KLT-40S Reactor Plant for the floating CNPP FPU INTRODUCTION OKBM has participated in realization of reactor plant (RP) designs for nuclear ships since 1954. JSC «Afrikantov OKBM» RP design, manufacture, complete supply Upgrade Creation of marine RPs Author’s supervision during manufacture and operation Lifetime and service time extension Disposal Currently, four generations of RPs have been developed for the civil nuclear fleet. Four generations of marine RPs 2 1 OK-150 2 OK-900 (OK-900A) 3 KLT-40 (KLT-40M, KLT-40S) 4 RITM-200 MARINE RPs Since 1954 JSC “AFRIKANTOV OKBM” IS THE CHIEF DESIGNER OF MARINE RPs FOR THE NUCLEAR ICE-BREAKER FLEET. 9 NUCLEAR ICE-BREAKERS AND THE OCEAN LIGHTER CARRIER “SEVMORPUT” ARE EQUIPPED WITH JSC “AFRIKANTOV OKBM” REACTORS. 20 REACTORS WERE FABRICATED AND OPERATED. THE RUNNING TIME IS MORE THAN 340 REACTOR-YEARS. 6 NUCLEAR ICE-BREAKERS ARE OPERATED. THE ACTUAL LIFE TIME OF THE NUCLER ICE-BREAKER “ARKTIKA” RP IS 177,204 H, THE SERVICE LIFE IS 34 YEARS. SERVICE LIFE EXTENSION UP TO 200,000 H FOR NUCLEAR ICE-BREAKER RPs IS ENSURED. 3 THE WORLD-LARGEST NUCLEAR ICE-BREAKER “50 LET POBEDY” WITH THE ОК-900А RP DESIGNED BY JSC “AFRIKANTOV OKBM” WAS PUT IN COMMISSION ON МARCH 23, 2007 AT MURMANSK OCEAN COMPANY (FSUE “ATOMFLOT”). THE FINAL DESIGN OF THE RITM-200 RP FOR THE UNIVERSAL NEW GENERATION DUALDRAFT NUCLEAR ICE-BREAKER WAS DEVELOPED. FLOATING NPPs ARE A NEW CLASS OF POWER SOURCES AN AUTONOMOUS POWER UNIT IS MOUNTED ON THE NON-SELF-PROPELLED BARGE. IT IS COMPLETELY FABRICATED AT THE SHIPBUILDING YARD. POWER UNIT CONSTRUCTION TIME IS NOT MORE THAN 4 YEARS. THE POWER UNIT IS SUPPLIED TO THE CUSTOMER ON A TURNKEY BASIS AFTER ACCEPTANCE TESTS. IT IS TRANSPORTED TO THE OPERATION SITE BY WATER. THE NUMBER OF OFFSHORE FACILITIES AND REQUIREMENTS FOR THEM ARE MINIMAL. THE POWER UNIT TOTAL SERVICE LIFE IS 40 YEARS. IT IS POSSIBLE TO CHANGE THE POWER UNIT LOCATION SITE. AFTER DECOMMISSIONING ON TERMINATION OF THE SERVICE LIFE, THE FLOATING POWER UNIT (FPU) IS TRANSPORTED TO ITS DISPOSAL SITE PROVIDING RETENTION OF THE “GREEN LAWN” STATE IN THE FLOATING NPP OPERATION AREA. 4 MAIN ENGINEERING CHARACTERISTICS OF FPU TYPE - SMOOTH-DECK NON-SELF-PROPELLED SHIP LENGTH, m WIDTH, m BOARD HEIGHT, m DRAUGHT, m DISPLACEMENT, t FPU SERVICE LIFE, YEARS 6 140,0 30,0 10,0 5,6 21 000 40 EXTERNAL ACTIONS ON THE RP The RP is designed to withstand the external actions, i.e. It withstands rolls and tilts in accordance with the requirements of the Russian Maritime Registry of Shipping. It has the impact resistance of not less than 3 g. The reactor is shut down, and containment is preserved in case of flood, including in case of turnover. The PR withstands the crash of an aircraft with the mass of 10 t from the height of 50 m. 8 KLT-40S RP FLOW DIAGRAM PASSIVE SYSTEM OF EMERGENCY PRESSURE DECREASE IN THE CONTAINMENT (CONDENSATION SYSTEM) PASSIVE EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM (HYDRAULIC ACCUMULATORS) ACTIVE SYSTEM OF LIQUID ABSORBER INJECTION PSCS PASSIVE EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM ACTIVE EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM REACTOR MCP ACTIVE SYSTEM OF EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN COOLING THROUGH PROCESS CONDENSER RECIRCULATION SYSTEM PUMPS STEAM GENERATOR PASSIVE SYSTEM OF EMERGENCY PRESSURE DECREASE IN THE CONTAINMENT (BUBBLING SYSTEM) 9 SYSTEM OF REACTOR CAISSON FILLING WITH WATER METALWATER PROTECTION TANK PRESSURIZER NEWLY INTRODUCED SAFETY SYSTEMS CORE REACTOR AND FA CPS AR Cover Vessel Block of CG control rods Fuel rod 6.8 mm Cavity KLT-40S Cassette Reactor 10 FA BPR CORE REFUELING DIAGRAM Refueling process safety is ensured for all possible initial events, in particular: SFA hanging-up during refueling; Refueling compartment SFA container hanging-up during transportation; SFA and SFA cask falling; Apparatus room refueling equipment deenergization; SFA-storage cooling circuit depressurization; SFA-storage deenergization; etc. Dry storage tanks Storage tank SFA (spent fuel assembly) transportation from the reactor to the storage tank FFA (fresh fuel assembly) cassette transportation to the reactor SFA transportation from the storage tank to the dry storage tank casks 11 MAIN CIRCULATION PUMP PUMP TYPE – CANNED, CENTRIFUGAL, SINGLE-STAGE, VERTICAL WITH TWO-SPEED (TWO-WINDING) MOTOR. RELIABILITY PROVED BY OPERATION EXPERIENCE OF MORE THAN 1500 SHIP MCPs; ELIMINATION OF PRIMARY CIRCUIT LEAKAGES; ELIMINATION OF EXTERNAL SYSTEMS OF THE PUMP AGGREGATE (EXCEPT COOLING): lubrication system of radial-axial bearing and motor; water supply system for seal unit; system of leakage discharge from seal. 12 Parameter Value High/low speed supply, m3/h 870/290 Consumed power, kW 155/11 Rotor rotation speed, synchronous, rpm Head , m Service life, year 3000/1000 38/4 12 STEAM GENERATOR STEAM GENERATOR TYPE – VERTICAL RECUPERATIVE HEAT EXCHANGER WITH COIL HEAT-EXCHANGING SURFACE OF TITANIUM ALLOYS AND FORCED CIRCULATION OF WORKING FLUIDS; MODULAR DESIGN WITH POSSIBILITY OF FLOW-LINE PRODUCTION; AUTOMATED ON-LINE DETECTION OF INER-CIRCUIT LEAKAGES BY SECONDARY CIRCUIT STEAM ACTIVITY REPAIRABILITY WITHOUT OPENING PRIMARY CIRYUT CAVITIES DEPRESSURIZATION CAPACITY AT PRIMARY CIRCUIT LEAKAGE NOT MORE THAN Deq.=40 mm 13 STEAM OUTLET FEEDWATER HEADER STEAM HEADER SG COVER ADAPTER FEEDWATER TUBES PRIMARY CIRCUIT INLET/OUTLET HEAT-EXCHANGING TUBES FEEDWATER INLET SAFETY CONCEPT OF KLT-40S RP The safety concept of the KLT-40S reactor plant is based on modern defence-in-depth principles combined with developed properties of reactor plant self-protection and wide use of passive systems and self-actuating devices; Properties of intrinsic self-protection are intended for power density self- limitation and reactor self-shutdown, limitation of primary coolant pressure and temperature, heating rate, primary circuit depressurization scope and outflow rate, fuel damage scope, maintaining of reactor vessel integrity in severe accidents and form the image of a «passive reactor», resistant for all possible disturbances; The KLT-40S RP design was developed in conformity with Russian laws, norms and rules for ship nuclear power plants and safety principles developed by the world community and reflected in IAEA recommendations. 14 SAFETY LEVELS 5 4 3 1 2 15 1 – FUEL COMPOSITION 2 – FUEL ELEMENT CLADDING 3 – PRIMARY CIRCUIT 4 – RP CONTAINMENT 5 – PROTECTIVE ENCLOSURE SYSTEMS OF REACTOR EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN 4 from CSS System of liquid absorber injection Electromechanical system of reactivity control 1 Reactor 2 CPS drive mechanisms 3 System of liquid absorber injection 4 Electric power circuit-breaker by pressure 16 Electric power circuit-breakers by pressure provide deenergizing of CPS drive mechanisms (reactor shutdown): by pressure increase in the primary circuit by pressure increase in the containment REACTOR EMERGENCY HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEMS 6 1 Reactor 2 Steam generator 3 Main circulation pump 4 Emergency heat removal system 5 Purification and cooling system 6 Process condenser There are two autonomous passive channels for heat removal from the core. Duration of operation without water makeup is for two channels, 24 h; for one channel, 12 h. 17 Hydraulically operated air distributors Opening of pneumaticallydriven valves of ECCS passive channels by primary circuit overpressure (cooldown) EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 4 1 Reactor 2 Steam generator 3 Main circulation pump 4 ECCS hydroaccumulator 5 ECCS tank 6 Recirculation system 4 5 3 2 1 A combination of passive and active core cooling subsystems is utilized in case of PR depressurization (LOCA). ECCS tank capacity is 2×10 m3. GA water volume is 2×4 m3. The time margin in the passive mode before core drainage starts is approximately 3 h. 18 6 SYSTEM OF EMERGENCY PRESSURE DECREASE IN CONTAINMENT The passive emergency pressure decrease system (preservation of safety barrier – containment) consists of two channels. Operation duration – 24 h. At LOCA the steamwater mixture is localized within the containment of the damaged RP 19 Conditioning system blower ANALYSIS OF POSTULATED SEVERE ACCIDENT Reactor vessel Melt volume, m3 Melt surface diameter, m Melt height, m Heat output, MW Core melt Reactor caisson Cooling water supply 20 - 0.885 - 1.918 - 0.471 - 0.79 Results of severe accident preliminary analysis Reactor vessel submelting does not occur; Reliable heat removal is provided from the outer surface of reactor vessel bottom; Reactor mechanical properties are maintained at the level sufficient to ensure load bearing capacity despite appeared temperature difference; Radiation dose for population in case of beyond design accident with severe core damage does not exceed 5 mSv. MELT CONFINEMENT IN KLT-40S RP REACTOR VESSEL ANALYSIS OF HYDROGEN SAFETY IN SEVERE ACCIDENTS Arrangement of hydrogen recombiners (afterburners) in equipment and reactor compartments of KLT-40S RP 21 Conclusions Based on the Results of the FPU Stress Test There are no radiation consequences for the population and environment when a postulated seismic impact on the FPU takes place with the force of 10-12 points at the vertical acceleration to 1.8 m/s2. Additional measures to increase strength, impact resistance of the FPU casing and its internal equipment are not required. Taking of the FPU ashore or grounding of the FPU at the basing point under the impact of tsunami waves does not lead to radiation consequences for the population and environment assuredly for 24 hours. When a postulated event generates with complete deenergization of the FPU and loss of all coastal, backup and emergency sources of electric power there is no depressurization of fuel rod cladding and, as a consequence, there are no radiation consequences for the population and environment assuredly for 24 hours. When a complex postulated event with the complete deenergization + RP accident with melting of FPU reactor cores originate the following takes place: The system assuredly stays deeply subcritical. At an absence of the steam gas mixture flaring up with account of stopping of recombiners, localization of the being-ejected primary coolant and non-condensing gases is provided within the containment, except for leaks through its leakages (1% of containment volume a day) into the space of the FPU protective enclosure. There are no radiation consequences for the population and environment assuredly for 14 hours after the beginning of the RP severe accident with melting of reactor cores. Here, the reactor vessel does not burn through under conditions of external heat removal using the system for filling the reactor caisson with water provided for in the design. 22 RADIATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY PROTECTIVE ACTION PLANNING AREA BUFFER AREA 1 km POPULATION RADIATION DOSE RATE UNDER NORMAL OPERATION CONDITIONS AND DESIGN-BASIS ACCIDENTS DOES NOT EXCEED 0.01% OF NATURAL RADIATION BACKGROUND; NO COMPULSORY EVACUATION PLANNING AREA; THE PERFORMED ANALYSIS OF REFUELING COMPLEX AND REFUELING PROCESS OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS OF FLOATING POWER UNIT REACTORS CONSIDERING ENGINEERING MEANS OF NUCLEAR SAFETY PROVISION SHOWS NO POSSIBILITY OF NUCLEAR OR RADIATION ACCIDENT OCCURRENCE. 23 FLOATING POWER UNIT AT BUILDING BERTH BALTIYSKY ZAVOD, 2009 24 FLOATING POWER UNIT WAS LAUNCHED IN JUNE 2010 25 FLOATING POWER UNIT AT BUILDING BERTH BALTIYSKY ZAVOD, 2010 26 FLOATING POWER UNIT AT BUILDING BERTH BALTIYSKY ZAVOD, JUNE 2010 27 FLOATING POWER UNIT AT BUILDING BERTH BALTIYSKY ZAVOD, JUNE 2010 28 STEAM GENERATOR UNIT 29 STEAM POWER UNIT AT ENGINEERING PLANT 30 STEAM POWER UNIT DELIVERY AT BALTIYSKY ZAVOD 31 Thank you for attention!