LASALA FOUNDATION
What Does the El Aro Massacre of
1997 in Colombia tell us about the
State’s Use of Paramilitary
Organisations?
Oluwafemi Senua
a
Terrorism and Political Violence Analyst
To cite this article: Oluwafemi, S. (2013). What Does the El Aro
Massacre of 1997 in Colombia tell us about the State’s Use of
Paramilitary Organisations? London: LASALA Foundation.
To link to this article: http://www.lasalafoundation.org/our-articles.html
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2
What Does the El Aro Massacre of 1997 in Colombia tell us about the State’s Use
of Paramilitary Organisations?
By Oluwafemi Senu
The political mind-set of Colombians had shifted, with paramilitary organisations
such as the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC) forming in 1997, as a
result of the state’s failure to adequately provide for the needs of Colombian citizens.
Colombian paramilitary organisations consequently became engaged in state affairs
and merged itself within contemporary society. Paradoxically, the paramilitary
organisations that were meant to be opposed by the Colombian government were
rather used as a way to achieve state aims. Through the analysis of the El Aro
Massacre of 1997 and sub-cases within Colombia, this paper makes a link between
why the state uses violence against its citizens and the uses of AUC paramilitary units
for this purpose.
Methods
This paper uses an ‘organisational manifestation of corporate and governmental crime’
approach for its analysis (Kramer, 1982; Needleman & Needleman, 1979). An
Integration Theoretical Model of State corporate crime suggested by Kramer &
Michalowski (1990) is used while a hypothesis-generating case study is applied to
allow the formulation of a hypothesis which can be tested in a larger amount of cases
(Lijphart, 1971). The paper uses both primary and secondary data. Data was collected
from Human Rights reports, Amnesty International reports, online data sources, such
as the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), newspaper articles and court cases.
Historical Context
The conflict in Colombia started with the outbreak of what is known as: La Violencia
(the ten-year civil war between the Conservative and Liberal Party in Colombia,
spanning between 1948 and 1958). Prior to 1948, specifically, in 1920, there was a
disagreement about who owned the Sumapaz and Tequendama regions (Palacios,
1980). The liberal and conservative political wings became engaged in the conflict
and the struggle escalated around 1948 with the assassination of a famous political
leader: Jorge Eliecer-Gaitan (Leech, 2009). In the 1960s, the United States also
became involved in the conflict, providing support for military assaults against the
peasants who were living in the rural areas of Colombia (Wolf, 2002).
It was a struggle between the Colombian government and peasant guerrillas such as:
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and National Liberation Army
(ELN). The Liberal political wing and the socialist militants were also engaged but
amalgamated into FARC during the period (Murilo, 2004). FARC and other guerrilla
groups claimed they were fighting against injustice and stood for the people’s rights
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(Rebellion, 2008). The government claimed to be protecting the population against
violence. However, violence was also being committed against private citizens who
had no connection with the insurgency movements. The case of El Aro is an example.
The El Aro Case
The assault on El Aro occurred on October 25, 1997 when paramilitary troops
stormed the village. There were several shootings and explosions heard. People
witnessed a white helicopter firing continually, as it headed through Northern Cauca,
with the assaulters claiming: “we are the Auto Defensas Campesinas” (Peasant SelfDefense Units) (Inter-America Court of Human Rights, 2006:26). These people were
then taken to the park and were falsely accused of being guerrillas while the
inhabitants of El Aro were taken to the village square and forced to lay on the floor.
Several people were murdered (Inter-America Court of Human Rights, 2006).
Analysing the El Aro case, AUC origins were rooted in paramilitary armies around
the 1980s but the legal status of ‘paramilitary organisation’ was removed in 1989
(Amnesty International, 2004). Nevertheless, the AUC continued functioning within
the same framework and became much involved with drug dealings and much
connected with the army, landowners, and political rings.
The El Aro case proves that the authorities were reluctant to protect civilians. For
instance, the Mayor of Ituango and councilors were fully informed of the invasion
prior to its happening. Furthermore, the El Aro Action Committee sought protection
directly from the state Governor’s office, requesting the intervention of the Fourth
Brigade Army, of the Girardot Battalion and the Yarumal prosecutor’s office but were
told “no troops were available” and that the troops were being deployed elsewhere
(witnesses claimed that “it was members of the paramilitary groups with the Army
that attacked El Aro”) (Guillen & Reyes, 2008; Inter-America Court of Human Rights,
2006). This example confirms that the perpetrators of the invasion were well
organized.
Organizational Deviance Analysis
Using the El Aro case to understand criminal behavior, the rationale of Green and
Ward (2004:5) that “state crime is one category of organizational deviance, alongside
corporate crime and organised crime” is very important. It was claimed that the
Colombian Air Force and the US oil company, Occidental Petroleum Company (OPC)
engaged in the planning of bomb attacks. The Cano Limon Company was also used
for planning these attacks and US Air-scans coordinated and pinpointed its locations
(Amnesty International, 2004). The US provided resources and helped in planning
operations in Arauca. The US State Department also helped fund and equip armed
brigades in Arauca.
The OPC was alleged to have financed brigades and these brigades were jointly
accused with the paramilitary of human rights abuses in Santo Domingo. These
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bombings took place on civilians, with helicopters provided by the US, proving
similar to that of the El Aro Case (Amnesty International, 2004). Therefore, all this
evidence suggests, based on the rationale of Green and Ward, that the attacks which
took place on innocent private citizens was criminal behavior, including that of El Aro.
Comparable Cases
Under the leadership of President Uribe, in November 2002, the people of Saravena
and Arauca were surrounded. Prior to this, their social movements were restricted.
Over 600 soldiers encircled the town, invaded people’s homes and over 2,000 were
intimidated at gun point. They were then taken to the stadium, detained and
interviewed. Amongst the detainees, 85 were officially apprehended, among these, 35
were released and the remaining (50) were said to be trade unionists (Amnesty
International, 2004).
The following statistics obtained from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) also
display comparable cases.
Statistical Analysis: 1990 – 2011
Fig. 1
Fig. 2
There were 744 incidents recorded in the GTD on assaults committed in Colombia
(Fig.1) and 37 of these were committed by the AUC (Fig. 2).This data reflects
information obtained from the GTD database only. This amount does not account for
unreported incidents. The data consists of: all atrocities committed in Colombia
(Fig.1), and all those perpetrated by the AUC only (Fig.2). Between 1990 and 1997,
no incidents were recorded for the AUC (Fig.2) as “perpetrators” by the GTD. The
reason for this might be because the AUC was established in 1997. Between 1998 and
2003 huge fatalities were committed by the AUC but declined slightly after 2003 and
increased around 2009. The similarities with all these cases are that, the attacks are
directed against civilians, properties, unionists, children and peasants who are neither
guerrilla or have a connection with guerrilla movements.
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The attacks committed by the AUC prove that the Colombian government
intentionally used paramilitary units to protect their interests and that of their allies.
This is shown in the following discovery. Alvaro Uribe came to power in 2002 (BBC
News, 2012). Uribe proclaimed a state of internal commotion in August 2002. An
order was issued and two sites that needed a security intervention were noted. RCZs
(Rehabilitation and Consolidation Zones) were applied to pinpoint zones of troubles.
Arauca and Saravena were one of the areas mapped. Amnesty International (2004)
argue that despite the refusal of Colombia constitution to renew the RCZs, the
mechanisms embedded within the RCZs were being employed throughout Colombia,
causing huge unrest and human rights abuses.
Motivational Factors
Oil was discovered by the OPC in 1983 (in Arauca) and its extraction started in 1985.
However, the pipelines had been under numerous attacks by the guerrillas. 910
million barrels of oil were being produced, with Colombia assumed to be the biggest
net importer in the future (Amnesty International, 2004). Eco-petrol also owned 50%
of the contract while the OPC and Spanish oil company: Repsol –YPF owned the
other 50%. Amnesty International (2004) perceived that the inconsistent US
relationship with the Middle East and the location of the oil (bordered with
Venezuela), placed large pressure on the US and radical action was imminent in the
case of Colombian resources, thus the introduction of paramilitary units. This kind of
deviant behaviour, engaged by the state, and its allies, is also cited by the Pearce
model of corporation and capital gains, which is described as: mainly for profit, where
a suitable environment is needed and control mechanisms are applied to any social
impediments (1976).
Catalyst for action: Lifting off Social Impediments
The creation of an illegal means within a legal framework was a method adopted by
the Colombian Government but under the framework of ‘Plan Colombia’. The US
previously engaged in a war against both the FARC and ELN, using the avenue of
Plan Colombia, but the true meaning of what Plan Colombia is, is unclear. Numerous
atrocities were committed under the framework of Plan Colombia and several
evidences link the government, the elites and multinational parties (Amnesty
International, 2004).
Plan Colombia was designed to combat civil wars and illicit drug cultivations
including smuggling. Plan Colombia’s agenda was set up during President Andres
Pastrana’s administration and during the first meeting held in Colombia in 1999. The
US’ White House team, CIA and other supporters were present and some of the US’
policies such as: putting an end to threats posed by insurgency, the promotion of the
respect for human rights and socio-economic development were incorporated into the
plan. This behaviour is defined in Green and Ward (2004:28) by both Kramer and
Michalowski that: state crime is socially harmful and it is an interaction between,
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policies or practices for the attainment of goals, for either one or more institutions of
political government. Other goals include one or more institutions of economic
production and distribution (Matthews and Kauzlarich, 2000:282).
Controlling Social Movements
North-eastern Colombia is oil wealthy. However, the state failed to use its resources
to provide for Colombian citizens. Many players are engaged with oil resources,
including the guerrillas who engage in the extortion of oil and threaten to incapacitate
those engaged in oil exploitation (Amnesty International, 2004).
Similar patterns of peasant struggle and violence found between the 1920s and 1948
were also identified with the violence that occurred between 1990 and 2011.
Higginbottom argues that “the enclave economy of the 1920s became dominated by
Tropical oil and the United Fruit Company” but the methods used now, are that, “the
entire nation is dragged into an enclave, servicing an unholy alliance of new
latifundistas, finance capital and multinationals” (2005:124). Social movements then
increased, which gave rise to insurgency, activists and guerrillas.
The Colombian government lost control over its citizens, thus turning to violent
behaviour against its citizens through the use of AUC paramilitary units. The aim, of
course, was to protect economic, political and social interests, mainly against left
wing insurgents around Colombia. The legal status adopted with the formation of
paramilitary organizations was stripped based on the many atrocities committed.
Meanwhile, the government has denied collaborating with the bad apples who
committed these atrocities (BBC News, 2007) regardless of the constant connections
between the government, paramilitary units and the Colombian armed forces. This
clearly shows the denial of responsibility as proclaimed by Cohen “I did not hurt
anyone”, or when the state buries their head pretending that nothing occurred
(2001:60).
Conclusion
The factors identified in this paper affirm that the Colombian government uses
paramilitary organizations for economic, social and political interests. They then
cover up the atrocities committed in exchange for elite, multinational and corporate
capital interests. Those who witnessed these atrocities became indirect victims as a
result.
After the Colombian government, witnessed the distress that paramilitary
organizations caused to innocent individuals, they proceeded to bring its use to a halt.
Regrettably, as a result of the paramilitary’s prevalent role in Colombian affairs, they
have not truly been stopped. Colombia’s future looks to be in jeopardy as elements of
the paramilitary are still within government. It begs the question: will Colombia ever
be safe?
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References
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