Why school choice policy has failed:
EU comparative study focusing on
Estonia
(Motivation for a Matching and
Mechanism Design)
Kaire Põder
Project team: Andre Veski, Triin Lauri and Tarmo
Veskioja
Contents
• Good policy:
– Equity (background or heterogenity within the school)
– Efficiency
• Causes of failure: decomposition
• Description of data (PISA and secondary):
– Mechanism Effect on PISA results
• Choice policy configurations and their effect on
– Efficiency and equity
• Estonian case – regulation design
Tallinn University of Technology -- ESCM
project
Policy platform
• NPM and OECD comparative turn
• Battle:
– Choice-proponents:
• choice will bring along both equity and efficiency (complements)
– Choice opponents:
• there is high trade-off between these two (substitutes)
• Causes of failure (literature):
– Users ability to execute choice has not been increased
• Lower SES are less able to participate in choice (for many reasons)
– Schools are allowed to select students (cream-skimming)
• Historical reputation effects, aspects of topped-off voucers etc.
– Competition must be real (but many cases is not)
• league tables usually reflect the results that are also dependent on peer-effects and
teacher-effects, etc.
• Our arguments why choice ‘reforms’ have not been too successful:
– Choice is one policy component in configuration with other institutional
rules
– Bad choice design (that allows manipulation or magnifies segregation)
Tallinn University of Technology -- ESCM
project
Education policy outcomes
• Efficiency of educational outcomes
– We don’t assess cost efficiency
– Mean results of the education system (e.g. PISA test
scores; TIMSS, PIRLS, etc)
• Or in school level analysis mean school (PISA) score
• Equity
– Minimal family background effects
• Difficult to operationalise:
– Secondary literature: Ferreira, F.H.G., & Ginoux, J. 2011 or
– Schuetz, G.; Ursprung, H.W.; Woessmann, L. 2008
– School level analysis: mean tested S.D. of PISA scores
within school
Tallinn University of Technology -- ESCM
project
Decomposition
Сurrent policy outcomes:
(residential, ethnic, religious) segregation, low mean results, ….
Policy goals and resources:
Influenced by theoretical trends (NPM) and international organisations
such as OECD
+ generosity and priorities of the welfare regime
Metrics for school priorities (autonomous or centralised)
Student preferences: what kind of variability within the system
Matching mechanism: allocation
In the case of over-demand
Tallinn University of Technology -- ESCM
project
Data:
• PISA for measuring Efficiency and Equity:
– Collected in many countries
– Conducted every 3 year
• Here we use data from 2009
– Problems:
• In the case of single structure education children were matched long time ago
(unables to measure the effect of recent policy amendments)
• Typology of ‘school choice regimes’:
– Põder et al 2013
•
•
•
•
Catchment (zoned);
Regulated (initiated by parents);
Controlled (central priority list based)
Others (unable to classify)
– Problem two main choice ‘locuses’:
• Primary school choice
• Lower-secondary school choice
• Explanatory policy variables:
– Eurydice, PISA and also secondary literature
Tallinn University of Technology -- ESCM
project
Equity: small background effect
(primary school choice, system-level)
Tallinn University of Technology -- ESCM
project
Equity as a mean tested variance
(primary school choice, system-level)
Tallinn University of Technology -- ESCM
project
Efficiency and inequality
(primary and lower-secondary school choice, school-level)
Tallinn University of Technology -- ESCM
project
Policy configuration:
• We search for “Best practices“
– Combination of institutions:
•
•
•
•
CHOICE = C: availability of parents’ choice at the system level;
TRACKING = T: in primary or lower secondary stage of education;
VARIABILITY = V: availability of school types and private participation;
EMPOWERMENT = E: information about schools (accountability measures like central
tests), free transport;
• FINANCING = F: incentive schemes for schools and teachers created by financial
instruments.
– Method:
• QCA fuzzy set
Tallinn University of Technology -- ESCM
project
Policy effect on efficiency/equity:
• We are after feasible combinations of institutions (C, T, V, E, F) that:
– satisfy the minimum consistency requirement (0,75)
– separately for ‘choice’ and ‘no-choice’ cases.
• Necessary conditions of ‘no-choice’ combination:
𝑐 ∙ 𝑡 → 𝐸𝐹 𝐴𝑁𝐷 𝐸𝑄
• Necessary conditions of ‘choice’ combination:
𝐶 ∙ 𝑉 → 𝐸𝐹 𝐴𝑁𝐷 𝐸𝑄
Tallinn University of Technology -- ESCM
project
Choice is neither necessary
nor sufficient for EF&EQ
Illustration: Estonian case
• 2008-2010 (semi-regulated choice) vs 2011 (free market)
– Case specificities:
•
•
•
•
•
Choice within public sector (minimal private participation)
Primary school choice (elite and non-elite schools)
Aptitude tests in entrance
School autonomy (no central priorities or matching)
Prep-schooling
• Is such ‘total’ market harmful for equity:
– Surprisingly de-segregating effect (next slide)
Tallinn University of Technology -- ESCM
project
Tallinn University of Technology -- ESCM
project
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.1
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Pr(elite_school)
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1
1
Example of the middle class child, who doesn’t live in the centre, (family with 2 children, not single parent, average income
500-800 eur, parent reads cultural journals and goes to the cultural events with the child(ren))
0
1
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0
Mother's_education
1
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Mother's_education
Pr(elite_school)
95% CI
Pr(elite_school)
95% CI
Panel (b): 2008-2010, child attended prep-school
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Pr(elite_school)
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Panel (a): 2011, child attended prep-school
0
1
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5
Mother's_education
Pr(elite_school)
6
0
1
2
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Mother's_education
95% CI
Pr(elite_school)
95% CI
Tallinn University of Technology -- ESCM
Panel (c): 2011, child didn’t attend prep-school project Panel (d): 2008-2010, child didn’t attend prep-school
6
Conclusions
• Choice policy is complex
– Matching matters if:
• there is over-demanded and under-demanded schools
• Where is variability between schools (we don’t mean reputable
– not reputable kind of variability)
– Cases differ (not all cases need matching):
• E.g. Swedish reform in 1990es
– no need for central priority lists, schools must accept everybody, no
topped-off vouchers, previous policy failure – residential segregation
• E.g. Estonian case 2011
– Total market (even without central priorities or matching) seems to
be more efficient than ‘chaos' by semi-regulated choice which
creates perverse incentives (manipulation, prep-schooling, etc.)
– But can be similar by most common problems (before
choice)
• Residential segregation
• Private vs public schools
• Early tracking Tallinn University of Technology -- ESCM
project
Thank You
Kaire.poder@ttu.ee