Ipca Laboratories LTD.
Survey no. 99 – 101, Village Ranu,
Taluka Padra, Dist. Vadodara.
RISK ASSESSMENT STUDY
For proposed plant
PREPARED BY
VAIBHU SAFETY CONSULTANTS
FF-11, Akshat Complex, High Tension road,
Subhanpura, Vadodara-390 023
Phone: 9825756467/9427838021 (M)
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
1
00
CONTENTS
SECTION
NO.
1
2
3
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
3.6
3.7
3.8
3.9
3.10
4
4.0
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
5
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4
5.5
5.6
5.7
5.8
Prepared By
HSE Department
CONTENTS
PAGE NO.
Executive Summary
Objectives, Philosophy and methodology of
Risk assessment
Introduction of the unit
Company Introduction
Details of Unit
Project setting
Organisational setup
List Of product
List of Raw material
Details of storage of Hazardous Materials and
control measures provided
Hazardous Properties Of The Chemicals,
Compatibilities And Special Hazard
Facilities / System for process safety,
transportation, fire fighting system and
emergency capabilities to be adopted
Brief Description of process plant
Hazard identification
Introduction
DOW’s Fire and Explosion Index
Identification of Hazardous area
Hazard and operatibility studies ( HAZOP)
Event Tree Analysis
Failure Frequency
Evaluation of Process areas
Risk Assessment
Effects of Release of Hazardous Substances
Tank on Fire / Pool Fire
Fire Ball
UVCE
Dispersion cases
Identification of High Risk Areas
Modes of Failure
Damage Criteria for heat radiation
4
6
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
8
8
8
10
13
13
14
16
20
22
26
27
27
28
29
29
33
33
35
37
37
37
38
38
38
38
39
40
Page
Rev.
:
:
2
00
6
6.1
6.2
6.3
7
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
8
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
8.8
8.9
8.10
8.11
8.12
8.13
8.14
8.15
8.16
8.17
Prepared By
HSE Department
Consequence Analysis
Consequence Analysis
Detail regarding consequences analysis table
Conclusions
Risk Reduction Measures
Design
Safety Devices
Operation and Maintenance
Recommendations
Disaster Management plan
On site emergency Plan (OSEP)
Scope of OSEP
Elements of OSEP
Methodology
Emergencies Identified
Others
Emergency Organization
Emergency Facilities
Emergency Escapes
Assembly points
Wind sock
Emergency transportation
Emergency communication
Warning Alarm/ Communication of Emergency
Emergency responsibilities
Mutual Aids
Mock Drill
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
41
41
80
83
84
84
84
85
85
87
87
88
88
88
88
88
89
89
90
90
90
90
91
91
91
91
91
Page
Rev.
:
:
3
00
SECTION I
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Executive Summary
M/s. Ipca Laboratories Ltd. is a new proposed industry which will be located at Survey no. 99 –
101, Village Ranu, Taluka Padra, Dist. Vadodara, Gujarat.
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
Experts from Vaibhu Safety Consultants visited the site on 10.03.2011 and subsequently
inspection of site as per site plan and the environs along with collection of relevant
information about the proposed installation and the operations of the plant. Also a detailed
discussion was held on various aspects including storage facilities, process safety and
emergency preparedness with the officers of the company.
Petroleum product like Methanol, Toluene, Acetone, etc., will be received through road
tanker and will be stored in CCOE approved underground storage tank farm area as per
Petroleum Act and Rules. Acetic acid, DNS, Acids, Alkalies, Flammable but non
petroleum products will be stored in above ground tank farm area. LNG will be received
by Cryogenic container and stored in SMPV explosive tank farm area. All safety measures
will be provided at design level and foolproof safety features will be provided.
Some flammable/combustible liquid/solid chemicals will be received in drums or bags or
in carboys and it will be stored in drum storage area and in warehouse as per its
incompatibility and other properties like flammable, toxic, corrosive and reactive.
This plant will receive hydrogen cylinders skid through Road trucks. Provision will be
made as per explosive licence.
Based on the data furnished and the study of the installation, certain hazards have been
identified and their consequences are modeled mathematically using HAMSGAP software.
Mapping of various scenario are with hazardous distances and safe distances are drawn on
site plan for easy understanding of the consequences of the accident/ incident.
The study indicates that possible hazards associated with the plant are confined to (a)
Underground petroleum storage tank farm (b) Above ground storage tank farm area(c)
Hydrogen cylinder road truck area (d) Drum storage area. (e) HSD storage tank area. (f)
LNG bullet storage area. Various hazardous scenarios have been identified for Risk
Assessment and the consequences modeled.
The results of the analysis have been summarized in the table appended.
It is observed from the summary that the consequences of hazards associated with any
possible spills / leaks for catastrophic failure of storage tanks, road tanker release scenarios
would be of large in nature and would be taken care of with the proposed emergency
facilities and manpower employed.
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
4
00
1.8
1.9
1.10
1.11
1.12
The possibility of occurrence of such hazards and their effects could be further reduced by
implementing the suggestions made in this report.
Catastrophic failure of storage tanks, road tanker resulting in major disaster due to fire,
explosion and toxic releases is very unlikely events barring gross neglect of time tested
safety standards and procedures set up by the industry.
The possibility of occurrence of major disaster due to fire, explosion and toxic release and
mishaps are considered very remote.
However considering the potential for major hazards, however remote they may be,
associated with storage area, some suggestions are made in the subsequent chapters for
further improvement in the areas of safety, environmental impact, Emergency facilities and
emergency preparedness plan.
Conclusion Based on the
1) Risk Analysis study and information regarding the layout plan and safety systems.
2) Discussions with company officials,
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
5
00
CHAPTER II
OBJECTIVE, PHILOSOPHY AND METHODOLOGY OF RISK ASSESSMENT
2.1 Objective :
The main objectives of the Risk Assessment (RA) study is to determine damage due to
major hazards having damage potential to life & property and provide a scientific basis to
assess safety level of the facility.
The principle objective of this study was to identify major risks in the manufacture of
specialty fine chemicals and storage of hazardous chemical at site and to evaluate on-site
& off-site consequences of identified hazard scenarios. Pointers are then given for
effective mitigation of hazards in terms of suggestions for effective disaster management,
suggesting minimum preventive and protective measures & change of practices to ensure
safety.
2.2 PHILOSOPHY :
This report is limited to the following:
 Identification of major risk areas.
 Hazard identification/Identification of failure cases
 Consequential analysis of probable risks / failure cases
o Evaluation of heat radiation & pressure wave profiles for identified failure
cases
o Risk assessment on the basic of the above evaluation & risk acceptability
o Minimum preventive & protective measures to be taken to minimize risks to
maximum possible extent.
 Giving pointers for effective disaster management
 Suggesting other measures to further lower the probability of risk
2.3 Methodology
The procedure used for carrying out the Quantitative Risk Assessment Study is outlined
bellow:
Identify Credible Loss Scenarios for the facility under the study by discussion with Ipca
Laboratories Ltd. Simulate loss Scenarios to determine the vulnerable zones for toxic
dispersion, pool fire, Tank on fire (Thermal Radiation ), Flash fire, Explosion over
pressure ( Vapour cloud Explosion, Ball fire using software packages HAMSGAP.
Suggest mitigating measures to reduce the damage, considering all aspects of the facilities.
The flowchart of the methodology for the present study is shown in following page.
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
6
00
RISK ASSESSMENT STUDY METHODOLOGY FLOWCHART
START
FACILITY, PROCESS AND METEOROLOGICAL DATA COLLECTION
LISTING OUT OF HAZARDOUS OPERATIONS & STORAGE DETAILS
IDENTIFICATION OF FAILURE SCENARIOS & QUANTIFICATION OF
PROBABLE HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH THEM
DEFINING OF PARAMETERS FOR EACH OF CHEMICALS & EACH OF
HAZARDS
DEFINING RELEASE TYPE (CONTINUOUS OR INSTANTANIOUS ) &
DETERMINE RELEASE RATES
SIMULATION OF SELECTED CASES FOR CONSEQUENCE MODELING
PREPARATION OF SUMMERY OF CONSEQUENCE RESULTS
EVALUATION OF POTENTIAL RISK TO THE SURROUNDING
POPULATION
DISCUSSION & RECOMMENDATION OF MITIGATIVE / REMEDIAL
MEASURES
END
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
7
00
SECTION III
INTRODUCTION OF THE UNIT
3.1
COMPANY INTRODUCTION
M/s. IPCA Laboratories Limited is a proposed bulk drug project, to be located at Survey No.
99 – 101, Village Ranu, Taluka Padra, Dist. Vadodara..
One of the first modern pharma factory of yesteryears was commissioned by IPCA at
Mumbai in 1969. The company was originally promoted by a group of medical
professionals and businessmen and was incorporated as 'The Indian Pharmaceutical
Combine Association Limited' in October 1949. The present management took over in
November 1975 when the total turnover of the company was only Rs. 0.54 crores.
Currently, this premise where IPCA started its operations, houses the Registered Office of
the company.
The unit is already manufacturing Guaifenesin, Methocarbamol, Camylofin
Dihydrochloride and Prenoxdiazine Hydrochloride. With the increasing demand of its
related products in the global market, the company proposes to start its production
activities in Gujarat at its proposed site. The proposed project falls under Category : 5(f) A,
as per the Environmental Impact Assessment notification, dated September 14, 2006.
Proposed site is located at Village Ranu, which is 9 Kms. From Taluka Padra and 18 Kms.
From Vadodara Dist. Railway station, Various industries are situated around the unit, most
of working on chemical products.
3.2
DETAILS OF UNITS
TABLE: 3.1
Sr.
No.
1.
2.
Particulars
Full Name & Address of Unit
: M/s. Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Survey no. 99 – 101, Village Ranu, Taluka
Padra, Dist. Vadodara, Gujarat.
Telephone No.
: 07412 – 278321
07412 – 279083
mmittal@ipca.co.in
3.
4.
5.
Month & Year of Establishment
: Up coming Unit
Full name & Address of the : Manoj Kumar Mittal
occupier
Sr. General Manager ( Corporate ) EHS
Ipca laboratories Limited ,
P.O. Sejavta ,
Ratlam ( M.P.)- 457002
Full name & Address of the Factory : Manoj Kumar Mittal
manager
Sr. General Manager ( Corporate ) EHS
Ipca laboratories Limited ,
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
8
00
6.
Man Power
P.O. Sejavta ,
Ratlam ( M.P.)- 457002
: 400 for upcoming unit
7.
No. of shift & Shift timing
: Upcoming unit
8.
Environs (Nearest Facilities)
1. Railway Station, Vadodara
2. Police Station, Padra
3. Fire Station, EICL Umaraya,
Padra
4. Hospitals, OHC, Shroff
Foundation, Kalali
: RANU – 3K
: PADRA – 9 KM
: Padra – 9 KM
: Padra – 9 KM
5. Metrological Data
Latitude
Longitude
22°13'21.02" N
73° 0'57.95" E
Temperature
40 0 C
13 0C
Maximum
Minimum
9.
Total Land at Plant
59.06 Acres
10.
Total Built-up area at the Factory
68164 sq.mtr
11.
Plant commissioning in the year
June 2011
12.
Power connection Demand :
2 MW KVA
13.
DG Set
2 Nos x 1000 KVA
14.
Power plant details :
-
15.
Water Storage and source
16.
TFH
400 M3 from borewell or Narmada Water
canal
10 LAC K CAL
17.
Boiler Capacity & type & licence:
6 TON X 2 NOS; 10 TONS X 2 NOS
18.
Effluent treatment Plant Capacity:
350 M3/DAY
19.
Fire water source
Bore Or Narmada canal water
20.
Fire Water Reservoir capacity : M3
400 M3
21.
GPCB/PCB consent (CC & A)
New Application
22
Solid waste Disposal
Member of Solid Waste disposal site on
Nandesari Environment Control Ltd.
(NECL) Member of Incinerator of
Nandesari Environment Control Ltd.
(NECL)
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
9
00
3.3
PROJECT SETTING:
Proposed company is located at 73° 0'57.17" East longitude & 22°13'22.89" North latitude
in Village: Ranu, Tal: Padra, Dist. Vadodara in Gujarat State.
Ranu is located at a distance of 18 km to the West of Vadodara District, The State
Highway No. 6 passes about 1 km north of the site. The Vadodara – Jambusar railway line
is about 3 km from the site with Ranu as the nearest railway station. Proposal site is shown
as Figure 1.1. & Plot plan is shown in figure 1.2.
The Gujarat has four distinct seasons: winter (December–March), summer (April–June),
rainy season (July–September), and monsoon season (October–November). Air
temperatures range from an average daily maximum around 40 C, normally recorded in
April and May, to an average daily minimum around 13 C in the winter. Relative humidity
is quite high, exceeding 70% during rainy season. The sky is mostly cloudy during the
rainy season and less cloudy in the post–monsoon months, with clear sky during the other
months of the year. Wind speeds are generally low, though they accelerate during the latter
part of summer and early southwest monsoons. Wind speeds range from calm to more than
6 km per hour.
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
10
00
Figure 1.1 Google Image
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
11
00
Figure 1.2
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
12
00
3.4
SAFETY ORGANIZATIONAL SET UP
SR.G.M.
(Corporate EHS)
PLANT MANAGER
Manager EHS
EHS Officer
Fire Supervisor-1
OHC
Visiting Doctor
Male Nurse
Word boy
Firemen -2 &
Safety Supervisor-1
3.5
LIST OF PRODUCTS
TABLE: 3.2
Sr. No.
Chemical
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
Extraction Of Artemisinin
Arte Range Products
Frusemide – DMF
Losartan Potassium
Allopurinol
Ramipril
Lisinopril
4,7, DCQ
Amodiaquine HCl / Base
Chloroquine phosphate
Quetiapine Hemifumarate
Gabapentene
Mesalamine
Mycophenolic acid
Rapamycin / Sirolimus
Serratiopeptidase
Tacrolimus
Tramadol
Febuxastat
R & D Products
3.6
Quantity
MT / Month
0.5
4.17
20
10
10
2.5
1.67
50
20
66.67
8.33
8.33
8.33
1.06
0.02
2
0.025
8.33
1.67
0.1
Physical
state
Liquid
solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
Storage
In
Drum
Drum
Drum
Drum
Drum
Drum
Drum
Drum
Drum
Drum
Drum
Drum
Drum
Drum
Drum
Drum
Drum
Drum
Drum
Drum
MOC
HDPE /FIBER
HDPE /FIBER
HDPE /FIBER
HDPE /FIBER
HDPE /FIBER
HDPE /FIBER
HDPE /FIBER
HDPE /FIBER
HDPE /FIBER
HDPE /FIBER
HDPE /FIBER
HDPE /FIBER
HDPE /FIBER
HDPE /FIBER
HDPE /FIBER
HDPE /FIBER
HDPE /FIBER
HDPE /FIBER
HDPE /FIBER
HDPE /FIBER
LIST OF ROW MATERIAL
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
13
00
TABLE: 3.3
Sr.
No.
1.
2.
Chemical
1-Hydroxy Benzotraizole
(HOBT)
2-Chloro ethoxy ethanol
Quantity
MT / Month
2.50
5.25
3 APC
4,7 Dicholoroquine (DCQ)
Acetic Acid
Acetone
Acetonitrile
Activated Carbon
Ammonium Sulphate
Anhydrous Zinc Chloride
Antifoam
Artemisinin
Artimisinin leaf
Azabicyclo Benzylester
Bacteriological Peptone
Benzoyl Peroxide
Boron Trifluoride Etherate
14.58
40.17
12.43
77.25
13.96
23.69
2.00
24.00
0.63
4.53
100.00
2.08
0.38
3.23
0.31
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
Bromine (Br2)
Br-OTBN
Calcium Carbonate
Calcium Chloride
Casein
Casein enzyme hydro lysole
Catalyst
Catalyst Pd
Caustic Soda Flakes
CDMA
Citric Acid
Cotton Seed Meal
Cyclohexanone
Denatured Spirit (DNS)
Dextrin
Dextrose
Di ethyl ether (DEE)
Di Hydro Artemisinin
Di Iso Propyl ether (DIPE)
Diammonium Phosphate
Dicyclo hexyl carbodimide
(DCC )
Dimethyl amine HCL
Dimethyl Formamide (DMF)
Dimethyl Tetrahydro
Pyrimidine (DTP) (IDI010)
Di-Potassium Hydrogen
Phosphate
EDTA
EMME
Ethanol
Ethoxy Carbonyl Phenyl
13.50
11.77
1.63
0.38
10.20
4.50
1.06
0.96
10.62
16.00
0.09
6.00
8.78
22.17
26.00
23.67
4.33
13.87
1.47
4.00
3.92
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
Prepared By
HSE Department
Physical
state
Storage
In
MOC
Solid
Drum
PVC
Liquid
PVC
Liquid
Solid
Solid
Solid
Solid
Carbuoy
/ Drum
Drum
Bag
Tank
Tank
Tank
Bag
Bag
Bag
Drum
Drum
Bag
Drum
Drum
Drum
Carbuoy
/ Bottle
Bottle
Drum
Drum
Bag
Drum
Solid
Solid
Solid
Solid
Solid
Drum
Drum
Bag
Drum
Bag
HDPE
HDPE
HDPE
HDPE
HDPE
Liquid
Liquid
Solid
Solid
Liquid
Solid
Liquid
Solid
Liquid
Drum
Tank
Bag
Bag
Drum
Drum
Drum
Bag
carbuoy
MS
SS
HDPE
HDPE
MS
HDPE
HDPE
HDPE
PVC
Solid
Liquid
Solid
Bag
Drum
Drum
Woven + PP
HDPE
HDPE
Solid
Bag
HDPE
Solid
Liquid
Liquid
Liquid
Bag
Tank
Tank
Drum
Woven + PP
HDPE
MS
HDPE
0.5
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
39.
40.
41.
Max. Storage
At a Time at
Site (MT)
6.93
6.38
6.33
1.1
2.9
8.0
20 KL
16 KL
18 KL
4.7
0.4
4.8
0.1
0.9
20.0
0.4
0.1
0.6
0.1
2.7
2.4
0.3
0.1
2.0
0.9
0.2
0.2
2.1
3.2
0.0
1.2
1.8
40 KL
5.2
4.7
0.9
2.8
0.3
0.8
0.8
1.4
1.3
Solid
Solid
Liquid
Liquid
Liquid
Solid
Solid
Solid
Liquid
Solid
Solid
Solid
Solid
Solid
Liquid
Fibre
Woven + PP
SS
MS
MS
Woven + PP
HDPE
HDPE
HDPE
HDPE
HDPE
HDPE
HDPE
HDPE
HDPE
Glass Bottle
HDPE
HDPE
HDPE
HDPE
1.3
0.90
0.03
26.75
169.33
2.20
0.2
0.0
5.4
40 KL
0.4
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
14
00
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
Propyl Alanine (ECPPA)
Ethyl 2-(3-formyl-4hydroxyphenyl)-4methylthiazole-5-carboxylate
Ethyl Acetate
Formamide
Formic Acid
Furfurylamine(FFA)
Glycerol
Grignard reagent
HCl CP grade
Hydrochloric Acid
Hydrogen Gas
Hydroxylamine hydrochloride
Hyflow
Iodine
IPA / Acetone
Iso Propyl Amine
IPAAC
Isopropyl Alcohol
Lasamide
Light Paraffin Oil
Liq. Ammonia
L-Proline – 04
Magnesium Sulphate
Magnesium turnings
Malic Acid
Malt Extract
Mannich Base
MCA
Meta bromoanisole
Methanol
Methyl tertiary Butyl
Ether(MTBE)
Methylene di chloride
N,N Dimethyl Aniline
N-Hexane
Nitric acid
Nitro compound
Novaldiamine
Para formaldehyde
Petroleum Ether
Phenol
Phosphoric Acid
2.25
19.20
18.83
17.08
20.67
10.45
0.18
0.21
136.42
1.88
0.53
1.60
0.01
10.00
8.83
31.75
170.75
25.75
166.75
154.58
6.25
1.63
2.37
1.15
0.37
12.25
15.75
15.35
319.71
1.05
20.85
2.02
87.40
5.48
12.28
5.25
2.54
0.59
20.00
36.39
0.5
3.8
3.4
4.1
2.1
0.0
0.0
40 KL
0.4
0.1
0.3
0.0
2.0
1.8
6.4
34.2
5.2
33.4
20 KL
1.3
0.3
0.5
0.2
0.1
2.5
3.2
3.1
40 KL
0.2
4.2
0.4
20 KL
5 KL
2.5
1.1
0.5
0.1
4.0
7.3
Liquid
Drum
HDPE
Liquid
Liquid
Liquid
Liquid
Liquid
Liquid
Liquid
Liquid
Gas
Solid
Solid
Solid
Liquid
Liquid
Liquid
Liquid
Solid
Liquid
Liquid
Solid
Solid
Solid
Solid
Liquid
Solid
Liquid
Liquid
Liquid
Liquid
Tank
Drum
carbuoy
Drum
Drum
Drum
Drum
Tank
bullet
Drum
Bag
Drum
Tank
Tank
Tank
Tank
Bag
Drum
Tank
Drum
Bag
Bag
Drum
Drum
Bag
Drum
carbuoy
Tank
Drum
MS
HDPE
HDPE
HDPE
HDPE
HDPE
HDPE
MSRL
MS
HDPE
Poly Bag
HDPE
MS
MS
FRP
MS
Woven + PP
MS
MS
HDPE
HDPE
Woven + PP
HDPE
HDPE
Woven + PP
HDPE
HDPE
MS
HDPE
Liquid
Liquid
Liquid
Liquid
Solid
Liquid
Solid
Liquid
Liquid
Liquid
MS
MS
MS
HDPE
HDPE
HDPE
HDPE
HDPE
MS
PVC
Liquid
Tank
Drum
Tank
Tank
Bag
Drum
Bag
Drum
Drum
Tank/car
buoy
carbuoy
Solid
Liquid
Solid
Solid
Solid
Solid
Drum
Drum
Drum
Bag
Drum
Drum
HDPE
HDPE
HDPE
Woven + PP
HDPE
HDPE
Solid
Solid
Drum
Drum
HDPE
HDPE
Solid
Solid
Drum
Bag
HDPE
Poly Bag
8.8
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
Phosphorous Oxy-chloride
POCl3
Piperazine
Poly Ethylene Glycerol
Poly Propylene Glycol
Potassium Carbonate
Potassium Chloride
Potassium Dihydrogen
Phosphate
Potassium hydroxide
Proline Benzyl Easter
Hydrochloride
Silica gel
Sodium Acetate
Prepared By
HSE Department
43.75
6.33
1.70
0.40
2.83
0.38
3.00
3.50
2.08
9.53
42.08
1.3
0.3
0.1
0.6
0.1
0.6
0.7
0.4
1.9
8.4
1.2
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
PVC
:
:
15
00
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
3.7
Sodium Azide
Sodium Bi Carbonate
Sodium Boro Hydride
Sodium Carbonate
Sodium Chloride
Sodium Hydroxide (NaOH)
Sodium Nitrate
Soluble Starch
Soya Bean Flour
Soya Oil
Soya Peptone
Succnic Anhydride
Sucrose
Sulphuric Acid
Tetra Butyl Ammonium
Bromide (TBAB)
Tetra hydro furan
TGA
Toluene
Triethylamine (TEA)
Trityl Chloride
Yeast Extract
Zinc Sulphate
Iso Butyl Bromide
Sodium Formade
5.88
72.33
2.08
0.83
55.00
61.56
3.10
12.33
30.35
8.40
2.47
2.43
11.60
59.92
2.18
52.67
0.07
439.92
11.08
16.67
0.50
0.04
1.07
0.67
14.5
0.4
0.2
11.0
12.3
0.6
2.5
6.1
1.7
0.5
0.5
2.3
20 KL
0.4
10.5
0.0
20 KL
2.2
3.3
0.1
0.0
0.2
0.1
Solid
Solid
Solid
Solid
Solid
Solid
Solid
Liquid
Liquid
Liquid
Liquid
Solid
Solid
Liquid
Solid
Drum
Bag
Drum
Bag
Bag
Bag
Drum
Drum
Drum
Drum
Drum
Bag
Bag
Carbouy
Drum
HDPE
Poly Bag
HDPE
Poly Bag
Poly Bag
Poly Bag
HDPE
HDPE
HDPE
HDPE
HDPE
PVC
PVC
HDPE
Fibre Drum
Liquid
Liquid
Liquid
Liquid
Solid
Solid
Solid
Liquid
Solid
Drum
Drum
Tank
Drum
Drum
Drum
Bag
Drum
Drum
MS
HDPE
MSRL Tank
HDPE
HDPE
HDPE
PVC
HDPE
HDPE
DETAILS OF STORAGE OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS & CONTROL
MEASURES:
TABLE: 3.4
NAME OF
MAX.
PLACE
OPERATING
TYPE OF
CONTROL
HAZARDOUS
STORAGE
OF IT’S STORAGE
PRESSURE
HAZARD
MEASURE PROVIDED
SUBSTANCE
CAP.[Qty.]
Sulfuric Acid
Tank Farm Area
A/G Tank
Tank Farm Area
A/G Tank
Tank farm area
A/G Tank
ATP
Ambient
ATP
Ambient
ATP
Ambient
Corrosive
Hydrochloric
Acid
20 KL X 1
Nos Tank
5 Kl x 1 no
Tank
20 KL X 2
Nos Tank
 Dyke wall will be provided to
storage tank Level gauge will
provided.
 Scrubber will be provided
 Required PPEs will be provided
to all employees
 Double drain valve will be
provided to Acid storage tank.
 Full body protection will be
provided to operator during
unloading and handling of Acids
 Caution note and emergency first
aid measures will be displayed
and train for the same to all
employees.
 Safety shower and eye wash will
be provided in storage tank area
and plant area.
 Total close process will be
adopted for Sulfuric acid
handling.
NAME OF
MAX.
PLACE
OPERATING
TYPE OF
CONTROL
HAZARDOUS
STORAGE
OF IT’S STORAGE
PRESSURE
HAZARD
MEASURE PROVIDED
Nitric Acid
Prepared By
HSE Department
AND TEMP.
Corrosive
Corrosive
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
16
00
SUBSTANCE
CAP.[Qty.]
Acetic Acid
Tank Farm Area
A/G Tank
Tank Farm Area
U/G Tank
Tank Farm Area
A/G Tank
Tank Farm Area
U/G tank
Tank Farm Area
U/G Tank
Tank Farm Area
U/G Tank
Tank Farm Area
U/G Tank
Tank Farm Area
A/G Tank
Tank Farm Area
A/G Tank
Tank Farm Area
U/G Tank
Tank Farm Area
U/G Tank
Tank Farm Area
A/G Tank
Tank Farm Area
A/G Tank
ATP,
Ambient
ATP
Ambient
ATP
Ambient
ATP
Ambient
ATP
Ambient
ATP
Ambient
ATP
Ambient
ATP
Ambient
ATP
Ambient
ATP
Ambient
ATP
Ambient
ATP
Ambient
ATP
Ambient
Fire
HSD
( As a Fuel)
10 KL X 2
No Tank
16 Kl x 1no
Tank
20 Kl x 2nos
Tank
20 Kl x 2nos
Tank
20 Kl x 1no
no. Tank
20 Kl x 1 No
Tank
20 Kl x 1nos
Tank
20 Kl x 1No
Tank
20 Kl x 1 No
tank
20 Kl x 2
Nos Tank
20 Kl x 1 No
Tank
18 Kl x 1no
Tank
10 KL X 1
No. Tank
Fire/
Toxic
Fire
 SS storage tank will be provided
as per IS code.
 Dyke wall will be provided to
storage tank.
 Level transmitter will be
provided with low level high
level auto cut-off provision.
 Vent will be connected to water
trap and vent of water trap will
be provided with flame arrestor.
 Water sprinkler system will be
provided to storage tank.
 Fire hydrant monitor with foam
attachment facility will be
provided.
 Dumping / Drain vessel will be
provided to collect dyke wall
spillage material.
 FLP type pump will be provided.
 Nitrogen blanketing will be
provided to storage tank.
 Double static earthing will be
provided to storage tank.
 Double Jumper clip will be
provided to pipeline flanges.
 SCBA sets available .
NAME OF
MAX.
PLACE
OPERATING
TYPE OF
CONTROL
HAZARDOUS
STORAGE
OF IT’S STORAGE
PRESSURE
HAZARD
MEASURE PROVIDED
Acetone
Denatured
spirit
Ethyl Alcohol
Ethyl Acetate
Toluene
N-Hexane
IPA
Iso Propyl
Amine
Methanol
Petroleum
Ether
Aceto Nitrile
Prepared By
HSE Department
AND TEMP.
Fire
Fire
Fire
Fire
Fire
Fire
Fire
Fire
 Flame proof plant, pumping
transfer, close process, etc.
 Double Static earthing
 Dyke wall
 Tanker unloading procedure.
 SCBA sets available .
 Flame proof plant, pumping
transfer, close process, etc.
 Jumper clips on flanges
 Fire extinguishers
 Fencing and No Smoking and
prohibited area.
 Tanker unloading procedure.
 Flame arrestor provided on vent
line of the tank
 Hydrant system
Fire
Fire
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
17
00
SUBSTANCE
CAP.[Qty.]
Liq. Ammonia
20 Kl x 1 No
Tank Farm Area
A/G Tank
ATP
Ambient
Corrosive
Toxic
Hydrogen Gas
Skid
H2 road truck
skid 1500 m3
Ambient
4 kg/cm2
Explosive
LNG
( As a Fuel)
Bullet
Explosive
licenced area
Cryogen
Storage
Explosive
Prepared By
HSE Department
AND TEMP.
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
 Level gauge will be provided.
 Scrubber provided
 Required PPEs will be provided
to all employees
 Double drain valve will be
provided to sulfuric Acid storage
tank
 Full body protection will be
provided to operator.
 Caution note and emergency first
aid will be displayed and train
for the same to all employees.
 Safety shower and eye wash will
be provided in storage tank area
and plant area.
 Total close process will be
adopted for Ammonia handling.
 Dyke wall will be provided to
storage tank
 Hydrogen road skid will be
connected to reactor.
 PRV station with NRV, SV Auto
shutoff valve will be provided.
 Non sparking tools will be used
for connecting skid to PRV
station.
 Static Earthing provision will be
made.
 One by one cylinder rack valve
will be opened.
 Storage facilities will be made as
per SMPV Rules.
 Tank farm away from the other
facilities.
 Safe distances will be maintained
 Double Safety Valve will be
provided.
 Double static earthing will be
provided.
 Level indicator with transmeter
will be provided.
 Pressure gauge will be provided.
Page
Rev.
:
:
18
00
3.8
SR.
HAZARDOUS PROPERTIES OF THE CHEMICALS, COMPATIBILITIES AND SPECIAL HAZARD
Table-3.5
NAME OF
CHEMICAL
NFPA
H F R
HAZARDOUS
COMBUSTIO
N PRODUCT
TLV /
TWA
PPM
1.1
SOLUBI
LITY
WITH
WATER
at 20 0 C
Soluble
1 3 0
Irritating vapour
HAZARD
FLASH
POINT
0
C
BP
0
C
LE
L%
UE
L%
SP.GR.
20 0 C
VD
F/T
10
54
5.4
44
0.792
IDLH
PPM
LC50
CARCINO
GENIC
CHARACT
ERISTIC
ANTIDOT
200
6000
LEL
64000
ppm for
4H rat
No
10 mg
diazepam
through
injection
Diazem – 1
mg/Kg.(Intrav
enous),
Epinephina,
Efidrine
Sodium
HydroCarbonate
(4% Conc.),
Milk, Lime
Juice, Milk of
Megnesia
Sodium HydroCarbonate (4%
Conc.), Milk,
Lime Juice,
Milk of
Megnesia
Sodium
HydroCarbonate
(4% Conc.),
Milk, Lime
Juice, Milk of
Megnesia
Not available
1.
Methanol
CAS# 67-56-1
2.
Toluene
CAS # 108-88-3
F
4.0
111
1.1
7.1
0.87
3.2
Insoluble
2 3 0
Irritating
Vapour
generated
50
2000
400 ppm
for 24Hr
Rat
No
3.
Acetic Acid
CAS # 64-19-7
T/F
44.4
117.9
5.4
16.0
1.015
--
SOLUBL
E
2 2 1
Irritating
Vapour
generated
10
40
5620
ppm for
1 Hr Rat
No
4.
Sulfuric Acid
CAS # 7664-93-9
C
NF
340
--
--
1.84
--
Water
reactive
3 0 2
Non
combustible
1
mg/m3
15
mg/m3
510
mg/m3 for
2H Rat
No
5.
Nitric Acid
CAS # 7697-37-2
C
NF
121
--
--
1.408
2.5
Soluble
3 0 0
-
4
67 ppm
260
(NO2)/ mg/m3/30
4H.
M Rat
Yes
6.
Ethyl Acetate
CAS # 141-78-6
Acetone
CAS# 67-64-1 99
F
-4.0
77.0
2.0
11.5
0.902
3.0
1 3 0
400
- 20
56
2.15
13.0
0.791
2.00
Irritating
Vapour
Irritating vapour
-
F
1 ml/10ml
water
Soluble
750
25000
LEL
7.
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
13 0
:
:
19
00
200
gm/m3
-
No
No
10 mg diazepam
through
injection
8.
Isopropyl alcohol
CAS # 67-63-0
F
18.5
82.3
2.3
12.7
0.785
2.1
Miscible
1 3 0
Acid smoke &
fumes
400
2000
LEL
-
No
Not available
9.
Acetonitrile
CAS #75-05-8
T/F
42
81.6
4.4
16
0.787
1.4
Soluble
2 3 1
Toxic vapor are
generated
2.7
40
ppm
4000
ppm
No
Cyanide Kit
10.
Ammonia liquor
CAS #1336-21-6
Toxic
-
36
Miscible
3 1 0
Not combustible
25
300
2000
ppm/4-hr
No
11.
Hexane
CAS #110-54-3
F
-7
68.7
1.2
7.7
0.659
3.0
-
1 3 0
CO & CO2
50 ppm
5000
ppm
-
No
Wash with
Lactic Acid,
Apply
soframycin
Smelling
Ethanol or Ether
No specific
Antidot
12.
Hydrogen Gas
CAS # 1333-74-0
F/E
N.A.
-
3.0
74
0.0696
-
-
0 4 0
Explosive gas
-
-
-
No
-
13.
Iso Propyl Amine
CAS # 75-31-0
F
-26.1
32.4
2.3
12
0.691
2.04
Soluble
3 4 0
Toxic oxides of
nitrogen.
5 ppm
750
ppm
No
14.
Petroleum Ether
CAS # 8000-05-9
T/F
-40
30
1.1
5.9
0.75
2.6
Insoluble
1 4 0
Toxic vapor are
generated
400
ppm
1100
ppm
No specific
Antidot
Water & Milk
Water
15.
Ethyl Alcohol
CAS # 64–17-5
F
55
78.3
3.3
19
0.790
1.6
Soluble
0 3 0
CO & CO2
1000
ppm
3300
ppm
3.28
mg/l for
4 hr rat
3400
ppm for
4H rat
20000
ppm for
10H rat
16.
Denatured Spirit
CAS # 64-17-5
F
55
78.3
3.3
19
0.790
1.6
Soluble
0 3 0
CO & CO2
1000
ppm
3300
ppm
20000
ppm for
10H rat
No
17.
LNG
F&E
Highly
Flammabl
e
-161
5
15
0.415 at
-162C
0.55
Float on
water
1 4 0
Not pertinent
Not
listed
Not
listed
Not
listed
No
F
E
BP
UEL
ER
R
NFPA
Prepared By
HSE Department
16
25
0.9
= FIRE
T
= EXPLOSIVE
R
= BOILING POINT
LEL
= UPPER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT
SP.GR
= EVAPORATION RATE
H
= REACTIVE HAZARD
BR
=NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION-usa N.A
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
1.2
= TOXIC
= REACTIVE
= LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT
= SPECIFIC GRAVITY
= HEALTH HAZARD CLASS
= BURNING RATE
= NOT AVAILABLE
Page
Rev.
:
:
C
STEL
PPM
VD
F
TLV
N.L
20
00
= CORROSIVE
= SHORT TERM EXPOSURE LIMIT
= PARTS PER MILLION
= VAPOUR DENSITY
= FIRE HAZARD CLASS
= THRESHOLD LIMIT VALUE
=NOT LISTED
No
No
2 gm sodium bi
carbonate in 250
ml water,
Diazepam 10 mg
through injection
2 gm sodium bi
carbonate in 250
ml water,
Diazepam 10 mg
through injection
Not applicable
3.9
Facilities / System for process safety, transportation, fire fighting system and
emergency capabilities to be adopted
Following facilities and system will be installed
3.9.1
Process Safety:
1
Process plant will be made as per USFDA and GMP requirements and
safety will be the first priority to make plant full proof safe.
Safety measures will be adopted from the design stage.
The reaction will be carried by heating, here the heat energy will be
conducted vide steam through Jackets/Limpet Coils. Low Pressure Steam
Line will be connected to these vessels with jackets /Limpet coils
appropriately insulated. The vessels will also be fitted with safety valve,
pressure indicator for visual periodic checks.
Safety Valve and pressure gauge will be provided on reactor jacket.
PRV will be provided from steam boiler high pressure line to control
required pressure in reactor jacket.
Utility like Chilling, cooling, vacuum, steaming and its alternative will be
provided to control reaction parameters in a safe manner.
Control of addition of reactants in to reactor by gravity from day tank or
by manual addition in continuous watching temperature and other critical
reaction parameters.
Free Fall of any flammable material in the vessel will be avoided.
Powder charging through man hole will be avoided and safe hoper with
slotting arrangement will be adopted.
Static earthing provision will be made at design stage to all solvent
handling equipments, reactors, vessels & powder handling equipments.
Any reaction upsets will be confined to the reaction vessel itself as defined
quantity of charges of raw materials is issued to the reaction vessel/Day
tank by metering pumps.
Stirrer On- Off position indicators will be provided.
Reactor vent line will be connected with reflux unit or condenser in case of
VOC or with scrubber in case of toxic gas generation in reaction.
All emergency valves and switches and emergency handling facilities will
be easily assessable.
Distillations will be carried out under vacuum fractionation distillations.
Hence the pressure development within the unit will not occur. However
since the distillations will be carried out well above the flash point of the
mass, vacuum failure alarm will be provided and non return valves will be
incorporated on the main vacuum lines to curb vacuum failure in the
system.
Further all the vessels will be examined periodically by a recognized
competent person under the Gujarat Factory Rules 1963-Rule 61(1).
All the vessels and equipments will be well earthed appropriately and well
protected against Static Electricity. Also for draining in drums proper
earthing facilities will be provided.
Materials will be transferred by pumping through pipeline or by vacuum
from drums.
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
21
00
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
All solvents and flammable material storage tanks will be away from the
process plant and required quantity of material will be charge in reactor by
pump.
Flammable material drum will be also charged by vacuum.
Temperature indicators are provided near all reactor and distillation
systems.
Jumpers will be provided on all solvent handling pipeline flanges.
Caution note, safety posters, stickers, periodic training & Updation in
safety and emergency preparedness plan will be displayed and conducted.
Flame proof light fittings will be installed in the plant.
All the Plant Personnel will be provided with Personal Protection
Equipments to protect against any adverse health effect during operations,
leakage, spillages or splash. PPE like Helmets, Safety Shoes, Safety
Glasses, Acid-Alkali Proof Gloves etc. will be provided to the employees.
All employees will be given and updated in Safety aspects through periodic
training in safety.
Material Safety Data Sheets of Raw Materials & Products will be readily
available that the shop floor.
3.9.1.1
Hydrogenation Plant:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
PLC base process controls and operation of plant will be installed.
FLP type area will be provided.
Total enclosed process system.
Instrument & Plant Air System.
Nitrogen blanketing in Hydrogenation reactor.
Safety valve and Rupture disc provided on reactor.
Cooling Chilling and power alternative arrangement have been made
on reactor.
Hydrogen and Nitrogen Cylinder bank away from the autoclave
reactor.
PRV station with shut off valve, safety valve provision will be made
for hydrogenation reaction safety.
Before Hydrogen Gas charging in to reactor and after completion of
reaction Nitrogen flushing will be done.
Flame arrestor will be provided on vent line of reactor and it will be
extended up to roof level.
Open well ventilated and fragile roof will be provided to on reactor.
Safe Catalyst charging method will be adopted.
SOP will be prepared and operators will be trained for the same.
Static earthing and electric earthing (Double ) provided.
Rector vent extended out side the process area and flame arrestor
provided on vent line.
Dumping vessel arrangement will be made.
Jumpers for static earthing on pipeline flanges of flammable chemical
will be provided.
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
22
00
3.9.2
Transportation
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
3.9.3
For Underground storage tank farm :
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
3.9.4
Class A petroleum products will be received through road tanker and
stored in underground storage tank as per petroleum rules.
Road tanker unloading procedure will be in place and will be
implemented for safe unloading of road tanker.
Static earthing provision will be made for tanker unloading.
Earthed Flexible Steel hose will be used for solvent unloading from
the road tanker.
Fixed pipelines with pumps will be provided for solvent transfer up to
Day tanks/reactors.
Double mechanical seal type pumps will be installed.
NRV provision will be made on all pump discharge line.
Some chemicals will be received at plant in drums by road truck and
stored in a separate drum store.
Class A petroleum products will be received through road tanker and
stored in underground storage tank as per petroleum rules.
Tank farm will be constructed as per explosive department
requirement and separation distance will be maintained.
Static earthing provision will be made for road tanker as well as
storage tank.
Flame arrestor with breather valve will be provided on vent line.
Road tanker unloading procedure will be prepared and implemented.
Fire load calculation will be done and as per fire load Hydrant System
will be provided as per NFPA std. and Fire extinguishers will be
provided as per fire load calculation.
Spark arrestor will be provided to all vehicles in side premises.
Flame proof type equipment s and lighting will be provided.
Lightening arrestor will be provided on the top of chimney.
Trained and experience operator will be employed for tank farm area.
NFPA label ( hazard identification ) capacity and content will be
displayed on storage tank.
Solvents will be transferred by pump only in plant area and day tank
will be provided. Overflow line will be return to the storage tank or
Pump On-Off switch will be provided near day tank in plant.
Jumpers will be provided on solvent handling pipe line flanges.
Flexible SS hose will be used for road tanker unloading purpose and
other temp. connection.
For Hydrogen skid :






Hydrogen road skid will be received by road and skid will be stored away from process
plant.
PRV station provided with shut off valve and safety valve .
Flame proof light fitting installed.
Static earthing and electric earthing (Double) provided.
Jumpers for static earthing on pipeline flanges of flammable chemical will be provided.
Non sparking tools will be used for hydrogen line fitting.
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
23
00
3.9.5
For LNG :







3.9.6
For Drum Storage area :









3.9.7
Only general shift material is being handled.
FLP type light fittings will be provided.
Proper ventilation will be provided in godown.
Proper label and identification board /stickers will be provided in the storage area.
Drum pallets will be provided.
Drum handling trolley / stackers will be used for drum handling.
Separate dispensing room with local exhaust and static earthing provision will be
made.
Materials will be stored as Compatibility and separate area for flammable, corrosive
and toxic chemical drums in store.
Smoking and other spark, flame generating item will be banned from the Gate.
Safety Measures for Acid storage tank area:














3.9.8
Storage facilities will be made as per SMPV Rules.
Tank farm away from the other facilities.
Safe distances will be maintained
Double Safety Valve will be provided.
Double static earthing will be provided.
Level indicator with transmeter will be provided.
Pressure gauge will be provided.
Storage tank will be stored away from the process plant.
Tanker unloading procedure will be prepared and implemented.
Caution note and emergency handling procedure will be displayed at unloading area
and trained all operators.
NFPA label will be provided.
Required PPEs like full body protection PVC apron, Hand gloves, gumboot,
Respiratory mask etc. will be provided to operator.
Neutralizing agent will be kept ready for tackle any emergency spillage.
Safety shower, eye wash with quenching unit will be provided in acid storage area.
Material will be handled in close condition in pipe line.
Dyke wall will be provided to all storage tanks, collection pit with valve provision.
Double drain valve will provided.
Level gauge will be provided on all storage tanks.
Safety permit for loading unloading of hazardous material will be prepared and
implemented.
TREM CARD will be provided to all transporters and will be trained for transportation
Emergency of Hazardous chemicals.
Fire hydrant system with jockey pump as per TAC norms will be installed.
Fire fighting system


400m3store capacity along with a stand by pump also doubles up as emergency water
supply in case of any eventuality.
Sufficient numbers of Fire extinguishers will be installed in plant and storage area as
per fire load calculation.
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
24
00



3.9.9
Fire hydrant system as per NFPA norms will be installed in the plant.
It is proposed to have a provision for separate Water storage tank for fire water as well
as process water requirement.
D.G. Sets will be provided for emergency power.
Pipelines:
The various pipelines to transfer i.e. charging, draining etc. in the plant will be periodically
inspected for Support, Vibration, Corrosion conditions, Painting, and Colour Code.
Pipelines and Flexible pipeline (SS 316/MS) are appropriately earthed to avoid
accumulation of Static Electricity. Periodic Checkups of the pipelines will be conducted to
curb any chances of mishap due to leakages. Preventive Maintenance Schedules will be in
practice.
3.9.10 Emergency Planning:
1.
Transport Emergency planning and training to driver and cleaner will
be provided.
2. TREM card will be provided to transporter.
3. On way emergency telephone number list will be provided to
transporter.
4. Acetonitril handling & transportation safety SOP will be prepared and
trained employees.
5. Emergency siren and wind sock will be provided.
6. Scenario base On Site emergency Plan will be prepared.
7. Tele Communication system and mobile phone will be used in case of
emergency situations for communication.
8. First Aid Boxes and Occupational health centre will be made at site.
9. Hydrant system & sprinkler system will be provided as per
requirements.
10. Emergency organization and team will be prepared as per On site-Off
site emergency planning.
3.10
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF PROCESS.
Process details are provided in EIA report.
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
25
00
SECTION IV
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
4.0
INTRODUCTION
Risk assessment process rests on identification of specific hazards, hazardous areas and
areas vulnerable to effects of hazardous situations in facilities involved in processing and
storage of chemicals.
In fact the very starting point of any such assessment is a detailed study of materials
handled & their physical / chemical / thermodynamic properties within the complex at
various stages of manufacturing activity. Such a detailed account of hazardous materials
provides valuable database for identifying most hazardous materials, their behaviour
under process conditions, and their inventory in process as well as storage and hence
helps in identifying vulnerable areas within the complex.
Hazardous posed by particular installation or a particular activity can be broadly
classified as fire and explosive hazards and toxicity hazards. Whether a particular
activity is fire and explosive hazardous or toxicity hazardous primarily depends on the
materials handled and their properties.
It will be from the above discussion that study of various materials handled is a
prerequisite from any hazard identification process to be accurate. Based on this study
the hazard indices are calculated for subsequent categorization of units depending upon
the degree of hazard they pose.
In a Pharmaceutical manufacturing plant main hazard handling of hazardous chemicals
like, Flammable solvents, corrosive and toxic chemicals, coal as a fuel in CPP, the
primary concern has always been, fire and explosion prevention and control as these are
the main hazard posed by such unit. This concern has grown through the loss of life,
property and materials experienced after experienced after major disasters, which have
occurred over the years.
Identification of hazards is the most important step to improve the safety of any plant.
The hazard study is designed to identify the hazards in terms of chemicals, inventories
and vulnerable practices /operations.
The hazard evaluation procedures use as a first step by chemical process industries and
petroleum refineries are checklists and safety reviews. Dow and Mond fire and explosion
indices, which make use of past experience to develop relative ranking of hazards, is also
extensively used. For predictive hazard analysis, Hazard and Operability studies
(HAZOP), Fault tree analysis, Event tree analysis, Maximum credible accident and
consequence analysis etc are employed.
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
26
00
4.1
Dow’s fire and Explosion Index (F & EI)
4.1.1
Steps in fire and explosion index calculation are given below :
Select Pertinent Process
Determine Material Factor
Calculate GPH(F1),
General Process Hazards
Calculate SPH(F2), special
process Hazards
Determine Hazard Factor
F1 X F2 =F3
F3XMaterial Factor
=F & E Index
Determine Exposure area
4.1.2 Results of fire explosion and toxicity indices.
TABLE- 4.1
Sr
No
Material
stored
Storage
Qty. (KL)
N N N M
h f r
F
GPH
SPH
FEI
Degree of
Hazard
Radius
of Exp.
(ft.)
Th
Ts
TI
Degree of
Hazard
1.
Methanol
1
3
0
16
2.55
2.35
95.88
Moderate
78
50
50
5.3
Light
2.
3.
Hydrogen
Ammonia
0
3
4
1
0
0
21
4
3.0
3.75
2.29
2.91
156
10.9
Heavy
Light
135
8
250
75
10.9
4.
1
3
0
24
2.85
1.5
102.6
Intermediate
87
250
125
20.1
Severe
2
3
0
16
2.55
2.35
95.88
Moderate
78
50
50
5.3
Light
6.
Sulfuric
acid
Aceto
Nitrile
Acetone
1
3
0
16
2.55
2.3
93.84
Moderate
75
125
50
9.2
Moderate
7.
Toluene
0
3
0
16
2.55
3
122.4
Intermediate
106
125
50
11.4
Severe
8.
IPA
1
3
0
16
2.55
2.4
97.92
Intermediate
79
50
50
5.9
Light
9.
Nitric
Acid
LNG
20 Kl x 2
No. Tank
Skid
20 Kl x
1 No
20 Kl x
1 No
18 Kl x
1no Tank
16 Kl x
1no Tank
20 Kl x 1
No Tank
20 Kl x 1
No Tank
5 Kl x 1
no Tank
20 M3 x 2
nos
Bullets
2
1
0
4
2.90
3.0
34.8
Intermediate
28
125
75
7.9
Moderate
1
4
0
21
1.85
2.94
76.11
Heavy
63
-
-
-
-
:
:
27
00
5.
10.
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
Heavy
Nh
Nf
Nr
MF
Ts
= NFPA Health rating
= NFPA Fire rating
= NFPA Reactive rating
= Material Fctor
= Penalty for Toxicity
4.2
GPH
SPH
FEI
Th
TI
= General Process Hazard
= Special Process Hazard
= Fire Explosion Index
= Penalty Factor
= Toxicity Index
Identification of Hazardous Areas:
A study of process for manufacturing Drugs as given in chapter 2 of the report indicates
the following:
 Process plant will be Batch process and multipurpose and multi utility base plant due to
that at a time inventory of raw material at production area will be very small.
 All raw material and finished product will be stored in tank farm area and required
material will be charged in process through pump and in close circuit.
 Batch size requirement chemicals will be charged in to day tank or reactor and empty
drums will be sent back to RM store for neutralization and disposed off. Thus the
inventory of the raw material in process area will be limited and for limited time.
 Most of reactions are similar type and slight exothermic in nature except hydrogenation
reaction area.
 Hydrogen reaction area segregates from the other process and storage area.
 Various raw materials used in the manufacturing processes are listed in Table-3.2 in
Section-3 along with mode / type of storage & storage conditions. It can be readily
seen that raw materials even though hazardous in nature, will be used in small
quantities & storage quantities will also very low at process plant.
 However some chemicals such as Methanol, Toluene, IPA, Acetone, Acetonitrile,
Hexane, LPO, Iso propile amine, Petroleum Ether, Ethanol, DNS, etc., will be used in
one or more process and therefore their requirement is slightly higher.
 All Class A petroleum products and flammable chemicals will be stored in
underground storage tanks in dedicated Explosive licence premises.
 Other flammable nature chemicals will be stored in above ground storage tanks as per
petroleum rules in dedicated storage tank farm area.
 Drums will be stored in licenced drum storage area as per petroleum rules. Maximum
six days running products raw material inventory will be kept in drum storage area.
 Hydrogen gas will be used in hydrogenation process and road skid will be used for
process and it will be directly connected to PRV station.
 LNG storage area.
 List of chemicals stored in larger quantities is provided in Table-3.3. Hazardous
properties are provided in Table-3.4
4.3
Hazard and Operability Studies ( HAZOP)
4.3.1
The basic concept of Hazop is to have an exhaustive review of the plant operation. Hazop
study highlights the hidden operability problems and identifies hazards, which are likely
to result from the expected intention of seemingly safe components or methods of
operation.
4.3.2
This work utilizes imagination of team members to visualize ways in which a plant can
malfunction or mal-operated. Each part of the plant is subjected to a number of questions
formulated around a number of guide words which are derived from method of study
technique. In effect, the guide words are used to ensure that the questions which are
posed to test integrity of each part of the design to explore every conceivable way in
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
28
00
which that design could deviate from the design intention. This usually produces a
number of theoretical deviations and each deviation is then considered how it could be
caused and what would be consequences.
4.3.3
HAZOP is a brainstorming approach, which stimulates creativity and procedure for
generating ideas. Possible results of this study are :(a) Identify and examining many types of risks.
(b) Identifying non-optimum system reliability.
(c) Suggestive qualitative recommendations regarding control, strategy, material
properties, material releases, alternative design option, operation and maintenance.
4.3.4
A
The important t terms pertaining to HAZOP study are:Intention :-
The intention defines how the part is expected to
operate. This can take a number of forms and can be
either descriptive or diagrammatic. In many cases, it
will be a flow sheet (P & ID)
Deviation :-
These are departures from the intention which are
discovered by systematically applying the guide
words.
Causes :-
These are reasons why deviation might occur. Once a
deviation has been shown to have a conceivable or
realistic cause, it can be treated as meaningful.
Hazards :-
These are the results of the deviations
Consequences:-
These are the consequences, which can cause damage,
injury or loss.
List of guide words
Guide
Words
None
More of
Meanings
Comments
Complete negation
of the intention
Quantitative
increase
No part of the intention is achieved e.g. no flow or
reverse flow.
More of any relevant physical properties than there
should be e.g. higher flow (rate or total quantity) higher
temperature, higher pressure higher viscosity, more
heat, more reaction etc.
Less of any relevant physical property than there should
be, e.g. Lower flow (rate or total quantity), lower
temperature, lower pressure, less heat, less reaction etc.
Composition of system different from what it should be
Less of
Quantitative
decrease
Part of
Quantitative
decrease
Qualitative increase
More
than
Prepared By
HSE Department
More components present in the system that there
should be e.g. extra phase present (Vapor, solid),
impurities (air, water, acids, corrosion products etc.)
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
29
00
Other
than
Substitution
What else can happen apart from normal operation e.g.
Start up, shutdown, high/low rate running, alternative
operation mode, failure of plant services, maintenance,
catalyst change etc.
Guidewords are applied to the design intention. The design intention informs us what the
equipment is expected to do.
4.3.5
A flow chart giving HAZOP procedure is given below:-
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
30
00
4.3.6
HAZOP studies for the Hydrogen cylinder skid to reactor is made and the Hazop study
sheets are as under.
HAZOP – 1
Parameters
Temp
GW
More
Causes
Consequences
Ambient
temperature high
Hot work/ Flame
in near by area.
Less
Pressure
More
Less
Flow
More
H2 being lighter gas
may expand on
heating which may
cause cracking,
bursting/weakening of
pipe.
Control Measures
Recommendation
Provided
Safety valve is
provided on header
PRV provided
--
Auto shutoff valve
provided
No hazard
High Temperature.
Valve closed,
Jammed.
Shut off valve
malfunctioned.
High pressure in
cylinder at filling
station
Low pressure in
cylinder,
Cylinder empty.
Ball valve
malfunction or
operates
at more then set
value.
Line jammed
Less
Low pressure
Reverse
Not applicable
No
Cylinder Empty
Valve closed
Process Disturbance
Pressure gauge
provided.
Shut off valve
provided.
Safety Valve
provided
PRV station
provided
Process Delayed
No Hazard
Process Disturbance
In high pressure
Exothermic
reaction more
flow will increase
temp. & pressure
but alarm/ hooter
will be provided
with
set temp. & flow of
H2
Thickness monitoring
of pipelines to
be carried out.
Reliability study
for the high pressure
pipeline to be carried
out.
Flow meter needs to
be provided.
Process Delayed
NRV at PRV to be
provided
Other than
Puncture in
pipeline, flange
joints
Explosive mixture will
be formed as the line is
under positive pressure
Hydrogen gas
sensor to be
provided
Power
failure
GEB failure,
Internal system
failure
Process Delayed
D. G. Set provided
On line Gas detection
system needs to be
provided in gas
handling area.
Conclusion : Above study shown that company has to be adopted and implemented required
safety measures to control process hazard and make it safe at maximum level.
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
31
00
4.4
Event Tree Analysis
4.4.1
Different outcomes of a leakage or catastrophic failure are possible depending on, if and
when toxic release incident occurs and the consequences thereupon. ETA considers
various possibilities such as catastrophic and Point source release outcomes to occur. From
ETA, following incident outcomes and pathways are identified.
4.5
Failure Frequencies
4.5.1 Hazardous material release scenarios can be broadly divided into 2 categories
I) catastrophic failures which are of low frequency and
II) ruptures and leaks which are of relatively high frequency.
Releases from failure of gaskets, seal, rupture in pipelines and vessels fall in the second
category whereas catastrophic failure of vessels and full bore rupture of pipelines etc. fall
into the first category.
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
32
00
4.5.2
Typical failure frequencies are given below:-
Item
Atmospheric
storage
Process Pipelines
< = 50 mm dia
> 50 mm <=150mm dia
< 150 mm dia
Hoses
TABLE-4.2
Mode of failure
Catastrophic failure
Significant leak
Failure frequencies
10-9 /yr
10-5 /yr
Full bore rupture
Significant leak
Full bore rupture
Significant leak
Full bore rupture
Significant leak
Rupture
8.8 x 10-7 /m.yr
8.8 x 10-6 /m.yr
2.6 x 10-7 /m.yr
5.3 x 10-6 /m.yr
8.8 x 10-8 /m.yr
2.6 x 10-6 /m.yr
3.5 x 10-2 /m.yr
TABLE-4.3
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
33
00
TABLE-4.4
4.6
Evaluation of Process Areas :
 Process plant will be Batch process and multipurpose and multi utility base plant due to
that at a time inventory of raw material at production area will be very small.
 All raw material and finished product will be stored in tank farm area and required
material will be charged in process through pump and in close circuit.
 Batch size requirement chemicals will be charged in to day tank or reactor and empty
drums will be sent back to RM store for neutralization and disposed off. Thus the
inventory of the raw material in process area will be limited and for limited time.
 Most of reactions are similar type and slight exothermic in nature except hydrogenation
reaction area.
 Hydrogen reaction area segregates from the other process and storage area.
 Various raw materials used in the manufacturing processes are listed in Table-3.2 in
Section-3 along with mode / type of storage & storage conditions. It can be readily
seen that raw materials even though hazardous in nature, will be used in small
quantities & storage quantities will also very low at process plant.
 However some chemicals such as Methanol, Toluene, IPA, Acetone, Acetonitrile,
Hexane, LPO, Iso propile amine, Petroleum Ether, Ethanol, DNS, etc., will be used in
one or more process and therefore their requirement is slightly higher.
 All Class A petroleum products and flammable chemicals will be stored in
underground storage tanks in dedicated Explosive licence premises.
 Other flammable nature chemicals will be stored in above ground storage tanks as per
petroleum rules in dedicated storage tank farm area.
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
34
00
 Drums will be stored in licenced drum storage area as per petroleum rules. Maximum
six days running products raw material inventory will be kept in drum storage area.
 Hydrogen gas will be used in hydrogenation process and road skid will be used for
process and it will be directly connected to PRV station.
Considering this, the risk analysis and consequences studies are concentrated on
Explosive U.G licenced area, Drum storage area, Hydrogen Skid location, A/G tank
farm area and LNG storage area.
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
35
00
SECTION V
RISK ASSESSMENT
5.1
Effects Of Releases Of Hazardous Substances
Hazardous substances may be released as a result of failures / catastrophes,
causing possible damage to the surrounding area. In the following
discussion, an account is taken of various effects of release of hazardous
substances and the parameters to be determined for quantification of such
damages.
In case of release of hazardous substances the damages will depend largely
on source strength. The strength of the source means the volume of the
substance released. The release may be instantaneous or semi-continuous.
In the case of instantaneous release, the strength of the source is given in
kg and in semi-continuous release the strength of the source depends on the
outflow time (kg/s.).
In order to fire the source strength, it is first necessary to determine the
state of a substance in a vessel. The physical properties, viz. Pressure and
temperature of the substance determine the phase of release. This may be
gas, gas condensed to liquid and liquid in equilibrium with its vapour or
solids.
Instantaneous release will occur, for example, if a storage tank fails.
Depending on the storage conditions the following situations may occur.
The source strength is equal to the contents of the capacity of the storage
system.
In the event of the instantaneous release of a liquid a pool of liquid will
form. The evaporation can be calculated on the basis of this pool.
5.2
Tank On Fire/ Pool Fire
In the event of the instantaneous release of a liquid a pool of liquid will
form. The evaporation can be calculated on the basis of this pool.
The heat load on object outside a burning pool of liquid can be calculated
with the heat radiation model. This model uses average radiation intensity,
which is dependent on the liquid. Account is also taken of the diameter-toheight ratio of the fire, which depends on the burning liquid. In addition,
the heat load is also influenced by the following factors:


Distance from the fire
The relative humidity of the air (water vapour has a relatively high
heat-absorbing capacity)
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
36
00

5.3
The orientation i.e. horizontal/vertical of the objective irradiated with
respect to the fire.
Fire Ball
This happens during the burning of liquid, the bulk of which is initially over rich (i.e.
above the upper flammable limit.). The whole cloud appears to be on fire as combustion is
taking place at eddy boundaries where air is entrained (i.e. a propagating diffusion flame).
The buoyancy of the hot combustion products may lift the cloud form the ground,
subsequently forming a mushroom shaped cloud. Combustion rates are high and the
hazard is primarily thermal.
5.4
“UVCE”
UVCE stands for unconfined apour cloud explosion. The clouds of solvent vapour mix
with air (within flammability limit 3.0 % to 11 %) may cause propagating flames when
ignited. In certain cases flame may take place within seconds. The thermal radiation
intensity is severe depending on the total mass of vapour in cloud and may cause
secondary fire. When the flame travels very fast, it explodes causing high over pressure or
blast effect, resulting in heavy damage at considerable distance from the release point.
Such explosion is called UVCE (Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion) and is most
common cause of such industrial accident.
5.5
DISPERSION CASES :
5.5.1 PLUMES :
Plumes are continuous release of hazardous gases and vapours. Smoke from
a chimney is an example. Plumes can cause FIRES AND EXPLOSIONS as
secondary scenarios.
5.5.2 PUFFS :
Puffs are instantaneous release of hazardous gases and vapours. Puffs can
give rise to FIRE BALLS and vapour cloud explosions (VCE). A special
case of vapour cloud explosion is the Boiling Liquid Evaporating Vapour
Explosion (BLEVE).
5.5.3 SPILLS POOL:
Spills are liquid pools created by leaking liquid chemicals. Spills cause
evaporation and dispersal of toxic gases and if the spilled liquid is
flammable, then it can catch fire creating a pool fire also the vapours can
cause explosion.
5.6
Identification of High Risk Areas :
It is observed that the storage areas pose fire/explosion hazards as it has a
substantial inventory of Methanol and Hydrogen, Toxic Gas (Ammonia)
and, which may lead to major accident event.
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
37
00
Thus the quantitative risk assessment studies are limited to above ground
storage tank farm area.
5.7
Modes of Failure:




Liquid release due to catastrophic failure of storage vessel or road tanker.
Liquid release through a hole/crack developed at welded joints/flanges / nozzles /
valves etc.
Vapour release due to exposure of liquid to atmosphere in the above scenarios.
Gas release due to catastrophic failure of Ammonia cylinder or outlet valve/line
failure.
Based on the above the following accident scenarios were conceived as most probable
failure cases:
TABLE-5.1
Event
Causes
Tank on Fire
-
Ignition availability
Pool fire
-
Failure of pump outlet-inlet line + Ignition availability
Fire Ball/Flash fire
- Catastrophic failure of road tanker/ storage tank
UVCE
-
Catastrophic failure of road tanker/ tank /
Vapour generation due to substrate and wind
Vapour cloud generation and about 15 % of
total vapour mass between the UEL-LEL %
Ignition availability
Considering the quantity of storages & nature of Toxic and Flammable storage, following
scenarios were taken up for detailed analysis & safe distances computed :
 Catastrophic failure of storage tank which on ignition poses heat radiation hazards to
nearby areas.
 Catastrophic failure of road tank and presence of ignition source poses heat radiation
hazards to nearby areas.
Failure cases considered for consequence analysis are representative of worst-case
scenarios. Probability of occurrence of such cases is negligible (less than 1 x 10-6 per
year) because of strict adherence to preventive maintenance procedures within the
complex. General probabilities for various failure is provided in Table-4.2, 4.3 and
4.4, but consequences of such cases can be grave & far reaching in case such systems
fail during life history of the company. Hence such scenarios are considered for
detailed analysis. It is to be noted however that such situations are not foreseeable or
credible as long as sufficient measures are taken. Also, consequence analysis studies
help us evaluate emergency planning measures of the Company.
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
38
00
5.8
Damage Criteria For Heat Radiation:
Damage effects vary with different scenarios. Calculations for various
scenarios are made for the above failure cases to quantify the resulting
damages.
The results are translated in term of injuries and damages to exposed
personnel, equipment, building etc.
Tank on fire /Pool fire due to direct ignition source on tank or road tanker
or catastrophic failure or leakage or damage from pipeline of storage
facilities or road tanker unloading arm, can result in heat radiation causing
burns to people depending on thermal load and period of exposure.
All such damages have to be specified criteria for each such resultant
effect, to relate the quantifier damages in this manner, damage criteria are
used for Heat Radiation.
TABLE 5.3
DAMAGE CRITERIA – HEAT RADIATION
Heat Radiation
Incident Flux KW/m2
Damage
38
100% lethality, heavy damage to tanks
37.5
100% lethality, heavy damage to equipment.
25
50% lethality, nonpiloted ignition
14
Damage to normal buildings
12.5
1% lethality, piloted ignition
12
Damage to vegetation
6
Burns (escape routes)
4.5
Not lethal, 1st degree burns
3
1st degree burns possible
(personnel only in emergency allowed)
2
Feeling of discomfort
1.5
No discomfort even after long exposure
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
39
00
CHAPTER VI
CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS
6.1
Consequence analysis.
In the risk analysis study, probable damages due to worst case scenarios
were quantified and consequences were analyzed with object of emergency
planning. Various measures taken by the company and findings of the study
were considered for deciding acceptability of risks.
6.1.1
Maximum Credible loss scenarios ( MCLS)
MSCL assume maximum inventory of hazardous chemicals and worst
weather condition prevailing at the time of failure. Further, no credit is
given for the safety features provided in the facility to determine maximu m
possible damage from the scenario selected. In reality, leakage of
hazardous chemical will be smaller in magnitude. Also the leakage will be
detected immediately by plant operating staff then initiate various
mitigation measures to prevent any disastrous situation.
The maximum credible loss Scenarios (MCLS) identified for plant base on above
criteria are listed below:
Table-6.1
Sr. No.
1,2,3 & 4
5
6,7,8 & 9
10,11
12
13
14
15,16,17
& 18
Prepared By
HSE Department
Failure Type
Road tanker catastrophic
failure.
20 KL Class A petroleum
above ground storage tank
fire in A/G storage tank
farm area
Catastrophic failure of 20
KL storage tank.
Drum storage area fire
HSD storage tank pool
fire
Hydrogen cylinder skid to
PRV station.
Hydrogen cylinder skid to
PRV station
LNG Bullet Catastrophic
failure
Failure Mode
Unloading arm 100
% failure,
Direct ignition
source
Catastrophic failure
Drum spillage
Catastrophic failure
Rupture of 1.0 cm
copper pipe line
Rupture of 1.0 cm
copper pipe line
Catastrophic failure
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Consequence
Un confined Pool Fire,
Flash Fire, Ball Fire,
UVCE(Over Pressure),
Tank On fire
Pool fire,
Flash Fire, Ball Fire,
UVCE(Over Pressure),
Pool Fire & BLEVE in
drums
Pool fire
Diffusion Jet Fire
Over pressure
Pool fire, Ball fie, Flash
Fire & UVCE
Page
Rev.
:
:
40
00
6.1.2
Weather Data:
Average wind speed
Average Ambient Temperature
Average Humidity
Atmospheric Stability
6.1.3
6.1.3.1
:
:
:
:
3 m / sec.
35 deg. c.
60 %
D
Assumption :
Basic assumptions For road tanker release scenario
100 % failure of Unloading arm is considered for 20 KL road tanker
while unloading work. Total material drain will spread on floor.
Immediate ignition will give unconfined pool fire. If there is no ignition
source available nearby area, liquid will evaporate and vapour cloud
will travel in wind direction, evaporated vapor mass comes in the
contact with any ignition source there will be chances of Flash fire ,
UVCE and BLEVE in road tanker.
6.1.3.2
Basic assumptions For 20 KL storage tank catastrophic failure
Catastrophic failure of 20 Kl storage tank or 100 % bottom valve/ line
failure and total material drain in dyke wall. Immediate ignition will
give pool fire and delay ignition will give Flash Fire, UVCE and
BLEVE.
Heat Radiation Damage
37.5
12.5
4.5
1.6
6.1.3.3
100% lethality, heavy damage to equipment.
1% lethality, piloted ignition
Not lethal, 1st degree burns
No discomfort even after long exposure
For Hydrogen Gas release scenarios
 Hydrogen cylinder road skid to PRV station line damage and
hydrogen gas release and it will be exploid due to any ignition
source. Following scenarios can be possible.
 Jet fire
 Explosion ( Over pressure)
 We have calculated following hazardous distance for the above
mentioned scenarios.
 Intensity of Heat Radiation ( IHR) at ground level (KW /m 2 )
6.1.3.4
For LNG release scenarios
Catastrophic failure of 20 M 3 storage tank or 100 % bottom valve/ line
failure and total material Spread out on floor. Immediate ignition will
give pool fire and delay ignition will give Flash Fire, UVCE and
BLEVE.
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
41
00
6.1.3.5
Evapouration rate calculation Table :
Material
Total
Maximum
Evapouration
Evaporated
Name
capacity of
Spillage
Rate
Vapour mass
( Kg/Sec.)
for 15 minutes
storage
(Kg)
Class
A
( M3 )
( KG )
ER-1
ER-2
20
17340
0.328
295
20
17340
0.154
138
20
900
0.18
253
Petroleum
Road
tanker
catastrophic
failure
Catastrophic
failure of 20
KL storage
tank.
Catastrophic
failure of
LNG Bullet.
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
42
00
MCA Scenario –1 Unconfined pool Fire for 20 KL Class A Petroleum Road tanker
catastrophic failure
TABLE – A
For 20 KL Class A Petroleum Road tanker.
Scenario
In put Data
20 KL
Stored quantity
25(m)
Pool diameter
0.1 (m)
Pool liquid depth
3 m/s
Wind speed
869 kg/m3
Liquid Density
: UNCONFINED POOL FIRE
Results of Computations
180 Kw/m2
Max. IHR at flame centre height
9.6 meter
Flame centre height
9.59 meter
Maximum Flame width
1.34 kg/ m2/min.
Mass burning rate liquid
58.82 Mims.
Flame burnout time
Incident Intensity of
Heat Radiation (
IHR) at ground level
KW /m 2
37.5
IHR- Isopleth
Distance
( Meters )
Effect if IHR at Height of Simulation
13.5
25.0
15.6
12.5
22.1
4.0
39.0
Damage to process equipment. 100 % Fatal in 1 Min. 1 %
fatal in 10 sec.
Min. to ignite wood ( without flame contact ). 100 % fatal
in 1 Min. Significant injury in 10 sec.
Min. to ignite wood (with flame contact). 1 % fatal in 1
min. 1 st deg. burn in 10 sec.
Pain after 20 secs. Blistering unlikely.
1.6
61.6
No discomfort even on long exposure.
Results




In the 13.5 meter radius area is considered as 100% fatality in 1 min.
In the 22.1 meter radius first degree burn in 10 sec.
In the 39 meter radius area will give pain after 20 seconds. Blistering unlikely.
In the 61.6 meter radius area is considered as safe area and no discomfiture even on long
exposure.
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
43
00
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
44
00
MCA Scenario –2 Fire Ball / BLEVE simulation for 20 KL Class A petroleum Road tanker
catastrophic failure
TABLE – B
For 20 Kl Class A Petroleum Road Tanker Catastrophic Failure
Scenario
: FIRE BALL/ BLEVE
Results of Computations
In put Data
20 KL
17.11 meter
Stored quantity
Fire Ball radius
Fire ball Intensity of Heat 119 Kw /m 2
Mass
of
vapour 295 Kgs.
radiation
between LEL-UEL %
40550 Kj/Kg
Heat of combustion
Fire Ball rate of energy 703908 Kj/ sec.
release
3 m/s
Wind speed
Fire- Ball total energy 4.9x106 Kj
release
6.9 sec.
869 kg/m3
Fire ball duration
Liquid Density
Incident Intensity
of Heat Radiation
( IHR) at ground
level
KW /m 2
37.5
IHR- Isopleth
Distance
( Meters )
Damage effects
33.0
25.0
45.0
12.5
65.0
4.0
118.0
100 % Fatal . Min. to ignite wood (without flame
contact)
Min. to ignite wood ( without flame contact ).
Significant injury.
Min. to ignite wood (with flame contact). 1 st deg. burn
.
Pain after 20 secs. Blistering unlikely.
1.6
186.0
No discomfort even on long exposure.
Results




In the 33 meter radius area is considered as 100% fatality in 1 min.
In 65 meter radius area is considered as 1st deg. Burn in 10 sec. and 1 % fatal in 1 minute.
In the 118 meter radius area will give pain after 20 seconds. Blistering unlikely.
In the 186 meter radius area is considered as safe area and no discomfort even on long
exposure.
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
45
00
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
46
00
MCA Scenario –3 Flash Fire simulation for 20 KL Class A petroleum Road tanker
catastrophic failure
TABLE – C
For 20KL Class A Petroleum Road tanker catastrophic failure
Scenario
In put Data
20 KL
Stored quantity
295 Kgs.
Mass of Gas
42267.5 Kj/kg
Heat of combustion
Fuel-Air volume ratio 0.600
in Flash fire cloud
Stochiometric
Fuel- 0.133
Air Mixture
3.0 m/s
Wind speed
Gas Density
1.2928 kg/m3
: FLASH FIRE
Results of Computations
54.02 meter
Visible Flash Fire Height
27.01 meter
Visible Flash Fire Width
6.99 sec.
Duration of Flash-Fire in Sec.
Radius of fuel-air cloud 17.11 meter
mixture
5981125 Kj
Total energy release
Max. Heat Radiation from 1 m 232.65 Kw/ m2
from Flash Fire
Combustion efficiency
0.5
Incident Intensity
of Heat Radiation
(IHR) at ground
level KW /m 2
37.5
IHR- Isopleth
Distance
( Meters )
Damage effects
45.0
25.0
56.0
12.5
74.5
4.0
125.0
100 % Fatal. Min. to ignite wood (without flame
contact)
Significant injury. Min. to ignite wood (without flame
contact).
Min. to ignite wood (with flame contact). 1 st. deg. burn
.
Pain after 20 secs. Blistering unlikely.
1.6
212
No discomfort even on long exposure.
Results




In the 45 meter radius area is considered as 100% fatality in 1 min.
In 74.5 meter radius area is considered as 1st deg. Burn in 10 sec. and 1 % fatal in 1 minute.
In the 125 meter radius area will give pain after 20 seconds. Blistering unlikely.
In the 212 meter radius area is considered as safe area and no discomfort even on long
exposure.
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
47
00
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
48
00
MCA Scenario - 4 Unconfined Vapour cloud Explosion (UVCE) For 20 KL Class A
petroleum Road tanker
TABLE – D
For 20 KL Class A Petroleum Road tanker
Stored quantity
Mass of vapour
TNT equivalent
Explosion efficiency
Wind speed
Scenario
: UVCE
In put Data
20 KL
651 Lbm
2.99
0.1
3.0 m/s
Radial
Distance
in meter
6.66
Over
pressure
( psi )
67.3
% Fatality
lung Rupture
% Eardrum
rupture
%Structural
damage
% Glass
rupture
100
100
100
100
8.33
39.5
93.5
100
100
100
15
9.7
0.1
81.4
100
100
35
2.7
0.0
6.7
46.8
100
535
0.3
0.0
0.0
0.0
8.2
Results
 In case of UVCE up to 6.66 meter distance is considered as 100 % fatality and 100 % ear drum
rupture radius.
 Up to 15 meter distance is considered as 100 % structural Damage and up to 25 meter distance
for 100 % glass damage area.
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
49
00
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
50
00
MCA Scenario –5 Tank on Fire for 20 KL Class A petroleum storage tank
TABLE – E
Tank on Fire Simulation for 20 KL tank.
Scenario
: TANK ON FIRE
In put Data
Results of Computations
20 KL.
12.50 Kw/m2
Stored quantity
Max. IHR at flame centre height
2.35(m)
7.12 meter
Pool diameter
Flame centre height
3.0 (m)
4.12 meter
Pool liquid depth
Maximum Flame width
3 m/s
5.1 kg/ m2/min.
Wind speed
Mass burning rate liquid
3
8.35 Hrs.
869 kg/m
Flame burnout time
Liquid Density
Incident Intensity
of Heat Radiation
( IHR) at ground
level KW /m 2
37.5
IHR- Isopleth
Distance
( Meters )
Effect if IHR at Height of Simulation
2.8
25.0
3.0
12.5
3.1
4.0
5.5
Damage to process equipment. 100 % Fatal in 1 Min. 1 %
fatal in 10 sec.
Min. to ignite wood ( without flame contact ). 100 % fatal
in 1 Min. Significant injury in 10 sec.
Min. to ignite wood (with flame contact). 1 % fatal in 1
min. 1 st deg. burn in 10 sec.
Pain after 20 secs. Blistering unlikely.
1.6
8.6
No discomfort even on long exposure.
Results




In the 2.8 meter radius area is considered as 100% fatality in 1 min.
In 3.1 meter radius area is considered as 1st deg. Burn in 10 sec. and 1 % fatal in 1 minute.
In the 5.5 meter radius area will give pain after 20 seconds. Blistering unlikely.
In the 8.6 meter radius area is considered as safe area and no discomfort even on long
exposure.
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
51
00
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
52
00
MCA Scenario –6 Pool Fire for Class A petroleum storage tank catastrophic failure
TABLE – F
For Class A Petroleum Storage Tank
Scenario
: POOL FIRE
In put Data
Results of Computations
20 KL.
77.07 Kw/m2
Stored quantity
Max. IHR at flame centre height
10.0(m)
22.44 meter
Pool diameter
Flame centre height
1.0 (m)
11.37 meter
Pool liquid depth
Maximum Flame width
3 m/s
5.2 kg/ m2/min.
Wind speed
Mass burning rate liquid
3
8.33 Hrs.
869 kg/m
Flame burnout time
Liquid Density
Incident Intensity
of Heat Radiation
( IHR) at ground
level KW /m 2
37.5
IHR- Isopleth
Distance
( Meters )
Effect if IHR at Height of Simulation
9.8
25.0
12.0
12.5
16.9
4.0
29.6
Damage to process equipment. 100 % Fatal in 1 Min. 1 %
fatal in 10 sec.
Min. to ignite wood ( without flame contact ). 100 % fatal
in 1 Min. Significant injury in 10 sec.
Min. to ignite wood (with flame contact). 1 % fatal in 1
min. 1 st deg. burn in 10 sec.
Pain after 20 secs. Blistering unlikely.
1.6
46.7
No discomfort even on long exposure.
Results




In the 9.8 meter radius area is considered as 100% fatality in 1 min.
In the 16.9 meter radius first degree burn in 10 sec.
In the 29.6 meter radius area will give pain after 20 seconds. Blistering unlikely.
In the 46.7 meter radius area is considered as safe area and no discomfiture even on long
exposure.
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
53
00
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
54
00
MCA Scenario –7 Fire Ball simulation for Class A petroleum storage tank catastrophic
failure
TABLE – G
For Class A petroleum storage tank
Scenario
In put Data
20 KL
Stored quantity
Mass
of
vapour 138 Kgs.
Between LEL-UEL%
40550 Kj/Kg
Heat of combustion
Wind speed
3 m/s
Liquid Density
869 kg/m3
: FIRE BALL
Results of Computations
13.35 meter
Fire Ball radius
Fire ball Intensity of Heat 188.53 Kw /m 2
radiation
Fire Ball rate of energy 422147 Kj/ sec.
release
Fire- Ball total energy 2.30035e +006 Kj
release
5.45 sec.
Fire ball duration
Incident Intensity
of Heat Radiation
( IHR) at ground
level KW /m 2
37.5
IHR- Isopleth
Distance
( Meters )
Damage effects
28.0
25.0
36.0
12.5
54.0
100 % Fatal . Min. to ignite wood (without flame
contact)
Min. to ignite wood ( without flame contact ).
Significant injury.
Min. to ignite wood (with flame contact). 1 st deg. burn.
4.0
92.0
Pain after 20 secs. Blistering unlikely.
1.6
142.0
No discomfort even on long exposure.
Results
 In the 28 meter radius area is considered as 100 % fatality in 1 min. and first degree burn in 10
sec.
 In the 54 meter radius first degree burn in 10 sec.
 In the 92 meter radius area will give pain after 20 seconds. Blistering unlikely.
 In the 142 meter radius area is considered as safe area and no discomfiture even on long
exposure.
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
55
00
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
56
00
MCA Scenario –8 Flash Fire simulation for Class A petroleum storage tank catastrophic
failure
TABLE – H
For Class A petroleum storage tank
Scenario
: FLASH FIRE
In put Data
Results of Computations
20 KL
45.73 meter
Stored quantity
Visible Flash Fire Height
138 Kgs.
22.87 meter
Mass of Gas
Visible Flash Fire Width
42267.5 Kj/kg
Heat of combustion
Duration of Flash-Fire in Sec. 5.45 sec.
Fuel-Air volume ratio 0.600
Radius of fuel-air cloud 13.35 meter
in Flash fire cloud
mixture
2797950 Kj
Total energy release
Stochiometric
Fuel- 0.133
Air Mixture
3.0 m/s
Wind speed
Max. Heat Radiation from 1 m 229.31 Kw/ m2
from Flash Fire
0.5
3.1 kg/m3
Combustion efficiency
Gas Density
Incident Intensity
of Heat Radiation
(IHR) at ground
level KW /m 2
37.5
IHR- Isopleth
Distance
( Meters )
Damage effects
32
25.0
40
12.5
57
100 % Fatal . Min. to ignite wood (without flame
contact)
Significant injury. Min. to ignite wood ( without flame
contact ).
Min. to ignite wood (with flame contact). 1 st deg. burn .
4.0
100
Pain after 20 secs. Blistering unlikely.
1.6
158
No discomfort even on long exposure.
Results
 In the 32 meter radius area is considered as 100 % fatality in 1 min. and first degree burn in 10
sec.
 In the 57 meter radius first degree burn in 10 sec.
 In the 100 meter radius area will give pain after 20 seconds. Blistering unlikely.
 In the 158 meter radius area is considered as safe area and no discomfiture even on long
exposure.
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
57
00
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
58
00
MCA Scenario –9 Unconfined Vapour cloud Explosion ( UVCE ) for Class A petroleum
storage tank
TABLE – I
For Class A petroleum storage tank storage tank
Scenario
: UVCE
In put Data
20 KL
Stored quantity
306 lbm.
Mass of vapour between LEL – UEL %
2.99
TNT equivalent
0.1
Explosion efficiency
3.0 m/s
Wind speed
Radial
Distance
in Meter
6.3
Over
pressure
( psi )
41.7
% Fatality
lung Rupture
% Eardrum
rupture
%Structural
damage
% Glass
rupture
100
100
100
100
6.66
36.9
52.3
100
100
100
11.6
9.7
0.1
81.4
100
100
35
2.1
0.0
3.5
17.8
100
535
0.3
0.0
0.0
0.0
5.3
Results
 In case of UVCE up to6.3 meter distance is considered as 100 % fatality and 100 % ear drum
rupture radius.
 Up to 11.6 meter distance is considered as 100 % structural Damage and up to 35 meter
distance for 100 % glass damage area.
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
59
00
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
60
00
MCA Scenario -10 Unconfined Pool Fire Simulation for Drum Storage Area.
TABLE – J
Unconfined Pool Fire for Drum Storage Area
Scenario
In put Data
20 KL
Stored quantity
25(m)
Pool diameter
0.01 (m)
Pool liquid depth
3 m/s
Wind speed
867 kg/m3
Liquid Density
: UNCONFINED POOL FIRE
Results of Computations
Max. IHR at flame centre height 143.48 Kw/m2
21.60 meter
Flame centre height
21.59 meter
Maximum Flame width
5.02 kg/ m2/min.
Mass burning rate liquid
1.66 Hrs.
Flame burnout time
Incident Intensity
of Heat Radiation
( IHR) at ground
level
KW /m 2
37.5
IHR- Isopleth
Distance
( Meters )
Effect if IHR at Height of Simulation
23.1
25.0
28.3
12.5
40
4.0
70.7
Damage to process equipment. 100 % Fatal in 1 Min. 1
% fatal in 10 sec.
Min. to ignite wood (without flame contact). 100 %
fatal in 1 Min. Significant injury in 10 sec.
Min. to ignite wood (with flame contact). 1 % fatal in
1 min. 1 st deg. burn in 10 sec.
Pain after 20 secs. Blistering unlikely.
1.6
111.8
No discomfort even on long exposure.
Results
 In the 23.1 meter radius area is considered as 100 % fatality in 1 min. and first degree burn in
10 sec.
 In the 40 meter radius first degree burn in 10 sec.
 In the 70.7 meter radius area will give pain after 20 seconds. Blistering unlikely.
 In the 111.8 meter radius area is considered as safe area and no discomfiture even on long
exposure.
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
61
00
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
62
00
MCA Scenario – 11 BLEVE simulation for Drums Storage
TABLE – K
BLEVE simulation for Drums Storage
Scenario
: FIRE BALL/ BLEVE
In put Data
Results of Computations
20 Kl
11.17 meter
Stored quantity
Fire Ball radius
80 Kgs.
Mass of vapour
Fire ball Intensity of Heat 186.59 Kw /m 2
radiation
Heat of combustion
40550 Kj/Kg
Fire Ball rate of energy 292486 Kj/ sec.
release
3 m/s
Wind speed
Fire- Ball total energy 1.333e + 006 Kj
release
4.56 sec.
867 kg/m3
Fire ball duration
Liquid Density
Incident Intensity
of Heat Radiation
( IHR) at ground
level
KW /m 2
37.5
IHR- Isopleth
Distance
( Meters )
Damage effects
25
25.0
30
12.5
42.5
4.0
76
100 % Fatal . Min. to ignite wood (without flame
contact)
Min. to ignite wood ( without flame contact ).
Significant injury.
Min. to ignite wood (with flame contact). 1 st deg. burn
.
Pain after 20 secs. Blistering unlikely.
1.6
120
No discomfort even on long exposure.
Results




In the 25 meter radius area is considered as 100% fatality in 1 min.
In 42.5 meter radius area is considered as 1st deg. Burn in 10 sec. and 1 % fatal in 1 minute.
In the 76 meter radius area will give pain after 20 seconds. Blistering unlikely.
In the 120 meter radius area is considered as safe area and no discomfiture even on long
exposure.
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
63
00
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
64
00
MCA Scenario-12 Pool Fire For HSD Road Tanker
MODEL - L
For HSD Road Tanker Fire
Scenario
In put Data
10 Kl
Spilled quantity
Pool diameter
Pool liquid depth
Wind speed
Liquid Density
17 (m)
1 (m)
3 m/s
841 kg/m3
: POOL FIRE
Results of Computations
Max. IHR at flame centre 115.29Kw/m2
height
20.094 meter
Flame centre height
19.094 meter
Maximum Flame width
6.65kg/ m2/min.
Mass burning rate liquid
2.11Hrs.
Flame burnout time
Incident Intensity
of Heat Radiation
( IHR) at ground
level
KW /m 2
37.5
IHR- Isopleth
Distance
( Meters )
Effect if IHR at Height of Simulation
18.5
25.0
22.7
12.5
32.1
4.0
56.7
Damage to process equipment. 100 % Fatal in 1 Min. 1
% fatal in 10 sec.
Min. to ignite wood ( without flame contact ). 100 %
fatal in 1 Min. Significant injury in 10 sec.
Min. to ignite wood (with flame contact). 1 % fatal in
1 min. 1 st deg. burn in 10 sec.
Pain after 20 secs. Blistering unlikely.
1.6
89.6
No discomfort even on long exposure.
Results
 In the 18.5 meter radius area is considered as 100% fatality in 1 min.
 In the 32.1 meter radius first degree burn in 10 sec.
 In the 56.7 meter radius area will give pain after 20 seconds. Blistering unlikely.
 In the 89.6 meter radius area is considered as safe area and no discomfort even on long
exposure
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
65
00
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
66
00
MCA Scenario –13 Diffusion Jet Fire Simulation for 1.0 cm copper pipe line of Hydrogen
cylinder skid to PRV station.
TABLE – M
For Hydrogen Cylinder Skid To PRV Station.
Scenario : JET FIRE
Results of Computations
Max. IHR at flame centre 52.49 Kw/m2
height
1 cm
63 meter
Gas Jet Diameter
Flame centre height
12 meter
Gas velocity in the 143463 m/s
Maximum Flame width
leakage hole/ pipe
3 m/s
8.5 Kw/ m2
Wind speed
Heat flux
3
3778 m2
0.067kg/m
Flame surface area
Gas Density
In put Data
50 kgs
Stored quantity
Incident
Intensity of
Heat Radiation
( IHR) at
ground level
KW /m 2
37.5
IHR- Isopleth
Distance
( Meters )
Effect if IHR at Height of Simulation
8.3
25.0
10.2
12.5
14.4
4.0
25.4
Damage to process equipment. 100 % Fatal in 1 Min. 1 %
fatal in 10 sec.
Min. to ignite wood ( without flame contact ). 100 % fatal
in 1 Min. Significant injury in 10 sec.
Min. to ignite wood (with flame contact). 1 % fatal in 1
min. 1 st deg. burn in 10 sec.
Pain after 20 secs. Blistering unlikely.
1.6
40.1
No discomfort even on long exposure.
Results
 In the 8.3 meter radius area is considered as 100% fatality in 1 min.
 In the 14.4 meter radius first degree burn in 10 sec.
 In the 25.4 meter radius area will give pain after 20 seconds. Blistering unlikely.
 In the 40.1 meter radius area is considered as safe area and no discomfort even on long
exposure
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
67
00
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
68
00
MCA Scenario –14 Over pressure / explosion for rupture of 1.0 cm copper pipe line of
Hydrogen cylinder skid to PRV station
TABLE – N
For Hydrogen Gas Copper Tube Failure
Scenario
: FLASH FIRE
In put Data
Results of Computations
0.52meter
1500 M3
Visible Flash Fire Height
Stored quantity
4 kgs
0.26 meter
Mass of Gas
Visible Flash Fire Width
42267 Kj/kg
2 sec.
Heat of combustion
Duration of Flash-Fire in Sec.
Fuel-Air volume ratio 0.600
Radius of fuel-air cloud mixture 4.19 meter
in Flash fire cloud
283720 Kj
Total energy release
Stochiometric Fuel- 0029
Air Mixture
3.0 m/s
Wind speed
Max. Heat Radiation from 1 m 750 Kw/ m2
from Flash Fire
0.5
0.067 kg/m3
Combustion efficiency
Gas Density
Incident Intensity
of Heat Radiation
(IHR) at ground
level KW /m 2
37.5
IHR- Isopleth
Distance
( Meters )
Damage effects
19
25.0
24
12.5
32
4.0
57
100 % Fatal . Min. to ignite wood (without flame
contact)
Significant injury. Min. to ignite wood ( without flame
contact ).
Min. to ignite wood (with flame contact). 1st deg. burn
.
Pain after 20 secs. Blistering unlikely.
1.6
89
No discomfort even on long exposure.
Results
 In the 19 meter radius area is considered as 100% fatality in 1 min.
 In the 32 meter radius first degree burn in 10 sec.
 In the 57 meter radius area will give pain after 20 seconds. Blistering unlikely.
 In the 89 meter radius area is considered as safe area and no discomfort even on long
exposure
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
69
00
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
70
00
MCA Scenario –15 Pool Fire For LNG 20 M3 Bullet catastrophic failure
TABLE – O
For LNG 20 M3 Bullet catastrophic failure.
Scenario
: POOL FIRE
Results of Computations
122.66 Kw/m2
Max. IHR at flame centre height
24.207 meter
Flame centre height
23.88 meter
Maximum Flame width
2.739 kg/ m2/min.
Mass burning rate liquid
50 Mims.
Flame burnout time
In put Data
20 M3
Stored quantity
50 (m)
Pool diameter
0.33 (m)
Pool liquid depth
3 m/s
Wind speed
415 kg/m3
Liquid Density
Incident Intensity of
Heat Radiation (
IHR) at ground level
KW /m 2
37.5
IHR- Isopleth
Distance
( Meters )
Effect if IHR at Height of Simulation
26.0
25.0
28.7
12.5
40.6
4.0
71.7
Damage to process equipment. 100 % Fatal in 1 Min. 1 %
fatal in 10 sec.
Min. to ignite wood ( without flame contact ). 100 % fatal
in 1 Min. Significant injury in 10 sec.
Min. to ignite wood (with flame contact). 1 % fatal in 1
min. 1 st deg. burn in 10 sec.
Pain after 20 secs. Blistering unlikely.
1.6
113.3
No discomfort even on long exposure.
Results




In the 26 meter radius area is considered as 100% fatality in 1 min.
In the 40.6 meter radius first degree burn in 10 sec.
In the 71.7 meter radius area will give pain after 20 seconds. Blistering unlikely.
In the 113.3 meter radius area is considered as safe area and no discomfiture even on long
exposure.
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
71
00
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
72
00
MCA Scenario –16 Fire Ball simulation For LNG 20 M3 Bullet catastrophic failure
TABLE – P
For LNG 20 M3 Bullet catastrophic failure
Scenario : FIRE BALL
In put Data
Results of Computations
20 M3
16.27 meter
Stored quantity
Fire Ball radius
Fire ball Intensity of Heat 636.63 Kw /m 2
Mass
of
vapour 253 Kgs.
radiation
Between LEL-UEL%
Heat of combustion
55644.7 Kj/Kg Fire Ball rate of energy 2.11902e + 006
Kj/ sec.
release
3 m/s
Wind speed
Fire- Ball total energy 1.40781e+007 Kj
release
6.64 sec.
415 kg/m3
Fire ball duration
Liquid Density
Incident Intensity
of Heat Radiation
( IHR) at ground
level KW /m 2
37.5
IHR- Isopleth
Distance
( Meters )
Damage effects
70.0
25.0
81.0
12.5
115.0
4.0
197.0
100 % Fatal . Min. to ignite wood (without flame
contact)
Min. to ignite wood ( without flame contact ).
Significant injury.
Min. to ignite wood (with flame contact). 1 st deg. burn
.
Pain after 20 secs. Blistering unlikely.
1.6
317.0
No discomfort even on long exposure.
Results
 In the 70 meter radius area is considered as 100 % fatality in 1 min. and first degree burn in 10
sec.
 In the 115 meter radius first degree burn in 10 sec.
 In the 197 meter radius area will give pain after 20 seconds. Blistering unlikely.
 In the 317 meter radius area is considered as safe area and no discomfiture even on long
exposure.
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
73
00
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
74
00
MCA Scenario –17 Flash Fire simulation for LNG 20 M3 Bullet catastrophic failure
TABLE – Q
For LNG 20 M3 Bullet catastrophic failure
Scenario
: FLASH FIRE
In put Data
Results of Computations
20 M3
20.41 meter
Stored quantity
Visible Flash Fire Height
253
Kgs.
10.21 meter
Mass of Gas
Visible Flash Fire Width
42267.5 Kj/kg
Heat of combustion
Duration of Flash-Fire in Sec. 6.64 sec.
Fuel-Air volume ratio 0.600
Radius of fuel-air cloud 16.27 meter
in Flash fire cloud
mixture
7039054.55 Kj
Stochiometric
Fuel- 0.50
Total energy release
Air Mixture
2.0 m/s
Wind speed
Max. Heat Radiation from 1 m 318.32Kw/ m2
from Flash Fire
0.5
415 kg/m3
Combustion efficiency
Gas Density
Incident Intensity
of Heat Radiation
(IHR) at ground
level KW /m 2
37.5
IHR- Isopleth
Distance
( Meters )
Damage effects
49.0
25.0
59.0
12.5
87.0
100 % Fatal . Min. to ignite wood (without flame
contact)
Significant injury. Min. to ignite wood ( without flame
contact ).
Min. to ignite wood (with flame contact). 1 st deg. burn .
4.0
137.0
Pain after 20 secs. Blistering unlikely.
1.6
226.0
No discomfort even on long exposure.
Results
 In the 49 meter radius area is considered as 100 % fatality in 1 min. and first degree burn in 10
sec.
 In the 87 meter radius first degree burn in 10 sec.
 In the 137 meter radius area will give pain after 20 seconds. Blistering unlikely.
 In the 226 meter radius area is considered as safe area and no discomfiture even on long
exposure.
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
75
00
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
76
00
MCA Scenario –18 Unconfined Vapour cloud Explosion ( UVCE ) for LNG 20 M3 Bullet
catastrophic failure
TABLE – R
For LNG 20 M3 Bullet catastrophic failure
Scenario
: UVCE
In put Data
20 M3
Stored quantity
561 lbm.
Mass of vapour between LEL – UEL %
0.6749
TNT equivalent
0.1
Explosion efficiency
3.0 m/s
Wind speed
Radial
Distance
in Meter
5
Over
pressure
( psi )
36.3
% Fatality
lung Rupture
% Eardrum
rupture
%Structural
damage
% Glass
rupture
100
100
100
100
5.3
31.1
98.1
100
100
100
8.3
10.7
0.1
85.5
100
100
28.3
1.9
0.0
2.9
20.9
100
401.6
0.3
0.0
0.0
0.0
5.2
Results
 In case of UVCE up to 5 meter distance is considered as 100 % fatality and 100 % ear drum
rupture radius.
 Up to 8.3 meter distance is considered as 100 % structural Damage and up to 28.3 meter
distance for 100 % glass damage area.
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
77
00
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
78
00
6.2
Detail regarding consequences analysis table
TABLE - 6.3
Type of failure
considered
MCA Scenario –
1,2,3,4 Pool Fire,
Ball Fire, Flash
Fire and UVCE
for 20 KL Class A
Petroleum Road
tankercatastrophic
failure
MCA Scenario –5
Tank on Fire for
20 KL Class A
petroleum storage
tank
MCA Scenario –
6,7,8,9 Pool Fire,
Fire Ball, Flash
Fire and UVCE
for 20 KL Class A
petroleum storage
tank
Spill
quantity
considera
tion Max.
Credible
loss
scenario
in KL.
Evaporatio
n vapor
cloud mass
Btn. LELUEL % for
15 mints
release
from the
source.
20
Pool fire / tank on fire
damage radius at
various KW/ M2 in
meter
Fire Ball damage radius at
various KW/ M2 in meter
Heat Intensity KW/ M2
37.5
12.5
4
37.5
12.5
1.6
91 Kgs.
13.5
22.1
61.6
33
65
20
-
2.8
3.1
8.6
-
20
138
9.8
16.9
46.7
28
Prepared By
HSE Department
Flash fire simulation
radius at various KW/ M2
in meter
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Vapor cloud Explosion
( Unconfined vapor cloud explosion) UVCE
peak over pressure in feet.
37.5
12.5
4
100%
Fatalit
y
186
45
74.5
212
-
-
-
-
54
142
32
57
Page
Rev.
:
:
79
00
100%
Structur
al
Damage
15
100%
Glass brk.
6.6
100%
Eardru
m
rupture
8.3
-
-
-
-
-
158
6.3
6.6
11.6
35
35
Type of failure
considered
MCA Scenario 10,11 Unconfined
Pool Fire and
BLEVE
Simulation
for
Drum
Storage
Area.
MCA Scenario-12
Pool Fire For
HSD Road Tanker
Scenario–13
Diffusion Jet Fire
Simulation for 1.0
cm copper pipe
line of Hydrogen
cylinder skid to
PRV station.
Scenario
–14
Over pressure /
explosion
for
rupture of 1.0 cm
copper pipe line
of
Hydrogen
cylinder skid to
PRV station
Spill
quantity
considera
tion Max.
Credible
loss
scenario
in KL.
Evaporatio
n vapor
cloud mass
Btn. LELUEL % for
15 mints
release
from the
source.
20
Pool fire / tank on fire
damage radius at
various KW/ M2 in
meter
Fire Ball damage radius at
various KW/ M2 in meter
Heat Intensity KW/ M2
37.5
12.5
4
37.5
12.5
4
80
23.1
40
111.8
25
42.5
20
-
18.5
32.1
89.6
-
50 Kgs.
-
8.3
14.4
40.1
1500 m3
4 Kgs
-
-
-
Prepared By
HSE Department
Flash fire simulation
radius at various KW/ M2
in meter
Vapor cloud Explosion
( Unconfined vapor cloud explosion) UVCE
peak over pressure in meter.
37.5
12.5
1.6
100%
Fatalit
y
120
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
19.0
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
80
00
100%
Structur
al
Damage
-
100%
Glass brk.
-
100%
Eardru
m
rupture
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
32.0
89.0
-
-
-
-
-
Type of failure
considered
MCA Scenario –
15,16,17,18 Pool
Fire, Fire Ball,
Flash Fire and
UVCE for LNG
20 M3 bullet
catastrophic
failure
Spill
quantity
considera
tion Max.
Credible
loss
scenario
in M3.
Evaporatio
n vapor
cloud mass
Btn. LELUEL % for
15 mints
release
from the
source.
20
253
Prepared By
HSE Department
Pool fire / tank on fire
damage radius at
various KW/ M2 in
meter
37.5
12.5
1.6
26
40.6
113.3
Fire Ball damage radius at
various KW/ M2 in meter
Flash fire simulation
radius at various KW/ M2
in meter
Heat Intensity KW/ M2
37.5
12.5
4
70
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
115
197
Page
Rev.
:
:
Vapor cloud Explosion
( Unconfined vapor cloud explosion) UVCE
peak over pressure in meter.
37.5
12.5
4
100%
Fatalit
y
49
87
137
5
81
00
100%
Eardru
m
rupture
5.3
100%
Structur
al
Damage
8.3
100%
Glass brk.
28.3
6.3
Conclusions
The appended table 6.3 summarizes the consequences of the various hazards analyzed
under this study.
As can be seen from the results of the summary of the Risk Analysis study, the Fatality
zone due to burn up to 70 meters in worst case scenario. First degree burn zone up to 115
meter. Due to explosion Fatal distance is maximum 6.6 meters, structural damage zone is
up to 15 meters for fire and explosion scenarios.
Within the manufacturing processes, no major hazards are for seen due to minimal storage
in process area.
On site emergency preparedness plan
On site emergency preparedness plan will be prepared as per risk assessment findings.
Emergency control facilities and resources will be plan and rehearsal / Mock- Drill to be
conducted regularly to combat emergency in minimum time.
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
82
00
SECTION VII
RISK REDUCTION MEASURES
Some of the safeties and risk reduction measures adopted and recommended for the safety of the
plant are as follows:7.1
Design
7.1.1
During the design stage itself adequate care to be taken for design, selection, fabrication,
erection and commissioning of Flammable and toxic liquid handling facilities and other
equipment, piping, pipe fittings, electrical equipment etc. Relevant and prevalent
international and Indian standards to be followed for design, fabrication, inspection of the
storage tanks and other equipment.
Civil foundations should suitably designed to take care of earthquakes, cyclones,
landslides, flooding, collapse of structures etc.
Plant operator and staffs to be selected well experience and qualified for chemical plant
operation.
All key personals to be trained for emergency handling procedures and regular MockDrills has been conducted on various scenarios.
7.1.2
7.1.3
7.1.4
7.2
Safety Devices
Following safety devices will be provided to protect from any malfunctioning of plant
equipments:
7.2.1
Storage tanks.
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
g)
h)
7.2.2
Pressure ( Maximum and Minimum ) cutoff and gauge provided.
Level gauges on storage tanks.
Static bonding of pipeline flanges.
Dyke wall provided surround above ground storage tanks.
Safety valve and other venting system provided on pressure vessels and utility.
All pumps flameproof type and double mechanical seal type.
Jumpers and static earthing provision made on all flanges and tanks.
Caution note and Material identification, capacity displayed on all storage tanks.
Pumps
a) Required out let valve and NRV on pump outlet.
b) Modular fire extinguishers near of most of the pumps.
c) FLP type and mechanical seal type pump to be installed for flammable chemicals.
7.2.3
Pipelines
a) Jumper connections on flanges to prevent build up of static electricity charge.
b) Proper supports and clamping
c) Double earthing to all electrical motors.
d) Colour code as Per IS -2379
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
83
00
7.3
Operation and Maintenance
Some of the guidelines are as follows:a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
g)
h)
i)
j)
k)
Periodic testing of hoses for leakages and continuity.
Earthing of all plant equipment and earthing of vehicles under unloading operations.
Annual testing of all safety relief valves.
Planned preventive maintenance of different equipment for their safety and reliable
operations.
Inspection of the storage tanks as per prefixed inspection schedule for thickness
measurement, joint and weld efficiency etc.
Comprehensive color code scheme to identify different medium pipes.
Strict compliance of safety work permits system.
Proper maintenance of earth pits.
Strict compliance of security procedures like issue of identify badges for outsides, gate
pass system for vehicles, checking of spark arrestors fitted to the tank lorries etc.
Strict enforcement of no smoking regime.
Periodic training and refresher courses to train the staff in safety, fire fighting and first
aid.
7.4
Recommendations
7.4.1
From the Risk Analysis studies conducted, it would be observed that by and large, the risks
are confined within the factory boundary walls in case of fire, explosion and spillage of
chemicals. On site emergency plan & preparedness plan to be prepared and implemented
to combat such situations. To minimize the consequential effects of the risk scenarios,
following steps are recommended.
 Plant should meet provisions of the Manufacture, storage & Import of Hazardous
Chemicals Rules, 1986 & the factories Act, 1948.
 Fire hydrant system needs to be installed as per NFPA / GFR 66 A Norms in plant and
buildings.
 Process hazard analysis to be conducted for each process and recommendation to be
implemented.
 On line Gas detectors needs to be provided in tank farm area for early detection of the
solvent vapour in case of leakage from anywhere.
 HSE management system to be implemented.
 Induction course for HSE to be implemented at very initial stage of the plant
employees recruitment.
 Periodic On Site Emergency Mock Drills and occasional Off Site Emergency Mock
Drills to be conducted, so those staffs are trained and are in a state of preparedness to
tackle any emergency.
 Emergency handling facilities to be maintained in tip top condition at all time.
 Safe operating procedure to be prepared for hazardous process and material handling
process.
 Local call points (LCP) and smoke detectors to be provided in godown/ ware house,
office building, drum storage area etc.
 Safety devices and control instruments to be calibrated once in a year.
 Proper colour work as per IS 2379 to plant pipeline and tank, equipments to be done
once in a six month to protect from corrosion.
 Preventive maintenance schedule to be prepared for all equipments.
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
84
00
 Permit to work system to be implemented 100 % for hazardous work in the plant.
 Safety manual as per Gujarat Factories Rule-68 K & P and Public awareness manual
as per Gujarat Factories Rule 41 B & C needs to be prepared and distributed to all
employees and nearby public.
 Emergency siren to be provided in all plant to declare emergency.
 Fire & Safety organization setup to be planed and implement for batter plant process
safety.
 Static earthing interlocking with pump facility to be provided in tank farm area to
avoid static hazard during tanker unloading work.
 Water Sprinkler system needs to be provided in Ammonia storage area.
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
85
00
SECTION VIII
DESASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN
An onsite emergency in the industries involving hazardous processes or in hazardous installations
is one situation that has potential to cause serious injury or loss of life. It may cause extensive
damage to property and serious disruption in the work area and usually, the effects are confined to
factory or in several departments of factory, premise. An emergency begins when operator at the
plant or in charge of storage cannot cope up with a potentially hazardous incident, which may turn
into an emergency.
8.1
ONSITE EMERGENCY PLAN
8.1.1
OBJECTIVES OF ONSITE EMERGENCY PLAN
A quick and effective response at during an emergency can have tremendous significance
on whether the situation is controlled with little loss or it turns into a major emergency.
Therefore, purpose an emergency plan is to provide basic guidance to the personnel for
effectively combating such situations to minimize loss of life, damage to property and loss
of property.
An objective of Emergency Planning is to maximize the resource utilisation and combined
efforts towards emergency operations are as follows. :
8.1.2
DURING AN EMERGENCY.




To increase thinking accuracy and to reduce thinking time.
To localize the emergency and if possible eliminates it.
To minimize the effects of accident on people and property.
To take correct remedial measures in the quickest time possible to contain the incident
and control it with minimum damage.
 To prevent spreading of the damage in the other sections.
 To mobilize the internal resources and utilize them in the most effective way
 To arrange rescue and treatment of causalities.
8.1.3
DURING NORMAL TIME.






To keep the required emergency equipment in stock at right places and ensure the
working condition.
To keep the concerned personnel fully trained in the use of emergency equipment.
To give immediate warning tooth surrounding localities in case of an emergency
situation arising.
To mobilize transport and medical treatment of the injured.
To get help from the local community and government officials to supplement
manpower and resources.
To provide information to media & Government agencies, Preserving records,
evidence of situation for subsequent emergency etc.
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
86
00
8.2
SCOPE OF OSEP
This OSEP is prepared for industrial emergencies like fires, explosions, toxic releases, and
asphyxia and does not cover natural calamities and societal disturbances related
emergencies (like strikes, bomb threats, civil commission’s etc.)
8.3
ELEMENTS OF ONSITE EMERGENCY PLAN
The important elements to be considered in plan are







8.4
Emergency organization
Emergency Facilities.
Roles and Responsibilities of Key Personnel and Essential Employee.
Communications during Emergency
Emergency Shutdown of Plant & Control of situation.
Rescue Transport & Rehabilitation.
Developing Important Information.
METHODOLOGY.
The consideration in preparing Emergency Plan will be included the following steps:







Identification and assessment of hazards and risks.
Identifying, appointment of personnel & Assignment of Responsibilities.
Identification and equipping Emergency Control Centre.
Identifying Assembly, Rescue points Medical Facilities.
Formulation of plan and of emergency sources.
Training, Rehearsal & Evaluation.
Action on Site.
Earlier, a detailed Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment was carried out on hazards and
their likely locations and consequences are estimated following the standard procedure.
However the causing factors for above discussed end results may be different and causing
factors are not discussed in this plan.
8.5
EMERGENCIES IDENTIFIED
Emergencies that may be likely at bulk fuel storage area, process plant, cylinder storage
area, and drum storage shed, and autoclave reactor area. There are chances of fire and
explosive only.
8.6
OTHERS
Other risks are earthquake, lightning, sabotage, bombing etc., which are usually, not in the
purview of management control.
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
87
00
8.7
EMERGENCY ORGANISATION.
Plant organization is enclosed. Based on the plant organization, which includes shift
organization, an Emergency Organization is constituted towards achieving objectives of
this emergency plan.
Plant Manager is designated as Overall in Charge and is the Site Controller.
The following are designated as Incident Controllers for respective areas under their
control. Shift in charge Engineer (Plant Operations) is designated at Incident Controller for
all areas of plant.
8.8
EMERGENCY FACILITIES
8.8.1
EMERGENCY CONTROL CENTRE (ECC)
It is a location, where all key personnel like Site Controller, Incident Controller etc. can
assemble in the event of onset of emergency and carry on various duties assigned to them.
Plant Manager’s Office is designated as Emergency Control Centre. It has P&T telephone
as well as internal telephones, ECC is accessible from plant located considerably away
from process plant, Storage’s and on evaluation of other locations, Plant Manager’s Room
find merit from the distance point of view, communication etc.
8.8.2
FACILITIES PROPOSED TO BE MAINTAINED AT EMERGENCY CONTROL
CENTRE (ECC)
The following facilities and information would be made available at the ECC














Latest copy of Onsite Emergency Plan and off sites Emergency Plan (as provided by
District Emergency Authority).
Intercom Telephone.
P&T Telephone.
Telephone directories (Internal, P&T)
Factory Layout, Site Plan
Plans indicating locations of hazardous inventories, sources of safety equipment,
hydrant layout, location of pump house, road plan, assembly points, vulnerable zones,
escape routes.
Hazard chart.
Emergency shut-down procedures.
Nominal roll of employees.
List and address of key personnel
List and address of Emergency coordinators.
List and address of first aides,
List and address of first aid fire fighting employees,
List and address of qualified Trained persons.
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
88
00
8.8.3
FIRE FIGHTING FACILITIES.


8.8.4
Internal hydrant system
Portable extinguishers
FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS
These systems are proposed to protect the plant by means of different fire protection
facilities and consist of





8.8.5
Hydrant system for exterior as well as internal protection of various buildings/areas of
the plant.
Portable extinguishers and hand appliances for extinguishing small fires in different
areas of the plant.
Water cum foam monitor to be provided in bulk fuel storage area.
Fire water pumps.
Two (2) independent motor driven pumps each of sufficient capacity and head are
proposed for the hydrant systems which is capable to extinguish Fire or cooling
purpose.
HYDRANT SYSTEM.
Adequate number of fire hydrants and monitors will be provided at various locations in
and around the buildings and other plant areas. The hydrants will be provided on a
network of hydrant mains drawing water from the hydrant pump, which starts
automatically due to drop of pressure in the event of operating the hydrant valves. We are
suggesting you to go for TAC approved hydrant system for foolproof safety and benefit
from fire policy premium.
8.9
EMERGENCY ESCAPES
The objective of the emergency escape is to escape from the hazardous locations, to the
nearest assembly point or the other safe zone, for rescue and evacuation.
8.10
ASSEMBLY POINT.
Assembly point is location, where, persons unconnected with emergency operations would
proceed and await for rescue operation.
8.11
WIND SOCK.
Wind socks for knowing wind direction indication would be provided at a suitable location
to visible from many locations. It is proposed to install windsocks at plant and
Administration Building so as to be visible from different locations in the plant.
8.12
EMERGENCY TRANSPORT.
Emergency Ambulance would be stationed at the Administration Office and round the
clock-driver would be made available for emergency transportation of injured etc.
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
89
00
However, the other vehicles of the company also would be available for emergency
services.
8.13
EMERGENCY COMMUNICATION.
There are two kinds of communication system provided.
(a) Regular P&T phones with intercom facility.
(b) Mobile phone
8.14
WARNING/ALARM/COMMUNICATION OF EMERGENCY
The emergency would be communicated by operating electrical siren for continuously for
five minutes with high and low pitch mode.
8.15
EMERGENCY RESPONSIBILITIES:
Priority of Emergency Protection.



8.16
Life safety
Preservation of property
Restoration of the normalcy
MUTUAL AID
While necessary facilities are available and are updated from time to time, sometimes, it
may be necessary to seek external assistance; it may be from the neighboring factories or
from the State Government as the case may be.
8.17
MOCK DRILL
Inspite of detailed training, it may be necessary to try out whether, the OSEP works out
and will there be any difficulties in execution of such plan. In order to evaluate the plan
and see whether the plan meets the objectives of the OSEP, occasional mock drills are
contemplated. Before undertaking the drill, it would be very much necessary to give
adequate training to all staff members and also information about possible mock drill.
After few pre-informed mock drills, few UN-informed mock drills would be taken. All
this is to familiarize the employees with the concept and procedures and to see their
response. These scheduled and unscheduled mock drills would be conducted during shift
change, public holidays, in night shift etc. To improve preparedness once in 6 months and
performance is evaluated and Site Controller maintains the record. Incident Controller (IC
) coordinates this activity.
Prepared By
HSE Department
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.
Page
Rev.
:
:
90
00