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The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
BRINGING THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION INTO EFFECT
THROUGHOUT THE MIDDLE EAST
ARUNDEL HOUSE, LONDON, 4 AUGUST 2014
WORKSHOP REPORT
In collaboration with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW),
the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) hosted a workshop on ‚Bringing the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) into effect throughout the Middle East‛ on 4 August
2014. Building on Syria’s chemical disarmament, the workshop aimed to stimulate
discussion in the Middle East about the benefits of and prospects for regional
universalization of the CWC and to understand and help to overcome existing obstacles to
adherence by the two remaining regional holdouts: Israel and Egypt.
The CWC
Noting that the workshop was held on the centenary day of Britain’s entry into World War
One - the 'chemists' war, a speaker briefed on the importance and success of the convention.
The CWC is the only multilateral treaty to ban an entire class of weapons of mass
destruction under international verification. Since its entry into force in 1997, more than 82%
of all declared chemical weapons have been verified by the OPCW as destroyed.
The ban against chemical weapons has become a global norm. With the accession of Somalia
and Syria last year, the number of States Parties to the CWC has grown to 190. Today, only
six countries remain outside the treaty: Angola, Egypt, Israel, Myanmar, North Korea and
South Sudan. Two of these - Israel and Myanmar - are signatories. Myanmar and Angola
have publicly indicated their intention to accede to the CWC. The OPCW’s technical
secretariat and certain states are working with both countries to inform the ratification
process, including offering technical assistance to support accession and implementation.
South Sudan is also expected to accede when the situation permits. One participant
suggested that this perhaps could be done via succession to Sudan’s accession.
While achieving universal adherence to the CWC has long been a priority for the OPCW and
its Member States, there has been limited engagement with Israel, Egypt and North Korea
(beyond Israel participating in the annual Conference of States Parties as an observer). None
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of these countries have communicated a change in their position in relation to the CWC, nor
have they sought to take up offers of engagement in OPCW activities.
Syria
Events in Syria reinforced the global consensus against chemical weapons and spiked
interest in the universalization of the treaty. Despite scepticism over the likelihood of
success and troubles along the way, today 100% of Syria’s declared chemical weapons have
been removed and are in the process of being destroyed. The OPCW confirmed that there
was ‘no chance of diversion’ as everything had been inventoried and documented along the
way.
One expert highlighted the failure to hold the Syrian regime accountable for its use of
chemical weapons, notwithstanding the considerable evidence that has been collected.
While establishing accountability need not be a measure of the success of disarmament
efforts, the speaker questioned the utility of extending the ban on chemical weapons if it is
not possible to punish those who are non-compliant.
While some issues remain (including destruction of all production and storage facilities and
verification of the completeness of Syria’s declaration),1 the removal and on-going
destruction of 1,300 tons of chemical weapons – what was once the largest arsenal in the
Middle East – is a significant success, one that was unimaginable less than a year ago.
Today, Syria’s disarmament presents the region with a real opportunity to move closer to
universalization.
Egypt and Israel – the region’s two holdouts
Today, Egypt and Israel are the only two states in the region not bound by the CWC.
Although Israel signed the CWC in 1993, it never ratified it. The Israeli government
discussed it more than once, including most recently at a cabinet meeting in September 2013,
after the US-Russia deal on removal and dismantling of Syria’s chemical weapons, but
decided against ratification at this time. Foreign Ministry spokesman Yigal Palmor said
‘Israel would not ratify the weapons convention as long as other states in the region that
possess chemical weapons refuse to recognize Israel and call for its destruction… The threat
of using chemical weapons against the civilian Israeli population is not theoretical or
distant.’2
How this statement squares with Syria’s agreement to ship out its CW was left unstated,
other than the implicit assumption that Assad would cheat on his declaration. Ongoing
1
Dina Esfandiary, ‘Syria and the removal of chemical weapons’, IISS Voices, 25 June 2014,
http://www.iiss.org/en/iiss%20voices/blogsections/iiss-voices-2014-b4d9/june-4703/syria-and-chemicalweapons-584a
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‘Israel opts to stay vague on chemical arms in wake of Syria disarmament’, Haaretz, 31 October 2013
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/1.555387
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OPCW verification efforts may soon lay this issue to rest. It was noted that Syria’s CW
disarmament means that today, the only other state not party to the CWC in the region,
Egypt, recognises Israel and is not a threat to Tel-Aviv. While questions about the
completeness of Syria’s CW declaration remain, it was argued that the potential retention by
Syria of a few tonnes of such weapons would not present a significant threat. Indeed, the
Israeli government has ceased distributing gas masks.
Tel-Aviv also fears the ‘slippery slope’ effect: accession to the CWC may increase pressure
on it to join all other non-proliferation treaties. Israel is also uncomfortable with the
provision allowing for ‘challenge inspections’ which it fears could be abused to probe
Israel’s nuclear secrets. In addition, Israel may want to maintain the policy of WMDambiguity. Ratifying the CWC entails clarification about past CW activities. Some
participants judged that Israel still maintains CW and that declaring them would trigger
negative domestic and international reactions. Finally, Tel-Aviv wants tangible benefits from
CWC accession, for example, regional discussions on security and both conventional and
non-conventional threats.
Egypt does not argue against CWC accession per se, but insists that it cannot accept any
more non-proliferation obligations until Israel joins the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In the 1990s, following the drafting of the CWC, Egypt promoted
an Arab boycott of the CWC and Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), but today it is
alone in its refusal to accede to them.
No reason to stay out
Several participants argued that today there is no reason for either state to remain outside
the convention. One speaker explained that one of the main reasons for not ratifying the
treaty has been removed: the removal and destruction of Syria's declared stockpile
represents the elimination of a hostile state's WMD capability - one that was conceived and
built as a deterrent against Israel
An Israeli participant explained the government’s fear that ratification of the CWC would
place additional ‘intolerable pressure’ on Israel to accede to other non-proliferation treaties.
But other participants questioned why the pressure would increase; suggesting instead that
ratification would relieve it. Workshop chairman Mark Fitzpatrick wrote afterwards that
acceding to the treaty would ‘help Israel climb out of the public relations hole its military
attacks in Gaza have created in the eyes of much of the world’.3 A European speaker
explained that Israel has already signed the convention, just not ratified it. This commits
Israel not to take any actions that are in contravention to the aims and objectives of the
convention. Any ambiguity that Israel might have wanted to preserve was already lost
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Mark Fitzpatrick, ‘Time for Israel and Egypt to abjure chemical weapons’, IISS Politics and Strategy, 6 August
2014, https://www.iiss.org/en/politics%20and%20strategy/blogsections/2014-d2de/august-bce1/time-forisrael-and-egypt-to-abjure-chemical-weapons-0490
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through its signature. In addition, according to one Israeli speaker, joining the convention
will give Israel ammunition to refute political attacks from its Arab neighbours on its
ambiguous stance on weapons of mass destruction.
Israel has also expressed its discomfort with the challenge inspections provision in the CWC.
Article 9 allows any State Party in doubt about another State Party's compliance to request
the OPCW Director-General to send an inspection team, with no right of refusal.4 The Syrian
experience has shown how intrusive and penetrating inspections can be, and that they could
easily be used for politically motivated reasons against a state. Israel fears that the provision
will be abused and it will be harassed with inspections. One speaker agreed that they were a
‘powerful tool’, but Syria was a unique case, having just used chemical weapons. To date, a
challenge inspection has never been requested. States may have been deterred from
invoking it, lest they will face a challenge inspection in return. According to the same
speaker, ‘experience shows that states joining the convention willingly and in good faith are
treated with respect and in a spirit of co-operation’. The same will apply for Israel.
A European speaker outlined the dilemma that Egypt would be faced with should Israel
accede to the CWC. Today, Egypt has a leading role in the preparatory discussions on a
conference on a Middle East Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction (hereafter WMDfree zone) and it wants the focus to remain on nuclear weapons. After recent events, it is
clear that the overwhelming majority of Middle Eastern states and their people see chemical
weapons as abhorrent. They therefore cannot be used as a bargaining chip in negotiations.
Israeli ratification could provide Egypt with an opportunity and political cover to adjust its
stance and claim at least a partial victory for its linkage policy because Israel would have
eliminated one category of nonconventional weapons and joined the CWC, albeit not the
NPT. According to a European speaker, it is in Egypt’s interest to join the CWC because
pursuing the zone incrementally rather than all at once maximises the likelihood of
achieving it. Although not everyone agreed, it was suggested that this would also maximize
the pressure on Israel to eventually join such a zone.
A European official explained that having Egypt and Israel inside the CWC would
strengthen cooperation on preventing non-state actors from obtaining chemical weapons.
The economic argument for accession to the convention is also important: according to one
speaker, Egypt's new President is keen to revitalise the economy, and Israel will want to
maintain its competitive edge in hi-tech industries, including the chemical industry.
Remaining outside the CWC prohibits any transfers of either schedule 1 or 2 chemicals
involving states parties.
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According to Article 9, paragraph 17, the OPCW’s Executive Council may refuse the challenge inspection (no
later than 12 hours after having received the request) by a three-quarter majority should it judge that the
request was unfounded.
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Finally, the political and reputational cost of remaining outside the treaty needs to be
considered. It is ‘a matter of time’ before Myanmar, Angola and South Sudan join the CWC,
which would leave only Israel and Egypt - alongside North Korea - outside of it. The
removal of Syria’s chemical arsenal delivered an important security dividend to the region,
which prompted Israeli President Shimon Peres to state that Israel should now consider
joining the CWC. Because chemical weapons are not essential to national security, it was
argued that Syria’s accession should be matched to remove any doubts about the status of
chemical weapons in the region.
Next steps
Participants also discussed accession timelines and confidence building measures that both
states could take. If immediate ratification is too difficult, one speaker suggested that both
countries conduct voluntary declarations of all industrial Schedule 2, 3 and other chemical
production facility (OCPF) sites. This would be seen as an initial confidence building
measure and therefore not necessarily comprehensive. This could be followed by voluntarily
declaring Schedule 1 facilities; issuing an Article 10-type statement on CW defence
programmes; issuing a voluntarily report on or passing CWC-compatible implementing
legislation, for example on the export and transfer to, and to prevent the acquisition of
materials and technologies by terrorists; inviting the OPCW technical secretariat to inspect
one site each according to verification annex rules; inviting the technical secretariat to
review lessons learnt from such declarations/visits/inspections series, perhaps leading to
annual visits. One other suggestion was for Israel to conduct ‘mock inspections’ at some of
its facilities to explore the possibility of allowing inspections while preserving sensitive
military secrets. The OPCW is currently conducting similar exercises with Myanmar.
One participant suggested that it might be preferable for Israeli officials to discuss
ratification of the CWC with its neighbours: once Israel signals its willingness to ratify the
CWC, the designated conveners of the Helsinki conference on the WMD-free zone (Russia,
the United Kingdom, and the United States) could begin negotiations with Egypt over its
accession to the treaty. This would be a step towards a WMD-free zone in the region. But
according to one Israeli speaker, simultaneous accession is not necessary. Given that Israel
faces fewer political obstacles to CWC adherence, ratification could instead be unilateral.
One Israeli speaker outlined a three-stage campaign that would encourage Israeli ratification
of the CWC: raising public awareness through the media and ‘making it an issue’, raising
awareness in the Knesset and creating a technical group of experts to think of specific
confidence-building measures and map out threat perceptions to address. Although efforts
would be focused on Israel, much of the process could be mirrored in Egypt and would
ultimately culminate in both countries acceding to the treaty.
Rapporteur: Dina Esfandiary