FITZ
PARTNERS
Investment costs and
performance
Empirical evidence of
UK fund industry delivery
August 2016
INVESTMENT COSTS AND PERFORMANCE: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF UK FUND INDUSTRY DELIVERY
CONTENTS
Executive Summary
3
Introduction5
Part One: Explicit investment costs for UK All Companies funds
Part Two: 20
Comparison of performance in Fitz Partners’ dataset and wider sector sample
Appendix C
16
Tables with simple averages
Appendix B
12
Performance and realised outcome
Appendix A
10
Portfolio turnover, transaction costs and expected shortfall
Part Three: 8
22
FTSE Indexes in 2012-2015
Fitz Partners
Suite 532, Linen Hall, 162-168 Regent Street, London, W1B 5TF
www.fitzpartners.com
The Investment Association
Camomile Court, 23 Camomile Street, London, EC3A 7LL
www.theinvestmentassociation.org
@InvAssoc
August 2016
© The Investment Association (2016). All rights reserved.
No reproduction without permission of The Investment Association.
1
THE INVESTMENT ASSOCIATION
INVESTMENT COSTS AND PERFORMANCE: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF UK FUND INDUSTRY DELIVERY
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
THE INVESTMENT ASSOCIATION, IN
CONJUNCTION WITH FITZ PARTNERS,
LOOKS AT FUND MANAGEMENT
CHARGES, INVESTMENT COSTS AND
FUND PERFORMANCE FOR A SAMPLE
OF ACTIVE AND PASSIVE EQUITY FUNDS
FROM JULY 2012 TO MAY 2015.
Using a comprehensive dataset based on
1,350 equity fund accounts, we analyse explicit
transaction costs and portfolio turnover rates, as
these are reported in these accounts, as well as fund
and benchmark returns from Morningstar.
For consistency, given the timing of the introduction
of the Retail Distribution Review (RDR), we
use bundled share classes, which reflect the
most expensive consumer experience given the
subsequent unbundling of platform and adviser
charges. The study is therefore an analysis of total
cost of ownership, including distribution and advice.
Future research will be able to analyse the cost of
investment separately from overall ownership in a
post-RDR world.
Table 1 shows the results as follows:
l Portfolio Turnover Rate, Transaction Costs and
Ongoing Charges Figure (OCF).
l Expected Shortfall (total transaction costs plus
OCF)
l Fund Return vs Benchmark Return
l Realised Outcome (fund return minus benchmark
return)
The comparison of Expected Shortfall with Realised
Outcome lies at the heart of the methodology in this
paper. We argue that all things being equal, if all
fund costs are accounted for, one would expect fund
returns to fall short of benchmark returns by the
sum of transaction costs and the ongoing charges
figure.
2
We find that:
l On an asset weighted basis, transaction costs
across IA equity sectors between 2012 and 2015
were 17 basis points (0.17%), the result of an
average portfolio turnover rate of around 40%.
l Given an average bundled OCF of 142 basis
points (1.42%), one might expect fund returns
to fall short of benchmark returns by 159 basis
points (the sum of 142 and 17 basis points for the
OCF and the transaction costs respectively).
l Contrary to this expectation, funds actually
covered both ongoing charges and explicit
transaction costs and delivered returns higher
than that of the benchmark – see Table 1 for a
summary of the results split into UK equity and
non-UK equity sectors.
We are careful not to over-interpret this data given
that it is based on a transaction costs database
which covers only the period 2012-2015. However,
the analysis offers strong empirical evidence of
recent industry performance in the context of
charges and transaction costs across a large
sample of UK funds. The results point to positive
performance outcomes and low transaction
costs. Our analysis of portfolio turnover rates also
contradicts criticisms that fund managers overtrade
and that the ensuing transaction costs are several
multiples of disclosed charges.
It is important to acknowledge that there is one
category of cost not included here as it is not
yet available on a standardised basis: implicit
transaction costs. They will become so in new
disclosure documents. There are no other fund
management costs unaccounted for in the shortfall
calculations or results. However, if implicit costs
were significantly damaging investor returns, this
would be seen in poor net return data – and our
results indicate that this is not the case.
3
THE INVESTMENT ASSOCIATION
INVESTMENT COSTS AND PERFORMANCE: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF UK FUND INDUSTRY DELIVERY
INTRODUCTION
Using internal IA data as well as data from the Fitz
Partners Transaction Fee dataset, Morningstar
and Financial Express, we are able to give as
comprehensive a picture as possible on fund
management charges, investment costs and fund
performance.
TABLE 1. SUMMARY OF RESULTS (FIGURES EXPRESSED AS A PERCENTAGE OF AVERAGE FUND ASSETS)
2012-2013
Portfolio Turnover Transaction
Rate
Costs
OCF
Expected
Shortfall Fund
Return
Benchmark Realised
Return
Outcome
Non-UK equity sectors
53.58
0.17
1.53
-1.70
11.96
11.78
0.18
UK equity sectors
28.58
0.17
1.32
-1.49
16.59
15.79
0.80
All equity sectors
41.07
0.17
1.42
-1.59
14.28
13.78
0.49
2013-2014
Portfolio Turnover Transaction
Rate
Costs
OCF
Expected
Shortfall Fund
Return
Benchmark Realised
Return
Outcome
Non-UK equity sectors
50.87
0.15
1.54
-1.70
15.11
14.44
0.68
UK equity sectors
29.34
0.19
1.37
-1.56
19.25
15.96
3.29
All equity sectors
40.01
0.17
1.46
-1.63
17.20
15.20
1.99
2014-2015
Portfolio Turnover Transaction
Rate
Costs
OCF
Expected
Shortfall Fund
Return
Benchmark Realised
Return
Outcome
Non-UK equity sectors
46.80
0.14
1.46
-1.60
10.03
11.93
-1.90
UK equity sectors
33.73
0.20
1.33
-1.53
6.17
4.94
1.22
All equity sectors
40.40
0.17
1.40
-1.56
8.14
8.51
-0.37
The colour coding of the table is as follows:
Fund return higher than benchmark return.
Fund return lower than benchmark return, but realised outcome smaller than expected shortfall.
Fund return lower than benchmark return, and realised outcome larger than expected shortfall.
The costs that affect fund performance are:
l Ongoing charges figure (OCF): this relates
to the costs of running the fund and covers
the management fee and costs such as fund
administration, custody, audit, regulator fees etc.
l Costs relating to investment activity. These can
be explicit and implicit:
– Explicit: these relate to real cash paid
from the fund to cover costs such as tax
and commissions from buying and selling
the fund’s investments and are directly
quantifiable.
– Implicit: these relate to the costs inherent in
accessing capital markets, such as the bidoffer spread and market impact, but do not
involve an actual transfer of cash out of the
fund and are thus not easily quantified.
l Other costs: entry and exit costs (one-off and
uncommon in the investment fund universe) and
performance fees (uncommon in the UK retail
market and triggered by certain performance
thresholds).
STRUCTURE OF THE PAPER
The Introduction outlines our main hypothesis and
the methodology for interpreting the above costs
in the context of performance. The analysis is then
presented in three parts:
l Part One presents a detailed analysis of
investment costs, including transaction costs.
l Part Two looks at portfolio turnover and
the expected impact of total costs on fund
performance.
l Part Three explores actual performance in the
context of cost quantification.
4
HYPOTHESIS AND METHODOLOGY
In a pure academic sense, the level of an index
such as the FTSE All Share reflects the collective
behaviour of all market participants, including fund
managers. The movement of the FTSE All Share
provides an indicator of a frictionless (i.e. costless)
return over a given period in time.
This has a number of implications at a theoretical
level for fund managers:
l All things being equal, one would expect that
aggregate active fund management performance
would represent the return of the index net
of transaction costs and fees. In other words,
unless fund managers as a group are superior (or
inferior) investors than other market participants,
the academic and wider analytical literature
would predict that the sum of transaction costs
and fees is the amount by which average fund
return would fall short of the index return.
l Passive vehicles tracking an index would return
the index net of their transaction costs and fees.
Any tracking error, positive or negative, in the
methodology used to replicate the index would
also impact the return.
l Adding distribution and advice fees will set a
higher performance hurdle, whether the fund is
active or passive. However, it is important to note
that although these fees impact the performance
delivered by the fund manager, the manager does
not levy them.
Given the points outlined above, we would therefore
expect that the sum of the ongoing charges and all
explicit and implicit investment costs (expected
shortfall) to be equal on average to the difference
between the fund net return and the cost-free
benchmark return (realised outcome). In other
words, if it were true, as some commentators state,
that there are hidden fees which are multiples of
disclosed costs, the impact ought to be reflected in
the average net returns that funds deliver.
To test this hypothesis, we look at ongoing charges,
total transaction costs, portfolio turnover and fund
and benchmark performance across a wide range of
investment funds, and then compare the expected
shortfall with the realised outcome.
5
THE INVESTMENT ASSOCIATION
In conducting this analysis, there are data
limitations. Implicit costs are more challenging
to quantify than explicit, although the industry
is moving towards implementation of further
transparency in this area and future analysis is
likely to have access to additional data. Based on
fund accounts, therefore, we calculate the expected
shortfall as the sum of the ongoing charges and
explicit transaction costs and realised outcome
as the difference between fund net returns and
benchmark returns. This has two implications at an
aggregate level:
l If implicit costs were causing a significant drag
on fund returns relative to the benchmark, we
would expect that the realised outcome ought to
be worse than the expected shortfall.
l The data limitations on implicit costs mean
that we cannot definitively isolate manager skill
from transaction costs. For example, a low net
return and realised outcome may indicate poor
stock and securities selection and significant
implicit transaction costs, or a combination of
both these factors. However, one indicator of high
transaction costs would be very high portfolio
turnover rates (PTR) and our analysis also takes
into account PTR and presents this alongside
transaction costs.
INVESTMENT COSTS AND PERFORMANCE: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF UK FUND INDUSTRY DELIVERY
HEADLINE FINDINGS
l Across many equity sectors in recent years,
the realised outcome is much better than the
expected shortfall.
l This finding is reinforced by calculations of both
actual transaction costs incurred and portfolio
turnover levels.
l In the largest sector, UK All Companies, little
shortfall is evident in recent years: in other words,
returns to investors net of all fees (including
advice and distribution) have been strong relative
to the benchmark. Transaction costs and portfolio
turnover rates are moderate, with the largest
component of transaction costs being stamp duty.
l Across all equity sectors, most funds either
outperformed their benchmarks or they
underperformed by far less than fees and
transaction costs would indicate.
l On an asset-weighted basis, average portfolio
turnover was around 40% (simple average around
60%) and average transaction costs amounted to
17 basis points (simple average close to 24 basis
points).
To express this more concretely, if the OCF is 0.7% and transaction costs are 0.3%, the expected shortfall
would be -1% (the sum of 0.7% and 0.3%, expressed negatively as a drag on return).
This means that we would expect that on average fund net returns fall short of the benchmark returns by at
least 1%, given that this excludes implicit costs such as the bid-offer spread and market impact.
So if the expected shortfall is -1% and assuming that the benchmark has returned 6% over a year
there are four possibilities:
1
If the relevant
fund universe
returns 5% net of
all fees and costs,
then the realised
outcome is -1%
(the difference
between 5% and
6%) and equals
the expected
shortfall.
2
If the fund
universe returns
5.5%, the realised
outcome is -0.5%
(the difference
between 5.5%
and 6%) and so it
is better than the
expected shortfall
but not as good
as the (costless)
benchmark
return. 3
If the fund
universe returns
6.5%, the realised
outcome is +0.5%
(the difference
between 6.5% and
6%) and is not only
better than the
expected shortfall
but it beats
the benchmark
return. 4
If the fund
universe returns
4.5%, the realised
outcome is -1.5%
(the difference
between 6% and
4.5%) and worse
than the expected
shortfall. There
may be a number
of reasons for this,
including manager
performance and/
or high implicit
costs.
In conclusion, although the analysis is not based on
long-term historical data, empirical evidence from
recent years does indicate that fund managers can
deliver positive performance and low transaction
costs. Indeed, if it were the case that investors
were systematically suffering from poor active
management, excessive trading and ‘hidden’ implicit
transaction costs, we would expect to find poor
realised outcomes as well as very high portfolio
turnover levels and, as in previous research1, the
results clearly do not show this.
Although the analysis is on equity funds, as reporting
of transaction cost data improves, this approach can
be extended beyond the equity fund universe e.g. to
include fixed income funds for which transaction
costs are largely, if not entirely, implicit.
DATA
The analysis is based on the Fitz Partners
Transaction Fee dataset published in October 2015.
This includes data from annual reports of open
and closed, active and tracker funds across all IA
sectors. Active funds represent approximately 91%
of the assets in the dataset, however within the IA
equity sectors this proportion drops to 87%. The
annual reports date from 2011 to mid-2015 and
include information on transaction costs (a further
breakdown into tax and commissions is carried out
for UK All Companies funds), average fund assets,
and portfolio turnover rates.
We completed this dataset with ongoing charges
data as well as monthly fund total net return series
from Morningstar – both based on the ‘old’ primary
share class of each fund, which most commonly
is the highest charging bundled share class, thus
accounting for the total cost of ownership (that
is including the cost of investment management,
advice and distribution). We used Financial Express
ongoing charges data where this was not available
from Morningstar. Also from Morningstar we sourced
monthly benchmark return series, matching the
available fund return series. To include funds for
which no benchmark information was available, we
took the most commonly used primary prospectus
benchmark in each IA sector and applied that to all
funds of that sector.
Fund performance was calculated as the cumulative
monthly return in the 12 months covered by the
annual report so as to match exactly the period
over which transaction costs were reported.
Where the fund existed for less than a year, the
cumulative return has been annualised. Benchmark
performance was calculated in the exact same way.
Moreover, funds under management data was
sourced from the IA’s internal dataset in order to
estimate the size of each sector and that of the
primary share classes as well as to assist with the
calculation of asset weighted averages.
In our analysis we considered all equity funds for
which the Fitz Partners’ dataset had transaction
cost information. This restricted the sample to 1,350
accounts for funds across 16 IA equity sectors,
representing approximately 56% of total funds
under management. Since the latest report in the
dataset was for the year ended in May 2015, we
separated the data into three different periods:
July 2012 – June 2013; July 2013 – June 2014; July
2014 – May 2015. This ensured that each fund was
included only once in each period and resulted
in more comparable sample sizes (as opposed to
distributing based on calendar year-ends). The funds
were distributed as follows: 387 funds in 2012-2013;
504 funds in 2013-2014; 459 funds in 2014-2015.
In terms of funds under management, the top
5 sectors were UK All Companies (representing
ca. 25% of funds and 35% of FUM), Global, UK
Equity Income, Europe exc. UK, and North America.
The bottom 5 sectors were: Japanese Smaller
Companies, North American Smaller Companies,
China/Greater China, Asia Pacific inc. Japan, and
Europe inc. UK.
IMA, Fund Management Charges, Investment Costs and Performance, London 2012.
1
6
7
THE INVESTMENT ASSOCIATION
INVESTMENT COSTS AND PERFORMANCE: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF UK FUND INDUSTRY DELIVERY
PART ONE:
EXPLICIT INVESTMENT COSTS FOR UK
ALL COMPANIES FUNDS
Using Fitz Partners data taken from funds’
annual long reports, we can measure the total net
investment costs. These are the total investment
costs net of income generated from activities that
do not relate directly to the fund’s investments. The
components are:
l Income, disclosed in the notes to the financial
statements under the revenue section:
– Stocklending: revenue generated from stock
lending activity
– Underwriting: revenue generated from
underwriting activity
l Total investment cost:
– Transaction costs: disclosed under the notes
to the financial statements. For our analysis
of UK All Companies funds, these are further
broken down into tax and commissions.
– Bank interest: interest received on cash
amounts held at bank
This detailed breakdown was carried out for the UK
All Companies funds – as mentioned, the largest
sector in the sample – to explore the magnitude
of the different components of explicit investment
costs. The simple and weighted average figures are
shown in Table 2, revealing a number of points.
– Schedule 19 SDRT: disclosed under
the statement of change in net assets
attributable to shareholders. This was
relevant when a fund was invested in UK
equities and investors redeemed their units in
UK unit trust schemes or shares in UK OEICs.
This tax was abolished on 30 March 2014.2
First, total investment costs are about 30 basis
points (bps) on average and 19 bps on an asset
weighted average basis. This indicates that
most assets (and hence the more representative
consumer experience) are in funds with lower
investment costs. Explicit transaction costs are by
far the largest component of total investment costs,
and of that, approximately two thirds are tax and one
third commission.
– Finance costs (interest): disclosed under
the statement of total return. This is the
overdraft interest paid when bank accounts
are overdrawn (the funds in this analysis are
permitted to borrow in short term temporary
form).
TABLE 2: EXPLICIT INVESTMENT COSTS AS A PERCENTAGE OF AVERAGE FUND ASSETS – UK ALL COMPANIES
Simple average
0.30
0.29
0.25
Tax
0.19
0.19 0.17
0.14
0.16
0.19
0.080.100.13
0.060.060.07
0.03
0.04
0.02
0.04
0.04
0.02
Finance costs: interest
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.00
Total investment costs
0.33
0.33
0.27
0.19
0.20
0.21
Stocklending revenue
0.00
0.00 0.00
0.000.000.00
Underwriting revenue
0.01
0.00 0.00
0.000.000.00
Bank interest
0.01
0.00 0.00
0.000.000.00
Income
0.01
0.01 0.01
0.010.010.01
Net investment costs
0.32
0.18
3
8
0.26
0.19
0.20
HM Revenue & Customs, Abolition of Stamp Duty Reserve Tax for collective investment schemes, March 2014. This tax is included in the
2014-2015 figures as some funds had incurred it in the first months of the year ended between July 2014 and February 2015 and it thus
showed on their accounts.
Figures may not add up due to rounding.
Weighted average
2012-2013 2013-20142014-2015
ActiveTracker
Transaction costs
0.17
Active Tracker
Active Tracker
0.05
0.19
0.05
0.23
0.04
Tax0.09
0.01
0.11
0.03
0.14
0.04
Commission0.07
0.01
0.07
0.00
0.08
0.00
Schedule 19 SDRT
0.04
0.03
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.01
Finance costs: interest
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
Total investment costs
0.22
0.08
0.24
0.08
0.25
0.06
Stocklending revenue
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.01
Underwriting revenue
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
Bank interest
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
Income
0.01 0.01
0.01 0.01
0.010.01
Net investment costs
0.21
0.23
0.24
0.07
0.07
0.05
2012-20132013-2014 2014-2015
Schedule 19 SDRT
2
TABLE 3: EXPLICIT INVESTMENT COSTS AS A PERCENTAGE OF AVERAGE FUND ASSETS – UK ALL COMPANIES ACTIVE
VS. TRACKER FUNDS4
3
Commission
0.11
0.11 0.09
0.32
A further breakdown of the UK All Companies
sample into active and tracker funds shows that
investment costs in active funds are approximately
23 bps compared to 6 bps for tracker funds – see
Table 3. Unsurprisingly, the main difference lies in
the transaction costs. Stocklending revenue, albeit
low, is slightly larger for tracker funds.
Weighted average
2012-20132013-20142014-2015
Transaction costs The Schedule 19 SDRT tax, already very low at
around 4 bps in 2012-2014, almost halved in 20142015 and will not be relevant in the future. Income
is very low at 1 bp. It should also be noted that
at a maximum, stocklending revenue was 5 bps,
underwriting revenue 6 bps and bank interest 3 bps.
As transaction costs constitute the largest part of
investment costs, it is the only component that is
considered for the other equity sectors. Moreover,
the rest of the analysis is carried out on asset
weighted averages but the results with the simple
averages are reported in Appendix A.
As indicated earlier, we do not include in the analysis
the following costs:
l Entry charges: these have historically been
connected to unit holding administration,
marketing and/or advice costs and are frequently
heavily – or totally – discounted by distributors.
Moreover, they have been reduced since RDR.
l Exit charges: these are imposed by few funds and
are limited to early redemptions.
l Performance fees: these apply mostly to
institutional clients and not retail funds that form
the basis of this analysis and have also become
less prominent across the industry.5
Entry and exit charges are one-off costs and
although relevant for the investor experience, their
effect on the overall outcome is small and does
not reflect what is happening on an ongoing basis.
Performance fees can be recurring but they are out
of scope because they incur only when the fund
outperforms a specified benchmark in the first
place.
Figures may not add up due to rounding.
The Investment Association, Asset Management in the UK 2014-15, London 2015.
4
5
9
THE INVESTMENT ASSOCIATION
INVESTMENT COSTS AND PERFORMANCE: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF UK FUND INDUSTRY DELIVERY
PART TWO:
PORTFOLIO TURNOVER, TRANSACTION
COSTS AND EXPECTED SHORTFALL
Transaction costs relate to the investment activity
and occur with every purchase and sale of an
investment within a portfolio. As returns are the
outcome of the investment activity within any
given time, performance and transaction costs
are effectively inseparable. The explicit (and easily
quantifiable) component of transaction costs
consists of commission, which is the fee paid to
brokers for facilitating the trade, and tax.
The portfolio turnover rate is an indicator of portfolio
trading activity and reflects roughly the percentage
of the portfolio holdings that have changed within
a specified period. In our analysis, we use the SEC
definition which calculates portfolio turnover as
the ratio of the lesser of purchases or sales within
a portfolio over the monthly average value of that
portfolio.
Transaction costs and portfolio turnover are
positively connected, i.e. the higher the portfolio
turnover, the higher the transaction costs. However,
this relationship is not necessarily linear. For
example, economies of scale can be achieved for the
amount of commission paid, depending on the size
of the trade. It is also worthwhile to note that, within
an investment fund, part of the turnover (and thus
the resulting transaction costs) relates to events
that are not connected to pure investment decision
making. These events can include investor flows, e.g.
fund inflows that need to be invested, re-investment
of income and/or capital gains, or it could be
portfolio rebalancing to reflect the changing
composition of a market index (particularly relevant
for tracker funds).
for active funds at about 33% and for tracker funds
at 11%. There is also variability from year to year,
for example North America turnover fluctuated
from almost 74% in the first period to 52% in the
second and then up to 62% in the last. Although
there could be further variability within each sector,
we can see that on average, and particularly on
an asset weighted basis, there is no evidence that
fund managers overtrade. This amount of turnover
would also indicate that implicit costs are unlikely
to be excessive – a point explored further in the
performance analysis later on.
Although data limitations mean that we are unable
to quantify implicit costs, portfolio turnover rates are
a good indicator of what to expect, i.e. the higher the
turnover the larger the implicit transaction costs can
be. Table 4 shows that across the IA equity sectors,
the average portfolio turnover rate (PTR) is about
40%. There is variability within this, for example
the China and Europe inc. UK sectors have much
higher turnover than the UK equity sectors. UK All
Companies turnover is around 28%, with turnover
Transaction costs (TC) are on average 17 bps – by
far not the multiple of fund charges as is sometimes
stated in the public debate. Moreover, it is more
expensive to trade in some sectors such as China
than the very liquid market of e.g. North America.
Active UK All Companies funds have on average
transaction costs of 19 bps compared to 5 bps
for tracker funds. This clearly contradicts claims
often made that trading costs amount to several
multiples of fund fees, as can also be seen from the
comparison with average ongoing charges (OCF)
which across all equity sectors are on average 142
bps and for UK All Companies specifically slightly
lower at 122 bps. As a reminder, both active and
tracker funds are included in the analysis but the
majority of funds (over 85%) are actively managed
and so the results are not driven by the tracker funds.
According to our hypothesis, the sum of transaction
costs and ongoing charges is the amount by which
we would expect average fund returns to fall short
of the benchmark return – as long as there are
no ‘hidden’ costs. So across all IA equity sectors,
we would expect fund return to fall short of the
benchmark return by around 160 bps. The expected
shortfall is larger in some sectors where it is both
more expensive to trade and to invest in a fund such
as China/Greater China where fund returns would
be expected to be on average 220 bps lower than
benchmark returns. In contrast, we would expect
active UK All Companies funds to fall short of their
benchmark by about 170 bps and tracker funds (that
trade less and have lower fees) by around 41 bps.
TABLE 4: PORTFOLIO TURNOVER RATE, TRANSACTION COSTS AND EXPECTED SHORTFALL
Weighted average
2012-2013
2013-20142014-2015
Expected
Expected
Expected
Sector
PTR
TC
OCF
Shortfall
PTR
TC
OCF Shortfall
PTR
TC
OCF
Shortfall
Asia Pacific Exc. Japan
Asia Pacific Inc. Japan
China/Greater China
Europe Exc. UK
Europe Inc. UK
European Smaller Companies
Global
Global Emerging Markets
Global Equity Income
Japan
Japanese Smaller Companies
North America
North Am. Smaller Companies
UK All Companies
UK All Companies - Active
UK All Companies - Tracker
UK Equity Income
UK Smaller Companies
38.69
18.54
92.47
64.60
94.67
75.69
53.50
35.35
27.07
39.52
50.23
73.74
70.19
25.31
29.26
9.93
34.04
33.03
0.211.56-1.77
0.09
1.81
-1.89
0.591.82-2.41
0.16
1.48
-1.64
0.32
1.76
-2.08
0.27
1.66
-1.93
0.161.60-1.75
0.18
1.71
-1.89
0.14
1.63
-1.77
0.070.98-1.05
0.12
1.75
-1.87
0.131.36-1.49
0.21
1.72
-1.93
0.14
1.15
-1.29
0.17
1.43
-1.60
0.05
0.39
-0.43
0.23
1.58
-1.80
0.221.61-1.83
36.930.18 1.59
-1.77
18.50
0.09
1.80
-1.90
88.400.51 1.80
-2.30
64.22
0.17
1.60
-1.78
71.22
0.28
1.69
-1.97
66.71
0.23
1.66
-1.89
49.600.13 1.63
-1.76
38.05
0.19
1.81
-1.99
52.16
0.19
1.66
-1.85
50.130.11 1.39
-1.50
55.17
0.13
1.74
-1.87
51.540.10 1.02
-1.12
64.84
0.15
1.71
-1.86
25.12
0.16
1.25
-1.41
29.70
0.19
1.52
-1.71
10.03
0.05
0.36
-0.41
37.08
0.24
1.57
-1.81
36.910.25 1.62
-1.87
37.310.17 1.52
-1.69
19.82
0.09
1.84
-1.93
43.780.30 1.79
-2.09
60.91
0.16
1.31
-1.47
84.24
0.19
1.70
-1.90
40.25
0.16
1.68
-1.84
41.200.12 1.63
-1.75
26.25
0.16
1.70
-1.86
43.51
0.15
1.63
-1.78
41.630.09 1.12
-1.20
45.77
0.09
1.73
-1.82
62.190.14 1.04
-1.18
61.56
0.13
1.69
-1.82
34.26
0.19
1.25
-1.43
39.74
0.23
1.55
-1.78
13.19
0.04
0.35
-0.39
32.02
0.21
1.53
-1.74
34.950.21 1.59
-1.80
TOTAL
41.07 0.171.42-1.59
40.010.17 1.46
-1.63
40.400.17 1.40
-1.56
10
11
THE INVESTMENT ASSOCIATION
INVESTMENT COSTS AND PERFORMANCE: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF UK FUND INDUSTRY DELIVERY
PART THREE:
PERFORMANCE AND REALISED
OUTCOME
The analysis above has demonstrated that equity
funds do not have high levels of turnover and that
transaction costs are far from being the several
multiples of charges as has been implied in the
public debate. The moderate portfolio turnover rates
indicated that one would not expect implicit costs
to be excessive. However, the effect of both trading
and implicit costs will be reflected on fund returns
and the realised outcome, i.e. the difference between
average fund returns and benchmark returns.
Table 5 shows for each IA equity sector the average
fund return, the corresponding benchmark return
and their difference in the “Realised outcome”
column. This is then compared to the expected
shortfall figure – which is the sum of explicit
transaction costs and ongoing charges from Table 4.
charges and the transaction costs. In 2014-2015
funds underperformed the benchmark but only by 37
bps – far less than the expected shortfall of 156 bps.
Our hypothesis was that if there are ‘hidden’ costs
we would expect the realised outcome to be much
worse than the expected shortfall, or in other words
that the average fund return would fall short of
the benchmark return by much more than the sum
of ongoing charges and transaction costs. We can
observe that on average across all IA equity sectors,
funds outperformed their benchmark in 2012-2014
so that the realised outcome is positive, i.e. fund
outperformance overcompensated both the ongoing
It should also be observed that, as noted earlier,
this analysis is based on bundled share classes,
thus reflecting the least favourable scenario in
terms of cost and the overall investor experience as
in the pre-RDR world, the fund OCF included both
platform and advice costs. In other words, fund
manager performance against the benchmark is
analysed not simply relative to the fund manager’s
fees but the fees of others in the delivery chain.
This is helpful from a perspective of ‘total cost
of ownership’, but not from a perspective of ‘total
cost of investment’ against delivery of investment
objective. Post-RDR it should be possible to measure
much more clearly fund manager delivery which
will help to inform the value for money debate
and the results would be even better using the
new unbundled pricing of the ‘new’ primary share
classes. However, it is important to note how much
the industry has delivered with the total cost of
ownership and to consider that it remains a common
practice when discussing returns in bundled
pension arrangements (e.g. personal pension, GPP,
stakeholder) to judge investment delivery against
the bundled cost of ownership, which contains
TABLE 5: PERFORMANCE AND REALISED OUTCOME
Sector
Weighted average
2012-2013
2013-20142014-2015
FundBenchmark
Realised
Expected
FundBenchmark
RealisedExpected
FundBenchmark
Realised
Expected
Return
Return
0utcome Shortfall
Return
Return
0utcome
Shortfall
Return
Return
0utcome Shortfall
Asia
Pacific Exc. Japan
6.33
4.80
1.53-1.77
5.27 3.63 1.65-1.77
9.48 11.41-1.93-1.69
Asia
Pacific Inc. Japan
-0.14
-4.77
4.63
-1.89
19.5521.95-2.40-1.90
3.03 2.620.40-1.93
China/Greater
China
6.57
3.40
3.17-2.41
17.55
6.24
11.31-2.30
7.10 9.21-2.11-2.09
Europe
Exc. UK
19.90
18.96
0.93
-1.64
18.6920.59-1.90-1.78
4.86 5.04-0.18-1.47
Europe
Inc.
UK
18.51
20.49
-1.99
-2.08
23.0320.03
3.00-1.97
8.76 6.352.42-1.90
European
Smaller Companies
17.81
14.52
3.28
-1.93
25.5333.47-7.94-1.89
4.72 5.35-0.64-1.84
Global
11.8813.02
-1.14
-1.75
15.8414.01
1.83-1.76
11.10
13.13-2.02-1.75
Global
Emerging Markets
4.79
-2.12
6.91-1.89
-0.97 0.35-1.32-1.99
5.13 6.71-1.59-1.86
Global
Equity
Income
16.56
18.90
-2.35
-1.77
18.6915.96
2.73-1.85
9.33 12.10-2.77-1.78
Japan
3.153.140.01
-1.05
25.7520.88 4.86-1.50
8.05 11.34-3.29-1.20
Japanese
Smaller
Companies
-12.88
-1.86-11.03
-1.87
41.0725.01
16.06-1.87
5.63 5.190.43-1.82
North
America
14.58
18.10
-3.52
-1.49
19.2018.78 0.42-1.12
19.17 22.68-3.51-1.18
North
Am.
Smaller
Companies
16.62
19.99
-3.37
-1.93
22.4823.98-1.50-1.86
8.28 12.30-4.01-1.82
UK
All Companies
16.4115.21 1.20-1.29
20.2616.08 4.17-1.41
5.82 4.89 0.93-1.43
UK
All
Companies
Active
16.50
14.71
1.79
-1.60
22.08
16.53
5.55
-1.71
5.91
4.64
1.27
-1.78
UK All Companies - Tracker
16.10
16.84
-0.74 -0.43 13.86
14.51
-0.65 -0.41 5.53
5.62
-0.09
-0.39
UK
Equity
Income
16.87
16.34
0.53
-1.80
15.1012.94
2.15-1.81
7.86
5.632.22-1.74
UK
Smaller Companies
17.05
19.79
-2.74
-1.83
30.8331.93-1.10-1.87
2.58 2.250.33-1.80
TOTAL
14.2813.78 0.49-1.59
17.2015.20 1.99-1.63
8.14 8.51-0.37-1.56
The colour coding of the table is as follows:
Fund return higher than benchmark return.
Fund return lower than benchmark return, but realised outcome smaller than expected shortfall.
Fund return lower than benchmark return, and realised outcome larger than expected shortfall.
12
13
THE INVESTMENT ASSOCIATION
multiple other elements, including administration,
communication and governance.6
Across the 16 sectors for these three periods, in 25
instances the average sector return was higher than
the benchmark return (green colour-coded) and in
8 instances the realised outcome was negative but
less so than the expected shortfall (yellow colourcoded). In 15 cases the realised outcome was more
negative than the expected shortfall (red colourcoded) but in 10 out of these the difference was less
than 1 percentage point.
In the UK All Companies sector in particular, we
see that funds outperformed the benchmark (for
this sector this is the FTSE All Share index) and
this was due to active funds having on average
higher returns than the average benchmark return
– especially in the 2013-2014 period where most
sectors performed well. Tracker funds on the other
hand underperformed the index by a little more than
the expected shortfall – 31 bps more than expected
in 2012-2013 and 24 bps in 2013-2014. In the last
period, tracker funds underperformed but by less
than the expected shortfall.
INVESTMENT COSTS AND PERFORMANCE: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF UK FUND INDUSTRY DELIVERY
Appendix B shows the averages over the three
periods for the Fitz Partners’ dataset and for the
wider sector sample. Although there are some
differences for the smallest sectors such as Asia
Pacific exc. and inc. Japan or China/Greater China,
we see that the largest sectors including the three
UK equity sectors still either outperformed or
underperformed by less than expected. Moreover, in
total across all equity sectors, funds were still able
to deliver higher returns than the benchmark.
On the whole, the wider sector results reiterate what
we found with the Fitz Partners’ dataset, i.e. for most
sectors, there is no evidence to support criticisms
against the industry that there are ‘hidden’ costs
and, on the contrary, fund managers were able to
deliver returns that not only covered all costs and
charges but they also outperformed the benchmark.
Given that our sample covers approximately 56%
of the total FUM of these equity sectors over 20122015, using Morningstar data, we repeated the
analysis on all funds within each sector for which
we could obtain monthly net return data. As we
did not have transaction cost data for this wider
sample, we assumed that the averages estimated
above hold. Moreover, due to lack of any information
about the timing of these funds’ annual accounts,
we calculated fund returns in the same way as
before, but this time we did so from July to June
for all funds. As a result, the period over which we
calculated fund and benchmark returns does not
coincide with that over which transaction costs are
reported and caution is needed in interpreting the
results.
6
DRIVERS OF PERFORMANCE
It is interesting to discuss the performance results
in the context of what theory would predict and
particularly the point that market indexes reflect
the decisions of all market participants, and so the
idea that the average fund manager could either
outperform or underperform the index may sound
mathematically impossible.
There are three sets of issues to consider in this
context:
l Relative group performance
l Stock selection
l Investing outside any given sector
First, fund managers are one group among many
other participants in the market which would include
hedge funds, high frequency traders, individuals
etc. Particularly in the UK equity market, we
estimate that fund managers own approximately
30% of public UK equity and account for around
40% of market trading. The managers running
the funds in Fitz Partners’ dataset represent only
a proportion rather than the total investor base
which is collectively responsible for the return of the
benchmark. The results in Tables 5 (and Appendix B)
would point to fund managers outperforming while
other market participants underperform the market.
Another factor is that active managers can stockpick, for example by overweighing companies that
are undervalued or that have growth potential etc.
In the context of the UK All Companies sector, the
mid-cap FTSE 250 outperformed both the FTSE All
Share and the FTSE 350 indexes during the period
under consideration, i.e. 2012-2015 – see Appendix
C – so managers could have overweighed midcap companies and thus outperformed the FTSE
All Share index. One could suggest that perhaps
this is due to the methodology explained earlier
in the paper of applying the most commonly used
benchmark in each equity sector across all funds
of that sector – which for UK All Companies funds
was the FTSE All Share index. Since, however, 88%
of the UK All Companies assets in the sample
had the FTSE All Share as primary prospectus
benchmark compared to only 4% of assets that were
benchmarked against the FTSE 250, this would not
be able to explain the sector’s outperformance.
There is also the possibility of fund managers
investing outside any given benchmark. In this
particular case, the IA sector classification criteria
most commonly require that a fund invests at least
80% of portfolio assets in the corresponding asset
class to be classified within a sector. For example,
a UK All Companies fund would be at least 80%
invested in UK (public) equity. IA sector monitoring
data would indicate that funds in all equity sectors
invest on average over 90% of their assets in their
respective markets, the only exception being the
Global Emerging Markets sector with this figure at
around 88%. Consequently, investing outside the
benchmark could be a factor but only to a limited
extent.
So overall, while we recognise that this is a relatively
short-run dataset, the analysis over four years shows
that on an asset-weighted basis, there is no evidence
that there are significant hidden costs damaging
investor outcomes. Quite the opposite, the results
would suggest a positive industry delivery across
these equity sectors compared to other market
participants.
At the time of the analysis, we could not accurately identify the new primary share class for all funds in the sample but future work is
going to address this point.
14
15
THE INVESTMENT ASSOCIATION
INVESTMENT COSTS AND PERFORMANCE: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF UK FUND INDUSTRY DELIVERY
APPENDIX A:
TABLES WITH SIMPLE AVERAGES
A: EXPLICIT INVESTMENT COSTS AS A PERCENTAGE OF AVERAGE FUND ASSETS IN THE UK ALL COMPANIES SECTOR
Simple average
2012-2013
ActiveTracker
Transaction costs
2013-20142014-2015
ActiveTracker
ActiveTracker
0.330.04
0.330.04
0.280.05
Tax
0.210.02
0.210.03
0.180.05
Commission
0.130.01
0.130.00
0.100.00
0.03
0.02
0.02
Schedule 19 SDRT
0.04
0.03
0.01
Finance costs: interest
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
Total investment costs
0.37
0.09
0.35
0.07
0.30
0.06
Stocklending revenue
0.00
0.00
0.000.00
0.000.00
Underwriting revenue
0.010.00
0.000.00
0.000.00
Bank interest
0.010.00
0.000.00
0.000.00
Income
0.010.01
0.010.01
0.010.00
Net investment costs
0.36
0.34
0.30
0.07
0.07
0.06
B: PORTFOLIO TURNOVER RATE, TRANSACTION COSTS AND EXPECTED SHORTFALL
Simple average
2012-2013
2013-20142014-2015
Expected
Expected
Expected
Sector
PTR
TC OCF Shortfall
PTR
TC
OCF Shortfall
PTR TCOCF
Shortfall
Asia Pacific Exc. Japan
Asia Pacific Inc. Japan
China/Greater China
Europe Exc. UK
Europe Inc. UK
European Smaller Cos
Global
Global Emerging Markets
Global Equity Income
Japan
Japanese Smaller Cos
North America
North Am. Smaller Cos
UK All Companies
UK All Companies - Active
UK All Companies - Tracker
UK Equity Income
UK Smaller Companies
59.66
24.21
70.52
88.13
95.36
58.04
60.17
47.78
56.74
68.35
50.55
74.87
72.02
40.86
45.86
7.50
47.51
37.48
0.28
1.58
-1.86
0.08
1.69
-1.77
0.521.76-2.28
0.22
1.56
-1.78
0.32
1.75
-2.07
0.23
1.68
-1.90
0.171.62-1.79
0.27
1.59
-1.85
0.28
1.77
-2.05
0.101.46-1.56
0.12
1.60
-1.71
0.111.51-1.63
0.20
1.71
-1.91
0.30
1.44
-1.73
0.33
1.52
-1.85
0.04
0.90
-0.95
0.33
1.55
-1.88
0.29
1.60
-1.89
64.32
0.33
1.62
-1.95
22.14
0.09
1.67
-1.76
60.530.42 1.76
-2.18
71.17
0.22
1.57
-1.79
87.06
0.31
1.72
-2.02
79.10
0.27
1.67
-1.94
57.500.17 1.58
-1.75
59.91
0.32
1.74
-2.06
54.33
0.20
1.63
-1.83
84.100.16 1.51
-1.67
79.87
0.18
1.66
-1.84
65.900.12 1.49
-1.61
73.09
0.16
1.69
-1.85
37.79
0.29
1.40
-1.68
42.38
0.33
1.51
-1.84
11.27
0.04
0.75
-0.80
52.69
0.36
1.58
-1.94
38.68
0.30
1.60
-1.90
51.10
0.24
1.54
-1.78
19.47
0.08
1.70
-1.77
53.470.38 1.73
-2.12
68.68
0.20
1.50
-1.70
100.53
0.29
1.69
-1.98
68.25
0.25
1.67
-1.91
54.960.15 1.54
-1.69
60.88
0.30
1.70
-2.00
48.56
0.16
1.65
-1.81
70.510.13 1.43
-1.56
63.94
0.13
1.66
-1.79
68.210.11 1.45
-1.56
70.93
0.13
1.68
-1.81
38.94
0.25
1.42
-1.67
42.58
0.28
1.51
-1.79
14.39
0.05
0.81
-0.86
41.92
0.30
1.54
-1.83
36.84
0.23
1.56
-1.79
TOTAL
59.52 0.241.62-1.85
61.760.24 1.62
-1.86
57.320.21 1.59
-1.80
16
17
THE INVESTMENT ASSOCIATION
INVESTMENT COSTS AND PERFORMANCE: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF UK FUND INDUSTRY DELIVERY
C: PERFORMANCE AND REALISED OUTCOME
Sector
Simple average
Fund
Return
2012-2013
2013-20142014-2015
BenchmarkRealised Expected
Fund BenchmarkRealised Expected
Fund Benchmark Realised Expected
Return
0utcome
Shortfall
Return
Return
0utcome
Shortfall
Return
Return
0utcome
Shortfall
Asia
Pacific Exc. Japan
11.20
11.05
0.15-1.86
2.36 1.43 0.93-1.95
11.3612.25-0.89-1.78
Asia
Pacific Inc. Japan
9.94
11.43
-1.48 -1.77
11.3511.12 0.23-1.76
11.59 9.56 2.03-1.77
China/Greater
China
8.30
6.841.46-2.28
11.69-0.1911.88-2.18
16.1926.46
-10.27-2.12
Europe
Exc. UK
17.55
16.05
1.51 -1.78
21.6921.53 0.16-1.79
3.17 5.22-2.06-1.70
Europe
Inc.
UK
18.77
20.40
-1.63
-2.07
16.2913.68
2.61-2.02
7.84
6.21
1.63-1.98
European
Smaller Companies
11.00
3.40
7.59 -1.90
30.9835.55 -4.56-1.94
4.35 5.90-1.56-1.91
Global
12.7213.30-0.58
-1.79
16.0414.13
1.91-1.75
10.8612.35-1.49-1.69
Global
Emerging Markets
8.17
7.35
0.83-1.85
-6.28-6.48 0.21-2.06
8.8310.46-1.64-2.00
Global
Equity
Income
12.30
10.48
1.82
-2.05
13.0712.81
0.26-1.83
9.4412.51-3.07-1.81
Japan
6.367.05-0.69 -1.56
18.5915.63 2.95-1.67
7.6310.95-3.33-1.56
Japanese
Smaller
Companies
17.66
12.87
4.79
-1.71
22.5613.01
9.55-1.84
15.9813.07
2.91-1.79
North
America
16.19
19.81
-3.63 -1.63
16.9017.03 -0.13-1.61
18.6321.74-3.11-1.56
North
Am.
Smaller
Companies
17.84
21.39
-3.55
-1.91
26.5226.48
0.03-1.85
11.9613.61-1.65-1.81
UK
All Companies
15.9714.10 1.87-1.73
20.8615.53 5.33
-1.68
4.68 5.17-0.50-1.67
UK
All
Companies
Active
16.00
13.61
2.39
-1.85
22.09
15.60
6.49
-1.84
4.63
5.12
-0.48
-1.79
UK All Companies - Tracker
15.78
17.27
-1.49
-0.95 14.04
15.16
-1.13 -0.80 4.94
5.55
-0.61 -0.86
UK
Equity
Income
13.73
12.29
1.44
-1.88
19.1815.63
3.54-1.94
6.66
4.98
1.69-1.83
UK
Smaller Companies
19.62
21.75
-2.13 -1.89
30.0729.76 0.32-1.90
3.62 3.08 0.54-1.79
TOTAL
13.5813.10 0.49-1.85
16.9914.79 2.20
-1.86
9.55 10.85-1.30-1.80
18
19
THE INVESTMENT ASSOCIATION
INVESTMENT COSTS AND PERFORMANCE: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF UK FUND INDUSTRY DELIVERY
APPENDIX B:
COMPARISON OF PERFORMANCE IN
FITZ PARTNERS’ DATASET AND WIDER
SECTOR SAMPLE
Fitz Partners’ dataset - 3 period average
Sector
Fund BenchmarkRealisedExpected
Return
Return
Outcome
Shortfall
Asia Pacific Exc. Japan
7.03
6.61
Asia Pacific Inc. Japan
7.48
China/Greater China
Wider sector sample - 3 period average
Sector
Fund BenchmarkRealisedExpected
Return
Return
Outcome
Shortfall
0.42-1.74
Asia Pacific Exc. Japan
11.32
11.58
-0.26-1.52
6.60
0.88-1.91
Asia Pacific Inc. Japan
11.69
14.17
-2.48-1.81
10.41
6.28
4.12-2.27
China/Greater China
20.75
21.55
-0.80-2.25
Europe Exc. UK
14.48
14.87
-0.38-1.63
Europe Exc. UK
18.89
17.37
1.53-1.59
Europe Inc. UK
16.77
15.63
1.14-1.98
Europe Inc. UK
17.38
15.00
2.39-1.37
European Smaller Companies
16.02
17.78
-1.76-1.88
European Smaller Cos
21.08
21.57
-0.49-1.88
Global
12.9413.39 -0.45-1.75
Global
16.8715.57 1.30-1.53
Global Emerging Markets
2.98
1.65
1.33-1.91
Global Emerging Markets
5.43
5.93
-0.50-1.76
Global Equity Income
14.86
15.65
-0.79-1.80
Global Equity Income
13.37
15.57
-2.20-1.79
Japan
12.3211.79 0.53-1.25
Japan
17.1116.52 0.59-1.16
Japanese Smaller Companies
11.27
9.45
1.82-1.85
Japanese Smaller Companies
18.43
14.67
3.75-1.84
North America
17.65
19.85
-2.20-1.26
North America
19.48
20.10
-0.62-1.03
North Am. Smaller Companies
15.80
18.76
-2.96-1.87
North Am. Smaller Companies
19.21
19.46
-0.26-1.88
UK All Companies
14.16
12.06
2.10
-1.38
UK All Companies
16.00
13.58
2.41
-1.32
UK All Companies - Active
14.83
11.96
2.87
-1.69
UK All Companies - Active
17.17
13.58
3.59
-1.68
UK All Companies - Tracker
11.83
12.32
-0.49
-0.41
UK All Companies - Tracker
13.45
13.58
-0.13
-0.46
UK Equity Income
13.27
11.64
1.64-1.79
UK Equity Income
16.01
13.58
2.43-1.54
UK Smaller Companies
16.8217.99 -1.17-1.84
UK Smaller Companies
21.04
21.90
-0.86-1.76
TOTAL
13.2112.50 0.71 -1.59
TOTAL
16.0314.71 1.33 -1.45
20
21
Jan–2012
Jan–2012
Feb–2012
Mar–2012
Apr–2012
May–2012
May–2012
Jun–2012
Jul–2012
Aug–2012
Sep–2012
Sep–2012
Oct–2012
Nov–2012
Dec–2012
Jan–2013
Jan–2013
Feb–2013
Mar–2013
Apr–2013
May–2013
Jun–2013
Jun–2013
Jul–2013
Aug–2013
Sep–2013
Oct–2013
Oct–2013
Nov–2013
Dec–2013
Jan–2014
Feb–2014
Feb–2014
Mar–2014
Apr–2014
May–2014
Jun–2014
Jul–2014
Jul–2014
Aug–2014
Sep–2014
Oct–2014
Oct–2014
Nov–2014
Dec–2014
Jan–2015
Feb–2015
Mar–2015
Mar–2015
Apr–2015
May–2015
Jun–2015
Jul–2015
Jul–2015
Aug–2015
Sep–2015
Oct–2015
Nov–2015
Nov–2015
Dec–2015
THE INVESTMENT ASSOCIATION
APPENDIX C:
FTSE INDEXES IN 2012-2015
250
200
150
100
50
0
FTSE 100
Source: IA analysis based on Morningstar data.
22
FTSE 250
FTSE 350
FTSE AIM All-Share
FTSE All-Share