Performance and Operations workshop in Beijing Improving Performance with Safety T/Off – APPRroach - LanDinG Presented by Captain HOUDIN Jean Pierre – Flight Operation Support Director Introduction • At the 18th Airbus Flight Safety Conference (March 2012), the main messages about ROPS were Recognized as a global opportunity to improve safety Extended to include contaminated runway conditions (A350XWB) Solution available for all Airbus FBW aircraft Solution possible for all other types of TAWS‐equipped airplanes • Today’s objectives are Two significant events replayed with ROPS ROPS development status Runway excursions, an industry priority for safety bodies Page 2 © AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. Content 1 Why, What and When (WWW.airbusworld.com) 2 Cockpit/Operations/Configuration changes 3 Operations/Configuration Impacts 4 Conclusion © AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. Take-Off – FMS functions • Objectives (TOS 1 function): • To provide a safety net within avionics regarding erroneous take-off parameters. To reduce risks of tail strike, Entry out of range between take-off parameters inserted in FMS. T/O SPEED TOO LOW • • Detect gross inconsistency • Two additional functions (TOS 2) • A/C position check • Take-off distance check Page 4 © AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. V1/VR/V2 DISAGREE Take-Off Securing (TOS 1) Detect erroneous weight initialization in the FMS Check ZFW range: ZFWMIN ≤ ZFW ≤ ZFWMAX Check performed as soon as ZFW is entered or modified. When check fails: « entry rejected. Page 5 © AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. » message and ZFW Take-Off Securing (TOS 1) Detect erroneous take-off speeds initialization in the FMS Check TO speeds consistency: V1 ≤ VR ≤ V2 Checks performed as soon as all the 3 TO speeds are inserted in the PERF TO page, or each time a TO speed is modified. When check fails: « V1/VR/V2 DISAGREE » message. Page 6 © AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. Take-Off Securing (TOS 1) Check VMC limitation: Check Vs1G/VMU limitation: V1 ≥ KV1VMCG * VMCG VR ≥ KVRVMCA * VMCA V2 ≥ KV2VMCA * VMCA VR ≥ KVR * VRMIN V2 ≥ KV2 * VS1G Checks performed: - When ZFW, BLOCK and CONF are entered on the MCDU. - When ZFW, BLOCK, CONF or TO thrust setting are modified. - At engine start. When check fails: «TO SPEED TOO LOW » message. TOS 1 reduces gross error entries in the FMS Page 7 © AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. Take-Off Securing (TOS 2) • A/C position check: Secure take-off location: ÂDetection of take-off from taxiway A/C not on runway ECAM TOS 2 “A/C position check” prevents take-off from taxiway. Page 8 © AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. Take-Off Securing (TOS 2) • A/C position check: Secure take-off location: ÂDetection of none FMS departure runway A/C on a runway ≠ FMS departure runway. FMS departure runway ECAM TOS2 “A/C position check” prevents take-off from wrong runway Page 9 © AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. Take-Off Securing (TOS 2) Check that the A/C has a sufficient runway length to perform a safe take-off. Performed in preflight/take-off phases. TOS 2: take-off distance check 1 At preflight 1 2 At take-off config test 3 At take-off power 2 3 © 2011 Google TOS 2 “take-off distance check” prevents risk of runway overrun Page 10 © AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. Take-Off Securing (TOS 2) 1 PREFLIGHT Pilot entries: - take-off speeds - ZFW - T.O. thrust - T.O. shift -… NO ALERT Lift-off distance < Runway length available Lift-off distance FMS runway Page 11 © AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. Runway length available Take-Off Securing (TOS 2) 1 PREFLIGHT © 2011 Google Pilot entries: - take-off speeds - ZFW - T.O. thrust - T.O. shift -… New check performed each time a parameter is modified Lift-off distance > Runway length available Lift-off distance FMS runway Page 12 © AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. Runway length available 1 Take-Off Securing (TOS 2) 2 TAKE-OFF CONFIG TEST © 2011 Google Pilot entries: - take-off speeds - ZFW - T.O. thrust - T.O. shift -… MCDU ECAM AUDIO Lift-off distance > Runway length available Lift-off distance FMS runway Page 13 © AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. Runway length available 1 Take-Off Securing (TOS 2) 2 3 TAKE-OFF THRUST SETTING © 2011 Google FMS pilot entries + + actual flap/slat conf setting AUDIO + actual A/C position at TO thrust setting ECAM +… Lift-off distance > Remaining distance on runway current runway Lift-off distance Remaining distance on runway Page 14 © AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. Non Precision Approaches (NPA) GPS PRIMARY © AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. Non precision approach like an ILS? Existing ILS look alike FLS FMS Landing System Available on A320 family Very soon on A330/A340 Basic on A380 and A350 © AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. FLS virtual beam FLS virtual beam defined by: • Slope • Course • Anchor Point (Runway threshold or Final End Point) Published NPA minima apply • Airport code • Runway Number • Runway Threshold © AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. Anchor Point Beam Course FLS approach • Slope/Course/Anchor Point (Runway threshold or Final End Point) • Only approaches with a straight final leg FLS beam Course • Temperature correction in cold weather conditions © AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. FLS concept – Key points • The FLS principle is based on a virtual beam output computed from the FMS database, • Most of published NPAs can be flown with FLS function, • Temperature correction in cold weather conditions, • Current NPA minima apply, • Not compatible to RNP AR approaches. FLS/FINAL APP capability possible on future FMS standards © AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. Common Interface for all Landing Systems ILS Selection replaced by LS But no change on: - Audio Control Panel - Radio Management Panel © AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. Not a new type of approach… But a new way to fly existing procedures PFD changes © AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. ND changes FLS Beam Modification Operational Impact (MOI) N°35811 © AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. Summary – FLS approach • ILS look alike concept • FLS Approach preparation identical to ILS • Mixed LOC/VNAV capability © AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. ROPS Design Objectives Transition Point ROPS Runway Overrun Prevention System Page 34 © AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. RWY Overrun Prevention System (ROPS) Reduction of avoidable runway overruns is a priority Page 35 © AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. © AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. © AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. Runway Overrun Factors at Landing • WET RLD determination: inaccurate method • Stabilization not achieved at 1000/500 ft • Wind change or shift at low altitude • Approach becoming unstable at low altitude • Long flare, • Long derotation • Late selection of engine thrust reversers • Auto brake setting too low • Late / weak pedal braking including Auto Brake override • Runway friction coefficient lower than expected • Cancellation of reversers at 70 kt • Partial / total failure of braking system • Contaminated runway (snow, ice…) Page 40 © AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. Solved by: ROW Solved by: ROP On top of ROPS: Brake To Vacate • Benefits • Optimisation of the runway occupancy • Integration in the future SESAR ATM concept • Enhanced safety • Environment • Lower fuel consumption with thrust reverser usage optimisation • Operational savings: Braking energy reduction (20 -30%) & Turn Around Time optimisation • Already certified on A380 • Certification target for A320 & A330/A340: 2013 Predicted performance Page 42 © AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. Real time monitored performance On top of ROPS: Brake To Vacate (BTV) © AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. BTV Selection (reminder): DRY & WET lines DRY and WET lines computed and displayed for ROW and inBTV BTV selection PLAN Mode 1 : Runway selection: DRY and WET lines Page 44 © AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. 2 : Exit selection 3 : BTV arming with Auto-Brake rotary switch BTV & ROW A380 Normal ops: DRY & WET lines Mode ARC – Range 5NM Predicted DRY/WET lines Mode ARC – Range 2NM BTV armed Page 45 © AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. Below 500 ft, DRY/WET lines are "alive” Mode ARC – Range 2NM BTV Activation STOP Bar on ND Runway Overrun Prevention System Description of the function ‐ ROW alarms (1/2) If ROW WET distance to stop is longer than remaining runway length: GS On ND wet line displayed Amber, if A/BRAKE BTV armed 145 WET DRY Below 400ft Amber message on PFD (flashing for 9s) And, no audio → Standard Operating Procedure : Go‐Around if runway is not DRY Page 46 © AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. Runway Overrun Prevention System Description of the function ‐ ROW alarms (2/2) If ROW DRY distance to stop is longer than remaining runway length: GS 145 WET DRY Below 400ft : Red message on PFD (flashing for 9s) And, below 200ft : Audio callout “RWY TOO SHORT” → Standard Operating Procedure : Go‐Around (whatever runway condition) Page 47 © AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. Runway Overrun Prevention System Description of the function ‐ ROP alarms If ROP distance to stop is longer than remaining runway length: • Red message on PFD Until max pedal deflection Repetitive audio “BRAKE… MAX BRAKING” Then, until max reverse selection : Repetitive audio “SET MAX REVERSE” • At 80kt (if still in overrun situation) One audio “KEEP MAX REVERSE” → Standard Operating Procedure : Apply Full Pedals and Set/Keep Max Reverse Page 48 © AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. Runway Overrun Prevention System A Natural Link with in‐flight realistic landing distance assessment based on IFLD Pilot action based on simple SOP In Flight Crew proactive one‐shot landing performance assessment On Ground Real‐time automated proactive landing performance assessment + Crew alerting In‐flight realistic landing distance assessment by the crew VFR stabilization gate As recommended per SOP Real‐time automated actual stopping distance calculation + Crew alerting Introduction of In‐flight landing distance assessment and ROPS, A consistent approach Covering training, procedure and cockpit technology ... Airbus is ready and active Page 49 © AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. Runway Overrun Prevention System Timeline for AIRBUS Fleet A350XWB A330/A340 A320 Family Q3 2013 A380 October 2009 1st Prototype April 2004 Research Oct. 1998 ‐ Feb. 2002 Page 50 © AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. Q4 2014 Baseline @ EIS ROPS flight deck technology is supplemented by Airbus SOP of in-flight realistic landing distance assessment based on FAA TALPA Operational Landing Distance (IFLD) recommendations: – AFM, QRH and FCOM Revisions – Airbus Type Rating Training based on IFLD – Taking into account FSF ALAR and IATA RERR recommendations © AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. Runway Overrun Prevention System Replay Of Two Significant Airbus Events – 1st Case Aircraft Conditions Runway Conditions • A320‐214 • Aerodynamic configuration : FULL • Landing Weight: 64 Tons • CG location : 28% • Landing Distance Available = 1966m • Average downhill slope: +0.23% • Reported Dry • 15kts average tailwind • 162kts ground speed at touchdown Short Final and • Touchdown at 850m from runway threshold Touchdown Conditions Pilot Actions • Ground spoilers not armed • Thrust reversers not selected • Hull loss without fatalities Consequences Page 52 © AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. Two significant events replayed with ROPS Runway Overrun Prevention System Replay Of Two Significant Airbus Events – 1st Case Aircraft Conditions Runway Conditions Short Final • A320‐214 • Aerodynamic configuration : FULL • Landing Weight: 64 Tons • CG location : 28% • Landing Distance Available = 1966m • Average downhill slope: +0.23% • Reported Dry • 15kts average tailwind • 162kts ground speed at touchdown • Touchdown at 850m from runway threshold Therefore, Go Around “IF WET: RWY TOO SHORT” passing 150ft and “RWY TOO SHORT” at threshold overfly Pilot Actions • Ground spoilers not armed • Thrust reversers not selected • Hull loss without fatalities Consequences Page 53 © AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. Runway Overrun Prevention System Replay Of Two Significant Airbus Events – 2nd Case Aircraft Conditions Runway Conditions • A320‐233 • Aerodynamic configuration : FULL • Landing Weight: 63.5 Tons • CG location : 33.5% • Landing Distance Available = 1649m • Average downhill slope: ‐0.47% • Reported Wet • 14kts average tailwind • 160kts ground speed at touchdown Short Final and • Touchdown at 400m from runway threshold Touchdown Conditions • Ground spoilers armed • Max Rev selected at touchdown • Max pedals 14s after touchdown Pilot Actions • Idle Rev selected at 190m from runway end Consequences • 54kts runway overrun speed • Hull loss with fatalities Page 54 © AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. Runway Overrun Prevention System Replay Of Two Significant Airbus Events – 2nd Case Aircraft Conditions Runway Conditions Short Final • A320‐233 • Aerodynamic configuration : FULL • Landing Weight: 63.5 Tons • CG location : 33.5% • Landing Distance Available = 1649m • Average downhill slope: ‐0.47% • Reported Wet Therefore, Go Around • 14kts average tailwind • 160kts ground speed at touchdown • Touchdown at 400m from runway threshold “RWY TOO SHORT” passing 150ft • Ground spoilers armed • Max Rev selected at touchdown • Max pedals 14s after touchdown Pilot Actions • Idle Rev selected at 190m from runway end Consequences • 54kts runway overrun speed • Hull loss with fatalities Page 55 © AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. © AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. Runway Overrun Prevention System A350XWB ‐ Step 3 Development Status Runway condition short feedback on ND RWY condition matrix on WHEEL page to assist pilots in contaminated runway conditions RWY condition selector A/BRK Pushbutton Page 62 © AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. Runway Overrun Prevention System A350XWB ‐ Step 3 Development Status • Achievements Detailed specification delivered EASA Human Factors evaluations successfully done EASA and FAA first certification meetings done First integration tests on bench done • On‐going activities Preparation of integration tests on iron bird Preparation of flight tests • Schedules for Entry‐into‐Service: BTV/ROPS available at A350XWB Entry‐Into‐Service Page 63 © AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. Runway Excursions, A Priority For Safety Agencies US NTSB (March 2011) “Actively pursue with aircraft and avionics manufacturers the development of technology to reduce or prevent runway excursions and, once it becomes available, require that the technology be installed.” (A‐11‐28 safety recommendation to FAA) European Aviation Safety Agency (June 2012) Release of draft Terms of Reference to mandate existing on‐board technologies on airplane To increase the level of safety by reducing the number of runway excursions Regional Aviation Safety Group – Pan America (October 2012) Positive Business Case related to the deployment of ROPS‐like technology to mitigate runway excursion risk in Latin America Recommendation to implement such on‐board technology European Action Plan for Prevention of Runway Excursions (January 2013) “On‐board real time performance monitoring and alerting systems that will assist the flight crew with the land/go‐around decision and warn when more deceleration force is needed should be made widely available.” (AM03 safety recommendation to aircraft manufacturers) Page 66 © AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. Enhanced Visual Systems (EVS) Page 67 © AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. EVS-HUD HUD provisions Page 68 © AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. Enhanced Visual Systems (EVS) Page 69 © AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. Conclusion – T/OFF Flight Phase TOS 1 TOS 2 Pre Flight •ZFW •SPEEDS •T/O Distance check T/O CONF CHECK •T/O Distance check T/O THRUST SET •A/C Position check •T/O Distance check Entry out of range V1/VR/V2 DISAGREE T/O SPEED TOO LOW Page 70 © AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. Conclusion - FLS approach •Most of published NPAs can be flown with FLS function, •Current NPA minima apply, Not compatible to RNP AR approaches. •FLS/FINAL APP capability possible on future FMS standards FLS beam Course © AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. Conclusion – FLS APPROACH Approach technique and procedures :ILS “Look-alike” concept Simplification of procedures Same procedures for all kinds of approach (decelerated technique) Reduce training time and cost due to standardization of procedures Improvements to increase safety/situation awareness during NPA Temperature correction for cold weather Vertical guidance for LOC only/LOC B/C FLS is not a new type of approach…. …but a new way to fly existing NPA © AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. Conclusion - landing © 2011 Google GS145 WET DRY Airbus improves permanently and implement safety systems © AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.