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The Seventeenth Discussion of The Incoherence of the Philosophers UniversityPressScholarshipOnline OxfordScholarshipOnline Al-Ghazali'sPhilosophicalTheology FrankGriffel Printpublicationdate:2009 PrintISBN-13:9780195331622 PublishedtoOxfordScholarshipOnline:September2009 DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195331622.001.0001 TheSeventeenthDiscussionofTheIncoherenceofthePhilosophers FrankGriffel(ContributorWebpage) DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195331622.003.0007 AbstractandKeywords Theseventeenthdiscussioninal-GhazaliIncoherenceofthePhilosophers(Tahafutalfalasifa)hasoftenbeenregardedasthelocusclassicusforanoccasionalistcritiqueof theconceptofcausality.Mostinterpreters,however,disregardedtheinternalstructure ofthischapteranddidn’trealizethatal-Ghazalioffersmorethanonesolutionforthe questionofwhetherwhatweconsideracausetrulyhasaneffectonwhatweconsideran effect.Foral-Ghazali,occasionalismisonepossibleexplanationofwhatwewitnesswith oursenses.Yetsecondarycausalityisalsoconsideredapossibleexplanationaslongasit doesnotassumethatanycausecouldstandonitsown.Allcausesdependonother causes,whichallgobacktoonesinglecause,namelyGod.Thisscenarioisacceptablefor al-Ghazaliaslongastheparticularconnectionbetweencauseandeffectthatwewitnessis notconsiderednecessary.Foral-Ghazali,“necessary”meansthattherewouldbeno conceivablealternativestateofaffairs.Hisunderstandingof“necessary”isdifferentfrom thatofAvicenna.Thischapterdiscussestheirdifferencesandcomestotheconclusion Page 1 of 36 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: University of Chicago; date: 13 March 2014 The Seventeenth Discussion of The Incoherence of the Philosophers thatsecondarycausalityisacceptableforal-Ghazaliaslongatitdoesn’timplythatthis particularworldisanecessarycreationofGod.Foral-Ghazali,thisworldwithallits connectionsbetweencausesandeffectsGod’scontingentcreation.Godhaschosenthis worldamongalternatives.Foral-Ghazalithesealternativesworldsareconceivableinour mind. Keywords:causality,occasionalism,secondarycausality,necessity,modalities,al-Juwayni,Julian Obermann Theseventeenthdiscussionofal-Ghazālī’sIncoherenceofthePhilosophershasbecome famousforitscriticismofcausality.WhenSolomonMunk,thefirstWesternanalystofthe Incoherence,readtheseventeenthdiscussion,heunderstoodal-Ghazālīassayingthat “thephilosophers’theoryofcausalityisfalse,andthattheyarenotrightwhentheydeny thatthingscanhappencontrarytowhattheycallthelawofnatureandcontrarytowhat happenshabitually.” 1 ForMunk,thiswasanexpressionofal-Ghazālī’sskepticism,which simplydeniedtheexistenceofcausalityintheoutsideworld.Forstudentsofphilosophy andtheology,theseventeenthdiscussionoftheIncoherencehasbecomealocus classicusforpiousandyetintelligentcriticismoftheexistenceofcausalconnection.The mistakenunderstandingthathereal-Ghazālīdeniestheexistenceofcausalconnections stillpersiststoday.MichaelE.Marmura,forinstance,goesasfarassayingthatforalGhazālī,“theAristoteliantheoryofnaturalefficientcausationisfalse.” 2 Aclosereadingoftheseventeenthdiscussionshows,however,thatonitstwodozenor sopages,al-Ghazālīdoesnotdenytheexistenceofcausalconnections—andthusof causality—andhecertainlydoesnotarguethatefficientcausalityasanexplanationof physicalchangeisfalse.Amongthemanythingshedoesinthisdiscussionisopenwaysto upholdcausalityasanepistemologicalprincipleofthenaturalsciences,whileremaining uncommittedwhetherthosethingsinthisworldthatweregardascausestrulyhave efficacyontheirassumedeffects.Moreimportant,however,theseventeenthdiscussion isacriticismofAvicenna’snecessarianism,thatis,thepositionthateventsinthisworld arenecessarilydeterminedandcouldnotbeanydifferentfromwhattheyare. (p.148) Al-Ghazālībeginshisanalysisoftheseventeenthdiscussionbystatingamuch morelimitedgoal.Initsprecedingintroduction,hesaysthatheaimstoconvincethe followersofthephilosophicalmovementandthosewhoareattractedtoitsteachingsthat thethingstheydeemimpossible—namely,somepropheticalmiracleslikethechangingofa staffintoaserpent,3therevivicationofthedead,4orthesplittingofthemoon(Q54.1)— shouldbeconsideredpossibleevents.Iftheyarepossible,theQur’anicaccountsof theseeventsareliterallytrueanddonotneedtobeinterpretedasmetaphors.5Inour earlierdiscussionofal-Ghazālī’sinterpretationoftheQur’an,wesawthataccordingto hisruleofinterpretation,one’sunderstandingofthetextofrevelationdependsonwhat oneconsiderspossibleorimpossible.Thispremisedeterminesal-Ghazālī’sperspectivein thisdiscussionoftheIncoherence.Itislessadiscussionaboutwhethercausalityisafact thanitisadisputeaboutmodalitiesandthewayweknowthem.Intheseventeenth discussion,al-GhazālīargueswiththeMuslimphilosophersaboutwhatispossiblefor Godtocreate.6 Page 2 of 36 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: University of Chicago; date: 13 March 2014 The Seventeenth Discussion of The Incoherence of the Philosophers Al-GhazālīpresentsthesubjectofcausalityasaproblemofQur’aninterpretation. Althoughthefalāsifaacknowledgethatprophetsarecapableofperformingextraordinary featsandcaninfluencetheirsurroundingsthroughthepracticalfaculty(al-quwwaalʿamaliyya)oftheirsoulsbycreatingrains,storms,andearthquakes,theydidnotaccept thattheprophetscouldchangeaninanimatebeingsuchasapieceofwoodoracorpse intoalivingbeingsuchasaserpentorahumanorthattheycouldtransformcelestial objectssuchasthemoon.7Intheirtheories,asubstance(jawhar)—hereunderstoodin theAristoteliansenseofaclearlydefinedobjectwithanumberofessentialand unchangingcharacteristics—suchasapieceofwoodcannotchangeintoanother substancesuchasalivingserpent.Celestialbodiesareuncomposedinthefalāsifa’s opinionandthusarenotdivisible.YettheQur’anandtheḥadīthdescribemiraclessuch astheseasconfirmingthepropheciesofMosesandMuḥammad.“Forthisreason,”alGhazālīsaysattheendoftheintroductiontotheseventeenthdiscussion,“itbecomes necessarytoplungeintothequestion[ofcausality]inordertoaffirmtheexistenceof miracles.”Thisallhappens,headds,intheinterestofupholdingtheMuslimreligious tenetthatGodisomnipotent(qādirʿalākullshayʾ).8 Intheseventeenthdiscussionitself,theclaimofupholdingGod’somnipotenceisnowhere mentioned.Indeed,onlyaverylimitedpartofthatchaptercanbeseenasrespondingto thisconcern.Al-Ghazālī’sgoalinthisdiscussionisratherlimited.Intheopeningsentence, heformulatesthepositionofwhichhewishestoconvincehisreaders:theconnection betweenthegenerallyacceptedideasof“thecause”and“theeffect”isnotanecessary one.Ifthereadersacceptthisposition,sogoestheimplicitassumption,theiracceptance ofthereportedmiracleswillfollow.Behindthisunderstandingliestheprinciplethatone mustfullyaccepttheauthorityofrevelationinplaceswhereitsliteralwordingisdeemed possible.IfthereadersacknowledgethatGod’sreportsofpropheticalmiraclesinthe Qur’anarepossibleintheiroutwardsense(ẓāhir),theymustacceptthereports’truth. (p.149) InaccordancewiththegeneralstrategyoftheIncoherencetoalertthe followersofthephilosophicalmovementstomistakestheirteachersmakeintheir reasoning,al-Ghazālīfirstpresentsanargumentthataimstoshakethereader’s convictionastothenecessityofcausalconnectionsandthenpresentsanalternative modelforexplainingtheseconnections.Al-Ghazālībrieflyintroducesthe counterargumentaswellasthealternativeexplanationinanopeningstatementthatisa masterworkofphilosophicalliterature: Theconnection(iqtirān)betweenwhatishabituallybelievedtobeacauseandwhat ishabituallybelievedtobeaneffectisnotnecessary(ḍarūriyan)accordingtous. But[with]anytwothingsthatarenotidenticalandwhichdonotimplyoneanother 9 itisnotnecessarythattheexistenceorthenonexistenceofonefollowsnecessarily (minḍarūra)outoftheexistenceorthenonexistenceoftheother.(…)Their connectionisduetothepriordecree(taqdīr)ofGodwhocreatesthemsideby side(ʿalāl-tasāwuq),nottoitsbeingnecessarybyitself,incapableofseparation.10 Here,al-Ghazālīlaysoutfourconditionsforexplainingphysicalprocesses.The requirementsare:(1)thattheconnectionbetweenacauseanditseffectisnot Page 3 of 36 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: University of Chicago; date: 13 March 2014 The Seventeenth Discussion of The Incoherence of the Philosophers necessary;(2)thattheeffectcanexistwithoutthecause(“theyarenotincapableof separation”);(3)thatGodcreatestwoeventsconcomitantly,sidebyside;and(4)that God’screationfollowsapriordecree.Earlierintheintroductiontothediscussion,alGhazālīhadsaidthatfromaMuslim’spointofview,aphysicaltheoryisacceptableonlyif itleavesspaceforunusualcreations“thatdisruptthehabitualcourse[ofevents].” 11 This conditionisnolongerpartofthefourinthisinitialstatementofthediscussion.This omissionisanimportantindicator.Additionally,upholdingdivineomnipotence,whichis mentionedasamotiveforthisdebateattheendoftheintroductorystatement,doesnot appearintheseventeenthdiscussionitself.Inthediscussion,al-Ghazālīfocusespurely onthepossibilityofthereportedmiracles,andhedoesnotclaimthatweshouldconsider GodcapableofdoingallthosethingsthephilosophersdenythatHecando.Itisimportant tounderstandthatal-Ghazālīdoesnotdenytheexistenceofaconnectionbetweena causeanditseffect;ratherhedeniesthenecessarycharacterofthisconnection.12 Onfirstsight,itseemsthatonlyaconsequentoccasionalistexplanationofphysical processeswouldfulfillthesefourconditions.UlrichRudolph,however,pointedoutthat notonlyoccasionalismbutalsoothertypesofexplanationsfulfillthesefourcriteria.Most misleadingisthethirdrequirementthatGodwouldneedtocreateevents“sidebyside.” Thesewordsseemtopointexclusivelytoanoccasionalistunderstandingofcreation.One shouldkeepinmind,however,thatthisformulaleavesopenhowGodcreatesevents. EvenanAvicennanphilosopherholdsthatGodcreatesthecauseconcomitanttoitseffect throughsecondarycausality.Rudolphconvincinglyarguesthatalthoughtheseventeenth discussionoftheIncoherencepointstowardoccasionalismasapossiblesolution,italso allowsforothersolutions.13Al-Ghazālīchooses(p.150) languagethatcanbeeasily associatedwithoccasionalisttheories,whichhasledmanyinterpretersofthisdiscussion tobelievethatherehearguesexclusivelyinfavorofit.Onatleasttwooccasions, however,al-Ghazālīalertshisoccasionalistreaderstosomeveryundesired consequencesoftheirposition.Heimplicitlycautionshisreadersagainstsubscribingto consequentoccasionalistexplanationsofphysicalprocesses.14Simultaneously,al-Ghazālī alertshistargetreadership—Muslimscholarsattractedtophilosophicalexplanations—toa fundamentalmistaketheymakewhentheytalkaboutnecessityandpossibility.Fromthat place,hedevelopsseveralalternativeexplanationslikelytosatisfytherequirementsfor physicalexplanationsasdescribedbyAristoteliannaturalsciences.Thesealternative explanationsacceptthepossibilityofthereportedpropheticalmiracles. PrioranalysesoftheseventeenthchapteroftheIncoherencedonotalwaysnoteits divisionintothreedifferent“positions”(singl.maqām).15Each“position”citesaclaim withintheteachingsofagroupoffalāsifaandpointsoutwhythisclaimiseitheruntenable ormustbemodified.Thesedifferentclaimscomefromdifferentgroupsamongthe falāsifa.The“position”(maqām)isthatofanopponent,whichisrebuffedbyal-Ghazālī’s objectionstoit.16Inonecase,thisrebuffisdividedintotwo“approaches”(singl.maslak). Itshouldbenotedthata“position”withinthistextconsistsofthecitationofa philosophicalpositionplusal-Ghazālī’sanswertoit.17ThecharacteroftheIncoherence allowsal-Ghazālītociteallsortsofobjectionsinhisanswers,whetherhesubscribesto themornot.Inordertomakehispointmosteffectively,al-Ghazālīputsforwardmore Page 4 of 36 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: University of Chicago; date: 13 March 2014 The Seventeenth Discussion of The Incoherence of the Philosophers thanjustoneexplanationastohowthereportedmiraclesarepossible.IntheSecondand theThirdPositions,hepresentsintotalthreedifferentinterpretationsoftherelationship betweenwhatiscalledcauseandeffect.Theseexplanationsaredifferenttheories;eachis consistentonlywithinitself.Theseventeenthdiscussionleavesopenwhetheral-Ghazālī subscribestoanyoneofthem.Althoughthefirstofhisalternativeexplanationsdeniesthe existenceofnatures,meaningtheunchangingcharacteroftherelationbetweencause andeffect,thesecondalternativeacceptsthatnaturesdoexist.18Al-Ghazālīpresents varioustheoriesthatshaketheconvictionsofhisopponentsondifferentlevels, sometimesmoreandsometimeslessradically. TheFirstPosition:ObservationDoesNotEstablishCausalConnections TheFirstPosition(al-maqāmal-awwal)citestheclaimthatinagivenexampleinwhichfire comesintocontactwithacottonball,“theefficientcauseofthe[cotton’s]combustionis thefirealone.” 19Thefireistheagentortheefficientcause(fāʿil)ignitingthecottonin accordwithitsnature(fāʿilbi-ṭabʿʿ),andithasnochoiceoveritsactions.Accordingto thisposition,fireistheonlyefficientcauseoftheignition;itistheonlysufficientcausethat byitselfmakesignitionnecessary.ThisisnotthepositionofAvicenna:hetaughtthatin anygiven(p.151) chainofefficientcauses,onlythefirstelementisthecauseinthereal senseofthatword.Thatfirstelementistheabsolutecause(ʿillamuṭlaqa)ofallthat followsafterit.Thus,withregardtoefficientcausality,thereisonlyoneabsolutecause, andthatisGod.ForAvicenna,whobelievedinsecondarycausality,thefirewouldonly beamiddleelementinacausalchain.Thefirewouldbebothacauseandaneffect,andit couldnotbecalledtheonlyefficientcauseoftheignition.Atotherplacesinhiswriting,alGhazālīascribedthisFirstPositionsomehowvaguelytoagroupofpeoplehecalls “eternalist”(dahriyyūn)fortheirbeliefinaneternalworldwithoutacauseoramaker. Thesepeople,headds,areclandestineapostates(zanādiqa),meaningtheycouldnotbe countedamongthevariousgroupsofMuslims.20Laterinthisbook,al-Ghazālīaddsthat thispositioniscloselyakintotheoneheldbyMuʿtaziliteswithregardtothegeneration (tawallud)ofhumanactionsandtheireffects.21 FromhislatercommentintheRevival,weknowthatal-Ghazālīcondemnedasunbelief (kufr)theviewthatstarswouldbebythemselvesefficientcausesthatarenotgoverned byhigherones.TheFirstPositioninthisdiscussionpresentsthisview.Itisnotsurprising thatal-Ghazālīrespondsvigorouslyinresponsetothistheory:thispositionmustbe denied.Rather,theefficientcausefortheburningofthecotton,anditbeingreducedto ashes,isGod.Again,thesewordsseemtosuggestthatal-Ghazālīrefersexclusivelyto occasionalismastheonlyacceptablealternativeexplanation.AnAvicennan,however, couldeasilyagreewiththestatementthatGodistheultimateorabsoluteefficientcause ofthecotton’scombustion.Thisalternateexplanationistakenintoaccountinthe statementinwhichal-Ghazālīrejectstheinitialposition: This[position]isoneofthosethatwedeny.Ratherwesaythattheefficientcause (fāʿil)ofthecombustionthroughthecreationofblacknessinthecottonand throughcausingtheseparationofitspartsandturningitintocoalorashesisGod, eitherthroughthemediationoftheangelsorwithoutmediation.22 Page 5 of 36 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: University of Chicago; date: 13 March 2014 The Seventeenth Discussion of The Incoherence of the Philosophers Theangelsherearethecelestialintellects.Thecorrectpositioniseitheranoccasionalist explanationorAvicenna’sviewofcreationbymeansofsecondarycausality.Inboth theories,notthefirebutGodistheabsoluteefficientcauseoftheburning. InthisFirstPosition,al-GhazālīimpliesagreementwithAvicennaandtheAristotelian philosopherswhenhesaysthateventssuchasthebirthofababyarenotsimplycaused bytheparentsbutratherby“theFirst”(al-awwal),meaningGod,“eitherwithout mediationorthroughthemediationoftheangelswhoareentrustedwiththesetemporal things.” 23Hereagain,theword“angels”(malāʾika)referstothecelestialintellects,who inAvicenna’scosmologyarecausalintermediariesbetweenGodandthesublunar sphere.Foreventsinthesublunarsphere,al-Ghazālīnamestheactiveintellectasoneof theircauses.Theintellectisnamedasthe“giverofforms”(wāhibal-ṣuwar)inthesphere ofgenerationandcorruption.HereintheFirstPosition,al-Ghazālīacceptsthatthe“giver offorms”istheangel(malak)fromwhichthe“eventsthatoccurwhencontactsbetween bodiestakeplace”havetheirsource(oremanate).24(p.152) Thisisthepositionof thosewhosearchdiligentlyfortruthamongthephilosophers(muḥaqqiqūhum),al-Ghazālī says. AfterfindingcommongroundwiththeAvicennans,al-Ghazālīattackstheadversary’s positionthatfirecanbetheonlyefficientcause.Hisobjectionisbasedonepistemology: thesimpleobservationofonethingfollowinganotherdoesnotjustifydenyingthe involvementofcausesthatarenotvisible.EarlierAshʿaritessuchasal-Bāqillānīhadused thesamelineofreasoningwithamoreradicalscope,arguingthatsenseperceptiondoes notestablishanyconnectionbetweencauseandeffect.25Accordingtoal-Bāqillānī,allwe canknowwithoutdoubtisthatthesetwothingsusuallyfolloweachotherinour observationoroursenseperception(mushāhada).Suchperceptions,however,are unabletoinformusaboutacausalconnectionbetweenthesetwoevents.Likeearlier Ashʿarites,al-Ghazālīusesthisargumentinaradicalsense.Thefactthatweexperience cottonasburningeverytimefiretouchesitinformsusneither(1)aboutanycausal connectionbetweenthefireandtheburningofthecottonnor(2)whetherfireistheonly cause: Observation(mushāhada)pointstowardsaconcomitantoccurrence(al-ḥuṣūl ʿindahu)butnottoacombinedoccurrence(al-ḥuṣūlbihi)andthatthereisnoother cause(ʿilla)forit.26 InthecontextoftheFirstPosition,al-Ghazālīfocusesonthelatterpoint;wehaveno meanstoknowwhetherfireistheonlyefficientcause,asthesepeopleclaim.Nobody wouldsay,forinstance,thattheparents(al-Ghazālīsayselliptically:thefather)arethe onlyefficientcausesofachild.Theremaybehiddencauseseverywhere,anditisnextto impossibletosaythatanygivencauseistheonlysufficientonefortheeffectitappearsto trigger. Al-Ghazālī’sdenialoftheclaimthataneventmayhaveasingleimmanentefficientcauseis basedonthewider-rangingepistemologicalobjectionthatsenseperceptioncreatesno knowledgeofcausaldependencies.Whenathingexiststogetherwith(ʿinda)another,it Page 6 of 36 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: University of Chicago; date: 13 March 2014 The Seventeenth Discussion of The Incoherence of the Philosophers doesnotmeanthatitexiststhrough(bi-)it.27Concurrenteventsneednotbeconnected withoneanother;andeveniftheyare,theconnectionmaybemuchmorecomplexthan whatwewitness. Byusingthisargument,al-GhazālīintroducessomeconfusionintothisFirstPosition. Apparently,al-Ghazālīintendstoargueagainstthepositionthatfireistheabsolute efficientcauseofthecotton’sburning,apointatwhichherightfullyclaimsagreementwith theAvicennanfalāsifa.Butbyreferringtotheepistemologicalobjectionthatobservation canproveconcomitanceoftwoeventsbutnoconnectionbetweenthem,hehasjustifiably beenunderstoodasbeingmoreradical.Heseemstoobjectnotonlytothosewhoteach thereare(absolute)efficientcausesotherthanGod,butalsotothosewhoteachthat causeshaveefficacyontheireffects. Thisisnotwheretheconfusionends.Whilearguingthatfirecannotbetheonlyefficient causeforthecotton’scombustion,al-Ghazālībringsaverybriefsideargument:“Asfor thefire,itisaninanimatebeing(jamād)andithasnoaction(fiʿl).” 28Hereal-Ghazālī refersbacktoanobjectionhemadeinthethirddiscussionintheIncoherenceaboutwhat canbecalledafāʿil,or,anagent(p.153) oranefficientcause.Motivatedby considerationsthatwillbecomeclearlaterduringthisstudy,al-Ghazālīsimplyrejectsthe terminologyofthefalāsifa—theAvicennansaswellasanyothergroup.ForAvicenna,for instance,thewordfāʿilmerelydescribestheefficientcause:itisthethingthatgives existencetoanotherthing.29InthethirddiscussionoftheIncoherence,al-Ghazālīrejects thatusageonthegroundsthataccordingtocommonunderstanding,thewordfāʿil describestheoriginatorofanact—al-Ghazālīusesapronounthatreferstoapersonand notathing—whohasawill,haschosentheactfreely,andhasknowledgeofwhatis willed.30ThissenseoffāʿilistotallyalientoAvicenna,andal-Ghazālī’sstatementhere showsafundamentaldisagreementbetweenhimandAvicennaaboutthemeaningofthe wordfāʿil.Foral-Ghazālī,itmeans“voluntaryagent”;forAvicenna,simply“efficient cause.”Intheseventeenthdiscussion,al-Ghazālīthrowsinthisearlierargumentwithout furtherpursuingthepoint.Althoughprimarilydirectedagainstanonsecondary understandingofcausality,thesentenceisultimatelyalsodirectedagainstAvicenna’s particularunderstandingofsecondarycausality.InthecontextoftheFirstPositionhere, whichdoesnotrepresentAvicenna’sviewoncausality,thesentenceissomewhat misleadingandhas,infact,ledtomisunderstandingsamongal-Ghazālī’smodern interpreters.31 TheFirstApproachoftheSecondPosition:HowtheNaturalSciencesAre PossibleEveninanOccasionalistUniverse TheSecondPosition(al-maqāmal-thānī)solvessomeoftheconfusionthatremainsfrom theFirst.Itbeginswiththeclaimofaphilosophicalopponentwhoconcedesthatfireisnot thetrueefficientcauseofthecotton’signition.Thisphilosopheradmitsthatevents emanatefrom“theprinciplesoftemporaryevents”(mabādīʾal-ḥawādith).Hemaintains thattheconnectionbetweenthecauseandtheeffectisinseparableandnecessary. Causalprocessesproceedwithnecessityandinaccordwiththenaturesofthings,notby meansofdeliberationandchoicebytheefficientcause.Thephilosophicaladversary Page 7 of 36 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: University of Chicago; date: 13 March 2014 The Seventeenth Discussion of The Incoherence of the Philosophers arguesthatallthingshaveacertainpredisposition(istiʿdād)thatdetermineshowthey reacttootherthings.Thispredispositionispartofthething’snature(ṭabʿ).32Because thesenaturescannotchange,thethingsreactnecessarilytogivencircumstances.Cotton, forinstance,necessarilyburnswhenitcomesincontactwithfire.Here,al-Ghazālī paraphrasesthepositionofAvicennaandotherAristotelians.Thephilosopherofthe SecondPositionteachessecondarycausality;hebelievesinthenecessityofcausal connectionandintheexistenceofnatures(ṭabāʾiʿ). Al-Ghazālīdivideshisresponsetothispositionintotwo“approaches”(singl.maslak).The FirstApproachcountersthisphilosophicalpositionwiththatofaconsistentoccasionalist. Al-Ghazālīaskshisphilosopher-opponenttoconsiderthatnothinginthisworldfollowsits givennatures.EverythingcanbechangedifsowilledbyGod.33PointingtoGod’s omnipotencepromptstheopponenttobringhismostforcefulobjectionagainstalGhazālī’scriticismof(p.154) causality.Iftherearenonaturesandnogiven predispositions,thephilosopher-opponentsays,howarewetoknowanythingaboutthe world?Ifwedonottakeourjudgmentsfromthenatureofthings,wemaywelltakethem fromanyrandomsource,andthentheysimplybecomearbitrary: Ifonedeniesthattheeffectsfollownecessarilyfromtheircausesandrelatesthem tothewilloftheCreator,thewillhavingnospecificdesignatedcoursebut[a coursethat]canvaryandchangeinkind,thenleteachofusallowthepossibilityof therebeinginfrontofsomeoneferociousbeasts,ragingfires,highmountains,or enemiesreadywiththeirweapons[tokillhim],but[alsothepossibility]thathe doesnotseethembecauseGoddoesnotcreate[visionofthem]forhim.Andif someoneleavesabookinthehouse,lethimallowaspossibleitschangeonhis returninghomeintoabeardlessslaveboy(…)orintoananimal(…).34 Al-Ghazālīadmitsthatthisisastrongobjectionbysayingthatitbringsupthevilifyingor hideousimpossibilities(muḥālātshanīʿa)ofaconsequentoccasionalistposition, impossibilitiesthatonemightnotwanttobeassociatedwith.35Muchofwhatfollowsinthe seventeenthdiscussionmaybeunderstoodasal-Ghazālī’sresponsetowhatheevidently consideredaquitecompellingpoint. Inhismostimmediateanswer,al-Ghazālībringstwoargumentsthatdefendthe occasionalist’sposition.Inthefirst,heintroducesadifferencebetweentwotypesof possibilities.ThispassageintheseventeenthdiscussionisverysimilartooneinalGhazālī’sBalancedBookonWhat-to-Believe,yethereintheIncoherence,thelanguage heusesissurprisinglyuntechnical.Al-Ghazālīsaysthatalthoughallofthepossibilitiesthe adversarymentionsarepossible,thereisadifferencebetweenpossibilityandactuality. Admittingthatsomethingispossibleinvolvesnocommitmentthatitistrue.IfGodhad createdthisworldinsuchawaythatwewouldmakenodistinctionbetweenwhatis possibleandwhatexistsinactuality,wewouldindeedbeconfusedaboutthepossibility ofabooktransformingintoahorse.However,Godcreatedhumanknowledgeinsucha waythatwedodistinguishwhatismerelypossiblefromwhatoccursinactuality.Granted thatitispossible—andthuswithinGod’spower—tochangebooksintohorsesatany moment,weknowthatinourworldsuchaneventneveroccurs,whetherinour Page 8 of 36 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: University of Chicago; date: 13 March 2014 The Seventeenth Discussion of The Incoherence of the Philosophers presenceorinourabsence.God’spasthabitshavegivenussomeguidanceaboutwhat weconsiderpossibleorimpossible:“Thecontinuoushabitoftheiroccurrence repeatedly,onetimeafteranother,fixesunshakablyinourmindsthebeliefintheir occurrenceaccordingtopasthabit.” 36Al-Ghazālīmakeshispointagaininanopaque passagewithanexamplethatheexplicatesfullyintheBalancedBookonWhat-to-Believe. Thephilosophersagree,al-Ghazālīsays,thatprophetshavebeengiventheabilitytolook intothefuture.Whentheydo,theyhavecertainknowledgeaboutwhichfuture contingencieswillbecomeactualandwhichwillnotberealized.Theclairvoyanceofthe prophetsshowsthatthedistinctionsbetweenwhatpossibilitieswillandwillnotoccurin thefuturealreadyexisttoday.IntheBalancedBook,al-Ghazālīsaysthatthosefuture contingencies,whichwillremainunrealized,are(p.155) possiblewithregardto themselvesbutimpossiblewithregardtosomethingelse.37Inotherwords,anevent suchasabookchangingintoahorseispossiblewithregardtoitself,butwithregardto the“somethingelse”ofGod’shabit,suchaneventwillnotoccur. WilliamCourtenay,whowasunawareofthediscussionintheBalancedBook,understood thathereal-GhazālīappliesadistinctionbetweenGod’sabsolutepower-to-actandthe exercisedorordainedpowerofGod.38Thisdistinctioncanbealsounderstoodas analogoustoal-Fārābī’sdistinctionbetweenwhatispossibleornecessary“initself”and “fromsomethingelse.”Regardedpurelyinitself,itiswithinGod’spowertochangebooks intohorses.ButGodoperatesconsistentlyanddoesnotalterhisoperationsbywhimor caprice.RegardedfromtheperspectiveofGod’spreknowledgeandtheconsistencyof Hisaction,wedonotthinkitpossibleforbookstoturnintoanimals.Godwillnotinterrupt thehabitualoperationsofwhatappearstobecauseandeffectwithoutgoodreason.The onlyreasonwhyGodwouldsuspendthehabitualrelationshipbetweencausesand effects—soitseemsintheseventeenthdiscussion—istheconfirmationofoneofHis prophets.IfGod’spreknowledgeincludestheenactmentofamiracle,HesuspendsHis habit. Al-Ghazālībringsasecondargumentindefenseoftheoccasionalist’sposition,onethat focusesontherelationshipbetweeneventsinthecreatedworldandourknowledgeof them.Usuallywesaytheirrelationshipiscausal:outsideeventscauseourknowledgeof them.Fortheoccasionalist,thistranslatesintosayingthatthisconnectionisnotbyitself determined.Giventhattherearenocausesamongcreatures,theoutsideeventscannot causeourknowledge,theoccasionalistclaims.Rather,Godbothcreatestheeventinthe outsideworldandcreatesourknowledgeindependentlytoaccordwiththeevent.39 Hereagain,therelationshipishabitualbutnotnecessary.Althoughwehavereasonto trustinGodandassumethatourknowledgeoftheworldcorrespondstoitsactual function,thereisnodirectconnectionbetweentheeventsandourknowledgeofthem.40 MichaelE.MarmuraandUlrichRudolphsuggestthatal-Ghazālītriedtorebuffthe objectionthatoccasionalismleadstoignorancebyaugmentinganoccasionalistviewof causalityintheoutsideworldwithanoccasionalistunderstandingofhumanknowledge. SinceGodhasdirectcontroloverourknowledgeaswellasoverourimaginations,and sincewewitnessthatnobodyisseriouslyconcernedaboutbookschangingintoananimal Page 9 of 36 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: University of Chicago; date: 13 March 2014 The Seventeenth Discussion of The Incoherence of the Philosophers zoo,Godevidentlypreventsusfrombeingconfusedbynotcreatinginusabsurd thoughtssuchasthese.41 Theforceofthislineofargumentseemstorestonthe commonobservations(1)thatnobodyexperiencesthetransformationsofbooksinto animalsandalso(2)thathumanswithasoundintellectdonotdrawfalseconclusions aboutwhatislikelytohappen.Thesecondexperienceisjustasimportantasthefirst.God createshumanknowledgetobeneitherdiscontinuousnorcapricious.Agreeingwithhis philosopher-opponent,al-Ghazālībelievesthattrueknowledgecorrespondswithits objectsintheoutsideworld.Hereheaimstostrengthenthenotionthathumansdohave trueknowledge.HearguesthatGodcreatesourknowledgeoftheworldhabituallyin accordwithit;truthis(p.156) thereforearesultofGod’shabitandnotofcausal connectionsbetweenobjectsandtheirperception. Thephilosopher-opponentsuggeststhatanomnipotentGodmayactarbitrarily.Asinthe firstpoint,al-Ghazālī’srebuffisbasedonthestrictlyhabitualcharacterofGod’sactions. HerespondsthatGod’shabitismanifestintwoways.First,bookshabituallydonot changeintoanimals.Second,ourknowledgeoftheactual(andnotpossible) transformationofbookshabituallycorrespondstowhatactuallyhappensintheoutside world.StressingthestrictlyhabitualcharacterofGod’soperationsaimsatrejectingthe ideasthatthisworldcouldbechaoticorthatwedonothavetrueknowledgeofit.Itis indeedpossibleinprincipleforbookstoturnintohorseswhilestillgivingusthe impressionthattheyhadremainedbooks.IfGodweretowillthatsortofthing,Hecould preventusfromeverfindingoutwhathadreallyhappenedtoourbooks.Neitherof theseincidentswouldeverhappen,al-Ghazālīsays,becausepastexperienceshowsthat Godhabituallydoesnotactthisway.Humansarethereforenotconfusedaboutbooks turningintohorses,becauseitispartofGod’shabittopreventourconfusion.WhenGod madeHisplanofcreation,Hechosenottoenactthesepossibilitiesthatthephilosophers evoke,andHecreatedhumanknowledgeaccordingly.GodalreadyknowsinHisdivine foreknowledgethatHewouldnotdoacertainactandthusbreakHishabit.42 MiraclesarenaturallypartofGod’sforeknowledge.Whentheyoccur,Godadjuststhe knowledgeofthosehumanswhowitnessit.Thewitnesses’habitualforegoneconclusions abouttheexpectedcourseofeventswillbesuspendedinorderforthemtorealizethat theyare,infact,witnessingamiracle: If,then,Goddisrupts(kharaqa)thehabitual[courseofevents]bymaking[the miracle]occuratatimewhenadisruptionofthehabitualeventstakesplace,these cognitions[aboutthehabitualcourseofevents]haveslippedawayfrompeople’s mindssinceGoddidn’tcreatethem.43 Thetwopointsal-GhazālīmakesintheFirstApproachoftheSecondPositionarethoseof afullyconsistentoccasionalistwhostressesthereliabilityofGod’shabit.Goddirectly createsalleventsinhiscreation,includingtheknowledgeofhumans.Yetthestrictly habitualcharacterofGod’sactionsavoidsepistemologicalsolipsismandcreatesthe possibilityofnaturalscience.Humanssuccessfullymastertheworldbyknowing,for instance,thatbookswillremainbooks.Thisfactisaclearindicationaboutthestrictly habitualcharacterofGod’sactions. Page 10 of 36 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: University of Chicago; date: 13 March 2014 The Seventeenth Discussion of The Incoherence of the Philosophers TheSecondApproachoftheSecondPosition:AnImmanentExplanationof Miracles Al-Ghazālīpresentstohisreadersasecondconsistenttheorytoexplainmiracles.This theorypromises“deliverancefromthesevilifications,”meaningtheabsurditiesofhaving toreckonwithbookschangingintohorsesandsimilar(p.157) things.44ThisSecond Approach(al-maslakal-thānī)lackstheradicalspiritofthefirst.Infact,ithasoftenbeen regardedasawide-rangingconcessiontoal-Ghazālī’sphilosophicalopponentsthat subscribetothenecessarycharacteroftheconnectionbetweencauseandeffect.45AlGhazālīproposesthatphysicalprocesses,whicharesimplyunknowntous,explainthose propheticalmiraclesthatthefalāsifadeny.Weareunawareoftheseprocessesbecause theyoccursorarelythatwemaynothavewitnessedthem.TheQu’randepicts Abraham’sbeingthrownintoablazingfire(Q21:68,29:24,37:97)andsurviving unharmed;hissurvivalcanbeseenassimilartopeoplewhocoatthemselveswithtalc andsitinfieryfurnaces,unaffectedbytheheat.Similarly,Moses’stickchangingintoa serpentcanbeseenastherapidversionofthenaturalrecyclingofastick’swoodinto fertileearth,intonewplants,intothefleshofherbivores,andfromthereintothefleshof carnivoressuchassnakes.Thereisnolimitationtohowfasttheseprocessescan unfold.46Miraclesaresometimeshardtodistinguishfromwhatmaybecalledmagicor sorcery.Talismanicart,forinstance,hasattimesrepelledsnakes,scorpions,orbedbugs fromtownsandvillages.47 Thelikelyconfusionofsorceryandpropheticmiraclesisanimportantmotifinal-Ghazālī’s laterworks,mostprominentlyinhisautobiography,DelivererfromError.Theselater passageswillbediscussedfurtheron.Thisexplanationofprophetical“miracles”provided intheSecondApproachiscertainlytheonemostconducivetoaphilosophicalreader.We alsonotethatthisapproachdoesnotupholdtheinitialstipulationofthediscussion’s introductionthatphysicaltheoriesmustleaveGodspacefor“disrupting(kharaqa)the habitualcourse[ofevents].” 48Indeed,atthebeginningoftheseventeenthdiscussion, thisconditionfailstobementioned.Inanycase,thekindsofexplanationsproposedinthis SecondApproacharenotdisruptionsofthephysicalcourseofevents.Hereprophetical “miracles”aremerelyunderstoodasmarvels,seeminglywondrouseventsthat,ifall factorsaretakenintoconsideration,canbeexplainedaseffectsofnaturalcauses.They areeffectsandpermutationsthatmaybewitnessedrarelyormaynothavebeen witnessedatall.Still,al-Ghazālīsays,theseriousnaturalphilosophershouldconsider thempossible.Hemustacknowledgethatthenaturalsciencescannotexplainall phenomenathathumanshavewitnessedinthepast:“Amongtheobjectslyingwithin God’spowertherearestrangeandwondrousthings,notallwhichwehaveseen.Why, then,shouldwedenytheirpossibilityandjudgethemimpossible?” 49Suchadenialofthe reported“miracles”wouldbebecauseofalackofunderstandingthewaysofGod’s creation:“Whoeverstudiesthewondersofthescienceswillnotregardwhateverhas beenreportedofthepropheticalmiraclesinanywayremotefromthepowerofGod.” 50 OvercomingOccasionalism:TheThirdPosition Al-Ghazālīquotesanotherclaimofanopposingphilosopherinwhatwefindasthethird andlastposition(maqām).51 Thisthirdphilosopher-adversary(p.158) proposesa Page 11 of 36 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: University of Chicago; date: 13 March 2014 The Seventeenth Discussion of The Incoherence of the Philosophers seeminglysimpleunderstanding:bothpartiesmustagreeuponthefactthatGodcanonly createwhatispossibleandthatHecannotcreatewhatisimpossible.Thisleadsthe philosophertoaskal-Ghazālī:whatdoeshebelieveisimpossible?52Ifhewouldsaythat impossibilityisjustthenegationoftwocontradictorythingsexistingtogether,hewould simplyrenderhimselfridiculous,sinceaccordingtotheopponent,itisobviousthatmany otherthingsarealsoimpossibleforGodtocreate.Godcannotmoveadeadman’shand, andHecannotcreateawillinacreaturethathasnoknowledge.Therecanalsobeno knowledgeincreaturesthathavenolife. Theimaginaryopponentputshisfingeronasignificantdiscrepancybetweenthetwo partiesthatexplainsmuchoftheirdifferences.TheAristotelianphilosophersregard creationasanecessaryprocessthatflowsfromGod’sunchangingknowledge.God’s knowledgeandHispowertocreatearetogethersufficientcausesfortheworldtobeas itis.God’sknowledgeisthedeterminingfactorthatnecessitatestheworldinitscurrent state,andHisknowledgeisitselfdeterminedbyHisunchangingandeternalnature. PresumingthatGod’sknowledgeiseternalandunchangingmakestheworld’shistory determinedandnecessary.Thisnecessitydoesnotpermitthecreationofanythingother thanwhatactuallyis.Anyactualcreationisnecessitatedbythecombinationoflongchains ofcausesthatallhaveitsstartingpointinGod’snature.Godcannotchangethe continuousrealizationofthesechainsofcausesandeffects,justasHecannotmakewater flowuphill.Forthefalāsifa,everythingthatdoesnotexistinactualityistherefore impossibletobecreated.Itisimpossiblefortheworldtobeanythingotherthanitis. ModernWesterninterpretersofal-Ghazālīdisagreeabouthisanswertothischallenge. Themajorityholdsthatal-Ghazālī’sresponsemakesasignificantconcessiontothe positionofthefalāsifa:heacknowledgesthattherearecertainlimitstoGod’screative power,boundariesmuchnarrowerthanthatwhichislogicallyimpossible.Al-Ghazālī concedesthatsomeassumptionsimplyothers.Astone,forinstance,canhaveno knowledge.Theassumptionofknowledgeinathingimpliesthatthisthinghaslife.The sameistrueforwillandknowledge,astheformerimpliesthelatter.Wecannotsaythat somethinghasawillwithoutalsoassumingthatithaspriorknowledgeabouttheobjectof itswill.InhisinterpretationoftheThirdPosition,UlrichRudolphpointstothefactthat fromtheverybeginningoftheseventeenthdiscussion,relationshipsofidentificationand implicationwereexemptfromal-Ghazālī’scritiqueofcausality.Theinitialstatementofthis discussionsaysthat,“[with]anytwothingsthatarenotidenticalandwhichdonotimply oneanother,itisnotnecessarythattheexistenceorthenonexistenceofonefollows necessarilyoutoftheexistenceorthenonexistenceoftheother.” 53Hereattheendof thediscussion,al-Ghazālīclarifieswhathemeantwhenhehadsaidthattwothingsare identicalorimplyeachother. AtthestartofthisThirdPosition,inhisresponsetothephilosopher’schallengeal-Ghazali postulatesthreeprinciplesthatGod’screativepowerissubjectto.Inhiscreation,Godis boundbythreenorms:Firstofall,Godcannotviolatetheruleofexcludedcontradiction. Hethuscannotaffirm(meaningcreate)(p.159) andalsodeny(meaningnotcreate)a specificthingatagiventime.Second,Godmustacceptrelationshipsofimplications.Thisis Page 12 of 36 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: University of Chicago; date: 13 March 2014 The Seventeenth Discussion of The Incoherence of the Philosophers closelyconnectedtotheprinciplejustmentioned:Godcannot“affirmthespecialandat thesametimedenythemoregeneral[whenitincludesthespecial]”(ithbātal-akhaṣṣ maʿanafīl-aʿamm).Third,Godcannot“affirmtwothingsandatthesametimedenyoneof them”(ithbātal-ithaynmaʿanafīl-wāḥid).Thesethreerulesdefinewhatisimpossible. Everythingthatisnotlimitedbythesethreerulesis,accordingtoal-Ghazālī,possiblefor Godtocreate.54 Inthenextstep,al-Ghazālīexplainshowthesethreenormsaretobeapplied.Hegives someexamples:Godcannotcreateblackandwhiteinthesamesubstrateorlocus (maḥall),andhecannotcreateapersonintwoplacesatoncesincethiswouldviolatethe principleofexcludedcontradiction.Thesecondruleonthebindingcharacterof implicationssaysthatGodcanneithercreateawillwithoutknowledgenorcreate knowledgewithoutlife.55LennE.Goodmansuggeststhatacknowledgingthisprinciple introducestheAristotelianschemaofgeneraanddifferentiaandofessencesand accidentalproperties.IdentifyingathingasXcarrieswithitallfurtherspecificationofX’s definition.56IfGodwishestocreateananimal,forinstance,Hemustcreateitanimated andcannotleaveitlifeless. Thethirdrulebringswithitanequallywide-ragingconsequence,sinceitdisallows,inalGhazālī’sview,“thechangingofgenera”(qalbal-ajnās).Goodmanprobablygoestoofar whenhearguesthatwiththisprinciple,al-Ghazālīacceptsthewholeapparatusof Aristotelianhylemorphism.57Morelikely,al-Ghazālīmeansthattransformationscanonly happenwithinthe“genera”andnotacrosstheirlines.Bloodcanchangeintosperm,and watercanchangeintosteam,butacolorcannotbechangedintoamaterialobject,for instance.Inthepermittedcases,thematter(mādda)oftheinitialsubstanceassumesa differentform(ṣūra).Foral-Ghazālī,matterisgenerallyreceptivetochangeandmaybe transformedintoanothermaterialbeing.Astickmaythereforebetransformedintoa serpent,sincethetwosharea“commonmatter”(māddamushtarika).Itisimpossible, however,thatanattributesuchas“blackness”couldchangeintoamaterialbeingsuchas acookingpot.58Thustheword“genera”(ajnās)describesforal-Ghazālīnotthe Aristotelianclassesofbeingsbutthetwotraditionalclassesofbeingsintheontologyof kalām:bodiesthatconsistofatoms(jawāhir)andattributes,thatis,accidents(aʿrāḍ)that subsistinbodies.59Thisisindeedhowtheword“genera”(ajnās)hasbeenusedby earlierAshʿarites.60Transformationbetweenbodiesandaccidentsisimpossible.All changeswithinthegeneraarepossible,saysal-Ghazālī,anditis,forinstance,easyfor Godtomovethebodyofadeadman.Thiswouldnotrequirethecreationoflifeina corpse,forGodcouldjustmovethelimbsofthecorpsewithoutputtinglifeintoit.Not themanbutGodwouldbethemover. LennE.Goodman’sandUlrichRudolph’sreadingsoftheThirdPositionrepresentthe majorityopinionofmoderninterpreters.61 Theyunderstandthatintheconcludingpart oftheseventeenthdiscussion,al-Ghazālīmakessignificantconcessionstohisphilosophical opponents.HeacknowledgesthatGodisboundnotonlybycertainrulesoflogic,suchas theprincipleofexcluded(p.160) contradiction,butalsotoalimitednumberofnatural lawsthatweknowtobetrueandbindingfromexperience.62Theimpossibilityof Page 13 of 36 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: University of Chicago; date: 13 March 2014 The Seventeenth Discussion of The Incoherence of the Philosophers “changingthegenera”(qalbal-ajnās)wouldbepartofthissecondgroupoflimitationson God’spower. JulianObermann’s“Subjectivist”InterpretationoftheSeventeenthDiscussion ThereisalsoaminorityinterpretationwhoseunderstandingoftheThirdPositionis probablyjustasconsistentwiththetextastheonewehavejustdiscussed.Initsscope, however,itismuchmoreradical.JulianObermann,whowasthefirstWesternscholarto criticallyanalyzetheseventeenthdiscussionoftheIncoherence,presentedtheresultsof his1915dissertationinalongarticleandaconsiderablyexpandedbook,bothpublished inViennashortlybeforeandaftertheFirstWorldWar.63Hisinterpretation,however, didnothavemuchimpactonlaterscholarship.64 Obermannconnectsal-Ghazālī’sdenialthatanythinginthisworldcouldbeanabsolute efficientcausetoargumentspresentedinearlierdiscussionsoftheIncoherence.Inthe firstdiscussiononthesubjectoftheeternityoftheworld,al-Ghazālīarguesthat“will” (irāda)issomethingthatisnotdeterminedbythethingswefindinthisworld.Ifathirsty manisgiventwoglassesofwaterthatareidenticaltoeachotherandequalintheir positiontohim,themanisnotatallparalyzedbythechoicebetweenthesetwoidentically beneficialoptions.Hischoicebetweenthetwoglassesisnotdeterminedbyhis experienceoftheoutsideworld.Foral-Ghazālī,willisthecapacitytodistinguishonething fromanotherthatisexactlysimilartoit.65Thelackofdifferencebetweenthetwoglasses hasnoeffectonthethirstyman’schoicetopickone.Itisthehuman’swillthat distinguishesthetwoglassesandnotthehuman’sknowledgeofthem.ThisshowsalGhazālīthatthefalāsifa’scausaldeterminismcannotexplainwhythethirstymanpicksa glass.Forthem,hischoiceshouldbedeterminedbythedifferencesheperceives.Since therearenodifferences,adeterministicexplanationofthissituationwouldhavetheman dieofthirst,unabletopickeitherofthetwoglasses.66 Obermannarguedmoregenerallythatforal-Ghazālī,humansdistinguishthingsby meansoftheirwillandnotbywhatthethingsreallyareorbyhowtheyinteractwithour epistemologicalapparatus.Thecriteriaofthehumanwillareoftenrandomandarbitrary. Theyarecertainlynotdeterminedbytheoutsideworld.Thelackofdistinctionbetween thetwoglassesisnotinanywaycausallyconnectedtothechoiceoftheman.More generally,ourpositiontowardcausalconnectionsintheoutsideworldisindependentof whatweperceivethere.Oursensesdonotperceivetheagencyofacauseonitseffect: causalityistheresultofachoicewithinus.Itis“solelyduetothecontinuityofahabitual actionthatourmemoryandourimaginationareimprintedwiththevalidityofanaction accordingtoitsrepeatedobservation.” 67 (p.161) ForObermann,whowrotehisanalysisofal-Ghazālī’scritiqueduringthelate 1910s,thisisthepositionof“philosophicalsubjectivism.”ObermanninterpretedalGhazālī’scriticismofcausalityfromthepointofviewofthepost-Kantiandebateabout “subjectivism”and“psychologism”inearlytwentieth-centuryVienna.68Al-Ghazālī’s thought,however,evenifitisunderstoodalongObermann’slines,canhardlybe comparedwithmodernsubjectivism.ThereisnotenoughevidencethattheMuslim theologianarguedinfavorofarelativistviewofhumanknowledge,oneinwhich Page 14 of 36 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: University of Chicago; date: 13 March 2014 The Seventeenth Discussion of The Incoherence of the Philosophers knowledgeisdependentonepistemologicaldecisionsbytheperceivingsubject.Infact,in thefaceofphilosophicalaccusationsofepistemologicalrelativism,al-Ghazālīmaintainsthat truthisthecorrespondenceofhumanknowledgewiththeoutsidereality.Hebelieves thathumansdohavetrueknowledgeinthissense.Therefore,HansHeinrichSchaeler, whocriticizedObermann’schoiceof“subjectivism,”suggestedthatifObermann’s interpretationiscorrect,al-Ghazālī’sapproachshouldratherbecalled“anthropocentric.” Itisnotoccupiedwithsubjectivistconcernbutaimstogainfurtherinsightintotheway Godcreatedhumanity.69 Obermannwelcomedal-Ghazālī’scritiqueofAvicenna’sepistemologicalrealismand considereditamajorphilosophicalachievement.70Hisanalysisplacesal-Ghazālīasa predecessorofImmanuelKantandproposesthat,whereasfortheMuslimtheologian empiricalobservationstandsonshakygrounds,humanjudgmentsremainthesolid foundationofcertainandfirmknowledge.ObermannunderstoodthatintheThird Positionoftheseventeenthdiscussion,al-Ghazālīreconsidershisearliersuggestionthat ourknowledgeisnotnecessarilyconnectedtotheworld.Butalthoughtheremaynotbe anecessaryconnectionbetweentheworldandourknowledgeofit,justasthereisno necessaryconnectionbetweenanytwoeventswithintheworld,ourknowledgeisbound tocertainconditionsofourjudgments.Themostimportantjudgmentsarethoseabout whatispossible,whatisimpossible,andwhatisnecessary. Thus,accordingtoObermann,al-Ghazālīobjectstowhathebelievesisanaiveempiricism ofthefalāsifabysayingthatpossibilityandimpossibilityarenotcontainedwithinthe thingsthemselves.Theyarepredicatesofhumanjudgments: Scienceonlyacceptsnecessaryconnectionswheretheyhavetobethoughtofas necessaryandimpossibilitieswheretheyhavetobethoughtofasimpossibilities. Thestandardforthevalueofscientificknowledge,foritsdignity,itsright,andits claimsiscreatedonlywithinourminds.71 Accordingtoourmutualjudgments,itisimpossiblethatoneobjectisattwoplacesatthe sametime.Thisimpossibilityweknownotfromobservation—aswecannotinspectall placesoftheworldsimultaneously—butratherweholditasaprincipleofourjudgment. Whenwesaythatanindividualiswithinthehouse,asal-GhazālīwritesintheThird Position,itimpliesthatwedenythatheorsheisoutsideofthehouse.72Wedenythe existenceoftheindividualoutsidethehouse,notbecausewecannotfindhimorher outside,butbecause(p.162) wecannotthinkofapersonasbeingatthesametimeinandoutsideofthehouse.73Thesameappliestotheotherimplicationsdiscussedabove. Whenwesaythatweknowthatthingswithoutlifecannotpossessknowledge,wereferto aprincipleofourjudgment,ratherthantheworldassuch.Itisinconceivablethat inanimatebeingsareknowledgeable,andthusitisimpossibleforustoassumethe existenceofaknowledgeablestone.74 Allthisleadstotheacknowledgmentofcertainconditionsforhumanknowledge, accordingtoObermann.Ifwetalkaboutsomethinghavingawill(irāda),weimplicitly assumethatthissomethingalsohasknowledgebecausewecannotimaginewillwithout Page 15 of 36 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: University of Chicago; date: 13 March 2014 The Seventeenth Discussion of The Incoherence of the Philosophers knowledge.75Thenecessaryconnectionbetweenwillandknowledgeisnotsomething thatwefindintheobjectsoftheworld;rather,itisgeneratedbyourjudgments.Inthe outsideworld,theremayormaynotbeaconnectionbetweenwillandknowledge. IntheFirstPositionoftheseventeenthdiscussion,al-Ghazālīhaddisputedthatour senseperception(mushāhada)candetectnecessityintheoutsideworld.Thus, Obermann’simplicitquestion:wouldhegiveupthispositionduringthelatercourseof thediscussionintheSecondandThirdPositions?IntheThirdPosition,whichisfor Obermannsomethinglikeasummaryconclusiontothewholeseventeenthdiscussion,alGhazālīproposesthattheprincipleofcausalityisvalidnotinanabsolutesensebutina logical-intellectualone.Itisvalidasalawwithinthesciences,althoughitsempirical verificationtranscendstheboundariesofhumanknowledgeandleadsintothefieldof religion. Al-Ghazālī’sCritiqueofAvicenna’sConceptionoftheModalities Obermann’suseofthecategory“subjectivism”maynothavebeenanauspiciousone.It seemsevidenttodaythatal-Ghazālī’sapproachhasnothingtodowithmodern subjectivism.Hedoesnotsaythathumanknowledgeofwhatispossibleismerelyan impressedbeliefthathasnoconnectiontoreality.Itistrue,saysal-GhazālīintheFirst ApproachoftheSecondPosition,thatGodcould,inprinciple,disconnectourknowledge fromtheoutsideworld.Butthatisonlyathoughtexperiment,similartothepossibility thatbookscouldchangeintoanimals,anotherpossibilitythatGoddoesnotenact.Wewill seethattrustinGod(tawakkul)isamajorconditionforinvestigatingthenaturalsciences. SuchtrustrequiresthecertaintytoknowthatGodwillnotchangebooksintohorsesor disconnectourknowledgefromreality.GiventhatGodhabituallycreatesourknowledge toaccordwithreality,wecanrelyonoursensesandourjudgmentandconfidently pursuethenaturalsciences. YetthereisamoremoderatewaytounderstandObermann’sinterpretationofalGhazālī.Certainwordsandformulasusedbyal-GhazālīsupportObermann’ssuggestion thatintheThirdPosition,al-GhazālīistalkingnotaboutwhatGodmightpossiblyenactbut ratherwhatispossibleforahuman’sjudgments.TheopponentintheThirdPosition startsthediscussionbyassumingthatthemodalitiesexistbothwithinthepowerofGod aswellasinourknowledge.76Al-GhazālīquotesthepositionofhisAvicennanopponent whosaysthat(p.163) theoutsideworldisdividedintotwobasicmodalities,meaningit isdividedintotwocategoriesofbeings:(1)thosethatarenecessarybythemselvesand (2)thosethatarebythemselvespossible(butnotnecessary).77Theopponentimplies thatthementalexistenceofthemodalities—meaningourjudgmentsthatsomethingis necessary,possible,orimpossible—isderivedfromtheirexistenceinreality.Wewillsee thatal-Ghazālīrejectssuchanunderstandingofthemodalities.Inhisresponse,hedoes concedethatGodcannotenacttheimpossible.Yethethenimmediatelyshiftsthewhole debateawayfromwhatGodcandotowhatcanbeaffirmedordenied,thatis,tothelevel ofhumanjudgments.78ThroughouttheThirdPosition,al-Ghazālīcombineslanguagethat referstoGod’spowertoact—usingsuchwordsas“power”(qudra)and“objectof power”(maqdūr),wordsthatrefertotheoutsideworld—withlanguagethatrefers Page 16 of 36 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: University of Chicago; date: 13 March 2014 The Seventeenth Discussion of The Incoherence of the Philosophers exclusivelytohumanjudgments,suchas“affirmation”(ithbāt)and“negation”(nafī).The “impossible”isdefinedasthecombinationofanaffirmationwithitsnegation(al-muḥāl ithbāt…maʿanafī…).79Impossibilityseemstoexistonlyinhumanjudgments.Ifthe interpreterofal-Ghazālīfollowsthehermeneuticstrategytoreplacetheword “impossible”withitsgivendefinition,al-Ghazālīissaying:“Godcannotenactanaffirmation thatiscombinedwithitsnegation.”Thissentences,ifitmakesanysenseatall,pointstoa nominalistinterpretationofGod’spowertocreateandsays:Godcannotcreate judgmentsinourmindsthatcombineanaffirmationwithitsmutualnegation. Avicenna’spositionstandsinoppositiontothis.Heteachesthatthementalexistenceof modalitiesderivesfromtheirexistenceinreality.80Avicennataughtthathuman knowledgeisdeterminedbythewayGodcreatestheworld.Likemostthinkersofhis tradition,Avicennawasanepistemologicalrealist;andlikePlatoandAristotle,hebelieved inaneternalandinvariantformallevelofbeingthatmakesindividualobjectswhatthey areandthatmakesthehumansoulaconsciouscopyoftheformalbasicstructureof reality.Aristotleteachesthatactualknowledgeisidenticalwithitsobject.81 Inbeing thoughtof,theformalbasisofreality—theformsandideasthatarethebackbonesof reality—isactualizedinthehumanmind.Thehumanmindisthusdirectlyacquaintedwith theformalunderpinningsofreality.Theknowledgeitcontainsis“aninsideviewintothe ultimatefoundationsofbeingandseesthevisibleworldasitsimitationorexplication.” 82 Whenweseeahorse,forinstance,weconnectoursensualperceptiontotheformal conceptof“horseness,”whichistheuniversalessenceorquiddity(māhiyya)ofevery individualhorse.InAvicenna’sopinion,knowledgecanbeachievedonlybyidentifyinga givenindividualobjectasamemberofaclassofbeing,auniversal.Understandingmeans reducinganygivenmultitudeofsensualperceptionstoacombinationofuniversals.The horsemaybewhite,male,andstrong.Whiteness,maleness,andstrengthareuniversals thatexistnotonlyascategoriesofdescriptionsinourmindbutalsoasentitiesthatexist inrealiterintheactiveintellect,fromwhichhumansreceivethem.Thesameappliestothe modalities. Al-Ghazālīquestionstheassumptionofanontologicalcoherencebetweenthisworldand ourknowledgeofit.Certainpredications—which,forAvicenna,applytothingsinthereal world—apply,foral-Ghazālī,onlytohuman(p.164) judgments.Al-Ghazālī’spositioncan beclarifiedfromthefinalsentencesoftheThirdPositionoftheseventeenthdiscussion. Hereal-Ghazālīmakesthepointthatwhenweseeapersonactingorderlywithouta tremororotherfreakmovements,wecannothelpassumingthatthepersonhascontrol overhisorhermovements.Theorderlymovementsofapersonleadto(ḥaṣala)the knowledgeabouthisorhercontrol.Thisconnection,however,cannotbemadesolely fromsensoryperceptions.Accordingtoal-Ghazālī,ourjudgmentthat“thepersonisin controlofthemovements”isalreadyunderstoodfromourobservationoftheorderly movements.ThisimplicationfollowsfromhowGodhascreatedthehumanmind: Thesearecognitions(ʿulūm)thatGodcreatesaccordingtothehabitualcourse[of events],bywhichweknowtheexistenceofoneofthetwoalternatives[namelythe person’scontrolornon-controloverhisorhermovements]butbywhichthe Page 17 of 36 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. 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Subscriber: University of Chicago; date: 13 March 2014 The Seventeenth Discussion of The Incoherence of the Philosophers impossibilityoftheotheralternativeisnotshown(…).83 Neitherthesheerfactoftheorderlymovementnorourperceptionofitcancreateour judgmentthatthepersonisincontrolofhisorherbody.Eventhefactthatthereare onlytwomutuallyexclusivealternatives(“incontrol”and“notincontrol”)canbeinferred neitherfromtheworldnorfromourvisualperceptionoftheorderlymovement.These predicatesdonotexistintheoutsideworld;rather,theyarenamesthatweconnectto certainsensualperceptions.Realityitselfdoesnotguarantyitsownintelligibility.84Our understandingoftheworldreliesonparametersthatarenotpartoftheworld’sformal structure.Sayingthattheseparametersare—likeallhumancognitions(ʿulūm)—God’s creationsandthatGodproducesourknowledgeabouttheperson’scontrolbycreating suchcategoriesinourmindonlymeansthatwecannotexpecttounderstandtheworld bysimplylookingatitandstudyingitsontologicalstructure. Al-Ghazālīwasparticularlyunsatisfiedwiththefalāsifa’suseofthemodalities,ashe makesclearinthefirstdiscussionoftheIncoherenceonpre-eternityoftheworld.Here al-Ghazālīrebuffstwoargumentsthatstemfromtheimplicationsofsayingthatsomething ispossible.Inthethirdargumentofthefirstdiscussion,thephilosophicalopponentclaims thattheexistenceoftheworldisandhasalwaysbeenpossiblebecausetheworldcannot changefromastateofimpossibilityintoastateofpossibility.Sincetheworld’spossibility hasnobeginning,itiseternallypossible.85InotherpartsofIncoherence,al-Ghazālī deniesthattheworldcanbeeternal.BasedonargumentsfirstproposedbyJohn Philoponus(d.c.570CE),hesayselsewhereinthisbookthatitisimpossibleforthe worldtobepre-eternalbecauseanaction(fiʿl)musthaveatemporalbeginning.86What didtheopponentmean,however,whenhesaidthattheworld’sexistencehasalways beenpossible?Al-Ghazālīdoesnotobjecttothisparticularstatement.Consideredjust byitself,hesaysattheendofthediscussion,thestatementthatthecreationoftheworld waspossibleatanytimebeforeorafteritsactualcreationistrue.Inthatsense,the worldiseternallypossible.87 However,thatisnothowtheopponentunderstandsthesentence:“Theworldisalways possibletoexist”(lamyazalal-ʿālammumkinanwujūduhu).The(p.165) difference betweenthetworeadingsofthissentencecanbeexplainedbyusingwhatbecameknown intheLatinWestasthedereanddedictodistinctionsofmodality.LaterArablogicians wouldrefertothisdistinctionasthedhātīandthewaṣfīreadingsofmodalsentences.The distinctiongoesbacktoAristotle’sSophisticRefutations.88Whenwesayitispossiblefor theworldtoalwaysexist,onewaytounderstandthesentenceistoattributepossible truthtotheproposition“theworldexistsalways”(lamyazalwujūdal-ʿālam).89This seemstobewhatthefalāsifaaredoingwhentheymaketheirpointthattheexistenceof theworldhasalwaysbeenpossible.Here,apredicationorproposition(dictum/waṣf)is consideredpossiblytrue.Foral-Ghazālī,thisdedicto/waṣfīinterpretationofpossibilityis unacceptableinthiscontextbecause,forhim,thatsentencecanneverbetrue.Ifitcan neverbetrue,thesentencecannotbeseenaspossiblytrue.However,wemaymeanto attributetotheworldthepossibilityofhavingalwaysexisted,thatis,atanygiventime beforeorafteritsactualcreation.Herethepredicate“exist”isattachedinapossible Page 18 of 36 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). 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Subscriber: University of Chicago; date: 13 March 2014 The Seventeenth Discussion of The Incoherence of the Philosophers predicationtothething(res/dhāt),thatis,theworld.Thispropositiondoesnotrequire theworldtobeeternal;itistrueaslongastheworldcouldhavecomeintoexistenceat anytimeotherthanitactuallydid.Thisiswhatal-Ghazālīstressesinhisobjectiontothe falāsifa’sthirdproof: Theworldissuchthatitiseternallypossibleforittobetemporallyoriginated.No doubtthenthatthereisno[single]momentoftimebutwhereinitscreationcould notbutbeconceived.Butifitissupposedtoexisteternally,thenitwouldnotbe temporallyoriginated.Thefactualthenwouldnotbeinconformitywithpossibility, butcontrarytoit.90 Regardedbyitself,al-Ghazālīconsidersthestatement“Theworldisalwayspossibleto exist”astrue.Yethereadsitdereordhātīandrejectsthecompetingdedicto/waṣfī interpretationofthestatement.Thedistinctionofmodalstatementsintothesetwo readingsisnotprominentlyrepresentedinAvicenna’slogicalworks.91 Someinterpreters believethatAvicennadidnotapplythedistinctionatall.Thethirdargumentthatal-Ghazālī objectstointhefirstdiscussionabouttheworld’spre-eternityisthusprobablynotfrom theworksofAvicenna.92Fromadiscussioninalaterwork,itbecomesclearthatalGhazālīunderstoodthedifferencebetweenthedere/dhātīanddedicto/waṣfīmeaningof modalstatements.Inthatlaterwork,suchasinthisexample,hewaswillingto understandmodalstatementsdere/dhātīratherthandedicto/waṣfī.93 Al-Ghazālī’sirritationwiththefalāsifa’streatmentofmodalitiesbecomesclearerinthe nextpassageoftheIncoherenceinwhichal-Ghazālī’scriticismismoreradical.Intwo articlespublishedin2000and2001,TaneliKukkonenandBlakeD.DuttonexaminealGhazālī’sinterpretationofmodaltermsintheIncoherence.94Bothfocusonal-Ghazālī’s responsetothephilosophers’fourthprooffortheeternityoftheworld,whichisalso debatedinthefirstdiscussionoftheIncoherence.Again,thefalāsifatrytoprovethe pre-eternityoftheworldfromthefactthatithasalwaysbeenpossible.Thistimethe argumentthatal-GhazālīaddressescomesfromAvicenna.Itisbasedonthepremisethat (p.166) possibilitycannotbeself-subsistentbutrequiresasubstrate(maḥall)inwhich toinhere.95FollowingAristotle’sargument,Avicennasaysthatthissubstrateisthehylé, theprimematterthatexistseternally.Itsreceptivitytotheformsmakesitthesubstrate oftheworld’spossibility.Thus,thefactthattheworldiseternallypossibleprovesthatthe substrateofthispossibility,whichisprimematter,mustexisteternally.96 Inhisresponse,al-Ghazālīdeniesthepremisethatpossibilityneedsasubstrate. Possibilitydoesnotexistintheoutsideworld;rather,itismerelyajudgmentofthemind: Thepossibilitywhichtheymentionrevertstoajudgmentofthemind(qaḍāl-ʿaql). Anythingwhoseexistencethemindsupposes,[nothing]preventingitssupposingit possible,wecall“possible,”andifitispreventedwecallit“impossible.”If[the mind]isunabletosupposeitsnonexistence,wenameit“necessary.”Fortheseare rationalpropositions(qaḍāyāʿaqliyya)thatdonotrequireanexistentsoastobe renderedadescriptionthereof.97 Page 19 of 36 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: University of Chicago; date: 13 March 2014 The Seventeenth Discussion of The Incoherence of the Philosophers Al-Ghazālīrepeatsthisargumentinthenineteenthdiscussion,inwhichAvicennaclaims thatthepossibilityofperishing(imkānal-ʿadam)canonlysubsistinmatterandthat purelyimmaterialbeingssuchashumansoulsareincorruptible.Ifthatweretrue,alGhazālīsays,itwouldimplythatathingcouldbesimultaneouslypotentialandactualwith regardtoacertainpredicate.Affirmingboththepotentialityandtheactualityofagiven predicateisacontradiction,al-Ghazālīobjects.Aslongasathingispotentiallysomething, itcannotbethesamethinginactuality.Attherootoftheproblem,al-Ghazālīsays,is Avicenna’sviewthatpossibility(imkān)requiresamaterialsubstrateinwhichtosubsist. Thissubstrateisnotrequired,al-Ghazālīmaintains,sincewhenwetalkaboutpossibility wemakenodistinctionwhetheritweretoapplytoamaterialsubstanceortoan immaterialonesuchasthehumansoul.98 AsKukkonenputsit,al-Ghazālīshiftsthelocusofthepresumptionofathing’sactual existencefromtheplaneoftheactualizedrealitytotheplaneofmentalconceivability.99 Thedomainofpossibilityisnotpartofwhatactuallyexistsintheoutsideworld,al-Ghazālī argues.Thesemodalitiesarelikeuniversalconcepts,andliketheuniversalssuchascolor orlikethejudgmentthatallanimalshaveasoul,forinstance,theirexistenceisinthemind only.Theoutsideworldconsistsofindividualobjects,andtheseindividualscannotbethe objectsofouruniversalknowledge.Theuniversalsareabstractedfromtheindividual objectsthatweperceive.“Whatexistsintheoutsideworld(fīl-aʿyān)areindividual particularsthatareperceptibleinoursenses(maḥsūsa)andnotinourmind (maʿqūla).” 100Liketheuniversalconceptof“beingacolor”(lawniyya)thatwecannotfind anywhereintheoutsideworld,thepredicates“possible,”“impossible,”and“necessary” donotapplytoobjectsoutsideofourmind.Al-Ghazālītakesanominalistpositionwith regardtothemodalitiesandarguesthatmodaljudgmentsareabstractnotionsthatour mindsdeveloponthebasisofsenseperception.101 (p.167) InhisobjectiontoAvicenna’sconceptionofthemodalities,al-Ghazālīmakes innovativeuseofAshʿariteontologicalprinciples.102WhentheAshʿaritesdeniedthe existenceofnatures,theyrejectedthelimitationsthatcomewiththeAristoteliantheory ofentelechy.Viewingthingsasthecarriersofpossibilitiesthatareboundtobeactualized restrictsthewaythesethingsmayexistinthefuture.Theserestrictionsundulylimit God’somnipotence,theAshʿaritessay;andaslongasthingsareregardedby themselves,thepossibilitiesofhowtheyexistarelimitedonlybyourmental conceivability.Additionally,whenAshʿaritestalkaboutsomethingthatexists,theymean somethingthatcanbeaffirmed(athbata).103Toclaimthattherepresentlyexistsinathing aninactivecapacitytobedifferentfromhowitpresentlyis—meaningthatthereexists suchapossibilityinthatthing—isreallytosaythattherepresentlyexistssomethingthat doesnotexist.104Thisisacontradiction,andAshʿaritessubsequentlydeniedthe existenceofnonactivecapacities:existenceisalwaysactualexistence.105Thisiswhy Ashʿaritesrefusedtoacknowledgetheexistenceofnaturesthatdeterminehowthings reacttogivensituations.Naturesare,inessence,suchnonactivecapacities.Inthe courseofthisstudy,itwillbecomeclearthatthestatusofmodalitiesmarksanimportant crossroadsbetweenAvicennaandal-Ghazālīthatdeterminestheirpositionsonontology. Al-Ghazālī’sphilosophicalshiftstemsfromabackgroundinkalāmliterature,achangethat Page 20 of 36 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: University of Chicago; date: 13 March 2014 The Seventeenth Discussion of The Incoherence of the Philosophers meritscloserlook. TheDifferentConceptionsoftheModalitiesinfalsafaandkalām AncientGreekphilosophyusedanddistinguishedseveraldifferentmodalparadigms,but noneincludedtheviewofsynchronicalternatives.Ourmodernviewofmodalitiesisthat ofsynchronicalternativestatesofaffairs.Inthatmodel,“[t]henotionoflogicalnecessity referstowhatobtainsinallalternatives,thenotionofpossibilityreferstowhatobtainsat leastinonealternative,andthatwhichislogicallyimpossibledoesnotobtaininany conceivablestateofaffairs.” 106Incontrast,Aristotle’smodaltheoryhasbeendescribed asastatisticalinterpretationofmodalconceptsasappliedtotemporalindefinite sentences.Toexplainatemporallyunqualifiedsentenceoftheform“SisP”containsan implicitorexplicitreferencetothetimeofutteranceaspartofitsmeaning.Ifthis sentenceistruewheneveruttered,itisnecessarilytrue.Ifitstruth-valuecanchangein thecourseoftime,itispossible.Ifsuchasentenceisfalsewheneveruttered,itis impossible.107SimoKnuuttilaclarifiesthatinancientGreek,modaltermswere understoodtorefertotheoneandonlyhistoricalworldofours,and“itwascommonly thoughtthatallgenerictypesofpossibilityhadtoprovetheirmettlethrough actualization.” 108 Avicenna’sviewofthemodalitiesisnotsignificantlydifferentfromthestatisticalmodelof Aristotlethatconnectsthepossibilityofathingtoitstemporalactuality.109Herehe followedal-Fārābī,whoteachesthattheword“possible”or,tobemoreprecise, “contingent”(mumkin)110isbestappliedtowhatisinastateofnonexistenceinthe presentandstandsreadyeithertoexistornottoexist(yatahayyiʾuanyūjadawaanlā yūjada)atanymomentinthefuture.111 (p.168) Avicennasharesthistemporalattitude towardthemodalities:thenecessaryiswhatholdsalways,andthecontingentiswhat neitherholdsalwaysnorholdsnever.112Thisposition,whichrepresentsmainstream Aristotelianism,seemstoimplythatsomethinghastoexistatonepointintimeinorderto bepossible.ForAvicenna,however,“whatneitherholdsalwaysnorholdsnever”refers topredicationsaboutthingsintheoutsideworldaswellasthosethatexistonlyinthe mind.The“heptagonalhouse”(al-baytal-musabbaʿ),forinstance,mayneverexistinthe outsidewordbutwillatonepointintimeexistinahumanmindandisthereforea possiblebeing.113ForAvicenna,theprincipleofplentitudeisvalidforexistenceinthe mind(fīl-dhihn)butnotforexistenceinre(fīl-aʿyān),thatis,intheoutsideworld.Itis contingentthatsomehouses,orallhouses,areheptagonal,sincethecombinationof “house”and“heptagonal”isneithernecessarynorimpossible.HereAvicennaclearly divorcesmodalityfromtime.Thepossibilityofathingisnotunderstoodintermsofits actualexistenceinthefuturebutintermsofitsmentalconceivability.114By acknowledgingthatsomebeingssuchasthechiliagon—apolygonwithsomanysidesthat itcannotbedistinguishedfromacircle—existinthemindbutwillprobablyneverexistin theoutsideworld,Avicennarecognizespossibilitiesthatareneveractualizedinre.115To saythat“allanimalsarehumans”isacontingentpropositionbecausewecanimaginea timeinwhichthereisnoanimalbutman,inspiteofthefactthatsuchatimeprobably neverexistedinre.116Thecontingencyofthepropositionisnotverifiedbythefutureor pastexistenceofacertainstateofaffairsinrebutratherthroughamentalprocess, Page 21 of 36 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). 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Subscriber: University of Chicago; date: 13 March 2014 The Seventeenth Discussion of The Incoherence of the Philosophers namely,whethersuchastatecanbeimaginedtoexistwithoutcontradictions.117The phrase,“allwhitethings,”mayhavetwodifferentmeaningsaccordingtothecontextin whichitisuttered.Itmayrefertoallbeingsthatarewhiteattheparticulartimewhenthe statementismadeortothosepossiblebeingsthatarealwaysdescribedasbeingwhite everytimetheyappearinthemind(ʿindal-ʿaql).118 Inprinciple,AvicennadoesnotpartwiththeAristotelianstatisticalunderstandingofthe modalities.Inordertobepossible,somethingmustexistforatleastonemomentinthe pastorfuture.Mentalexistence(al-wujūdfī-l-dhihn),however,isoneofthetwomodesof existenceinAvicenna’sontology.Whethersomethingexistsinourmindsdependsupon whetheritisthesubjectofapredication.Thereisnoontologicaldifferencebetween whetherathingexistsinrealityormerelyinthehumanmind.119 Avicenna’sunderstandingofexistenceissignificantlydifferentfromthatofhis predecessors.Al-Fārābī,forinstance,followedAristotleandtaughtthatpredicationitself includesnostatementofexistence.Whenonestatesthat“Socratesisjust,”itneednot followthatSocratesisexistent.Avicennadisagreedbecausethenonexistentcannotbe thesubjectofapredication;anypredicationgivesmentalexistencetoSocrates.120 Allowingtwomodesofexistenceandacceptingmentalexistenceasequaltoexistencein releadsAvicennatodevelopanunderstandingofpossibilityasthatwhichisactually conceivedinthemind(maʿqūlbi-l-fiʿl).121 Anypossiblesubjectofatruepredicationisa possiblebeing.ThisdovetailswithAvicenna’sviewthatwhatispossiblebyitself(mumkin bi-dhātihi)isdeterminedonthelevelofthequiddities(māhiyyāt).Thequiddities(p.169) havethreemodes:inthemselves,inindividuals(fīaʿyānal-ashyāʾ),andassingular objectsofthought(fīl-taṣawwur).122Inthemselves,thequidditiesareinastatepriorto existenceandarepurepossibilitybythemselves;themomentaquiddityisconceivedin thehumanmind,itisgivenexistence.Whenthemindproceedstoanotherthought,the thingjustponderedorimaginedfallsfromexistence.Thisexamplehighlightsthatfor Avicenna,theconceptsofpossibilityandexistencearecloselyconnected.Possibilityis whatcanbeexistentatanymomentinourmind,andexistenceisactualizedpossibility eitherinreorinthemind.Themodalitiescan,therefore,alsobeexpressedassimple modesofexistence:necessaryiswhatcannotbutexist;possible(orrather:contingent)is whatcanexistbutmustnotexist;impossibleiswhatcannotexist.Ineachofthethree modes,existenceisunderstoodasbeingeitherinreorinthemind,althoughinmost contextsitisboth.ForAvicenna,thedivisionbetweennecessaryandcontingentisoneof theprimedivisionsofbeingthatisknownasapriori.123Althoughstrictlyspeaking,thisis stillatemporalunderstandingofthemodalities,itputsthemodalitiesontheplaneof mentalconceivability.Forallpracticalmatters,themodalitiesarenotconnectedto existenceintimebuttoexistenceinthemind(fīl-dhihn).124 Avicennatookanimportantsteptowardunderstandingpossibilityasasynchronic alternativestateofaffairs.Hehimselfneverachievedsuchanunderstanding,however, becauseinhisontology,therecanbenoalternativestowhatactuallyexists.Wehave alreadysaidthatAvicenna’smetaphysicswasnecessitarian,meaningthatwhateverexists eitherintheoutsideworldorinthehumanmindisthenecessaryresultofGod’s Page 22 of 36 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: University of Chicago; date: 13 March 2014 The Seventeenth Discussion of The Incoherence of the Philosophers essence.125InchapternineofDeinterpretatione,Aristotlehadalreadyarguedthatwhat presentlyexistscanbedefinedasnecessary:whatis,isbynecessity.Avicennaapplies thedistinction—knowntousfromal-Fārābī’scommentaryonthissectionofDe interpretatione—betweenthemodalstatusabeinghasbyitselfanditsmodalstatusas coexistingwithotherthings.Byitself,thereisonlyonebeingthatisnecessarybyvirtue ofitself(wājibal-wujūdbi-dhātihi),andthatisGod.Thisbeingcannotbutexist. Consideredbythemselves,allotherbeingsaremerelypossible(mumkinal-wujūdbidhātihi);God’screativeactivity,however,makestheexistenceofthesebeings necessary.Onceathingthatisonlypossiblebyvirtueofitselfcomesintobeing,itis necessarybyvirtueofsomethingelse(wājibal-wujūdbi-ghayrihi).Itis,firstofall,the necessaryeffectofitsproximateefficientcause.Thatcause,however,isitselfthe necessaryeffectofotherefficientcauses,whichproceedinachainofsecondaryefficient causesfromGod.Everythingthatwewitnessincreationispossiblebyvirtueofitselfand necessarybyvirtueofsomethingelse,ultimatelynecessitatedbyGod.126 IntheWesternphilosophicaltradition,inwhichAvicennabecameaninfluentialcontributor afterthetranslationofhisworksintoLatinduringthethirteenthcentury,theintroduction ofthesynchronicconceptionofmodalityiscreditedtoJohnDunsScotus(d.1308).An avidreaderofAvicenna,DunsScotusclaimedthatthedomainofthepossibleisana prioriareaofwhatisintelligibleandassuchdoesnothaveanykindofexistenceinthe outsideworld.AmonghissuccessorsinLatinphilosophy,thisledtoaviewinwhich modality(p.170) lacksanessentialconnectionwithtime.Thisdisconnectallowedfor alternativepossibilitiesatanygiventime,aswellasthedevelopmentofanotionof possiblewords,someofthemnotactualized. JohnDunsScotus,however,wasnot“thefirstever”toemployasynchronicconception ofmodality,assomeWesternhistoriansofphilosophyassume.127Suchaviewhad alreadybeendevelopedinAshʿaritekalām.ThenotionofGodasaparticularizingagent (mukhaṣiṣ),whodetermines,forinstance,whenthethingscomeintoexistence,isanidea thatappearsinthewritingsofal-BāqillānīandofotherAshʿariteauthors.128Theideaof particularization(takhṣīṣ)implicitlyincludesanunderstandingofpossibleworldsthatare differentfromours.Theprocessofparticularizationactualizesagivenoneofseveral alternatives.Yetthealternativestothisworld—whichwouldbe:“Xcomesintoexistence atatimedifferentfromwhenXactuallycomesintoexistence”—arenotexplicitly expressedorevenimagined.Thekalāmconceptofpreponderance(tarjīḤ),however, explicitlydiscussestheassumptionofpossibleworlds.Thepreponderatordistinguishes theactualstateofbeingfromitspossiblealternativestateofnonbeing.Whereasitis equallypossibleforagivenfuturecontingencytoeitherexistornotexist,eachtimea futurecontingencybecomesactual,thepreponderatordecidesbetweenanactualworld andanalternativeworldinwhichthatparticularcontingencyisnonexistent.Inkalām,the ideaofpreponderance(tarjīḤ)alreadyappearsintheworkoftheMuʿtaziliteAbūlḤusaynal-Baṣrīinthecontextofhumanactions.129Abūl-Ḥusaynwasayounger contemporaryofAvicenna,andhehadreceivedaphilosophicaleducation.Healso developedaparticularizationargumentfortheexistenceofGod.130Basedonthese developmentswithinkalām,al-JuwaynīwasthefirstAshʿaritewhodevelopedastringent Page 23 of 36 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: University of Chicago; date: 13 March 2014 The Seventeenth Discussion of The Incoherence of the Philosophers argumentforGod’sexistencebasedontheprincipleofparticularization.131 Inhis BalancedBookintheLetterforJerusalem,andinhisScandalsoftheEsoterics,alGhazālīreproducesversionsofthisproof.Al-Ghazālī’sversionscontainstrongovertones ofAvicenna’sontology:becauseeverythingintheworldcanbeperceivedasnonexisting, itsnonexistenceisbyitselfequallypossibleasitsexistence.Existingthingsnecessarily needsomethingthat“tipsthescales”(yurajjiḥu)orpreponderatesbetweenthetwo equallypossiblealternativesofbeingandnonbeing.Godisthis“preponderator” (murajjih.),whointhissensedeterminestheexistenceofeverythingthatexistsinthe world.132 Avicenna’sviewofmodalitiesdoesnotbreakwithAristotle’sstatisticalmodel,yethe postulatespossibilityasmentalconceivability,thustakingasteptowardanunderstanding ofpossibilityasasynchronicalternativestateofaffairs.Weseeoneelementofsucha synchronicalternativeinAvicenna’sdescribingGodasthe“preponderator”(murajjih.) betweentheexistenceofathinganditsalternativeofnonexistence.Avicenna’sontology ofquiddities,whereinexistencedependsonaseparateactofcoming-to-be,fostersthe ideaofGodasapreponderatorbetweenbeingandnonbeing.InAvicenna’smajorwork, TheHealing,however,theword“preponderance”(tarjīḤ)anditsderivatesdonot appearthatoften.ItismuchmoreprominentinoneofAvicenna’searlytreatiseson divineattributes.Thissmallwork,ThronePhilosophy(al-Ḥikmaal-ʿarshiyya),madea significantimpressiononal-Ghazālī.WhenhereportsAvicenna’s(p.171) teachingson thissubject,forinstance,hestressestheideaofpreponderanceandfollowsAvicenna’s languagefromhisThronePhilosophymorethanthelanguageofTheHealing.133 EventhoughtheAshʿaritesreadilyembracedtheconceptofpreponderance,they rejectedAvicenna’sunderstandingofthemodalities.Foral-Ghazālī,Avicenna’slackof distinctionbetweenexistenceinmind(fīl-dhihn)andexistenceintheoutsideworld(fīlaʿyān)removesanimportantdifference:whetherpossibilityandnecessityexistinthings outsideofourmind,orwhethertheyaresimplypredicatesofourjudgment.Al-Ghazālī’s critiqueofAvicenna’sunderstandingofthemodalitieswasanticipatedbyal-Juwaynī’s notionofnecessityandpossibilityinhisproofofGod’sexistenceintheCreedforNiẓām al-Mulk.Al-Juwaynībeginshisargumenttherewithanexplanationofthemodalities.Every soundthinkingpersonfindswithinhimself“theknowledgeaboutthepossibilityofwhatis possible,thenecessityofwhatisnecessary,andtheimpossibilityofwhatis impossible.” 134Weknowthisdistinctionwithouthavingtostudyormakefurtherinquiry intotheworld;itisanimpulse(badīha)ofourrationaljudgment(ʿaql). Theimpulsivepossibilitythattheintellectrushestoapprehendwithout[any] consideration,thinking,orinquiryiswhatbecomesevidenttotheintelligentperson whenheseesabuilding.This[scil.thebuilding]is[simply]apossibilitythatcomes intobeing(minjawāzḥudūthihi).Heknowsdecisivelyandoffhandthattheactual state(ḥudūth)ofthatbuildingisfromamongitspossiblestates(jāʾizāt)andthatit isnotimpossibleintheintellectthatithadnotbeenbuilt.135 Theintelligentperson(al-ʿāqil,heremeaningapersonwithfullrationalcapacity)realizes Page 24 of 36 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: University of Chicago; date: 13 March 2014 The Seventeenth Discussion of The Incoherence of the Philosophers thatallofthefeaturesofthebuilding—itsheight,itslength,itsform,andsoforth—are actualizedpossibilitiesthatcouldbedifferentfromwhattheyare.Thesamepossibilities applytothetimewhenthebuildingisbuilt.Weimmediatelyrealize,al-Juwaynīsays,that thereisasynchronicalternativestatetotheactualbuilding.Thisiswhatwecall, contingency(imkān).Realizingthatthereissuchanalternativeisanimportantpartofour understanding:“Theintelligentpersoncannotrealizeinhismindanythingaboutthe statesofthebuildingotherthanthroughacomparisonwithwhatiscontingentlikeit (imkānmithlihi)orwhatisdifferentfromit(khilāfihi).” 136 Knowledgeaboutthemodalitiesis“onanimpulsiverank”(bi-l-martabaal-badīha), meaningitisapriori:itcannotbederivedfromanyotherpriorknowledge.137This statementislimitedtothemodalitieswhentheyareconsideredbythemselves.AlJuwaynīrealizesthatGod’screativeactivitymakesalltheunrealizedpossibilities impossible.Ifconsidererdonitsown,theactualmovementofthecelestialspheres(aflāk) fromeasttowestcouldbeimagineddifferently.Theintellectcanimaginethatthespheres couldmoveintheoppositedirection.Studyingthemovementsinheaven,however,leads totherealizationthatthispossibilityisnotactualized. Al-Juwaynīunderstandspossibilityassynchronicalternativestatestowhatactuallyexists. ThisisdifferentfromAvicenna’sunderstandingofpossibility(p.172) andnecessityas modesofactualizedbeings.Italsoshiftstheperspectiveofthemodalitiesawayfromwhat existsinactualitytowardwhatisconsideredalternativestatesinthehumanmind.AlGhazālī’scritiqueofAvicenna’smodaltheoryisinnowayhaphazardbutisanoutcomeof long-standingconsiderationofmodalitiesdevelopedinAshʿaritekalām.138 WhatDoesal-GhazālīMeanWhenHeClaimsThatCausalConnectionsAreNot Necessary? OnceAvicenna’sandal-Ghazālī’sdifferingunderstandingsofthemodalitiesareappliedto theinitialstatementoftheseventeenthdiscussion,theychangetheestablishedmeaning ofthispassage.Whenal-Ghazālīsaysthat“accordingtous(ʿindanā),”theconnection betweenanygivenefficientcauseanditseffectisnotnecessary,139heaimstopointout thattheconnectioncouldbedifferent,evenifitneverwillbedifferentfromwhatitis today.ForAvicenna,thefactthattheconnectionneverwasdifferentandneverwillbe differentimpliesthattheconnectionisnecessary.Notsoforal-Ghazālī.His understandingofmodaljudgmentsdoesnotrequirethatanygivencausalconnection wasdifferentorwillbedifferentinordertobeconsideredpossibleandnotnecessary. Thepossibleisthatforwhichthehumanmindcanperceiveanalternativestateofaffairs. Foral-Ghazālī,theconnectionbetweenacauseanditseffectispossible—or,tobemore precise:contingent(mumkin)—becauseanalternativetoitisconceivableinourminds. Wecanimagineaworldinwhichfiredoesnotcausecottontocombust.Or,toquotethe secondsentenceoftheinitialstatementoftheseventeenthdiscussion: Itiswithindivinepowertocreatesatietywithouteating,tocreatedeathwithouta deepcut(ḥazz)intheneck,tocontinuelifeafterhavingreceivedadeepcutinthe neck,andsoontoallconnectedthings.Thefalāsifadenythepossibilityof[this]and claimittobeimpossible.140 Page 25 of 36 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: University of Chicago; date: 13 March 2014 The Seventeenth Discussion of The Incoherence of the Philosophers Ofcourse,aworldinwhichfiredoesnotcausecombustionincottonwouldberadically differentfromtheoneinwhichwelive.Achangeinasinglecausalconnectionwouldlikely implythatmanyotherswouldalsochange.Still,suchaworldcanbeconceivedinour minds,whichmeansitisapossibleworld.God,however,didnotchoosetocreatesuch analternativepossibleworld.Hechosetocreatethisworldamongalternatives. Intheinitialsentenceoftheseventeenthdiscussion,al-Ghazālīarguesagainsttwotypes ofadversaries.First,hearguesagainstthosewhoholdthatacausalconnectionis necessarybyitself.Thisgroupincludespeoplewhoclaimthatanygivenproximate efficientcauseisanindependentefficientcause(fāʿil)ofitseffect.Thisgroupalsoincludes somenaturalphilosopherswhorejectsecondarycausalityaswellastheMuʿtazilites,who arguethathumanscreatetheiractionsandtheimmediateeffectsofthem.Al-Ghazālī, however,makesaclear(p.173) distinctionbetweentheteachingsoftheMuʿtaziliteand thoseoftheAvicennanfalāsifa.141 TheAvicennanfalāsifaarethesecondgroupof adversariesintheseventeenthdiscussion.Althoughal-Ghazālīdoesnotargueagainstthe ideaofsecondarycausalityinAvicenna,hedoesrejectAvicenna’steachingthatthe connectioncannotbeanydifferentfromwhatitis.Beingcontingentbyitself,accordingto Avicenna,theconnectionbetweencauseandeffectisnecessaryonaccountofsomething else,namely,God’snature.God’snaturecannotbeconceivedanydifferentlyfromwhatit is.ForAvicenna,therecanbenoworldalternativetotheonethatexists. Intheinitialstatementoftheseventeenthdiscussion,al-Ghazālīalsoclaimsthat“the connection[betweencauseandeffect]isduetothepriordecision(taqdīr)ofGod.” 142 WhenheobjectstoAvicennaandstatesthattheseconnectionsarenotnecessary,alGhazālīwishestoexpressthatGodcouldhavechosentocreateanalternativeworldin whichthecausalconnectionsaredifferentfromthoseofthisworld.Al-Ghazālīupholds thecontingencyoftheworldagainstthenecessitarianismofAvicenna.Foral-Ghazālī,this worldisthecontingenteffectofGod’sfreewillandHisdeliberatechoicebetween alternativeworlds. WhilerejectingthisnecessitarianelementinAvicenna’scosmology,al-Ghazālīdoesnot objecttothephilosopher’sconceptofsecondarycausality.OfthetwopillarsinAvicenna’s cosmology—secondarycausalityandnecessitarianism—al-Ghazālīrejectsonlythelatter. IntheFirstPositionoftheseventeenthdiscussion,al-Ghazālīusessecondarycausalityto refutetheviewthatproximatecausesareindependentefficientcauses.IntheSecond Position,heofferstwoalternativeexplanations(“approaches”)ofpropheticalmiracles,the firstbasedonoccasionalism,thesecond,onsecondarycausalityandtheexistenceof natures(ṭabāʾiʿ).Inallthisdiscussion,al-GhazālīsaysnothingaboutwhetherGodactually breakshishabit,meaningtheexistentlawsofnature,whencreatingtheprophetical miracle.Foral-Ghazālī,theconnectionbetweenthecauseanditseffectiscontingent evenifGodneverchangesHishabits.ThesolepossibilityofHisbreakingHishabit—that wecouldconceiveofGodbreakingHishabit—orjustthepossibilitythatHecouldhave arrangedthelawsofnaturedifferentlymeansthatanyindividualconnectionbetweentwo ofHiscreationsisnotnecessary.Althoughitisconceivableandthereforepossiblethat Godwouldbreakhishabitorinterveneintheassignedfunctionofthesecondarycauses, Page 26 of 36 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: University of Chicago; date: 13 March 2014 The Seventeenth Discussion of The Incoherence of the Philosophers anactualbreakinGod’shabitisnotrequiredfortheconnectionstobecontingent. (p.174) Notes: (1).Emphasisintheoriginal.Dictionairedessciencesphilosophique,2:507–8.This passagewaslaterincorporatedinMunk,Mélangesdephilosophiejuiveetarabe,377–78. (2).Marmura,“Ghazali’sAttitudetotheSecularSciences,”109.Forsimilarviewsin recentpublications,see,forinstance,Moosa,Ghazālī&thePoeticsofImagination,184; orRayan,“Al-Ghazali’sUseoftheTerms‘Necessity’and‘Habit.’” (3).ThisisthepropheticmiraclethatMosesperformedinfrontofPharao;cf.Qurʾan 7.107,20.69,26.32,and45. (4).PerformedbyJesus,seeQ3:49and5:111. (5).Al-Ghazālī,Tahāfutal-falāsifa,272.1–5/163.18–21;275.10–11/165.17–18. (6).ThefocusonmodalitiesispromptedbyAvicenna’swork,yetitalsohasa predecessorinal-Juwaynī’sal-ʿAqīdaal-Niẓāmiyya,14–29,withitsthreechapters,“On WhatIsImpossibleforGod”(Kalāmfī-māyastaḥīluʿalāLlāh),“OnWhatIsNecessary forGod”(Kalāmfī-māyajibuli-Llāh),and“OnWhatIsPossibleforGodtoDecide” (Kalāmfī-māyajūzuminaḥkāmAllāh). (7).Al-Ghazālī,Tahāfutal-falāsifa,274.3–275.11/164.20–165.18.Kogan,“The Philosophersal-GhazālīandAverroesonNecessaryConnection,”116–20. (8).Al-Ghazālī,Tahāfut,275–76/165–66.Kogan,“ThePhilosophersal-Ghazālīand Averroes,”121–22. (9).Theoriginaltextexpressesthesetworelationsinmanymorewords;cf.Marmura’s translationonp.166,andhiscommentsin“Al-GhazalionBodilyResurrectionand Causality,”60. (10).Al-Ghazālī,Tahāfut,277.2–278.2/166.1–10. (11).Ibid.,270.10–11/163.15–16. (12).Lizzini,“Occasionalismoecausalitàfilosofica,”182. (13).Perler/Rudolph,Occasionalismus,75–77. (14).Ibid.,85–86,98,referringtoal-Ghazālī,Tahāfut,283.9–285.6/169.19–170.15and 292.14–293.4/174.120–175.3. (15).ContributionsthatarebasedonIbnRushd’sresponsetoal-GhazālīinhisTahāfut al-tahāfut,517–542,andSimonvandenBergh’sEnglishtranslationthereof,oftentake littlenoticeofal-Ghazālī’sinitialthreefolddivisionofhisobjections. Page 27 of 36 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: University of Chicago; date: 13 March 2014 The Seventeenth Discussion of The Incoherence of the Philosophers (16).TheThirdPosition(maqām)isannouncedonp.278.9/167.3butnotintroducedas such.Itstartswiththeobjectiononp.292.2/174.9.Ahelpfulanalysisofthewinding courseoftheargumentsandthe“positions”and“approaches”isgivenbyRudolphin Perler/Rudolph,Occasionalismus,77–105. (17).Itiscertainlywrongtoassume,asAlon,“Al-GhazālīonCausality,”399,does,that thetextisdividedintotwo“philosophicalapproaches(…)calledmaqām,whilethe religiousonesarecalledmaslak.” (18).Al-Ghazālī,Tahāfut,290.1–7/173.6–10;Goodman,“Didal-GhazâlîDenyCausality,” 108. (19).annafāʿilal-ikhtirāqihuwal-nārufaqaṭ;al-Ghazālī,Tahāfut,278.10/167.4. (20).Al-Ghazālī,al-Munqidh,19.4–7;Tahāfut,206.5–207.5/123.3–12. (21).Ibid.,377.1–2/226.13.OntheMuʿtazilteteachingonthegeneration(tawalludor tawlīd)ofhumanactionsandtheireffects,seevanEss,TheologieundGesellschaft, 3:115–21,4:486–88;andGimaret,Theoriesdel’actehumain,25–47.Schöck,“Möglichkeit undWirklichkeitmenschlichemHandels,”109–16,discussesinwhatwaythetheoryof tawalludisbasedontheassumptionthatnatures(ṭabāʾiʿ)exist. (22).Al-Ghazālī,Tahāfut,278.13–279.2/167.6–8. (23).Ibid.,279.5–11/167.12–18. (24).al-aʿrāḍuwa-l-ḥawādithuallatītaḥiṣaluʿindawuqūʿi(…)l-ajsām(…)tufīḍuminʿinda wāhibil-ṣuwar;ibid.,281.3/178.11–13.IfthisisintendedasaparaphraseofAvicenna’s position,itisnotexactlycorrect.SeeMarmura’scommentinthenotestohistranslation onp.242. (25).Al-Bāqillānī,al-Tamhīd,43.4–9;EnglishtranslationinMarmura,“TheMetaphysicsof EfficientCausality,”184–85;seealsoidem,“AvicennaonCausalPriority,”68;andSaliba, “TheAshʿaritesandtheScienceoftheStars,”82. (26).Al-Ghazālī,Tahāfut,279.3–4/167.10–13. (27).Ibid.,280.1–2/167.19. (28).Ibid.279.2/167.8–9. (29).IbnSīnā,al-Najāt,211.21–22/519.7–8:“Thatfromwhichathinghasitsbeing— withoutbeingforthatpurpose—isthefāʿil.”Cf.idem,al-Shifāʾ,al-Ilāhiyyāt,194.9.See alsoGoichon,Lexiquedelalanguephilosophiqued’IbnSīnā,238,278–79. (30).Al-Ghazālī,Tahāfut,96.11–12/56.1–2.Druart,“Al-Ghazālī’sConceptionofthe Agent,”429–32. Page 28 of 36 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: University of Chicago; date: 13 March 2014 The Seventeenth Discussion of The Incoherence of the Philosophers (31).Amongotherthings,thissentencepromptedMcGinnis,“Occasionalism,Natural CausationandScience,”449,toarguethatal-Ghazālīrequiresadivine,oratleastangelic, volitionalacttoactivatepassivedispositionsinthings.Onlythisactivationallowsthe connectionbetweencauseandeffecttomaterialize.Nosuchactis,however,required. (32).Al-Ghazālī,Tahāfut,281.11/167.20. (33).Ibid.,283.4–8/169.14–17. (34).Ibid.,283.9–284.6/169.19–170.3. (35).Ibid.,283.9/169.21. (36).Ibid.,285.12–13/170.21–22. (37).Ibid.,286.1–3/171.1–2,discussestheexamplehowaprophetknows,through meansofdivinity,thatapersoninthefuturewillarrivefromatrip.Al-Ghazālī’sal-Iqtiṣād, 83–86(EnglishtranslationinMarmura,“Ghazali’sChapteronDivinePower,”299–302), discussestheexampleofZaydarrivingtomorrowandaskswhetherfuturecontingencies thatarenotcontainedinGod’spre-knowledgearepossibleforGodtocreate.Fora discussionofthispassageanditsFarabianbackground,seepp.139–40and218–19. (38).Courtenay,“TheCritiqueonNaturalCausality,”81.Onthedistinctionbetween God’sabsoluteandordainedpower,whichdevelopedinthirteenth-centuryLatin philosophy,seeKnuuttila,ModalitiesinMedievalPhilosophy,100. (39).Marmura,“Ghazali’sAttitudetotheSecularSciences,”106,108. (40).Al-Ghazālī,Tahāfut,285.7–12/170.17–22. (41).Marmura,“GhazaliandDemonstrativeScience,”202–4;Perler/Rudolph, Occasionalismus,86–88;seealsoMarmura,“Al-Ghazālī’sSecondCausalTheory,”91, 105–6;andIbnRushd,Tahāfutal-tahāfut,531.9–12.MarmuraandRudolphpointout thatthisisnothingnewintheAshʿaritetradition.Alreadyal-AshʿarīassumedthatGod createsthehumanperception(idrāk;seeIbnFūraq,Mujarradmaqālātal-Ashʿarī,263.7– 8)andthatourperceptioncorrespondstotheworld(ibid.263.5–6). (42).Al-Ghazālī,Tahāfut,286.10–11/171.10–11. (43).Ibid.,286.6–7/171.7–8. (44).Ibid.,286.12/171.12. (45).Marmura,“Al-Ghazālī’sSecondCausalTheory,”92–95. (46).Al-Ghazālī,Tahāfut,286.12–288.10/171.12–172.10;Kukkonen,“PossibleWorlds,” 497–98. Page 29 of 36 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: University of Chicago; date: 13 March 2014 The Seventeenth Discussion of The Incoherence of the Philosophers (47).Al-Ghazālī,Tahāfut,291.5–6/171–72. (48).Ibid.,270.10–11/163.15–16. (49).Ibid.,288.1–3/172.2–4. (50).Ibid.,291–92/174.7–8. (51).Ibid.,292.2–296.6/171.12–177.5.Unliketheearliertwo,thebeginningoftheThird Positionisnotannouncedinal-Ghazālī’stext. (52).Al-Ghazālī,Tahāfut,292.2–5/174.10–13. (53).Ibid.277.3–4/166.2–3;Perler/Rudolph,Occasionalismus,98. (54).Al-Ghazālī,Tahāfut,293.5–7/175.5–7;Perler/Rudolph,Occasionalismus,99. Rudolph’sinterpretationthatthethirdmaqāmconcernswhatispossibleforGodto createintheoutsideworldis,forinstance,sharedbyMarmura,“Al-Ghazālī’sSecond CausalTheory,”103–6;andGoodman,“Didal-GhazālīDenyCausality?” (55).Al-Ghazālī,Tahāfut,293.8–294.4/175.8–19.Thatwill(irāda)requiresknowledge (ʿulūm)isanolderAshʿaritetenet;seeal-Juwaynī,al-Irshād,96.12. (56).Goodman,Avicenna,186–87. (57).Goodman,“Didal-GhazâlîDenyCausality,”118. (58).Al-Ghazālī,Tahāfut,294.4–295.1/175.20–176.10. (59).Ibid.,295.1–2/176.11–12. (60).Frank,“TheAšʿariteOntology:I.PrimaryEntities,”206–8. (61).Goodman,“Didal-GhazâlîDenyCausality,”105–7,doesnotmakeadistinction betweenthesecondmaslakofthesecondmaqāmandthethirdmaqām.Hearguesthat whatal-Ghazālīputforwardinthesetwopartsishisultimatepositionontheissueof causalityandthatherejectedallothers,particularlytheoccasionalistapproachofthefirst approachinthesecondmaqām. (62).Perler/Rudolph,Occasionalismus,101–5.Rudolph(inibid.,101–2)pointstoprior discussionswithinkalāmliteratureaboutthelimitsofGod’somnipotence. (63).Obermann,“DasProblemderKausalitätbeidenArabern,”332–39,andhislater, moredetailedmonograph,DerphilosophischeundreligiöseSubjektivismus,68–85. (64).TomyknowledgethereisnoEnglish-languagepresentationofObermann’s researchdespitethefactthathetaughtintheU.S.(inNewYorkandatYale)betweenthe timeofhismigrationin1923andhisdeathin1956. Page 30 of 36 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: University of Chicago; date: 13 March 2014 The Seventeenth Discussion of The Incoherence of the Philosophers (65).Obermann,DerphilosophischeundreligiöseSubjektivismus,73,quotingal-Ghazālī, Tahāfut,37.9–38.2/22.1–9.Onthisexample,seealsoMarmura,“Ghazaliand DemonstrativeScience,”187. (66).Obermann,DerphilosophischeundreligiöseSubjektivismus,73–74;seeal-Ghazālī, Tahāfut,38–39/22–23. (67).Obermann,DerphilosophischeundreligiöseSubjektivismus,81,quotingalGhazālī,Tahāfut,285.11–12/170.20–22. (68).Intheearlydecadesofthetwentiethcentury,subjectivismwasharshlycriticized byphilosopherssuchasRudolphCarnapandtheViennaCircle.Carnapwantedto establishapuristempiricism,whichacknowledgesthattruthandknowledgeare guaranteedthroughempiricalexperienceoftheworldandthroughlogicaldeduction. OtherinfluentialthinkersofthistimesuchasFranzBrentanoandEdmundHusserl equallybemoanedthe“subjectivism”and“anthropologism”ofthistime. (69).Schaeler,inhisreviewofObermann’sbookinDerIslam13(1923):121–32, especially130. (70).Obermann,“DasProblemderKausalitätbeidenArabern,”339;Subjektivismus, 85. (71).Obermann,DerphilosophischeundreligiöseSubjektivismus,83–84. (72).Al-Ghazālī,Tahāfut,293.11–13/175.11–13. (73).Obermann,DerphilosophischeundreligiöseSubjektivismus,82–83. (74).Ibid.,83,quotingal-Ghazālī,Tahāfut,294.1–4/175.16–18. (75).Al-Ghazālī,Tahāfut,293.13–14/175.14–15. (76).Ibid.,292.2–5/174.10–12. (77).Thisiswhatwemeanwhenwesaysomethingiscontingent:thatitispossiblebut notnecessary. (78).Al-Ghazālī,Tahāfut,293.5–6/175.5. (79).Ibid.,293.5–7/175.5–7.Cf.alsoal-Ghazālī’searlierdefinitionofimpossibilityas “conjoiningnegationandaffirmation”(al-mumtaniʿuhuwal-jamʿubaynal-nafīwa-l-ithbāt); ibid.64.11/38.17. (80).Bäck,“Avicenna’sConceptionoftheModalities,”217–18,229–31. (81).Aristotle,Deanima,431a.1–2. Page 31 of 36 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: University of Chicago; date: 13 March 2014 The Seventeenth Discussion of The Incoherence of the Philosophers (82).Knuuttila,“Plentitude,ReasonandValue,”147.Cf.Hintikka,Time&Necessity,72– 80. (83).Al-Ghazālī,Tahāfut,296.4–6/177.4–5. (84).Kukkonen,“Plentitude,Possibility,andtheLimitsofReason,”555. (85).Al-Ghazālī,Tahāfut,66.8–67.8/39.13–40.5;seeKukkonen,“PossibleWorldsinthe Tahāfut,”481. (86).Al-Ghazālī,Tahāfut,80.9/47.14–15;103.6–8/60.4–7.Forthebackgroundtothis argument,seeDavidson,Proofs,87–88,352–53. (87).Al-Ghazālī,Tahāfut,67.9–10/40.7–8. (88).Aristotle’sSophisticielenchi,166a.22–30. (89).Al-Ghazālī,Tahāfut,66.8–67.8/39.15–40.5. (90).Al-Ghazālī,Tahāfut,70.10–71.1/42.2–5;Kukkonen,“PossibleWorldsinthe Tahāfut,”482. (91).Street,“Fahˇraddīnar-Rāzī’sCritique,”102–3. (92).Bäck,“Avicenna’sConceptionoftheModalities,”229–31;seealsoWisnovsky, Avicenna’sMetaphysics,248. (93).Al-Ghazālī,al-Maqṣad.31.15–32.3;Frank,Creation,13. (94).Kukkonen,“PossibleWorldsintheTahāfut”;Dutton,“Al-GhazālīonPossibility.” Dutton’sarticleappearstohavebeenwrittencontemporaneoustoKukkonen’sarticle. AlthoughhelistsKukkonen’sarticleinhisfootnotes,Duttondoesnotrefertoitsparallel content.Thefactthatal-GhazālīcriticizesIbnSīnā’sconceptofthemodalitieshadbeen pointedoutinearlierliteraturesuchasZedler,“AnotherLookatAvicenna,”517. (95).Al-Ghazālī,Tahāfut,69.5–7/41.6–7. (96).IbnSīnā,al-Najāt,220.2–5/536.4–6;idem,al-Shifāʾ,al-Ilāhiyyāt,137.8–9;cf. Aristotle,Metaphysics,1032a.20. (97).Al-Ghazālī,Tahāfut,70.10–71.1/42.2–5.SeeKukkonen,“PossibleWorldsinthe Tahāfut,”488;Dutton,“Al-GhazālīonPossibility,”27. (98).Al-Ghazālī,Tahāfut,343.4–13/207.5–14.SeeDavidson,Alfarabi,Avicenna,and Averroes,onIntellect,152–53. (99).Kukkonen,“PossibleWorldsintheTahāfut,”488–89;idem,“Plentitude,Possibility, andtheLimitsofReason,”543. Page 32 of 36 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: University of Chicago; date: 13 March 2014 The Seventeenth Discussion of The Incoherence of the Philosophers (100).Al-Ghazālī,Tahāfut,74.11–12/44.13–14. (101).Ibid.,74.6–75.10/44.8–45.3. (102).Dutton,“Al-GhazālīonPossibility,”27–29,40–5. (103).Gimaret,Ladoctrined’al-Ashʿarī,30. (104).McGinnis,“Occasionalism,NaturalCausationandScience,”445. (105).Frank,“TheNon-ExistentandthePossibleinClassicalAshʿariteTeaching,”1–4. (106).Knuuttila,“Plentitude,Reason,andValue,”145. (107).Hintikka,Time&Necessity,63–72,84–86,103–5,149–53;Knuuttila,Modalitiesin MedievalPhilosophy,1–38. (108).Knuuttila,“Plentitude,Reason,andValue,”145. (109).Street,“Fahˇraddīnal-Rāzī’sCritique,”104–5. (110).Whilepossibilityisdefinedastheoppositeofimpossibilityandmighttherefore includethenecessary,contingencyexcludesbothimpossibilityandnecessity. (111).Al-Fārābī,KitābBārīarmīniyāsayal-ʿIbāra,71.1–5;Englishtranslationin Zimmermann,Al-Farabi’sCommentary,247.Knuuttila,ModalitiesinMedieval Philosophy,114. (112).Bäck,“Avicenna’sConceptionoftheModalities,”231;Rescher,Temporal Modalities,8,37–38. (113).IbnSīnā,al-Shifāʾ,al-Ilāhiyyāt,148–49. (114).Bäck,“Avicenna’sConceptionoftheModalities,”232. (115).IbnSīnā,al-Shifāʾ,al-Manṭiq,al-Qiyās,21.6–12. (116).Ibid.,30.10–12. (117).Bäck,“Avicenna’sConceptionoftheModalities,”232–36. (118).IbnSīnā,al-Shifāʾ,al-Manṭiq,al-Qiyās,21.10–12. (119).Craemer-Ruegenberg,“Ensestquodprimumcaditinintellectu,”136;Rescher, “ConceptofExistenceinArabicLogic,”72–73.SeealsoBlack,“Avicennaonthe OntologicalandEpistemologicalStatusofFictionalBeings.” (120).Bäck,“AvicennaonExistence,”354,359–61.Ontheprinciplethatthenonexistent (al-maʿdūm)cannotbeanobjectofpredication,seeIbnSīnā,al-Shifāʾ,al-Ilāhiyyāt, Page 33 of 36 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: University of Chicago; date: 13 March 2014 The Seventeenth Discussion of The Incoherence of the Philosophers 25.14–16. (121).IbnSīnā,al-Shifāʾ,al-Manṭiq,al-Qiyās,21.9. (122).IbnSīnā,al-Shifāʿ,al-Manṭiq,al-Madkhal,15.1–15. (123).IbnSīnā,al-Shifāʾ,al-Ilāhiyyāt,22.11–13;27.18–29.10.Thesameinal-Fārābī, Sharḥal-Fārābīli-KitābArisṭutālīsfīl-ʿIbāra,84.3–5;EnglishtranslationinZimmermann, Al-Farabi’sCommentary,77–78. (124).Bäck,“Avicenna’sConceptionoftheModalities,”241. (125).Seeabovepp.141–43. (126).IbnSīnā,al-Shifāʾ,al-Ilāhiyyāt,29–34;idem,al-Najāt,224–28/546–53.Davidson, Proofs,290–93;idem,“Avicenna’sProofoftheExistenceofGodasaNecessarilyExistent Being”;Wisnovsky,“AvicennaandtheAvicennianTradition,”105–27;Hourani,“IbnSina onNecessaryandPossibleExistence.” (127).Normore,“DunsScotus’sModalTheory,”129.OnDunsScotus’smodaltheory, seealsoKnuuttila,ModalitiesinMedievalPhilosophy,138–49,155–57. (128).Al-Bāqillānī,al-Tamhīd,23.13–16;al-Baghdādī,Uṣulal-dīn,69.2–7;al-Juwaynī,alIrshād,28.3–8;idem,Lumaʾfīqawāʿid,129.3–6;idem,al-Shāmil(ed.Alexandria),262–65; Davidson,Proofs,159–61,176–80. (129).Abūl-Ḥusaynal-Baṣrītaughtthateachtimeahumanconsidersanact,heorsheis equallycapableofperformingandnotperformingit.Thehuman’smotiveisthe preponderator(murajjiḥ)betweenthesetwoequallypossiblealternatives.See Madelung,“LateMuʿtazilaandDeterminism,”249–50. (130).SeetheexcursusinIbnal-Malāḥimī’sKitābal-Muʿtamad,169.9–172.18,inwhich hereportsAbūl-Ḥusayn’sargumentinfavorofGod’sexistence.SeealsoMadelung, “Abūl-Ḥusaynal-Baṣrī’sProoffortheExistenceofGod,”279–80.Ontheparticularization argumentandonGodasthepreponderator(murajjiḥ),seeCraig,KalāmCosmological Argument,10–15;repeatedinidem,TheCosmologicalArgument,54–59;andDavidson, “ArgumentsfromtheConceptofParticularization.” (131).Al-Juwaynī,al-ʿAqīdaal-Niẓāmiyya,11.9–13.2.Seealsoidem,al-Shāmil(ed. Alexandria),263–65;andidem,Lumaʿfīqawāʿid,129–31.IbnRushd,al-Kashfʿan manāhij,144–47,analyzesal-Juwaynī’smurajjiḥargumentforGod’sexistenceandsaysit isbasedonsimilarpremisesasIbnSīnā’sproof.Onal-Juwaynī’sproofandhowitdiffers fromIbnSīnā’s,cf.Rudolph,“Lapreuvedel’existencededieu,”344–46.Seealso Davidson,Proofs,161–62,187;Saflo,Al-Juwaynī’sThought,202. (132).Al-Ghazālī,Iqtiṣād,25–26,Iḥyāʾ,1:144–45/183–84(=Tibawi,“Al-Ghazālī’s Sojourn,”80–81,98–99);idem,Faḍāʾiḥal-Bāṭiniyya,81–82;cf.Ibnal-Walīd,Dāmighal- Page 34 of 36 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: University of Chicago; date: 13 March 2014 The Seventeenth Discussion of The Incoherence of the Philosophers bāṭilwa-ḥatfal-munādil,1:284–86.Onthearguments,seealsotheliteraturementioned onp.313,n.140. (133).OnthevarioustitlesunderwhichIbnSīnā’sal-Ḥikmaal-ʿarshiyyawasknown,see Mahdavī,Fihrist-inuskhat-hā-yimuṣannafāt-iIbnSīnā,75–76(no.61).Ilargelyfollow Gutas,AvicennaandtheAristotelianTradition,withregardtothetitlesofworksbyIbn Sīnāandthetitles’Englishtranslations.PreponderanceappearsinIbnSīnā,al-Shifāʾ,alIlāhiyyāt,233.4,303.2,303.9–11,335–36.Al-Ghazālī,Tahāfut,23.3–4/13.9–10,reports thatthefalāsifasaywithoutapreponderator(murajjiḥ),therewouldbenoexistence.In theversionsoftheproofofGod’sexistenceinhisal-Shifāʾ,al-Ilāhiyyāt,31–32;andalNajāt,236–37/570–71;IbnSīnāusesthewordtakhṣīṣbutnottarjīḥormurajjiḥ.The sameargumentinal-Ḥikmaal-ʿarshiyya,2–3,however,mentionstarjīḥ.IbnRushd,alKashfʿanmanāhij,144–45,alsoreportsthisproofasinvolvingamurajjiḥ,notamukhaṣiṣ. (134).Al-Juwaynī,al-ʿAqīdaal-Niẓāmiyya,8.peanult.–9.1. (135).Ibid.,9.4–7. (136).Ibid.,9.9–10. (137).Ibid.,10.1–2. (138).Atthispoint,theroleoftheMuʿtaziliteAbūl-Ḥusaynal-Baṣrīandhisviewson tarjīḥareunclear.Hemayhavehadasignificantinfluenceonal-Juwaynī’sandonalGhazālī’sunderstandingofthemodalities.Soonafteral-Ghazālī,MaḥmūdibnMuḥammad al-Malāḥimī(d.536/1141)—oneofAbūl-Ḥusaynal-Baṣrī’sfollowerswholivedin Khwarezm—wrotearefutationoffalsafa.Thisbook,Tuḥfatal-mutakallimīnfī-l-raddʿalā l-falāsifa,iscurrentlybeingeditedbyWilferdMadelung. (139).Seethetranslationonp.149. (140).Al-Ghazālī,Tahāfut,278.2–5/167.10–12. (141).Basedonabriefnoteinal-Ghazālī’sfatwāattheendoftheTahāfut,377.2–3/ 226.12–3;Marmura,“Al-GhazalionBodilyResurrection,”48;and“Ghazali’sChapteron DivinePowerintheIqtiṣād,”280assumesthatforal-Ghazālī,thecausaltheoriesofthe Muʿtazilaandthefalāsifaareidentical.Intheseventeenthdiscussion,thesetwocausal theoriesareclearlydistinguishedandtreateddifferently. (142).Al-Ghazālī,Tahāfut,278.1/167.8–9. Page 35 of 36 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: University of Chicago; date: 13 March 2014 The Seventeenth Discussion of The Incoherence of the Philosophers Accessbroughttoyouby: UniversityofChicago Page 36 of 36 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: University of Chicago; date: 13 March 2014

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