d c h c l rn m u n i c y Dcuee clre 1 nex c n ca h h· i 1 11 h· c l .
A rm s and Ord 1 n anct .
n e _l:a r t cl o r n u l l i ties chc I m m u n i t y DL·ncL.
c h c Spc· i t: h c C ro u p ro r c c u rn a l l c he w e a p o n s . . . t h e n .
c h t Cnnd i r i o 1 1 S o f r h e i\ c c u rd a n d w i l l m e a n c h � l'ro,· r s J o n s
/d. a t I I. .
", ( ) 7
_
K o nr( J r l: , .111/"." nmt I '1 9 .
.
.
c h L· Ll d u rt
co
r e c u rn r h e
. I f t h e r e hc1s b e e n a Lu l u n: by
c h i s w i l l 1 n d i c<� r t a tu n d a m c n c a l b reach o t
nf rht
l m m u n 1 c \· D t cr ee w i l l n m o p tr<l t e .
200 1 I Reframing Impunity
529
nesty. The second arg u m e n t , that t h e m i l i tary o n l y s i g ned t h e accord u nder
duress , goes s trai g h t co t h e quest i o n o f do mes ti c legitimacy. '0fi
The H i g h Court appears to b e g i v i ng p r i o r i ty to the quest i o n of l eg i t i ­
macy a n d s hou l d con t i n ue t o d o s o . I n part i c u l ar, i t shoul d c o n t in ue to ask
whether the F i j i a n peopl e would have chosen th e am nesty. A s the Spe i g h t
Case p roceeds , t h e Court s h o u l d a l s o lo o k at th e scope o f t h e l aw, a s J u s t i c e
Serman d i d , 1 09 c o determ i ne n o t j us t whether th e acts o f th e accused fal l
w i th i n the scope of t h e law, b u t also whether t h e scope o f t h e law i ts e l f
comp l ies w i t h F i j i 's i n ternat i on a l l e g a l o b ligat i o n s . Assum i ng t h e H ig h
Court s t r i kes d o w n t h e Spe i g h t amnesty o n grounds of scope a n d l eg i t i macy,
as the test case suggests i t may, i t would s i g nal a t rend away fro m e n fo rc i ng
Loca l l y Leg i t i m i zed , Parci al I m m u n i ty i n domes t i c courts a n d toward a
h i g h e r t h reshold of l eg i t i macy for th e acceptance of am n es ty l eg i s lati o n .
Such a precedent could have far reac h i ng co nsequences for redefi n i ng the
s tandards for domes t i c e n forcemen t o f amnesty legis lat i o n , along l i nes p ro­
posed by t h i s A r t i c l e .
IV. C O N C L U S I O N
Part I created a normati ve l i b eral i n ternati o nal law theory. Th e powerfu l
pote n t i a l o f t h i s t h eory as a model w i th w h i c h c o b u i l d a two -axes fra me­
work for analy s i s comprised of l eg i t i m acy and scope was then d e m o n strated .
, Part II app l i ed t h i s two-axi s fram ework to a n u m b e r of case s t u d i es to cate­
gorize amnesty l eg is l a t i o n and t o determ i ne i ts vali d i ty. Pare I I I , w h i le not­
i ng the i ncons i s te n c i es in j ud i c i al c onsi derat i o ns of amnes ty leg i s l a t i o n , pre­
sented ev i dence of correlat i on between this two-ax i s fra mework and recen t
am n esty dec i s i o n s . T h i s conc l us i o n b r i e fly co n s iders research poss i b i l i t i es .
How d o state o b li g at i o n s l i m i t t h e scope o f amnesty l eg i s l at i o n ! How can
j udges app l y t h i s A r c i cl e 's framework to dete r m i n e the val i d i ty o f s uch leg­
i s l at i o n ;; What i mp l i cat i on s do the recen t trend s in amnesty leg i s la t i o n have
on state sovere i g n ty ?
As noted at t h e o ut s e t , states may face cus tom ary law- an d treaty law­
based obligations to p rosecute certai n c r i m es . ' 1 1 1 These obl i ga t i o ns s erve as a
ce i l i ng for each part i c u lar s tate, l i mi t i ng the scope of any am nesty g ra n t .
W h e re s u c h o b l igations e x i s t , am nes ty laws are fu ndamental l y i nappl i cable.
W h i le certa i n o b l igati o n s to p rosecute ( i n relatio n to , at a m i n i m u m , geno­
c i d e , war c r i m e s , c r i mes agai n s t human i ty, and corcure)1 1
'J U S
l s oa R acn a Karawa, C n m i n al Appeal No. l··l A A ( ) () l of .2 ( )01 ) , ar l l .
\· .
Sec. e.g. , l �; T · I LAw A ss · N , C:O,\L\1 .
110
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Han'ard International Lau '}o11rna! I Vol 42
5 30
a l l s tates t h rough custom ary i ntern ati o na l l aw and are e n s h r i n e d i n c h e
e mergent i n ternational cons c i c u c i o n , m a n y cri mes chat are often c h e s u b j ect
of amnes ty g rams are n ot so c l early w i t h i n t h e scope of this e m erg e n t i n ter­
nat i o n a l co n s c i c uc i onal order. 'd 2 M oreover, many o b l i g at i ons co prosecute are
derived fro m i n ternational t reat i e s , as w e ll as or i ns tead of, cust o m ary i nt e r­
n a ti on a l l aw. I t i s beyon d t h e reach of c h i s A r t i c l e co determ i ne c h e e x c e m o f
state o b l igations c o p rosecute an d t h us t o d e termi ne t h e cei l i ng o n a m ne s t y.
S uc h research would req u i re a carefu l cons i derati o n of che n o r m s of c h e
emerg i ng i n ternati o nal cons c i c m i o n and a speci fic country - b y - co u n t ry re­
view of t reaty-based obl igat i o n s as app l ied t o each state . Even l eav i n g a case­
by-case determ i na c i o n of the compat i b i l i ty of am nesty l aws w i t h s t ate o b l i ­
gati o n s for fut u re s t udy, s i g n i ficant c o n c l u s i o n s h ave a l ready e me rged as co
how each category of am nesty l e g i s l a t i o n m easures up to state o b li g a t i o ns .
B la n ke t A m nes t i e s , w i t h t h e i r extraord i n ar i l y b road scope, d e n y t h e j ud i ­
c i ary c b e pote n c i a l t o prosecu t e , a n d conseq u e nt l y render act u a l pcosecu c i o n
i mposs i b l e fo r cri mes c h a t are gen era l ly regarded a s req u i r i ng p rosec u t i o n
under customary i n ternat i o n a l l aw. T h e en ac t m e n t o f B lan ket A m nes ty leg­
i s l a t i o n in C h i le , A rge n t i na , an d Peru violated t hese customary i n te r n a t i o nal
legal norm s . Q uestions o f l eg i t i m acy as i d e , the i n ternational c o n s t i t u t i o n
i ntervenes to d e n y t h ese a m nesties val i d i ty o n s ubstant i ve gro u n ds . T h e re­
fore , domestic a nd extraterri to rial courts al i ke should i n val i d ate any pans o f
th es e laws exceed i ng the i n t e rnat i o n a l l y authori zed s co pe. P ol i ti c i a n s i n
s cares cons i d e r i ng am nest ies and d rafters o f n ew a m nesty l aws w o uld be wel l
advised to exclude from t h e i r laws c r i mes chat req u i re prosecut i o n u n d er
c usto m ary i n ternat ional law.
W h e t h e r locall y leg i t i m i ze d , Parcial I m m u n i ty and I n te rn a ti o n a l l y le­
g i ti m i zed , Par t i a l I m rTm n i ty conform
co
th e c h e n-prevai l i n g i n te r n a t i o na l
conse n s us d ep end on both a scare's part i c ular o b l i gations and an ad j ud i cacory
body's determ i na c i on of t h e scope o f the a m n es ty. I n order for s u c h a m n e s t i es
co meet i nt ernational o b l i g a c i o n s , the a d j ud i cato ry body can n o t i n c l ud e
genocide, war c r i m e s , cr i mes agai n s t h u m a n i ty, a n d torture . Depen d i ng o n
t h e s ca re's rat i fication of part icular treati es , am n es ty for ocher cri m es , s u c h as
aparth ei d ,
cr i m es
agai n s t
i nt ernationally procectecl
person s ,
a n d g rave
b reaches in n o n - i n t e rn a t io n a l armed c o n fl i c t s , m ay also be pro h i b i te d . Lo­
cal l y legi t i m i zed , Par c i a l I m nw n i c ies cl!1d I n ternat i o n a l l y leg i t i m i zed , Par­
t i al I m m u n i ties w i th m o re res t r i c t i ve scope are m o re l i kely co c o m p l y w i t h
t h e enac t i ng state's i n te rnat i o na l o b ligat i o n s .
I n ternational Co nsc i c m i o n a l Am n e s t i e s , b y d e fi n i c i on , c o n fo r m
to
the
m a nc.laces of t h e i nt ernat i o n a l consci c u t i o n a l order. They exem p t fron1 i m ­
m un i ty cri m es c h a r r h e
S Gl t t
i s o b l igated c o p rosecut e under i n te r n a t i o n a l
l aw. B y spec i fica l l y exc l u d i ng fro rn t h e am n e s c i t s cht mosc seri o u s c r i m es
·"
1 .! .
S u c h c r i m e s l l l l i u d c . it>[ t">:Clll1 p k , ,l: l";i\"t" h rc·c[l"hcs or r il e c;l" l)l'\';1 Coi1\'(; [ J [ i u n s
I ll
f1U i l - 1 1 1 [ l "ri1Ci l l l l 1 1 d l
a r m e d C t l ll l l i cr s . c r i m e s ci,C: ct l lb l J n r e rn cH I U I< : d l v p r"rcncd pnsu n s . c t n d l: ,C:I"l",L: I U LI S U I V i r< l l l ll1 l" I J ca l c r t m c s . Sec
\\' �-:� . 1 . 1 ·: 1z &: Fl i .' [( K I '. - \V i i i T I : . .>!tf> l d 1 1 o r c i · i . ; � r c h . I .
Reframing Imp�tnity
200 1 I
531
req u i r i n g p rosecut i o n under custo mary i nternational law, s tates en s ure t hat
the amnesty l aw s , h owever app l ie d b y the j ud i c i ary, w i l l com p l y w i t h t h e
d ic tates of t h e i nternational c on s ti t utio n a l order. F o r i nstance, s u c h laws
cannot g rant i mpun i ty fo r grave b reaches of t h e Gen eva Conven t i o n s , c r i m es
aga i n s t h u m a n i ty, g enoci de , torture , and other addi t i o nal c r i m es req u i r i ng
prosecut i on . Operati ng w i t h i n t h e rest r i cted scope and h e i g h tened s tandards
of domestic and i n ternational l eg i t i macy o f I n ternati o nal C o ns t i t u t i o nal
I m m u n i ty, states c an balance t h e o b l igat i o n to p rosecute t h e m os t serious
c r i mes w i t h the need to grant amnesty to promote reco n c il i at i o n an d po l i t i ­
cal trans i t i on .
Determ i nati o n s of t h e l eg i t im ac y o f a s tate's gove r n m e n t h ave been c r i t i ­
c i zed as subj ective a n d beyond t h e competency o f t h e j ud i c iary. A d m i tted ly,
the app l i cati o n of t h i s A r t i c l e 's framework depends o n t h e ab i l i ty of j udges
and p o l icy-makers to en gage i n such determ i na t i o n s . W h i l e it is t rue t hat
tests w h i c h look to whether t h e w i l l o f the people i s t h e ul t i m ate source o f a
state's aut hor i t y are s om ewhat subj ective, such an i nq ui ry i s w e l l w i t h i n t h e
realm of j ud i ci a l competency.
Th i s A r t i c l e argues that o n l y I n ternational Cons t i tu t i onal A m nes t i es an d
t he i r c l osest equivalents should be g iv en extraterri torial effect . T h i s A r t i c l e 's
framework , h owever, p rovides flex i bi l i ty to t h e j ud i c i ary of t h e e n fo rc i ng
state to determi n e exac t l y w h e re t h e e n forcemen t l i n e s h o u l d be d rawn .
B o t h d o m e s t i c and i nternational c o n s t i t u t i o n s place l i m i ts o n the scope o f
t h e laws , b u t an e n forci ng j ud i c i ary m a y m ak e i ts o w n d e term i natio ns o f
wha t le v e l of l e g i t i macy i s n e e d e d before an amn es ty w i l l be recog n i zed .
Ad m i ttedly, j udges are rarel y t ra i n ed pol i t i cal s c i e n t i s t s , but they h ave of­
t e n m ad e suc h d eterm i nations of leg i t i macy. For exam p l e , i n Bi
Carbide Chemiw!J and Plcr.1tin,
z ·.
Ullion
the U . S . Court of Appeals fo r the Second C i r­
c u i t add ressed the i ssue of whether to " g ive e ffect to the stat u te of a fo re i g n
gove rn m e n t t h a t p urports t o g r a n t t h a t government exclusive s tan d i ng to
represen t " m as s t or t v i c t i m s . 1 1 ' Such a s tat ut e , w h i c h may d e n y i nd i v i duals
a ri g ht of redress , i s not d is s i m i l ar to an amnesty g ran t . I n d ec l i n i ng the
v i c t i m s ' chal lenge of t h e settle m e n t , t h e Second C i rc u i t reasoned that " I n d i a
i s a d e m o c racy. I rs Cons t i t u t i o n , w h i c h took effect i n 1 9 5 0 , p rovides fo r a
repub l i can fo r m of par l i a m e ntary gove r n m e n t and guarantees the fu ndam e n ­
t a l ri gh t s of t h e people, i nclud i ng e q ual p ro t ec t i o n a n d proced ural d ue proc­
ess . " ' 1 1 As I n d i a " d ec i ded in an act passed by i ts d e m ocrat i c parl iament to
reoresem cxc l u s i v e l v all t he v i c t i m s in a s u i t , " that d e c i s i o n s h o u l d be b o n ,
'
o recl . ' 1 5 I n
Bi,
w h e n t h e court c o n s i d e red whether I n d i a was a d e m oc racy,
whether the act \vas passed by a l eg i t i m at e parl i a m e nt , and w h e ther the act
d e m o n s t rated adherence to the s ca r e s c o n s t i t u t i o n , i t made d e te r m i n atio n s
'
s i m i l ar
ro
;I ;
'·
;I �
1I5
Br
/d.
U
ac
t h ose s u gg ested i n c h i s A rt i c l e . N u m ero us o t h e r c o u rc s h a v e e n -
L n 1 u n Cr r h r d t: Cht· m , c:r l s cu1d P L t s c i cs Co . SIS-\ f'. 1 d S S .' . S S S U d C 1 r. I l) 'J i )
S S C1 .
l-Iaruard lntenwtioual Law)o!trnal I Vol. 42
gaged i n s i m i l ar fact-spec i fic determ i n atio n s o f govemmemal type a nd le­
g! t i macy, especi al ! y in relati o n co
frmmz
non
COJl1)CJliens determi nati o n s ' 1 6 and
asy l u m claims . -1 1 7 Non - U . S . courts have also e ngaged i n s i m i lar dete r m i na­
t i o n s of governmen tal l eg i t i m acy. i i i-: I n m ak i n g such fact-spec i fic and pol i t i ­
cal dete rm i nati o n s , j udges may seek ass i stance fro m the exec u t i ve branc h ,
non-govemmental organi zat i o n s , a n d even po l i t i cal s c i e n t i s t s , t h rough a m i c i
briefs co t h e court o r i n t roduc t i o n 1 n to evidence o f State Depart m e n t docu­
ments and s i m i lar repo rcs . -1 1 9
A complete analys i s of t h e ways courts e ngage q uestions o f l eg i t i m acy o f
foreign govem m e n t s , the sources o n w h ich t hey draw, and t h e resu l tant j u­
risprudence i s a t op i c w e l l worth funher study. For th e purpose o f t h i s A rt i ­
c l e , i t i s suffi c i e n t co s how c hat courts can a n d do make d et e rm i nations
about leg i t imacy, i nd icat i ng chat this A rt i c l e 's frame·w ork can be effectively
m i l i zed .
The appl icati o n of c h i s A r t i c l e 's framework also s uggests c h e poss i b i l i t y of
a trans - j ud icial d i alogue , lead i ng co a co nvergence of norms and prac t i ces i n
t h e e n forcement o f amnesty laws . ' � 1 1 \Y/ hen a court d ecides o n t h e vali d i ty o f
an am nesty l aw u s i ng ch i s framework , i t is s i m u l taneo u s ly c o m m u n i ca t i ng
w i t h courts in other staces . ' 2 1 Such com m un i cat i o n s i g nals co ocher j ud i c i -
_) 1 6 .
Fo r u m
""" "'"' 'ollw.<
cons i d e ra r i o n s vfren I n \· o l n- a dne r m 1 n a r i on o f w h e r her " p la i m i ffs art
obr,l i n bas 1 c j u s r i ct .. i n r h e l '''rcnt i a l l y i nconvt n i e m t(Jr u m . Vaz Gorralh o v . Ktyd r i l
Co . . ()9(i F. 2cl _1 7 9 . .1 9 .1-9 -1 ( 5 r h C i r. 1 9� .1 .L S u c h < i dererrn ' l1 <l r i o n ma\· d e l'end o n d i rtcr pol i r i c a l a n a l vs i s
h i g h l y u n l i keh·
LO
ol- r h t g o v t rn m e n r s 1 11 q u es r i o n . Sec. e.g. , C1 n \'. U S . 1 -1 F 1 d I (, ( ) ( 2 d C.:i r I 09-i ) <exa m i n i ng r h e n a ru rc o f
r h e S o u r h V i e rnamcsc: gon:r n rn e n r , b u r c·\-e n ru a l l y d c· n \· 1 ng rt: l 11 .: f o n p o l i r i c,li q u e,; r i o n g r o u n d s ) ; B h a r n a­
,t; <l r
S ur r e n d r·a 0\·erseas. J.rcl . . � 2 1 1 F S u p l ' · l) ) :' . ') G i l ( [ D . jJ,t l 9 Sl ) ) ( a i 'ti r rn r n g r h c: pror,o s H i o n u f "ck­
Y.
fe r r i n g ro rhe s r a w r c o f a d e ! llOLr <l r i c cou n t ry. .. hut d r s [ l n g u t s h r r< ,c:
M c Do n n e l l Dou,c ;Lts C tx p .
v.
t h t: Llck o f U . S . d i p l o m a t i C
C J !l
,c: ro u n cls o f J•us s r b k j u d i c i a l d t b y ) ;
I s l a m i c RejlU b l i c uf l r<t l l . 7 '5 0 F 2 d -l-\ I . _) '/ (, ( � r h C r r. I C)S 'i ) ( c o ns r d u i n g
r c: l a r l l J n s w i t h I r a n < I n c ! ti n d r n g t h <H ] i [ l g •I r i c l l l 1 11 I ra n w o u l d d e p r i ve r h e
p a m c:s o f r h t i r· " eLl)' 1 11 c u u r r " ) ; A m e r i c a 1 1 B e l l ! me r. I n �.· . v . I s l a rn t c R e p u b l i c o f l r-,t n , -+ 7 4 F.Su p p . - i 2 0 ,
4 2 _) ( S . D N . Y I 9 7 9 ) ( fi nd i n g r h a r r h c: govt: m m c nr of t h e " I s l am i c Rc·j) U b l r c r s x e n o p h o b i c " a n d r h us
wou l d nor honor A m er i c a n con r rans ) ; R a s i y l z,ldeh , ._ i\ssoc i a rcd Press. ) 1 - \ F S u p p . � 5 4 . S o l ( S . D . N . Y.
1 90 1 )
<�){J
1 6 7 F 2 d ')OS ( 2 d C i r. I ')� ) ) (co n s i d u i ng r h e J U S r r c e a\'<l i lablc i n cuu rrs " ad m i ll l srered by
I ra n i a n m u l l a h s . . ) ;
.ret·
I I 2- 1 1 C'>d erl 1 99 6 )
,tf.,o C.\ltY S cm �� . h T J : Jt r, ,\TJ 0 :<,\1 C r \' 1 1 . L n ! C.\TIO:<
1 c-'
U "< I TUl ST.\TLS C o u ltTS
) 1 7 . See. <. g . . M e l e n c l u - r l ores v. I N S . I 6 5 F .1 d 1 ) ( ') r h C i r. 1 9 ':! � 1 ( seek r r l ,C: Srart Dc 1 'arrmcm R t·porrs
[l) j U d g e the p u l i r lC<t! S ! l ll .H ! O il I ll El s,dV<lt. I I J !' ) ; G o n z a l e s - N ena V. I N S , 1 2 2
<llld Freedom H o use R c p o r r s
F. _:; d 1 2 �!.'> . 1 2 l) 5 -9 G ( I ') 9 7 ) ( cu n s r d u i n g r h e po i i r l c;t l S l [ l l <l[ l ( lil 1 11 P e r u <l!lcl bas r ng d t t t f lll l ll•H i o n o r'
<lsy l u m c l a i m oC a P e r u v i <l ll n ;l [ i o n a l 011 <l S r,I re Dt:j•<� r r m u H repc ; r r ) ; i\hza r i cgos
C e ncTa l . 2 0 0 1 \'V L I I '7-P 9 ( l l rh C i r. 2 00 1 ) ( ulll s r clc-ri n g
1 11
v.
Orti c e o f U . S . A r rorn t\'
d e ra i l r h e pol i r i c a l s i r u a r i o n i n G u a re m a L l i n
I 99 i)
.'1 I � - Set'. "-.� · · R c·,c: m<� \'. B u w Srren ;\ I c r r(>po l r c<ln S u p c i l d i a r y il ! ag r s u< � r e .
'l ) I ,A, C:
1 - 1 7 ( 1-!L. _? ( ) ( H i ) ( li. I ( ) ( a n ,d n i ng r h e l'ol r r i cal :; l [ [Ll t l l Jll
1 11
' ·'-·
ju ;'lt'
P i n u c h e r U,t; a r r e i N u .
C:h i k , <� nd n m i n� r h a r r h c Homt'
Secrt:r:;u·;·'s dererm i n a r i o n of rile a pp l i cab i l 1 r \· of P i n oc htt's I m m u n r r\· s h ou l d deptnd i n l'<lrr on \\· h e t lwr.
:,: i n· r 1 the· c u r rc n r go\·un nl l' m . j l! ', r i cc can be dune 1 11 C h r l t J .
) ! ') . S,·e . ,
.� - .
i\ l c nwr<uld u m r·o r r h r· U r l i rccl S ca res S u b m a r·,·cl ru r h c· Corm o i . c\ pj•c-a l s ii H- r h t �;tcor1d
C:: I rC u i r in F i l a r r i ," ''
\.
P c n « - l r<�Ll, rcj!/'/l!!ed i;; J l) ! L. \l
') I l ( ') r h C i r. .2 1 1 1 11 1 ) ( ; w r 1 n ,c: c h <I l r h e
" :; ci c t:
r n c m i>Or<l[cd r n ru c h c rc·cord bv rd.cruKt· " ) .
) :--; � ( I ')i; ( I J : �Ltrri rt,S I'<I n
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I N S . 2 2 9 F 1 d ')l i _) ,
d c l ' "r t n l l' tl t R ,-r,un . i ! h.l t i K ,-\. ;· nlt n i <� n C o u n c ry ll.. q·-orr
[wert]
1 .2 0 . S l a u ,c: l m· r. .< 11/'�'" nore I l l , a r 5 2 i .
12
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_ l o sc:ph \Ve r i e r Ins s r u d r c d < t n d d oc u m c n r n l d1<: p< •'.s r lJ t i l r r cs or· < e l l i n r l'I'- J U Li l c i <d d ! a l u,c: u c· 1 1 1 r h c·
E u ro pean U n i o 1 1 . Sec. c .� . . _j
H . H . \Vt i l n . . ·\ {j11i, ; f.; ,., ,,f;;: ; .,;;: ' {/;, f:';:T•'/',.";;
(ol!i'l o/)11 •11<:
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200 1 I Rejra111ing IllljJIInity
533
aries bow q u e s t i o n s of s i m i l a r l y s i tuated am nesties s h o u l d be dec i ded i n t h e
fu t u re . ' 2 2 T h e re a l s o e x i s t poss i b i l i t i es of j ud i c i a l - l eg i s la t i v e d i a l og ues ,
t h rough w h i c h t h e courts o f e n forci ng states would c o m m u n i cate w i th l eg ­
i s la t u res i n states enac t i ng o r c o n t e rn p la t i n g am nest i e s . T h rough s u c h c o m ­
m u n i ca t i o n , d raft i n g l eg i s lat ures co u l d develop a n u n d e rs t a nd i ng o f j ud i c ia l
reaso n i ng a n d cou l d c o n s t r u c t t h e i r l eg i s l a t i o n co c o m p l y w i t h develop i ng
norm s . These trans- j ud i c i a l a n d j ud i c i a l - l eg is l a t ive d i a l ogues m ay eve n tual ly
l ead co converg e n ce o f standards o n a m nesty scope and l eg i t i m acy. Theore t i ­
cally, w i c h s uch standard s , l e g i s l atures a n d exe c u t i ves wo u l d cease c o e nact
i nv a l i d a m n e s t i e s , as t h ey wou l d k n ow
a
priori
chat such l a\vs would not be
accorded ex traterritorial respe c t a n d w o u l d nor, t h erefore, fur t h e r their goal
o f i m m u n i ty. 1 2 ;
T h i s n o rm a t i ve l i bera l i n t e r n at i o n a l l aw t h eo ry bas i mp o r t a n t i m p l i ca­
t i o ns fo r the evol u t i o n fro m t rad i ti o n al n o t i o ns o f -westpha l i a n scare sover­
e i g n ty. :; 2 1 The res t r i c t i o n s o n a m n e s t y a n d t h e l i m i ts on the scope of poten­
tial i m m u n i ry " e rocl [e} r he c o n t e n t of sovere ignty a n d res t r i c t [ } t h e r i g h t s ,
d e ri ved fro m sovere i g n ty,
chat s ta t es were free c o exerc i s e at h o m e . " 1 2 5 \'Vb i l e
d i l u t i o n o f u n l i m i ted sovere i g n t y i s w e l l d o c u m e n ted , t h i s A n i c l e s uggests
a new i n terpretac i o n . B ased on th i s n o rm m i ve t heory, the e x te n t o f a s t a t e 's
sovere i g my depends , i n part , on t h e l e g i t i nwcy of i ts g ove rn m e n t . S tates
che peop l e 9S the u l t i m at e s o u rce o f g overn m e nt al
d i ffe r e n t degree of s overe i g n t y i n e n ac t i ng c e r ta i n types of
that respect the w i l l of
a m h o r i t y have
a
l eg i s la t io n . \{!b i l e the e n1 e rg e n r i n te r n a t i o n a l c o n s t i t u t i o n res t r i c t s the scope
for the m o s t l eg i c i mme gov e r n m e m s , u nder t h i s
n o rm at i ve t h e o ry, a s t a t e ' s �;overe i g n cll li : h o r i cy i s d i rec t l y co rrelated t o L h e
leg i t i ma c y of i ts gover n m e m .
T h e i rn p l i cat i o n s m a y g o \ve l ! beyond t h e va l i da t i o n o f am n e s t y leg i s la­
c i o n . The e m e rg e n t i nt e r P a t i o n a l c o n s c i ru c i o n , created by the w i ll of t h e
t ra n s n a t i o n a l p o l i cy, p laces o b j ec cive l i m i t s o n t h e behav i or o f a l l sraces . A n
i me r n at i o n a l l y m i nded j ud i c i ary may s o l i d i fy and e nforce c h ese en1 e rg i ng
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