e-Counting in the Rugby
elections
I n O c t o b e r 2 0 0 1 , T h e D e p a r t m e n t f o r Tr a n s p o r t , L o c a l G o v e r n m e n t a n d t h e
Regions invited applications from Local Authorities to pilot new methods of voting
at local and mayoral elections in May 2002.
A number of Councils
were given the go
ahead to pilot
innovative schemes
designed to modernise
electoral procedures
and make voting
straightforward,
e ff i c i e n t , s e c u r e a n d a b o v e a l l r e a d i l y a c c e s s i b l e
to all. Some of those e-democracy pilots
i n v o l v e d e - Vo t i n g a n d e - C o u n t i n g . D R S w o r k e d
on a number of the e-Counting projects, one of
them involving Rugby Borough Council.
R u g b y B o r o u g h C o u n c i l ’s l o c a l e l e c t i o n s w e r e
complex by nature. Boundary changes meant
that, for the first time since 1979, there were
‘all-out’ elections, with 20 wards and 4 parishes
and various numbers of councillors to be elected. If a manual method of counting was used, it
would have taken around 8 hours to complete.
With just under 40% turnout, DRS successfully
delivered the results quickly and accurately in
just 3 hours.
A f t e r t h e e l e c t i o n s , R u g b y ’s C h i e f
Executive stated:
“The e-Counting equipment
delivered a fast and accurate result
in record time. If the election had
been counted manually it would
have taken up to eight hours. DRS
delivered the results in around
three. The system worked very well
and in line with expectations.”
e-counting
Complex Projects
It has worked on a wide range of projects
including the proportional elections in Norway
for nine years, elections in Bosnia and
Herzegovina in 1998 and 2000 and the high
profile London Assembly and Mayoral elections
in 2000 - the first in the UK to entirely use
e-Counting and a mixture of electoral systems.
Such projects are extremely complex,
large-volume, involve sensitive information and
n e e d t o b e c o m p l e t e d q u i c k l y a n d a c c u r a t e l y.
DRS has an unprecedented reputation for
delivering electoral projects on time, the first
time.
Type of election
Electorate
Wards
Turnout
Postals
Polling stations
Count location
Scanners
Local Authority wards
& parish councils
67,000
20 + 4 parishes
39%
1,339
83
The Benn Hall
5 DRSPS880s
DRS e-Counting in
the May 2000
London elections
D R S , w i n n e r o f t h e 2 0 0 2 Q u e e n ’s Aw a r d f o r
E n t e r p r i s e i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l Tr a d e a n d a B r i t i s h
designer and manufacturer of e-Counting
solutions, has extensive experience in providing
full voting solutions.
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e-Counting in the Rugby elections
Why use e-Counting?
With 20 wards and 4 parishes, each having a
variable number of councillors to be elected, the
May 2002 Rugby elections were complex by their
very nature. DRS’ e-Counting system is designed
for such elections. Every ballot paper carries a
unique barcode, when the paper is electronically
counted, the e-Counting system automatically
assigns the vote to the relevant ward or parish.
N o t o n l y d o e s t h i s e l i m i n a t e h u m a n e r r o r, w h i c h
can be associated with manual counting, it is
also much faster than a manual count as the
papers do not need to be sorted before counting.
e-Counting also maintains voter familiarity as
votes are cast using the traditional
c r o s s i n a b o x o n a b a l l o t p a p e r.
What about rejected ballot papers?
The scanners will automatically send images of
potentially rejected ballot papers (e.g. where
too many votes may have been cast) to the
central database for on-screen checking by the
R e t u r n i n g O ff i c e r. T h e R e t u r n i n g O ff i c e r w i l l
see an on-screen image of the ballot paper
and will enter the votes cast or the reason for
rejection directly into the central database.
Any ballot papers that the scanner cannot read
(eg, torn) results in the scanner sending the
actual ballot paper to a second ‘hopper ’. The
R e t u r n i n g O ff i c e r w i l l t h e n c h e c k t h e s e b a l l o t
papers and manually enter the votes cast or
the reason for rejections into the central
database.
Ballot papers that the scanner cannot read
How does it work?
Each ballot paper is scanned by a DRS PS880
Imaging Mark Reader which captures and
automatically reorients the ballot paper images
at high speed, so it doesn’t matter which way the
b a l l o t p a p e r i s f e d t h r o u g h t h e s c a n n e r. I m a g e
p r o c e s s i n g i s u s e d t o d e t e r m i n e t h e v o t e r ’s
intent and their vote is recorded directly into the
central database. If there is any doubt over the
v o t e r ’s i n t e n t ( e g , w h e r e t o o m a n y v o t e s m a y
have been cast) then an image is also saved for
later ‘on-screen’ adjudication. Networked
workstations connected to the central database
support all other stages of the ballot counting
process - verification, adjudication and
consolidation.
How accurate is it?
The scanners and specially designed ballot
papers ensure accurate data capture that
e l i m i n a t e s h u m a n e r r o r. A u n i q u e b a r c o d e o n t h e
reverse of each ballot paper ensures it cannot
be counted twice, and a small barcode on the
f r o n t i d e n t i f i e s w h i c h c o n t e s t e a c h b a l l o t i s f o r.
The scanner uses these barcodes to ensure a
genuine ballot is being scanned
and checks that the image has
been accurately captured and
correctly reorientated. The
scanners will only record a
clear vote, all other decisions
are taken by the Returning
O ff i c e r.
Scanned ballot papers
How secure is it?
There are safeguards built into the computer
software to ensure the security of the system.
I t r e c o r d s e v e r y t i m e a m e m b e r o f s t a ff l o g s o n
a n d o ff e v e r y w o r k s t a t i o n a n d t h e r e i s l i m i t e d
access to the system, so logging on at one
workstation does not give access to the whole
s y s t e m . O n l y t h e R e t u r n i n g O ff i c e r w i l l h a v e
access to all the information stored. All the
data and the ballot papers remain within the
c o n t r o l o f t h e R e t u r n i n g O ff i c e r a f t e r t h e
election, as with any manually counted
election.
What difference did voters see
when they voted?
The ballot papers were broadly similar to
existing designs. The voters might have
noticed that their ballot papers had a barcode
on them and they were asked not to fold their
ballot papers. The voters then posted their
unfolded ballot papers face down into the side
of a specially designed ballot box.
DRS Data Services Limited is part of the DRS Group.
Please note DRS products and services are subject to change without prior notice and
that the information provided is for guidance only. DRS equipment complies with all
current regulations. All trademarks acknowledged.
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