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Reducing the Risk
of Entrapment in Wildfires
A Case Study of the Linton Fire
CFA, July 1999
Photo: Ballarat Courier
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ISBN: XXXX
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Reducing the Risk of Entrapment in Wildfires
A Case Study of the Linton Fire
CONTENTS
Introduction
2
Linton Fire Case Study
3
Linton Fire Entrapment
4
Map of Linton Fire
6
Key Issues from the Linton Fire
8
Reducing the Risk of Entrapments
10
Proposed Programs to Improve
Planning, Procedures and
Equipment
11
Safety First for Firefighters
12
This document was prepared from
information available at the time of writing.
Photo: The Age
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INTRODUCTION
Forest firefighting is a difficult and often
To reduce the risk of entrapments, key risk
dangerous task. Whenever firefighters
factors need to be identified and addressed
attempt to contain a wildfire, there is a risk
through an on-going process of learning from
that vehicles and crews may become
experience.
entrapped or surrounded by fire.
This Case Study has three aims:
Entrapment in wildfire can have tragic
consequences - as was the case in the Linton
1.
Fire entrapment.
Fire in December 1998 when five firefighters
2.
died.
To present the key facts about the Linton
To inform brigades and the community
about planned programs to reduce the
risk of similar entrapments. Proposed
programs will:
•
reinforce existing safety procedures;
•
review and improve current
procedures; and
•
develop new procedures and equipment.
3.
To raise awareness of safety
requirements and procedures including:
Photo: CFA
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Reducing the Risk of Entrapment in Wildfires
•
Standard Fire Orders;
•
Watch-Outs; and
•
Anchor Points.
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LINTON FIRE CASE STUDY
On Wednesday 2 December 1998, at about
In the weeks after the fire, a team of officers
13.00 (1.00 p.m.), a wildfire started in forest
conducted a thorough scientific review of the
north of the small Victorian town of Linton.
fire and its management.
o
The day was hot (28 C) with light northerly
winds.
The investigation of the fire and its
management identified key issues that need
The fire was managed by an Incident
to be addressed in order to minimize the
Management Team consisting of CFA and NRE
likelihood of similar tragedies.
personnel. An Incident Control Centre was
established at the NRE Office in Ballarat and
The issues included:
an Operations Point and a Staging Area were
•
firefighter competencies;
established at Linton.
•
work practices and equipment;
At about 18.00 (6.00 p.m.), when the main
•
contractors;
•
policy and planning;
•
command structure;
•
communications; and
•
information flow.
fire had been contained around the edge of
the town, bulldozers supported by tankers
started clearing a control line on the eastern
flank of the fire.
At about 20.00 (8.00 p.m.) the Operations
Point broadcast a warning to crews that a
wind change was one hour away.
Two tankers, one from Geelong City and one
from Geelong West drove ahead of a
bulldozer along an old track in an attempt to
A set of proposed action plans was developed
to be implemented by CFA and NRE. The
actions needed to reduce the risk of
entrapments aim to improve:
get to a water point. The crews of the two
•
communication and information flow;
tankers did not acknowledge receipt of the
•
command and control;
•
firefighting methods, work practices and
broadcast warning.
The two tankers were surrounded by unburned
equipment; and
fuels and were up-slope from the fire.
•
firefighter skills and knowledge.
When the wind changed direction and
strength it drove the fire towards the Geelong
City and Geelong West tankers. One tanker
was destroyed by fire and its crew of five men
died.
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Linton Fire Entrapment
13.03
(1.03 p.m.)
First report of the fire.
13.22
(1.22 p.m.)
First CFA tankers arrived from the Snake Valley Brigade.
14.00
2.00 p.m.
Fire Area
Fire Ground Actions
Temperature.:
28ºC
First slip-ons arrived from Ballarat.
Rel. Humidity:
24%
Beaufort NRE units and bulldozer arrived.
Wind Speed:
44 km/h
First attack failed due to poor access.
Wind Direction:
N
Fire Spread:
N/A.
Intensity:
N/A.
A combined CFA, NRE and Victoria Police Incident
Management Team established: local CFA
Operations Manager was in control.
At 14.30 (2.30 p.m.) a back-burn was attempted at
Madden Flat Road/ Pittong-Snake Valley Road but
the fire breached the control line.
Twenty-seven tankers attempted to stop the fire at
Pittong-Snake Valley Road. This attempt failed.
The Snake Valley A tanker drove into the forest on
the south side of the Pittong-Snake Valley Road to
put out a spot fire. The tanker became entrapped
when surrounded by several spot fires.
Aircraft began firebombing the fire.
15.00
3.00 p.m.
Temperature.:
27ºC
24%
Wind Speed:
43 km/h
Wind Direction:
N
Fire Spread:
1.6 km/h
Intensity:
13 100 kW/m
Staging Area was established at Linton Recreation
Reserve.
Aircraft continued to attack spot fires.
4.00 p.m.
Temperature.:
Fire Ground Actions
Operations Point was initially established at Linton
Fire Station, then moved to Linton Shire Offices.
Rel. Humidity:
16.00
Fire Area
Fire Area
Fire Ground Actions
An NRE ground observer reported that the fire had
crossed over Possum Gully Road.
29ºC
Rel. Humidity:
24%
Wind Speed:
33 km/h
Wind Direction:
N
Fire Spread:
1.1 km/h
Intensity:
9400 kW/m
Additional Strike Teams were ordered by the
Incident Controller to protect Linton, the town
south of the fire.
By 16.30 (4.30 p.m.), a number of spot fires had
started on the outskirts of Linton. The spot fires
were extinguished by ground crews.
A strike team of five tankers including the Geelong
West and Geelong City Tankers arrived at Linton at
about 17.40 (5.40 p.m.).
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6.00 p.m.
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Fire Area
Fire Ground Actions
Temperature.:
28ºC
The fire was contained to the north of Linton.
Rel. Humidity:
24%
Wind Speed:
10 km/h
Two additional NRE bulldozers and the first of the
large bulldozers arrived at the fire.
Wind Direction:
N
Fire Spread:
0.2 km/h
Intensity:
600 kW/m
The small bulldozers began construction of control
lines heading north from Linton, one on the east
and one on the west flank of the fire.
At 18.00 (6.00 p.m.), a ground observer was sent by
the Incident Management Team to report on the
wind change as it progressed.
At 18.10 (6.10 p.m.), a large bulldozer began
constructing a control line from Pittong-Snake
Valley Road heading south. The strategy was to have
a completed control line to the east of the fire
before the expected wind change.
19.00
Temperature.:
7.00 p.m.
26%
Wind Speed:
0 km/h
Wind Direction:
N
Fire Spread:
N/A
Intensity:
N/A
8.00 p.m.
Temperature.:
27ºC
Rel. Humidity:
26%
Wind Speed:
24 km/h
Wind Direction:
N
Fire Spread:
N/A
Intensity:
N/A
Fire Ground Actions
A general message was broadcast at 19.50 (7.50
p.m.) that the cold change had reached Wickliffe
(70 km’s west of Snake Valley), with wind from the
south-west at 35 km/h and no rain.
27ºC
Rel. Humidity:
20.00
Fire Area
At 19.53 (7.53 p.m.), the Bureau of Meteorology
issued a Spot Fire Weather Forecast including
details of a major wind change. The forecast
predicted the change for 23.00 (11.00 p.m.) with
south-west winds gusting to 60 km/h.
Fire Area
Fire Ground Actions
The bulldozer moved away from the fire edge to
construct the control line along the extension of
Homestead Track. (The track runs north to south
about 30-90 metres east of the fire edge.) This
would have made control line construction quicker
and easier.
The Geelong West and Geelong City tankers
followed the south-bound bulldozer onto the
extension of Homestead Track, then passed the
bulldozer and continued heading south.
The two tankers and the bulldozer were working
in an area with unburned fuels on both sides of the
track.
Approximately
20.40 (8.40 p.m.)
The south-west wind change arrived at the eastern flank of the fire.
The fire edge suddenly moved eastwards trapping the two tankers approximately 26 metres beyond the end of the bulldozed trail.
The Geelong City Tanker was undamaged; the Geelong West Tanker was destroyed in the fire and its crew of five men died.
* Weather records are from the Sheoaks automatic weather station, 60 km south-east of the fire.
Reducing the Risk of Entrapment in Wildfires
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Linton Fire – 2 December 1998
This fire ignited on private property at around 13.00 (1.00 p.m.) on
NRE Beaufort D4
from 14.00 (2.00 p.m.)
2 December 1998.
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It burned through open eucalypt forest and moved south until it was
3452_CFAcaseStudyLinton.xps
Map of Linton Fire
halted in grassland north of Linton.
Origin of fire
13.00 (1.00 p.m.)
Total fuel loads in fire area: 14 to 20 t/ha.
•
Flame heights were generally less than 6 m.
•
Average intensity was 9000 kW/m.
•
Rate of fire spread was up to 1.5 km/h.
•
Final fire area: 660 ha.
•
Resources deployed at the fire:
CFA personnel:
27 tankers attempted
to halt the fire here at
14.30 (2.30 p.m.)
NRE personnel:
50+
CFA tankers:
65+
NRE tankers:
Bulldozers:
G - SNA
KE
Mid-West Komatsu
form
18.10 (6.10 p.m.)
10
NRE
3
Private
5
Aircraft:
ROAD
Mid-West D56E
from
20.00 (8.00 p.m.)
Snake Valley
A tanker entrapped
at about
15.00 (3.00 p.m.)
ROAD
PITTON
Symes D6
from
20.00 (8.00 p.m.)
Bulldozed control line at
20.30 (8.30 p.m.)
Back-burn fires lit
here at about
15.00 (3.00 p.m.)
Approximate fire edge at
20.30 (8.30 p.m.)
400+
6
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•
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N
Tiley Komatsu D65A
from
18.00 (6.00 p.m.)
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South-west wind
change arrived here at
20.40 (8.40 p.m.)
Final Fire
Perimeter
Geelong West Tanker
entrapped and
destroyed here
Geelong City Tanker
entrapped here
Planned
Control Line
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Jennings TD20 from
18.30 (6.30 p.m.)
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NRE Ballarat D4
from
18.00 (6.00 p.m.)
•
At about 20.30 (8.30 p.m.) the Midwest
Komatsu D155 bulldozer was re-directed
Reducing the Risk of Entrapment in Wildfires
to the Track which is the extension of
Homestead Road.
NRE Macedon D4
from
19.30 (7.30 p.m.)
•
This Track was 30 to 90 m east of the
fire edge.
t
re a
d he
.)
aine
t
n
.m
p
co
.00
Fire
0 (6
18.0
•
The Geelong West Tanker and Geelong
City Tanker moved ahead of the
bulldozer on this track.
•
At about 20.40 (8.40 p.m.) the southwest wind change pushed the fire
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towards the tankers.
•
The tankers became entrapped about 26m
beyond the end of the bulldozed trail.
•
The Geelong West tanker was destroyed
and 5 firefighters died.
•
The Geelong City Tanker, only 12 m away
from the Geelong West Tanker, was
undamaged.
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Key Issues from the Linton Fire
The following issues emerged from the study
Communications
of the Linton fire. They highlight some of the
key risk factors associated with entrapment in
Procedures for communicating critical safety
advice (such as wind changes and radio
wildfires.
channel changes) should be reinforced to
Firefighter Skills and Knowledge
ensure that:
•
all people are advised;
fighting operations should have adequate
•
the advice is acknowledged; and
training and experience to enable them to:
•
the advice is understood.
•
Incident communications plans should:
Firefighters who may be engaged in wildfire
understand the Standard Fire Orders and
the Watch Out Situations;
•
•
take appropriate and safe actions on the
fire ground;
identify all communications media and
frequencies to be used on the fire; and
•
allocate frequencies to achieve effective
•
wear personal protection equipment;
•
recognise and understand basic fire
Both agencies should adopt a common
behaviour in a variety of fuel types;
procedure for actions on receipt of a MAYDAY
understand the importance of working
call.
from a safe anchor point;
Processes should be developed and
carry out safe and effective basic fire
implemented to enable effective radio
suppression, including dry fire fighting;
discipline.
•
•
communications.
and
•
follow procedures in a disciplined
manner.
Research
Research is needed to gain a better
understanding of the relationships between
Command Structure
Drought Index, Drought Factor, Soil Dryness
Index and fuel availability, particularly after
Incident Management Teams should have
prolonged dry periods.
adequate personnel to meet the following
critical success factors:
The coverage of remote automatic weather
stations in the region around Ballarat needs
•
production and distribution of an
incident communications plan;
•
production and distribution of an
incident action plan; and
•
review to achieve improved tracking of wind
changes in this area.
The effectiveness of resources at constructing
and holding control lines, and at protecting
provision of information to all firefighters
assets, in various fuel types at differing levels
on the fire ground about the fire,
of fire intensity, needs to be reviewed.
strategy, weather and warnings;
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Equipment
Planning
Reviews are needed to assess:
Reinforce and further develop the concept of
•
the options available for wildfire personal
protective equipment;
•
the appropriateness of current survival
engineering on tankers;
•
•
joint agency pre-incident plans that cover the
period from the start of the fire until the
production of the first incident action plan.
Reinforce the requirement that Operations
Section plans must clearly identify who is
the inventory and stowage of personal
currently fulfilling various roles in the chain
protection and survival equipment on
of command, and that this information needs
vehicles, appliances and bulldozers; and
to be disseminated.
provision of large bulldozers as a
Adopt joint procedures for reviewing wildfire
Regionally based State resource.
incidents.
Contractors
Contractors and personnel from other
agencies who are deployed on the fire ground
should have appropriate skills and knowledge
to operate in wildfires or should be
accompanied by someone who does.
Photo: CFA
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REDUCING THE RISK OF ENTRAPMENTS
What can we do?
1. Reinforce Safety Procedures
3. Review Current Procedures
Reinforce and promote existing safety
Review and improve current procedures
procedures to ensure that they are
to enhance all aspects of incident
understood and properly applied. These
management and to ensure that
include:
firefighters receive and acknowledge
•
Standard Fire Orders.
•
Anchor Points
•
Watch Out Situations
appropriate information promptly.
4. Review Equipment
Research and, where appropriate,
introduce new equipment.
2. Enhance Firefighter Skills and
Knowledge
Improve firefighters’ understanding of
how fuel characteristics, terrain and
weather conditions can influence fire
behaviour and fire suppression methods
and tactics.
CFA and NRE are committed to continuously
improving safety and work practices.
The list on the next page gives a summary of
the specific projects that will commence
during the next few months.
In addition to the specific programs, major
projects will be established to review existing
policies, standing orders, standard operating
procedures and research activities over the
next 18 months.
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Reducing the Risk of Entrapment in Wildfires
Research alternative tanker materials and
design to improve firefighter safety and
incident management.
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Proposed Programs to Improve Planning, Procedures and Equipment
PLANNING
PROCEDURES
EQUIPMENT
1. Command and Control
•
Document framework for new CFA standing
orders and operating procedures.
•
Reinforce existing procedures for resources
management.
•
Extend and review Wildfire Response Plan
concept.
•
Review ICS Chain of Command Form.
•
•
Review the role of Groups.
•
Document policy for "critical success
factors" for incident management.
Document "trigger points" and resource
requirements for Staging Areas and
Operations Points.
•
Reinforce standard briefing format.
•
Reinforce role of crew leaders.
2. Communication and Information Flow
•
Review format of current plans
•
Adopt NRE "check" system.
•
Investigate satellite telephones
•
Complete radio coverage surveys
•
Deploy radio repeaters where needed
Reinforce T-cards, ICS forms, staging areas,
etc.
Reinforce Fire Agencies Improvement
Initiative channel numbers.
•
•
•
Two radios in command vehicles
•
Activate DISPLAN phone lines for the whole
fire season.
Mobile communications vehicles to have
radio technician.
•
Document messaging procedures.
•
Reinforce training in radio discipline.
•
Improve procedures for documentation of
communications plans.
•
Develop procedures for managing flow of
critical information.
•
•
Develop multi-Region and multi-agency
communication plans.
•
Review State Communications Plan.
•
Amend rules to facilitate cross-boundary
communications.
3. Firefighting Methods and Equipment
•
Reinforce use of Anchor Points.
•
Develop procedures for documenting
wildfire incidents and entrapments.
•
Reinforce "safety first" culture.
•
•
Identify "trigger points" for activation of
portable remote automatic weather
stations.
Initiate a bulldozer contract for the coming
fire season.
•
Document standard procedures and
inventory for appliances.
•
Issue ration packs for all CFA appliances.
•
Incorporate fire behaviour issues into
management processes.
•
Establish criteria for provision of contract
bulldozers.
•
Investigate and fit low-water-level warning
devices to all tankers.
•
Use external/specialist agencies for
specialist functions.
•
Mandatory personal protection equipment
and survival training.
•
Investigate potential for improving safety/
survival features of appliances to protect
personnel.
•
Establish registers of heavy equipment
operators and provide survival training.
•
Review personal protection equipment.
4. Firefighter Skills and Knowledge
•
Conduct research into firefighter attitudes.
•
Issue survival checklists to individuals.
•
Safety checklists in vehicles.
•
Reinforce safety procedures
•
•
Develop additional training packages.
•
Introduce a system of mentors at State and
local level.
Assemble pre-planned ICS teams for
deployment to significant incidents.
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Safety First For Firefighters
The following pages give some examples of safety messages and procedures that can reduce the
risk of injuries and entrapments in wildfires.
Standard Fire Orders
1.
Always stay in contact or tell someone where you are going
STAY IN CONTACT
2
Know where the fire is and its direction.
WATCH THE FIRE
3.
Know the country or have someone with you who does.
KNOW THE COUNTRY
4.
Plan an escape route.
ESCAPE ROUTE
5.
Park your vehicle in a safe place.
PARK IN SAFE PLACE
6.
Be sure that your instructions are clear.
CHECK INSTRUCTIONS
7.
Build a fire line from a safe anchor point.
USE AN ANCHOR POINT
8.
A full set of safety gear is compulsory.
WEAR SAFETY GEAR
9.
Do not panic -- keep calm and make logical decisions.
KEEP CALM
10. Accidents and ill-health can endanger all the crew.
TAKE CARE
Anchor Points
An anchor point is a firm base from which
perimeter control lines can be constructed.
The advantages of working from an anchor
point are:
•
the anchor point is a safer area from
which to start work; and
•
the risk of being outflanked or
surrounded by fire is reduced.
An anchor point could be:
•
the point of origin of the fire;
•
the "black" - that is, the controlled fire
edge and area within the burn.
Photo: Ballarat Courier
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Firefighters: Watch Out When ......
FIRE DOWNHILL
1. ...
building a control line downhill towards the fire.
ON A SLOPE
2. ...
on a slope - because rolling burning material can ignite
fuels below you.
WIND CHANGES
3. ...
the wind changes speed or direction.
HOT WEATHER
4. ...
the weather gets hotter or drier.
UNBURNT FUELS
5. ...
there are unburned fuels between you and the fire.
POOR ACCESS
6. ...
the terrain or vegetation impedes travel or visibility.
NIGHT
7. ...
in country you have not seen in daylight.
UNFAMILIAR
8. ...
you are not familiar with the weather or local fire behaviour.
SPOT FIRES
9. ...
spot fires occur over your control line.
MAIN FIRE
10. ... you cannot see the main fire or communicate with anyone who can.
UNCLEAR
11. ... your instructions are not clear.
EXHAUSTED
12. ... you feel exhausted.
NO ANCHOR POINT 13. ... attacking a fire or constructing a fire control line without
a safe anchor point.
ALONE
14. ... working alone with no communications link to crew members
or supervisor.
UNINFORMED
15. ... you are not fully informed about strategy, tactics and hazards.
NO ESCAPE ROUTES 16. ... safety zones and escape routes have not been identified.
FIRE POTENTIAL
17. ... the potential of the fire has not been assessed.
LOW WATER
18. ... water levels are getting low.
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Photo: CFA