Green Paper Consultation
Security vs. Defence
Key Gaps in Defence Capability
Some Observations and a Few Suggestions
The Green Paper
The Green Paper provides an admirably comprehensive overview of the changes in
Europe and in the wider security context within which Ireland exists. However, I believe
that a greater degree of attention should be given to a consideration of conventional
defence matters.
Historical baggage:
The ‘defence’ policy of Ireland has traditionally had a strong internal security focus. The
Civil War gave pre-eminence to the army. The lack of modern equipment during the
Emergency meant that a lare army was the main strategy for defence. No naval capability
existed and only a tiny air defence force was available. The conflict in Northern Ireland
has reinforced the internal security focus of the ‘defence’ policy. The United Nations
missions have also emphasised a land based element.
The location of Ireland beside the home islands of the British Empire meant that attack
from any other country was highly unlikely as it would trigger British intervention.
Indeed the preponderance of major powers nearby, with powerful air forces and navies
meant that these arms were unlikely to play a significant role in deterring a large scale
attack.
Reduction in British defence spending and capability means that local defence needs
must be met by ourselves. The Cold War period meant that Great Britain and the US
would step in if any large scale attack on Ireland took place. Britain might consider it in
its interests to still do so. However, a small scale conflict or terrorist attack might not
evoke much sympathy. It is one thing to give a couple of billion to the Irish when they
mess up their economy, much less likely they would be happy to see British lives lost for
Ireland.
The historical situation has biased our perception of Irish defence capability needs.
Ireland may need to act alone at times and cannot depend on neighbouring nations to
provide for our basic defence needs. An island nation should focus on its naval, air and
land defence in that order of priority.
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Potential Threats:
A growing number of small nations are equipped with advanced weapons, such as
submarines that now possess the range to operate in Irish waters. Long range attack
aircraft with air to air refuelling support are no longer a preserve of large nations and
North African nations have the capability to operate combat aircraft that can reach
Ireland.
A more immediate threat is provided by Al Queda’s demonstration of its ability to use
aircraft to attack major urban centres. Ireland has no manned air defence assets and is
alone in this respect among Western nations. This is a significant gap that could be
exploited with terrible consequences.
Structure and Advice:
The Army dominated chain of command gives an unhelpful pre eminence to land forces
capability and results in a lack of balance in the capability of the Defence Forces. As a
consequence there is a lack of sufficient policy and strategy advice on air power and
naval defence areas for the Minister. There is a need for senior appointments and small
senior staff teams in the Air Corp and Naval Service so that the argument for these arms
contribution to a balance defence strategy can be presented.
The failure to appoint an independent Minister of Defence by the current Government is a
major step backwards
Key Themes:
Deterrence and Credibility:
The lack of capability in air defence and naval defence areas reduces the deterrence
credibility of Irish defence strategy to near zero. Propeller driven aircraft and armed
patrol vessels have no significant military capability. Submarines and even small
warships could operate in Irish waters with impunity. Most commercial and military
aircraft can fly over Irish airspace with impunity.
Balance:
As noted above, the bulk of manpower and equipment is still centred in the Army branch.
This provides a very unbalanced force structure. There is an urgent need to provide a
combat capability through the Air Corp and Naval Service. Small jet powered aircraft and
small warships are essential to protect our airspace and vital sea lanes to Britian and
Europe.
Core Capability:
The capacity to build operational capability quickly in an emergency situation or period
of heightened tension is severely curtailed by the lack of any combat aircraft or warships.
Even operating modern radars and sonars , much less weapon systems, is simply not
possible with the current patrol vessels or aircraft. Naval and air force capability is not of
a modern military standard. Even the acquisition of second hand, last generation warships
and combat aircraft would provide a significant step change in core capability. These
would allow a modern operational capability to be developed by core elements of the
Defence Forces. Each arm of the Defence Forces should have a modern military combat
capability.
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Fundamentals:
Irish exports are currently valued at € 13.7 billion. As Ireland is an island nation, it is
dependent on trade for it’s prosperity, this should have profound implications for our
defence posture. Our economic growth and prosperity are very dependent on the ability to
import and export goods. The continued existence of sufficient levels of Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI)are based on secure sea lanes to trade and need to be defended.
The Gross National Product of Ireland means that we are a relatively rich, prosperous
country. Ireland has the resources to provide a properly resourced and balance defence
capability. This should be set in line with other nations of a similar GDP and population.
Ireland’s international profile is very positive with a tradition of UN service based on our
independence from the major powers, a sympathetic approach to Palestinian cause and a
broadly anti imperial stance. However, Ireland has recently been instrumental in assisting
to move 1 million American soldiers through our country to fight in key battlegrounds
against Al Queda. This puts us firmly in the Western camp and therefore a possible target
for Islamic extremists. Ireland is also weakly defended in the air and naval areas and thus
provides an easy target.
Ability to fulfil key Defence needs:
The Green paper takes quite a security based approach and largely neglects a
consideration of a conventional defence analysis of the military capability needs of
Ireland. The Defences forces are not equipped with warships, combat aircraft or any
heavy or medium armoured elements. Internal security, land based terrorist attacks and
peacekeeping tasks are the only capability provided for to a credible standard. The
capability to keep vital sea lanes open is non existent. The capability to prevent a 9/11
style attack is non existent. The army could not operate effectively in a difficult peace
enforcement role nor against a modern European army.
Military neutrality is only a credible policy if a balanced defence capability exists that
can meet a sufficiently wide range of potential threats. An alternative is to adopt the
approach of the small Baltic states that have joined NATO and rely on this for their air
and coastal defence. A military treaty with Britain could also provide a credible
capability. The cost in monetary terms would probably not be high, however the status of
Ireland as a neutral, independent Western nation would be significantly effected.
Benchmarking:
The capability gap that persists is caused mainly by an inadequate level of investment by
successive Irish Governments over a long period of time. At 0.6% of GDP, defence
investment is the second lowest in the EU. Ireland should target spending to be at top of
the bottom quartile of European Union nations. A level of 0.85% of GDP would allow for
adequate equipment levels to be achieved, especially for the Air Corp and Naval Service,
and allow large scale inter services operational training to take place.
Small neutral countries with long coastlines and significant external trade links, such as
New Zealand, Denmark or Norway could be used as comparators for force structure and
% of GDP spend. Other small, neutral countries such as Austria or Finland could also be
considered for use as benchmarks.
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Acquisitions Policy:
Surplus or Second Hand Equipment:
Significant sized nations such as Chile, Argentina and Mexico equip major units of their
army, navy and air force with second hand equipment acquired from European nations or
the United States. Because America and Europe both acquire the most advanced and
sophisticated weapons, even when these are retired they are still very capable systems.
Meeting defence equipment needs through selective purchase of surplus military standard
equipment such as combat aircraft, corvettes, light frigates or tanks can be a very cost
effective way of providing Ireland with the core capability needed. This would allow
Ireland to build an operational expertise with relatively modern and sophisticated military
equipment and tactics.
New Equipment:
This very expensive acquisition approach should only be used where the equipment will
receive extensive use, where the latest technology is essential and the cost of purchase /
operation provides significant life time savings. Equipment that would be used regularly
on UN missions would fall into this category. Patrol ships, maritime patrol aircraft and
ministerial transport aircraft would also fall into this category.
Air Defence Needs:
A powerful memory for many people is watching the Twin Towers in New York
collapsing with the loss of life of about 3,000 people. This spectacular attack gained
enormous attention for a previously little know terrorist network and led to the ongoing
War on Terror. Complacency was the key mistake that led to this disaster. Despite
precautions such an attack cannot be ruled out again. Such a catastrophic event in Ireland,
even on a much smaller scale, could cause multiple casualties including many deaths, and
horrific injuries. What worked for the terrorists once could be used again. Although the
likelihood of this happening is not high the impact on Ireland would be enormous.
The present provision of air defence through short range, low level surface to air missiles
(SAM’s) and the PC 9 propeller driven aircraft is marginal at best and completely
inadequate at worst. If the PC 9 aircraft had been equipped with short range air to air
missiles (AAM’s) and an infra red search and track (IRST) capability they could be
considered adequate to intercept similarly powered aircraft, such as a regional airliner or
other slow civilian aircraft.
Civilian commercial jet airliners or business jets are clearly beyond the capability of
these aircraft to intercept. To fill this gap, the acquisition of faster, more heavily armed
jet aircraft with radar or IRST equipment is essential. This type of aircraft would provide
a credible daylight and limited poor weather and night interception capability against
large and small commercial jet aircraft. Jet aircraft in the advanced jet trainer, lead in
fighter trainer or light combat aircraft categories could fulfil this function at an affordable
cost. Eight aircraft would provide a sufficient capability for quick reaction interceptions
and for training and maintenance needs.
These aircraft capabilities should also be able to intercept the attack aircraft of other
states that are in reach of Ireland. The advent of long range attack aircraft and aerial
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refuelling puts Ireland in range of these bomber or strike aircraft. Even light combat
aircraft can provide a basic intercept capability against unescorted attack aircraft.
Ukraine has deployed Mi24 gunship helicopters in support of the UN deployment in
Liberia. This type of force can be a crucial deterrent to attacks on UN troops. Irish light
combat aircraft could be deployed in a similar role and would be low cost to operate.
Maritime Defence Needs:
Ireland as an island is dependent on trade and secure maritime sea lanes for its prosperity
and security. Ireland imports significant amounts of fuel for power stations and general
use. Many of the multinational companies source parts and raw materials from abroad.
The continued investment from foreign multinationals is based on the assumption of the
security of sea lanes to and from Ireland. Exports are a vital part of the Irish economy
including the electronics, pharmaceutical and food exports. Much of these exports and
imports are moved over the sea lanes and through our ports. The capability to defend
these ports and sea lanes are vital to Ireland’s prosperity.
The routes to the UK are the most crucial as a large percentage of trade is with the UK or
could be rerouted through the UK. The control of the Irish Sea is of vital strategic
importance to Irish defence. In addition, continental European countries are also an
important and growing area of trade. The protection of the sea lanes to the ports on the
French Atlantic seaboard and to Belgian and Dutch ports is also crucial. The protection of
shipping travelling to and from Ireland is of vital national importance. This requires the
development of a military standard naval capability built around a small number of light
vessels, built and equipped to warship standards. In the current peaceful climate they do
not need to be equipped with sophisticated, latest technology.
Warships could be purchased second hand from the well equipped European navies. The
capability required to protect these sea lanes is well within the economic capacity of
Ireland to provide. The Irish sea could be secured by a small force of corvettes and a
similar sized force of light frigates could patrol in the Bay of Biscay. This small force of
light warships could be supplemented by upgraded CASA maritime patrol aircraft. The
addition of anti submarine warfare (ASW) capability and an anti surface warfare (ASuW)
capability would enhance the usefulness of the CASA platform and allow training to take
place to develop an airborne capability in this area.
Chile and Turkey have both acquired CASA aircraft recently with this additional
capability and test firings have taken place with an anti ship missile. The corvette could
be acquired second hand from Spain (Descubierta class, soon to be retired and put up for
sale) or France (A69 class). This/these light frigate(s) could be acquired from Italy (Lupo
class) or France (Floreal class). These latter ships would require a naval ASW helicopter
to provide patrol capability in the Bay of Biscay. These warships could be refurbished
and modernised with some latest generation weapons and sensors in key areas.
A less effective, but cheaper alternative would be to equip the patrol vessels with
enhanced sensors and weapons. In this way they could provide a basis for training and a
second line capability for military missions. These ships could take part in UN patrol
missions to interdict arms smugglers and pirates, and enforce embargos.
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Land Forces:
The size and equipment of the land forces component is of a good standard even for
demanding missions in a peacekeeping role. However, beyond this level of military
tasking there are significant capability gaps that ought to be filled urgently. These include
some direct fire support vehicles, indirect fire support vehicles, armoured mobile artillery
and some medium tanks /infantry combat vehicles.
The army should have counter attack, manoeuvre and garrison/security levels of
capability, with the required equipment and training. Two battalions should be equipped
to the level of a manoeuvre unit. Currently, the MOWAG armoured personnel carriers
can provide a manoeuvre element if up gunned (25-30mm cannon) and the units had
integral air defence, direct and indirect armoured fire equipment provided.
Three battalions should be equipped for garrison/security tasks. This requires the
acquisition of lightly armoured tactical vehicles with limited armament and cross country
capability. Vehicles based on commercial chassis, in the 5 to10 ton category, such as the
Duro or Eagle could provide this level of capability. They could also be used in peace
keeping scenarios where the MOWAG’s protection, mobility and firepower levels are not
required, such as Haiti or Kosovo.
An armoured battalion should be created with medium tanks and infantry fighting
vehicles. These could replace the Scorpion light tanks and the Timoney APC’s currently
in service. An airborne assault element would complete this capability. This would use
the existing helicopter resources and a small number of heavy lift helicopters.
Humanitarian Assistance
Ireland has a long and proud record of providing assistance to nations and people that are
less well off than ourselves. Irish missionaries have went abroad to teach and assist. More
recently Irish Aid and the Defence Forces as part of the UN deployments,have provided
essential assistance in crisis circumstances. Security is the essential requirement for the
building / functioning of a State or the delivery of humanitarian assistance.
When the Defence Forces provide resources to undertake these missions, funding for
these operations should be provided by Irish Aid, The Department of Foreign Affairs or
the UN. Operational expenses should not be attributed to the Defence spend. In addition
to security support, the provision of air and sea transport can be of great assistance and
this contribution should be available from Irish resources. New or second hand transport
aircraft and/or a sealift capability should be acquired to fill this role. Casa transport
aircraft or C130 Hercules (second hand) and a Logistics and Patrol vessel similar to the
Danish Absolom class could meet these needs.
Acquisition options:
Offsets: The purchase of significant numbers or value of military equipment is often
accompanied by significant offset deals between the nation and businesses involved. In
some cases, offset contracts to the value of the full cost of the equipment bought are
provided to local business partners. Even offsets to half the value could provide
significant opportunities for Irish companies to get involved in supply chains of major
international companies such as British Aerospace, EADS, or Boeing.
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Pooling: Becoming involved with other countries to purchase on a joint basis a specific
vehicle or aircraft capability can provide a cost effective way of acquiring this capability ,
particularly where it is not needed on a full time basis. Operating these assets on a joint
basis also provides opportunities to reduce training costs, spares holding costs and major
maintenance costs which can be provided at a central location. Luxembourg has
purchased a A400M transport aircraft which is operated jointly with Belgium.
Leasing: A recent development has seen the use of a leasing option for the acquisition of
major and very expensive military combat aircraft by Czech Republic and Hungary. This
can provide a lower cost means of providing capability that may be needed urgently but
on a temporary basis.
Preferred Partners: It might also be worth considering having preferred partners in
particular areas. Partnering with the Royal Air Force for jet training and air defence needs
might be a practical alliance. Partnering with France for maritime patrol and sea lane
defence may be another option worth pursuing. The current close relationship of the
Army with the Nordic countries is one that could be developed further through joint
procurement proposals.
Surplus Equipment:
Equipment that is surplus to the needs of major military powers can still have useful lives
and retain significant capability in lower threat scenarios. This equipment can be acquired
at much reduced costs. If the equipment is refurbished then the useful life of the
equipment can be significantly extended to 20 or 30 years usage.
The Spanish navy is preparing a list of vessels available for disposal over the next 5
years. Dutch F16 fighters, Frigates and German Leopard battle tanks have recently
entered service with the Chilean armed forces. French and Spanish Mirage F1 fighters are
being withdrawn from service as will Swiss F5 and Israeli F16 and A4 combat aircraft.
A good recent example of this approach is the Finnish acquisition of surplus Swiss Hawk
60 advanced jet trainers for 2M€ per aircraft. These were refurbished to a modern digital
cockpit standard for a further 2M€ per aircraft. Buying a similar capability new Hawk
100 would cost over 10M€ per aircraft. Second hand Hawk 60’s may be available from
the UK or Zimbabwe.
Defence Strategy Objectives:
The five key priorities should be:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Develop a capability to control the sea lanes in the Irish Sea and it’s approaches.
Develop a capability to patrol and escort vessels to continental ports.
Develop an air defence capability against fast commercial and business jets.
Develop a full manoeuvre and counter attack capability for the land forces.
Develop a capability to project and sustain military power in support of UN and
EU missions.
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Summary:
In a less predictable world the provision of a core balanced and modern capability in air
defence, naval and land areas is vital for credible deterrence and protection of the
nation’s vital interests. The common interest in world security should also point us
towards providing an enhance capability to project the military power that we have
available in support of the UN and EU missions for peace and stability.
An acquisition programme is needed over a10 year period, with a minimum investment
of €50M per annum, in new or surplus, up to date military equipment. This effort should
be especially focussed in amending the deficits in the naval and air defence areas.
Appendix 1
Key Equipment and Force Levels:
Purpose
Type
Number
Example
Air Defence
Light combat aircraft
8
Bae Hawk
Sea lane defence
Corvettes
2
Descubierta
Fire support
Fire support veichles
18
MGS/AMS
Protection
Armoured tactical APC’s
100
Duro
Sea Lane defence
Light Frigates
2
Lupo class
Disaster relief
Tactical transport
1 or 2
C130 or C295
Rapid intervention
Heavy lift helicopters
2
EH 101
Sea lift capability
Large Logistics vessel
1
Absolom class
8