AUSTRALIA AND
THE US ASIAN
ALLIANCE NETWORK
Elsina Wainwright
ussc.edu.au
March 2016
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
■■
The United States’ presence in the Indo-Asia-Pacific is transforming from a traditional
alliance network (of Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea and Thailand)
into a web of strengthened alliances, new partnerships and creative linkages.
■■
Washington must manage this transformation carefully, so its alliance network
maintains a deterrent function and reassures allies, but does not exacerbate USChina tensions.
■■
The changing regional setting has increased ANZUS’ value to both Australia and the
United States. However, ANZUS has emerging fault lines that need to be addressed,
including the risk that Australia’s and America’s strategic objectives might diverge.
Australia has a major interest in the stability of the US Asian alliance network and broader regional
web. The transformation of the US Asian alliance network beyond a hub-and-spoke framework
is driven by shifting power relativities, particularly China’s rise and assertive regional behaviour. It
is also part of a broader regional transformation, with a flurry of linkages not involving the United
States forged in the last year alone. China is watching the changing US presence with suspicion, but
also participating in some of the regional connections. Managing the tension between the threatbalancing and order-building dimensions of its network is an ongoing challenge for Washington.
Three policy priorities should guide Australian efforts to deepen both ANZUS and Australia’s regional
relationships. First, ANZUS should become even more enmeshed in the emerging regional web
of relationships and institutions. Canberra should articulate to regional partners and Washington
how ANZUS fits into (and often complements) Australia’s regional engagement. Second, Canberra
should contribute more to Washington’s deliberations on China’s rise. This includes finding
pathways for China within this regional order, while remaining firm on important regional norms.
Third, ANZUS’ formal mechanisms should be broadened to ensure a greater focus on fostering
mutual and regional prosperity. Expanding the AUSMIN foreign and defence ministerial dialogue to
include geoeconomic issues would enable a more comprehensive discussion on regional matters
with strategic and economic dimensions. This would allow the 65 year-old ANZUS to be more
effective in a transforming Asia.
The Alliance 21 Program is a multi-year research initiative that examines
the historically strong Australia-United States relationship and works to
address the challenges and opportunities ahead as the alliance evolves
in a changing Asia. Based within the United States Studies Centre at the
University of Sydney, the Program was launched by the Prime Minister of
Australia in 2011 as a public-private partnership to develop new insights
and policy ideas.
The Australian Government and corporate partners Boral, Dow, News Corp
Australia, and Northrop Grumman Australia support the program’s second
phase, which commenced in July 2015 and is focused on the following
core research areas: defence and security; resource sustainability; alliance
systems in Asia; and trade, investment, and business innovation.
The Alliance 21 Program receives funding support from the following partners.
Research conclusions are derived independently and authors represent their own
view not those of the United States Studies Centre.
United States Studies Centre
Institute Building (H03)
City Rd
The University of Sydney NSW 2006
T: +61 2 9351 7249
E: us-studies@sydney.edu.au
W:ussc.edu.au
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Introduction
The United States’ presence in the Indo-Asia-Pacific is transforming from a traditional
alliance network (of Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea and Thailand)
into a web of strengthened alliances, new partnerships and creative linkages.1 This
shift is a concerted US strategy, driven by changing power relativities, particularly
China’s rise and assertive regional behaviour.
(ANZUS) also remains a compelling value proposition for Australia in the current
strategic climate, as Australia’s 2016 Defence White Paper makes clear.4 Despite
this traditional strength, emerging fault lines in the Alliance need to be addressed.
There is a risk that Australian and US strategic objectives might diverge, and they
could make different decisions about an acceptable regional strategic order.
The shift is also part of a broader regional transformation, with a flurry of strategic
and economic linkages not involving the United States, many forged in the last
year alone.2 China is watching this transformation closely, viewing the changing
US presence with suspicion, but also participating in some of the wider regional
connections.
Australia has a major interest in the ongoing stability of the US Asian alliance
network and broader regional web. Deepening its own alliance with the US and
at the same time, broadening regional engagement will require the Australian
government to carefully manage often
complex interdependencies. Three
policy priorities should guide Australian
ANZUS should become more
efforts.
This evolving US network can help reinforce regional stability by providing some
predictability in the current strategic flux, as well as a flexible framework for
addressing common challenges. But Washington must manage this transformation
carefully so that the network maintains a deterrent function and reassures allies but
does not exacerbate US-China tensions. It should be part of an inclusive regional
order which accords more space to China.3
The Australia-US Alliance (‘the Alliance’) features prominently in the transforming
US Asian alliance network. The United States values Australia’s reliability, regional
expertise, and that it is less encumbered with historical territorial tensions than
other Asian allies. Australia’s geography makes it increasingly important to regional
US military planning. The Australia, New Zealand and United States Security Treaty
enmeshed in the emerging regional
web of relationships and institutions
First, ANZUS should become more
enmeshed in the emerging regional
web of relationships and institutions.
Too often Australian officials and the public alike conceptualise and discuss ANZUS
in isolation from the United States’ other Asian alliances. In diplomatic discussions
with regional partners and Washington, and in official public statements, Australia
should more clearly articulate how ANZUS fits into (and often complements)
Australia’s regional engagement. This would enable Australia to have a more
independent regional posture, but also be an effective US ally, with greater regional
expertise.5
Cover image: ‘AUSMIN meeting in Boston, MA, October 2015’ US Department of State
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Second, Canberra should contribute more to Washington’s deliberations on China’s
rise — the key driver of the changing US Asian alliance network. As a valued US
ally with a major stake in how US-China relations unfold Canberra should both help
Washington find pathways for China within this regional order and remain firm on
the maintenance of important regional norms. This should include encouraging the
US Administration and Congress to support regional and global architectural reform
that accords China a greater role.
Third, ANZUS’ formal mechanisms should be updated and broadened to ensure a
greater focus on fostering mutual and regional prosperity. Existing leader meetings
and working groups are naturally focused on defence and foreign policy issues, but
increasingly Asian strategic issues have critical economic dimensions. Expanding
the Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) beyond foreign
and defence dialogue to include geoeconomic issues would ensure a more
comprehensive exchange of US and Australian views on emerging regional issues
and update the 65 year-old ANZUS alliance to be more effective in a transforming
Asia.
This paper first surveys the nature and functions of the US global alliance network,
and how the US Asia alliance network is transforming.6 It then analyses the
deepening Australia-US alliance and its place within the network. Finally it outlines
policy objectives for ANZUS in this changing strategic environment.
The US global alliance network:
nature and aims
The US global alliance network is now being shaped by a strategic shift involving a
rising China, a revisionist Russia, a rupturing Middle Eastern order with a rampaging
ISIS, an anemic Europe grappling with existential questions and refugee waves,
and declining US relative power (though US absolute power remains unmatched).
It is also shaped by US unwillingness to tolerate allied freeriding, fuelled by years
of US budget constraints and sequestration-induced damage to defence planning.7
Some NATO countries are now raising defence budgets in the face of Russian
assertiveness. However, European defence capability remains patchy and many
states are deeply reluctant to use it.8 Even once stalwart US allies like the United
Kingdom have become less reliable. Post-Iraq wariness, austerity measures and
domestic political introspection have led to a reduction in British defence personnel
and capability, and strained the US-UK ‘special relationship’. While the United States
is increasing its military presence in Europe as a result of heightened RussianWestern tensions, it continues to expect NATO and other allies to contribute more
to their own and regional security. But US efforts to increase allied burden sharing
without seeming to run down alliances have been fraught, feeding into criticism of
US abdication of its leadership role.9
Notwithstanding these challenges the US global alliance network remains an integral
feature of the international order and one of the most important dimensions of US
global power. The United States, with more than 50 allies, is “the hub of alliances
unrivalled in the history of nations”.10 The United States and its Asia-Pacific allies
alone account for one-third of the global economy, at US$25 trillion.11 The US global
alliance network dominates global military spending, comprising 65-70 per cent of
the total. This aggregation of capability augments US power projection.12
Alliances became an integral part of US strategy at the end of the Second World
War, when the United States oversaw the creation of the post-1945 international
architecture and needed a forward presence — and allies — to maintain it.13 With
the onset of the Cold War the US global presence acquired the additional purpose
of containing Soviet power. Alliances became a key policy tool for US policymakers
to create “situations of strength”.14 Within a few years the Truman and then
Eisenhower Administrations forged the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO,
1947), the Australia, New Zealand and United States Security Treaty (ANZUS,
1951), and alliances with Japan (1951), the Philippines (1951), South Korea (1953),
and Taiwan (1954). Given US dominance there was a pronounced structural
asymmetry to all these relationships, amounting to the provision of a US security
guarantee in return, often, for troop presence.
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NATO was a highly institutionalised collective defence apparatus. America’s Asian
alliances were primarily bilateral but also included the trilateral ANZUS (with the
US-New Zealand security relationship suspended in 1986). US officials concluded
that largely bilateral alliances would satisfy US strategic objectives in Asia: to
contain Soviet power and prevent the regional spread of communism; satisfy
US basing requirements in Asia’s maritime theatre; reassure Australia and New
Zealand that Japan was reigned in; and prevent anti-communist South Korea and
Taiwan dragging the United States into war with China or the Soviet Union.15 This
San Francisco system of alliances gave a framework to the US regional presence: it
provided stability and enabled a regional focus on prosperity. It was purposefully hub
and spokes, with Washington at its centre, not spoke to spoke. US policymakers
sought to optimise US leverage and constrain allied adventurism by ensuring the
spokes did not connect.16
Each alliance was crafted to suit a particular set of circumstances. For example, the
1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United
States, which revised the 1951 US-Japan security treaty sought “to encourage
closer economic cooperation between them and to promote conditions of
economic stability and wellbeing in their countries.”17 This economic focus made
sense, as the United States recognised its strategic and economic interest in
Japan’s economic reconstruction.
The 1991 Soviet collapse raised questions as to the continued relevance of the US
global alliance network. Some of less compelling utility, such as the Southeast Asia
Treaty Organization (SEATO), were disbanded. But NATO, the five US treaty allies
in the Pacific, and a growing set of formal and informal US commitments in the
Middle East outlasted the Soviet threat. NATO lost its immediate purpose with the
Soviet demise. By contrast the US Asian alliance system retained the North Korean
threat as a raison d’être and from the late 1970s served as a hedge against an
ascending China. The Asia-Pacific network therefore retained the classic alliance
function of reassuring allies in the face of enduring and potential threats, and its
continued relevance was affirmed in the Pentagon’s 1995 East Asia Strategy.18
The Pentagon’s 1998 East Asia Strategy foreshadowed the evolution of the
network. It described US Asian alliances in the post-Cold War as unlike threatbased Cold War alliances, instead serving “the interests of all who benefit from
regional stability”.19 Fostering alliances was the cornerstone of the George W. Bush
Administration’s Asia policy, and the first pillar of the Obama Administration’s 2011
rebalance policy of increased regional engagement.20
Functions of US alliances today
US global alliances serve as tools to further US interests and also to reinforce
stability in the following ways: first, they deter other states from aggression; for
example, US strategic protection to NATO member states during the Cold War
deterred against a Soviet incursion.
Second, alliances enhance the US
capacity to protect global sea-lanes vital
The Asia-Pacific network retained
for the passage of energy and trade.
the classic alliance function of
Third, alliances can provide predictability
and a mechanism for managing crises,
reassuring allies in the face of
as well as restraining allies from
enduring and potential threats
pursuing destabilising policies.21 This
order-building role is particularly valuable
during strategic transitions. NATO, for instance, helped facilitate a stable transition
to the post-Cold War era.22 Today, US strategic protection prevents Japan from
pursuing a significantly more independent posture. Weakening or abolishing
alliances, conversely, could generate a destabilising flux and increasing regional
competition, as erstwhile allies shore up their security, perhaps by attempting to
go nuclear.
And fourth, the US global alliance network provides mechanisms and capability
sets to address challenges requiring a collective response.23 This order-building
function is especially useful in the current global strategic setting: with a stymied
global multilateral architecture and diffuse transnational challenges such as
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terrorism, weapons of mass destruction proliferation, biologic threats, and the
human security consequences of climate change. The alliance system provides a
framework from which coalitions can be built, and other states drawn in, to address
such challenges.24
Alliances can destabilise, however. They can preserve inter-state tensions in
aspic, decreasing the need for allies to work on their own to preserve stability.
For example, the hub-and-spoke arrangement insulated Japan from integrating into
the region and reconciling with neighbours, leaving historical enmities in place.25
Alliance management requires extra care during strategic transitions, as alliances
adapt to changing threat perceptions and strategic outlooks. NATO’s post-Cold
War expansion, especially the 2008 statement of intention to incorporate Georgia
and Ukraine, antagonised Russia by appearing poised to extend the alliance right
up to its border.26
Allied abandonment and entanglement fears can also become more pronounced
during strategic shifts. Japan and the Philippines in particular have sought
reassurance about US commitment in recent years.27 However, historical evidence
suggests that entrapment risks can be overstated, at least for the senior ally: states
tend to envisage the risks and factor them in when crafting their commitments.28 For
instance, the Obama Administration has not formally declared that US protection
of the Philippines extends to Philippine-claimed South China Sea territory as it has
with Japan and the Senkakus.29
Managing the tension between the threat-balancing and order-building dimensions
of alliances is an ongoing challenge for the United States, particularly during strategic
transitions, such as is occurring in Asia today. While the US alliance network can
play a stabilising role calibration is required to minimise destabilising tendencies
and maintain that equilibrium.
America’s evolving Asian alliance network
The strategic transition under way in the Indo-Asia-Pacific is transforming the US
regional alliance network. The rise of China, but also India, Indonesia, and other
states, is fuelling heightened competition and growing activity in regional sea lanes,
which in turn are driving the emergence of the Indian Ocean as a strategic theatre
and the Indo-Pacific as a strategic construct.30 Territorial disputes and maritime
tensions are worsening, as are a raft of non-traditional challenges, including
cybersecurity, nuclear proliferation, and natural disasters intensified by climate
change. The US rebalance, itself a response to global economic and strategic
power shifting to the region, is also shaping this increasingly complex strategic
environment.
The US Asian alliance network is transforming in several important ways. First, the
traditional hub-and-spoke relationships with the five Treaty allies are being updated
according to each ally’s changing strategic outlook, particularly its perception of
China. The United States is building allied maritime, cyber and space resilience
capability, and has expanded joint allied exercises and training. Its Japan alliance
has deepened significantly with the revision of the US-Japan Defence Cooperation
Guidelines, increased interoperability and technology sharing, and the stationing
in Japan of US capabilities such as Global Hawk drones and CV-22 Osprey.31
The Philippine alliance has rebounded from its 1990s nadir. The US-Philippine
Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement, which provides for a US rotational
military presence and capacity building, including maritime domain awareness and
Coast Guard assistance, can now be implemented after the Philippine Supreme
Court declared it constitutional.32
The South Korea alliance maintains its North Korean focus with the United States
increasing alliance deterrent capability, including recent discussions on installing
the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence System (THAAD).33 Seoul is also boosting
its contribution to the bilateral relationship, including financing for the US troop
presence, and to regional security. The US-Thai alliance has been strained since
the 2014 Thai coup, and the Thai junta signalled its distance from Washington with
a decision to purchase Chinese submarines (though the deal is not yet finalised).34
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However, significant elements of US-Thai military-to-military cooperation remain in
place. For instance, Thailand still hosts training exercises such as the multi-national
Cobra Gold.
These Treaty alliances are also transforming from purely patron-client relationships.35
US scrutiny of allies’ low defence spending and freeriding has increased and it is
expecting allies to contribute more, including defence spending, complementary
capability sets, and increased interoperability, to their own, regional, and even
global, security.
Second, the United States is purposefully transforming its alliance system beyond
the hub-and-spoke framework and actively promoting Asian spoke-to-spoke
linkages.36 Japan is providing maritime, including Coast Guard, security assistance
to the Philippines, for example, and the Australia-Japan strategic partnership has
deepened, with growing defence technology, maritime security, and logistics
cooperation.37 Washington is encouraging its high-capability allies Australia,
Japan and South Korea, to pool capability and increase interoperability; a concept
described as ‘federated defence’.38 These allies are also assisting in building the
capacity of other US allies and partners.
In addition, alliance agendas have broadened to encompass out-of-area operations
and transnational challenges. For instance, the 2015 US-Japan Defence Guidelines
envisage a regional and global role for the US-Japan alliance, including humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations, peacekeeping, and maritime
security.39 In 2011, Japan established a counter-piracy presence in Djibouti, Africa
and is expanding that base to accommodate potential HADR, peacekeeping and
counter-terrorism cooperation with the United States and NATO. The guidelines
also outline the economic dimension to the US-Japan alliance, describing how the
United States and Japan “will take a leading role in cooperation with partners to
provide a foundation for peace, security, stability, and economic prosperity in the
Asia-Pacific region and beyond.”40
Third, the United States is expanding beyond its traditional Northeast Asian focus,
to incorporate South and South-East Asian partnerships. This includes an updated
bilateral defence framework with India; rotational deployments of littoral combat
ships in Singapore; maritime security and HADR assistance to Vietnam; counterterrorism and counter-piracy cooperation with Malaysia; and a strategic partnership
with Indonesia.41 The United States has also announced a US$250 million maritime
South-East Asian assistance package to the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia and
Malaysia.42
Fourth, the United States has encouraged the recent dramatic creation of
minilateral frameworks of US allies and partners, some not including the United
States. Trilateral arrangements include the US-Japan-Australia Trilateral Strategic
Dialogue, involving defence
technology
and
maritime
security cooperation, the USThe United States has encouraged the
Japan-South Korea information
sharing and crisis management
recent dramatic creation of minilateral
arrangement,
US-Japanframeworks of US allies and partners,
India cooperation on maritime
some not including the United States
security and HADR information
sharing, and the 2015 inaugural
India-Japan-Australia strategic
dialogue at which maritime security and cooperation were discussed.43 The US
head of Pacific Command also recently called for the revival of the 2007 US-JapanAustralia-India quadrilateral dialogue.44
Fifth, the United States is actively supporting regional institutions such as the East
Asia Summit (EAS) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and
its institutions, including the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM+).45
President Obama recently hosted the US-ASEAN Sunnylands Summit to deepen
the US-ASEAN strategic partnership.
These are the elements of the concerted US strategy to turn its Asian alliance
system into a web of alliances, partnerships, and minilateral frameworks.46 It
involves classic balancing against a rising China and concern about energy/
trade route access. Chinese assertiveness in the East and South China Seas has
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hardened the strategic calculus in Washington as well as in many Asian capitals.
US policymakers have concluded that spoke-to-spoke linkages advance US
interests by placing US Asian commitments within a more flexible framework.47
This provides room to manoeuvre and adjust the temperature of relationships and
helps offset the loss of US leverage.
Furthermore, years of US defence budget constraints and uncertainty have
contributed to the focus on resource pooling to augment collective capability.48 US
policymakers have also decided that Asian multilateral institutions, while far from
problem-solving bodies, can complement US alliances, provide a useful certainty
to US regional commitments, and build trust and habits of cooperation.49
There are two other important dimensions to the US regional strategy.
Washington recognises the centrality of US-China relations to regional and global
stability. Accordingly, the United States has broadened US-China linkages and
communication pathways, including military-military communications. The most
significant of these initiatives is the annual US-China Strategic and Economic
Dialogue at which US and Chinese senior officials hold extensive discussions on
issues covering the breadth of the bilateral strategic and economic relationship.
But Washington did not anticipate China’s rapid South China Sea land reclamations
and willingness to withstand US and regional reactions. The US Administration
has grappled with how to respond and it took months to commence freedom of
navigation operations in the South China Sea.50
The economic dimension of the US regional strategy — the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP) — is also critical though it has yet to be ratified by Congress. The TPP creates
a new economic architecture and has a significant strategic dimension: to diversify
regional trade and investment networks, and therefore minimise the importance of
any in particular.51 The objective is to help lessen the divergence between regional
states’ economic and security interests, as a number (including Australia) balance
their largest trade relationship with China and their main security relationship with
the United States.
Regional security, economic and diplomatic ties not involving the United States
have also grown markedly over the last decade.52 An extraordinary array of intraregional strategic links have been forged or enhanced in the past year alone. They
include India-Vietnam and Singapore-Vietnam defence agreements, the VietnamPhilippine Strategic Partnership, the Singapore-India Strategic Partnership, the
Australia-Singapore Strategic Partnership, and growing Australia-India strategic
relations (with a 2015 naval exercise). Bilateral trade and investment relations have
also expanded, including a number of bilateral free trade agreements.
This intra-regional strategic flurry is partly a balancing response to China’s rise and
activities in some regional seas and energy/trade route access fears. US officials
are supporting this expanding cooperation. They have concluded that relationships
generated independently of the United States can help keep regional tensions in
check by diversifying interactions and lessening the US-China focus.53 However,
the United States does not have control of these linkages so there is a risk they will
form in ways which might lessen US regional leverage or damage regional stability.
There is a strong demand from allies and other Asia-Pacific states for continued
US regional engagement especially given China’s continued South China Sea
assertiveness. Still a plurality of views about the US role exists within Asian states,
including allies. In Japan there are some longstanding concerns over US basing and
there has been prominent criticism of alliance strengthening in Australia and the
Philippines.54 In South Korea there tends to be a detached acceptance, rather than
an embrace, of US strategic protection. Many US allies and partners also maintain
significant security relationships (as well as crucial economic relationships) with
China and the United States understands that they do not want to be forced to
choose.
China is paying close attention to this regional transformation and views the
transforming US alliance system with suspicion.55 Chinese officials have criticised
US alliances as ‘Cold War relics’ and argued that some US-led minilaterals
— for example the 2007 US-Japan-India-Australia quadrilateral — amount to
containment.56 But despite some angst, China has largely acquiesced to the
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trilateral dialogues.57 China is also participating in some of the region’s increasing
interconnectedness such as the resumed South Korea-Japan-China trilateral
discussions, a number of free trade agreements, and the Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank (AIIB). It has also taken part in military exercises including ChinaIndia counter-terrorism drills, the low-level Australia-US-China survival Exercise
Kowari, and the US-hosted Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC). China’s response has
been a complex mix of rising power assertiveness, counter balancing and order
building.
The cumulative result of all this activity is a regional web in which US Asian alliances
are purposefully enmeshed: a mix of bilateral, multilateral, formal and also ad hoc
mechanisms, some involving the United States and some not.58 This evolving
architecture can contribute to regional stability by providing a flexible framework
to address challenges, while increased spoke-to-spoke linkages can offer better
prospects for managing inter-allied tensions. Japan, for instance, is fostering
relations with the Philippines and even South Korea.59
The challenge for US alliance management is to balance the order-building and
threat dimensions of its networked alliance system.60 The threat dimension
remains crucial in a landscape of sustained and escalating tensions on the Korean
peninsula and in the South China Sea. But the United States and other states need
to maximise the order-building dimensions of these relationships, so they are not
perceived as solely targeting China. Minilaterals require particular judiciousness.
They are less likely to antagonise if they include a practical cooperation capability, to
address common challenges such as natural disasters and future human security
consequences of climate change, violent extremism and health security. It is also
important that other regional partnerships and regional institutions are fostered at
the same time, and where possible, draw in China.61
ANZUS in Asia
The Australia-US Alliance is playing an increased role in the transforming US
Asian alliance network. Australia and the United States continue to share many
interests, not least in the maintenance of a stable, rules-based regional order.62
The shifting regional setting has lent a new lustre to some of the Alliance’s key
features, increasing its importance to both the United States and Australia. For the
United States, the first enhanced
feature is geostrategic: the
Alliance anchors US presence
The shifting regional setting has lent
in the southern Pacific Ocean
and the eastern side of the
a new lustre to some of the Alliance’s
Indian Ocean, which are both of
key features, increasing its importance
increasing strategic importance.
to both the United States and Australia
Australia offers prime territory
for training and equipment
prepositioning, but is also out of
range of the region’s growing anti-access/area denial capabilities.63 It is near but
sufficiently south of the increasingly strategically sensitive South-East Asian sea
lanes, and is not a party to the region’s territorial disputes, making it Washington’s
least complicated regional alliance.64 It is also America’s only Indian Ocean ally.65
The second enhanced feature is reliability. Australia’s strong diplomatic support for,
and military contribution to, Afghanistan, Iraq and now Syria, contrasts favourably
with other US allies. This commitment builds on Australia’s history of continuous
involvement in US conflicts and has lent an outsized sense to Australia’s
contribution, especially given Australia’s history of modest defence spend.66
Australia’s reputation as a can-do, proactive ally was further buttressed by its wellregarded stint on the UN Security Council.67
Australia and the United States also have an interdependence that the United
States only shares with one other ally: the United Kingdom. Australia and the United
Kingdom are America’s most important partners for non-duplicative intelligence
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within the Five Eyes intelligence alliance and the United States depends on Australia
in the niche area of space as well.68 However, it is again worth noting that the UK’s
reliability as an ally has decreased at the same time as Australia’s importance to the
United States has grown.69
The third feature is ANZUS’ high military and diplomatic functionality, again
compared to other alliances. Australia is one of a handful of US allies with
an expeditionary capability, including amphibious capability, and its Iraq and
Afghanistan involvement has led to an interoperability unmatched by any other two
militaries.70 Washington also benefits from Canberra’s diplomatic perspectives and
engagement. US officials have long valued Australia’s capacity building and lead
role in the South-West Pacific and parts of South-East Asia, and have employed
Australian neighbourhood strategies in other contexts. For example, the United
States Coast Guard (USCG) assistance to the Philippines and Vietnam has adapted
the Australian Pacific Patrol Boat Program model.71 In addition, the Alliance agenda
has grown to include a broader suite of regional and global challenges, including
the military campaign against ISIS and countering violent extremism diplomatic
initiatives.
For Australia, the Alliance continues to provide enduring benefits, including access
to US intelligence and sophisticated defence equipment.72 Australia also benefits
from US political, diplomatic and technological support, such as the United States
provided to Australia during its operation to recover MH17 victims from the Ukraine
crash site.73 The Alliance is an even more compelling value proposition for Australia
in the transformed regional setting, in which regional military modernisation is
eroding Australia’s capability gap, and the cost of securing Australia’s interests
using expensive defence technology is climbing ever higher.74 ANZUS remains a
cost effective way for Australia to protect its vital interests, including safeguarding
the regional sea lanes through which the majority of its trade flows.75 Accordingly,
Australia has backed US freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea,
and continued its decades-long routine air patrols over the South China Sea.76 There
are costs to the Alliance, including a posture which can be perceived in the region
as less-than-independent and thus complicate Australia’s regional relationships.
But without it, Australia would have to spend much more on defence and make
significant economic trade-offs.
The 2014 US-Australian Force Posture Agreement demonstrates the deepening
bilateral defence ties: it provides a long-term (25 year) timeframe and further
institutionalises the Alliance.77 The rotational marine presence, US air equipment
rotation, expanded joint training and exercises, and personnel exchanges have
given ANZUS a self-reinforcing momentum as administrative infrastructure has
been added, and the tempo and depth of interactions have increased.78 Maritime
security, space, and ballistic missile defence cooperation has expanded, as has the
US presence at Australian bases.79 Defence technology and scientific innovation
are an increasing focus, including cooperation on hypersonics, electronic warfare,
cyber, and enhanced ICT connectivity.80
The 2016 Defence White Paper describes the US alliance as the “centrepiece
of [Australia’s] defence policy”, and declares that Australia will support the US
role of “underpinning the stability of our region”.81 The White Paper also makes
international engagement a core defence function. Australia’s participation in
multinational exercises will increase, and Australia’s regional defence partnerships,
especially with Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, India and China, will
be strengthened.82
The Australia-US economic relationship is also growing, though it is often eclipsed
by the security relationship in public discussions and there is scope for significantly
more growth. Two-way trade and investment has increased significantly, bolstered
by the 2005 bilateral Free Trade Agreement: the United States is Australia’s biggest
economic partner, when trade and investment are combined.83 US goods exports
to Australia have grown by 68 per cent since 2005. Australia’s goods exports to
the United States have grown by 26 per cent, including an increase in Australia’s
value-added exports heading to the United States. Food products, for example,
nearly doubled to 2014 and two-way services trade has grown by 72 per cent since
2005.84
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Bilateral investment has risen as well: US investment in Australia has more than
doubled since 2005, and comprises 26.7 per cent of total foreign direct investment
in Australia.85 This is not solely resource based, though US investment in Australian
energy has been substantial. US investment in service and high-tech industries —
growing, job-producing segments of Australia’s economy — is also expanding.86
For example, US investment in professional, scientific and technical services
quadrupled from 2004 to 2013, more than tripled in financial and insurance sector
investments over the same period, and almost tripled in computers and electronic
products.87 Australia’s investment stock in the United States has likewise risen,
though much less sharply, climbing in aggregate roughly 10 per cent between
2005 and 2013.88
Fault lines and risks
In terms of the breadth and regularity of interaction the Alliance has never been
closer. The White Paper’s funding commitments and Alliance focus (including
defence/technology cooperation and prioritising interoperability-enabling capability)
are likely to be well received in Washington. The northern Australian infrastructure
spending will give some momentum to the stalled Force Posture Agreement
cost sharing discussions.89 Washington is still watching Canberra’s submarine
competitive evaluation process closely. US officials have largely not weighed in, but
there seems a clear US Pacific Command preference for a Japanese submarine for
strategic, security and technical reasons.90
But a robust ANZUS is by no means inevitable, and fault lines must be addressed.
The relationship is driven too much by policy elites in both countries. While the
Alliance is well supported in Australia across a fair degree of the political spectrum,
Australians tend to view the alliance as a standalone bilateral, which is separate from
the US Asian alliance network, and even from regional dynamics.91 There is low
public support in Australia for joining the United States in an Asian contingency.92
In the United States, there is little awareness outside the policy world of the
dimensions of the relationship. Australia’s reliability is greatly valued, but it can
sometimes be viewed in Washington as automatic support.93 This can lead to
complacency in Washington, with Canberra’s support being taken for granted.
The most significant risk is whether Australian and US strategic objectives diverge
as China’s rise alters the regional power structure. The United States looks at Asia
from the north, whereas Australia looks up at the region from the south, through
South-East Asia. These differing outlooks have already altered US and Australian
perceptions, particularly of China, as their respective final positions on the AIIB
indicate.
This risk is heightened by the divergence of Australia’s own economic and security
interests, with China its main trading partner, and the United States its main security
partner. This was clearly apparent in the Darwin Port lease decision, which caused
consternation
in
Washington.94
Australia’s trade relationship with
China can make Canberra perceive
a level of risk of Beijing’s economic
punishment that is not borne out by
evidence.95
China’s continued rise might lead to
a crisis point, with the United States
China’s continued rise might
lead to a crisis point, with the
United States seeking to maintain
regional primacy and Australia
settling for something less
seeking to maintain regional primacy
and Australia settling for something
less.96 This divergence of Australian and US strategic objectives is less likely if both
accept incremental adaptation of the existing order, so that China can exercise
increased leadership.97 Certainly the current order has enabled China’s rise, and
the stability it provides helps China maintain the economic growth required for its
domestic stability. US dominance of global energy routes mean the United States
could choke off China’s energy supply if tensions increased.98 However, China’s
South China Sea land reclamation and militarisation are testing operating principles
such as freedom of navigation, and tensions are escalating.
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Lastly, there is the risk of a weakening or retrenching United States. America’s
unmatched global power has been buttressed by the resurgent US economy.99
But there are sharp questions about US global leadership on a myriad of global
challenges, especially in the Middle East. There are also questions in Asia about
the strength of America’s Asia focus, given pressing events in the Middle East and
Europe. Furthermore, the United States has significant domestic vulnerabilities,
including crumbling infrastructure and congressional dysfunction stymieing
effective governance.100 While US retrenchment from Asia remains unlikely, a
weakened US security commitment would leave Australia exposed.
These fault lines mean Australia’s continued reliability cannot be taken for granted,
notwithstanding 100 years of fighting side by side.
Conclusion
The transforming US Asian alliance network can be a stabilising force in the region
if it strikes a balance between threat balancing and order building. ANZUS itself can
contribute more to regional security and be a mechanism for addressing common
challenges if its fault lines are addressed and new opportunities for cooperation are
pursued. Three policy priorities should guide Australian efforts.
First, ANZUS should become more enmeshed in the emerging regional web of
relationships and institutions. The Australian Government is right to deepen both
ANZUS and regional partnerships with Indonesia, India, Japan, South Korea, China
and other states, as well as support regional institutions such as the ADMM+. In
diplomatic discussions with regional partners and Washington, and in official public
statements, Australia should more clearly articulate how ANZUS fits into (and often
complements) Australia’s regional engagement.
Framing ANZUS less as a standalone bilateral and more as part of the web of
regional linkages would allow Australia to forge a more independent regional
posture. It would reduce the Alliance cost of being seen as too US-dependent, and
help ANZUS evolve in ways consistent with regional stability. This approach would
benefit the United States, too, by augmenting Australia’s role as a well-positioned
ally. Strengthened regional relationships enhance Australia’s regional perspective,
leading to better US policy outcomes in the southern Indo-Asia-Pacific.
Second, Canberra should contribute more to Washington’s deliberations on
responding to China’s rise. China’s rise is the key driver of the US Asian alliance
network’s transformation, and Australia has a strong interest in the network and
broader regional web remaining stable. As a valued US ally with a unique regional
perspective, Canberra should help Washington find ways to integrate China
into the existing order, to increase
China’s stake in that order.101 A good
start would be encouraging the US
ANZUS’ formal meeting mechanisms
Administration and Congress to
should be broadened to increase the
support regional and architectural
focus on economic partnerships and
reform which gives China a
greater role, along the lines of
regional economic connectivity
Congress’ belated ratification of the
International Monetary Fund reform
enlarging emerging power representation. This should include recommending that
Washington be more receptive to initiatives such as the AIIB, and to eventually
open the TPP to China.
Canberra should also take more of a lead in establishing functional cooperation
networks between the United States, China, and Asian neighbours which can
tackle common challenges. These can leverage Australia’s terrain and expertise,
including in crisis response.102 Where possible, they should prioritise Chinese
engagement, building on successes like Exercise Kowari and Australia-China
cooperation during the flight MH370 search. One practical idea gaining traction
is for a regional humanitarian and disaster relief centre to be located in northern
Australia.103
At the same time, Australia should continue to take a firm stand on regional norms,
including the non-alteration of the status quo by force. This involves continued
support for US freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea as well
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as the continuation of Australia’s own long-standing patrolling under Operation
Gateway. Australia should remain prepared to stand against further unilateral
activities by China, such as any declaration of a South China Sea Air Defence
Identification Zone.
Pursuing these three policy objectives would help consolidate a mature and
forward-looking ANZUS situated more squarely in a transforming Indo-Asia-Pacific.
It would be an ideal way to mark ANZUS’ 65th anniversary.
Third, ANZUS should add an economic dimension to its support for regional
stability. ANZUS’ formal meeting mechanisms should be broadened to increase
the focus on economic partnerships and regional economic connectivity. This
would reduce often-bifurcated discussions on strategic and economic interests in
Australia, particularly within the context of US-Australia-China relations. AUSMIN
could be expanded to include the Australian Treasurer and US Treasury Secretary. If
scheduling logistics require it, this could occur biennially in the first instance, when
AUSMIN is hosted in the United States. Rather than diluting the focus of AustralianUS security discussions, this more comprehensive dialogue structure would tackle
more effectively the growing number of issues in the alliance with both security
and economic dimensions. Adding an economic dimension to AUSMIN might lead,
in time, to a more formal bilateral commitment on mutual and regional prosperity,
similar to the US-Japan alliance framework.
An institutionalised sharing of geoeconomic perspectives would be particularly
useful, given Australia’s and America’s different vantage points in Asia. It would
build on existing bilateral business, trade and TPP discussions, models such as the
Australia-Singapore Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, and the Prime Minister’s
and Foreign Minister’s recent comments on how economic interdependence
offsets regional tensions.104 It would also promote continued expansion of AustraliaUS business-business linkages and overall Australia-US trade and investment.105 As
commodity prices fall and China’s economy slows, the Australian economy needs
to continue to reorient toward more technology- and innovation-focused markets
such as the United States. Deeper bilateral economic engagement can buttress
the defence relationship, and reduce the divergence of Australia’s economic and
security interests.
This report may be cited as:
Elsina Wainwright, ‘Australia and the US Asian alliance network’, Alliance 21
Report (United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney, March 2016).
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Endnotes
1.
The White House Office of the Press Secretary, ‘Fact sheet: Advancing the
rebalance to Asia and the Pacific’, Washington DC, 16 November 2015.
2.
These intra-Asian linkages have been described as an ‘Asia power
web’ in a Center for a New American Security analysis. Patrick
M. Cronin, Richard Fontaine, Zachary M. Hosford, Oriana Skylar
Mastro, Ely Ratner and Alexander Sullivan, ‘The Emerging Asia
Power Web: The Rise of Bilateral Intra-Asian Security Ties’, Center
for a New American Security, Washington DC, June 2013.
3.
William T. Tow, ‘Rebalancing and order building: Strategy or
illusion?’, William T. Tow and Douglas Stuart, eds. The New
US Strategy Towards Asia: Adapting to the American Pivot,
London and Routledge, New York, 2015, pp. 31, 46.
4.
Australian Department of Defence, 2016 Defence White Paper,
Canberra, February 2016, for example paragraphs 2.17, 5.22.
5.
Ely Ratner, ‘Australia’s new activism: The view from Washington’, The
Interpreter, Lowy Institute for International Policy, 23 July 2014.
6.
This paper defines alliances as commitments for mutual defence support
and military cooperation. Stephen M. Walt, ‘Why Alliances Endure or
Collapse’, Survival, vol. 39, no. 1, Spring 1997, pp. 156-179, at p. 157.
7.
8.
9.
Michael Birnbaum, ‘Gates rebukes European allies in
farewell speech’, Washington Post, 10 June 2011.
Constanze Stelzenmüller, ‘Europe to Planet America: Stay
with us, but don’t stampede us’, Policy Brief, German Marshall
Fund of the United States, Paris, September 2015.
David Rothkopf, ‘Does America need new ‘special relationships’?’,
Foreign Policy, 4 August 2015. Richard Sokolsky and Jeremy
Shapiro, ‘It’s hard to get good help these days: The problem with US
allies’, Order from Chaos, Brookings Institution, 28 May 2015.
10. Barack Obama, ‘Remarks at the United States Military Academy
(West Point) Commencement Ceremony,’ United States Military
Academy, 28 May 2014. No other state comes close; China,
by contrast, has two allies: Pakistan and North Korea.
11. Ashton Carter, ‘Remarks on the Next Phase of the US Rebalance to the
Asia-Pacific’, McCain Institute, Arizona State University, 6 April 2015.
12. US military spending is 35-40 per cent of global military spending, and
US allies spend around 30 per cent of the total. Michael E. O’Hanlon,
‘Dollars at work: What Defense spending means for the U.S. economy’,
Order from Chaos, Brookings Institution, 20 August 2015.
13. Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: American and Europe in the
New World Order, Vintage, New York, 2004, p. 17; Robert Kagan,
‘Superpowers don’t get to retire: what our tired country still owes the
world’, New Republic, 26 May 2014; and Ashley J. Tellis, ‘Seeking
Alliances and Partnerships: The Long Road to Confederationism
in US Grand Strategy’, in Ashley J. Tellis, Abraham M. Denmark,
and Greg Chaffin, eds., US Alliances and Partnerships at the
Center of Global Power, Strategic Asia 2014-15, National Bureau
of Asian Research, Seattle and Washington, DC, 2014, p. 12.
14. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State
Department, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 1969, p. 378.
15. Victor D. Cha, ‘Powerplay: Origins of the US Alliance
System in Asia’, International Security, Vol. 34, No. 3, Winter
2009/10, pp. 158-196, at pp. 158-9, 168, 190.
16. In particular, they were concerned that South Korea and Taiwan might band
together to get the US to take on China and North Korea. Cha, p. 189.
17. US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, 1960, Preamble.
18. Joseph S. Nye Jr., ‘East Asian Security: The Case for
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Deep Engagement’, Foreign Affairs, 1 July 1995.
19. United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region,
November 25 1998, section 2. See also Tow, ‘Rebalancing
and order building: Strategy or illusion?’, p. 36.
20. Tom Donilon, ‘The United States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013’,
Speech to the Asia Society, New York, March 11 2013.
21. Robert E. Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy,
Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1968, p. 22; Walt, ‘Why
Alliances Endure or Collapse’, pp. 158, 173.
22. Walt, ‘Why Alliances Endure or Collapse’, p. 171.
23. Bruce Jones, Still Ours To Lead: America, Rising Powers,
and the Tension Between Rivalry and Restraint, Brookings
Institution Press, Washington D.C., 2014, pp. 5, 27.
Obama and Benigno Aquino III, Remarks by President Obama
and President Benigno Aquino III of the Philippines in Joint
Press Conference, Washington DC, 28 April 2014.
30. Michael Wesley on the shifting power dynamics and the
Indo-Pacific’s emergence, ‘Australia’s Alliance in a Changing
Asia’, Alliance 21 Report, United States Studies Centre,
University of Sydney, Sydney, August 2012, pp. 2-4.
31. Japan Ministry of Defence (JMOD), Guidelines for Japan-US Defence
Cooperation, Tokyo, 2015; Craig Whitlock and Anne Gearan, ‘Agreement
will allow U.S. to fly long-range surveillance drones from base in Japan’,
Washington Post, 2 October 2013; and Reiji Yoshida, ‘U.S. to station
Ospreys at Yokota Air Base starting in 2017,’ The Japan Times, 12 May 2015.
32. Prashanth Parameswaran, ‘Philippine Court Upholds New
US Defense Pact’, The Diplomat, 12 January 2016.
24. Joseph S. Nye Jr, ‘The American Century: RIP?’,
The National Interest, September 24 2015.
33. KJ Kwon and Paula Hancocks, ‘South Korea, U.S. to discuss
THAAD missile defense system’, CNN, 7 February 2016.
25. Cha, ‘Powerplay’, pp. 195-96. It likewise preserved South Korea’s historical
resentments. See also Robert Kelly, ‘East Asia’s history wars: South Korea
and Japan (Yes, once again)’, Asian Security Blog, 2 November 2015.
34. ‘Thailand tilts away from the US’, The Wall Street
Journal Editorial, 30 June 2015.
26. John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault’,
Foreign Affairs, September/October 2014, vol. 93, no. 5, pp. 77-89.
27. Rod Lyon, ‘The US and assurance anxieties in Asia’, The Strategist, ASPI,
16 September 2015; and ‘Philippines Sends SOS to the International
Community’, Philippine Star, 2 May 2012. Concerns about alliance
entanglement can also be greater during strategic adjustments.
28. Michael Beckley, ‘The Myth of Entangling Alliances’, International Security,
vol. 39, no. 4, Spring 2015, pp. 7-48; David Santoro, ‘America’s Treaty
Allies: worth going to war over?’ The National Interest, 28 April 2014.
29. Lyon, ‘The US and assurance anxieties in Asia’; and Barack
35. Susan E. Rice, ‘America’s future in Asia’, Remarks at Georgetown
University, 20 November 2013; and Scott Snyder, ‘The US-ROK Alliance
and the US Rebalance to Asia’, in Tellis, Denmark and Chaffin, ‘US
Alliances and Partnerships at the Center of Global Power’, pp. 61-85.
36. White House Fact Sheet, ‘Advancing the rebalance
to Asia and the Pacific’, 16 November 2015.
37. Toko Sekiguchi, ‘Japan to Provide Patrol Vessels to the
Philippines’, The Wall Street Journal, 4 June 2015.
38. Michael J. Green, Kathleen H. Hicks, and Zack Cooper, ‘Federated
Defense in Asia’, Center for Strategic and International Studies,
Washington DC, December 2014; and Michael J. Green and Lt. Gen.
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Thomas Conant (USM C Ret.), ‘An independent perspective of US
defence policy in the Asia-Pacific region’, Statement before the US Senate
Armed Services Committee, Washington, 3 February 2016, p. 4.
39. JMOD, Guidelines for Japan-US Defence Cooperation, 2015, Section 5.
40. Ibid.
41. White House Fact Sheet, ‘Advancing the rebalance
to Asia and the Pacific’, 16 November 2015.
42. The White House Office of the Press Secretary, ‘Fact sheet: U.S. Building
Maritime Capacity in Southeast Asia’, Washington DC, 17 November 2015.
43. David Lang, ‘The not-quite-quadrilateral: Australia, Japan
and India’, The Strategist, ASPI, 9 July 2015.
benefits: the EAS allows useful discussions at leaders’ level, and
the ADMM+ is relatively action oriented, promoting functional
cooperation on maritime security, HADR, and counterterrorism.
50. Michael Green, Kathleen Hicks, Mark Cancian, Zack Cooper, John Schnaus,
et al, Asia-Pacific Rebalance 2025: Capabilities, Presence, and Partnerships,
Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, January
2016, p. 5; Michael J. Green, Peter J. Dean, Brendan Taylor and Zack
Cooper, ‘The ANZUS Alliance in an Ascending Asia’, ANU Strategic and
Defence Studies Centre, Centre of Gravity Series Report, July 2015, p. 11.
51. Ashton Carter, ‘The United States and challenges to Asia-Pacific
security’, 14th IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, 30 May 2015, p. 4.
44. Harry B. Harris Jr, ‘Let’s be ambitious together’, Raisina
Dialogue Remarks, New Delhi, 2 March 2016.
52. Patrick M. Cronin, Richard Fontaine, Zachary M. Hosford, Oriana
Skylar Mastro, Ely Ratner and Alexander Sullivan, ‘The Emerging
Asia Power Web: The Rise of Bilateral Intra-Asian Security Ties’,
Center for a New American Security, Washington DC, June 2013.
45. James A Baker III, ‘America in Asia: Emerging Architecture for a Pacific
Community’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 70, number 5, Winter 1991-92, pp. 1-18.
53. Cronin, Fontaine, Hosford, Mastro, Ratner and Sullivan,
‘The Emerging Asia Power Web’, p. 5.
46. White House Fact Sheet, ‘Advancing the rebalance to Asia and
the Pacific’, 16 November 2015; US Department of Defense, The
Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, Washington DC, 2015, p.
20; and Dennis C. Blair and John T. Hanley Jr., ‘From Wheels to
Webs: Reconstructing Asia-Pacific Security Arrangements’, The
Washington Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 1, Winter 2001, pp. 7-17, at p. 11.
54. Malcolm Fraser with Cain Roberts, ‘Dangerous Allies’, Melbourne University
Press, Carlton, 2014. One of the candidates for the 2016 Philippine
Presidency opposes the US-Philippine Visiting Forces Agreement.
47. Chuck Hagel, ‘The U.S. Approach to Regional
Security’, Singapore, 1 June 2012.
56. Brendan Nicholson, ‘China warns Canberra on
security pact’, The Age, 15 June 2007.
48. US Department of Defence, Quadrennial Defense
Review, Washington DC, 2014, p. VI.
57. Rory Medcalf, ‘The ‘q’ word: US Pacific commander defies
diplomatic niceties in New Delhi’, The Interpreter, Lowy
Institute for International Policy, 4 March 2016.
49. Bates Gill, ‘Alliances under Austerity: What does American want?’,
ANU Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Centre of Gravity
Series, September 2013. Some institutions also provide specific
55. Zhu Feng, ‘TSD - Emphemism for multiple alliance?’, in National Bureau
of Asian Research Special Report, December 2008, pp. 43, 48.
58. Brendan Taylor, ‘Conceptualizing the bilateral-multilateral security nexus’,
and William T. Tow, ‘Conclusion’, in William T. Tow and Brendan Taylor,
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eds, Bilateralism, Multilateralism and Asia-Pacific Security: Contending
cooperation, Routledge, London and New York, 2013; Elsina Wainwright,
‘Conflict Prevention in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific’, New York
University Center on International Cooperation, New York, April 2010.
59. Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Japan-Philippines Joint Declaration: A
Strengthened Strategic Partnership for Advancing the Shared Principles and
Goals of Peace, Security, and Growth in the Region and Beyond’, Tokyo,
4 June 2015; and Choe Sang-hun, ‘Japan and South Korea Settle Dispute
Over Wartime “Comfort Women”’, New York Times, 28 December 2015.
60. Tow, ‘Rebalancing and order building: Strategy or illusion?’, pp. 31, 46.
61. Rory Medcalf, ‘Squaring the triangle: An Australian perspective
on Asian security minilateralism’, National Bureau of Asia
Research Special Report, December 2008, p. 28.
62. Malcolm Turnbull, ‘New Responsibilities for an Enduring Partnership’, Center
for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, 18 January 2016.
63. Jim Thomas, Zack Cooper, Iskander Rehman, ‘Gateway to the
Indo-Pacific: Australian Defense Strategy and the Future of
the Australia-US Alliance’, Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments, Washington DC, 2013, pp. 13-20.
64. Bates Gill, ‘The US-Australia Alliance: A Deepening Partnership
in an Emerging Asia’, in Tellis et al, US Alliances and Partnerships
at the Center of Global Power, at pp. 115-116.
65. Bates Gill and Tom Switzer, ‘The New Special Relationship: The USAustralia Alliance Deepens’, Snapshot, Foreign Affairs, 19 February 2015.
66. Mark Thomson, ‘Australia’s Future Defence Spending and its Alliance
with the United States’, Alliance 21 report, United States Studies Centre
at the University of Sydney, 2013; Hayley Channer, ‘Steadying the US
rebalance to Asia: The role of Australia, Japan and South Korea’, Strategic
Insights no. 17, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, November 2014, p. 7.
67. Richard Gowan, ‘Syria, MH17, and the Art of the Possible’, The
Interpreter, Lowy Institute for International Policy, 22 July 2014.
68. Elsina Wainwright, Interview with James Brown, New
York/Sydney, October and November 2015.
69. Tara McKelvey, ’Is the US-UK’s special relationship
in decline?’, BBC, 22 May 2015.
70. Maren Leed, J. D. McCreary, and George Flynn, ‘Advancing
U.S.-Australian Combined Amphibious Capabilities’, Center for
Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, 2015.
71. Evan Medeiros, ‘35 Years of U.S.-China Relations: Diplomacy,
Culture and Soft Power’, Washington DC, 21 January 2015.
72. Australian Department of Defence, Defence White Paper
2013, Canberra, 13 May 2013, section 6.8.
73. Ashton Carter and Marise Payne, ‘Remarks With Secretary of
Defense Ash Carter, Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop, and
Australian Defense Minister Marise Payne’, 13 October 2015.
74. Dennis Richardson, Blamey Oration: The Strategic Outlook for
the Indo-Pacific, RUSI’s Third International Defence and Security
Dialogue, 27 May 2015. Accessed on SMH.com.au website
75. Peter Jennings, ‘The U.S. Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific: An Australian
Perspective’, Asia Policy, no. 15, January 2013, pp. 38-44, at p. 41.
76. Australian Department of Defence, ‘Statement: Freedom of
Navigation in the South China Sea’, Canberra, 27 October 2015.
77. Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, The Force Posture
Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government
of the United States of America, Canberra, 2014, Article 21 section 3.
78. Gregory Poling, ‘AUSMIN takes the long view of USAustralia security cooperation’, CSIS Pacific Partners
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Outlook, Volume IV, Issue 8, September 2014.
79. AUSMIN 2015 Joint Statement, 13 October 2015.
80. Ibid.
81. Australian 2016 Defence White Paper, paragraph 2.17.
82. Australian 2016 Defence White Paper, paragraph 5.17. Alan Dupont,
‘Full spectrum defence: Re-thinking the fundamentals of Australian
defence strategy’, Lowy Institute Analysis, Sydney, March 2015, p. 10.
83. Julie Bishop, ‘US-Australia: The Alliance in an Emerging Asia’, Speech to
the Alliance 21/CSIS Conference, Washington DC, 22 January 2014.
84. East-West Center (EWC), United States Studies Centre at
University of Sydney (USSC), and Perth USAsia Centre at University
of Western Australia (USAC), ‘Australia matters for America/
American matters for Australia’, Washington DC, 2015.
85. Ibid.
86. John Goyer, ‘US-Australia Trade Pact Impresses after First
Decade’, US Chamber of Commerce, 24 March 2015.
87. Michael White, ‘US-Australia Free Trade Agreement
turns 10’, Global Trade Daily, 27 March 2015.
88. EWC, USSC, and USAC, ‘Australia matters for
America/American matters for Australia’.
89. Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Defence White
Paper 2016, Canberra, 2016, Chapter 9, Sections 5.18-5.30.
90. Cameron Stewart, ‘US eyes strategic benefits from Japan
submarines deal’, The Australian, 22 January 2016.
91. Rory Medcalf, ‘We’re not the only friends the United States has
in the Asian region’, The Age, 16 June 2015; Alex Oliver, ‘Will
Australians support a deeper, bolder US alliance?’ The Interpreter,
Lowy Institute for International Policy, 16 July 2015.
92. Ibid.
93. Elsina Wainwright, Interviews with Washington DC analysts,
New York/Washington DC, October and November 2015.
94. Michael Green, Kathleen Hicks, Mark Cancian, Zack Cooper, John
Schnaus, et al, Asia-Pacific Rebalance 2025: Capabilities, Presence, and
Partnerships, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington
DC, January 2016, p. 67. Michael Green and Andrew Shearer, ‘Mr
Turnbull Goes to Washington’, The National Interest, 17 January 2016.
95. Mark Thomson, ‘We don’t have to choose between the US and
China’, The Strategist, ASPI, 2 May 2015; Darren Lim, ‘Hillary
Clinton’s trade warning: Can China coerce Australia?’, The
Interpreter, Lowy Institute for International Policy, 1 July 2014.
96. Hugh White, ‘ANZUS in the Asian Century’, The Strategist,
ASPI, 15 July 2015; and Hugh White, The China Choice: Why
America Should Share Power, Black Inc., Collingwood, 2012.
97. There seems to be some coalescence around this approach. Peter
Varghese, ‘An Australian Worldview: A Practitioner’s Perspective’, Speech
to the Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, 20 August 2015;
Ashton Carter, ‘The United States and challenges to Asia-Pacific security’,
2015 Shangri-La Dialogue, p. 4; Michael J. Green, Peter J. Dean, Brendan
Taylor and Zack Cooper, ‘The ANZUS Alliance in an Ascending Asia’,
ANU Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Centre of Gravity Series
Report, July 2015, p. 12; and G. John Ikenberry, ‘The Rise of China and
the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive?’, Foreign Affairs,
1 January 2008, p. 1. There is also some evidence that China would be
prepared to play an enlarged role within the existing order. Xi Jinping,
Address at the General Debate, 70th Session of the United Nations
General Assembly, New York, 28 September 2015; and Kevin Rudd, ‘USChina 21: The Future of US-China Relations under Xi Jinping: Summary
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Report’, Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center, April 2015, p. 24.
98. Chris Mills, ‘The United States’ Asia-Pacific Policy and the Rise of the
Dragon’, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, August 2015, pp. 3-4.
99. US power stems in part from its rebounding economy with
unrivalled market influence and innovative capacity, the world’s most
technologically advanced military, with a decades-lasting capability
edge, and a new energy security. Jones, Still Ours To Lead.
100.Richard N. Haass, Foreign policy begins at home: The case for putting
America’s house in order, Basic Books, New York, 2013, pp. 139,155.
101. Rudd, ‘US-China 21 Summary Report’, pp. 33-34.
102.Gregory Poling and Benjamin Schaare, ‘Australia’s search for MH370:
Regional leadership through HADR and Search and Rescue Efforts’,
CSIS Pacific Partners Outlook, vol. IV, issue 3, 10 April 2014; Linda
Jakobson, ‘Add substance to Australia’s strategic dialogue with China’,
in Anthony Bubalo, ed., ‘Judicious ambition: International policy
priorities for the new Australian government’, Lowy Institute Analysis,
September 2013, pp. 12-13; Green, Hicks, and Cooper, ‘Federated
Defense in Asia’; and Peter Jennings, ‘The known truths revealed
by flight MH370’, Australian Financial Review, 20 March 2014.
103.Anthony Bergin, ‘Darwin defence hub crucial to white paper’s diplomatic
ambitions,’ The Australian, February 29 2016, p. 9; Jakobson, ‘Add
substance to Australia’s strategic dialogue with China’, pp. 12-13.
104.Julie Bishop, ‘Mapping Asia’s trajectory: An Australian perspective’,
Address to the United States Studies Centre and Center for a
New American Security, Washington DC, 26 January 2016.
105.Niels Marquardt, ‘America and Australia: economic ties
as strong and important as security ties’, The Strategist,
Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 11 August 2014.
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UNITED STATES STUDIES CENTRE | ALLIANCE 21
AUSTRALIA AND THE US ASIAN ALLIANCE NETWORK
About the author
Dr Elsina Wainwright
Adjunct Associate Professor
United States Studies Centre
Dr Elsina Wainwright is an adjunct associate
professor at the United States Studies Centre and a
non-resident fellow in its Alliance 21 Program. Based
in New York, she is also a visiting senior fellow at
the Center on International Cooperation at New York
University. Previous roles include director of the
strategy and international program at the Australian
Strategic Policy Institute, an associate with McKinsey
& Company, a consultant political analyst for the
International Crisis Group, and a stipendiary lecturer
in politics at Oriel College, Oxford University. She
has arts and law degrees from the University of
Queensland, and a master’s degree and doctorate in
international relations from Oxford University, where
she studied as a Rhodes Scholar.
Media enquiries
United States Studies Centre
Institute Building (H03)
The University of Sydney NSW 2006
T: +61 2 9351 7249
E: us-studies@sydney.edu.au
W: ussc.edu.au
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