District Assessment
Kandahar-city,
Kandahar Province
November 2009
Table of Contents
Executive Summary ..............................................................................................................i
Recommendations........................................................................................................................v
1
PurposeandMethodology........................................................................................................1
1.1
Overall Purpose ...................................................................................................1
1.2
Research Methodology ........................................................................................2
1.2.1
Data limitations and Management of Bias ........................................................3
1.2.2
Estimation Methods .........................................................................................4
2
DistrictContext......................................................................................................................5
2.1
Overview of Kandahar Municipality ..................................................................6
2.1.1
Administrative Divisions and Population ..........................................................6
2.1.2
Loya Wiala – the melting pot............................................................................6
2.1.3
Historical Sites.................................................................................................7
2.2
Historical Background .......................................................................................7
2.2.1
The mujahideen in Kandahar ...........................................................................7
2.2.2
The rise of the Taliban ...................................................................................11
2.2.3
The fall of the Taliban ....................................................................................13
2.3
Economy ...........................................................................................................15
2.3.1
Markets - Export/Import Goods ......................................................................16
2.3.2
Agricultural Production...................................................................................17
2.3.3
Poppy Economy.............................................................................................18
2.4
Services ............................................................................................................18
2.4.1
Education.......................................................................................................18
2.4.2
Health ............................................................................................................19
2.4.3
Electricity .......................................................................................................21
2.4.4
Communication and media ............................................................................21
3
2.5
Reconstruction .................................................................................................22
2.6
Security Situation .............................................................................................23
ActorsAnalysis...................................................................................................................28
3.1
Afghan Government Structures ......................................................................29
3.1.1
Provincial Governors .....................................................................................31
3.1.2
Afghan National Police (ANP) ........................................................................33
3.1.3
Provincial Council ..........................................................................................34
3.1.4
Kandahar Tribal Council ................................................................................36
3.1.5
Municipal Government ...................................................................................40
3.1.6
Judiciary ........................................................................................................40
3.2
Pashtun tribes ..................................................................................................41
3.2.1
Zirak Durrani Tribes .......................................................................................43
3.2.1.1 Popalzai ....................................................................................................43
3.2.1.2 Barakzai ....................................................................................................45
3.2.1.3 Alkozai ......................................................................................................49
3.2.1.4 Achekzai ...................................................................................................52
3.2.1.5 Mohammadzai...........................................................................................54
3.2.2
Panjpai Durrani Tribes ...................................................................................55
3.2.2.1 Nurzai........................................................................................................55
3.2.2.2 Other Panjpai tribes...................................................................................57
3.2.3
Ghilzai ...........................................................................................................57
3.2.4
Kuchi .............................................................................................................58
4
3.3
Shia population ................................................................................................58
3.4
Religious and spiritual figures ........................................................................59
3.5
Insurgency ........................................................................................................61
3.6
International Military Actors ............................................................................63
ConflictAnalysis..................................................................................................................65
Tribal rivalry......................................................................................................65
4.1
4.1.1
Tribal rivalry in the 18th and 19th century ........................................................65
4.1.2
Tribal rivalry during the mujahideen ...............................................................66
4.1.3
Tribal rivalries and the current Taliban insurgency .........................................67
Political economy of Kandahar-city ................................................................68
4.2
4.2.1
Economic sectors and administration.............................................................68
4.2.2
Land grabbing................................................................................................69
Appendix.................................................................................................................................71
Table 1: Kandahar Government............................................................................................71
Table 2: Business Associations ............................................................................................73
Table 3: Important Businessmen of Kandahar ......................................................................75
Executive Summary
The plans for the political reorganisation of Afghanistan became a reality in Kandahar after
9/11 when the US-led invasion removed the Taliban regime from their capital Kandahar-city.
Many Kandahar residents had high hopes for the newly emerging governance structure,
instead yet another chapter in the long history of power struggles over the control of southern
Afghanistan’s political and economic centre was opened. Rather than ushering in a new era
of peace, opportunities and prosperity, developments since 2001 point to continued violence
and struggles over who is to rule the province.
Acts of political violence (assassinations of pro-government religious figures or government
leaders) continue to shake Kandahar-city as the Taliban once again struggled for the control
of their former capital. Since 2005 the security situation in the city began to deteriorate more
rapidly when the Taliban insurgency increased its grip on surrounding rural districts and
increasingly began to infiltrate urban areas. In 2009, the operational radius of the Taliban
insurgents reaches into the very heart of the city where they stage impressive operations
undermining the confidence in the Government of Afghanistan (GoA) to protect its citizens.
Although they have not attempted a large-scale invasion of the city (except the Sarpoza
jailbreak), the potential for direct urban guerrilla warfare against Afghan government and
international forces inside the city is increasingly likely. The situation in and around
Kandahar-city resembles more and more the early 1990s when the communist People’s
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) government only held on to the city centre and the
major transportation routes while cutting deals ‘left and right’ with the mujahideen in order to
stay in power and prevent a hostile take-over. Many city residents have already started to do
the same, believing that the most effective protection against the Taliban insurgents is not
the number of police or international forces in the city, but the payment of protection money
to the insurgency. It is open to speculation if these payments have contributed more to the
Taliban from refraining to take control of Kandahar-city than other efforts taken so far.
The new and old distribution of power
There are two main fault lines or divisions in Kandahar: one runs among Pashtun
confederations and tribes, especially the traditional Zirak Durrani tribal establishment vs. the
Panjpai and Ghilzai tribes; the other lies in the opposition against supporters of the 1990s
Taliban regime and pre-Taliban power holders of the mujahideen era (including newcomers
on both sides). The international intervention in Afghanistan neither understood nor
addressed these underlying political struggles that characterize Kandahar resulting in a
highly unstable political situation. Moreover, due to their ignorance of the situation, they
i
became entangled in local power struggles that pre-dated their intervention, sometimes
linked to century old “ways of doing things”.
The traditional political system of Kandahar has never been conceived of as representing
tribes proportionally but rather as a system of domination of the Zirak Durrani tribal
establishment over others. This started in 1747 when the Ghilzai ruler, Mirwais Hotak, lost
power and Popalzai and Barakzai families cemented their dominance. While the communist
and Taliban government attempted to break the “tribal logic” of the social order, the current
government re-established the domination of Zirak tribes for two reasons. First the Barakzai
under the leadership of Gul Agha Sherzai were instrumental in helping the US-led
intervention to defeat the Taliban in Kandahar, and the Popalzai benefited from the fact that
the new Afghan president, Hamid Karzai, came from within their ranks.
This reversal of history to long-standing political arrangements was effectively imposed with
the help of international actors, because of a lack of understanding of the complexity of the
situation and buying into a simplistic friend and foe schemata that stigmatized Panjpai and
Ghilzai tribal leadership collectively as Taliban, and Zirak Durrani as allies. The prominence
of Ghilzai and Panjpai tribesmen among the former Taliban leadership cannot be denied but
this in turn does not mean that the Zirak collectively opposed the former Taliban.1 Yet, as
Zirak Durrani (Popalzai, Barakzai, Alkozai and Achekzai)2 allied with the US-led intervention
into Afghanistan that took down the Taliban and the continuous struggle against “Taliban and
Al-Qaeda” terrorists, cards were stacked against other tribes from the beginning. This
allowed Zirak Durrani commanders to become very powerful and act with impunity, harassing
former Taliban (from all tribes) and extorting lootable resources (money, weapons, cars,
drugs) from them.
While the reliance on anti-Taliban commanders made sense as a short-term military strategy
to remove the Taliban regime, it had long lasting political consequences in the South and did
little to pave the way for an inclusive future structure in Kandahar with political and
economical power monopolised by Zirak Durrani tribes. Reconciliation with the Taliban
leadership willing to break link with global jihadists such as Al-Qaeda was not considered.
1
The current Taliban insurgency and the pro-government camp are better analysed along two
oppositions: the first between Zirak vs. Panjpai and Ghilzai; and the second between mujahideen era
vs. Taliban era power holder. This results in four spaces that offer a more complete perspective. For
example, the Barakzai who are often considered pro-government are the strongest backers of the
insurgency in Shah Wali Kot for the same reasons as Panjpai and Ghilzai in other areas do.
2
The fifth Zirak tribe, the Mohammadzai, lost most of its influence as a consequence of the Afghan
wars after 1978 and do not play an important role in Kandahar-city anymore. When we speak of Zirak
tribes in relation to power, the Mohammadzai are not included.
ii
Zirak Domination of the Political Economy
The domination of the Zirak Durrani tribes in Kandahar is impressive. While they make up
only 50% of the city population (and an estimated 50% of the provincial population), they
established a near monopoly on powerful political positions, key economic sectors and the
security apparatus of Kandahar. The only sector they so far have not yet monopolised is
business with less strategic goods such as dry and fresh fruits, textile, and other items of
daily use.
o
Afghan government political power is dominated by the Barakzai (Sherzai family) and
Popalzai (Karzai family). Governors, provincial council, municipality government, as well
as provincial and district administrations are close to either the Sherzai or Karzai family or
had to establish links to them. Aside from this, a few technical experts have served under
every past government.
o
The Barakzai were strongest in the Kandahar government during the
governorship of Gul Agha Sherzai (2002-2005), a Barakzai strongman.
o
The Popalzai used their leverage from being the tribe of the newly appointed
interim leader Hamid Karzai. When he was elected as president in 2004 their
power grew even stronger. From 2002 on, Hamid Karzai’s half-brother Ahmad
Wali Karzai headed the Kandahar shura, a sort of parallel power structure to the
provincial government through which he exerted great influence until he was
selected head of the elected provincial council of Kandahar in 2005. Ahmad Wali
Karzai’s power increased further when Sherzai was removed as Governor.
o
The Alkozai (late Mullah Naqibullah and Khan Mohammad) and Barakzai (as well as
Achekzai linked to Sherzai) took a leading role in the security apparatus, by
integrating their tribal militias into the police force; both are also involved in narcotics
trade. The Barakzai via Sherzai also have many security contracts with international
military forces, including guarding Kandahar Airfield (KAF).
o
Alkozai (late Naqibullah) and Popalzai (Lalay) strongmen were prominent in grabbing
and distributing government land in close proximity to Kandahar-city and strengthened
the power of their tribes even further as they settled their constituencies in the Kandahar
municipality.
o
The political reorganisation of Kandahar after the Taliban was also linked to an
economic reorganisation, with external resources (development, aid, contracts,
logistics for internationals) also being distributed in a highly unequal way. There is a
strong perception among the population that the concentration of income and wealth in
the hands of a few increased drastically over the last seven years with Zirak Durrani (who
are considered wealthy) being able to grab the biggest share of the pie while Panjpai and
iii
Ghilzai tribes (who are considered poor) are left with mere crumbs. For example, the
Barakzai but also the Popalzai monopolise key economic sectors such as fuel,
attracting development funds, contracting and logistics to foreign military as well as
narcotics trade.
In light of the above, there has been a backlash of those left out squarely from the access to
resources and power in the current government. The excluded have reactivated or turned to
the Taliban insurgency networks that build on the feelings of marginalization as well as the
growing discontent of the population in the districts due to civilian casualties in operations
conducted by foreign forces, which are seen very closely allied with Zirak power holders.
Zirak Rivalry
o
The tribal (confederation) system often presents unity against outsiders despite internal
rivalries. Thus, while on a greater scale the Zirak Durrani tribes exclude the Panjpai and
Ghilzai from power, they were never unified enough to effectively govern or suppress
increasing revolt. Old rivalries persist, with each Zirak tribe trying to gain the upper hand.
o
Especially the Popalzai (Karzai) have tried to cement their leadership by sidelining
other Zirak tribes, mainly rivalling with the Barakzai (Sherzai) over political and
economic power since the fall of the Taliban, but also with the Alkozai (for example in
Ghorak and Khakrez districts).
o
The Barakzai and Alkozai tribes could not or did not want to improve their less than
friendly relationship that goes back at least to the mujahideen government and
instead continued to rival, at present mostly over the control of the government
security apparatus.
The insurgency quickly realized that the increasing marginalization of the Alkozai in the progovernment camp made it the weakest link in the Zirak chain and began to target their
leadership through assassinations in order to weaken them and possibly bring them onto
their side. The power vacuum that was created after several main Alkozai leaders were
assassinated or died, most recently the strongman Naqibullah, has created a situation where
the Alkozai have become increasingly under the influence of the Taliban standing in front of
the choice whether they need to accommodate the Taliban in order to protect their own
communities. Much of the current insecurity and increased reach of the insurgency operation
radius into Kandahar-city is linked to the inability or unwillingness of the Alkozai to stop them
from doing so.
iv
Recommendations
The security situation in Kandahar-city has deteriorated considerably in recent years and
reduced the presence of national and international development actors. Any response needs
to be backed by sufficient political commitment and cooperation among the different
international actors present in Southern Afghanistan and the Government of Afghanistan.
Efforts to stabilize the situation in Kandahar-city should also take on a regional perspective
and be linked to the surrounding districts and provinces.
Development of infrastructure, capacity building and civil society
As the main urban centre of southern Afghanistan, Kandahar-city requires improvement of its
infrastructure. This is particularly the case of the Loya Wiala area where the occupation of
government land led to an unplanned rapid urbanization in the form of slum dwellings.
•
A detailed survey of the Loya Wiala is desirable to assess the needs of the local
population including the many internally displaced persons and economic migrants
that have settled there.
•
Based on such a survey an integrated strategy for assistance to urban poor and
displaced persons could be developed, including protection strategies for IDPs.
Especially the lack of an adequate and stable provision of electricity is a main obstacle to a
more thriving economy and the development of industry. Access to electricity also improves
security and protects communities against petty crime.
•
Bridge the current efforts to rehabilitate the Dahla Dam (that will bear fruits only in
some years) with the expansion of the diesel generators currently providing
electricity. Once larger electricity generation projects supply power, diesel generators
can be shifted to other areas.
Kandahar-city is considered the economic centre of the South and one of the main trade
centres of Afghanistan. Agricultural infrastructure and farmer’s access to markets still lag
behind neighbouring countries as the continued lack of cool storage space, handling,
packing, grading, storing, processing facilities as well as marketing hinders competitive
business development, especially for export, in the entire south.
o
A strategy for an industrialization of the agriculture of Kandahar Province in general,
and Kandahar-city in particular should be devised in order to improve Afghanistan’s
export potential. This should include the setting up of cool storage and processing
facilities.
o
Especially industries that add value to local produce should be developed.
v
Kandahar-city is the seat of the provincial government, the regional centre of southern
Afghanistan and the seat of courts, schools and clinics. However, the infrastructure needs to
be matched with the capacity-building of lawyers, health care workers and teachers.
•
Increase efforts to build the capacity for civil servants.
•
Improve adult education level through increased efforts in adult literacy programs in
the city.
The justice system of Kandahar-city is overwhelmed by the amount of cases it must handle
and suffers from a lack of staff. The example of the mobile judge operating out of Kandaharcity and also covering Daman, Takhtapul and Spin Boldak illustrates this problem.
•
In order to alleviate the overburdened state justice system, the possibilities of outof-court
mediation/arbitration
systems
performed
by
traditional
justice
providers should be explored. A possibility might be to learn from the experience of
the Commission on Conflict Mediation dealing mainly with land conflicts in Khost.
Past experiences in civic education outreach in Afghanistan (mostly around elections),
including Kandahar, have shown that the general population often neither understand the
rights and obligations of government or citizens. Civic education programs conceived of as
long-term processes can help build a vivid civil society and transform them into informed
citizens that can build a grassroots process for a democratisation process. Revive civic
education programs by
•
Surveying the numerous existing associations and interest groups in Kandahar-city
and their capacity to provide civic education.
•
Developing a uniform curriculum development (one for government bureaucrats and
one for the general citizenship) for civic education providers.
•
Training a core task force of civic educators and make funds available for ongoing
programs.
Diplomacy/Governance
Any kind of program dealing with stabilization in Kandahar-city needs to respond to two main
problems concerning weak governance: corruption and exclusion. In order to work against
corruption, the following specific recommendations can be made:
•
Set up an oversight mechanism that controls civil servants’ prevalence to extract
hidden fess and taxes on basic economic transactions.
•
Set-up a transparent and accessible complaint mechanism with clear
accountability structures for poor government performance.
vi
•
Introduce merit based incentive systems in the public administration.
•
Increase of salary for government officials should be considered in order to decrease
the incentive for corruption (with reward for good behaviour).
•
Set incentives for local government officials to engage in capacity building programs
in order to increase their ability to serve the community.
A serious effort to create participatory and politically inclusive political structures must
be undertaken to counterbalance the feeling of marginalization among different tribes, in
particular the Panjpai and Ghilzai but also other ethnic or religious minorities. To address
these shortcomings, two directions can be taken: improve sub-national governance and
possibility of reconciliation with Taliban insurgents.
•
In consultation with local community leaders, explore ways and means of creating
a sense of balance and representation in appointed provincial and district
government structures without reinforcing tribal division or creating unnecessary
rigidity.
•
Consider the appointment of outsiders to sub/national governance positions and use
leverage to ensure that de facto power holders cannot meddle in or subvert the efforts
of these government officials.
•
Favor merit based appointment system in the administration and the police.
Explore/support reconciliation efforts aimed at including Taliban and other opposition to the
government.
•
This effort should be lead by persons with political clout and good-will on both
government and Taliban side.
•
To maintain neutrality, international actors should not be directly involved in the
reconciliation efforts (or are seen as leading it).
•
Explore if the GoA can appoint prominent and trusted tribal elders and religious
figures to conduct the reconciliation efforts on behalf of the government.
Security
As one of the main desires of the population is security, the international community should
support the government in setting up a trust-worthy and professional ANP in the city, and
continue to bolster the ANA. Local respondents reported a positive change in behaviour of
trained police and appreciate increased professionalism in the police forces.
o
Police training and mentoring should be expanded
vii
o
A transparent complaints mechanism for policy corruption and misbehaviour should
be devised and made accessible to the general population.
o
As parts of the community are unwilling to send their sons to the police forces until a
more inclusive political process has begun, a more representative local government
needs to b linked to improving the police force.
o
One could explore ways of reintegrating Taliban fighters that have laid down their
weapons into Afghan National Security Forces.
viii
Chapter
1
1 Purpose and Methodology
1.1
Overall Purpose
This assessment of Kandahar-city was commissioned by the Canadian Department of
Foreign Affairs and International Trade in order to increase the understanding of
development actors about existing social, political, economic, security, and conflict dynamics
in selected areas of Kandahar Province. Working with the “Do-no-Harm”3 framework that
aims to increase understanding regarding the complexity of conflict environments, this
assessment provides baseline data and ground realities about a district in which the
Government of Afghanistan’s (GoA) still has some control.
The Do-No-Harm methodology recognizes first and foremost that assistance in conflict or
post-conflict environments, regardless of motive, is not neutral; and that aid and development
which does not benefit the community as a whole can hinder reconciliation efforts, embolden
spoilers, and re-ignite conflict. A first step towards ensuring that aid does not make a fragile
situation more precarious is to gain an understanding of the current environment in light of
the following areas included in this assessment:
o
A better understanding of the district context and community needs, especially
economy and service delivery
o
An understanding of social structures (ethnic, religious, tribal), inter-group relations
and power dynamics
o
An overview of governance, rule of law and security from the perspective of district
residents
o
A background of key actors in Kandahar-city, including those who may seek to “spoil”
development and/or peace initiatives; but also potential capacities for peace
3
See Annex 1 for CDA Collaborative Learning Project “Do No Harm” key principles
1
This assessment should be considered a primer for development actors seeking to develop
sustainable engagement strategies. It can serve as an initial guide for navigating the district’s
fractured political and tribal landscape and identify possible entry points for undertaking
community driven development.
1.2
Research Methodology
In addition to desk research in Kabul, qualitative research was conducted through semistructured interviews and focus group discussions. The methodology used for this
assessment reflects a pragmatic approach to conducting research in a difficult and insecure
environment where obtaining information is not without danger. This is reflected in the
selection of surveyors, sampling techniques and triangulation of data.
First, due to an environment characterized by volatility and mistrust of outsiders, surveyors
were not selected based on their previous research experience, but were carefully chosen
according to the following criteria:
o
Prior knowledge of the district context and ability to gather information efficiently
without drawing too much attention to themselves (this biased selection to individuals
from Kandahar-city).
o
Surveyors had to be known either to TLO staff or trusted focal points – hence only
individuals considered as honest and trust-worthy were hired. If the surveyor was not
well-known, background checks were conducted with other individuals of trust to
assure that the surveyors were fit for the job.
After surveyors were selected they were trained on the survey questionnaire and information
to be collected. A comprehensive training was issued at the beginning of research and
subsequently surveyors were re-trained twice, after the completion of the first and second
phases of data collection respectively when data was delivered to TLO’s regional office in
Kandahar.
Second, for security reasons only a few formal interviews were conducted. The interview
methodology was adjusted to informal discussions where surveyors used their knowledge
about individuals in the district to engage them into an informal discussion covering various
topics. Furthermore, again due to security, surveyors did not disclose that they were
conducting formal research, the organization they worked for, or the donor that
commissioned the research.
Third, representative and random sampling was not used for this assessment; rather
surveyors relied on a mix of non-probability sampling techniques in order to reduce risk to
their person:
2
o
Purposive/stratified sampling, where a subset of the population is selected that share
at least one common characteristic. For this assessment tribal elders, government
employees, teachers and individuals with relevant knowledge (e.g., farmers) on the
district were selected for interviews. Men from all tribes within the district were
interviewed.
o
Convenience sampling, where those individuals known to the surveyor, or readily
available to participate in the research, are interviewed. Here surveyors also relied on
snowballing technique, where they relied on referrals from initial interview partners to
identify additional ones.
o
Judgment sampling whereby surveyors used their best judgment on whom to include
in the interview process. This only worked due to the careful selection of the
surveyors based on their previous experience and knowledge of the districts included
in this study.
Two surveyors conducted 45 individual informal interviews in Kandahar-city ranging from 30
minutes to three hours with: tribal elders (16), NGO staff (4), shopkeepers (6), merchants (3),
medical doctors (2), spiritual figures (3), mullahs (3), former jihadi commanders (2), staff of
the Directorate of Refugees and Repatriation (2), Afghan National Police (ANP) officers (2),
and health professionals (2, one veterinary and one vaccinator).
Surveyors supplemented interview data with information gathered through participant
observation. This helped, at times, to put information into the relevant social, political and
economic context, and is an important part of triangulation used in research to verify
information through various methods of data collection.
Additionally, the Kabul research team evaluated the data as it was collected and sent the
surveyor back into the field twice to fill gaps and collect details during which any remaining
gaps, inconsistencies, or contradictions were identified. In order to verify information, the
Kabul research team conducted four individual interviews lasting approximately four hours
each with key informants in Kandahar and Kabul.
1.2.1
Data limitations and Management of Bias
This assessment was limited by several factors, all linked to conducting research in an
insecure and difficult environment. In conflict contexts, the well-being of surveyors needs to
be balanced against scientific standards and rigor. Even though we attempted as much as
possible to double-check and triangulate information, we cannot fully guarantee the accuracy
of data presented here.
3
First, even though surveyors were rigorously screened and subsequently trained, their
potential bias towards other tribes/ethnic groups/communities, international military actors,
and the GoA must be taken into account.
Second, while sampling techniques used dramatically reduced risks to the surveyor, it may
have introduced bias, as those interviewed likely do not represent a perfect cross-section of
the population. As a result, findings by no means reflect the views of the entire population in
the areas studied, even though interview partners were selected as the most adequate
sources to reflect the views and experiences of the local population.
Third, the surveyor had to first memorize parts of the questionnaire and could not
immediately write down, much less record, respondents’ answers. The delay between
receiving and recording information may have resulted in the omission of details or the
oversimplifications.
1.2.2
Estimation Methods
This assessment includes two types of estimates, those for the general district population, as
well as population groups within the district. Due to the fact that big cities such as Kandaharcity lack the cohesion of villages, with populations intermixing, it was much harder to obtain
good information on the overall population and the social groups within them. Nevertheless,
the following methods were used to arrive at the final estimate, which differ from those of the
Central Statistics Office (see later discussion):
Population estimates: Surveyors estimated the population numbers with the help of the
number of mosques. They estimated that there are 2,000 mosques in the 11 precincts of
Kandahar-city. Every mosque represents an average of 100 households with an average size
of 10 members. This resulted in an estimated 2 million inhabitants on municipality ground.
Tribal Group estimates: Surveyors held a total of 20 interviews between 45 minutes and
one hour with tribal elders from different precincts of the city to gather estimations of the tribal
composition of the city. These individual estimations were compared with each other and an
averaged was taken. Estimation were first made on the level of tribal confederations and
ethnic groups, and then within confederation for individual tribes. In general, there were few
discrepancies between estimations. This resulted in the following tribal/ethnic breakdown:
Zirak Durrani 50%, Panjpai Durrani 15%, Ghilzai 15%, Shia 8% and 12% others, such
Wardak, Mohmand, Sayed, Tajik, Baluch, and other small tribes. Within the Zirak Durrani,
40% are Popalzai, 30% are Barakzai, 15% Alkozai, Achekzai 10% and Mohammadzai 5%.
4
Chapter
2
2 District Context
Kandahar-city is located 280
miles southwest of Kabul at an
elevation of 1,000 meters above
sea level.4 Spin Boldak, the only
legal border crossing to Pakistan
in Kandahar Province is located
120 kilometres or a two hours
drive
to
the
Kandahar-city.
Southeast
The
of
Kandahar
International Airport is located
about 25 km south of the city in
Daman District and connects
Kandahar
to
national
and
international destinations such
Figure 1: Location of Kandahar-city
as Mashad (Iran) and Dubai
(United Arab Emirates).
The city areas is mainly (70%) comprised of roads, houses, markets, schools, government
buildings and parks (70%), with only 30% (2,500 ha) remaining as irrigated agricultural land.
The most important source of water for Kandahar-city is rivers and canals, especially the
Arghandab irrigation network that feeds water from the Arghandab River through canals to
the city. Similar to Kabul, most drinking water for the city population is supplied by deep
wells.
4
Adamec Ludwig. Historical Dictionary of Afghanistan, Manas Publication, Delhi.
5
2.1
2.1.1
Overview of Kandahar Municipality
Administrative Divisions and Population
The Central Statistic Office estimates the population of Kandahar-city at 500,0005, with TLO’s
estimate being four times as high (2 million). Given that Kandahar-city has shown a drastic
growth in the post-Taliban period and is considered one of the biggest cities in Afghanistan,
the CSO estimates seem unrealistically low.
For administrative purposes, Kandahar-city is divided into ten precincts or nahiya. Nahiyas 14 are the “old city” that had originally been populated by the traditional pre-war elite of the
Zirak Durrani Pashtun Mohammadzai, Barakzai and Popalzai tribes, Shia mostly of Qizilbash
and Hazara descent (nahiya 1) and the merchant Hindu community (nahiya 4). Shia still
make up an estimated 40% of nahiya 1 and in nahiya 7 there is a small population of Sikhs
(0.5%) that moved to Kandahar from Tirin Kot after mujahideen grabbed their land and shops
after the fall of the government of Dr. Naqibullah in 1992. They are mostly money changers
and shopkeepers. Other non-Pashtun ethnic groups in Kandahar-city include Baluch and
farsiwan (Persian speaking Sunnite Tajiks) and religious families (such as sayeds, pirs). The
Sayed claim direct descent from the Prophet Mohammad’s family (PBUH) and stand outside
the tribal and ethnic order.
2.1.2
Loya Wiala – the melting pot
Loya Wiala is a large suburban area located north of the city centre (and old town) and the
melting pot of the city. Since 1992, it has been the gravitational centre for newly arriving
population from different tribes and provinces, be they economic migrants or internally
displaced persons (IDP). Many of the economic migrants were landless people who migrated
to the city after the khan system broke down as a consequence of both the policy of the
People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) and population growth in rural areas.
Labourers who were no longer employable in the agricultural sector moved into the city in
search for new economic opportunities. The IDPs in Loya Wiala come from different
provinces of Afghanistan and fled to Kandahar in different phases since 1992. Since 2006,
IDPs from the Zhari Dasht IDP camp and conflict-induced IDPs from other provinces such as
Helmand, Uruzgan and Zabul have moved to Loy Wiala, melting in with the urban poor.6
Local respondents describe parts of Loya Wiala as the most insecure area of the city, where
there is less social control with easier infiltration by Taliban insurgents. They have been able
5
Central Statistics Office (2008)
Susanne Schmeidl, Alexander D. Mundt and Nick Miszak, 2009, Beyond the Blanket: Towards more
Effective Protection for Internally Displaced Persons in Southern Afghanistan, a Joint Report of the
Brookings/Bern Project on Internal Displacement and The Liaison Office, Washington D.C.: The
Brookings Institution.
6
6
to establish networks in this area of the city because of the insecure land tenure rights (more
details in chapters 2.6 and 4.4).
Today, Loya Wiala consists of two different parts.
•
The area now constituting Loya Wiala I was state land developed under the government
of Dr. Najibullah as part of urban planning and development schemes. There is water
supply and streets are paved.
•
The areas now making up Loya Wiala II have been populated continuously since 1992
mostly by Alkozai and migrants from Helmand, Uruzgan and Zabul after the government
land was occupied by commanders Mullah Naqibullah (Alkozai, Jamiat) and Amir Lalay
(Popalzai, Mahaz) who subsequently sold it off. Some of the land is made up of irregular
squatter settlements.
2.1.3
Historical Sites
Kandahar has a rich history and a number of historic sites are located on municipality
grounds:
o
nahiya 2: Khirqa Mubaraka west of the city centre, Ahmad Shah Baba Shrine, Mullah
Azla Baba and Speen Kosee Baba Shrines
o
nahiya 3: Moee Mubarak
o
nahiya 4: Mir Wais Nika Shrine, Mullah Dawran Baba and Sheenaghzai Aghsabee
Shrines
o
nahiya 6: Akhtar Mazaree Ziarat Shirne
These historic sites are popular places for pilgrimage. Some of the sites are linked to the
strong popular belief that visits to these places help to recover from sickness, assure healthy
animals and fertility.
2.2
Historical Background
The communist coup d’etat and ensuing Afghan wars changed the face of Kandahar-city by
sparking population movements and the destruction of property. The significance of the city
elite in Kandahar-city declined as executions targeting the royal family (mostly of the
Mohammadzai tribe) led to an exodus of many khans from the city and the surrounding
districts. At the same time, new leaders emerged from the war and took their place in the
power structure.
2.2.1
The mujahideen in Kandahar
The surrounding districts fell to the mujahideen faction before the city. From 1979 on, armed
struggle against the government of the PDPA spread from rural areas to the west of
Kandahar. While they were initially popular uprisings linked to khans negatively affected by
7
the communist land redistribution decrees, they became increasingly organized and linked to
jihadi factions channelling resources from Pakistan to fighting groups inside Kandahar. The
main jihadi factions operating around Kandahar-city are described in the Box 1 below:
Box 1: Main jihadi factions operating around Kandahar-city
Jamiat-e Islami (Islamic Society) was led by the late Mullah Naqibullah Akhund, an
Alkozai of modest standing (former shopkeeper/mullah) from Arghandab. He later became
corps commander in the mujahideen government. Support by the Alkozai of Arghandab, the
possession of heavy and light weapons as wells as 6,000 armed fighters forces made Jamiat
the strongest faction in the Kandahar-city area.
Mahaz-e Milli-e Islami (National Islamic Front) had strong support of the Barakzai and
Popalzai tribal establishment, but their strongest commanders were of modest social
standing. The most important Mahaz commanders were Haji Latif, the father of Gul Agha
Sherzai (Barakzai), and Amir Lalay (Popalzai) from Shah Wali Kot. Amir Lalay later
established links to Jamiat and was involved in heavy fighting in the city with Mullah
Naqibullah after 1992. While Mahaz counted around 5,000 fighters it had fewer weapons than
Jamiat.
Hizb-e Islami - Gulbuddin (Hekmatyar) faction (HIG) was led by Sarkatib Atta
Muhammed, a Lodin from Dand District of Kandahar. HIG had little power inside the city and
its troops of about 1,500 fighters were concentrated on the western city border. Its support
was stronger among the Ghilzai tribes.
Ittehad-e Islami was led by Ustad Abdul Halim, a Nurzai from Panjwayi who commanded
about 1,000 armed forces. He became the first Chief of Police of the mujahideen government.
In addition to Nurzai backing, support for Ittehad was also strong among the Kakar tribe.
Harakat-e-Islami was the faction supported by the Shia population in the city and was led by
Ali Yawar, a Shia of Qizilbash descent resident of Top Khana, Kandahar-city.
Harakat-e Inqilab-e Islami was led by Mullah Azizullah in the city. The party was strong
among religious leaders (mullahs) and later largely integrated into the Taliban movement.
Mullah Mohammad Omar (Hotak), the leader of the Taliban, used to be a member of Harakate-Inqilab.
Kandahar-city stayed a safe haven for pro-government individuals until the fall of the
government of Dr. Najibullah in 1992. The PDPA government was able to keep their
presence for so long mostly because PDPA leaders channelled resources into the city and
made deals with the mujahideen forces.7
The mujahideen forces took control of Kandahar-city on 28 April 1992, after the collapse of
the government of Dr. Najibullah. As in many places around Afghanistan, the mujahideen
7
A prominent PDPA supporter was the former Minister of Defence and Governor of Kandahar under
Dr. Najibullah, Nur-ul Haq Ulumi of the Barakzai tribe. Under his leadership in Kandahar-city (19891992), mujahideen fighters were allowed to enter the city at night without weapons to visit their
families. He is to this day one of the most important leader of the Barakzai tribe next to Gul Agha
Sherzai and member of the Wolesi Jirga. He received most votes of the Barakzai tribe in the
parliamentary elections.
8
government in Kandahar was highly unstable as different power struggles shook the city.
Armed conflict between rivalling commanders broke out as they sought to expand their
respective areas of control, killing hundreds of people. The mujahideen factions divided the
city, street-by-street (see Box 2), taxed people arbitrarily, looted ministries and committed
revenge killings. Gul Agha Sherzai, who became the governor of Kandahar during the
mujahideen government, was unable to manage the rivalries and effectively assert his
leadership.8
Box 2: Areas of control and check posts of different commanders
o
o
o
o
Haji Ahmed (Achekzai from Spin Boldak, son of Haji Maghash)
o
Captured the airport region
o
Check post (patak) on the Kandahar-Spin Boldak Highway
Amir Lalay (Popalzai from Shah Wali Kot)
o
Captured the area of the textile factory and the customs house, Qishla-e-Jadeed,
Dafi-e-Hawa Ghund, Manzil Bagh, Deh Khwaja, Baro Darwaza and many other
areas.
o
Check post (patak) on the highway from Kandahar to Kabul, close to the textile
factory
Mullah Naqibullah Akhund (Alkozai from Arghandab, Jamiat, head of the
mujahideen army corps)
o
Captured Firqa, Darwaza-e-Herat, Chonay, and Shahr-e-Naw (Jamiat, Alkozai
tribe); head of the mujahideen army corps.
o
Check post (patak) on the highway from Kandahar to Uruzgan in Kotal Marcha
village located north of Loy Wiala and known as the boundary between the city
and Arghandab district
Gul Agha Sherzai (Barakzai, Mahaz-e-Milli-e-Islami from Dand)
o
o
o
Captured the areas in the south, Ikhkarpur Darwaza, Arg, Charsu, Kabul Bazar.
Ustad Abdul Alim (Nurzai, Ittehad from Panjwayi)
o
Captured Mirwais Maidan and Sarpoza,
o
He became the first CoP until fighting with Mullah Naqibullah forced him to flee.
Sarkatib Atta Muhammed (Lodin, Hizb-e Islami, from Arghandab)
o
Captured Baghpul
o
HIG also captured the cantonment (chawni). When the other factions turned on
HIG they retreated to the west.
o
Check post (patak) on the highway from Kandahar to Herat province in Baghpul,
Mirwais Meena village
8
According to Giustozzi, this failure to manage tribal rivalries and assert his leadership was essentially
repeated during his governorship from 2002-2005.
9
The failure of the mujahideen government in Kandahar-city to establish law and order and
unified governance allowed the more powerful commanders Amir Lalay (Popalzai) and
Mullah Naqib (Alkozai) to occupy state land located north of the army garrison (Qishla-eJadeed) as well as the Loya Wiala desert (now nahiya 9). Subsequently they sold plots to
their sub-commanders.9 Coming from modest social standing, both commanders used the
land not only to enrich themselves but also to build up constituencies.10 Mullah Naqibullah
distributed land among Alkozai who moved into the city and today make up a majority of
nahiya 9, while Amir Lalay built his constituency not only among his sub-commanders but
also Popalzai landowners and farmers, and former PDPA clerks and factory workers
(discussed further in Chapters 3). At the same time both commanders engaged in violent
clashes against each other that destabilized the city.
Numerous conflicts other fault lines centred on Mullah Naqibullah, the Alkozai commander of
Jamiat-e-Islami were created at that time:
o
Power struggle between Provincial Governor Gul Agha Sherzai and Mullah
Naqibullah (see Figure 2), the Corps Commander of the mujahideen government.
This power struggle continued with the Taliban takeover and collapse and soured
relations between the Alkozai and the Barakzai tribes to this day (see chapter 3).
Mahaz-e
Milli
Barakzai
Jamiat-e
Islami
Gul Agha
Sherzai
Mullah
Naqibullah
Alkozai
Conflict Line
Alliance or affiliation
No relation
Figure 2: Power struggle between Amir Lalay and Mullah Naqibullah
9
The occupation and selling of state land was repeated in the beginning of the current government.
This is very similar to other commanders such as Mullah Nasim Akhundzada from Helmand, who
used the drug trade and the distribution of its benefits as a way of asserting his continued leadership
large areas of northern Helmand.
10
10
o
Ustad Abdul Alim (Nurzai, Ittehad), the first CoP of Kandahar was forced to flee the
city after armed clashes with Mullah Naqibullah; he later supported the Northern
Alliance.
o
Mullah Naqibullah struggled with Sarkattib Atta Mohammad, because the latter was a
HIG commander. The defeat of HIG (and thus the marginalization of the Ghilzai
support base) finds a continuation today in Arghandab district where the Alkozai
marginalize the Ghilzai tribes (see Chapter 3).
HIG against the rest
With the common PDPA and Soviet enemies gone, the old Zirak Durrani - Ghilzai rivalry in
and around Kandahar-city over regional leadership resurfaced as HIG and the other
mujahideen factions began opposing each other. HIGs support base was strongest among
the Ghilzai tribes, the Kandahar tribal “underdogs” since 1730 (see also Chapter 4.1) while
the Zirak Durrani establishment (Barakzai and Popalzai) had been closer to the traditionalist
Mahaz-e-Milli and Jabha-e-Nejat (the Alkozai were divided between Jamiat and Mahaz,
further discussed in Section 3). The “Zirak factions” agreed on a loose alliance against HIG
and pushed them to the western border of the city (see Figure 3).
Zirak
Durrani
Mahaz ,
Nejat, Jamiat
HIG
Ghilzai
Figure 3: Simplified major fault lines between HIG and other factions
The Panjpai tribes such as the Nurzai, Alizai and Ishaqzai were strongly fragmented and split
among different factions. This is a continued feature today particularly concerning the Nurzai
tribe (see Chapter 3).
2.2.2
The rise of the Taliban
These power struggles in Kandahar during the short-lived mujahideen rule paved the way for
the Taliban movement that started when (minor) jihadi figures Mullah Rabbani (Kakar)11,
Mullah Omar (Hotak), and Mullah Abdul Salam Zaif (Alizai) formed the nucleus of the Taliban
movement and moved against check posts violence and hung Commander Mansur
(Achekzai) in Takhtapul. Haji Basher, a former HIG commander and narcotics pusher of the
11
He was allegedly killed by ISI because of his moderate stance on religious issues.
11
Nurzai tribe, was one of the first major jihadi commanders to support the Taliban movement
with weapons and money, which gave them a decisive momentum.12
Initial support for the Taliban movement seems to have come from Panjpai, Ghilzai and other
smaller tribes who had historically not been part of the tribal establishment. As the Taliban
grew in strength, members of the Zirak Durrani tribes (Popalzai, Barakzai and Alkozai) began
supporting them as well. At that time a faction of the Taliban supported the return of the king
from exile and thus fit well with the political platform of the Zirak Durrani.13 This provided the
Taliban movement with a broad support base from different tribal confederations, with the
Zirak Durrani mostly supporting the pro-royalist wing of the Taliban.
The only mujahideen commanders who actively fought the Taliban were Commander Amir
Lalay (Popalzai) and Sarkatib Atta Muhammed (Lodin; see Figure 4). Sarkatib Atta
Muhammed Lodin’s forces fought shortly against the Taliban in the west of the city but
eventually abandoned their positions and weapons caches in Nawrozi Ghar.14 Amir Lalay
was not looked upon favorably by the Taliban because of the openly anti-Pakistani stance he
had taken in opposition to the continued influence of the ISI on Afghanistan after the Soviet
withdrawal in 1989.15 Lalay staged a battle in the airport region against the Taliban whom he
saw as Pakistan’s proxies. When the Taliban moved on Kandahar-city they targeted
commanders loyal to Lalay such as Baro Popalzai from Kandahar-city who was caught and
executed publicly. Wishing to maintain at least some power, Lalay fled to Iran and later joined
the Northern Alliance. Lalay’s rival Mullah Naqibullah was allowed to stay in Arghandab
District by the Taliban despite his former affiliation with Jamiat-e Islami as he handed over
weapons and ammunition. The then mujahideen governor and Barakzai commander Gul
Agha Sherzai went into exile in Quetta without a fight.
12
There are different local accounts of the genesis of the Taliban. Some claim it was a rather
spontaneous event while others claim the ISI orchestrated everything from the beginning.
13
see Shetter (2004) Hamid Karzai. Ein Portrait. Südasien Information Nr.1.
14
He is now a businessman in Dubai.
15
Local respondents claim that Lalay was approached by the ISI who asked him to sabotage the
Dahla Dam in Shah Wali Kot which was under his control as a way of disrupting the Afghan economy.
Lalay refused to destroy Kandahar’s biggest asset and denounced Pakistan’s meddling in Afghan
affairs on public TV by tearing up a check he had received from the ISI.
12
Factional fights
nd
La P o
we
r
HIG
Amir Lalay
Mullah
Naqibullah
weapons
Sar Katib
Atta
Anti-Pak
istan
Taliban
Figure 4: Alliances and opposition to the Taliban
The handover of Kandahar to the Taliban forces is subject to speculation. Some local
respondents claim that while Gul Agha Sherzai and the Taliban were still negotiating, Mullah
Naqibullah switched sides to the latter and weakened the position of the mujahideen
government. Those who believe this version of events see Naqibullah as a traitor and his
opportunism as an explanation for the bitter rivalry between the Alkozai and the Barakzai in
the current government.16 Others maintain that the entire Zirak Durrani establishment was
bought off on 2 November 1994 at a meeting in the Pakistani consulate, attended by
Azizullah Wasifi (Alkozai), Abdul Ahad Karzai (Popalzai) and Gul Agha Sherzai (Barakzai),
where millions of Pakistani Rupees changed hands and a decision was made to hand over
the city to the Taliban. The versions are not necessarily irreconcilable, as a switching over of
Naqibullah to the Taliban could have forced Sherzai to accept an “out of battle settlement”.
The differing accounts do, however, express the views of locals about the possible complicity
of the jihadi leadership in the Taliban takeover as well as the centrality of Pakistan’s
involvement.
2.2.3
The fall of the Taliban
As noted earlier, the Zirak Durrani tribal establishment initially supported the political wing of
the Taliban movement that promised the return of the king from exile.17 Over time however,
16
Some Alkozai also claim that this rivalry is much older. In their account, the power of the Alkozai in
Kandahar-city and its surroundings used to be much bigger in the distant past and they had been
pushed out by the Barakzai tribe when they became more powerful.
17
See Shetter (2004) Hamid Karzai. Ein Portrait. In: Südasien Information Nr.1.
13
the influence of the pro-monarchist camp within the Taliban movement was weakened.18 The
pro-royal Zirak Durrani tribes, among them the Karzai family, increasingly turned away from
the Taliban movement and began to be active in a network of exile Afghans known as the
Rome group that planned a post-Taliban political reorganisation of Afghanistan.19
After 9/11 the US-led Coalition Forces invaded Afghanistan to oust the Taliban and Al-Qaeda
from power in Afghanistan. In addition to support from the Northern Alliance in northern
Afghanistan, militias led by some of the old power holders of southern Afghanistan such as
the Karzai family and Gul Agha Sherzai who prepared the run on Kandahar-city were
instrumental to the strategy of the US-lead Coalition Forces.
Gul Agha Sherzai (Barakzai) entered Afghanistan with a tribal militia from his exile in Quetta
and his forces captured the airport and moved into Kandahar-city. Hamid Karzai (Popalzai)
had entered Afghanistan from Shah Wali Kot to rally support against the Taliban among the
Pashtun tribes in Uruzgan and approached Kandahar-city. Amir Lalay (Popalzai) returned
from the north to regain control of the Dahla Dam in Shah Wali Kot.
Mullah Naqibullah, the Alkozai leader who had stayed in Arghandab District during the
Taliban, exhibited his political opportunism once again and took on the role as key negotiator
between the Taliban and the new powers to be. With the exception of foreign Taliban or Al
Qaeda fighters of Arab descent no one put up a fight and Gul Agha Sherzai's troops took
control of the city following negotiations. The entire Taliban leadership escaped. While the
circumstances are not entirely clear, some local respondents claim that while Sherzai
approached the city from the south, Mullah Naqibullah provided the Taliban leadership with
an escape route to the west and northwest.
Defeating the Taliban proved easier, however, than to share power as the different victors
positioned themselves to claim key positions in the post-Taliban political set-up. The question
of who would have control over Kandahar City pinned the Zirak leaders Gul Agha Sherzai
and Hamid Karzai against each other.20 Karzai wanted to install Mullah Naqibullah as
Provincial Governor while Sherzai opposed this, as he resented the role Naqibullah had
played in the Taliban take-over of Kandahar. Although Karzai allegedly favoured Mullah
Naqibullah as provincial governor he was forced to compromise and appoint Sherzai upon
pressure of tribal elders and other influential regional leaders. Karzai’s brother, Ahmad Wali
Karzai would become the informal ruler of Kandahar-city.
Disunity among the victors plagued the post-Taliban government from the onset.
Furthermore, the opportunity for reconciliation with the Taliban was missed and Kandahar
18
Again, some local respondents stressed the role of Pakistan in this context. They claim the ISI
assassinated pro-monarchist Taliban because the royal family had not accepted the Durand line.
19
see Shetter (2004) Hamid Karzai. Ein Portrait. Südasien Information Nr.1.
20
CNN December 6, 2001
14
(and Afghanistan) is currently bearing the consequences. Even though Hamid Karzai
proposed the currently debated reconciliation and amnesty for the Taliban leadership already
in 2001, if they were to renounce their association with Al-Qaeda, Gul Agha Sherzai, then
already governor was unable to partake due to pressure from the Americans. Former USDefence Minister Rumsfeld publicly declared: “It has been communicated to us that if we
arrange a peace plan that allows for the release of Mullah Omar, Karzai would lose support
from America, and the northern alliance would lose the support of the coalition."21
2.3
Economy
Kandahar-city’s strategic location on trade routes between Iran and the Indian subcontinent
have made it an important trading hub for many centuries and many conflicts throughout
history have been related to the control of the flow of economic goods through the area.
Today, Kandahar is the main trading centre of southern Afghanistan with businesses of all
sorts. All surrounding districts are closely linked to the bazaars in Kandahar-city. The major
sources of income in the municipality, according to local respondents, are linked to shop
keeping and trade with food items (especially orchard products), import-export businesses of
Pakistani, Chinese, and Iranian goods by Afghan merchants, illegal poppy trade (albeit there
is no poppy bazaar in the city), daily wage labour, Afghan government and NGO
employment, agriculture and transportation.
In addition, two stone quarries are located on municipality ground: Baba Sahib Ghar lies to
the south of the city and Chalzino Ghar is located 7 km to the west of the city. The rocks and
stones of the mountains are used for construction purposes such as retaining walls and for
the production of gravel for roads and sand for pavement.
The average income level of each family is between 4,500 and 5,000 Afghani per month
(US$ 90 to 100) in the city, more than double the World Bank poverty line (US$ 1.25/day).22
Trade associations
There are a great number of trade associations and interest groups in Kandahar-city
including associations for perishable goods, non-perishable goods, and services. Their main
purpose is price control and lobbying, with the key associations listed below (for a full list see
Table 2 in the annex):
o
Perishable goods associations include fresh fruit, dry fruit, butcher, and bakers
associations;
21
December 7, 2001, Friday, BC cycle
http://www.globalissues.org/article/4/poverty-around-theworld#WorldBanksPovertyEstimatesRevised
22
15
o
Non-perishable goods associations include textile, gasoline, construction material,
car dealers, jewellery, gas sellers, and wood sellers associations;
o
Service associations include money exchange, tailors, hotels, truck drivers,
teachers, doctors, writers and poets associations;
Money – banks, money markets
Kandahar-city is the main financial centre of southern Afghanistan. There are several banks
in Kandahar-city and the largest money exchange market of southern Afghanistan. The main
currency used in Kandahar-city is the Pakistani Rupees (PKR) as most goods are imported
from Pakistan. Local respondents estimated that almost 80% of the sum of business
transactions is done in PKR and only 20%, mostly involving smaller sums, in the official
currency, the Afghani. There are almost 90 roadside money exchangers in the city centre,
but many are concentrated in the Sarafi market in nahiya 1.23 The money exchangers and
lenders use the hawala system and charge one percent on every transaction to Kabul (see
money changers association in Table 2 of the annex).
2.3.1
Markets - Export/Import Goods
There are many shops and bazaars in the city where items of daily use are bought and sold.
There is no particular scarcity of goods and most things are readily available if the price is
right. The main trading partner is Pakistan from where most items are imported; the main
export product to Pakistan is dry fruit.
The main problems traders confront are the effects of road insecurity, road blocks, unclear
expectations towards the future, arbitrary bureaucratic ‘taxation’ of business transactions
(see more in Section 4) and inadequate infrastructure (lack of reliable electricity, cool
storage, processing and packaging facilities).
Especially the lacking infrastructure causes a sub-optimal use of Kandahar’s export potential.
Especially fresh and dry fruits such as raisins of different kinds are in high demand in
Pakistan, India, and UAE and have a great export potential. The problem is that local
standards regarding food safety and quality do not meet international export standards. While
there is an industrial park located on the Kandahar to Spin Boldak highway close to
Shorandam (Daman), it is underused (few enterprises making cooking oil) because there is
not enough electricity.
There are four main bazaars in Kandahar-city listed according to their size:
o
Shah bazaar south of the governor’s house with 2,000 shops
o
Herat bazaar west of the governor’s house with 2,000 shops
23
The most important exchange rates are: 1,000 AFN for 1,500 PKR, 1,000 Iranian Toman equal 82.5
AFN and $1 is equal to 80.60 PKR.
16
o
Ikhkar-pur Darwaza south of the governor’s house with 1,200 shops
o
The Kabul bazaar east of the governor’s house with around 1,000 shops
The products available are mostly of Pakistani or Chinese origin (especially textile, clothes)
while Pakistan and Iran is important for food items. Fuel is imported form Iran and medicine
and farming items from India, Pakistan, Iran, and China. Farming items also come from
Russia. Closures of the border with Pakistan lead to increased prices of imported goods such
as meat, fertilizer, sugar and rice.
There are also a number of specialized bazaars. Dry fruits such as raisins, almonds and figs
are sold in nahiya 4 and the former customs house. In nahiya 5 and 6 there are 40 and 30
car dealerships, respectively.
2.3.2
Agricultural Production
An estimated 30% (2,500 ha) of municipality land is arable and mostly located to the west of
the city in nahiya 6, the south in nahiya 2 and the east in nahiya 5. About 10% of the
municipality population is engaged in agriculture and some people living mostly in nahiya 2
and 6 (5%) keep livestock such as cows and goats, selling excess produce in city bazaars.
The main crops are pomegranates, carrots, alfalfa, spinach, and cauliflower. Pomegranates
are the most important crop and cultivated on an estimated third of all arable land.
The most important source of irrigation water for Kandahar-city comes from the Arghandab
canal network that feeds water from the Arghandab and Aliband Rivers to other canals. The
main canals are:
o
The Pirpaimal Wiala located to west of the centre in nahiya 6; it extends to Salihan
located on the eastern border of Panjwayi District
o
The Noshi Jan and Robat Wiala flow from the Aliband and Arghandab Rivers to Noshi
Jan village (nahiya 6) and the Robat Wiala to Robat village (Dand District).
o
The Loya Wiala (‘big canal’) connects the Aliband and Arghandab Rivers to the north
of the city centre and reaches Qalamtar and Khoshab in Daman District.
An additional 15 deep wells located to the east, west and south sides of the city are used
when there is no water in the wialas.
The problems with agricultural production are similar to surrounding districts. Water is
available in sufficient amounts but the agricultural sectors lacks “industrialization”. There are
insufficient amounts of tractors, professional farming equipment, fertilizers, improved seeds,
pesticides as well as processing and marketing of agricultural products. Agricultural
infrastructure and farmer’s access to markets still lag behind neighbouring countries as the
continued lack of cool storage space, handling, packing, grading, storing, processing facilities
17
as well as marketing hinders competitive business development, especially for export, in the
entire south. There used to be a big state-owned fruit-processing factory called Shirkat-e
Miwa that is fully destroyed now. With a strategy for an industrialization of the agriculture of
Kandahar Province, the city could become the centre of an industry addressing these deficits
by developing a seed production industry and cooperatives to get tractors, loans, water
pumps and marketing. A recent initiative has been the creation of a cooperative in the city
centre that sells milk, yoghurt, etc.
2.3.3
Poppy Economy
Kandahar is a key transit route for opium poppy to factories in Afghanistan that refine it to
heroin. The narcotics industry in Afghanistan is best described/understood as an economic
activity with competition between rivalling networks often structured along tribal lines that
may be pro- or anti-government. Thus, members of all tribes, including largely progovernment, are involved in drug trafficking. Nonetheless, because Panjpai tribes are often
marginalized from opportunities in the legal economy they have a higher likelihood to be
involved in illicit smuggling activities of all kind. There are no poppy bazaars in the city,
however, as these were already closed down in 2002 by the order of US Special Forces.24
2.4
Services
The service provision In Kandahar-city is good by Afghan standards. There are open schools
for boys and girls, health clinics and hospitals, communication infrastructure and media and
interest groups for women, athletes, and persons with disabilities. The electricity supply,
however, is still insufficient. This section provides a first quick overview of the service
provision in Kandahar-city, but given the size of the city and complexity of services offered it
is possibly some elements were missed here.
2.4.1
Education
Literacy and education levels are relatively high in Kandahar-city with an estimated two-thirds
of the population having at least basic skills in reading and writing. UN Habitat has been
active in Kandahar since the Taliban regime of the mid-1990s. Their good reputation aids
them to continue to provide services even in a deteriorating security environment. According
to local respondents, in the beginning of 2009, they started a six months daily adult literacy
courses for 25 students each morning and afternoon in all precincts of the city. There are
also six months vocational courses for carpenters, metal working, tailoring, mechanics and
electricians.25
24
25
Press Worldstream February 11, 2002
http://www.unhabitat.org/list.asp?typeid=13&catid=245
18
According to local respondents there are 22 open schools in Kandahar-city with 1,180 female
teachers and 1,796 male teachers accommodating a total of 38,220 boys and 23,500 girls.
Table 1 provides an overview of schools in Kandahar-city. The relative high number of high
schools suggests that the city is an important centre for higher education for surrounding
districts, especially girls.
Table 1: Open Schools in Kandahar City
Mixed (boys &
girls)
Boys only
Girls Only
Total
High School
9
1
4
14
Secondary
School
3
1
1
5
Primary School
2
1
--
3
Total
14
3
5
22
2.4.2
Health
Tables 2-4 provide an overview of health services in Kandahar-city by service provider.
There is a mix of government, private and NGO-run hospital and clinics. There are two
government-run hospitals (Table 2) and nine private hospitals (Table 3). The Mirwais
Hospital is also known as Chinese Hospital due being financed and supported by China. The
Nizamai Shafakhana (Military hospital) is located on the Kandahar- Kabul Highway near the
Kabul bus station. It is no longer a military hospital because the Ministry of Defence sold it to
the Kandahar University Medical Branch where graduate students can start their last
practical year in this hospital.
Table 2: State-run hospitals and clinics in Kandahar-city
Name
Chinese
Shafakhana
Nizamai
Shafakhana
Campaign
Malaria And
Lashmania office
TB Treatment
and control
centre
Indicate type of
facility:
Hospital
Hospital HC
Male/Female
Both male
and female
Both male
and female
Malaria treatment
Tuberculosis
treatment
19
Male
Male
Female
Doctors Nurses Doctors
Female
Nurses
60
100
30
90
50
4
0
2
Table 3: Private hospitals
Male
Doctors
Male
Nurses
Female
Doctors
Female
Nurses
Alhadi Farhad Roghtoon
20
6
0
4
Bilal Roghtoon
22
9
9
10
Alhajir Khidmat Roghtoon
9
6
0
0
Ayoubee Roghtoon
15
18
10
4
Alsina Roghtoon
12
9
0
0
Itihad Roghtoon
8
0
14
0
Hila Roghtoon
50
30
20
12
Alhadee Roghton
3
3
2
1
Noor Shafakhana
20
10
3
5
Name
Information of the Ministry of Public Health also indicates the existence of an additional 16
clinics of different type supported by the government (2) and NGOs (14): four
Comprehensive Health Clinics, seven Basic Health Clinics, and five specialized clinics (see
Table 2 for government-run clinics and Table 4 for those run by NGOs). The local NGO
Afghan Health & Development Services (AHDS) run by far the highest number of clinics (8):
four Basic Health Centres and four Comprehensive Health Centres. The Afghan Red
Crescent Society (ARCS) also runs a clinic. Four other NGOs are in charge of the remaining
five clinics: Comprehensive Disabled Afghans' Program (CDAP), Coordination of Afghan
Relief (COAR), and Alternative Development and Agriculture (ADAG) run one each, and the
Islamic Aid Health Centre (IAHC) runs two.
Table 4: Clinics supported by NGOs26
Facility Name
Facility Type
NGO
Angoryan Clinic
Basic Health Centre
AHDS
House Madad(Ashoqa) Clinic
Basic Health Centre
AHDS
Mansoor Kalay Clinic
Basic Health Centre
AHDS
Zakir Sharif Clinic
Basic Health Centre
AHDS
Fatema Zhara Clinic
Basic Health Centre
CDAP
Central Poly Clinic of Kandahar
Basic Health Centre
COAR
26
Source: Ministry of Public Health
20
Facility Name
Facility Type
NGO
Mia Sahib Clinic
Basic Health Centre
IAHC
Loya Wiala Clinic
Comprehensive Health
Centre
AHDS
MirZa Muhamad Khan
Comprehensive Health
Centre
AHDS
PirKalacha Clinic
Comprehensive Health
Centre
AHDS
Rawani Clinic
Comprehensive Health
Centre
AHDS
ADAG, MCH Clinic
Other
ADAG
Kandahar Health Clinic of ARCS
Other
ARCS
Nazwana Clinic
Other
IAHC
Medicine of Pakistani, Iranian, Indian and Chinese origin is available in over 730 private
pharmacies located in different parts of the city. Most of them are staffed with pharmacists
but some also run by businessmen.
2.4.3
Electricity
The main sources of electricity are 14 diesel-run generators in Brikhna Kot (nahiya 6) located
to the north of the city centre. They provide six hours of electricity in a 24-hour period. More
affluent people, NGOs and business rely on private generators.
The National Solidarity Programme (NSP) implemented by UN Habitat provided electricity
through solar panels and generators in nahiyas 2, 5, 6, and 9. More recently, six solar panels
and two generators for people in an area called Naw-e Hawza to the north of the city centre
that did not have access to the city electricity grid. As a result, 10% of the population in Nawe-Hawza now has electricity.
2.4.4
Communication and media
While the offer of different media products with a selection of print-media, radio and TV on
offer is greater than in rural areas (or other southern provinces), people say that media
freedom is limited and contents censored. Local respondents provided the example of a
disabled person who wanted to read a critical piece of society in a poetry forum. Allegedly
government officials did not let him and he was beaten. Despite the fact that the case went to
the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) and UNAMA nothing
happened.
All of Kandahar-city’s population has access to FM radio channels such as BBC, Radio
Azadi, Voice of America and Radio Kandahar (government radio). Radio Kilid (from Kabul) is
21
popular with younger persons. There are also some print media, such as Sur Ghar (monthly
magazine) and Tolo Afghan. Tolo Afghan is sold at a price of 5 Afghani and published three
times a week (Sunday, Tuesday, and Thursday) by the Directorate of Information and Culture
and distributed among government officials. Sur Ghar is published in Pashtu with some
pages in English.
The major mobile phone providers in Kandahar-city are Afghan Wireless (AWCC), Roshan,
Areeba, and Etisalat. According to local respondents Roshan is more expensive but provides
better quality than the less expensive AWCC. Some more affluent people use satellite
phones as well. There are 2,000 public call offices (PCOs) located in different places of the
city.
Several transmitters of mobile phone providers reportedly have been damaged. In separate
incidences, the Etisalat transmitter located to the east of the centre and two transmitters of
the Roshan Company in the south and west were damaged by explosive devices planted by
Taliban insurgents. The latter had warned the companies to not operate services during
nights but as the companies did not stop their operation the Taliban decided to blow up the
transmitters.
2.5
Reconstruction
This section provides a first quick overview of the reconstruction efforts in Kandahar-city, but
given the size of the city it is possibly some elements were missed here.
According to local respondents, large reconstruction projects were implemented during the
governorships of Gul Agha Sherzai and Yusef Pashtun between 2002 and 2005. Prominent
examples were the construction of the Eidgah road, the road to Arghandab district, the repair
of Bai road, as well as the construction of Ghazi Park. During the governance of Asadullah
Khalid, however, many projects stopped and were blocked.
During the governorship of Yusef Pashtun (2003-2004),27 the National Solidarity Project
(NSP) of the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) implemented by UNHabitat started its work in Kandahar, with a focus on urban planning and development.28
Together with the Ministry of Urban Development & Housing UN-Habitat established an
Urban Management Consultative Group (CG) to support the ministry in its efforts. A key area
of intervention was the upgrading of informal settlements in Loya Wiala where large
vulnerable groups with insufficient shelters and service provision live (e.g., returnees,
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) vulnerable families and widow-headed households). As
27
Pashtun also used to be the Minister of Urban Development and returned to this post after Gul Agha
Sherzai became provincial governor for a second time.
28
This section draws heavily on
http://www.unhabitat.org/content.asp?cid=4907&catid=298&typeid=13&subMenuId=0
22
noted earlier, NSP also provided solar panels and generators to some neighbourhoods (see
2.4.3 above).
The focus of the Canadian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kandahar-city lies
on larger infrastructure projects such as roads, bridges, and schools. The above mentioned
Eidgah road, the road to Arghandab district, the repair of the Bai road, the Sarai Jamai road,
the road from Khakarpur Darwaza and Kabul Darwaza as well as 2 km road from Loya Wiala
to the 2nd nahiya of the city were constructed by them. The PRT also constructed retaining
walls from Zarsanzarai Ada up to Pirqa and the Malalai School beside Khalqa Sharifa in the
1st nahiya of the city.
The PRT works through a public bidding system and implements its projects with local
contractors, a business-sector dominated by Barakzai and Popalzai tribes. Khalid Pashtun,
for example, a close friend to Gul Agha Sherzai is a big contractor with the international
military. Some local respondents accuse the PRT of involvement in corruption (mainly overbilling, for example buying trucks for construction at higher than market prices). While this is
a common allegation, no specific examples or evidence was provided.
2.6
Security Situation
"It's getting worse and worse... everybody in Kandahar-city can see the pressure."29
Kandahar-city is one of the three areas of the province (besides Daman and Spin Boldak)
that still remains under Afghan government control. The notion of control, however, needs to
be considered with care. Due to its geography, Kandahar-city is difficult to defend militarily as
the flow of persons in and out of the city is nearly impossible to control. This is even more the
case in the north and the west of the city, where the Loya Wiala area has turned into a
massive suburban sprawl extending into neighbouring districts. The Soviet army had already
learned this some twenty years ago and decided not to seal off the city but rather relied on
financial deals with mujahideen groups to keep them out. Often day and night time control
was passed between the two conflict parties, with the government ruling during the day and
mujahideen during the night.
The same is happening today. The Taliban insurgents (or groups operating in their name)
stage impressive operations in the city centre but have so far not attempted a large scale
invasion of the city or direct urban guerrilla warfare. Many city residents believe that currently
the most effective protection against the Taliban insurgents is not the number of police or
international forces, but the payment of protection money, a practice that is already
widespread. This demonstrates that the operational radius of the Taliban insurgents already
reaches into the very heart of the city.
29
Agence France Presse – English June 25, 2006
23
The concentration of government institutions and local pro-government leaders in the city has
made it the site of political violence throughout the current Afghan government. While the
Taliban insurgency never held any permanent territory in the city and large scale attacks like
the Sarpoza jailbreak on 13 June 2008 are an exception, convoys of international military
forces passing through the city have made Kandahar-city the site of many suicide attacks. To
the population, other main components of insecurity are criminality that target wealthier
people through robberies, kidnappings and extortion. In addition, night raids and house
searches by international military forces (allegedly Special Forces) are also perceived as a
source of insecurity.
How did it come to this?
In the years 2002-2005, Taliban insurgents carried out occasional high profile assassinations
to undermine the credibility of the new government:
o
In April 2002 Qari Obaydollah (of Daman), an influential figure in Kandahar was killed
by gunmen. He was considered to be a serious supporter of the late Afghan King
Mohammad Zaher Khan.30
o
In July 2003, a grenade attack targeting the compound of Khalid Pashtun, the
spokesman for provincial governor Gul Agha Sherzai, was carried out.31
o
President Karzai escaped two assassination attempts: September 2002, and April
2004.32
o
On 9 April 2005, Haji Granay from the Alkozai tribe was shot by unidentified gunmen
in the Loya Wiala area. He died of the injuries later.
o
On 1 June 2005, General Muhammed Akram Khakrezwal, a famous commander of
the Alkozai tribe, the first chief of police of Kandahar and at that point of Kabul, died in
a suicide attack bomb blast in the Mullah Abd-u-Rab congregational mosque during
the funeral of the Head of the Ulema shura, a prominent and outspoken progovernment cleric, Mullah Abdul Fayaz33, who had been assassinated three days
earlier.34
The situation in Kandahar deteriorated after 2005 when plans to expand ISAF to southern
Afghanistan coincided with the removal of three strongmen provincial governors: Gul Agha
Sherzai (Kandahar), Jan Mohammad Khan (Uruzgan), and Sher Mohammad Akhundzada
30
Text of a report by Iranian radio from Mashed on 26 April 2002
Agence France Presse –July 7, 2003
32
Agence France Presse – English June 2, 2002
33
The Associated Press June 1, 2005
34
N.C. Aizenman, 2005, “Suicide Bomber Kills 20 in Afghan Mosque,” Washington Post Foreign
Service, June 2, 2005; http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/06/01/AR2005060100263.html
31
24
(Helmand). Coinciding with their removal, the western Kandahar districts Maywand,
Panjwayi, and Zhari started to slip out of government control into the hands of the Taliban
insurgency negatively affecting the security situation in Kandahar-city.
During the governorship of Asadullah Khalid from June 2005 to August 2008, who had been
moved from his centre of influence in Ghazni where he served as a governor until then, the
security situation in the city (as in the province) deteriorated rapidly. This is not to suggest
that Gul Agha Sherzai had been a better governor than Khalid. Rather, the repercussion of
actions undertaken during the Sherzai governorship and the regrouping of the insurgency
(inability to become a uniting figure and reaction by Taliban to the Kandahar strike force/CIA
(see more Chapter 3) simply materialized in the governorship of Khalid.
In 2006, the city population witnessed 26 suicide attacks that killed at least 42 Afghan
civilians and twelve soldiers or policemen in six months.35 Attacks on international
development actors and the UN mounted and politically motivated assassinations striking
mostly non-Popalzai, continued (see also Box 3).
o
On 10 March 2007, Mullah Naqibullah Akhund, a very important Alkozai leader, was
seriously wounded in a mine explosion and died later in September of 2007.36
o
On 18 February 2008, Abdul Hakim Jan of the Alkozai tribe was killed in a bomb blast
while attending a dog-fighting contest in Bagh Pul village of Kandahar-city.
o
The infamous peak of insecurity was probably the widely publicised Sarpoza jailbreak
in June 2008 that allowed over a 1,000 prisoners, many of them Taliban, to escape
and re-join insurgency fighting forces.37
o
In late 2008, acid attacks on school girls were reported.38
o
The provincial council and its members have been the target of four spectacular
attacks.
o
On 12 November 2008 an attack claimed six lives and 43 injured people.
o
On 16 April, 13 people were killed and more than 30 injured when four suicide
attackers exploded themselves at the PC headquarters while two further were
shot by police.
o
An attack on 1 April 2009 killed 13 people.
35
Agence France Presse – English June 25, 2006
The Globe, March 10 2007.
37
ABC Transcripts (Australia) June 17, 2008
38
Canwest News Service November 12, 2008
36
25
o
In addition, in mid April 2009, Sitara Achekzai, a provincial council member
and clerk and women activist, was shot dead by four armed Taliban riding
motorbikes on Manzil Bagh Boulevard in Achekzai Kalacha.
Box 3: High noon in Kandahar
On June 29, Kandahar CoP Matiullah Qatea, an Achekzai, was killed in a shootout with what
is believed to be members of an “armed support group” – an unregistered militia force – run
by US Special Forces (SF) out of Camp Gecko in Kandahar-city.39
The circumstances of the killing are unclear but local respondents were convinced that the
action was planned and not spontaneous as earlier that day gun battles between ANA and
ANP had taken place in Herat Square at around 7:45 for unknown reasons. After the killing of
CoP Matiullah, police forces were disarmed by the ANA who took control of the city and even
occupied the police headquarter.
According to local respondents, most of the arrested were Popalzai. This could have serious
repercussions as the Achekzai tribe may reconsider its support for Karzai.
Loya Wiala
Loya Wiala has been the gravitational centre for newly arriving population from different
tribes and provinces, be they economic migrants or internally displaced persons (IDP) that
have come from different provinces of Afghanistan and have fled to Kandahar in different
phases since 1992. Since 2006, IDPs from the Zhari Dasht IDP camp and conflict-induced
IDPs from other provinces such as Helmand, Uruzgan and Zabul have moved to Loya Wiala
melting in with the urban poor.40
Local respondents describe parts of Loya Wiala as the most insecure area of the city for two
main reasons: there is less social control due to a lack of cohesive communities living in a
melting pot, and the area is easier to infiltrate by Taliban insurgents establishing networks in
the city because of insecure land tenure rights. In the words of a police officer: “If someone
lives in the area for a long time, their neighbours usually know something about him and what
kind of person he is. But most people in Loya Wiala have been here less than six or seven
years and they often change houses. Therefore it is hard to track each and every one to what
he is up to.”
39
Jake Sherman and Victoria DiDomenico (2009), The Public Cost of Private Security in Afghanistan.
Briefing Paper, Centre on International Cooperation, New York University.
40
Susanne Schmeidl, Alexander D. Mundt and Nick Miszak, 2009, Beyond the Blanket: Towards more
Effective Protection for Internally Displaced Persons in Southern Afghanistan, a Joint Report of the
Brookings/Bern Project on Internal Displacement and The Liaison Office, Washington D.C.: The
Brookings Institution.
26
Some Kandahari also believe that the squatters in Loya Wiala are illegal, and many of the
new-arrivals fear that if the government gets stronger it is very likely that the government
would take the land back from them, so they financially or physically help insurgents as a
form of protection.
27
Chapter
3
3 Actors Analysis
This section focuses on those individual and collective actors who significantly shape the
situation, events and future of Kandahar-city and by extension Kandahar Province. The aim
is to present individual key actors and the larger social groups to which they belong.
The importance and influence of actors comes from their ability to control resources and
mobilize support by redistributing these resources to their respective constituencies. Scarcity
and unequal access to resources is often the reason why different actors engage in armed or
non-armed conflict. In general, power is often based on an accumulation of the following
resources:
•
Networking: connections with national and sub-national government actors and
foreign sponsors;
•
Tribal membership – as much of the historic section showed, membership in specific
tribes (and their respective population size, power alliances and combined land
holdings) greatly influences political allegiance, power and status;
•
Family status (inherited) – membership of prominent families (including landed elite)
also remains important;
•
Land: cultural status symbol; economic benefit via agricultural production, etc;
•
Other economic resources: which allows for less dependence on daily work and the
ability to gain clients through distribution of assets;
•
Control and access to the means of violence: which allows for control of territory
and illicit trading routes;
•
Knowledge: traditionally this was primarily knowledge of pashtunwali and/or sharia,
increasingly it has become a knowledge of how to access or ‘win’ resources from
internationals or the government);
o
Personal leadership skills
28
o
Knowledge (e.g. different customs of the customary law - pashtunwali, or
religious knowledge such as sharia);
o
Mitigation and conflict resolution skills;
o
“Good reputation“ as a source of moral authority and power;
o
Military skills (e.g., leadership skills during conflict) as well as control and
access to arms and ammunition that allows control of territory and trade);
o
3.1
Administrative skills/technical expertise for government bureaucrats.
Afghan Government Structures
Kandahar-city is the seat of all provincial wide government institutions as well as the
municipality government (sharwali wolayat). The most important among them are the
Provincial Governor, Chief of Police, the 15-member Provincial Council, National Directorate
of Security (NDS), and provincial line departments (see overview of the directors of these
departments in Table 1 in the appendix). Municipal government structures exist as well in the
city.
Of the 33 provincial government position, include the heads of provincial departments,
provincial governor, provincial chief of police and head of the provincial council (see Figure
5):
o
Twenty (20) are held by Zirak Durrani (seven Achekzai, five Popalzai,
four Mohammadzai, three Alkozai, one Barakzai)
o
Two (2) are held by Panjpai Durrani (one Alizai, one Nurzai)
o
Five (5) are held by Ghilzai, three of which are not natives of Kandahar
(two are Suliman Khail from Laghman; one is Ahmadzai) and two are
Tokhi
o
Six (6) are held by members of other tribal confederations (Barets, Tarin,
Kakar, Zazai), a Dari speaker and one is unknown
29
Panjpai Durrani
6%
Ghilzai
15%
Other
18%
Zirak Durrani
61%
Figure 5: Distribution of government positions among tribal confederations
Of the total 34 positions of district governors and district chiefs of police in the 17 districts41
(see Figure 6) over half (26) are held by Zirak Durrani (11 Popalzai; 6 Achekzai; 4 Alkozai; 5
Barakzai); five by Panjpai Durrani (3 Alizai; 2 Nurzai); two by other Pashtun tribes (1 Barets, 1
Kakar) and one from another ethnic group (Baluch). None are held by members of the Ghilzai
confederation.
Panjpai Durrani
15%
Other
9%
Zirak Durrani
76%
Figure: 6 District governors and CoP distribution among tribal confederations
41
Note that in Miya Nishin no district governor or chief of police has been present since 2007 but the
numbers include the last ones.
30
In light of the above, the government is clearly dominated by the Zirak Durrani confederation,
and within the Zirak confederation increasingly by Popalzai, while the Panjpai and Ghilzai are
strongly underrepresented compared to their population size (see more in section 3.2).
According to local respondents this domination is also manifest in the overall provincial
government administration with a majority of Zirak Durrani bureaucrats.
3.1.1
Provincial Governors
Kandahar has had five governors in eight years. According to local respondents, the
replacement of governors, with the exception of Gul Agha Sherzai, has not changed the
balance of power significantly and they claim the city is under the authority of Provincial
Council Head Ahmad Wali Karzai. The latter already wielded a considerable amount of
power as head of the Kandahar shura when Gul Agha Sherzai was provincial governor, and
some local respondents spoke of the ‘two governments’ of Kandahar (Karzai vs. Sherzai). It
is alleged that most governors since Sherzai had to arrange themselves with Ahmad Wali
Karzai in order to stay in power, as none were strongmen in their own right, at least not in
Kandahar (see Figure 7):
Barakzai,
Mahaz -e-Milli
Wardak ,
PDPA
Taraki, Ittehade-Islami
Gul Agha Sherzai
and Yusef
Pashtun
Rahmatullah
Raufi
Ahmad Wali
Karzai
Asadullah
Khalid
Toryali Vesa
Mohammadzai
Figure 7: Competition between governors and Ahmad Wali Karzai
31
Popalzai
Gul Agha Sherzai (Barakzai) served as Governor of Kandahar three times: from 1992 to
1994 during the mujahideen government and twice during the current administration: the first
time 29 months (2002-September 2003) and the second time only six months (December
2004 - June 2005). During the 15 months between his tenure he switched positions with
Yusef Pashtun, the Minister of Urban Affairs. In June 2005 he was appointed the Governor of
Nangarhar and replaced with Asadullah Khalid (see Section 3.2 for more information of
Sherzai).
Yusef Pashtun (Barakzai) is from Kandahar and served as Provincial Governor in Kandahar
from September 2003 to December 2004. He had worked with the Demining Agency for
Afghanistan during the mujahideen government and lived in Quetta during the Taliban
government. He returned to Kandahar in 2001 and was advisor and spokesman of Gul Agha
Sherzai. He is currently Minister of Urban Development, a position he also held before his
governorship.
Asadullah Khalid, a Taraki (Ghilzai) from Ghazni, served as Governor of Kandahar province
over three years (from June 2005 to August 2008). He was previously the Governor of
Ghazni Province (2001 to 2004). Khalid was a controversial governor and there were
allegations of torture of prisoners and corruption under his tenure and the security situation
worsened (bandits, assassinations, kidnappings).42 He escaped an assassination attempt in
early 2007 when he was targeted by a suicide bomber. He was replaced by Rahmatullah
Raufi in August 2008 and appointed Minister for Parliamentary Affairs. Assadullah Khalid was
affiliated with the Ittehad-e Islami faction that had allied itself with the Northern Alliance
against the Taliban. During the Taliban time he spent time in the USA. He maintains close
links to the Karzai family but his greatest source of power were good relations to Coalition
Forces.
Rahmatullah Raufi (Wardak, Mir Khail) from Wardak was Provincial Governor for a mere
four months only (August – December 2008). He had completed his military studies in the
Soviet Union and was a pro-PDPA army commander in the Afghan wars. In the current
government he became the commander of the 205 Atal (Hero) corps, was a senior military
commander of the Afghan Nation Army (ANA) and a main commander in Operation Mountain
Thrust. On 15th of August 2008, he became the new governor of Kandahar province. He was
allegedly replaced because of a tense relationship with the head of the provincial council
Ahmad Wali Karzai (see also Section 3.1.4).43 Local respondents perceived him well but his
short time in office makes any evaluation difficult.
42
43
Canwest News Service April 14, 2008 Monday
Canwest News Service January 23, 2009
32
Tooryalai Wesa, a Mohammadzai originally from Arghandab, has been the Governor of
Kandahar since 18 December 2008.44 A native of Kandahar, he was appointed as the Dean
of Kandahar University and served there until the collapse of Dr. Najibullah’s regime. He left
Afghanistan in 1991 for Canada and only recently returned to follow the call of President
Karzai to the governorship. An expert of agriculture, he holds Afghan and Canadian
citizenships. He has good connections to foreign forces and the local and central government
as he is a friend of President Karzai and his brother Qayum Karzai.
3.1.2
Afghan National Police (ANP)
“Why should our sons die for you when you do not share political power with us?”
Kandahar Province has seen eight police chiefs between 2002 and 2009, most being
appointed for one year only, with some staying only a few months (see Table 5). All of them
had good relations with Ahmad Wali Karzai, Arif Khan Nurzai (AKN) and Karim Khan
Achekzai (KKA) and some also with Gul Agha Sherzai. The Kandahar-city police force itself
has members from many different tribes but the Alkozai and Barakzai dominate. This is due
to the fact that Sherzai (Barakzai) and Khakrezwal (Alkozai, see Table 5 below) integrated
their former fighting forces into the ANP after the establishment of the current government.
There are fewer Popalzai in the police, but they play an important role in Kandahar-city
because of the political support of Ahmad Wali Karzai. The other tribes have few members in
the police, as they are not willing to send their sons to do dangerous police work as long as
political and economical power is distributed more equitably.
Table 5: CoPs of Kandahar
Name
Tribe
General Mohammad
Akram Khakrezwal
Alkozai
Mohammad Hashim
Salangi
Tajik
Khan Mohammad
Mujahed
44
Alkozai
Background
2002 – August 2003
He is from Khakrez and was with Mahaz. During the
Taliban regime he lived in Pakistan. After his tenure he
became the police chief of Kabul.
He had good relations with key Kandahar figures such as
Ahmad Wali Karzai (AKW) and Arif Khan Nurzai (AKN).
He was killed in June 2005 by a suicide bomber inside a
mosque in Kandahar-city during a funeral of a famous progovernment religious leader who was killed three days
earlier. Khakrezwal’s brother was killed in 2008.
August 2003 - March 2004
From Parwan, he was associated with Jamiat-e-Islami and
the northern alliances. He had good relations with AWK,
Gul Agha Sherzai (GAS), Arif Khan Nurzai (AKN) and
Karim Khan Achekzai (KKA).
March 2004 - March 2005
See more in Section 3.2.1.3
http://www.nps.edu/programs/ccs/
33
Name
Tribe
Abdel Malik Wahedi
Tajik/Shia
Sayed Aziz Ahmad
Wardak
Wardak
Ismatullah Alizai
Alizai
Sayed Agha Saqib
Nurzai
Matiullah Qatea
3.1.3
Achekzai
Background
March 2005 - August 2006
He is a resident of nahiya 4. During the jihad and Taliban
time he lived in exile in Pakistan and Germany. He has
good relations with AWK, AKN and KKA.
August 2006 - December 2006
Resident of Said Abad district in Maidan Wardak. He was
affiliated with Mahaz. He has good relations with AWK,
AKN and KKA.
December 2006 - November 2007
He is from Musa Qala, Helmand. He has a communist
(Khalqi) background and maintained good relations with
AWK, AKN, and KKA.
November 2007 - June 2008
From Farah Province. Was non-aligned during jihad and
Taliban. He had good relations with AWK, GAS, and AKN
and KKA.
June 2008 – June 2009
From Khas Uruzgan with a PDPA/Khalqi background. Son
of Anif Khan, a former senator from Uruzgan Province On
June 29, 2009 he was killed in a shootout with what is
believed to be Afghan Special Forces linked to the
international military. He had good relation with AWK,
GAS, AKN and KKA.
Provincial Council
The Provincial Council (PC) was elected in September 2005 and is composed of 15
members (see Table 6). The members are elected by popular vote and four seats are
reserved for women. There are no fixed quotas for representatives from the different district
however. According to an AREU Briefing Paper, the rights and obligations of the Provincial
Council fall into three categories: “Participation in provincial development planning,
monitoring and appraisal of other provincial governance institutions, participation in three
inter-related activities of conflict resolution, the elimination of customs “contrary to the law
and shari’a” or human rights standards, and the reduction of illicit drug activity.45
The composition of the provincial council clearly shows a) the dominance of the Zirak Durrani
tribes who hold 10 of 15 seats (66%) and b) the weak representation of Panjpai Durrani
tribes (2 of 15 seats; 13%) as well as a complete absence of Ghilzai tribes from Kandahar.
Notable is also a skewed geographic representation due to the fact that those with the
highest votes take all. The northern, southern and eastern Kandahar districts are not
represented at all.
As noted earlier (Section 2.6), there have been four attacks on provincial council members
since 2008: the Shiite member from Kandahar-city was killed by unknown gunmen in
Kandahar-city in 2006 and the female clerk was assassinated on the street in 2009. Ten of
45
AREU Briefing Paper Series, Provincial Governance Structures in Afghanistan: From Confusion to
Vision? 2006.
34
the 17 members ran again for the 2009 PC elections for a total of 14 seats, nine were reelected (in bold), with five new comers.46
Table 6: Provincial Council members (women are indicated with a *)
Name
District
Tribe or
ethnic
group
Ahmad Wali
Karzai
Dand
Popalzai
Mohammad
Ehsan
Maywand
Nurzai
Ahmad Shah Khan
Spin Boldak
Background
He was the head of the provincial council and
re-elected into the council in the 2009 elections
with the highest score of 27,147 votes (11%).
(See Section 3.2.1.2)
He was the deputy head of the provincial
council. He comes from a khan family. He was a
supporter of Hizb-e Islami Hekmatyar then
Ittehad. He is known as neutral, honest and
considered an intellectual and has a good
personality. He is a friend of Sherzai and Karzai
and a nationalist. He was re-elected in the 2009
th
elections with the 10 score 9,884 (4%)
Achekzai
He is a tribal elder and was affiliated with Nejate Milli and is also a member of the provincial
council. Close to Ahmad Wali Karzai, he is well
liked by the people. He was re-elected in the
2009 elections with the 9th score 10,676 (4.3%).
Haji Fazel
Mohammad
Takhtapul
Achekzai
He comes from a khan family. His brother was
commander of the airport area in the
mujahideen time. He was a commander with
Jabha-e Nejat and Mahaz. He is close to Karzai
and Sherzai. He was re-elected in the 2009
elections with the 8th score 11,169 (4.5%).
Sitara Achekzai
(*,killed in 2009)
City
Achekzai
She grew up in Germany, close to Afghan Millat
and comes from a well known Kandahar-city
family.
Haji Agha
Lalai Dastagir
Panjwayi
Alkozai
He was re-elected in the 2009 elections with the
th
5 highest score 15,709 (6.4%).
(See Section 3.2.1.3)
Dr. Mohammad Qasim
Dand
Barakzai
He has studied some medical courses. He is
considered an honest man and has good conflict
resolution skills. He did not run again for the
2009 elections.
Janan Gulzai
unknown
Barakzai
He ran again in the 2009 elections but was not
among the top 11 men qualifying for the council.
Barakzai
He was a Mahaz-e-Milli commander of Sherzai.
He used to be against Ahmad Wali but is now
his friend. He is not well liked by the people. He
is a big enemy of the Taliban.
Mullah Sayed
Mohammad
46
Dand
The total mount of candidates was 47.
35
Name
District
Tribe or
ethnic
group
Background
Zarghuna Kakar (*)
City
Kakar
Women's delegate. When she was young she
was in the Khalq faction of the communist party.
She was re-elected in the 2009 elections with
th
the 14 score of 566 votes (0.2%).
Omar Sherzad
Zhari
Khogiani
He is a naqilin (migrant). He is an open minded
person. He is the representative of Kandahar
Province to the Senate. Also a member of the
security council (shura amniat) in Kandahar.
Soria Barna (*)
City
Laghmani
Originally from Laghman, but has married a
Kandahari and lived there for a long time. She
was a teacher in the past.
Bismillah Afghanmal
City
Mohmand
Haji Neamatullah
Khan
Spin Boldak
Nurzai
Haji Sayed Jan
Khakrez
Popalzai
Mariam Durrani (*)
City
Popalzai
Mohammad Younes
Husseini ()
Kandahar-city
Shia
He is also a member of the provincial council.
He is affiliated with Hizb-e Islami Hekmatyar and
presently claims to be a member of the Afghan
Millat Party. He is ready to do every thing for the
sake of his reputation. He is accused of many
things, among them being a narcotics trafficker,
collusion with Qanuni and known to have links to
the Iranian Consulate in Kandahar. He was rerd
elected in the 2009 elections with the 3 score
19,231 (7.8%).
He ran again in the 2009 elections but was not
among the top 11 men qualifying for the council.
(See Section 3.2.2.1)
Very close to Ahmad Wali Karzai, has no
independent power base. He was re-elected in
the 2009 elections with the 2nd score 22,462
(9.1%).
Friend of Ahmad Wali Karzai. She is also the
member of a youth organization in Kandahar.
She was re-elected in the 2009 elections with
th
the highest female score, 12 overall of 948
votes (0.4%).
Shiite from Kandahar-city killed by unknown
gunmen in Kandahar-city in 2006. He was a
member of the Harakat-e-Islami faction.
Newly elected:
•
Haji Rahmatullah Khan, 4th place, 18,408 votes (7.5%)
•
Haji Mukhtar, 6th place, 11,730 votes (4.7%), a Shia from Kandahar-city
•
Haji Saleh Mohammad Pahlawan, 7th, 11,187 votes, (4.5%)
•
Haji Mohammad, 11th, 7,958 votes, (3.2%)
•
Shekila Selahi (*), 13th place, 877 votes (0.4%).
3.1.4
Kandahar Tribal Council
In 2005, Qayum Karzai, the brother of President Karzai and former Member of Parliament,
created a “Shura for Security and Reform” in Kandahar, composed of 29 tribal elders. The
36
purpose of the shura was not entirely clear to local respondents and some dismissed it as a
tool to support the president’s brother in the province, an election campaign shura for
President Karzai (as all members are seen as close to Ahmad Wali Karzai) or simply as a
way of getting donor money. The shura was widely seen as a failure. In 2008, Provincial
Governor Rahmatullah Raufi attempted to create a larger tribal council that was perceived as
a reconciliation shura, but it met the opposition of Ahmad Wali Karzai. The latter proceeded
to create another shura called the Kandahar “Tribal council” that held its first session on 11
March 2008.
Local respondents claim the Kandahar Tribal Council, is more balanced in tribal composition
than the provincial council (see Table 7). There are: Achekzai (3), Alizai (2), Alkozai (2),
Barakzai (2), Kakar (2), Ishaqzai (3), Popalzai (3), Nurzai (4), Tokhi (2) one each Sadat,
Farsiwan, Mohmand, Mohammadzai, Mojaddidi/Hazrat, and one unknown; thus, 38% (11 of
29) are Zirak Durrani, 31% are Panjpai, 7% are Ghilzai, and 24% from other Pashtun tribes
or ethnic group.
As in the provincial council, representatives of the northern, southern and eastern Kandahar
districts are largely absent displaying a strong geographic inequality of political power. Six
members (bold) are also part of the Provincial Council (until 2009).
Table 7: Tribal council or Qayum shura
Name
District
Tribe/Ethnic
group
Background
Saranwal
Mohammad
Isa Khan
Spin Boldak,
but
lives in the
City
Achekzai
He is a tribal elder from an influential khan family,
has higher education and is government official.
He was a member of Mahaz-e Milli, and was in the
country during the jihad and the Taliban time.
Haji Ahmad
Shah Khan
Spin Boldak
Achekzai
See Table 6.
Karim Khan
Panjwayi
Achekzai
Haji Ali Shah
Khan
Zhari
Alizai
Haji Saidullah
Khan
Zhari
Alizai
He is a member of the district council and an elder
of the Achekzai council. He was a commander in
the jihad time with links to Ittehad-e Islami, Ahmad
Wali Karzai and Gul Agha Sherzai.
He is a member of the Zhari district council and a
tribal elder of the Alizai. He was a commander of
Hizb-e Islami Hekmatyar. He had good relations to
the Taliban government and of but the mentioned
person did not have formal job. He is linked to
Ahmad Wali.
He is the brother of Habibullah Jan, the late
commander of the Mahaz-e Milli faction. His family
is accused of war crimes and has bad reputation
among the people.
37
Name
Haji Agha
Lalai
District
Panjwayi
Tribe/Ethnic
group
Background
Alkozai
He is a member of the Qayum Karzai council and
was re-elected to the provincial council. He is a
friend of the Taliban and was a commander of
Harakat-e Inqilab-e Islami. He is presently
involved in preparing a new council by the
stimulation of the Karzais. He is head of the
reconciliation commission.
Haji Khan
Kaka
Arghandab
Alkozai
He is an elder of both the Alkozai and the district
council. He was a Jamiat-e Islami commander,
supporter of Mullah Naqibullah and opponent of
the Taliban. He has great support from his tribe.
Dr.
Mohammad
Qasam
Dand
Barakzai
He has some knowledge of medicine and is known
as a good man. Close to Gul Agha Sherzai.
Haji Nusrullah
City
Barakzai
He is a tribal elder and businessman and linked to
Gul Agha Sherzai.
Haji Mukhtar
City (nahiya 1)
Farsiwan
He has been accused on assassination and on
robberies during the jihad. He is an illiterate
person and has good ties with Ahmad Wali Karzai.
Shahabuddin
Akhundzada
City (nahiya 4)
Ishaqzai
He is from a religious family, tribal elder and a
distinguished person.
Ishaqzai
He is the assistant of the Panjwayi district council
and an influential member of the Ishaqzai council.
He is a former Hizb-e Islami Hekmatyar
commander and presently a member of Afghan
Millat party and a close friend of Ahmad Wali and
Haji Agha Lalai Dastagir.
Ishaqzai
He is a tribal elder. He was a mujahideen of Hizbe Islami Hekmatyar and is currently in charge of
the district's Afghan Millat party. He is popular
among the people.
Kakar
He is a tribal elder and was regional commander
of Hizb-e Islami Hekmatyar. He is linked to Ahmad
Wali and Agha "Lalai" and has no special status.
He came to the council by district support. He was
an ordinary person and had no job during the
Taliban government.
Kakar
He is a member of the Kakar council. He is head
of the cadastre department and a member of the
Hizb-e Islami Hekmatyar's Chaman office, now
also in charge of Kandahar province. He has close
ties with Gul Agha Sherzai and Ahmad Wali. He is
also a friend of the Taliban insurgency.
Mohammadzai
He is an elder of the Mohammadzai tribe and
comes from a khan family. He is known and
trusted by the people in the government, strong
supporter of Gul Agha Sherzai and the family of
late Zahir Shah.
Haji Abdur
Rahim
Haji Fazal
Mohammad
Haji
Hayatullah
"Kakar"
Haji Sardar
Mohammad
Sardar
Mohammad
Osman
Panjwayi
Panjwayi
Panjwayi
City
Maywand
38
Name
Bismillah
Afghanmal
District
City
Tribe/Ethnic
group
Background
Mohmand
See Table 6.
Haji Masoom
Agha
City
Mojaddidi
(Hazrat)
He is a government official, member of Nejat-e
Milli, and friend of Ahmad Wali Karzai. He has
allegedly seized both communal and
governmental land, especially a Kandahar
graveyard and is a known as a corrupt person.
Haji
Neamatullah
"Shirdal"
Spin Boldak
Nurzai
See Table 6.
Haji Wali
Mohammad
Maywand
Nurzai
Assistant of the district council.
Haji Ehsan
Maywand
Nurzai
See Table 6.
Haji Isa Jan
"Nurzai"
Panjwayi
Nurzai
He comes from an influential khan family. He was
a fighter affiliated with Ittehad-e Islami. Presently
he is a mediator and has good behavior with the
people. He is also closely linked to Arif Nurzai.
Haji Said Jan
Khakrez
Popalzai
See Table 6.
Jan
Mohammad
"Popalzai"
City
Popalzai
Zaiqullha
"Akhunzada"
Shah Wali Kot
Popalzai
Haji Fazul-udin Agha
Dand
Sadat
Toran Nik
Mohammad
City
Tokhi
Haji
Mohammad
"Isa"
Zhari
Tokhi
Haji Abdul
Ahad
City
unknown
Head of the writers and poets association. Came
to the council by the representation of cultural
people and was not invited back after the first
session.
He comes from a religious (ulema) family and is a
member of the Shah Wali Kot district council. He
was a member of Harakat-e Inqilab-e Islami during
the jihad. He is an alim (scholar) and has a good
reputation among the people.
He was a farmer and a commander of Mahaz-eMilli and linked to Sherzai. In the current
government he was district governor of Spin
Boldak for some few years. He has links to
smugglers. He has a good reputation with the
people.
He is a former military officer and was a key
member of the Khalq/PDPA. He is a member of
both the Ghilzai and Qayum Karzai Council. He is
an opportunist and joins any government.
He is a member of the Zhari district council. He
was affiliated with Hizb-e Islami Hekmatyar. He
has a good reputation among the district
population.
He has a membership in the traders' association.
39
3.1.5
Municipal Government
The municipal government is composed of a city mayor who works with nahiya councils. The
latter are a link of the population to the head of the municipality, but often the people address
him directly. The municipal government is perceived to be little more than an extension of the
power of the head of the provincial council Ahmad Wali Karzai. Except for the first mayor of
Kandahar, the other three city mayors were ‘suggested’ by Qayum Karzai and are very close
to the Karzai family. There have been four majors to date (see Table 8).
Table 8: Mayors of Kandahar
Name
Tribe
District
Background
Son of Munshi Abdur Rauf. During the jihad he was
spokesperson of Hamid Karzai. During the Taliban he
Abdullah Popal Popalzai
Dand
was in exile in Pakistan and the USA. Appointed in
interim government. Close to Karzais, Arif Khan Nurzai,
Sherzai and Karimullah Khan.
Son of Sardar Abdullah Khan, resident of nahiya 2. He
was in Pakistan during the jihad, came back in
Azizullah Khan
Mohammadzai City
mujahideen time without particular job. He has good
Sardar
relations to Ahmad Wali Karzai, Arif Khan Nurzai,
Sherzai and Karimullah Khan.
Resident of nahiya 6. During the jihad he went to
Pakistan and Germany. He has good relations to
Zmaray Usmani Suliman Khail City
Ahmad Wali Karzai, Arif Khan Nurzai, Sherzai and
Karimullah Khan.
He is from Kohak Village. During Zaher Shah he was in
the Ministry of Finance and went to Pakistan and USA
during the jihad. He has good relations Ahmad Wali
Ghulam Hayder
Mohammadzai Arghandab Karzai, Arif Khan Nurzai, Sherzai and Karimullah Khan
Hamidi
and even better relation with Qayum Karzai. He belongs
to an elite family. He survived a bomb attack in the city
on 15 March 2009.
3.1.6
Judiciary
Two types of court have currently a presence in Kandahar City: the Provincial Civilian Court
and a Military Court.
The civilian court consists of three different courts that handle all of Kandahar-city and its
surrounding districts cases: a primary court, a litigation court (murafia), and the istinaf court,
the appeals court. The primary court is the first instance of the judiciary that hears a case and
consists of five persons: a head of court, two members (aza) and two assistants to the head
of the court. The primary court makes the decision about the case and refers it to the
secondary court known as murafia (litigation) court where judges evaluate the decision of the
primary court. This second court is also called upon for appeals. If both side of the conflict
are happy with the decision of the primary court, and it is reviewed and approved by the
litigation court, the decision is signed and stamped. The istinaf court is the final instance of
appeals and evaluates both decisions of the primary and murafia courts.
40
Each province has its own provincial civilian court, but bigger cases are also sent to
Kandahar City from surrounding provinces such Helmand, Uruzgan and Zabul. For example
if a high-profile drug dealer is arrested in Helmand, the Helmand court refers it to Kandahar
then to Kabul in order to do full justice to the case. Sometimes judges also feel that Kandahar
and Kabul are more secure places to carry out such high profile trials.
In general, people are not happy with the performance of the judiciary system because cases
take a very long time to be handled. There is not enough capacity which badly affects the
judiciary system. The bad security situation was also mentioned as a deterrent to work in
courts or even to take cases there, especially from the districts. Most of Kandahar district
courts are located inside the Kandahar-city provincial court for security reasons. There is also
a mobile court consisting of a judge who also deals with Spin Boldak and Daman.
According to members of the provincial court there are some civil cases, such as divorce
issues, which are referred to traditional conflict resolution bodies by the state courts. This is
primarily done for cultural reasons and to protect the honour of the family. Traditional conflict
resolution bodies are said to have a good track record in this field. Some cases are referred
back to the state courts however.
There is also a military court in Kandahar-city responsible for trying military personnel as well
as police involved in legal cases. According to military court personnel most cases actually
involve members of the Afghan National Police (ANP), because they do not have proper
training and are often involve in illegal activities. The military court is located inside the
former Afghan National Corps station in the middle of Kandahar-city.
3.2
Pashtun tribes
The Pashtun tribal system is widely portrayed as being divided into different confederations,
tribes and sub-tribes. The most prominent confederations are the Durrani, Ghilzai, Karlyani,
and Ghurghusht. The Durrani and the Ghilzai confederation subsume more than two-thirds of
all Afghan Pashtuns and predominate in southern Afghanistan.
The Durrani confederation is split into two main sub confederations: Zirak and Panjpai.
The Achekzai, Alkozai, Barakzai, Mohammadzai and Popalzai make up the Zirak Durrani
confederation. Afghan rulers since Nadir Shah (1747) traditionally came from the Zirak
Durrani confederation. Geographically, they are concentrated in Kandahar and eastern
Uruzgan, and western Zabul.
The Panjpai Durrani (literally five legs) is composed of Alizai, Ishaqzai, Nurzai, Khogiani and
Maku tribes. The Panjpai were originally Ghilzai tribes and were slowly integrated into the
Durrani confederation in the South over the centuries and therefore retain a distinct
character, although this distinction may vary regionally. Large Panjpai populations live in
41
Helmand, western Uruzgan, Farah and Nimroz. When it came to power sharing, they usually
had to take a second seat to the Zirak Durrani.
The Ghilzai confederation is made up of the Ali Khail, Andar, Hotak, Kharoti, Naser,
Suliman Khail, Taraki, Tokhi and Tota Khail. They are most prominent in Ghazni, Paktika,
Zabul and parts of Kandahar.
The Ghurghusht tribal confederation in Afghanistan is mostly made up of the Kakar tribe.
There are few Kakar living in Uruzgan, Kandahar and Zabul. A much larger part of the Kakar
tribe lives in Pakistan.
The Karlyani tribes are prominent in southeast Afghanistan and the Federally Administered
Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan.
Pashtun tribes in Kandahar
The Panjpai Durrani (and Ghilzai) tribes have historically been in the shadow of the much
more powerful Zirak tribes. While the Taliban regime in the 1990s at least attempted to
bridge tribal divides, the current government returned back to the exclusionary style of ruling,
with the Zirak monopolizing government power to a large extent. Thus, with the fall of the
Taliban the tribal rivalries between the Zirak Durrani and the Panjpai and Ghilzai
confederations resurfaced. The Panjpai and Ghilzai were stigmatized as the backbone of the
Taliban movement and subjected to harassment and arrest. Only the business sector seems
to be open to all tribes (see Table 2 with a list of key businessmen and their tribal affiliation in
Annex). Of the 19 main traders, four are Achekzai, two Alizai, one Alkozai, one Barakzai, two
Kakar, four Nurzai, four Popalzai and of unknown background.
Given the rapid growth of Kandahar-city in the last decades due to urban migration, exact
numbers on tribal affiliation are difficult to obtain. There are members of an estimated 40
tribes living in Kandahar-city, and 20 of them have populations of less than one percent of
the total population. Estimations were first made on the tribal confederation level. This
resulted in the following breakdown: Zirak Durrani 50%, Panjpai Durrani 15%, Ghilzai 15%,
Shia 8% and 12% others, such Wardak, Mohmand, Kakar, Sayed, Tajik, Baluch, and other
small tribes (see Figure 8). For the Panjpai and Ghilzai tribes, no percentages are provided
for individual tribes but among the Panjpai the Nurzai are most numerous and among the
Ghilzai the Hotak, Tokhi and Lodin. The most sizeable population among the other Pashtuns
tribes are the Kakar.
42
Durrani
Other Pashtun
tribes and ethnic
groups (20%)
Panjpai (15%)
Popalzai (20%)
Barakzai (15%)
Alkozai (7.5%)
Achekzai (5%)
Mohammadzai
(2.5%)
Zirak Durrani
(50%)
Ghilzai (15%)
Figure 8: Tribal tree of Kandahar-city.
3.2.1
Zirak Durrani Tribes
The Zirak Durrani tribes have been the most powerful actors in Kandahar’s history since
Ahmad Shah Durrani established the dynastic rule of the Popalzai tribe in 1747 (see also
Chapter 4). The rule of the Popalzai tribe lasted until 1818, after which Dost Mohammad of
the Mohammadzai (sub-tribe of the Barakzai) provided the leading figures until the
communist coup d’etat in 1978. This is the historical rationale for Zirak tribes to see
themselves as the “rightful” leaders of Kandahar. While they had to share power during the
Communist government and Taliban regime, they returned to an exclusionary style of rule in
the current government by monopolizing political power. They make up an estimate 50% of
the city population.
As noted earlier, however, the Zirak Durrani tribes are far from united and not all Zirak tribes
are equally influential. The Alkozai, for example, are less influential for three reasons: first
because of the “hand-over” of Kandahar-city to the Taliban by their most prominent leader
Mullah Naqibullah, something the then governor Gul Agha Sherzai interpreted as treason;
second, because parts of the Alkozai were allied with Yunus Qanuni of the Northern
Alliance/United Front; and finally while the Alkozai once used to be powerful in the security
apparatus, they are currently being pushed out by the Achekzai who are allied to the
Barakzai.
3.2.1.1 Popalzai
The Popalzai, the tribe of President Hamid Karzai, ruled Kandahar from 1747 to 1823 and
represents the biggest Zirak Durrani tribe (20%) in the city. They also have been influential in
government, education, business; they are large landowners and entertain good contacts
43
with the international actors. Besides the city they also live in Arghistan, Daman, Dand,
Ghorak, Khakrez, Panjwayi, Shah Wali Kot, and Zhari. During the jihad, the Popalzai tribe
was strong in the Hizb-e-Islami Khales (Abdur Raziq), Mahaz-e-Milli (Amir Lalay) and Jabhae-Nejat factions, while inside the city Lal Jan Allaqa Dar was the main PDPA supporter. The
Popalzai are also influential in neighboring Uruzgan province.
Main leaders
The Popalzai in Kandahar are currently led by Ahmad Wali Karzai, the half-brother of
President Hamid Karzai. He is married to Arif Khan Nurzai’s sister, which has allowed him to
co-opt parts of the internally divided Nurzai tribe. As noted earlier, during the governorship of
Gul Agha Sherzai, Ahmad Wali Karzai created and headed the “Eslahi shura” that
represented the Popalzai pole of power and counterweight to the provincial governor. He was
chosen as representative of Kandahar Province in the 2002 Emergency Loya Jirga and in the
2004 Constitutional Loya Jirga. Since 2005 he is the head of the elected Provincial Council;
in the 2009 provincial council elections he received the highest score of all candidates.
Ahmad Wali Karzai comes from a respectable Popalzai tribal family with leadership tradition
from the village of Karz in Dand. Ahad Karzai, his father, was leader of the Popalzai tribe
during the jihad and mujahideen time. He had initially supported the royalist faction within the
Taliban who promised to bring back the king from exile. Over time however, the influence of
the pro-monarchist camp within the Taliban movement was weakened while the influence of
the Pakistani intelligence service ISI increased and Abdul Ahad Karzai distanced himself
from the movement. He was murdered by unknown gunmen in Quetta in 1999. Ahad Karzai
was succeeded by his oldest son Hamid Karzai as leader of the Popalzai tribe. Initially close
to the Taliban movement, he later became active in a network of exile Afghans (known as the
Rome group) planning a political reorganisation of Afghanistan from 1997 on.47 Well
positioned in different networks by 2001, he became the interim and then first President of
the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, still running the country today. Ahmad Wali Karzai,
himself, only rose to power after Hamid Karzai took on the presidency, and his other brother
Qayum Karzai functioned in an advisory role.
The main rival within the Popalzai tribe is Amir Lalay (see Table 9). The differences between
them are best described as one of different social backgrounds, as Lalay represents an
achieved leader that rose to power during the jihad, rather than the traditional landed elite
from which the Karzai family hails. The Karzai clan resented Lalay’s increasing importance in
Kandahar. Furthermore, during the jihad, Lalay switched over to the Jamiat-e Islami faction
and become close to Rabbani. During the Taliban regime, after a short period in exile, he
47
Shetter (2004) Hamid Karzai. Ein Portrait. Südasien Information Nr.1.
44
joined the Northern Alliance. He still has good relation with Jamiat-e-Islami and supported the
Northern Alliance candidates Yunus Qanuni and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah in the 2004 and 2009
presidential elections against Karzai, respectively. Other Popalzai key actors are presented
in Table 9 below.
Table 9: Key Popalzai actors
Name
Village/area
Background
Haji Mawladad
nahiya 10
He is the elder of his tribe and influential in nahiya 10. He
only solves people’s conflicts and assumes neutrality.
Haji Abdul
Ghani
Originally from Bala
Karz, he now lives in
nahiya 5
An influential man in the entire city, he is a tribal of elder of
his tribe and area of residence. He has not been linked
with any faction and now serves as a contact-person
between the government and his people.
Abdul Qayum
Karzai
Karz
He is the brother of President Hamid Karzai and until
recently was a representative of Kandahar in the Senate.
Government.
Haji Doctor
Hayatullah
Originally from Shah
Wali Kot district but
nd
presently lives in 2
Nahiya
He descends from a rich family and has inherited tribal
eldership from his forefathers. During the years of jihad
and the Taliban government he ran a drugstore in Khwaja
Mulk. He is only influential in the district.
Shah Wali Kot
He was an important Mahaz-e-Milli commander and led
between 1,000 and 2,000 fighters. He does not come from
a traditional tribal elite family. After the jihad, this put him at
odds with the Karzai clan who resented his increasing
importance. Lalay later switched factions to Jamiat-eIslami and established links to Rabbani. He fought against
the Taliban, fled to Iran and joined the Northern Alliance.
He returned after the fall of the Taliban and since regained
control over the Dahla Dam in Shah Wali Kot.
Amir Lalay
Main rivalries: Popalzai vs. Barakzai
The main rivals of the Popalzai are the Barakzai (see description under 3.2.1.1 above).
Main alliances
The Popalzai have been much more successful than the Barakzai in co-opting parts of the
Panjpai tribes and also maintain better relations with the Alkozai as well as the Nurzai tribes.
Ahmad Wali Karzai is married to Arif Khan Nurzai’s sister and has good relations with the
main Alkozai leaders Agha Lalay and Karimullah Khan.
3.2.1.2 Barakzai
The Barakzai are the second largest of the Zirak tribes in Kandahar-city (15% of total
population) and have maintained influence through successive regimes from monarchy
45
(1823-1978), over the PDPA until today. The Barakzai tribe in Kandahar was close to the
Mahaz-e Milli faction that represented the interests of the tribal establishment and large
landowners. They have been influential in government, education, business, and dominate
also as large landowners. Besides the city, they also live in Arghistan, Daman, Dand, Maruf,
Nesh and Takhtapul districts of Kandahar and they are also influential in parts of Helmand
Province.
During the governorship of Gul Agha Sherzai (2002 until December 2004), the Barakzai were
the most powerful tribe in Kandahar. Many important political positions were filled with
Barakzai and they had established good contacts with international actors, especially military
ones. The Barakzai managed to control much of the logistics for the internationals as the
airport was occupied in 2001 by Gul Agha Sherzai's brothers Abdul Raziq and Haji Bacha.
Since then Gul Agha Sherzai’s Barakzai militia have been in charge of the security of the
airport and dominate the business surrounding the logistical support of the international
military forces stationed at Kandahar Airfield (KAF). They also have a quasi monopoly on the
gas business.48 Khalid Pashtun, a Barakzai close to Gul Agha Sherzai and his former
spokesman, owns a construction company that implements PRT projects. This said, despite
the fact that Barakzai and Popalzai contractors dominated the business, at least many
reconstruction projects were accomplished during the Sherzai’s governorship.
The Barakzai are also strongly present in the ANP as they rolled over some of their militia
into the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Sherzai’s second corps merged into the
ANP after demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) and is close to Coalition
Forces.
Main leaders
Gul Agha Sherzai is the main leader of the Barakzai tribe even though he does not come
from a traditional tribal elite family. He achieved his status, stepping into the footsteps of his
father, the late Haji Latif, a prominent and well-respected Barakzai commander of Mahaz-e
Milli who was poisoned in 1989.49 He is one of the main strongmen in the province, having
held the governor position trice, once during the mujahideen government, and twice during
the current one (See section 3.1.1 for a description of Sherzai’s background.) The family of
Gul Agha Sherzai is from the Nurdinzai sub-tribes of Dand district.
The main rival of Sherzai within the Barakzai tribe is Nur-ul Haq Ulumi (see Table 10 for
other Barakzai key actors); the two men have a different outlook and worldview. Nur-ul Haq
48
Giustozzi, Antonio; Ullah, Noor (2007): The inverted cycle: Kabul and the strongmen's competition
for control over Kandahar, 2001-2006. In: Central Asian Survey, Volume 26, Number 2, June 2007,
pp. 167-184(18).
49
See: UNDP, 1991, Kandahar. A socio-economic profile. UNDP
46
Ulumi was a member of the Parcham faction of the PDPA during the communist government
and served as Minister of Defence and governor of Kandahar during the government of Dr.
Najibullah. Sherzai, as noted, fought against the PDPA on the side of the mujahideen.
Table 10: Key Barakzai actors
Name
Haji Abdul
Majid
Haji
Hidayatullah
Haji Abdullah
Village/area
nahiya 7
He is a tribal elder and malik and a good conflict mediator.
He is only influential in nahiya 7. He also represents his
people in the government. During jihad he stayed in the city
but assisted the mujahideen in secret. During the Taliban
government he stayed at home and resolved conflicts. He is
a tribal elder now.
nahiya 4
He never had membership of any faction. He is a
businessman. His area of influence encompasses the entire
city. Since the years of jihad he has stayed out of politics.
He is the twin brother of Haji Abdullah.
nahiya 2
He never had membership of any faction. He is a
businessman. His area of influence encompasses the entire
city. Since the years of jihad he has stayed out of politics.
He is the twin brother of Haji Hidayatullah.
Haji Pacha
Dand
Nur-ul Haq
Ulumi
Maruf
Engineer Yusef
Pashtun
Miyandoshin
Awsat/Arghandab
He is the son of Haji Abdul Latif, the brother of Gul Agha
Sherzai and leads the Barakzai council. He is influential
among the Barakzai tribes, especially in Dand. During jihad
years he fought alongside his father and emigrated to
Pakistan during the Taliban.
Tribe
He was a Parcham/PDPA in the past
and served as Minister of Defence and governor of
Kandahar during the government of Dr. Najibullah. He is a
member of the Wolesi Jirga. His main source of influence is
political power.
He is the son of Ghond Mashar Sahib. He was briefly the
Provincial Governors in 2003-2004 (see section 3.1.1 for
his profile). His main source of influence is political power.
He is the brother of Senator Mullah Said Mohammad
Akhund (Mahaz). During the jihad he was a commander
with Gul Agha Sherzai. Gulalai is general chief commander
of a garrison at the airport. His main source of influence is
security provision.
General Gulalai
Haji Sayed
Mohammad
Akhund
Background
City, Originally a
resident of Dand
district, but now living
in Khakarpur Darwaza
He built a huge mosque close to his house. During the jihad
he was a sub-commander of Abdul Latif. During the Taliban
government he stayed at home. He rose to become a tribal
elder during the current government. His influence is limited
to Kandahar-city. His main source of influence is conflict
resolution and political connections.
47
Name
Village/area
Dr. Qasam
Khan
City
Hajji Abdullah
Dand
Haji Musa
Dand
Background
He is a khan and a tribal elder in his tribe and is important
in resolving people’s conflicts. He was a mujahed during the
jihad; he stayed at home during the Taliban government.
Now he is a member of the PC. His influence covers Dand,
Kandahar-city and all Barakzai tribes. His main source of
influence is conflict resolution and political connections.
He is a resident of Kharpor Darwaza, and is a moneychanger. His main source of influence is business.
He is a resident of Mullah Alam Akhund village and is from
the Nurdinzai sub-tribe. He imports automobiles from
Japan.
His main source of influence is business.
On the intertribal level, the Barakzai are involved in rivalries with the two other largest Zirak
tribes: the Alkozai and the Popalzai. While the Alkozai rivalry dates back to the mujahideen
time, the Popalzai-Barakzai emerged after Hamid Karzai became the interim president,
making the Popalzai into the “ruling” tribe.
Main rivalries: Barakzai vs. Alkozai
The Barakzai have a tense relationship with parts of the Alkozai since the jihad and
especially with the late Alkozai leader Mullah Naqibullah who supported the rivalling faction
Jamiat-e-Islami. More significantly, some local respondents attribute the bad relationship to
the role Naqibullah played in the handover of Kandahar-city to the Taliban in the mid 1990s,
when Sherzai was the mujahideen Governor of Kandahar. Mullah Naqibullah declared
support for the Taliban and weakened Sherzai’s position. This creating stories of treason and
provided an explanation for the bitter rivalry between the Alkozai and the Barakzai which
continues into the current government. Since both the Barakzai and Alkozai rolled over large
contingents into the police force, their rivalry has weakened the police internally.
By the end of 2002 the Alkozai and Barakzai militias came close to an all out war when Chief
of Police Khakrezwal (an Alkozai) tried to fire his Barakzai Deputy, Naser Jan leading to the
transfer of Khakrezwal from Kandahar to Kabul in 2003. In 2004 Khan Mohammed, an
Alkozai leader and former jihadi commander, lost his position as commander of the 2nd Army
Corps (Alkozai-dominated) when it was abolished as part of a country-wide DDR campaign.
Less than a year later Khan Mohammed, like Khakrezwal, was transferred outside the
Province.50 These transfers of key Alkozai leaders outside of Kandahar happened during the
governorship of Sherzai and Pashtun, both Barakzai, and were interpreted by the Alkozai
tribe as deliberate attempts by their Barakzai rivals to weaken them.
50
Giustozzi, Antonio; Ullah, Noor (2007): The inverted cycle: Kabul and the strongmen's competition
for control over Kandahar, 2001-2006. In: Central Asian Survey, Volume 26, Number 2, June 2007, pp.
167-184(18).
48
Main rivalries: Barakzai vs. Popalzai
The Popalzai tribe led by Ahmad Wali Karzai (AWK) is the main rivals to the Barakzai. While
Gul Agha Sherzai became the first provincial governor of Kandahar in the new government,
Ahmad Wali Karzai established a consultative council of 100-150 men called “Eslahi shura”
six months after the fall of the Taliban regime to create a counterweight to the provincial
governor. The Eslahi shura was dissolved once Sherzai was transferred to Nangarhar in
2005 and the Provincial Council was elected. Once Karzai was confirmed as president in the
October 2004 elections and AWK was elected as the PC head, the power in Kandahar
shifted from the Barakzai to the Popalzai.
Main allies
The main ally of the Barakzai tribe is the Achekzai tribe. The Achekzai were a Barakzai subtribe until they were elevated to the status of a proper tribe during the reign of Ahmad Shah
Durrani (1747), the Popalzai leader whose tribal policies shaped southern Afghanistan
significantly.
To fight against the Taliban in Kandahar in late 2001, Sherzai allied himself with the Achekzai
tribal militia under the command of Abdur Raziq, the nephew of an infamous mujahideen
commander (Ismat Muslim)51 despite the fact that the Gul Agha’s father Haji Latif and Ismat
Muslim had been bitter enemies during the jihad. After Sherzai became provincial governor,
Raziq’s militia was integrated into the Spin Boldak border police. Sherzai was thus able to
form a strategic Barakzai–Achekzai alliance in Kandahar for the purpose of controlling the
Kandahar–Spin Boldak road, the economic lifeline of Kandahar, including the border crossing
to Pakistan in Spin Boldak.
Another main ally of Gul Agha Sherzai was the late Habibullah Jan, an Alizai from Zhari
district, whom he helped to carve out the new Zhari district from Maywand and Panjwayi (see
Zhari District Assessment). He was killed in 2008 by unknown gunmen and since then the
alliance between the Alizai and Barakzai in Kandahar has been weakened. The relationship
of the Barakzai with the Alizai, however, was always somewhat ambiguous, as Sher
Mohammad Akhundzada (Alizai), the former provincial governor of Helmand (2002-2005) is
married to a sister of Arif Khan Nurzai, whose other sister is married to Ahmad Wali Karzai.
3.2.1.3 Alkozai
The Alkozai, the third largest tribe in Kandahar-city (7.5%) are part of the Zirak Durrani
“troika” forming the power elite of Kandahar. Historically, however, they have been weaker
than the Barakzai or Popalzai. Their main bases of power are located in Arghandab, Khakrez
51
Esmat Muslim was a militia leader during the jihad. While Muslim initially fought the PDPA and
Soviets, he joined the PDPA in 1984 when he lost support of the ISI.
49
and Panjwayi district. Since the late commander Mullah Naqibullah Akhund grabbed and
distributed government land in Loya Wiala (Kandahar-city) in 1992 (see also 2.1) mainly
among the Alkozai, the tribe makes up much of the population of nahiya 9 of Kandahar-city.
The Alkozai tribes were mostly in Jamiat-e-Islami (Mullah Naqibullah) and to a lesser degree
Mahaz-e-Milli (Khakrezwal).
As the Barakzai, the Alkozai went more massively into the police than other tribes as they
initially held the position of chief of police. Zabit Akram Khakrezwal (Alkozai) from Khakrez
became provincial Chief of Police of Kandahar; Khan Muhammad (Alkozai) from Arghandab
became head of the Kandahar military corps and later pprovincial Chief of Police. The
Alkozai are one of the largest contributors to state security forces in Kandahar, a tradition
reaching back to the 18th and 19th century when the Alkozai gained fame due to their large
tribal militia. Alkozai power eroded when key Alkozai leaders were transferred out of their
positions during the governorship of Gul Agha Sherzai. They also came under pressure by
the rise of the Achekzai allied with Sherzai as a backbone of the police.
Internal divisions in the Alkozai tribe started to become apparent in 2004 when half the tribe
backed Mohammed Younes Qanuni (Tajik candidate of the United Front) in the presidential
elections while the other half, lead by Senator Wasifi, an inherited status Alkozai tribal elder
long-exiled in Europe, backed Karzai. Divided internally, and weakened by provincial power
holders, Alkozai leadership (all with jihadi background, see Chapter 2.6) was then targeted
for assassination by the insurgency from approximately 2005 onwards to further weaken the
tribe: Haji Granay, Muhammed Akram Khakrezwal, Mullah Abdul Hakim Jan, and Malim
Akbar were assassinated while Mullah Naqibullah Akhund was seriously wounded in a mine
explosion and died later in September of 2007.52 This has left the Alkozai vulnerable as the
new leadership still has to be consolidated.53
Main leaders
The main leaders of the Alkozai tribe that remain alive are Karimullah Khan from Arghandab
and Haji Agha Lalay from Panjwayi.
Karimullah Khan is the son of the late Mullah Naqibullah Akhund. Mullah Naqibullah did not
come from the tribal establishment but gained his influence as a Jamiat-e-Islami commander
and was known as a political opportunist. Naqib used his influence to allow a blood-less takeover of Kandahar to the Taliban and later from the Taliban to the new government. After his
father’s death, President Karzai intervened and selected Karimullah Khan as a successor. It
is not yet clear how much power Karimullah has, as power transfers from father to son are
52
The Globe, March 10 2007.
It should be noted that it is not entirely clear if all Alkozai leaders were killed by Taliban insurgents.
Some local respondents suggested that rivals close to the Afghan government may also have been
involved.
53
50
less predictable for achieved status holder rather than in tribal elite families. Karimullah Khan
is also an elder of the Alkozai tribe of nahiya 9. He is better connected with Ahmad Wali
Karzai than with Gul Agha Sherzai.
Haji Agha Lalai Dastagir is a member of the Provincial Council, the head of the Panjwayi
district council and a member of the Qayum Karzai council. He has good relations with
Ahmad Wali Karzai and is presently involved in preparing a new Kandahar tribal council upon
suggestion of Ahmad Wali Karzai. He has a better relationship with Ahmad Wali Karzai than
with Gul Agha Sherzai. He was also head of the new reconciliation commission but resigned
in May because he was running again for the provincial council. He was re-elected with the
5th highest score.
He comes from a very influential khan family that revolted against the PDPA because they
were heavily affected by land redistribution. During the jihad he switched factions frequently
and later became a Taliban commander.
He also used political marriage to create networks. One of his sisters is married to a Taliban
commander, the other with an Ittehad commander of the Nurzai tribe that was led by Ustad
Abdul Malim.
He is a regionally influential tribal elder with good links to both the government and the
Taliban insurgency. He is also said to be influential beyond the Alkozai tribe. His father was a
big khan, affected by the PDPA land distribution policies and killed by the PDPA
government.45 He successfully reclaimed the land of his family and is one of the wealthiest of
all Alkozai khans, owning 350 jeribs (70 ha) of land plus three vineyards. Other influential
elders are listed in Table 11.
Table 11: Key Alkozai actors
Name
Azizullah
"Wasifi"
Village/area
Background
Arghandab
Advisor minister during the government of Zahir Khan.
Within the Alkozai tribe he constitutes the second main pole
of power and advocates for closer relations with the
Popalzai as opposed to connections to Qanuni based on
old factional ties (see Arghandab District Assessment).
He has been a respected conflict mediator from many
Haji Mohammad Originally from Shah
years. During jihad he was a HIG commander. He was a
Isa Sahibzada
Wali Kot, now nahiya 9 conflict mediator during the Taliban government too. He is
influential among all Alkozai tribes.
Mohammad Haq
nahiya 2
Jinabee Sahib
He is the son of a reputable religious scholar, highly
respected by the people of Kandahar City and often
involved in conflict resolution. His area of influence entails
the entire Kandahar province.
51
Name
Village/area
Background
He is an elder and influential man of his tribe and the
nahiya where he lives. He is a conflict mediator. During
Haji Abdul
Originally from
jihad he was a member of the Jamiat faction. During the
Manan khan
Khakrez, now nahiya 9
Taliban government however he stayed at home. Now he is
a tribal elder.
He is a tribal elder. He rose to tribal eldership during jihad
years. He is influential in his tribe and is considered the
most active of all tribal elders. He used to be a commander
Haji Pacha Aka Panjwayi
of Mahaz faction during jihad. During the Taliban
government he stayed at home. He plays a significant role
in resolving conflicts. His influence is confined to his tribe in
Panjwayi district.
His father was a famous religious scholar known as Jenabi
Mawlawi Sahib. He called on people to wage jihad against
the Soviet troops and was one of the most influential pirs of
Mohammad Haq
City (nahiya 2)
the Alkozai tribe. Upon his death Mohammad haq Jinayee
Jinayee
became a tribal elder. Now he is a member of the Alkozai
council and a respected tribal elder among others other
tribes. During the Taliban government he stayed at home.
He is a resident of Char Qulbi, Arghandab. He was the
assistant of Mullah Naqibullah in the army and was also
Khan
Arghandab
CoP. He has connection with Jamiat-e-Islami and is an
Mohammed
advisor in the MoI. He supported Dr. Abdullah Abdullah
during the 2009 presidential elections.
He is a tribal elder. He has inherited spirituality from his
forefathers. He is a popular amulet writer among the
Haji Mohammad Resident of Shah Wali
people. He also takes part in resolving disputes. During the
Isa Sahibzada
Kot district
Taliban government he stayed at home and resolved
conflicts. He is a figure of regional influence.
Major Rivalry: Alkozai vs. Barakzai
The main rivals of the Alkozai are the Barakzai, see the description under 3.2.1.1.
3.2.1.4
Achekzai
The Achekzai were considered a Barakzai sub-tribe until Ahmad Shah Durrani elevated them
to a proper tribe to weaken his Barakzai rivals. They are a cross-border tribe and have large
populations in Spin Boldak, Takhtapul Pul districts and in Baluchistan Province of Pakistan.
They make up an estimated 5% of the population of Kandahar-city. Their influence and
power comes through links with the Barakzai and their effective control of the road from
Kandahar to Spin Boldak, their main power base. They are traditionally well established in
business and cross-border smuggling activities. They had three provincial council members,
one of which was assassinated in early 2009 (Sitara Achekzai). They also head several
provincial departments.
The killing in June 2009 of the Achekzai Chief of Police (CoP) of Kandahar Matiullah Qatea
has raised some concerns as to the further destabilization of the government. Local
respondents claim that the people involved in the killing of the CoP, who were subsequently
52
arrested by American forces, are mostly Popalzai. This may create future problems with the
Popalzai tribe. Table 12 provides an overview of other prominent Achekzai figures.
Table 12: Key Achekzai actors
Name
Haji Torjan
Aka
Tribe
Village/area
Background
Achekzai
Originally from
Farah
province, now
nahiya 9
He is an old man who actively resolves people’s
conflicts. He was a conflict solver during the
Taliban government as well. He is influential
among the community from Farah living in
Kandahar.
Haji Ahmad
Shah khan
Achekzai
Haji
Mohammad
Isa khan
Achekzai
Haji Abdul
Wali
Achekzai
He is tribal elder. And has influence in his own
nahiya and in his tribe. He was member Mahaz. In
the government of Taliban he stayed home and
solved the conflicts of the people on that time.
Now he is representative in provincial council of
his tribe.
nahiya 6
He is a businessman and a tribal elder in his tribe
and the nahiya where he lives. He has never been
associated with any faction.
Originally from
Panjwayi, now
nahiya 9
He is a tribal elder of his tribe and nahiya.
Moreover, he is head of the municipality council.
He is influential in nahiya of his residence. During
jihad he was a member of the Mahaz faction.
During the Taliban government he only led his
tribe.
Main rivalries and alliances
Their main rival on the provincial level is the Nurzai tribe from the Panjpai Durrani subconfederation. They have been engaged in a century old conflict over political power and
economic resources in Spin Boldak. During the jihad, many Achekzai in Spin Boldak fought
under Ismat Muslim’s Fedayin faction that was known for switching between the mujahideen
and the PDPA government opportunistically. The Nurzai on the other hand were closer to
different mujahideen factions and later to the Taliban government whom they also used to
settle scores with the Achekzai.
When the Taliban government collapsed, the Achekzai tribe entered into an alliance with Gul
Agha Sherzai and the Barakzai tribe. Achekzai and Barakzai forces captured the airport as
they moved on Kandahar City and since then the Achekzai have been strongly present in the
border police led by Abdur Raziq. This has come at the expense of the Alkozai tribe, a tribe
traditionally known for mustering a strong militia. The alliance of the Achekzai with the
Barakzai has brought the Nurzai closer to the Popalzai (see Figure 9).
53
Barakzai
Popalzai
Achekzai
Nurzai
Figure 9: Main rivalries and alliances
During the post-Taliban period, Nurzai/Achekzai tribal tensions have not been confined to
Spin Boldak. The Afghan government used Abdul Raziq and his militia to fight the Taliban in
Nurzai dominated Panjwayi district. Raziq’s forces were defeated as Nurzai tribesmen from
across the south and southwest flocked to Panjwayi to assist their fellow tribesmen.54
3.2.1.5 Mohammadzai
The Mohammadzai are a sub-tribe of the Barakzai but are often considered as a proper tribe
because of their past importance. They lead the pre-war elite of Kandahar since Dost
Mohammad established the dynastic rule of the Mohammadzai in 1818, providing members
of the royal family. They influenced the creation of a much more hierarchical tribal system
than in the east and southeast of Afghanistan and the affairs of government became more
exclusively a Mohammadzai affair.55 The new hierarchy meant that on the very top were the
immediate families of Mohammadzai rulers and landowning aristocracy followed by nonDurrani (Ghilzai, Farsiwan, and Qizilbash) who ran much of the administration.
Targeted by assassinations during the early PDPA years, a majority of the Mohammadzai
tribe emigrated and are part of the large Afghan Diaspora living in many different countries.
They make up 2.5 % of the city population. The two key Mohammadzai leaders in Kandaharcity are mentioned in Table 13 below.
54
Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalishnikov, and Laptop: The neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan Hurst
and Company, London (2007), pp. 55-56.
55
Christine Noelle, State and Tribe in Nineteenth-Century Afghanistan, Curzon Press, Richmond
(1997), p.240.
54
Table 13: Mohammadzai leaders
Name
District
Background
Tooryalai
Vesa
Arghandab, Kowok Village
See Provincial Governors under
3.1.1
Originally from Arghandab but presently lives
in nahiya 2
He immigrated to Pakistan during
the jihad and started his private
business. Now he is head of the
provincial court and a tribal elder
of the Mohammadzai tribe.
Abdul
Hamid
3.2.2
Panjpai Durrani Tribes
The Panjpai Durrani tribes in Kandahar consist mostly of the Alizai, Ishaqzai, Nurzai and few
Maku villages. They are mostly concentrated in Maywand, Panjwayi, Zhari, Maruf and Spin
Boldak. They make up an estimated 15% of the Kandahar-city population.
3.2.2.1 Nurzai
The Nurzai is the largest of the Panjpai tribes in Kandahar, but their exact numbers are hard
to estimate. They are mostly settled in Maywand, Panjwayi, Spin Boldak, Takhtapul and
Zhari district. Some of their leaders have been able to establish connections to the central
power holders, most notably Arif Khan Nurzai (see below). The Nurzai also have two
members in the provincial council and one head of a provincial government department.
Similarly to their main rival, the Achekzai, they are a cross-border tribe with a large
population in Baluchistan province of Pakistan. They are traditionally well established in
business and cross-border smuggling activities.
The Nurzai are said to be particularly divided and their leadership has good relations with
Afghan government power holders as well as the Taliban insurgency. The Nurzai are often
stigmatized as Taliban supporters which has made them the prime targeted of international
military forces despite their connections to the government.
Main leaders
Arif Khan Nurzai comes from a family of Nurzai tribal elders of Panjwayi. He is a member of
the provincial council and well connected to Ittehad-e-Islami. He maintains good relations
with other influential individuals and is linked to the Karzai family through the marriage of his
sister to Ahmad Wali Karzai. During the Taliban government he lived in Quetta city of
Pakistan. His forefathers were tribal elders. He is influential in the region. In the pre-2005
cabinet he served as the Minister of Tribal and Border Affairs.
He is the son of Haji Musa Jan Nurzai who was said to be one of the drug barons during
Zahir Shah’s time and his family has been allegedly involved in drug trafficking since the
1960s and thus managed to amass wealth from illegal and legal business. His uncle is
55
Muhammed Yunus, a resident of Nawi Khar city who became the first Director of the
Customs Office post 2001.
His cousin is Haji Basher, one of the first jihadi commanders to support the emerging Taliban
movement, was the former Taliban district governor of Maywand and is a major narcotics
dealer. He was arrested in 2008 in New York where he is currently serving a life sentence for
major narcotics offences.
Haji Neamatullah Khan is the main Nurzai leader from Spin Boldak. He is a member of both
the provincial and Kandahar tribal council. He was a Jabha-e-Nejat-e-Milli. He has good ties
with Ahmad Wali Karzai, Gul Agha Sherzai and Arif Nurzai. The connection to Arif Nurzai is
the main factor for his involvement in the council. He allegedly also has contacts with the
Pakistani intelligence service ISI, a reason for which he is mistrust by many. He is known as
an opportunist who is close to everyone with power and money.
Hafiz Majid is an old garde Taliban from the first Taliban regime. From a religious family, his
father Mullah Abdullah Jan was mullah of a mosque in Panjwayi (Safid Rawan area). During
the jihad he studied at a religious madrassa in Pakistan and memorized the Koran. He
became a group commander of Ittehad-e Islami by the end of the jihad and spent his time
during the mujahideen government as a sub-commander of Arif Khan Nurzai at the 7th
Division at Kandahar airfield. He rose to prominence during the Taliban government. Known
as a ‘right-hand’ to the Taliban leader Mullah Omer, he served as CoP of Kandahar province
during the Taliban government. During the old Taliban regime, he allegedly tortured
numerous potential opponents of the regime in Kandahar. Amid the Taliban collapse, he
reportedly stocked huge cashes of ammunition at an unknown location in Panjwayi. Now he
is the most powerful insurgency commander in Panjwayi and also in Kandahar, Helmand,
Uruzgan, and Zabul. He is reportedly the head of the Taliban insurgency military operations
in these provinces. He leads the insurgency activities in Panjwayi from Quetta, Pakistan.
Other prominent Nurzai figures are listed in Table 14.
Table 14: Key Nurzai actors
Name
Area
Background
Haji Shirin Agha nahiya 7
He is known as a spiritual figure and a conflict mediator
among the people. He is an elder of nahiya 7.
Haji Qader
Panjwayi
He is Arif Khan's uncle and heads the Afghan Independent
Human Rights Commission. He has a tense relationship
with Arif Khan.
Haji Isa Jan
Panjwayi
He is a tribal leader and khan. He was the first CoP of
Panjwayi after the collapse of the Taliban regime.
Abdul Samad
Khan
Spin Boldak
He is the son of Mohabub Khan, an important Nurzai from
Spin Boldak.
56
Main rivalries and alliances
Their main rival on the provincial level is the Achekzai tribe (see earlier discussion under
3.2.1.4).
3.2.2.2 Other Panjpai tribes
Other Panjpai tribes include the Ishaqzai and the Alizai. The Ishaqzai is the second largest of
the Panjpai tribes in Kandahar settled mostly in western Kandahar districts Maywand and
Panjwayi. They have large populations in neighbouring Helmand. They are strongly
marginalized in the government and have no provincial council member or head of
government department.
The Alizai are not very powerful either but better connected to the central government
because of the marriage of Mullah Sher Mohammad Akhundzada an Alizai, previous
Governor of Helmand and ally of the Karzai family, to a sister of Arif Khan Nurzai. They head
one provincial government department and one of the Chiefs of Police of Kandahar was an
Alizai from Musa Qala in Helmand.
Their main tribal area is Maruf and Zhari District, but their population is more concentrated in
northern Helmand. Their main leader in Kandahar was Habibullah Jan from Zhari who was
killed in 2008 by unknown gunmen. One of the main reasons he created Zhari district was to
give the Alizai one area where they were in the majority (see Zhari District Assessment).
3.2.3
Ghilzai
The Ghilzai confederation tribes have shared much of the same predicament as the Panjpai
Durrani and have historically been in the shadow of the much more powerful Zirak tribes. The
Ghilzai are even weaker than the Panjpai in terms of connections to the provincial
government as they have no provincial council member or other important government
positions.
Even more so than the Panjpai, the Ghilzai tribes were associated with the Taliban regime,
as many of the old garde Taliban (including their leader Mullah Omar) were from the Ghilzai
confederation. This has been used as an excuse to sideline them from post-2001 politics,
and also made them a prime target for arrests by the international military forces. It is alleged
that the overwhelming majority of prisoners all across southern Afghanistan are Ghilzai.
The Ghilzai tribes created their own council in order to counter balance the influence of the
Durrani, but it is seen by many Ghilzai as mainly composed of pro-Karzai Ghilzai. While this
Ghilzai shura has an official status with the provincial government it holds less power than
the provincial shura. Currently, efforts are underway to create a new Ghilzai shura.
57
Among the Ghilzai tribes, the Hotak are the most prominent in Kandahar-city (5%), especially
among the religious figures. The overall percentage of the Ghilzai is hard to gauge due to
their diversity.
Mohammad Hassan Akhund is a Hotak, a prominent religious scholar and one of the most
famous mullahs of Kandahar province. He was never linked to any faction. Since the Taliban
government he is Khatib56 of the Moyi Mobarak Jamai Mosque where hair of the prophet
Mohammad (PBUH) is said to be kept. Another well known religious scholar of the Hotak
tribe is Haji Kari Sahib. He is a member of the ulema shura and the Mullah Imam of the Moyi
Mobarak Jamai Mosque and has good relations with the major Kandahar power holders.
Mohammad Haq Akhunzada is another elder of the Hotak tribe and lives in nahiya 11. He
was never linked to any party and is a conflict mediator known for his wisdom and
impartiality.
3.2.4
Kuchi
During the winter season, an estimated 6,000 Kuchi families from Ghazni (Muqur), Zabul
(Qalat) and Uruzgan provinces pass the Kandahar-city area on their way to Garamsir district
of Helmand province. They stay for about two or three days in the area of the Nisaji factory
located in the east of the city between the border of Daman district and the city. During the
summer months they return back to the highlands.
3.3
Shia population
There is a sizeable Shia population in Kandahar-city (8%) that lives mostly in nahiya 1. They
are most likely descendents of Qizilbash who came to Kandahar during the time of Nadir
Shah and Ahmad Shah Baba and constituted large parts of the administrative class in the
past. The Shia population is famous as potters and jewellers and are also strongly involved in
the import of construction materials such as farming tools and pipes. Today, they are strongly
represented in NGOs and many Shia women work. Local respondents estimated that most of
the girls in the schools of Kandahar-city are Shia.
During the jihad the Shia mostly supported Harakat-e-Islami, led by Ali Yawar, a resident of
Taop Khana in Kandahar-city. The Shia community has set up their own council in the city.
Tables 15 profile important Shia leaders in Kandahar-city.
Table 15: Key leaders of the Shia community
Name
Haji Sher Agha
56
Village/area
nahiya 1
Background
He is an elder among the Shia and solves their conflicts.
Since the Taliban government he resolves conflicts of the
Shia community.
A khatib is a main speaker of the Friday prayers.
58
Name
Village/area
Background
He is the son of Mohseni, the leader of the Harakat party
and a tribal elder of the Shia. He is a member of the Shia
council. During the Taliban government he migrated to Iran.
He is influential and respected in his tribe.
He is a big landholder whose lands are located in Zala
Khan. His father was Malik Din Muhammad. He has
inherited tribal eldership from his forefathers. During the
Taliban government, he tended his farms and resolved
people’s conflicts. He is only influential among the Shia of
Kandahar.
Sheikh Haji
Abdullah
Resident of Top khana
Haji Sher
57
Agha
Resident of Top khana
Agha Mazfari
Resident of Top khana
He rose to tribal eldership during this government. During
jihad he went to Iran. Upon return from Iran following the
Taliban overthrow he became a tribal elder of the Shia.
Resident of Top khana
Known as a spiritual figure, tribal eldership has been
endowed to him from his forefathers. During jihad years, he
was a commander of Ali Yawar. He stayed at home during
the Taliban government. Following the Taliban ouster from
power he became a tribal elder.
Sayed Mukhtar
Agha
3.4
Religious and spiritual figures
Kandahar-city is an important religious centre with holy several sites. The most important is
the mausoleum and mosque where the akherqa, the cloak of the Prophet Mohammad
(PBUH) is kept.58 A second site of great importance is the Moyi Mubarak Jamai Mosque
(where the hair of the Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) is kept). In the north of the city there is
the shrine of Hazrat Baba, a revered saint who lived in Kandahar 300 years ago.
Islam is deeply embedded in the life of all Afghans and religious and spiritual figures play an
important role in the Afghan social structure as formers of public opinion and legitimizers of
social order. The support of the ulema was very important for the newly forming Afghan
government. In turn, it has made the pro-government clergy the prime target of
assassinations by the Taliban insurgency. Attacks against religious leaders considered as
pro-government started in 2003 already. The first thee heads of the Kandahar ulema shura
were all assassinated, with the most famous of them being Mullah Faiz Mohammad, a Kakar
from Kandahar-city. Mullah Faiz was the son of Abd-u-Rab Akhunzada, the famous Mubaligh
and resident of Ikhkar-pur Darwaza. He was a teacher and religious scholar during the jihad
and mullah imam in his village during the Taliban regime. In the current government he was
the scholars and ulema council director. On 31 May 2005 he was assassinated and the
57
This is a different Haji Sher Agha, which is a common name.
It is also the site where Mullah Omar wrapped the cloak around himself before a crowd of religious
scholars to have himself declared Amir al-Mu'mineen, (Commander of the Faithful); the last time it was
used was when the city was struck by a cholera epidemic in the 1930s. www.wikipedia.org, Consulted
July 2009.
58
59
attacks on his funeral one week later claimed the life of Alkozai leader Khakrezwal.59
Seventeen people were injured when a bomb exploded at a Kandahar mosque during
evening prayers aimed at Mullah Faiz.60 Other ulema shura heads assassinated by Taliban
insurgents include Mawlawi Qaba, a Popalzai from nahiya 4 and Sayed Imam, an Alkozai,
former Jamiat-e Islami supporter and son of the famous late religious scholar Nabi
Akhundzada.
Table 16 provides an overview of current ulema shura members, and Table 17 of other
famous religious scholars in Kandahar.
Table 16: Current ulema shura members
Name
Mawlawi
Tribe
Sayed
Position
District
Background
Current
Barakzai Head of
Dand
ulema shura
Important in his tribe. Had no important post
in the Taliban regime. Current head of the
shura.
Mawlawi Shalu
Akhundzada
Alkozai
Member
nahiya 1
Current imam of the Kharq-e Sharif (mosque
where the cloak of the prophet PBUH).
During jihad and Taliban regime he was
mullah imam of a mosque.
Haji Kari Sahib
Hotak
Member
nahiya 4
Haji Kari Ahmad
Akhundzada
Popalzai Member
nahiya 4
Haji Mullah
Matiullah
Akhundzada
Nurzai
nahiya 6
Mohammad
Akhundzada
Member
Mullah Imam of the muj mobarak (mosque
where the hair of the prophet PBUH is).
He was mullah imam in the past
governments.
He was mullah imam in the past
governments.
Table 17: Famous religious scholars of Kandahar-city
Name
Tribe
Village/area
Background
Mohammad
Hassan
Akhund
Hotak
Resident of
10th Nahiya
See 3.2.3
Mawlawi
Abdul Hakim
Sahib
Babar
Arghandab
He is a famous religious scholar and a devout preacher.
During the Taliban regime he was an imam but was never
affiliated with any faction. Originally from Sozanyan village
in Arghandab district, he now lives in nahiya 5 of the city.
Mawlawi
Abdul Majid
Sayed
Resident of
nahiya 5
As his forefathers, he is a religious scholar in the Hazrat
Sahib mosque and a spiritual leader. He was never
59
Other assassinated ulema are Mawlawi Hamdullah (Dand District), Mawlawi Abdul Manan
(Panjwayi), Mawlawi Abdul Bari (Kandahar-city), Mawlawi Mohammad Nabi Bali (Kandahar-city) See
Kandahar Report.
60
Agence France Presse – English July 7, 2003
60
Name
Tribe
Akhunzada
Mawlawi
Abdul Bari
Mawlawi
Abdul Karim
Background
Village/area
affiliated with any faction.
Achekzai
Alkozai
Resident of
nahiya 8
As his forefathers, he is a religious scholar of the Haji
Mohammad Jan mosque. He was not linked to any factions
and he was an imam during the Taliban government.
Arghandab
He is a very famous religious scholar in the Haji Mullah
Naqibullah mosque. He is the cousin of the late Mullah
Naqibullah Akhund and he was also a mullah imam during
the government of the Taliban. He is originally from
Arghandab district but now lives in the 9th nahiya.
Spiritual leaders such as Sayed often play an important role in mediation and conflict
resolution. Table 18 provides and overview important spiritual figures in Kandahar-city.
Table 18: Spiritual figures of Kandahar
Name
Tribe
Village/area
Marach Agha
Badar
Sayed
Resident of
nahiya 6
Haji Nanai Agha
Sayed
Resident of
Zakir Sharif
Talib Agha
Babar
Resident of
nahiya 9
Hazrat Sahib
Mubarak
Sayed
Originally from
Ghor province
but lives in
nahiya 9
Bahaodden Jan
Agha
Sayed
Resident of
nahiya 7
3.5
Back ground
He is the son of Sayed Manak Agha. He is spiritual
person in Kandahar city and gives amulets to people.
He is also important in mediation and in conflict
resolution. He had no factional affiliation in the past.
He is a famous pir and Sayed and spiritual healer. He
is known as an exorcist and trusted by the people.
He is a religious scholar and a wealthy man. He is
also known as a spiritual figure who writes amulets to
people. During the jihad and the Taliban regime he
studied religious subjects. His vast religious
knowledge is the base of his reputation.
He is a pir and a spiritual man and respected and
trusted by the people. He is known as an exorcist of
bad spirits. He was not linked to any faction. As an
amulet writer he found popularity during the Taliban
regime.
He is a grandson of Pir Mawlawi Mohammad Jan
Akhund. He writes amulets and heals people and is
trusted by the people of Kandahar. He has never been
linked to any faction.
Insurgency
The current fault line between the Taliban insurgency and the Afghan government is primarily
a political and economic struggle. The lack of a meaningful reconciliation process at the
beginning of the current government translated into an exclusion of the former Taliban
leadership from the current government and associated economic opportunities. Added to
this came grievances of commanders affiliated with the past Taliban regime that were
arrested and tortured by forces linked to the GoA or international military actors. Lastly, it is
important to recall that Kandahar was the birthplace of the Taliban movement which started
in Sangi Hesar village of Maywand District (now Zhari District).
61
The current Taliban insurgency in Kandahar is composed of three main groups: Old garde
Taliban, opportunistic Taliban, and foreign fighters.
The old garde (or their close relatives) are prominent among the current Taliban insurgents.
They can be considered the hard core Taliban who belonged to the old Taliban regime of
Mullah Omar. These ideological Taliban are following a strategy of fighting against NATO
and Afghan forces. They are the most ideological group among the Taliban and supported
by Pakistan’s secret service, the ISI. They focus on propaganda, building of political support,
and some may also be commanders. The propaganda of Taliban insurgents combines the
old religious jihadist rhetoric against a foreign occupying force with Afghan nationalism. This
discourse is supported and legitimized by mullahs who benefit from taxes that are distributed
to them by the insurgents.
Three of the main positions in the current Taliban insurgency governance structure (as of
July 2009) are old garde Taliban (see Table 19).
Table 19: Taliban insurgency governance structure
Name
Tribe
District
Background
Akhtar Mohammad
Mansur
Ishaqzai
Maywand
Provincial governor (July 2009). During
the Taliban regime he was the security
chief of Kandahar Airport and later
minister of aviation until the collapse of
the Taliban regime.
Mohibullah
Akhundzada
Barakzai
Shah Wali Kot
Deputy Provincial Governor. During the
Taliban government he was the provincial
governor of Faryab.
Mawlawi Andul
Ghaffur
Akhund
Ishaqzai
Grishk
Head of the administrative
commission for Kandahar that
appoints district governors. During
Taliban time he was in charge of
Battalion 93 of Helmand.
Mullah Zulgay
Alizai
Zhari
Chief of Police of the
Taliban insurgents.
The continuity between the current Taliban insurgency and the past Taliban regime is
highlighted by the fact that the Pashmul area of Panjwayi and Zhari districts and Sangi Hesar
in Zhari was (and is) the strongest support base of the Taliban insurgency. The Taliban
movement was supported by different tribes, but the Panjpai and Ghilzai tribes from Pashmul
and Sangi Hesar were more prominent among the top leadership. Particularly strong were
the Nurzai, Ishaqzai and Kakar tribes who made up many of the field commanders. The initial
leading figures were Mullah Rabbani (Kakar)61, Mullah Mohammad Omar (Hotak), and Mullah
Abdul Salam Zaif (Alizai) and others. Haji Basher, a former Jamiat commander and narcotics
61
He was allegedly killed by ISI because of his moderate stance on religious issues.
62
pusher of the Nurzai tribe was one of the first major jihadi commanders to support the
Taliban movement with weapons, money and logistics.62
The most prominent jihadi commander in Kandahar Province who supported the Taliban
movement was the late Mullah Naqibullah (Mullah Gul Akhund) of the Alkozai tribe from
Arghandab district. Despite the fact that he was a member of Jamiat-e-Islami, he
strengthened his friendship with the Taliban. Commander Abdur Raziq, a Popalzai resident
of Arghistan district and commander of Hizb-e Islami Khales joined them as well. The Taliban
were strongly supported by the mullahs, as Mawlawi Nabi, a religious scholar and the leader
of Harakat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami faction had joined the Taliban.
The second main group of local Taliban are opportunistic Taliban. They are the foot
soldiers of the Taliban and usually men under 20 years of age. This group of Taliban is not
specifically part of the Taliban insurgency out of adhering to a specific ideology, but more out
of political or economic opportunism.
Foreign fighters are a third group. Most of them also come from an ideological motivation.
Local respondents claim that there are at least 500 foreign insurgents from Waziristan
(Pakistan) and loyal to Mehsud in western Kandahar. They usually are trainers, explosives
and IED experts and support propaganda.
3.6
International Military Actors
Kandahar-city hosts a number of different international military actors with different mandates
ranging from American and Canadian Special Forces to the Canadian Provincial
Reconstruction Team (PRT). Most of the American and Canadian Special Forces are settled
in the former house of Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar. The Special Forces do
house searches and raids in the city. Since August 2005, the Canadian PRT comprised of
330 military and civilian personnel is stationed at Camp Nathan Smith in nahiya 5 of
Kandahar-city in Shirkat Miwa Amiryat.63 There are only Canadian forces that are charged
with security provision and the responsibility of reconstruction in Kandahar-city and districts
of the province. An additional location of international military forces is called the Joint
Coordination Centre (JCC) and is located to the south of the Kandahar provincial palace. At
JCC there are American forces, Canadian forces, as well as Afghan National Security Forces
from the National Directorate of Security (NDS), ANA and ANP. Their responsibility is
intelligence gathering and analysis.
About 25 km south of the city centre located in Daman District is the Kandahar international
airport or Kandahar Airfield (KAF). It is the biggest international forces centre in southern
62
He is the cousin of Arif Nurzai. He would later become a Taliban frontline commander in Shamali.
He was also a major narcotics dealer and later arrested in New York; he is serving a life sentence.
63
www.afghanistan.gc.ca
63
Afghanistan and hosts American, Australian, British, Canadian, Dutch, and Romanian military
forces.
Canadian forces have the formal leadership for the security and reconstruction of Kandahar
Province but may be helped by other forces when needed. For example, in the summer of
2008, Taliban insurgents launched a large attack accompanied by suicide attacks on
Kandahar prison and after a few days of aggressive attacks captured Arghandab district and
the Mahalajat area of the city. Canadian forces were unable to maintain the control of
Kandahar province so British and Dutch forces settled for a few days in Kandahar centre,
new city areas and Warzashi Lobghari located close to the Mahalajat area to block the
movement of Taliban to the city. As a consequence insurgents left the mentioned areas.
Since the beginning of the current government, when ISAF troops settled inside Kandahar
airport, Gul Agha Sherzai's brothers Abdul Raziq and Haji Bacha as well as Zar Gulalay
(Barakzai) settled there, too. They are still there and responsible to deliver their supplies and
provide security.
Mandate and perception
According to local respondents the main responsibility of international forces is to stop
internal conflicts, fight the insurgency or to encourage them to peace, to build up Afghan
National Security Forces (such as ANA, ANP, NDS) and intelligence forces and start and
implement reconstruction projects.
Generally, the city population is not very happy with the international military forces because
they have not achieved what they set out to accomplish: the security situation has
deteriorated and people attribute the losses and damage inflicted by conflict to the
internationals. Furthermore, according to local respondents international military forces
behave badly with residents and the reconstruction projects are said to be of poor quality.
For example, in 2008 Special Forces entered a house in the city in the Mullah Guldad Street
during a night raid and gunned down an innocent butcher while he was sleeping. In a
separate incident international military forces (nationality unknown) shot and killed a woman
while she was crossing the road in broad daylight in December 2008. People especially
disapprove of actions undertaken without ANA or ANP presence. In an instance mentioned,
international military actors attacked the house of Pir Sayed Shah (from Sayed tribe, a
resident of Loy Wiala, nahiya 9) accusing him of being a Taliban supporter. They arrested
him and the people in his house without ANA or ANP presence.
64
Chapter
4
4 Conflict Analysis
The ongoing conflict in southern Afghanistan in general and Kandahar-city in particular, is
characterized by weak governance and expressed through two main inter-related conflicts.
The first major fault line/division runs between Pashtun tribes and confederations, especially
between the traditional Zirak Durrani tribal establishment and the Panjpai Durrani and Ghilzai
tribes. This conflict line is far more complicated at a district level than for Kandahar province
as a whole. The second division is between ex-mujahideen power holders who experienced
a renaissance in the post-2001 period and ex-Taliban actors from the first regime in the
1990s (including newcomers on both sides). While there is a clear overlap between these
two conflict lines, it is important to emphasize that it can be neither reduced to simple tribal
rivalries nor to political differences. Their complex interplay creates a highly unstable political
situation in Kandahar-city today.
From the onset the international intervention became entangled in these political fault lines
that pre-dated their intervention. Their reliance on mostly Zirak Durrani Taliban opponents
made sense as a short-term military strategy to remove the Taliban regime, but it had long
lasting political consequences in the South. Furthermore, the lacking political will to reconcile
with those elements of the Taliban leadership who were willing to break links with global
jihadists or Al-Qaeda hindered the creation of an inclusive political structure in Kandahar.
Political and economical power was subsequently monopolised by Zirak Durrani Taliban
opponents and their constituencies.
4.1
4.1.1
Tribal rivalry
Tribal rivalry in the 18th and 19th century
As the main nexus of power in southern Afghanistan, Kandahar-city has always been at the
centre of conflicts and power struggles between different tribes or tribal confederations.64
Tribal rivalry has been the norm rather than the exception in Kandahar-city at least since 16th
64
Afghanistan. Past, Present & Future. Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad 1997. pp 84.
65
century C.E. when the Safavids and Moghuls quarreled over the possession of Kandahar
because of its strategic location on an important trade route connecting the Indian
subcontinent with Central Asia and Iran.65
In 1595 the city passed into the possession of the Moghuls until it was reconquered by the
Safavids in 1622 with the help of Sado, the leader of the Popalzai (Durrani) tribe who was
subsequently granted authority over all Durrani tribes. The Ghilzai confederation asserted
itself as the dominant force in Kandahar when Mir Wais of the Hotak tribe wrestled Kandahar
from the Safavids and the Pashtun Abdali (later Durrani) tribes in 1709 and invaded Persia.
The Hotak ruled over a vast empire stretching from Kandahar to Persia until 1730, when the
emerging Persian emperor Nadir Shah reconquered Persia and Afghanistan with the help of
Pashtun Abdali (later renamed Durrani) tribes. This allowed Ahmad Shah Durrani of the
Popalzai (Sadozai sub-tribe) tribe to found a new dynastic rule in Kandahar in 1747. He also
renamed the Abdali Pashtuns “Durrani”, (Pearls of pearls) the name under which they are
known today. Since then power in Kandahar has been wielded by the Zirak Durrani tribes
(especially the Sadozai sub-tribe of the Popalzai or the Mohammadzai, a Barakzai sub-tribe
from 1818 to the communist coup d’etat in 1978).
In the 18th and 19th centuries rivalries between Durrani and Ghilzai but also among Durrani
tribes (especially Alkozai, Barakzai and Popalzai) were exacerbated through policies of land
redistribution and political and administrative appointments. Ahmad Shah Durrani confiscated
Ghilzai land around Kandahar-city, expelled many of them from the city and distributed the
land among Durrani khans. The Ghilzai were pushed towards the region between Kandahar
and Kabul. Ahmad Shah Durrani also weakened the Ghilzai by “remodelling” their tribal
genealogy, splitting off five Ghilzai tribes (today known as Panjpai) and integrating them into
the Durrani confederation.
The political system of Kandahar was thus never conceived as a system representing tribes
proportionally based on to their population size but rather, at least since 1747, as a system of
domination by the Zirak Durrani tribes. This century old rule of the Zirak is the historical
rationale to the Zirak tribes’ claim that they are the “natural” leaders of Kandahar, still
impacting the conception of politics today.
4.1.2
Tribal rivalry during the mujahideen
Tribal politics was also apparent during the jihad and the mujahideen government as the
factions showed a tendency to recruit (and rival each other) along tribal lines.
65
This section draws heavily on pages 229-232 in: Christine Noelle, State and Tribe in NineteenthCentury Afghanistan, Curzon Press, Richmond, (1997).
66
•
The Zirak Durrani establishment (Barakzai and Popalzai) of the provincial centre were
closer to the traditionalist Mahaz-e-Milli and Jabha-e-Nejat; the Alkozai on the other hand
were linked to Jamiat-e Islami (see Chapter 3).
•
The support base of the Hizb-e Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar was strongest among the
Ghilzai and Panjpai tribes (see Chapter 3).
•
The Panjpai tribes were fragmented and split among different factions: the Nurzai
supported the Hizb-e Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Ittehad-e Islami while the
Ishaqzai were strong in Harakat-e Inqilab and the Alizai were closer to Jamiat-e Islami.
While the factions did show pragmatism in their recruitment as long as the common enemy
was present, the old Zirak Durrani - Ghilzai rivalry over leadership in Kandahar-city reemerged after the Soviet forces withdrew from Kandahar. The “Zirak factions” agreed on a
loose alliance against HIG and pushed them to the western border of the city. The
mujahideen government was clearly dominated by the Zirak tribes.
4.1.3
Tribal rivalries and the current Taliban insurgency
There is currently a backlash by the Panjpai and Ghilzai tribes who have been left out
squarely from the access to resources and power as the Zirak Durrani hold the sceptre firmly
in their hands (see 4.2 below). In southern Afghanistan, the US military strategy relied heavily
on Zirak Durrani anti-Taliban forces who were subsequently rewarded with the control of key
business sectors, political positions and the security apparatus. The new (and old) Zirak
power holders suggested a simplistic friend and foe schemata that allowed for a
stigmatization of Panjpai and Ghilzai tribes as Taliban and their subsequent marginalization.
Similarly, the jails of southern Afghanistan are filled with Ghilzai and Panjpai Durrani whereas
Zirak Durrani tribes often avoid imprisonment because of their connections to the police or
other central power holders (see Box 4 below). The example of the Sarpoza jailbreak below
is telling in this regard. The current Taliban insurgency has been fast in picking up on these
grievances as the basic political problem between the traditional Zirak Durrani establishment
and the Panjpai and Ghilzai “underdogs” remains unresolved.
Box 4: Tribal dimension of police and prisons
The infamous peak of insecurity in Kandahar was probably the widely publicised Sarpoza
jailbreak in June 2008 that allowed over a 1,000 prisoners, some hundreds of them Taliban,
to escape and re-join insurgency fighting forces.66 A less publicised story occurred during the
jailbreak and illustrates the tribal dimension surrounding police and prisons in Kandahar.
During the jailbreak, two prisoners (a Popalzai and Ghilzai) decided to stay and protect the
66
ABC Transcripts (Australia) June 17, 2008
67
prison. When the Afghan security forces arrived several hours later they found that during the
actual jailbreak two prisoners had seized weapons and prevented 120 inmates from fleeing
the prison, holding the others hostage.
The Afghan security forces gave the two hostage takers their respective ‘rewards’. The
Popalzai prisoner, who had been convicted of 15 murders and stealing gas and fuel was
pardoned and even became Commander of the Security of the Police headquarters. The
other hostage taker, a Ghilzai who had been convicted of a relatively minor crime, was thrown
back into jail.
4.2
Political economy of Kandahar-city
While the ideology of the Taliban movement (just as the PDPA) tried to replace the tribal
logic with a new identity, the US-led intervention in 2001 re-established the domination of
Zirak tribes (again mainly Popalzai and Barakzai) through a simplistic friend and foe
schemata that stigmatized Panjpai and Ghilzai tribal leadership collectively as Taliban, and
Zirak Durrani as allies. The prominence of Ghilzai and Panjpai tribesmen among the former
Taliban leadership cannot be denied but this in turn does not mean that the Zirak collectively
opposed the former Taliban or that the Ghilzai and Panjpai tribes wholeheartedly supported
the Taliban. Yet as Zirak Durrani leaders (Popalzai, Barakzai, Alkozai and Achekzai)67 allied
with the US-led intervention into Afghanistan that took down the Taliban, cards were stacked
against other tribes from the beginning. The close relationship between US forces and Zirak
Durrani leaders was fortified in the subsequent join-hunt on “Taliban and Al-Qaeda” terrorists
that allowed Zirak Durrani commanders to become very powerful and act with impunity,
harassing former Taliban (from all tribes) and extorting lootable resources (money, weapons,
cars) from them. In essence they used their ties to the US Coalition Forces to cement their
powerbase, control the economy and the government and increase their wealth and weaken
their rivals.
4.2.1
Economic sectors and administration
Military power was not the only monopoly of the Zirak tribes in the current government. As
the Taliban were defeated quickly, the ambition to control quickly extended to political and
economic resources. According to local respondents presently the Popalzai, Barakzai and to
a lesser degree the Achekzai political power and key businesses in the licit and illicit
economy (fuel, gasoline, diesel), narcotics (poppy and heroin), development funds,
contracting, and logistics to foreign military (see also chapter 3). Most security providers and
private construction companies are in the hands of Barakzai and Popalzai who are well
67
The fifth Zirak tribe, the Mohammadzai, lost most of its influence as a consequence of the Afghan
wars after 1978 and do not play an important role in Kandahar-city anymore. When we speak of Zirak
tribes in relation to power, the Mohammadzai are not included.
68
connected to international military forces. The political control allows for the appointment of
administrators where the Zirak Durrani tribes are also dominant (see Chapter 3.1). One of the
benefits of a position in the administration is linked to corruption as shown in box 5 below.
Box 5: “Taxing” of economic transactions
Political positions allow tapping into various legal and especially illegal taxes on economic
transactions ranging from small shops to property sales. For example, on a transaction of
10,000,000 (Da Lak) Afghanis there is a regular tax of 15,000 Afs, but in reality people end
up paying about 300,000 Afs for various administrative places documents and stamps or to a
group of middlemen who deal with the administration on their behalf.
There is a perception among the people that the international presence and the inflow of
massive amounts of resources into this political system has lead to a increasing income and
wealth concentration and inequality that has reached drastic proportions. While many agree
that because of the international presence living standards in general have risen over the last
seven years, the strong wealth concentration in the hands of few creates resentment among
the excluded: the Panjpai and the Ghilzai.
4.2.2
Land grabbing
Both in 1992 and 2001, when regime changes created temporary power vacuums, state land
in and around Kandahar-city was appropriated and distributed by powerful Zirak Durrani
leaders; this process allowed them to increase their personal influence and alter the
demographics of Kandahar-city to increase the power of the tribe.
Loya Wiala, located to the north of the “old town”, is a large area to the north of the city
centre and the melting pot of the city. After the collapse of the Najibullah government in 1992
large tracts of the Loya Wiala desert were occupied and subsequently sold by jihadi
commanders. Prominent examples are the late Mullah Naqib (Alkozai) and Amir Lalay
(Popalzai). The Dabaro Manda (Stone’s River) in Loya Wiala was the “land grabbing divide”
between Mullah Naqib and Amir Lalay. The area west of the Dabaro Manda was grabbed
and distributed by Mullah Naqib, including the area from Najeeb Numar to the Tirin Kot bus
station from 1992-1994 the east by Amir Lalay Both of them used the land not only to enrich
themselves, but also to build constituencies and consolidate the status they achieved as
military commanders during the Afghan wars within their respective tribe. Mullah Naqibullah
distributed land mostly among his Alkozai tribe who moved into the city in large numbers and
as a consequence constitute a more important part of the population than before. Amir Lalay
did the same by providing Popalzai sub-commanders who had fought with him in the jihad
69
with land plots. These soldiers in turn sold their land to other tribesmen from Shah Wali Kot,
Miya Nishin and Tirin Kot.
This process was repeated in the current government in 2001 in the Loya Wiala area, but
also to the east of the city. Since 2001 different commanders grabbed land in Mullah Naqib’s
name and distributed about 10,000 jeribs (2,000 ha) of land among their fellow tribesmen
from Ghorak, Zhari, and Arghandab. Amir Lalai distributed about 5,000 jeribs (1,000 ha) of
land among 200 Popalzai families from Panjwayi, Shah Wali Kot, Maruf, Arghistan, Deh
Rawud (Uruzgan), Khakrez and Daman. These beneficiaries were Popalzai who still own
their lands.
The legal property rights of the houses built in Loya Wiala 2 are far from secure as it used to
be government land. Some Kandahari believe that these squats are illegal. People living in
Loya Wiala 2 also fear that if the government becomes strong enough to assert its property
rights there is a high possibility that the state will take the land back. Some claim this leads
some tenants in Loya Wiala 2 to financially or physically support the insurgents in order to
weaken the current government, and ensure they can keep their land.
70
Appendix
Table 1: Kandahar Government
Name
Tribe
Job/Department
Tooryalai Vesa
Mohammadzai
Provincial Governor, Tooryalai Wesa, from Kohak Village
is a Mohammadzai from Arghandab from the same village
as the deputy governor of Arghandab, was a lecturer in the
faculty of agriculture.
Ahmad Wali Karzai
Popalzai
Head of Provincial Council, from Karz Village in Dand.
Matiullah Qatea
Achekzai
Late Police Chief of Kandahar, Khalqi background, from
Khas Uruzgan. Killed on 29 June 2009, allegedly by
security contractors.
Momin
Suliman Khail (Ali
Khail sub tribe)
from Laghman
Director of NDS, Khalqi background. Previously head of
the NDS in Kunduz. Has a good relationship with Karzai.
Haji Fazal Ahmad
Khan
Alkozai
Director of Water and Power. Serves as deputy head of
the department under the PDPA, mujahideen, and Taliban.
Resident of nahiya 6.
Abdullah
Achekzai
Head of the Department of Transportation. Was a
refugee in Pakistan in jihad and returned in the current
government. Resident of nahiya 10 or 11.
Shokrani
Alkozai
Head of Anti-Narcotics Department, resident of nahiya
7. Not affiliated with any faction.
Abdul Wahab
Amraz
Achekzai
Director of Water supply. Lives in Kandahar old city
(nahiya 1-4). He was affiliated with the PDPA/Khalq
faction.
Haji Said Jan
Achekzai
Director of Social Affairs, Labour, Martyrs and
Disabled. He is known to be a hard worker. He is from
Spin Boldak and was Takhtapul district governor in the
past.
Abdul Qayum
Pukhla
Popalzai
Director of Public Health. He is from Tirin Kot. During the
PDPA and mujahideen he studied, during Taliban he
became head of the Mansel Bagh Military Hospital.
Haji Abdullah
Popalzai
Director of Hajj and Religious Affairs. Resident of Dand.
He is not affiliated with any faction, but has good relations
with AWK.
71
Name
Tribe
Job/Department
Haji Matiullah
Achekzai
Director Finance Department
Mohammad Azim
Khan
Mohammadzai
Director of Refugees and Repatriation. He is from Tirin
Kot and resident of nahiya 9. He has a jihadi background
and good relations with the Karzais.
Rahimi Sahib
Barakzai
Director of Economy Department. He has a jihadi
background and is resident of nahiya 4. Good ties with Gul
Agha Sherzai.
Haji Matiullah
Achekzai
Head of Central Statistics Office. Resident of nahiya 10
or 11. He was living in Pakistan from jihad on and came
back in this government.
Sardar Hamidullah
Mohammadzai
Head of State Case Department. Resident of nahiya 2. In
the past he was non-aligned. Now he is head of the
Mohammadzai tribe in Kandahar.
Ghulam Hazrat
Alkozai
Head of Fire Department. Resident of nahiya 4. Nonaligned.
Sadozai
Popalzai
Head of Natural Disaster. Resident of nahiya 8, nonaligned.
Najibullah Ahmadi
Popalzai
Director of Education Department. Resident of nahiya 6.
He did not finish the 12th grade, and imposed on the
department by Ahmad Wali Karzai. The department was
forced to fake his certificate.
Abdul Majid Khan
Achekzai
Head of Kuchi Department. He is from Khas Uruzgan.
He was non-aligned in the past governments.
Abdul Baqi Rayat
Mohammadzai
Head of Tribal Affairs Department. Resident of nahiya 8.
Non-aligned in past governments.
Abdul Wahid
Alizai
Director of City Court. Resident of Naw Zad, during
Zaher Shah he already worked in the court and is nonaligned.
Akil Shah
Nurzai
Director of Law. From Spin Boldak, he has a jihadi
background.
72
Name
Tribe
Job/Department
Abdul Latif Ashna
Tokhi
Director of Rural Rehabilitation and Development.
Resident of Shar-e Naw (nahiya 1). Good qualification.
Rana Tarin
Tarin
Director of Women’s Affairs. She was a housewife in the
past.
Haji Mohammad
Baresi
Barets
Head of Afghan Red Crescent, he is from Shorabak
district, Kandahar Province. He was a mujahed, but not
clear with which faction. Entertains good relations with the
Karzais.
Eng. Abdul Hai
Nyamati
unknown
Director of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock. He is
from Farah and was a mujahed. He was Farah's Provincial
Governor in the early years of the Karzai Government.
General
Mohammad Yusef
Khan
Suliman Khail (Ali
Khail sub tribe)
from Laghman
Head of Military Court. Khalqi background.
Abdul Majid Khan
Babai
Tokhi
Information, Culture, Youth and Tourism Department.
Resident of Kandahar-city, member of a traditional elite
family. Has good relationship with Karzais. Non-aligned in
past government, spent most of his life abroad.
Mohammadullah
Khan
Ahmadzai
Head of Traffic Department. Worked in the same
department under Taliban, but not as head.
Abdel Mohammad
Dari speaker
Head of Public Works Department.
Mohammad Zaher
Khan
Zazai from Paktia
Head of Customs Department.
Haji Sardar
Mohammad
Kakar
Cadastre. Resident of nahiya 3, with a jihadi background.
Table 2: Business and civil society associations
Fresh Fruit
Name of Business/Civil
Position
Society Association
Head
Member
Member
Member
Member
Name
Tribe
Haji Abdel Khaliq
Haji Zabet Mohammad Wali
Haji Abdul Hadi
Haji Ghulam Rasul
Haji Joma Gul
Kakar
Alkozai
Kakar
Nurzai
Alkozai
73
Name of Business/Civil
Position
Society Association
Name
Tribe
Haji Ayatullah
Haji Neamatullah
Haji Atiqullah
Haji Abdul Wahed
Mustafa
Haji Wakil Ahmad
Haji Hayatullah
Haji Mir Wais
Haji Khaysta Khan
Haji Shafiq
Haji Akhtar Mohammad
Haji Abdullah
Haji Jad Mohammad
Haji Mohammad Shah
Haji Nasrullah
Haji Wazir
Mohammad Qasim
Haji Musa Jan
Abdur Raziq
Haji Mira Jan
Haji Saleh Mohammad
Haji Rahmad
Haji Atiqullah (Azizi Bank)
Haji Pacha
Haki Khan Aka
Lala Piari
Haji Ekmatullah
Haji Mohammad Rafiq
Haji Nasrullah
Mohammad Musa
Haji Khan Mohammad
Amena Tarak
Sayed Ismael
Mohammad Nabi
Sayed Mohammad Daud
Sabur Khan
Haji Sadat Mohammad
Haji Nasrullah
Haji Mohammad Hashim
Haji Abdullah
Ustad Ahmadullah Gul Alay
Amanullah
Dr. Payinda Mohammad
Arghandawi
unknown
Nurzai
Alkozai
Nurzai
Shia
Nurzai
Nurzai
Popalzai
Barakzai
Popalzai
Tokhi
Achekzai
Nurzai
Achekzai
Barakzai
Achekzai
Popalzai
Barakzai
Achekzai
Alkozai
Kakar
Nurzai
Alizai
Kakar
Ishaqzai
Hindu
Nurzai
Popalzai
Alizai
Achekzai
Alkozai
Barakzai
Shia
Suliman Khail
Sayed
Tajik
Achekzai
Achekzai
Tarin
Nurzai
unknown
Nurzai
Head
Mohammad Yar
Mohammadzai
Head
Khayro Khan
Alkozai
Doctor's association
Head
Money
Exchange
Car Dealers
Dry Fruits
Gasoline
Textile
Women's Association
Jeweler's Association
Butcher's Association
Tailor's association
Hotels
Gas sellers' association
Truck drivers association
Teacher's association
Wood sellers association
Athlete's association
Baker's association
Head
Member
Member
Member
Member
Member
Head
Member
Member
Member
Member
Head
Member
Member
Member
Member
Head
Member
Member
Member
Member
Member
Head
Member
Member
Member
Member
Head
Member
Member
Member
Head
Head
Head
Head
Head
Head
Head
Head
Head
Head
Head
Construction Material
Writers and poets
association
Disabled Organisation
74
Suliman Khail
Table 3: Important Businessmen of Kandahar
Name
Tribe
District
Background
Haji Qayum Jan
Achekzai
Panjwayi
Lives in nahiya 5. He has a market in Spin Boldak. In
the past he was involved in livestock sales. Now he
deals in many things and imports from Pakistan, China,
Japan, and India. No political affiliation.
Haji Bahawudin
Achekzai
Spin Boldak
He deals different things from fertilizer, agricultural
machinery, transportation etc.
Haji Abdullah
Achekzai
Spin Boldak
Lives in nahiya 5. His father used to export dried fruit to
Pakistan but was imprisoned by the PDPA and
disappeared. He is in the same business.
Haji Abdul Jabar
Achekzai
unknown
Ali Khan
Alizai
from Mullah
Alam
Haji Atiqullah
Alizai
Helmand
Haji Nanay
Alkozai
nahiya 5
Haji Abdullah
Barakzai
Kandahar
Haji Talib
Kakar
nahiya 4
Haji Pacha
Kakar
nahiya 4
Haji Khodai Dat
Nurzai
Farah
Animal sales, switched to dried fruits business. Now he
imports steel form Almaty.
His father was a businessman who imported rice from
Pakistan.
Owner of Azizi Bank of Kandahar. Was in real estate
before. No political affiliation. Used to be close to
Esmatullah Alizai, former CoP of Kandahar.
He used to export scrap metal to Pakistan, and now he
imports steel from Almaty.
Forefathers were also businessmen. No political
affiliations. Known as a charitable person.
Poor guy in the past who owned a flower shop.
Switched to the fertilizer business and started importing
from Pakistan and now he is very wealthy. No political
affiliations.
No political affiliations. Imports, cooking fat, flour, rice.
Considered a big business man of Kandahar.
Lives in nahiya 9. Dried fruits in the past, now cement
from Pakistan. No political affiliation.
Vegetable and fruit trade, import and export from
Pakistan.
Lives in nahiya 9. Does petrol, gas and diesel and fruit
business.
Lives in nahiya 6.Vegetable and fruits import/export.
Lives in nahiya 5. His father used to export dried fruit to
Pakistan. He himself also imports cement from
Pakistan.
Haji Neamatullah Nurzai
nahiya 5
Haji Hayatullah
Nurzai
Spin Boldak
Haji Abdul Satar
Nurzai
Spin Boldak
Zulmay
Popalzai
Daman
Mohammad
Zaher
Popalzai
From Daman
Dried fruits. No political affiliation.
Tor Mohammad
Qasim
Popalzai
nahiya 1
Involved in car and motorbike dealings. Imports from
China and Japan. No political affiliation. Now also
imports gas, petrol, and diesel.
Popalzai
nahiya 3
Import of cooking fat. No political affiliation.
unknown
Panjwayi
Lives in nahiya 9. Clothes.
Haji Agha
Mohammad
Haji Ayatullah
75