KLT-40S Reactor Plant
for the floating CNPP FPU
INTRODUCTION
OKBM has participated in realization of reactor plant (RP) designs for nuclear ships since 1954.
JSC «Afrikantov OKBM»
RP design, manufacture,
complete supply
Upgrade
Creation of marine RPs
Author’s supervision during
manufacture and operation
Lifetime and service time
extension
Disposal
Currently, four generations of RPs have been developed for
the civil nuclear fleet.
Four generations of marine RPs
2
1
OK-150
2
OK-900
(OK-900A)
3
KLT-40
(KLT-40M, KLT-40S)
4
RITM-200
MARINE RPs
Since 1954
JSC “AFRIKANTOV OKBM” IS THE
CHIEF DESIGNER OF MARINE RPs FOR THE NUCLEAR ICE-BREAKER FLEET.
9 NUCLEAR ICE-BREAKERS AND THE OCEAN LIGHTER
CARRIER “SEVMORPUT” ARE EQUIPPED WITH JSC
“AFRIKANTOV OKBM” REACTORS.
20 REACTORS WERE FABRICATED AND OPERATED.
THE RUNNING TIME IS MORE THAN 340 REACTOR-YEARS.
6 NUCLEAR ICE-BREAKERS ARE OPERATED.
THE ACTUAL LIFE TIME OF THE NUCLER ICE-BREAKER
“ARKTIKA” RP IS 177,204 H, THE SERVICE LIFE IS 34 YEARS.
SERVICE LIFE EXTENSION UP TO 200,000 H FOR NUCLEAR
ICE-BREAKER RPs IS ENSURED.
3
THE WORLD-LARGEST NUCLEAR ICE-BREAKER
“50 LET POBEDY” WITH THE ОК-900А RP
DESIGNED BY JSC “AFRIKANTOV OKBM” WAS
PUT IN COMMISSION ON МARCH 23, 2007 AT
MURMANSK OCEAN COMPANY (FSUE
“ATOMFLOT”).
THE FINAL DESIGN OF THE RITM-200 RP FOR
THE UNIVERSAL NEW GENERATION DUALDRAFT NUCLEAR ICE-BREAKER WAS
DEVELOPED.
FLOATING NPPs ARE A NEW CLASS OF POWER SOURCES
AN AUTONOMOUS POWER UNIT IS MOUNTED ON THE NON-SELF-PROPELLED BARGE.
IT IS COMPLETELY FABRICATED AT THE SHIPBUILDING YARD.
POWER UNIT CONSTRUCTION TIME IS NOT MORE THAN 4 YEARS.
THE POWER UNIT IS SUPPLIED TO THE CUSTOMER ON A TURNKEY BASIS AFTER ACCEPTANCE
TESTS.
IT IS TRANSPORTED TO THE OPERATION SITE BY WATER.
THE NUMBER OF OFFSHORE FACILITIES AND REQUIREMENTS FOR THEM ARE MINIMAL.
THE POWER UNIT TOTAL SERVICE LIFE IS 40 YEARS.
IT IS POSSIBLE TO CHANGE THE POWER UNIT LOCATION SITE.
AFTER DECOMMISSIONING ON TERMINATION OF THE SERVICE LIFE, THE FLOATING POWER UNIT
(FPU) IS TRANSPORTED TO ITS DISPOSAL SITE PROVIDING RETENTION OF THE “GREEN LAWN”
STATE IN THE FLOATING NPP OPERATION AREA.
4
MAIN ENGINEERING CHARACTERISTICS OF FPU
TYPE - SMOOTH-DECK NON-SELF-PROPELLED SHIP
LENGTH, m
WIDTH, m
BOARD HEIGHT, m
DRAUGHT, m
DISPLACEMENT, t
FPU SERVICE LIFE, YEARS
6
140,0
30,0
10,0
5,6
21 000
40
EXTERNAL ACTIONS ON THE RP
The RP is designed to withstand the external
actions, i.e.
It withstands rolls and tilts in accordance
with the requirements of the Russian
Maritime Registry of Shipping.
It has the impact resistance of not less
than 3 g.
The reactor is shut down, and
containment is preserved in case of flood,
including in case of turnover.
The PR withstands the crash of an
aircraft with the mass of 10 t from the
height of 50 m.
8
KLT-40S RP FLOW DIAGRAM
PASSIVE SYSTEM OF
EMERGENCY PRESSURE
DECREASE IN THE
CONTAINMENT (CONDENSATION
SYSTEM)
PASSIVE EMERGENCY CORE
COOLING SYSTEM (HYDRAULIC
ACCUMULATORS)
ACTIVE SYSTEM OF
LIQUID ABSORBER
INJECTION
PSCS
PASSIVE EMERGENCY
SHUTDOWN COOLING
SYSTEM
ACTIVE EMERGENCY CORE
COOLING SYSTEM
REACTOR
MCP
ACTIVE SYSTEM OF EMERGENCY
SHUTDOWN COOLING THROUGH
PROCESS CONDENSER
RECIRCULATION SYSTEM PUMPS
STEAM GENERATOR
PASSIVE SYSTEM OF
EMERGENCY PRESSURE
DECREASE IN THE
CONTAINMENT (BUBBLING
SYSTEM)
9
SYSTEM OF REACTOR CAISSON
FILLING WITH WATER
METALWATER
PROTECTION
TANK
PRESSURIZER
NEWLY INTRODUCED
SAFETY SYSTEMS
CORE REACTOR AND FA
CPS AR
Cover
Vessel
Block of CG
control rods
Fuel rod 6.8 mm
Cavity
KLT-40S Cassette
Reactor
10
FA
BPR
CORE REFUELING DIAGRAM
Refueling process safety is ensured for
all possible initial events, in
particular:
SFA hanging-up during refueling;
Refueling
compartment
SFA container hanging-up during
transportation;
SFA and SFA cask falling;
Apparatus
room
refueling equipment deenergization;
SFA-storage cooling circuit
depressurization;
SFA-storage deenergization; etc.
Dry storage tanks
Storage tank
SFA (spent fuel assembly) transportation from the reactor to the storage tank
FFA (fresh fuel assembly) cassette transportation to the reactor
SFA transportation from the storage tank to the dry storage tank casks
11
MAIN CIRCULATION PUMP
PUMP TYPE – CANNED,
CENTRIFUGAL, SINGLE-STAGE,
VERTICAL WITH TWO-SPEED
(TWO-WINDING) MOTOR.
RELIABILITY PROVED BY
OPERATION EXPERIENCE OF
MORE THAN 1500 SHIP MCPs;
ELIMINATION OF PRIMARY
CIRCUIT LEAKAGES;
ELIMINATION OF EXTERNAL
SYSTEMS OF THE PUMP
AGGREGATE (EXCEPT
COOLING):
lubrication system of
radial-axial bearing and
motor;
water supply system for
seal unit;
system of leakage
discharge from seal.
12
Parameter
Value
High/low speed supply, m3/h
870/290
Consumed power, kW
155/11
Rotor rotation speed,
synchronous, rpm
Head , m
Service life, year
3000/1000
38/4
12
STEAM GENERATOR
STEAM GENERATOR TYPE –
VERTICAL RECUPERATIVE
HEAT EXCHANGER WITH COIL
HEAT-EXCHANGING SURFACE
OF TITANIUM ALLOYS AND
FORCED CIRCULATION OF
WORKING FLUIDS;
MODULAR DESIGN WITH
POSSIBILITY OF FLOW-LINE
PRODUCTION;
AUTOMATED ON-LINE
DETECTION OF INER-CIRCUIT
LEAKAGES BY SECONDARY
CIRCUIT STEAM ACTIVITY
REPAIRABILITY WITHOUT
OPENING PRIMARY CIRYUT
CAVITIES
DEPRESSURIZATION CAPACITY
AT PRIMARY CIRCUIT LEAKAGE
NOT MORE THAN Deq.=40 mm
13
STEAM OUTLET
FEEDWATER
HEADER
STEAM HEADER
SG COVER
ADAPTER
FEEDWATER
TUBES
PRIMARY
CIRCUIT
INLET/OUTLET
HEAT-EXCHANGING
TUBES
FEEDWATER
INLET
SAFETY CONCEPT OF KLT-40S RP
The safety concept of the KLT-40S reactor plant is based on modern
defence-in-depth principles combined with developed properties of reactor
plant self-protection and wide use of passive systems and self-actuating
devices;
Properties of intrinsic self-protection are intended for power density self-
limitation and reactor self-shutdown, limitation of primary coolant pressure
and temperature, heating rate, primary circuit depressurization scope and
outflow rate, fuel damage scope, maintaining of reactor vessel integrity in
severe accidents and form the image of a «passive reactor», resistant for all
possible disturbances;
The KLT-40S RP design was developed in conformity with Russian laws,
norms and rules for ship nuclear power plants and safety principles
developed by the world community and reflected in IAEA recommendations.
14
SAFETY LEVELS
5
4
3
1
2
15
1 – FUEL COMPOSITION
2 – FUEL ELEMENT CLADDING
3 – PRIMARY CIRCUIT
4 – RP CONTAINMENT
5 – PROTECTIVE ENCLOSURE
SYSTEMS OF REACTOR EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN
4
from CSS
System of liquid
absorber injection
Electromechanical
system of reactivity
control
1 Reactor
2 CPS drive mechanisms
3 System of liquid absorber injection
4 Electric power circuit-breaker by pressure
16
Electric power circuit-breakers
by pressure provide deenergizing of CPS drive
mechanisms (reactor
shutdown):
by pressure increase in the
primary circuit
by pressure increase in the
containment
REACTOR EMERGENCY HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEMS
6
1 Reactor
2 Steam generator
3 Main circulation pump
4 Emergency heat removal
system
5 Purification and cooling
system
6 Process condenser
There are two autonomous passive channels for heat
removal from the core.
Duration of operation without water makeup is
for two channels, 24 h;
for one channel, 12 h.
17
Hydraulically
operated air
distributors
Opening of
pneumaticallydriven valves
of ECCS
passive
channels by
primary circuit
overpressure
(cooldown)
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS
4
1 Reactor
2 Steam generator
3 Main circulation pump
4 ECCS hydroaccumulator
5 ECCS tank
6 Recirculation system
4
5
3
2
1
A combination of passive and active core cooling subsystems is utilized in case of PR
depressurization (LOCA).
ECCS tank capacity is 2×10 m3.
GA water volume is 2×4 m3.
The time margin in the passive mode before core drainage starts is approximately 3 h.
18
6
SYSTEM OF EMERGENCY PRESSURE DECREASE IN
CONTAINMENT
The passive
emergency pressure
decrease system
(preservation of
safety barrier –
containment)
consists of two
channels.
Operation duration –
24 h.
At LOCA the steamwater mixture is
localized within the
containment of the
damaged RP
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Conditioning system
blower
ANALYSIS OF POSTULATED SEVERE ACCIDENT
Reactor
vessel
Melt volume, m3
Melt surface diameter, m
Melt height, m
Heat output, MW
Core melt
Reactor
caisson
Cooling water
supply
20
- 0.885
- 1.918
- 0.471
- 0.79
Results of severe accident preliminary
analysis
Reactor vessel submelting does not
occur;
Reliable heat removal is provided from
the outer surface of reactor vessel
bottom;
Reactor mechanical properties are
maintained at the level sufficient to
ensure load bearing capacity despite
appeared temperature difference;
Radiation dose for population in case
of beyond design accident with severe
core damage does not exceed 5 mSv.
MELT CONFINEMENT IN KLT-40S RP REACTOR VESSEL
ANALYSIS OF HYDROGEN SAFETY IN SEVERE ACCIDENTS
Arrangement of hydrogen
recombiners (afterburners) in
equipment and reactor
compartments of KLT-40S RP
21
Conclusions Based on the Results of the FPU Stress Test
There are no radiation consequences for the population and environment when a postulated seismic impact on the FPU
takes place with the force of 10-12 points at the vertical acceleration to 1.8 m/s2. Additional measures to increase strength,
impact resistance of the FPU casing and its internal equipment are not required.
Taking of the FPU ashore or grounding of the FPU at the basing point under the impact of tsunami waves does not lead
to radiation consequences for the population and environment assuredly for 24 hours.
When a postulated event generates with complete deenergization of the FPU and loss of all coastal, backup and
emergency sources of electric power there is no depressurization of fuel rod cladding and, as a consequence, there are no
radiation consequences for the population and environment assuredly for 24 hours.
When a complex postulated event with the complete deenergization + RP accident with melting of FPU reactor cores
originate the following takes place:
The system assuredly stays deeply subcritical.
At an absence of the steam gas mixture flaring up with account of stopping of recombiners, localization of
the being-ejected primary coolant and non-condensing gases is provided within the containment, except for
leaks through its leakages (1% of containment volume a day) into the space of the FPU protective enclosure.
There are no radiation consequences for the population and environment assuredly for 14 hours after the
beginning of the RP severe accident with melting of reactor cores. Here, the reactor vessel does not burn
through under conditions of external heat removal using the system for filling the reactor caisson with water
provided for in the design.
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RADIATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY
PROTECTIVE ACTION
PLANNING AREA
BUFFER
AREA
1 km
POPULATION RADIATION DOSE RATE UNDER NORMAL OPERATION CONDITIONS AND DESIGN-BASIS
ACCIDENTS DOES NOT EXCEED 0.01% OF NATURAL RADIATION BACKGROUND;
NO COMPULSORY EVACUATION PLANNING AREA;
THE PERFORMED ANALYSIS OF REFUELING COMPLEX AND REFUELING PROCESS OF NUCLEAR
POWER PLANTS OF FLOATING POWER UNIT REACTORS CONSIDERING ENGINEERING MEANS OF
NUCLEAR SAFETY PROVISION SHOWS NO POSSIBILITY OF NUCLEAR OR RADIATION ACCIDENT
OCCURRENCE.
23
FLOATING POWER UNIT AT BUILDING BERTH
BALTIYSKY ZAVOD, 2009
24
FLOATING POWER UNIT WAS LAUNCHED IN JUNE 2010
25
FLOATING POWER UNIT AT BUILDING BERTH
BALTIYSKY ZAVOD, 2010
26
FLOATING POWER UNIT AT BUILDING BERTH
BALTIYSKY ZAVOD, JUNE 2010
27
FLOATING POWER UNIT AT BUILDING BERTH
BALTIYSKY ZAVOD, JUNE 2010
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STEAM GENERATOR UNIT
29
STEAM POWER UNIT AT ENGINEERING PLANT
30
STEAM POWER UNIT
DELIVERY AT BALTIYSKY ZAVOD
31
Thank you for attention!