Performance and Operations workshop in Beijing
Improving Performance with Safety
T/Off – APPRroach - LanDinG
Presented by
Captain HOUDIN Jean Pierre – Flight Operation Support Director
Introduction
• At the 18th Airbus Flight Safety Conference (March 2012), the main messages about ROPS were
Recognized as a global opportunity to improve safety
Extended to include contaminated runway conditions (A350XWB)
Solution available for all Airbus FBW aircraft
Solution possible for all other types of TAWS‐equipped airplanes
• Today’s objectives are
Two significant events replayed with ROPS
ROPS development status
Runway excursions, an industry priority for safety bodies
Page 2
© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
Content
1
Why, What and When (WWW.airbusworld.com)
2
Cockpit/Operations/Configuration changes
3
Operations/Configuration Impacts
4
Conclusion
© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
Take-Off – FMS functions
• Objectives (TOS 1 function):
• To provide a safety net within avionics
regarding erroneous take-off parameters.
To reduce risks of tail strike,
Entry out of range
between take-off parameters inserted in FMS.
T/O SPEED TOO LOW
•
• Detect gross inconsistency
• Two additional functions (TOS 2)
• A/C position check
• Take-off distance check
Page 4
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V1/VR/V2 DISAGREE
Take-Off Securing (TOS 1)
Detect erroneous weight initialization in the FMS
Check ZFW range:
ZFWMIN
≤
ZFW
≤
ZFWMAX
Check performed as soon as ZFW is entered or modified.
When check fails: «
entry rejected.
Page 5
© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
» message and ZFW
Take-Off Securing (TOS 1)
Detect erroneous take-off speeds initialization in the FMS
Check TO speeds consistency:
V1
≤
VR
≤
V2
Checks performed as soon as all the 3 TO speeds are inserted in the
PERF TO page, or each time a TO speed is modified.
When check fails: « V1/VR/V2 DISAGREE » message.
Page 6
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Take-Off Securing (TOS 1)
Check VMC limitation:
Check Vs1G/VMU limitation:
V1 ≥ KV1VMCG * VMCG
VR ≥ KVRVMCA * VMCA
V2 ≥ KV2VMCA * VMCA
VR ≥ KVR * VRMIN
V2 ≥ KV2 * VS1G
Checks performed:
- When ZFW, BLOCK and CONF are entered on the MCDU.
- When ZFW, BLOCK, CONF or TO thrust setting are modified.
- At engine start.
When check fails: «TO SPEED TOO LOW » message.
TOS 1 reduces gross error entries in the FMS
Page 7
© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
Take-Off Securing (TOS 2)
• A/C position check:
Secure take-off location:
ÂDetection of take-off from taxiway
A/C not on runway
ECAM
TOS 2 “A/C position check” prevents take-off from taxiway.
Page 8
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Take-Off Securing (TOS 2)
• A/C position check:
Secure take-off location:
ÂDetection of none FMS departure runway
A/C on a runway ≠ FMS departure runway.
FMS departure
runway
ECAM
TOS2 “A/C position check” prevents take-off from wrong runway
Page 9
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Take-Off Securing (TOS 2)
Check that the A/C has a sufficient runway length to perform a safe take-off.
Performed in preflight/take-off phases.
TOS 2: take-off distance check
1 At preflight
1
2 At take-off config test
3 At take-off power
2
3
© 2011 Google
TOS 2 “take-off distance check” prevents risk of runway overrun
Page 10
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Take-Off Securing (TOS 2)
1
PREFLIGHT
Pilot entries:
- take-off speeds
- ZFW
- T.O. thrust
- T.O. shift
-…
NO ALERT
Lift-off distance < Runway length available
Lift-off distance
FMS runway
Page 11
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Runway length available
Take-Off Securing (TOS 2)
1
PREFLIGHT
© 2011 Google
Pilot entries:
- take-off speeds
- ZFW
- T.O. thrust
- T.O. shift
-…
New check performed
each time
a parameter is modified
Lift-off distance > Runway length available
Lift-off distance
FMS runway
Page 12
© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
Runway length available
1
Take-Off Securing (TOS 2)
2
TAKE-OFF CONFIG TEST
© 2011 Google
Pilot entries:
- take-off speeds
- ZFW
- T.O. thrust
- T.O. shift
-…
MCDU
ECAM
AUDIO
Lift-off distance > Runway length available
Lift-off distance
FMS runway
Page 13
© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
Runway length available
1
Take-Off Securing (TOS 2)
2
3
TAKE-OFF THRUST
SETTING
© 2011 Google
FMS pilot entries
+
+ actual flap/slat conf setting
AUDIO
+ actual A/C position at TO thrust setting
ECAM
+…
Lift-off distance > Remaining distance on runway
current runway
Lift-off distance
Remaining distance on runway
Page 14
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Non Precision Approaches (NPA)
GPS PRIMARY
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Non precision approach like an ILS?
Existing
ILS look alike
FLS
FMS Landing
System
Available on A320 family
Very soon on A330/A340
Basic on A380 and A350
© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
FLS virtual beam
FLS virtual beam defined by:
• Slope
• Course
• Anchor Point (Runway threshold or
Final End Point)
Published NPA
minima apply
• Airport
code
• Runway Number
• Runway Threshold
© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
Anchor
Point
Beam
Course
FLS approach
• Slope/Course/Anchor Point (Runway threshold or Final End Point)
• Only approaches with a straight final leg
FLS beam
Course
• Temperature correction in cold weather conditions
© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
FLS concept – Key points
• The FLS principle is based on a virtual beam output computed
from the FMS database,
• Most of published NPAs can be flown with FLS function,
• Temperature correction in cold weather conditions,
• Current NPA minima apply,
• Not compatible to RNP AR approaches.
FLS/FINAL APP capability possible on future FMS standards
© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
Common Interface for all Landing Systems
ILS Selection replaced by LS
But no change on:
- Audio Control Panel
- Radio Management Panel
© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
Not a new type of approach…
But a new way to fly existing
procedures
PFD changes
© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
ND changes
FLS
Beam
Modification Operational Impact (MOI) N°35811
© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
Summary – FLS approach
• ILS look alike concept
• FLS Approach preparation identical to ILS
• Mixed LOC/VNAV capability
© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
ROPS Design Objectives
Transition Point
ROPS
Runway Overrun Prevention System
Page 34
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RWY Overrun Prevention System (ROPS)
Reduction of avoidable runway overruns is a priority
Page 35
© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
Runway Overrun Factors at Landing
• WET RLD determination: inaccurate method
• Stabilization not achieved at 1000/500 ft
• Wind change or shift at low altitude
• Approach becoming unstable at low altitude
• Long flare,
• Long derotation
• Late selection of engine thrust reversers
• Auto brake setting too low
• Late / weak pedal braking including Auto Brake override
• Runway friction coefficient lower than expected
• Cancellation of reversers at 70 kt
• Partial / total failure of braking system
• Contaminated runway (snow, ice…)
Page 40
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Solved by:
ROW
Solved by:
ROP
On top of ROPS: Brake To Vacate
• Benefits
• Optimisation of the runway occupancy
• Integration in the future SESAR ATM concept
• Enhanced safety
• Environment
• Lower fuel consumption with thrust reverser usage optimisation
• Operational savings: Braking energy reduction (20 -30%) & Turn
Around Time optimisation
• Already certified on A380
• Certification target for A320 & A330/A340: 2013
Predicted performance
Page 42
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Real time
monitored
performance
On top of ROPS: Brake To Vacate (BTV)
© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
BTV Selection (reminder): DRY & WET lines
DRY and WET lines computed and displayed for
ROW
and inBTV
BTV selection
PLAN Mode
1 : Runway selection:
DRY and WET lines
Page 44
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2 : Exit selection
3 : BTV arming with
Auto-Brake rotary switch
BTV & ROW A380 Normal ops: DRY & WET lines
Mode ARC – Range 5NM
Predicted
DRY/WET lines
Mode ARC – Range 2NM
BTV armed
Page 45
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Below 500 ft,
DRY/WET lines are
"alive”
Mode ARC – Range 2NM
BTV Activation
STOP Bar on ND
Runway Overrun Prevention System
Description of the function ‐ ROW alarms (1/2)
If ROW WET distance to stop is longer than remaining runway length:
GS
On ND
wet line
displayed
Amber, if
A/BRAKE BTV
armed
145
WET
DRY
Below 400ft Amber message on PFD (flashing for 9s)
And, no audio
→ Standard Operating Procedure : Go‐Around if runway is not DRY
Page 46
© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
Runway Overrun Prevention System
Description of the function ‐ ROW alarms (2/2)
If ROW DRY distance to stop is longer than remaining runway length:
GS
145
WET
DRY
Below 400ft :
Red message on PFD (flashing for 9s)
And, below 200ft :
Audio callout “RWY TOO SHORT” → Standard Operating Procedure : Go‐Around (whatever runway condition)
Page 47
© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
Runway Overrun Prevention System
Description of the function ‐ ROP alarms
If ROP distance to stop is longer than remaining runway length:
• Red message on PFD Until max pedal deflection Repetitive audio “BRAKE… MAX BRAKING”
Then, until max reverse selection :
Repetitive audio “SET MAX REVERSE”
• At 80kt (if still in overrun situation)
One audio “KEEP MAX REVERSE”
→ Standard Operating Procedure : Apply Full Pedals and Set/Keep Max Reverse
Page 48
© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
Runway Overrun Prevention System
A Natural Link with in‐flight realistic landing distance assessment based on IFLD
Pilot action based on simple SOP
In Flight
Crew proactive one‐shot landing performance assessment
On Ground
Real‐time automated proactive landing performance assessment
+
Crew alerting
In‐flight realistic landing distance assessment by the crew
VFR stabilization gate
As recommended per SOP
Real‐time automated actual stopping distance calculation
+
Crew alerting
Introduction of In‐flight landing distance assessment and ROPS,
A consistent approach
Covering training, procedure and cockpit technology
... Airbus is ready and active
Page 49
© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
Runway Overrun Prevention System
Timeline for AIRBUS Fleet
A350XWB
A330/A340
A320 Family
Q3 2013
A380
October 2009
1st Prototype
April 2004
Research
Oct. 1998 ‐ Feb. 2002
Page 50
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Q4 2014
Baseline @ EIS
ROPS flight deck technology is supplemented by Airbus SOP of in-flight realistic
landing distance assessment based on FAA TALPA Operational Landing Distance
(IFLD) recommendations:
– AFM, QRH and FCOM Revisions
– Airbus Type Rating Training based on IFLD
– Taking into account FSF ALAR and IATA RERR recommendations
© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
Runway Overrun Prevention System
Replay Of Two Significant Airbus Events – 1st Case
Aircraft Conditions
Runway Conditions
• A320‐214
• Aerodynamic configuration : FULL
• Landing Weight: 64 Tons
• CG location : 28%
• Landing Distance Available = 1966m
• Average downhill slope: +0.23%
• Reported Dry
• 15kts average tailwind
• 162kts ground speed at touchdown
Short Final and • Touchdown at 850m from runway threshold
Touchdown Conditions
Pilot Actions
• Ground spoilers not armed
• Thrust reversers not selected
• Hull loss without fatalities
Consequences
Page 52
© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
Two significant events replayed with ROPS
Runway Overrun Prevention System
Replay Of Two Significant Airbus Events – 1st Case
Aircraft Conditions
Runway Conditions
Short Final
• A320‐214
• Aerodynamic configuration : FULL
• Landing Weight: 64 Tons
• CG location : 28%
• Landing Distance Available = 1966m
• Average downhill slope: +0.23%
• Reported Dry
• 15kts average tailwind
• 162kts ground speed at touchdown
• Touchdown at 850m from runway threshold
Therefore, Go Around
“IF WET: RWY TOO SHORT” passing 150ft
and “RWY TOO SHORT” at threshold overfly
Pilot Actions
• Ground spoilers not armed
• Thrust reversers not selected
• Hull loss without fatalities
Consequences
Page 53
© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
Runway Overrun Prevention System
Replay Of Two Significant Airbus Events – 2nd Case
Aircraft Conditions
Runway Conditions
• A320‐233
• Aerodynamic configuration : FULL
• Landing Weight: 63.5 Tons
• CG location : 33.5%
• Landing Distance Available = 1649m
• Average downhill slope: ‐0.47%
• Reported Wet
• 14kts average tailwind
• 160kts ground speed at touchdown
Short Final and • Touchdown at 400m from runway threshold
Touchdown Conditions
• Ground spoilers armed
• Max Rev selected at touchdown
• Max pedals 14s after touchdown
Pilot Actions • Idle Rev selected at 190m from runway end
Consequences
• 54kts runway overrun speed • Hull loss with fatalities
Page 54
© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
Runway Overrun Prevention System
Replay Of Two Significant Airbus Events – 2nd Case
Aircraft Conditions
Runway Conditions
Short Final
• A320‐233
• Aerodynamic configuration : FULL
• Landing Weight: 63.5 Tons
• CG location : 33.5%
• Landing Distance Available = 1649m
• Average downhill slope: ‐0.47%
• Reported Wet
Therefore, Go Around
• 14kts average tailwind
• 160kts ground speed at touchdown
• Touchdown at 400m from runway threshold
“RWY TOO SHORT” passing 150ft
• Ground spoilers armed
• Max Rev selected at touchdown
• Max pedals 14s after touchdown
Pilot Actions • Idle Rev selected at 190m from runway end
Consequences
• 54kts runway overrun speed • Hull loss with fatalities
Page 55
© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
Runway Overrun Prevention System
A350XWB ‐ Step 3 Development Status
Runway condition short feedback on ND
RWY condition matrix on WHEEL page
to assist pilots in contaminated runway conditions
RWY condition selector
A/BRK
Pushbutton
Page 62
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Runway Overrun Prevention System
A350XWB ‐ Step 3 Development Status
• Achievements
Detailed specification delivered
EASA Human Factors evaluations successfully done
EASA and FAA first certification meetings done
First integration tests on bench done
• On‐going activities
Preparation of integration tests on iron bird
Preparation of flight tests
• Schedules for Entry‐into‐Service:
BTV/ROPS available at A350XWB Entry‐Into‐Service
Page 63
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Runway Excursions, A Priority For Safety Agencies
US NTSB (March 2011)
“Actively pursue with aircraft and avionics manufacturers the development of technology to reduce or prevent runway excursions and, once it becomes available, require that the technology be installed.”
(A‐11‐28 safety recommendation to FAA)
European Aviation Safety Agency (June 2012)
Release of draft Terms of Reference to mandate existing on‐board technologies on airplane
To increase the level of safety by reducing the number of runway excursions
Regional Aviation Safety Group – Pan America (October 2012)
Positive Business Case related to the deployment of ROPS‐like technology to mitigate runway excursion risk in Latin America
Recommendation to implement such on‐board technology
European Action Plan for Prevention of Runway Excursions (January 2013)
“On‐board real time performance monitoring and alerting systems that will assist the flight crew with the land/go‐around decision and warn when more deceleration force is needed should be made widely available.”
(AM03 safety recommendation to aircraft manufacturers)
Page 66
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Enhanced Visual Systems (EVS)
Page 67
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EVS-HUD
HUD provisions
Page 68
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Enhanced Visual Systems (EVS)
Page 69
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Conclusion – T/OFF
Flight Phase
TOS 1
TOS 2
Pre Flight
•ZFW
•SPEEDS
•T/O Distance check
T/O CONF CHECK
•T/O Distance check
T/O THRUST SET
•A/C Position check
•T/O Distance check
Entry out of range
V1/VR/V2
DISAGREE
T/O SPEED TOO
LOW
Page 70
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Conclusion - FLS approach
•Most of published NPAs can be flown with FLS function,
•Current NPA minima apply, Not compatible to RNP AR approaches.
•FLS/FINAL APP capability possible on future FMS standards
FLS beam
Course
© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
Conclusion – FLS APPROACH
Approach technique and procedures :ILS “Look-alike” concept
Simplification of procedures
Same procedures for all kinds of approach (decelerated technique)
Reduce training time and cost due to
standardization of procedures
Improvements to increase safety/situation awareness during NPA
Temperature correction for cold weather
Vertical guidance for LOC only/LOC B/C
FLS is not a new type of approach….
…but a new way to fly existing NPA
© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
Conclusion - landing
© 2011 Google
GS145
WET
DRY
Airbus improves permanently and implement safety systems
© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.