The Roots of Public Attitudes toward State Accommodation of European Muslims' Religious
Practices before and after September 11
Author(s): Joel S. Fetzer and J. Christopher Soper
Source: Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, Vol. 42, No. 2 (Jun., 2003), pp. 247-258
Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of Society for the Scientific Study of Religion
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1387840
Accessed: 27/09/2010 04:29
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=black.
Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Society for the Scientific Study of Religion and Blackwell Publishing are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,
preserve and extend access to Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion.
http://www.jstor.org
The Roots of Public Attitudes Toward State
Accommodation of European Muslims' Religious
Practices Before and After September 11
JOEL S. FETZER
J. CHRISTOPHER SOPER
More thannine millionMuslimscurrentlylive in WesternEurope,whichmakesthemthe largest religiousminority
in the region.Therehas been significantpoliticalcontroversyin variousEuropeanstates over howbest to recognize
Muslims'religious rights. Thesequestionshave become even moresignificantand contentiousin the aftermathof
the September11 attacksby Islamic extremists.Using privately commissionedpolls on attitudestowardMuslim
religious rights taken before and after September11 in Britain, France, and Germany,this article determines
the extent of popular opposition to state accommodationof Muslimpractices and tests several leading theories
of attitudestowardMuslims. Weconclude that the most importantdeterminantsof attitudestowardMuslimsare
educationand religiouspractice.
May I suggest thatthe last thing our society needs at this momentis more schools segregatedby religion?Before
11 September,it looked like a bad idea; it now looks like a mad idea.
TonyWright(House of Commons2001)
My country,France,my fatherland,is once againbeing invaded,with the blessing of our successive governments,
by an excessive influxof foreigners,notablyMuslims,to which we aregiving our allegiance.... Fromyearto year
we see mosques sproutingup prettymuch everywherein France,while churchbells are becoming silent because
of a lack of priests.
Frenchactressandanimal-rightsadvocateBrigitteBardot(AgenceFrancePresse 1996)
I see that Islam can representan enrichmentfor social life. I think it could representan even greaterenrichment
if people approachedit with a more open mind. ... People just want to have theirprejudicesconfirmed.No one
is ready,really to listen or in any way to thinka little differently.... Especially on the topic "Womenand Islam,"
Islam is reducedto the hijab,polygamy,and inheritancelaw.
Maryam,a 37-year-oldGermanconvertto Islam(Biehl andKabak1999:108)
In functioning democracies, political elites ignore mass opinion at their electoral peril. The
political appeal of such anti-immigrant-or even anti-Muslim-political parties as the British
National Party, the French Front National, and the Dutch List Pim Fortuyn appears to have led
governing parties to adopt harsher measures toward immigrants, most of whom are Muslims.
Rather than be thrown out of office by anti-Muslim voters, mainstream politicians prefer to adopt
moderate versions of the anti-immigrant or anti-Muslim platforms advocated by the extreme right
(Geddes 2002). Popular fear of Muslims intensified in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks
and subsequent arrests by European governments of Islamic extremists.
European states have long struggled with how best to integrate Muslim immigrants into
historically Christian societies (Nielsen 1999; Ramadan 1999). Although states vary in the extent
to which they foster Muslim religious activities, popular antipathy to Islam sometimes limits their
policy options. Determining the extent of opposition to state accommodation of Muslim religious
Joel S. Fetzeris AssistantProfessorof Political Science at PepperdineUniversity,24255 Pacific Coast Highway,Malibu,
CA 90263. E-mail:joel.fetzer@pepperdine.edu
J. ChristopherSoper is Professor of Political Science at PepperdineUniversity,24255 Pacific Coast Highway,Malibu,
CA 90263. E-mail: chris.soper@pepperdine.edu
Journalfor the ScientificStudyof Religion 42:2 (2003) 247-258
248
JOURNALFOR THE SCIENTIFICSTUDY OF RELIGION
practicesand isolatingthe causes of such hostilityhave thus become all the more criticalto West
Europeanpolitics.
Many scholarshave studied Europeans'attitudestowardimmigrationpolicy (e.g., Hoskin
1991; Fetzer2000). Veryfew micro-leveldataon public views of Muslims' religiousrights even
exist, however, and methodologicallysophisticated,cross-nationalanalysis of mass-level attitudes towardMuslims is virtuallynonexistent.Following a brief descriptionof overallEuropean
attitudestowardstate accommodationof Muslim practices,we thereforeintendto close this gap
in the literatureby conductinga mulitivariateanalysis of our privatelycommissionedpolls on
Muslim rights and of several related surveys. Because Britain, France, and Germanyhave the
largestMuslim populations,we focus on these threecountriesin our surveysand analysis.
DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
To measure public supportfor state accommodationof Muslims' religious practices, respondentsin our three-nation,two-wave survey (Roper Europe2001, 2002) were asked policy
questions specific to their country.Ideally,we would have used a common question in the three
countriesto makethe responsesperfectlycomparable.However,policy debateon stateaccommodationof Muslims' religiousrightsvariesin the threenations.The issue at the forefrontof debate
in Britainis state aid to separateIslamic schools (Dwyer and Meyer 1995). Fordecades,the state
has financedthousandsof Anglican and Catholic schools and dozens of Jewish ones. Muslims
arguethatthe state,which currentlyfundsonly a handfulof Islamicschools, shouldprovideaid to
theirinstitutionsunderthe same conditions.This issue is not even on the agendain France,where
the most controversialissue has been students'wearingof the hijabin stateschools. Muslimgirls
have been excludedfrom state schools for refusingto removethe Muslim head-covering,and the
issue remainsa political flashpoint(Zouari2002). In Germany,the most debatedissue has been
whetherto include instructionabout Islam in state schools. Although schools in some Lander
providesuch publicly fundedreligious instruction(Pfaff 2000), othersdo not.
In Britain, participantsin our poll were surveyed about whether the governmentshould
(1) approvefundingfor moreIslamicschools (labeled"expand"in Figure 1), (2) limit its approval
to those currentlypermitted(labeled "statusquo"),or (3) cancel its approval("restrict").French
intervieweesindicatedwhether(1) wearingthe hijab should always be allowed in state schools
("expand"),(2) shouldbe allowed only duringschool breaksandotherrecreationaltimes ("status
quo"), or (3) should never be allowed ("restrict").In Germany,respondentsstated that state
schools should (1) provideinstructionin Islam for every Muslim studentwho wishes to have it
("expand"),(2) providesuch instructiononly whereMuslim studentsmakeup a largeproportion
of the school ("statusquo"),or (3) neverprovidesuch classes ("restrict").
As Figure 1 indicates, public attitudestoward state accommodationof Muslim religious
practicesdiffer significantlyin the threecountries.Frenchrespondentsare far less likely to support an expansivepolicy (17 percent)than are their British (32 percent)or Germancounterparts
(62 percent).It is also interestingto note that in none of the countriesdid a majorityof the respondentssupportthe policy statusquo, which furtherindicatesthatissues surroundingMuslims'
religious rights are both unsettledand contentiousin each of the countries.Two other relevant
polls generallymirrorour results.The 1995 SOFRESFrenchNationalElection Study included
an item on whetherit was "normal"for "Muslimsliving in France"to have "mosquesto practice
their religion" (Boy and Mayer 1997:Annexe4). Nearly half (43 percent) of the respondents
disagreedwith this statement.The 1996 GermanSocial Survey(ALLBUS 1996) likewise asked
respondentstheirviews aboutincludingIslam in religion classes in the state schools. A plurality
(40.3 percent)of West Germanintervieweesbelieved that such instructionshould be provided,
33.3 percentheld thatonly Christianityshouldbe taught,and26.5 percentmaintainedthatreligion
classes should be abolishedaltogether.
11
OFMUSLIM
PRACTICES
BEFORE
ANDAFTER
ACCOMMODATION
SEPTEMBER
249
FIGURE 1
PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR STATEACCOMMODATIONOF KEY MUSLIM RELIGIOUS
DEMANDS IN BRITAIN, FRANCE, AND GERMANY
7060 5040
302010-
f
0
France:hijab Germany:instruction
Britain:schools
%statusquo
%expand
3 %restrict
TOTHEPOLITICAL
ACCOMMODATION
OFOPPOSITION
THEORIES
PRACTICES
OFMUSLIMRELIGIOUS
No one theory specifically attemptsto explain public attitudestowardstate accommodation
of Muslim religious practices. There are, however, a numberof more general explanationsof
political behaviorthatmay be appliedto our inquiry.
Status as Religious Majority/Minority
One theorythatseems particularlyrelevantto ourstudyis thatof statuspolitics, developedby
SeymourMartinLipset.Lipset(1981; see also Gusfield1963) arguesthatstatusdistinctionsbased
on religion are often the basis for the political divisions in a society. The majorityreligion, often
with the supportof the state, subjectsminorityreligions to varioustypes of social and political
discrimination.Minority groups respond by forming movements of religious defense, thereby
bringingreligious cleavages to the centerof partisanshipand political debate.
Statepolicy in Britain,France,andGermanymay advantagesome churchesanddisadvantage
Muslims and some otherreligious minoritiesin variousways. Mass public attitudestowardstate
accommodationof Muslim religious practicesmight reflect those policy choices. If this theory
is correct, a person's religious identificationshould determineher or his attitude toward the
politicalquestionof whetherthe stateshouldaccommodateMuslimreligiouspractices.Religious
minoritieswould favor an extension of state benefits to include Muslims, while membersof the
religious majoritywould oppose any furtheraccommodationof Muslims' religious practices.
DuncanMacpherson(1997:110) has hypothesizedaboutsuch a mobilizationamongreligious
minoritiesin Britain.He suggests thatthe situationin which BritishMuslims find themselves at
the end of the 20th century is in many ways analogous to the social and political position of
RomanCatholicsin the last three-quartersof the 19thcentury.Given thatthey share"analogous
experiences of exclusion and discrimination,of popularhostility and of intellectualdisdain,"it
is quite possible that Muslims and Roman Catholics in Britain would join forces for political
purposes.
As Table 1 indicates, the religious majorities in the three countries are Church of
England(Britain),RomanCatholic(France),andLutheranor ReformedProtestant(Evangelische;
Germany).Prominentreligious minorities,on the other hand, include Jews, Hindus, Muslims,
JOURNALFOR THE SCIENTIFICSTUDY OF RELIGION
250
TABLE 1
RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION IN BRITAIN, FRANCE,
AND GERMANY
Responses (%)
Britain
Churchof England
Catholic
Lutheranor ReformedProtestant
Evangelical,Born-Again,or Free-ChurchProtestant
Methodist
Baptist
Muslim
Jewish
Hindu
Buddhist
Other
No religion
n
51.9
10.8
2.2
2.5
3.1
1.3
2.3
1.0
1.2
4.7
19.0
872
France
Germany
66.5
1.9
32.6
39.8
0.2
3.5
0.6
0.8
0.2
1.4
26.1
976
1.5
25.1
959
Source:RoperEurope(2001).
Note: Data weighted by demographiccharacteristics.Smaller religious groups may have
in this sample (e.g., Muslims and Jews in Germany).
been underrepresented
Buddhists, Baptists, Methodists, British and German Catholics, French Protestants, and British
evangelical or German "free-church" Protestants.
As Table 2 suggests, public opinion data do not generally support this religious majority/
minority theory. With the obvious exception of Muslims, religious minorities did not usually
support the expansion of Islam in the schools. Conversely, our results do not confirm the hypothesis
that the religious majority is significantly more hostile to such expansion.
The German sample in Table 3 echoes our results in Table 2; religious minorities showed no
more support for Islamic instruction in state schools than did the majority.1 In France, by contrast,
Jews (b = 1.784, p < 0.10) and members of "other religions" (b = 1.373, p < 0.05) did support
Muslims' right to build mosques.
Perhaps this slight difference in results between Tables 2 and 3 stems from the different
policies proposed. State funding for Islamic schools, Islamic instruction in state schools, or even
allowing the wearing of the hijab in public schools may all be plausibly viewed as state support
for religion. Permission to build a mosque, on the other hand, does not imply state sponsorship of
Islam. Religious minorities may be more likely to exhibit solidarity with one another on questions
of religious liberty than on policies requiring explicit state encouragement.
Solidarity of the Religious
Several other theories examine the effects of secularization on political behavior. Theories of
culture wars (Hunter 1991), value conflict (Leege and Kellstedt 1993), and culture shift (Inglehart
1990) similarly claim that secularization undermines the political role of religion and poses a
threat to religious groups who advocate religiously based public policy. The electoral impact has
been a shift from political cleavages based on class to those based on lifestyle concerns. The
result, particularly in the United States, has been political conflict around such cultural issues as
abortion, gay rights, and the place of religion in public schools. The religious and political divide
is not, however, between majority and minority faiths but rather between orthodox religionists of
ACCOMMODATIONOF MUSLIMPRACTICESBEFOREAND AFTER SEPTEMBER11
DETERMINANTS
TABLE 2
OF SUPPORT FOR ISLAM IN THE SCHOOLS IN BRITAIN,
FRANCE, AND GERMANY
Britain
Catholic
Lutheranor ReformedProtestant
Evangelical,Born-Again,or Free-ChurchProtestant
Baptist,Methodist,or otherProtestant
Muslim
Hindu,Jewish, Buddhist,or otherReligion
No religion
Low supportfor church-statestructure
Medium supportfor church-statestructure
Female
Class
A (uppermiddle)
B (middle)
C1 (lower middle)
C2 (skilled working)
D (working)
Income
Bac/Abitur
Higheruniversitydegree
Age
Children
Constant,restrictIslam in schools
Constant,maintainstatusquo of Islam in schools
n
pseudo R2
X2
df
251
France
0.229
Germany
0.104
0.058
0.865*
-0.094
2.537**
-0.242
-0.047
-0.771**
-0.459*
0.393
0.833**
-0.202
0.126
-0.134
-0.871
0.168
0.107
-0.397
-0.030
0.151
0.150
0.204
-0.176
0.044
-0.074
-0.341
-0.529*
-0.414
-0.297
-0.124
0.476
-0.130
0.192
0.737
0.017**
-0.071
-2.591**
-0.254
695
0.111
70.612**
16
0.048
0.120
0.386*
0.023**
-0.067
-1.737**
0.440
811
0.065
47.097**
16
0.065
0.429**
0.039
0.027**
-0.317
-2.929**
-1.105
738
0.086
54.720**
17
-0.537
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05.
Source:RoperEurope(2001).
Note: Estimatesare orderedlogit coefficients. Data weighted by demographiccharacteristics.
varioustraditions,who are culturallyconservative,and secularistsor religious liberals, who are
culturallyliberal (Wuthnow1988).
Giventhatlargepercentagesof thepopulationin eachof thethreecountriesin oursurveyclaim
to have no religion (19 percentin England,26 percentin France,and 25 percentin Germany),
secularismhas clearly had an impact on the region. Religiously orthodoxelites are becoming
increasinglyawarethat secularismthreatenstheirsocial andpolitical identities.TariqModood, a
BritishMuslim,notes that"therealdivisionof opinionis notbetweena conservativeelementin the
Churchof Englandversusthe rest of the country,butbetweenthose who thinkreligionhas a place
in secularpubliccultureandthose who thinknot"(Modood 1994:72). Similarly,Leslie Newbigin,
a BritishChristian,asserts"inourpresentsituationin Britain,whereChristiansandMuslimsshare
a commonpositionas minorityfaithsin a society dominatedby the naturalisticideology, we share
a common duty to challenge this ideology" (Newbigin, Sanneh,and Taylor1998:22).
If these theories are correct,the data should show a political coalition of secularistson the
one hand and orthodoxreligionists on the other.Arguing thatreligion should be purely private,
252
JOURNALFOR THE SCIENTIFICSTUDY OF RELIGION
TABLE 3
DETERMINANTS OF SUPPORT FOR MUSLIM
RELIGIOUS PRACTICES IN FRANCE
AND GERMANY
France
Catholic
Active
Nominal
Protestant
Active
Free-ChurchProtestant
OtherChristian
Muslim
Jewish
Otherreligion
No religion
Female
Professional/managerial
Manuallaborer
Nonpaidworker
Income
Bac/Abitur
Higheruniversitydegree
Age
Constant
n
pseudo R2
X2
df
0.484**
Germany
0.066
0.192
0.089
-0.342
-0.545
-0.590
6.225
1.784*
1.373**
0.252**
-0.123*
0.215
-0.166
0.003
0.068**
0.730**
0.851**
0.011**
-0.963**
3,617
0.123
346.5**
14
2.072**
0.463**
0.441**
0.420**
0.140
0.067
0.038
0.354
-0.104
-0.021**
0.103
1,305
0.122
125.1**
15
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05.
Source: 1995 SOFRES French National Election Study (France)
and 1996 ALLBUS (Germany).
Note: Estimates are dichotomous logit coefficients. French data
weightedby demographiccharacteristics.
secularists should oppose the state accommodating Muslim religious practices. Religionists, on
the other hand, ought to support Muslims out of a common conviction that the state should make
room for the public expression of religious values.
The results for secularists ("No Religion") in Tables 2 and 3 fail to support this theory,
however. Nowhere were secularists more likely than the majority religious group to oppose state
accommodation of Muslims' religious practices. In none of the three countries in our survey did
the No Religion variable achieve statistical significance (see Table 2). In Table 3, moreover, being
a secularist appears to have increased support for Muslims' practices (b = 0.252, p < 0.05 for
France; b = 0.463, p < 0.05 for Germany).
Data from practicing or orthodox religionists, on the other hand, provide mixed support for
this theory. In Britain, born-again Protestants, who are very likely to be religiously orthodox, did
disproportionately agree with the expansion of faith-based schools to include Muslims (b = 0.865,
p < 0.10; see Table 2). Practicing Catholics in France likewise defended Muslims' right to build
mosques (b = 0.484, p < 0.05; see Table 3). In Germany, by contrast, variables for Catholics
ACCOMMODATIONOF MUSLIMPRACTICESBEFOREAND AFTER SEPTEMBER11
253
or EvangelischeProtestantswho regularlyattendreligious services and free-churchProtestants,
who are likely orthodox,all failed to producestatisticallysignificantresults.
The data,in short,do tend to confirmthe view that orthodoxreligionistshavejoined forces.
It is too early to tell if this centripetaltendencyrepresentsthe beginningsof the kind of political
coalition of religious defense that Europe has seen in the past (Kalyvas 1996; Gould 1999).
Secularists,however,do not appearto be rallyingagainstIslam.Perhapsthey do not view orthodox
religion as enough of a political threatagainstwhich to mobilize.
Gender
Genderis anotherfactorthatmight help to explainpublic attitudestowardstateaccommodation of Muslim religiouspracticesin WesternEurope.Fromthe standpointof some feminists,the
Islamicfaithoppresseswomen in variousways. They claim thatcertainpassagesfromthe Qur'an
teachthe inferiorityof women, thatIslamiclaws of inheritance,marriage,anddivorcefavormales
over females, thatpracticesin some Muslim countriesoppresswomen, and thatpatriarchalpressures and assumptionsforce Islamic women in Westerncountriesinto traditionalgender roles.
AlthoughFrenchfeministElizabethAltschull,for example,believes that"all religions have their
oppressiveaspects towardwomen," she neverthelessconcludes that "none [but Islam] has gone
so far, is as systematic,or is as explicit aboutthe inferiorstatusof women, [a status]willed and
createdby God"(1995:200). GermanscholarUrsulaSpuler-Stegemannlikewise labels the Shi'ah
practiceof "temporarymarriage"(mut'ah)as "religiouslylegitimatedprostitution"(1998:19394). Sallah EddineBen Abid (2000:13) acknowledgesthattherehas indeed been a revivalin the
practiceof such marriages"incertainMuslim communitieswhich have immigratedinto Europe"
(see also Heine 1997:204-05). What is beyond dispute is that the role of women in Islam is a
highly contestedissue in WesternEurope.
Accordingto gendertheory,public accommodationof Islam reinforcessexist models about
the properrole of women. To the extent thatIslam oppresseswomen, feminists would claim, the
state should not actively promote this faith by encouragingseparateIslamic schools (Britain),
allowing Muslim girls to wear the hijab (France), or teaching about the faith in state schools
(Germany).If this theoryholds, women in the surveysshouldthereforedisproportionatelyoppose
these policies.
The datado not generallysupportthistheory.No female variablein Table2 achievesstatistical
significance, and in the GermanALLBUS sample (see Table 3), women are significantlymore
supportiveof Islamicinstruction(b = 0.441, p < 0.05). The only resultconfirminggendertheory
is thatfor women in the FrenchNationalElection Study,who are more likely to oppose mosque
building(b = -0.123, p < 0.10).
Whatexplainsthefactthatwomenareno morelikely thanmento oppose stateaccommodation
of Muslims' religiouspractices?One set of explanationscomes from some Muslim women, who
arguethatthe Qur'anpreachesthe spiritualequalityof women andmen andthatIslamis no more
inherentlypatriarchalthan other religious traditions.In a study of Islamic women in the West,
Anne Sofie Roald notes that"asin Christianity,whereinterpretationsof biblicalverses pertaining
to women have been undergoinga process of changerecently,in Islam a similarmovementseems
to be in progress"(2001:296).
Similarly,many Muslim women arguethat the wearing of the hijab is a symbol of cultural
identity,not a sign of women'soppressionatthehandsof men.Althoughnotingthat"theearlyfeminist lifting of the face-veil was aboutemancipationfromexclusion,"FadwaEl Guindi(1999:184)
assertsthat "the voluntarywearing of the hijab since the mid-seventiesis about liberationfrom
imposed,importedidentities,consumeristbehaviors,andresisting ... Westerndominance."That
women in these three countries do not generally oppose state accommodationof Islam might
suggest that they arejust as likely to accept the claims of many Muslim women as they are to
believe non-Muslimfeminists aboutthe effects of those policies on genderrights.
254
JOURNALFOR THE SCIENTIFICSTUDY OF RELIGION
Social Class Theory
An alternativetheoryfocuses on social class. Scholarsof immigrationpolitics have demonstratedthat members of the lower and lower-middleclasses disproportionatelyoppose immigrationand immigrantrights (Simon and Alexander1993:39-40; Fetzer 2000:116-17), perhaps
out of fear of economic competition with working-class immigrants.Because large percentages of migrantsto WesternEuropeare working-classMuslims, lower- and lower-middle-class
respondentsmight plausibly oppose the accommodationof Muslim religious practices. Making life too comfortable for Muslim immigrants,such interviewees might argue, would encourage even greaternumbersof Muslims to settle in Europe and compete economically with
natives.
The datathatwe analyze,however,do not generallysupportthis theory.Among respondents
in our survey (see Table 2), only professionalsor managersfrom France were associated with
a statisticallysignificant estimate. This estimated effect, however, is in the direction opposite
that predictedby social class theory (b = -0.529, p < 0.10). Ratherthan disproportionately
supportingstate accommodationof Islam, French professionals were more likely to oppose
this policy. No occupation variablein the French National Election Study achieved statistical
significance (see Table 3). In the GermanALLBUS, in contrast,professionals and managers
were more supportiveof Islamic instruction(b = 0.420, p < 0.05), thus confirmingsocial class
theory.
These resultsfor attitudestowardstateaccommodationof Muslimreligiouspracticescontrast
with the findingsof some studiesof publicopinionon immigrationpolicy, which seem morelikely
to find class effects. It is possible that lower- or lower-middle-classrespondentswant to restrict
immigrationbut do not necessarilymake the connectionbetween stoppingfurthermigrationand
makingit moredifficultfor immigrantsalreadyin Europeto practicetheirreligion.If so, this view
is consistentwith the policies of manystatesin the region,who aresimultaneouslyacknowledging
Muslims' religious rights but also drasticallyincreasingthe barriersto immigrationby asylum
seekersor economic migrants(Lyall 2002).
Education
A numberof studieshave suggestedthateducationhas a liberalizingeffect on politicalopinions (Jennings and Niemi 1981; Erikson, Luttbeg, and Tedin 1991:154-59; Alwin,
Cohen, and Newcomb 1992). Arguably,the liberal political position is for the state to accommodate Muslims' religious practices. Some scholars have advocated multiculturaleducation
in West Europeancountries on the ground that learning about other faiths would make people more tolerantand understandingof religious diversity (Nielsen 1999; Parekh2000). If this
theory holds, those with more education should be more likely to supportMuslims' religious
rights.
In almost all polls for which we have educationdata,our analysisconfirmsthis explanation.
In the Frenchand Germansamples of our survey(see Table2), respondentswith higherlevels of
educationdemonstrategreatersupportfor allowing Muslim practicesin the schools. In Table 3,
French holders of both the baccalaureat(b = 0.730, p < 0.05) and such advanceduniversity
degrees as the maitrise(b = 0.851, p < 0.05) were substantiallymore sympatheticto Muslims'
religious needs. In the ALLBUS, the effect of earningthe GermanAbiturjust misses reaching
traditionallevels of statisticalsignificance(p = 0.108).
Views on Church-State Arrangements
The next theorylooks at the relationshipbetweenmass attitudestowardchurch-statearrangementsin a particularcountry(i.e., the establishedAnglicanchurchin Britain,separationistlaicite
ACCOMMODATIONOF MUSLIMPRACTICESBEFOREAND AFTER SEPTEMBER11
255
in France, and a dual, Evangelische/Catholicreligious establishmentin Germany)and popular
supportfor the stateaccommodatingMuslims' religiouspractices.We hypothesizethatthese differentinstitutionalchurch-statemodels socialize individualsto expect the state to accommodate
religious groups in particularways. Those citizens who favor the historicallyclose ties between
church and state in Britain and Germanymay value state recognitionof religion and therefore
be more likely to see the benefits of extendingthat system to include Muslims. The French,by
contrast,might oppose the wearingof the hijab in public schools because of a strongpreference
for institutionallaicite and a strictseparationof religion and public life.
To measurepublic supportfor existing church-statearrangements,respondentsin the three
countriesin oursurveywere askedaboutthe institutionalmodeluniqueto each country.In Britain,
the questionnaireasked about the Church of England's gradual accommodationof religious
groups in areas such as education and membershipin the House of Lords. Frenchrespondents
indicatedtheirlevel of supportfor the strictseparationof religion and state (laicite). In Germany,
intervieweesvoiced theiragreementor disagreementwith the system by which the statecollects
funds for churchesthatare publicly recognized (Kirchensteuer).
At least in France and Germany,however, the data provide no supportfor the mass-level
version of our church-statestructuraltheory.French devotes of laicite were no more likely to
oppose the wearingof the hijabthanwere those who rejectedFrenchseparatism.Germanrespondents likewise showed no propensityto link supportfor Kirchensteuerto sympathyfor Islamic
instructionin public schools. In Britain, on the other hand, opposing the Churchof England's
policy on nonestablishedreligiousgroupsdoes appearto have increasedhostilityto the expansion
of Islamic schools (b = -0.771, p < 0.05).
September 11 Attacks
The final theory is that the September2001 terroristattacksin New Yorkand Washington
affectedEuropeans'attitudestowardstateaccommodationof Muslims' religiouspractices.In the
aftermathof the attacks,West Europeangovernmentsbecame awarethat many of the terrorists
had lived in Europe, and that other radical Islamists were still in their midst (Waldman2002).
In response,Britain,France,and Germanypassed laws to crackdown on domestic terroristsand
furtherto restrictimmigrationand political asylum (Daley 2002).
In addition,the EuropeanMonitoringCenteron Racism and XenophobiareportedthatMuslims acrossWesternEuropehad sufferedincreasedhostilityandphysical attackssince September
11 (Allen and Nielsen 2002). In Britainalone, more than300 assaultson Muslimswere reported
after the terroristattacks (Guardian2002). Finally, a British public-opinionpoll taken shortly
afterSeptember11 found that26 percentof the populationfelt thatIslam was a threatto Western
values (Travis2001).
If this theoryis correct,public supportfor state accommodationof Muslims' religious practices in the schools should have decreased.To test this explanation,we had the identical policy
questions from our July 2001 survey (Roper Europe 2001) added to a poll conductedin April
2002 (RoperEurope2002).
The datareportedin Table4 partiallyconfirmthis theory.In Britain,supportfor abolishing
statefundingof Islamic schools increasedfrom 19.9 percentto 25.6 percent,a statisticallysignificant change.In Germany,supportfor alwaysprovidingIslamic instructionfell from 61.6 percent
to 55.8 percent,which is likewise statisticallysignificant.The percentageof Frenchrespondents
who advocatedbanningthe hijab in public schools also rose from 38.8 percentto 41.2 percent,
thoughthis differencefails traditionaltests of statisticalsignificance.
It is intriguingthatthe percentageof respondentswho identifiedthemselvesas Muslims fell
in all threecountries.Only in Britainwas this differencestatisticallysignificant,however.Given
the increasein anti-Muslimhate crimes and the intense public attentionpaid to Islamistradicals
in the West, this apparentreluctanceto acknowledgebeing Muslim is not surprising.
256
JOURNALFOR THE SCIENTIFICSTUDY OF RELIGION
TABLE 4
SUPPORT FOR ISLAM IN THE SCHOOLS BEFORE
AND AFTER SEPTEMBER 11
Britain
France
Germany
Responses(%)
pre-
post-
pre-
post-
pre-
post-
Expand
Statusquo
Restrict
n
Muslim
n
31.8
48.4
19.9
756
2.3
872
28.0
46.4
25.6*
777
0.8*
896
16.7
44.5
38.8
951
3.5
976
14.4
44.4
41.2
1,014
3.0
1,031
61.6
27.9
10.5
950
0.8
959
55.8*
32.4*
11.8
928
0.2
956
Source:RoperEurope(2001,2002).
*=statistical test
Note: Data weightedby demographiccharacteristics.
for independence
of pre- andpost-wavessignificantat the 0.05 level (see
Wonnacott
andWonnacott
1985:242).
DISCUSSION
According to our analysis, the variablesthat best explain Europeans'supportfor the public accommodationof Muslim religious practices are education and religious practice. On the
other hand, the data in this article do not generally supportexplanationsbased on social class,
gender, and status as a religious minority.Exposure to a liberal-arts-styleeducation (e.g., in
the GermanGymnasiumor French lycee) seems to increase supportfor public accommodation of Muslim religious practices.Studentswho have reachedthis educationallevel have likely
learnedaboutculturesotherthanthatdominantin a particularcountry.Perhapsthose who favor
pro-accommodationpolicies, as we do, thereforeought to advocatefor multiculturaleducation
throughoutthe curriculum.
Ouranalysis also confirmsthatreligiously active respondentsdo show solidaritywith practicing Muslims. As TariqModood and others have argued,religionists perceive secularismas
a common threatto their values. On the other hand, the data in this article do not supportthe
second half of the solidarity-of-the-religioustheory; seculariststend disproportionatelyto support state accommodationof Muslim religious practices.Our findings parallelthose by Allport
(1979:449-53) on the curvilinearrelationshipbetween religiosity and racial or religious prejudice. In a predominantlypost-ChristianWesternEurope,secularistsmay not feel threatenedby
a few orthodoxreligionists. Despite the apparentphilosophical similaritiesbetween practicing
Muslims and Christians,Muslims might be better served to join political forces with the large
numberof pro-multiculturalseculariststhanwith the small bandof orthodoxChristians.
The events of September11, 2001, have affected popularattitudestowardEuropeanMuslims. In all three countries in our before-and-aftersurveys, respondentswere less likely after
September11 to supportthe accommodationof Islam in state-runschools. In France,however,
this decline in supportdid not achieve statisticalsignificance.Nonetheless, even in Britainand
Germany,interviewees did not become markedlyanti-Islamic,only changing their propensity
to oppose accommodationby a few percentagepoints. Moreover,respondentsin Britain and
Germany seem far more tolerant toward Islam than reports in the popular press might suggest. Even with the knowledge that some of the September11 terroristslived in Germanyand
Britain,Germanrespondentsremain overwhelminglysupportiveof Islamic instructionin state
schools, while most Britishintervieweescontinueto endorsestatefundingof Islamic schools. At
least in Germanyand Britain,politiciansmight thus considerpolicies thatrecognize the genuine
ACCOMMODATION
OF MUSLIMPRACTICESBEFOREAND AFTER SEPTEMBER11
257
religious pluralismin the region without having to worry about widespreadpublic hostility to
such programs.
Finally,ourdatado not seem to confirma microversionof ourchurch-statetheory.At a popular
level, the church-statestructuresthatare so importantfor shapingelite attitudesandpublic policy
in these threecountriesdo not appearto determineindividuals'views on stateaccommodationof
Muslimreligiouspractices.Perhapsas Converse(1964) might suggest, the Islam-relatedattitudes
of Europeanelites-who are more likely to strive for ideological consistency-are much more
constrainedby theircountry'sparticularchurch-statearrangementthanarethe views of ordinary
citizens.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The writers are grateful for researchsupportfrom the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion, the German
MarshallFund of the United States, the American Political Science Association, PepperdineUniversity, and Central
MichiganUniversity.We arealso indebtedto thejournal'stwo reviewersandto the manyMuslims in Britain,France,and
Germanywhom we interviewedfor this article.The opinions and analysis containedin this work are nonethelesssolely
those of the authors.This articleis partof a largerprojecton state accommodationof Muslim religious practices,which
is to be publishedby CambridgeUniversityPress as Muslimsand the State in Britain,France,and Germany.
NOTE
1. Although the independentvariable"OtherReligion" is statistically significantand strongly pro-expansionist(b =
2.072), this classificationlikely includes a majorityof Muslims. Unfortunately,the 1996 ALLBUS groupedall nonChristianreligions into a single category.
REFERENCES
Agence FrancePresse. 1996. BrigitteBardotdenonce le 'debordementislamique' en France.Wire service "informations
gen6rales."April 26.
ALLBUS (Allgemeine Bevolkerungsumfrageder Sozialwissenschaften).1996. GermanSocial Survey.Cologne: Zentralarchivfur empirischeSozialforschung.
Allen, C. andJ. S. Nielsen. 2002. Summaryreporton Islamophobiain the E.U. after 11 September2001.Vienna:European
MonitoringCentreon Racism and Xenophobia.
Allport,G. W. 1979. The natureof prejudice.Reading,MA: Addison-Wesley.
Altschull, E. 1995. Le voile contre l'ecole. Paris:Editionsdu Seuil.
Alwin, D. F, R. L. Cohen, and T. M. Newcomb. 1992. Political attitudesover the life span: TheBenningtonwomenafter
fifty years. Madison,WI: Universityof Wisconsin Press.
Ben Abid, S. E. 2000. The Shariabetween particularismand universality.In Islam and Europeanlegal systems,edited by
S. Ferrariand A. Bradney,pp. 11-30. Dartmouth,NH: Ashgate.
Boy, D. and N. Mayer. 1997. L'dlecteura ses raisons. Paris:Presses de Sciences Po.
Biehl, F. and S. Kabak, editors. 1999. MuslimischeFrauen in Deutschland erzdhlen iiber ihren Glauben. Giitersloh:
GiitersloherVerlagshaus.
Converse,P. E. 1964. The natureof belief systems in mass publics. In Ideology and discontent,edited by D. Apter,pp.
201-61. New York:Free Press.
Daley, S. 2002. Europewary of wider doors to immigrants.New YorkTimesOctober20.
Dwyer, C. andA. Meyer. 1995. The institutionalisationof Islamin the Netherlandsand in the United Kingdom:The case
of Islamic schools. New Community21:37-54.
El Guindi, F. 1999. Veil:Modesty,privacy and resistance.Oxford:Berg.
Erikson,R. S., N. R. Luttbeg,and K. L. Tedin. 1991. Americanpublic opinion, 4th ed. New York:Macmillan.
Fetzer,J. S. 2000. Publicattitudestowardimmigrationin the UnitedStates,France,and Germany.New York/Cambridge:
CambridgeUniversityPress.
Geddes, A. 2002. The bordersof absurdityand fear. TimesHigher EducationSupplementMay 24.
Gould,A. C. 1999. Originsof liberaldominance:State,church,and nineteenthcenturyEurope.Ann Arbor,MI:University
of MichiganPress.
Guardian.2002. From scholarship,sailors and sects to the mills and the mosques. Guardian(London)June 18.
Gusfield,J. R. 1963. Symboliccrusade: Statuspolitics and the Americantemperancemovement.Urbana,IL: University
of Illinois Press.
258
JOURNALFOR THE SCIENTIFICSTUDY OF RELIGION
Heine, P. 1997. HalbmondiiberdeutschenDachern. Munich:List Verlag.
Hoskin, M. 1991. New immigrantsand democraticsociety: Minorityintegrationin Westerndemocracies. New York:
Praeger.
House of Commons.2001. Hansard22 November.
Hunter,J. D. 1991. Culturewars: Thestruggle to defineAmerica.New York:Basic Books.
Inglehart,R. 1990. Cultureshift in advancedindustrialstates. Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversityPress.
Jennings, M. K. and R. G. Niemi. 1981. Generationsand politics: A panel study of young adults and their parents.
Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversityPress.
Kalyvas,S. N. 1996. The rise of Christiandemocracyin Europe.Ithaca/London:CornellUniversityPress.
Leege, D. C. and L. A. Kellstedt. 1993. Rediscoveringthe religiousfactor in Americanpolitics. Armonk, NY: M.E.
Sharpe.
Lipset, S. M. 1981. Political man: The social bases of politics, expandeded. Baltimore,MD: Johns Hopkins University
Press.
Lyall, S. 2002. When asylum seekersknock, Europeis deaf. New YorkTimesJune 20.
Macpherson,D. 1997. Papiststhen and Muslims now. In Universitylectures in Islamic studies, edited by A. Jones, pp.
109-26. London:AltajirWorldof Islam Trust.
Modood, T. 1994. Establishment,multiculturalismand Britishcitizenship.Political Quarterly65(1):53-73.
Newbigin, L., L. Sanneh,and J. Taylor,editors. 1998. Thesecular myth.London:SPCK.
Nielsen, J. S. 1999. Towardsa EuropeanIslam. London:MacmillanPress.
Parekh,B. 2000. Rethinkingmulticulturalism:Culturaldiversityand political theory.London:MacmillanPress.
Pfaff, U. 2000. IslamischeUnterweisungan den Schulen in Nordrhein-Westfalen.
epd-Dokumentation2:42-44.
Ramadan,T. 1999. Tobe a EuropeanMuslim.Leicester:Islamic Foundation.
RoperEurope.2001. Religion and the state I. Surrey,UK: RoperASWEuropeLtd.
.2002. Religion and the state II. Surrey,UK: RoperASWEuropeLtd.
Roald, A. S. 2001. Womenin Islam: The Westernexperience.London/NewYork:Routledge.
Simon, R. J. andS. H. Alexander.1993. Theambivalentwelcome:Printmedia,public opinionand immigration.Westport,
CT: Praeger.
Spuler-Stegemann,U. 1998. Muslimein Deutschland:Nebeneinanderoder Miteinander?Freiburg:Herder.
Travis,A. 2001. Attackon Afghanistan:ICM poll. Guardian(London)October 12.
Waldman,A. 2002. How in a little Britishtownjihad found young converts.New YorkTimesApril 24.
Wonnacott,R. J. and T. H. Wonnacott.1985. Introductorystatistics, 4th ed. New York:Wiley.
Wuthnow,R. 1988. The restructuringof American religion: Society and faith since WorldWar Two. Princeton,NJ:
PrincetonUniversityPress.
Zouari,F. 2002. Le voile islamique:Histoire et actualite, du Corana l'affaire dufoulard. Lausanne:Favre.