Behind the Dotted Line on the Chinese Map of the South China Sea
Behind the Dotted Line on the Chinese Map of
the South China Sea
Li Jinming*
inadvertently or by design, the Western media is currently
Whether
misinterpreting the dotted line (or“the nine-dotted line”) on the
Chinese map as indicating China’
s claim of ownership (sovereignty) to
over 80% or even the entire South China Sea. Its aim is to pit China against
the entire ten ASEAN states as a regional hegemonic bully. Nothing could
be further from the truth. At the same time, what compounds the confusion
are the different and sometimes mutually inconsistent interpretations given
to that line among Chinese academic and journalistic circles. This essay
traces the origin of the dotted line, and safely affirms its legal status as
defining Chinese ownership (sovereignty) over the enclosed islands, isles,
reefs and atolls.
The Origin of the Dotted Line
Since its 1885 occupation of Annam (a former kingdom, now part of
Vietnam), the French colonialists have cherished territorial designs on
China’
s Xisha Islands (the Paracels). They fabricated the lie of seizure of
the Xisha Islands by the Annam kingdom in the early 19th century,1 but the
truth of the matter is that Commander-in-Chief Li Zhun of the Guangdong
provincial navy led a fleet to investigate the Xisha Islands, named every
isle there, built log cabins, and planted the Qing imperial flags on the
flagpoles erected there to indicate them as part of the Chinese territory.2
The French colonial authorities did not lodge protests at the time.
Li Jinming is a Professor of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies at Xiamen
University.
1
Olivier A. Saix 著，胡焕庸译：
“法人谋夺西沙群岛”，载于凌纯声著：
《中国今日之
边疆问题》，
台北学生书局，1975 年，第 171 页。
2
“李准巡海记”
，天津《大公报》，1933 年 8 月 10 日。
*
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Li Jinming
Furthermore, when a meteorological meeting was held in Hong Kong in
April 1930, Mr. E. Bruzon, the French stationmaster of the meteorological
station in Indo-China, and Father L. Froe, his counterpart in a local station
in Shanghai, suggested to the attending Chinese delegate that a similar
observatory be built in the Xisha Islands. This indicates recognition of
Chinese sovereignty there by the international community including the
French.1
In his September 29, 1932 note to the French Foreign Ministry, a
minister to France of the then Republic of China refuted territorial designs
on the Xisha Islands (the Paracels) on the part of the French Governor in
Indo-China at the time. The note pointed out that Chinese fishermen had
settled there since ancient times and that the Qing dynasty had sent its
naval ships there in 1909 to declare to the world its valid occupation of the
islands.2
Frustrated in their design to seize the Xisha Islands, the French
colonialists then turned their eye southward to the Nansha Islands
(Spratly). Disregarding the existing settlements of Chinese fishermen, they
dispatched a gunboat and a surveying ship under the guidance of a Mr.
Cheyey, Director of the Hanoi Oceanic Studies, in order to demonstrate
their occupation.3 Shocked at the event, the Republic of China’
s Foreign
Ministry delivered a note to the French Embassy, asking for the name,
longitude and latitude of the relevant isles.
In its reply telegram, the French government mentioned only the nine
islets of steep rock situated in the path of the shipping lane between Annam
(Vietnam) and the Philippines, which often caused the shipwreck of French
vessels (a flimsy pretext!), and called for safeguard facilities, adding that
they had nothing to do with the Xisha Islands.4
Monique Chemillier-Gendreau, Sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands,
Klumer Law International, The Hague, 2000, pp. 166.
2
Monique Chemillier-Gendreau, Sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands,
pp. 185-186.
3
徐公肃：
“ 法国占领九小岛事件”，载于凌纯声著：
《中国今日之边疆问题》，第
149 页。
4
陆东亚：
“对于西沙群岛应有之认识”，载于凌纯声著：
《中国今日之边疆问题》，第
189 页。
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2
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Vol. 22 No. 6
Behind the Dotted Line on the Chinese Map of the South China Sea
This incident alarmed the government of the Republic of China to the
need for publishing a detailed map of the South China Sea with unified,
verified names in Chinese and English for all the 132 relevant islands,
isles, reefs and shoals. This comprised the 28 in the Xisha Islands and the
96 in the Nansha Islands. The task was entrusted to a new Land and
Maritime Map Examination Commission, which published The Map of
Chinese Islands in the South China Sea in April 1935.1 The Map of Chinese
Islands in the South China Sea indicates the location of the Dongsha
Islands, Xisha Islands, Nansha Islands and Tuansha Islands, surrounded by
boundary lines, and shows China’
s southernmost boundary line reaching a
north latitude of 4° and enclosing Zengmu shoals. It was accompanied by a
note saying that the Sea Lane Surveying Bureau under the Chinese Navy
Department had made an on-the-spot survey that confirmed the existence
of settlements of Chinese fishermen there from ancient times. This proves
Chinese sovereignty of the nine French-occupied islets in the Nansha
Islands. Thus the U-shaped dotted line on the Chinese map today
originated in April 1935 as a sound basis in jurisprudence for diplomatic
negotiations with France.
Having seized the Nansha Islands after its aggressive war against
China in 1937, Japan put the islands under the administration of its Taiwan
governorship as part of Gaoxiong County. Upon victory over Japan, acting
on the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation that“Japanese
sovereignty be confined to Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu and Shikoku and
other islets decided by us,”2 the Chinese government of the time recovered
Taiwan and soon afterwards both the Xisha and Nansha Islands.
In the fall of 1946, under the order of the then Chinese government,
the Chinese navy headquarters dispatched the four warships of Taiping,
Yongxing, Zhongjian and Zhongye to the islands in order to recover lost
territories, with the former two taking over the Xisha Islands and the latter
two the Nansha Islands. Memorial monuments were erected to mark the
event. They were accompanied by representatives from the departments of
《水路地图审查委员会会刊》第 1 期，
1935 年 1 月，
第 61-69 页。
《国际条约集（1934-1944）》，世界知识出版社 1961 年，
第 407 页。
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Li Jinming
defense, internal affairs, logistics, and also the air force headquarters, for
inspection. The Guangdong provincial government of the time also sent
out officials to take over the administration, setting up an office at the
largest Taiping Island for taking care of affairs of all the subordinate islets
of the Nansha Islands.1
But things did not go as smoothly as expected. Seizing the
opportunity of a temporary power vacuum after Japanese surrender, both
the French colonial authorities in Vietnam and the Philippines attempted to
assert control over part of the relevant islands. In quick response, the
Chinese government adopted some effective measures. It adjusted the
names of the islands in the South China Sea in the light of their
geographical positions, changing the names of the original Tuansha Islands
into the Nansha Islands and the original Nansha Islands into Zhongsha
Islands. It reconfirmed the Zengmu shoals as China’
s southernmost
territory. The Chinese Navy Headquarters dispatched troops to garrison as
many islands as possible, and offered protection, transportation and
telecommunications facilities to the Chinese fishermen during the fishing
season. The Territory Division of the then Ministry of Home Affairs
published a Map of the Location of Chinese Islands in the South China Sea
in 1947, with a U-shaped dotted line enclosing them. The map was
included in The Atlas of the Administrative Areas of the Republic of China.
Moreover, this map was circulated throughout the world and observed by
most countries.2
Since its publication in 1947, the tongue-shaped dotted line on the
Chinese map of the South China Sea, otherwise known as the“nine-dotted
line,”did not incur any challenges from the international community nor
any diplomatic protests from neighboring South-East Asian littoral states
until the mid-1990s, signifying their tacit recognition. Further, many maps
published abroad also depict the dotted line as such. It was only as late as
吴清玉等：
“抗战胜利后中国海军奉命收复南沙群岛实录”，载于中国科学院南沙
综合考察队编：
《南沙群岛历史地理研究专集》，中山大学出版社，1991 年，第
110-111 页。
2
韩振华主编：
《我国南海诸岛史料汇编》，东方出版社，1988 年，第 182 页；第
363 页。
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Behind the Dotted Line on the Chinese Map of the South China Sea
the mid-1990s that some neighboring South-East Asian countries began to
challenge its legal status.
In short, the dotted line was drawn against the backdrop of the French
design on the nine isles in the Nansha Islands in 1933. It was finalized after
the victory over Japan, when France and the Philippines were attempting to
take over part of the Islands. Such safeguards for territorial sovereignty
were entirely necessary and justified for a sovereign state.
Not a Line of“Historic Waters”
The claim of the waters enclosed by the dotted lines as“historic
waters”was first made by the Taiwan authorities in July 1989. Two special
commissions were then set up under its“Department of Home Affairs,”
one responsible for helping affirm base points and baselines to determine
the breadth of the territorial waters of the Republic of China, and the other
in charge of formulating laws on the exclusive economic zone and
territorial waters.
Incidentally, for a better understanding of the complexities involved,
some background knowledge on the Law of the Sea is required before we
proceed with our analysis. The United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS), which governs maritime border disputes, only gives
primacy to absolute sovereignty in territorial seas. Here the rules are
relatively clear, as states have absolute sovereignty either 3 or 12 nautical
miles from their coast. The rules of the high seas are equally clear in that
the high seas are global commons to which all states have equal rights. By
contrast, the rules governing areas in between the territorial seas and the
high seas, the so-called exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and continental
shelf zones, are not easily applicable in practice. This lack of clarity also
pervades the rules governing territory that constitutes islands as opposed to
territory such as islets and reefs. As a consequence, these legal principles
leave considerable room for divergent interpretations; multiple ways of
delineating territorial, EEZ, and continental shelf boundaries; and quarrels
over the rights to utilize maritime resources as well as to access.
Small wonder that there emerged divisions even inside the two
Taiwan commissions over the validity of the claim to historic waters. The
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advocates asserted that the 1948 Atlas had not evoked any international
protest or objections and that the claim did not violate Article 47,
paragraph 1 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) (1982). But those opposing argued that lack of coordinates
made it impossible to fix the position of the dotted U line on the sea,
thereby determining the legal status of the historic waters.1 What is more,
the definition of the historic waters had already become obsolete. Its
authoritative definition could not be found in any convention such as the
1962 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, the 1964 Regime of
Bays in International Law and the 1988 Canada’
s Arctic Waters in
International Law. There the historic waters was equated with a coastal bay
or inland waters. Furthermore, since its publication, neither the Chinese
mainland nor Taiwan had exercised jurisdiction over the sea waters inside
the U-shaped dotted line, with their exercised authority mostly confined to
the islands or isles and their adjacent waters, without affecting the freedom
of navigation for foreign vessels or fishery rights for foreign fishing boats.
In fact, in its January 1998 Republic of China Law on Territorial Waters
and Adjacent Areas, Taiwan no longer mentioned the historic waters,
without formally abandoning the claim nevertheless.
Not the Line of“Historic Rights”or
“Maritime Boundary”Either
After abandoning the claim of historic waters, some scholars on the
Chinese mainland and overseas proposed instead the claim of“historic
rights.”Professor Zou Keyuan of the Institute for East Asian Studies at
Singapore National University, wrote that“Chinese fishermen have been
fishing in the South China Sea, a most convincing evidence that China has
all along enjoyed historic fishing rights there.”2
But the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
Yann-huei Song and Peter Kien-hong Yu,“China’s‘Historic Waters’in the South
China Sea: An Analysis from Taiwan,”American Asian Review, Vol. 12, No.14,
Winter, 1944, pp. 86-88.
2
Zou Keyuan,“Historic Rights in International Law and in China’s Practice,”Ocean
Development & International Law, Vol. 32, No. 2, 2001, p. 162.
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Behind the Dotted Line on the Chinese Map of the South China Sea
has not provided a definition for“historic rights,”even though it has
accepted this legal term in Article 15, thus hinting that the definition
should be sought from customary international law.1 As such,
world-renowned Dutch law of the sea expert Yehuda Blum held that
“historic rights represent an outcome of a long process of accumulation
that have been consolidated and evolved into effective rights in
international law.”2
In the long period of more than half a century since the publication of
the Chinese map, China has constantly reiterated in its domestic laws that
the islands inside the dotted line are part of its territory. Such a long
process of accumulation has naturally produced“historic rights.”As such,
its June 26, 1998 Law on Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental
Shelf states“This law does not affect China’
s historic rights.”However,
the same law did not provide a further accurate explanation to the term
“historic rights”.
But the Vietnamese government and scholars challenged China’
s
claim of historic rights, saying that the normal activities of neighboring
countries have not met with obstructions from China, and stressing that
historic rights do not come under international law. It seems this claim is in
need of further elucidation.
As for the claim of the maritime boundary line, the dotted line was
indeed drawn on the middle line of equal distance between the outermost
isles of China’
s islands, the isles in the South China Sea and the lines of
neighboring countries as a maritime boundary line. But it has not
functioned as such in practice. Well-known expert on maritime boundaries,
Daniel Dzurek, pointed out that what the traditional maritime boundary
line determines is a country’
s sovereignty over the islands inside the line,
3
and not the sea waters. Senior Indonesian diplomat Hasyim Djalal also
《联合国海洋法公约》，海洋出版社，1983 年，
第 11 页。
Yehuda Z. Blum,“Historic Rights,”in Rudolf Bernhardt ed., Encyclopedia of Public
International Law, Installment 7, Amsterdam, North-Holland Publishing Co., 1984,
pp. 120, 121.
3
Quoted from Liselotte Odgarrd, Maritime Security between China and Southeast
China, Ashgate Publishing Company, Burlington, 2002, p. 90.
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noted that the absence of definition and point coordination of the dotted
line made it difficult to determine its accurate location. Clearly, the
Chinese government only claimed sovereignty over the island groups,
rather than the entire maritime space inside the dotted line.1
The 1958“Declaration on China’
s Territorial Sea”says that“This
regulation applies to all the territories of China including the Chinese
mainland, its coastal islands and Taiwan, Penghu Islands, the Dongsha
Islands, Xisha Islands, Zhongsha Islands, Nansha Islands and other Chinese
isles that are separated by the high sea.”This suggests that China did not
claim sovereignty on sea waters beyond the 12 nautical miles’limits of
territorial waters.2 Moreover, the 1996 Statement on the Baseline of
Territorial Waters claimed that the baseline for the Xisha Islands is
composed of 28 surrounding base points. This further indicates that China
has not considered the dotted line as its maritime boundary line in the
South China Sea. If this was the case, the announcement of the baseline for
the Xisha Island would have been superfluous.3
Defending the Clarified Dotted Line
As a matter of fact, most Chinese scholars regard the dotted line only
as an“island ownership line.”Gao Zhiguo, Director of the Institute of
Oceanic Development Strategy under the State Oceanic Administration
(supervised by the Ministry of Land and Resources), wrote that“scrutiny
of relevant Chinese documents shows that Beijing has never laid claims to
the entire maritime space in the South China Sea save the island groups
and their adjacent areas inside the dotted line.”4 Taiwan scholar, Professor
Yu Kien-hong, echoed his view, saying that“The aim of the dotted line
Hasyim Djalal,“Spratly dispute needs democratic settlement,”The Jakarta Post,
January 2, 1995, p. 5.
2
Lu Ning,“Baseline for claims on territorial waters,”Business Times (Singapore),
June 19, 1996, p. 10.
3
Zou Keyuan, Law of the Sea in East Asia: Issues and Prospects, Routledge, London
and New York, 2005, p. 57.
4
Gao Zhiguo, “The South China Sea: From Conflict to Cooperation,” Ocean
Development & International Law, Vol. 25, 1994, p. 346.
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Behind the Dotted Line on the Chinese Map of the South China Sea
was to indicate China’
s sovereignty over the four island groups.”1 Another
Taiwan scholar, Professor Yu Kuanci, went into more detail, observing that
“Although we may refer to the demarcation line between maritime space
or the outer line of all maritime space under state jurisdiction as‘boundary
line,’the term can only apply to inland waters under absolute state
sovereignty. The island ownership line is another story. This indicates state
ownership over the islands, islets, reefs and shoals inside the dotted line.
The legal status of the maritime space inside the dotted line hinges on that
of the islands, reefs or island groups, with nothing to do with the island
ownership line. As such, the original aim was undoubtedly to indicate
sovereignty over all the islands, islets, reefs and shoals inside the dotted
2
line.”
What is more, the way that the dotted line is delineated also
substantiates our argument. The line basically follows the outermost islets
and reefs of the four Chinese island groups in the South China Sea, with its
northern part at the Beiwei shoals of the Dongsha Islands, its eastern part at
the Huangyan Islands of the Zhongsha Islands and the Haima shoals of the
Nansha Islands, its southern part at the Zengmu shoals, and its western part
at the Wan’an shoals of the same Nansha Islands. This explains why the
Ministry of Home Affairs of the Republic of China called the map it
published in 1947 The Geographical Location Map of the Islands in the
South China Sea as a claim to China’
s ownership over these islands, islets,
reefs and shoals. Such a method of delineation accords with the
international convention of the time. It is a shorthand method of
encompassing all the islands and reefs within a boundary line that runs
along the outermost islets, so sparing the trouble of enumerating the
numerous islets individually by name.
In fact, such a practice was in widespread use in the late 19th and
early 20th centuries, as seen in the boundary delineation in Alaska between
Yann-huei Song and Peter Kien-hong Yu,“China’s‘Historic waters’in the South
China Sea: An analysis from Taiwan,”American Asian Review, Vol. 12, No. 4,
Winter, 1994, p. 98.
2
俞宽赐：
“我国南海 U 形线及线内水域之法律性质和地位”，载于海南南海研究中
心编：
《海南暨南海学术研讨会论文集》，2001 年，
第 427-439 页。
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the United States and Czarist Russia in 1867, Britain’
s permission for
Queensland (Australia) to annex the Islands of Terres Strait in 1879, and in
the carving up of the Solomon Islands by Great Britain and Germany in
1899.1 What was divided up was merely the relevant islands, rather than
the entire water area. Again, the so-called“treaty line”inherited by the
Philippines from America upon independence on July 4, 1946 was
delineated by the treaty signed on December 10, 1898 between the United
States and Spain. Washington later reiterated time and again that Manila
has all along been aware that the treaty relates only to the land and
maritime territories as opposed to the entire water area inside the treaty line
that was adopted for the convenience of listing numerous islets, despite it
being identified with latitude and longitude. Washington did not intend to
include the water area between the islets into any article of the treaty.2 As
such the dotted line should naturally be considered as indicative of island
ownership only.
Examination of relevant Chinese official statements and maritime
laws and regulations bolster my argument even further. In the Statement
Concerning the Anglo-American Draft Treaty with Japan and the San
Francisco Conference, the then Chinese Premier and concurrent Foreign
Minister Zhou Enlai declared in 1951 that“just like the entire Nansha
Islands, Zhongsha Islands and Dongsha Islands, the Xisha Islands and
Nanwei Islands have been Chinese territories since ancient times.”
Thereafter, all Chinese official statements and relevant maritime legislation
(for example the 1958 Declaration on the Territorial Sea and the 1992 Law
on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone) have all along adhered to
this stance without any reference whatsoever to the entire maritime space
inside the dotted line.
What merits our attention is an article“Beijing should erase the
‘U-shaped Line’”by Mr. Barry Wain, Contributor to the Asian Wall Street
Journal. He asserted that“If the dotted line represents China’
s claim to the
J. R. V. Prescott, The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World, Methuen, London,
1985, p. 235.
2
Kriangsak Kittichaisaree, The Law of the Sea and Maritime Boundary Delimitation
in Southeast Asia, Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1987, p. 156.
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Behind the Dotted Line on the Chinese Map of the South China Sea
relevant islands, Beijing may immediately erase the dotted line without
causing too much damage.”1 Clearly, he had a trick up his sleeve. If things
were really that simple, why did he not advise Manila to do the same thing
by erasing the treaty line previously clarified as an island ownership line.
In fact, the dotted line has been in existence for over half a century,
since its inception in 1947. Indeed, it has served as historic evidence
supporting China’
s claim to the island groups in the South China Sea, in
particular the shoals and the submerged coral islets. It may also help us to
demarcate maritime boundaries between China and other littoral states.2
Therefore, no matter what legal status will eventually be confirmed for the
dotted line, instead of erasing it, we should protect it with redoubled efforts.
(translated by Ma Zongshi)
1 Barry Wain,“Beijing should erase the‘U-shaped Line,’”The Asian Wall Street
Journal, May 26-28, 2000, p. 10.
2 Zou Keyuan, Law of the Sea in East Asia: Issues and Prospects, Routledge, London
and New York, 2005, p. 59.
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