894
BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
F. S., contain any such minimum. The only section in which the $50
minimum is mentioned is §324.051 (2), F. S. Said section requires
that the commissioner shall suspend the licenses and registrations
of those uninsured persons involved in a motor vehicle accident
unless the total property damage is less than $50. It will be noted
that said section applies to all persons involved in a motor vehicle
accident regardless of fault, which is the reason that a minimum
limit is necessary.
When a judgment has been rendered against the person at
fault and is not satisfied within 60 days, the sanctions of §324.121,
F. S., should be imposed no matter how small the judgment. Your
2nd question is answered in the affirmative.
AS TO QUESTION 3 :
"Judgment" as defined in §324.021 (10), F. S., includes any
judgment arising out of a motor vehicle accident "rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction of any state or of the United States,
. . . ." It would appear, therefore, that the "judgment" referred to
in .§324.121, F. S., includes judgments rendered in other states
against Florida residents.
Section 324.081, F. S., provides that the commissioner may
establish reciprocal agreements with other states and "pursuant to
such agreements may suspend the license and registration of a
resident of this state involved in an accident in another state."
Succeeding provisions indicate that the agreements contemplated
involve the revocation of licenses and registrations of uninsured
motorists unless they put up security for damages for which they
may be responsible. Section 324.081, F. S., does not appear to me
to be a limitation upon §324.121, F. S., but appears to be supplementary. Your 3rd question is answered in the affirmative.
058-321-December 3, 1958
CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS TRUSTS
FOREIGN CORPORNrIONS-CONSTRUCTION OF TERM
"TRANSACTING BUSINESS IN THIS STATE"
CH. 613, §613.11, F. S.
To: Gordon G. Oldham, Jr., State Attorney, Fifth Judicial Circuit,
Leesburg
QUESTION:
Is a particular foreign corporation doing business
in this state within the meaning of Ch. 613, F. S.,
thereby transacting business without a ,permit, in violation of §613.1l, F. S.?
Before analyzing the factual situation· of this particular case,
we must first define what is meant by the terminology "transact(ing) business in this state" within the meaning of Ch. 613,
supra.
Section 8, Art. I, of the constitution of the U. S. provides that
congress shall regulate all interstate and foreign commerce. The
supreme court of the U. S. in interpreting this constitutional provision has consistently held that the regulation of a foreign corporation engaged exclusively in interstate or foreign commerce rests
solely within the power of congress and statutes of the several
states which attempt to regulate such foreign corporations are void
and unconstitutional as repugnant to the federal constitution (Pem-
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895
bina Consol. Silver Mining and Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125
U. S. 181, 31 L. ed. 650, 8 S. Ct. 737; McCall v. Calif., 136 U. S. 104,
34 L. ed. 391, 10 S. Ct. 881; Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47, 35
L. ed. 649, 11 S. Ct. 851; Interstate Amusement Co. v. Albert, 239
U. S. 560, 60 L. ed. 439, 36 S. Ct. 168).
To give meaning to the terminology "transact business within
this state" as set out in Ch.613, supra, it must be interpreted so
as to uphold the constitutionality of the statute. Within the meanhig
of the above-stated rule, the only interpretation that could be placed
on the statute is that it was intended to regulate foreign corporations engaged exclusively in intrastate commerce or engaged in
intrastate commerce in conjunction with other interstate and foreign commerce.
The question therefore becomes a factual one in determining
whether the actions of this particular corporation in engaging in
business in this state involves intrastate commerce or interstate
commerce.' The corporation in question appears to be incorporated
under the laws of Oregon. It is engaged in the training of airline
stewardesses and maintains schools in California and Illinois for
this purpose. Prior to commencing actual school training, correspondence courses are carried on between the corporation and the
trainee. Agents of the corporation appear to go throughout the
U. S. into the several states eliciting business and obtaining applicants for the school. Based on the previous rulings of the U. S.
supreme court, I am of the opinion that the foreign corporation
in question was and is engaged in interstate rather than intrastate
commerce and therefore, does not come within the provisions of
Ch. 613, supra.
In International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91, 54 L. ed. 678,
30 S. Ct. 481, the U. S. supreme court was called upon to determine
the validity of a Kansas statute which required any foreign corpol'ation seeking to do business in Kansas to make application to that
state for permission to engage in business. Such application also
required the payment of a $25 fee and the filing of several other
necessary documents. In that case, the corporation for profit was
engaged in the promotion of an international correspondence school.
Its home office was in Scranton, Pa. The corporation's business was
conducted by preparing and publishing instruction papers, textbooks and illustrative apparatus for courses of study to be pursued
by means of correspondence, and the forwarding, from time to time,
of such publications and apparatus to students. In the conduct of its
business, the company employed local or traveling agents whose
duties were to procure and forward to the home office, from persons
in a specified territory, on blanks furnished by the corporation,
applications for scholarships in the corporation's school, and also
to collect and forward to the company deferred payments on scholarships. In conformity with the contract that was entered into
between the company and its students, the scholarship and instruction papers, textbooks and illustrative apparatus under each accepted application were sent by the company directly to the applicant and instruction was imparted by means of correspondence
through the mails between the company at its home office and the
applicant at his residence in another state.
In the Pigg case, the supreme court declared the Kansas statute,
which was very similar to our Ch. 613, supra, to be unconstitutional
as violating §8, Article I, of the U. S. Constitution and, in so doing,
/
896
BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
held that the International Textbook Co. engaged in interstate commerce.
.
In light of the above-stated reasons, it is my opinion that the
foreign corporation in question was and is engaged in interstate
commerce; that it does not come within the provisions of Ch. 613,
supra; and that your question must be answered in the negative.
It is to be noted that this opinion relates only to whether or
not the foreign corporation in question is guilty of a criminal violation of the Florida Statutes and such opinion does not encompass
the question of whether or not such foreign corporation could sue
or be sued in the courts of this state. (See Annot. 38 A. L. R. 2d
747, 760-762.)
058-322-December 4.1958
PUBLIC LANDS AND PROPERTY
STATE OIL AND GAS LEASES-CONTRACT OBLIGATIONSSALE OF SUBMERGED LANDS-§§253.06-253.11 (REPEALED),
253.12-253.14, 253.15 (REPEALED), 253.36-253,41, 253.47,
253.51, 253.61, 271.01, 377.22 AND 377.27, F. S.
To: Van H. Ferguson, Director, Internal Improvement Fund, Tallahassee
QUESTIONS:
1. What effect, if any, does the sale and conveyance
of submerged sovereignty lands and the filling in and
improvement of the same, for residential and business
purposes, have upon oil and gas leases previously made
by the state or its agency?
2. What effect, if any, does the extension of municipal corporate limits have upon oil and gas leases previously made by the state or its agency?
Oil and gas leases of sovereignty and public lands owned and
held by the state or its agencies have been made pursuant to either
§253,47, or §§253.51 to 253.61, F. S. Submerged sovereignty lands
have been and may be sold under and pursuant to §§253.12, et seq.,
F. S., as well as §§253.36-253,41, F. S. Lands were also sold and
conveyed in Dade, Monroe and Palm Beach counties under §§253.06253.11, F. S., prior to their repeal by Ch. 57-362. Some submerged
lands lying between the high watermark, along navigable salt or
tidal waters were also filled in and improved pursuant to §271.01,
F. S., prior to its repeal by Ch. 57-362, or maybe by Ch. 26776, 1951,
(See Duval Eng. and Constr. Co. v. Sales, Fla., 77 So. 2d 431, text
433). The right of upland owners to fill in submerged lands under
this section was withdrawn by its repeal. Under said §271.01, no
title vested in the upland owner until the submerged lands had been
filled in or improved in accordance with the provisions of said section (Stein v. Brown Properties, Fla., 104 So. 2d 495, text 499;
Hayes v. Bowman, Fla., 91 So. 2d 795, text 800).
Oil and gas leases made and delivered, by the state to the
lessees, under the provisions of Florida Statutes, entitle the lessees
to explore for oil and gas under the leased lands, including sovereignty water bottom lands, and to take and use such oil and gas
as may be recovered by reason of such exploration and recovery
operations; subject to applicable statutes and the state's royalty
and' other interests in accordance with the lease contracts. These
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