Result of the questionnaire on Centralised Control Centres
This chart describes expert’s views on the following questions in line with the article written and edited by Christian Sevestre on behalf of the International
Technical Committee of the IRSE with the contribution of:
-
Mr. Peter Symons
Dr. Mickaël Leining
Mr. Andreas Goetz
Mr. Ian Mitchell
Mr. Fernando Montes
Mr. Libor Lochman
Mrs. Maria Torttila
Dr. Markus Montigel
Mr. Per Börjel
Mr. Wim Coenraad
Dr. Masayuki Matsumoto
Mr. Yuji Hirao
Mr. Joseph Noffsinger
Mr. Edward Goddard
Mr. Hugh Rochford
National traffic control centre, what should it consist of?
1
COUNTRY
Questions – Answers
1. Objectives of traffic control centres centralisation in your country?
- Improve throughput and productivity.
WESTERN AUSTRALIA
AND NEW ZEALAND
GERMANY
UK (NETWORK RAIL)
SPAIN
CZECH REPUBLIC
FINLAND
SWITZERLAND
SWEDEN
THE NETHERLANDS
FRANCE
JAPAN
NORTH AMERICA
(USA)
ENGLAND METRO
- Provide a semi-integrated centralised control centre for both trains, power and security.
- Reduce costs through economies of scale and reduced duplication.
DB AG is pursuing the strategic objective of to a great extent centralising and automating operations management tasks in the long-distance and conurbation
network. 7 Operations Centres were erected at the seven Regional Unit locations to be DB Netz AG centres of excellence from which operations on the route
network are to be monitored, controlled and also signalled.
The objectives are: improvements in operating quality and increased profitability thanks to extensive centralisation and automation and the optimisation of
organisational processes for operations and technical systems.
- reduced operating costs through reduction in number of operating staff
- reduced train delays due to better management of incidents
- improved capacity through better planning and management of train paths
- improved flexibility in dealing with short notice requirements of additional or amended train paths
- increase capacity, reduce costs (reduction of manpower needed, investments and life cycle)
- to get better controlled functionality in case of disturbance,
- automated control of trains with train numbers
Improving efficiency, reduction of cost for man power, centralisation to increase efficiency of traffic management
13 TCCs: regulation of train traffic by setting routes, providing passenger information.
OCCR: coordinate efforts of all parties involved in transport system in dealing with disturbances and restoring normal operations asap.
- to improve the productivity by reducing the staff in the signal boxes
- to improve the quality of service :
o by reducing the numbers of actors in the operational train management,
o by giving them a global view of the managed area therefore a bigger capacity to anticipate and to take the good decision,
o by accelerating the resolution of crisis.
- to reduce costs in operation (especially staff for route setting)
- to realise high quality of traffic control and passenger service
(punctuality / prompt and appropriate traffic recovery on the occurrence of disturbance / co-operation with adjacent lines)
(provision of passenger information)
- reduce costs through elimination of staff (historical)
- priority management of unscheduled freight trains / automated planning to optimize value and increase network velocity
- System wide management of locomotive fleet.
- Automatic route setting and control to improve train regulation, optimise train operation
- provide accurate real time information to passengers, drivers, station staff and management
- Control response to incidents and co-ordinate resources.
2
2. Organisation
2.1 What was the initial organisation of your network for train management? What were the main functions of existing control traffic centres?
WESTERN AUSTRALIA
AND NEW ZEALAND
Organisation was as is now. Train control prior to 1990 was a decentralised system with train controllers and signalmen at each station. The drive to centralise
all train control was completed in 1992 with the completion of the electrification of the metro network. The train control system was then replaced in 2005 due to
the age of the existing system. The structure is this :
- Train controllers: handling the calling of signals/routes and points, tracking of trains, schedule and crewing.
- Suburban operations controller: overseeing and coordinating the operation of the controllers and handling scheduling issues in the short to medium term.
- Train Systems Manager: handling people issues (shifts & rosters, etc), safety, policy, etc, in the control centre.
- Train scheduling department: handling long term planning and scheduling of trains and crews.
The starting point was the former systems in use: manual reporting via the computer-supported train monitoring offices at Deutsche Bundesbahn and the
computer-supported dispatcher centres at Deutsche Reichsbahn (in each case located at the Regional Directorates). Merging the respective areas of
responsibility in the Operations Centres enables a substantially higher quality of operations management.
The former traffic control offices and Central Traffic Control had the task of monitoring and controlling train running and train priorities within their own area of
responsibility, or coordinating these across the network, respectively. Traffic control and signalling were technically, spatially and organisationally separate from
each other. Communication between the signalling and dispatch level on site and Central Traffic Control was only automated in the reporting direction. In the
traffic control offices, the system support in use was unified to a large extent; on the signalling side, a variety of designs were in use (mechanical, electromechanical and relay signalboxes).
In terms of interaction between the two levels, this means:
-
GERMANY
the Traffic Control level directed operations and in cases of operating conflicts had power of decision in respect of order and priority in train running.
-
at the signalling level (locally staffed signalboxes), the signallers worked autonomously within their spatial area of responsibility; coordination
requirements or technical dependencies (via interfaces) only existed in connection with the handover and acceptance of trains to and from the areas
of responsibility of neighbouring signalboxes. In the process, the operating directions from the traffic control level were implemented under the
premise of safe operating.
With the construction of the Operations Centres, the core operating tasks
-
coordination of operating activities (with RUs, other railways and third parties),
-
control of trains en route and in hubs,
-
signalbox operation – now also on a uniform technical platform and
monitoring of technical installations,
can be concentrated spatially and merged, step by step.
The UK network is managed by signallers working individually in small signalboxes and in teams of up to 10 at larger signalling control centres. The
responsibilities of the signaler are:
UK (NETWORK RAIL)
-
Monitoring train movements in the area of responsibility,
-
Setting of routes for trains in accordance with the timetable,
-
Verbal communications with train drivers via radio lineside telephones,
-
Management of incidents and possessions.
3
The signaler works with a signaling control system which provides indications of the status of signaling equipment and location of trains, and an interface with
the interlocking for route setting and controls on individual objects such as axle counters and points. The signaling control systems are based on a range of
technologies:
-
Mechanical levers,
-
Push buttons and switches,
-
Computer workstations.
The most modem control centres incorporate automatic route setting which reduces signaler workload ans allows larger areas to be controlled by each
signaler. The most complex areas controlled by one signaler are 250-350 SEU (signal equivalent units).
SPAIN
CZECH REPUBLIC
FINLAND
SWITZERLAND
SWEDEN
THE NETHERLANDS
FRANCE
JAPAN
A higher level of traffic management is undertaken en 10 regional operations control centres. The staff in these centres does not have any direct control of the
signaling but they are responsible for coordination a response to incidents and changes to the planned timetable. They have access to a wide range of
information sources about the performance of the railway in their area, but there are no automated decisions support tools. Most of the operations control
centres are managed jointly by Network Rail and the principal passenger Railway Undertaking in the area.
National management centre is supervising daily traffic and in exceptional situation will make the decision which traffic is the most important and is there any
need for replace some train by bus.
7 local operation control centres have response for operational functions (route setting) all the time according the time schedules.
Each station manned, control distributed.
CTC for major dispatching decisions only.
The train management was fulfilled by a 3 levels organisation (national, regional and local):
- The National Operations’ Centre (CNO) in charge of the overall management of the network and the crisis management in relation with national
representatives of the operating train companies.
- 21 Regional Regulations’ Centres in charge of:
o the regulation of the traffic (the respect of the theoretical timetable without any safety responsibilities),
o the management of the rolling stock and the drivers,
o the arbitration between commercial activities (TGV trains, long distance passenger trains, regional and suburban trains, freight trains).
- The local signalboxes in charge of the operational management (the route setting) and the safety management in case of failures and, when necessary, in
relation with the local representatives of the operating train companies.
Apart some big signalboxes (so called large area signalboxes) which were in charge of their local regulation in normal and degraded situations in their area,
the local signalboxes had no regulating responsibility. They had only to apply the regulation directives issued from their Regional Regulations’ Centre.
In all the signalboxes, there were 2 levels: the chief operator and the operators.
Very schematically, the general principle was that the chief operator was the “head” and the operators the “legs or the arms”.
In 1987 JNR (the former Japanese National Railways) was privatised and devided reginonally to 6 railway companies. Whereas Infractructre Managers are
responsible for railway infrastructures in Europe, railway companies are responsible for train operations their infrastructres as well in Japan.
- Although train operaion devisions of railway companys are in charge of the overall management of the network, traffic control/management is carried out at
each traffic control center, which can be categorised into main and regional ones.
(In the case of Shinkansens, four railway companies have their own centerised trafiic control center. JR East lines on Tokyo metropolitan areas are all
controlled/managed by the centerised traffic center.),
4
NORTH AMERICA
(USA)
ENGLAND METRO
Migration steps (general case – see discussion in appendix)
1. Interlocking station manned towers with subdivision telephone dispatching and management
2. Remote control of interlocking from division dispatch center
3. Conversion of division control centers to video displays, touch screen controls, consolation of territories
4. Consolidation of division control centers to regional control centers
5. On class I railways (the 7 very large freight companies), the regional centers have been consolidated into a single control center for the company
(there are a few interim regional centers not integrated from acquisitions of railways).
Traditionally - Local signal cabins, and a central controller linked by telephone. Train crew managed locally at depots.
Control centres (1950’s on)
Train regulators Existing functions- train regulation, supervision of automatic route setting.
Logging of train movements.
Information assistants Provision of information to platforms and drivers.
Line controllers, modifications to timetable to cover incidents,
co-ordination of staff and emergency services
Provision of information to station managers and train crew managers on service
Alterations.
5
2.2 What will Centralised Traffic Control Centres consist of? What main functions will be/have been implemented in these traffic control centres?
Which task repartition between actors? Which relations with Railway Undertakings? Are they present in the control center? How to preserve the
confidentiality between them?
WESTERN AUSTRALIA
AND NEW ZEALAND
As above.
Today’s Operations Centres bring together railway operational traffic control and process management (= signalling) for DB Netz AG’s core network at 7
locations:
-
the modular traffic control systems function with common data storage and with algorithms for identifying conflicting train movements.
-
There are no operating staff at the electronic signalling centres with automatic controls on site (sub-centres), which are linked, via public transmission
networks, to user interfaces in the Operations Centres. In the final situation, it is intended that traffic control decisions should be transformed
automatically into route settings at the interlocking level.
-
as well as the operating functions, technical routing functions are integrated, so that optimum coordination is achieved between operations
management and technical services in the maintenance and restoration of route availability. At the same time, in cases of route disruption, the
decision process is supported by the spatial proximity and structured base data from the systems for traffic control and the operating level.
-
lines which have to continue to be operated locally due to the existing infrastructure can also fall under the responsibility of the relevant Operations
Centre for traffic control purposes.
GERMANY
UK (NETWORK RAIL)
SPAIN
CZECH REPUBLIC
FINLAND
SWITZERLAND
SWEDEN
THE NETHERLANDS
Basically, it is possible for the Railway Undertakings to have a direct presence in the Operations Centres. By mirroring operating data, they are in a position to
input findings from it directly into their own upstream and downstream processes (e.g. in respect of train or traincrew allocations). Secrecy is assured between
the system for the exchange of current train running information and the Railway Undertakings’ systems thanks to filtering functions. This ensures that the RUs
can organise their own business processes independently and autonomously. Above and beyond this, direct verbal communication with those involved is
possible.
The strategy is that the centralised traffic control centres (to be known as Railway Operating Centres-ROC) will combine the functions of the existing signalling
centres and operations control centres. Manual route setting will be eliminated in almost all circumstances, by providing automatic route setting driven by a
dynamically updated timetable. The emphasis will be on predicting problems in advance and re-planning to provide a solution, instead of managing the
problem as it occurs.
The ROCs will be mainly staffed by Network Rail, but it is expected that there will also be staff of the principal Railway Undertakings in the area. Presence of
staff from different Railway Undertakings is not seen a problem of confidentiality, but this may need to be considered where data needs to be exchanged
between computer systems of IM and RU.
In 7 local CTCs are doing daily operational functions. At the moment FTA has outsourced this task on commercial contract bases to VR Group Ltd, which is
also RU in Finland.
In 1 national management centre will control the whole traffic and will decide actions in disturbed circumstances. This task is directly under FTA staff.
The local CTC are equipped with automatic route setting based on train numbers and time table data.
Everything centralised in 5 centres for SBB+BLS with “Mega-Center” for nation-wide coordination and coordination with other countries. Two-layerorganisation: dispatching and control.
TCCs set routes and give passenger information. Operators are not present. Operators are (or can be) present and represented in the OCCR.
6
FRANCE
JAPAN
NORTH AMERICA
(USA)
The organisation has been contracted and the French network is divided into 2 parts: the main lines which are regulated by the centralised traffic control
centres (CCR) and the other lines which are not regulated (or regulated by local signalboxes). The signalboxes are modernised and remotely controlled from
the CCR.
The train management for the main lines is fulfilled by a 2 levels organisation:
- The National Operations’ Centre (CNO) in charge of the overall management of the network and the crisis management in relation with national
representatives of the operating train companies remains and is reinforced.
- The 16 Centralised Traffic Control Centres (CCR) (that replace the existing 21 Regional Regulations’ Centres (CRO) and local signalboxes) in charge of:
o the regulation of the traffic (the respect of the theoretical timetable) in normal and degraded situations,
o the operational management (the route setting) and the safety management in case of failures,
o and the short term arbitration between trains and railway undertakings (TGV trains, long distance passenger trains, regional and suburban trains,
freight trains)
The controlled areas are adjacent and form homogeneous and continuous local regulated centres under the responsibility of an operational manager in charge
of coordinating the actions (within the regulated areas and some other areas not regulated still dependent from the CCR), management of incidents,
contingency plans… in relation with representatives of train operating companies, when their trains are affected.
The management of the rolling stock and the drivers is carried out by each railway undertakings. The railway undertakings representatives are normally not
present in the control centres. They are only called in case of big disturbances. This requires improvement of bidirectional information and decision links.
There are two types of Traffic Control system in Japan :
Centralized Type
PRC : computerized Programmed Route Control for conventional lines and urban lines
COMTRAC : COMputer aidedTRAffic Control system for Tokaido & Sanyo Shinkansen
Main function: Train schedule management, Train operation monitoring, train schedule adjustment
Decentralized Type
ATOS : Autonomous decentralized Transport Operation control System for Tokyo metropolitan area
COSMOS : COmputerized Safety Maintenance and Operation systems of Shinkansen for Tohoku & Joetsu Shinkansen
Main function: Train schedule management, Train operation monitoring, train schedule adjustment
1.
Since all railroads are fully vertically integrated operations, the control centers consolidate all functions necessary to operate & manage a railway.
That includes SCADA remote command & control of all signal territories and interlocking. For non-signalled lines, verbal movement authorities are
issued, tracked and managed by computer.
2.
Control systems include the command & control of routes, points, and signals. There is a high level of integration with the railroad information
technology business systems, to:
a)
Acquire information about each freight car (wagon) in a train (for example the type of hazardous load, so that train may have special
procedures),
b)
To pass location data of the carload to central systems and in turn to customers. The centers usually include systems for managing the
locomotive fleet, coordination of track & signal maintenance crews, severe weather alerts, and for managing emergencies such as derailments,
hazardous material incidents, etc... For disaster recovery, an alternate facility is usually fitted with equipment to mirror the control center, and is
located ample distance away.
3, 4, 5, 6 are not applicable in an integrated railway.
ENGLAND METRO
Each line controlled from a single centre, with an emergency fall back centre.
Centre provides
Train service optimisation, supervision of automatic route setting and train regulation.
Service information to platforms, passengers and drivers.
Line control, modifications to timetable to cover incidents,
7
-
Co-ordination of staff and emergency services
Provision of information to maintainers
8
2.3 What kind of additional services if any will be/Have been added?
Train describer: introduced in 2005 and enhanced in 2007.
WESTERN AUSTRALIA
AND NEW ZEALAND
Automatic route setting: introduced in 2007.
On time running reports: generated from the train control system.
Video recorder style playbacks of the panel.
Separate web based panel for viewing by the organisation.
Traffic control:
The traffic control systems were commissioned in 1999 at all Operations Centre locations, linking all planned sections of route. Initially, only the basic functions
(monitoring train running, automated reporting flow) were implemented. The overall system was subsequently expanded, in several stages. Since then, train
running on the most important roughly 13,000 km of route in the Deutsche Bahn network has been automatically recorded and controlled and coordinated with
computer support. The uniform functional scope thus achieved, particularly improved data management for timetabling purposes, has in the meantime enabled
improvements to take place in traffic control.
In connection with the implementation of corresponding technical systems, the "direct intervention” process is intended to be introduced successively in the
Operations Centres in future: in the process, the decisions made by the traffic controller on the traffic control panel in his function as a signaller will be
automatically forwarded to the train signalling system in the signalbox systems. A further increase in efficiency can be expected in connection with the extended
assistance for traffic control systems which is currently being developed for the identification and solution of conflicts in traffic management. In the process, the
available options are identified by the system and after the operator makes a selection, are entered directly into the traffic control systems and are thus also
forwarded to the system world of operational route control functions. In parallel with this assistance system, corresponding driving recommendations can be sent to
train drivers.
GERMANY
Route control:
As a technical pre-requisite for the grouping of operating and control systems in Operations Centres, a standard "Operations Centre-compatible" signalbox
infrastructure needs first to be created on site. An expansion of the territory of the Deutsche Bahn network which is to be controlled by the Operations Centre can
therefore only take place together with the construction of new signalboxes which are suitable for the purpose. At final capacity, the core long-distance and
conurbation network should be controlled from Operations Centres. Up to now, about 50% of this has been realised, in several stages.
In the field of signalbox operation itself, manual operations have been supported by automation (automated impulse from the signalling system for route setting), or
operating reports have been better channelled (reports are automatically assigned to the operator responsible).
It must be possible to monitor and operate the control and safety installations which function decentrally from the Operations Centres. For this purpose, special
user interfaces will be installed in the Operations Centres and linked to the sub-centres via public data transmission networks. It must be possible for the signallers
and controllers to carry out safety-related operating actions from the user interfaces.
The concentration of functions in the Operations Centres should in future be more than just spatially adjacent operating installations for the control and signalling
levels. As a decisive innovation in the operating concept, it is planned to concentrate the functional levels of command and control technology, traffic control,
alarms and other reporting systems, as well as telecommunications, in a common, integrated control panel.
9
Network Rail has specified the following as the “business capabilities” to be provided by the Traffic Management system in the ROCs.
Business Capacity
Train Location Tracking
Train Movement
Enquiries
Predict Operational
Situation
Train Graph
Identify Conflicts
Resolve Conflicts
Operational Planning
Validate Plan
UK (NETWORK RAIL)
Current Plan
Distribution
Contingency Planning
Train Prioritisation
Train Crew Information
Train Consist and Load
Information
Network Displays and
Schematics
Network and Traffic
Restrictions
Automatic Movement
Authority
Remote Interface (RIF)
CCTV Monitoring
Advisory Train Speeds
Drivers Advisory
Information
Possession
Management
Reconfigure Control
Area
Operational Events and
Description
Combines multiple sources of train movement data (TD, GPS etc) to conclusively determine where a train is on the network & current
delay. Also includes a software train describer function based upon track circuit data from the RIF.
Records the movements of trains over time to support downstream business processes and supports ad-hoc operational enquiries.
Also includes location simplifiers to signallers in manually signalled areas.
Predicts where each train will be and at what time based upon the current operational situation (incidents, delays etc) and individual
performance.
Plots the current and predicted location of trains, highlighting any conflicts and enabling direct manipulation of the current plan.
Checks for path conflicts with the current plan, possessions and infrastructure availability and calculates the consequential delay.
Assumes that the plan is already consistent for crew and consists – conflicts with these are analysed as part of the “validate plan”
capability.
Suggests options to mitigate conflicts and predicts the associated improvement to delay. Includes changes to the plan and advisory
speeds.
Manages changes to the current plan as a result of VSTP requests, direct manipulation (e.g. via Train Graph), automatic conflict
resolution or the implementation of contingency plans. Also includes management and modification of planned possessions.
Analyses the current plan for viability, including route availability, sectional running times, consist, load, crew information and planned
possessions.
Maintains the current plan by combining the day plan and any operational “on the day” changes. Distributes the plan for automatic or
manual implementation, and includes information on planned possessions.
Stores predefined and agreed plan modifications to be electronically implemented during times of perturbation.
Determines the relative priorities of trains based upon configurable rules (such as train class or delay) to aid conflict resolution.
A single store of data provided by operating companies used to improve the quality of plan changes. This information is assumed to
be voluntarily provided.
A single store of data provided by operating companies and used to improve the quality of plan changes, validate that train paths are
permitted and facilitate better predictions of train running performance.
A set of workstation visualisations and overlays showing the state of the railway by augmenting multiple sources of information
including the location of trains. Also includes manual route setting in RIF enable areas.
Maintains a digital catalogue of known issues impacting train movements including infrastructure availability and condition, incidents,
speed restrictions and operating notices. Also includes information on train faults that may impact other vehicle movements.
Consumes the current plan and coordinates the appropriate implementation by issuing updated plans to existing ARS systems,
automatically setting routes via the RIF or through direct train control as appropriate.
A common interface to enable interaction with rail infrastructure including interlocking, CCTV and trackside telecoms regardless of
type or manufacturer.
Manages the display of live CCTV streams and interfaces for controlling cameras (wipers, floodlights etc) primarily for level crossings
and tail lamp monitoring.
Facilitates the direct interface with train-borne control systems for speed control.
Provides relevant information to train drivers on incidents and other restrictions.
Workflow tool to facilitate the electronics take-over and hand-back of possession worksites, tracking work progress and influencing
permitted train movements.
Enables the dynamic reconfiguration of workstations to meet operational demand. Interacts with the necessary infrastructure and
telecoms systems to enable communications and authorisation to move with a workstation.
Processes a range of data sources to identify issues that may impact the operational situation and raising alerts/alarms where
10
Alerts
Incidents Management
Operational Log
Infrastructure
Indications Distribution
Integrated Desktop
Geographic Model
SPAIN
CZECH REPUBLIC
FINLAND
SWITZERLAND
SWEDEN
THE NETHERLANDS
appropriate.
Coordinates the tracking and management of operational events that have impact on train movements. Includes interaction with fault
management systems.
An integrated platform recording the automatic and manual observations and actions relating to the operation of the railway.
Receives and stores indication date from the RIF such as signals, points and track circuits. Makes this available for Train Location
Tracking and replay of events through the appropriate Network Displays and Schematics.
Provides a standardised platform that Traffic Management users will interface with to access the user-based functions of all other
capabilities.
Stores slow changing information on the network geography and infrastructure such as track, points, stations, bridges as well as the
corresponding schematics, routes and control regions.
All failures in signalling systems are reported to local CTC. Local CTC forward the information to the traction/catenary control centre to call maintenance.
Train Traffic Optimisation, Energy Savings, Power Control, Train heartiness control (ZKE), Tunnel control, passenger information, Comm-Network Control,
interface to train companies.
ProRail is investigating and tendering for a modernisation of 9 TCCs. This involves a renewal of the IT systems.
The power supply management is not included in the train management control centres.
The infrastructure maintenance supervision centres are not included in the train management control centres but the information links are improved.
FRANCE
Tools and interfaces have been adapted/have to be developed to provide information and improve decision making in relation with train operating companies and
station managers.
For the moment, in the control centre, there are still people in charge of passenger information but in the final situation, le passenger information will be carried out
by the station managers (“Gares et Connexions” part of SNCF).
The following functionalities are already included:
JAPAN
-
Maintenance work management (ATOS, COSMOS),
-
Electric power control, Rolling stock management and Expected train diagrams display(COSMOS)
New functionatities to be added are:
NORTH AMERICA
(USA)
Train Traffic Optimization, Energy Savings, Power Control.
All failures in signalling systems are reported to local CTC. Local CTC forward the information to the traction/catenary control centre to call maintenance.
More sophisticated train regulation, and strategic management aids for line control.
Much improved communications, real time information provision, management information provision, event logging.
Greater areas of control, integrated with network control.
ENGLAND METRO
Integration with station management systems, improved CCTV monitoring, SCADA info, etc.
Integrated radio communications for all operational staff.
Provision of real time service information via internet for internal and external use.
Improved condition monitoring and maintenance integration
11
2.4 Which new capabilities for emergency situations have been added?
- Alternate control facility: control centre separate from the main centre which can be activated within 30 min of a failure of the min system.
WESTERN AUSTRALIA
AND NEW ZEALAND
GERMANY
UK (NETWORK RAIL)
SPAIN
CZECH REPUBLIC
FINLAND
SWITZERLAND
SWEDEN
THE NETHERLANDS
FRANCE
JAPAN
NORTH AMERICA
(USA)
- Local Automatic Working: automatic route calling from the interlocking in the event of communication loss. Activated manually from site.
- Local laptop based control panels which can be used during emergencies at each station.
An emergency centre has been installed in each of the 7 Operations Centres. It is separated spatially from the operating control desks and is equipped for
emergencies with components for displaying train movements and with telecommunications systems. The existing emergency concepts were re-examined and
updated as a result.
See above.
National management centre will see al the track network and co-operating with local CTC they will make the decisions in emergency. Local CTC will contact local
rescue organisations in case of accidents.
Depending on the type of line, very sophisticated new functionality to handle emergencies (mostly in long railway tunnels).
The OCCR ProRail is investigating the possibilities of having an emergency TCC to move operations if one of the TCCs becomes inoperable, e.g. due to fire,
evacuation, technical issues.
A crisis room included within the control centre, independent from the operating room, with train information and communications capabilities available for
operation and emergency services.
See question above.
Automatic provision of information to emergency services, greatly increased CCTV coverage for control staff, station staff and emergency services.
ENGLAND METRO
Co-ordinated radio communications with emergency services.
Ability to command all trains to stop, or to stop at first station encountered.
12
2.5 Which relations with the catenary switching system?
WESTERN AUSTRALIA
ANDNEW ZEALAND
GERMANY
UK (NETWORK RAIL)
SPAIN
CZECH REPUBLIC
FINLAND
SWITZERLAND
SWEDEN
THE NETHERLANDS
FRANCE
JAPAN
Traction Power controller resides in the Train Control Centre.
The monitoring and operation of catenary is done from independent, central switching stations. In individual cases, these can also be integrated spatially in an
Operations Centre. Communication with the switching stations is organisationally assured.
The control of the traction supply for overhead and third rail electrification will not be located in the ROCs, as it is intended that it will be centralised to a greater
extent with only two electrical control rooms for the whole of Network Rail.
National management centre and local CTCs can observe from monitors if there is power in catenary system. Failures and abnormal situations are reported to
traction control centre which will contact maintenance organisation.
Will fully centralised for SBB, with remote works stations in each centre.
Traction / Cateneray switching is a separate organisation housed in separate control centres (SMCs) which are usually co-located with the TCCs.
At traction control centre level, train describer can be used to display train information provided by the train management system.
Currently catenary switching process is carried out under procedure between traction and traffic control centres staff. At signalling control system level, information
is used to display and protect de-energised catenary elementary sections.
Usually the power supply control center is in the same place as the traffic control center.
NORTH AMERICA
(USA)
Not relevant. Less than 1% of the network is electric traction territory.
ENGLAND METRO
Traction managed separately. Communication links between line and power control centres.
13
2.6 Which priority operation rules between the different types of traffic (suburban, long distance, international, freight…?
WESTERN AUSTRALIA
AND NEW ZEALAND
GERMANY
UK (NETWORK RAIL)
SPAIN
CZECH REPUBLIC
FINLAND
SWITZERLAND
SWEDEN
THE NETHERLANDS
FRANCE
JAPAN
NORTH AMERICA
(USA)
ENGLAND METRO
Passenger traffic always has priority over freight.
Train operations are managed in accordance with the filed timetable. Any deviations from this are agreed between DB Netz AG (traffic controller) and the Railway
Undertakings in accordance with applicable rules and regulations. The power of decision in cases of disagreement lies with DB Netz AG’s network coordinator.
Existing automatic route setting systems generally prioritise on the basis on minimising total delay for all trains affected.
National management centre will make the priorisation.
1. Long distance
2.
Suburb
3.
Freight
Freight companies are demanding to change that but will be extremely hard to change politically.
Yes, according to national preset rules and published guidelines.
The train management system applies planned timetable data. Performance regime or priority rules are not in place.
1. Express > 2. Suburb or Commuter > 3. Freight
Freight company is demanding to change this situation, but will be extremely hard to change politically.
(6 railway companies operate passenger trains and obtain infrasttractures after the JNR privatisation in 1987. The freight comapny, which operates freight trains
throughout the country, has no infrastructures.)
All railroads are moving to higher levels of optimisation of traffic flow and prioritisation is a key element. The current leading edge technology for this is Movement
Planner in the Norfolk Southern control center. The planner optimises traffic routing based on parameters such as value of the train, penalties for missed
connections or missed schedules, fuel burn rates and cost, crew time remaining on legal duty, and others. The Movement Planner solves this multivariate problem
every few minutes and outputs signal commands and pacing recommendations.
No applicable.
14
3 Impact
3.1 What will be/was the impact of the centralisation on operation principles?
WESTERN AUSTRALIA
AND NEW ZEALAND
Difficult to say since the centralisation was done at the same time as electrification and upgrade of all signalling. Centralisation of Train Control and upgrade of
signalling reduced costs and the workforce significantly.
In the Operations Centres, all tasks for managing train operations (functions of signallers for operating signalboxes) and for network-wide monitoring and control
(functions of the former traffic control offices) are concentrated in one place.
GERMANY
UK (NETWORK RAIL)
SPAIN
CZECH REPUBLIC
FINLAND
SWITZERLAND
SWEDEN
THE NETHERLANDS
FRANCE
JAPAN
NORTH AMERICA
(USA)
ENGLAND METRO
The technical systems for the management and protection of train movements, i.e. the interlockings, continue to remain decentral and on site, but the signalboxes
are no longer staffed by operating personnel. In principle, the functions remain basically the same; however, operating personnel is concentrated where the
Operations Centres are located.
The main impact on operating principles is that to achieve the targeted staff reductions it will be necessary to abandon the existing rule that every part of the
railway must be continuously supervised by a signaller, even when automatic route setting is provided. The new principle will be “management by exception” with a
reliance on automated systems to alert the operators when some action is required.
The second main impact will be that every train will be planned and included in the dynamic timetable. In principle this should include shunting movements.
Easier to handle train movements and trains to bypass or cross, especially in abnormal situations.
Operation principles still more or less the same (2 layer system).
Centralisation was accomplished in the 1980’s so basically none.
There are no more operators in the stations.
A lot of operations which were made locally, officially or not, by these operators shall be re-affected to other staff from train operating companies, maintenance
staff… (for instance: train integrity supervision, catenary switches operating, points lubricating, detonators reloading, incident management…).
Main impact is to reduce signal staff by CTC (Centralized Traffic Control, non-vital remote control systems) at the first stage, and next to enhance the traffic
management efficiency by introducing PRC(Programmed Route Control system, attomatic route setting).
Centralisation allows full command and control to execute optimised plans.
Better co-ordination in response to major incidents but loss of local multi-department teams based on geographical organisation of departments.
Initial impact was a worsening of local information provision but with improved communications and IT systems current position is a vast improvement.
15
3.2 What will be/was the impact of the centralisation on operators?
WESTERN AUSTRALIA
AND NEW ZEALAND
As above.
Thanks to the high degree of centralisation and automation, more effective and more profitable operations management becomes possible.
GERMANY
Through structured data management and targeted data evaluation, working processes in the Operations Centre, but in particular also the business processes
connected directly with them (train and traincrew allocation, passenger information, equipment maintenance) are to be further improved.
The roles of the staff and the required skill set and experience will need to change. It is envisaged that the three main roles will be:
UK (NETWORK RAIL)
SPAIN
CZECH REPUBLIC
FINLAND
SWITZERLAND
SWEDEN
THE NETHERLANDS
-
Planner,
-
Traffic manager,
- Incident manager.
Saving the dispatching personal.
However, more track km per person to be controlled.
The responsibilities and the way of working of simple operators, chiefs operators, dispatchers are deeply modified by the new organisation.
FRANCE
The HMI/control system (Mistral in France) was significantly modified for the first phase of the CCR project and will be even deeper modified for the second phase
to improve ergonomy and develop new interfaces for operating and information systems.
JAPAN
NORTH AMERICA
(USA)
The level of automaticity is increased. The roles of the first and second operating levels within the control room are deeply modified. Their production tools as well.
See above
The first impact and driver was the tremendous cost savings from elimination of manned signal boxes. Elimination of the multiple management eliminated
opportunities for errors in communications and interpretation.
Reduced staff numbers, and better utilisation of trains.
ENGLAND METRO
Better staff conditions.
Potential for driver less trains due to improved radio communications.
16
3.3 What will be/was the impact on maintenance?
WESTERN AUSTRALIA
AND NEW ZEALAND
Major reduction in costs but a increase in the impact on any faults, i.e. one fault in the control centre could stop all trains rather than trains at one station.
The concentration of technical systems in one place also makes it possible to optimise maintenance. Thus, with regard to the Operations Centre as a technical
system, the stockholding of certain components can be centralised and the logistics simplified.
GERMANY
In respect of the maintenance of infrastructure systems on site, coordination is simplified thanks to the spatial concentration of contact partners and the
standardised technical platform of the signalboxes enables maintenance to be performed more efficiently.
By the same token, the retention by and further development of technical expertise in maintenance staff becomes easier.
UK (NETWORK RAIL)
SPAIN
CZECH REPUBLIC
FINLAND
SWITZERLAND
SWEDEN
THE NETHERLANDS
The impact on maintenance is not yet clearly defined.
Failure information comes from one address and when there is some work going on, only one contact person is needed.
All the local contacts between maintainers and operators are no more possible.
The operators of the control centre don’t know as well as in the past the installations and the geography.
They generally don’t know personally and physically the maintainers.
FRANCE
The contacts are somehow more difficult.
When many work operations are carried out at the same time, all the demands to apply for, or give up possessions are concentrated on a small number of
operators. It may cause delays and a waste of time for the maintainer.
JAPAN
NORTH AMERICA
(USA)
ENGLAND METRO
A new module has been added to facilitate simultaneous dialogues between the control centre and the maintainers and manage the associated protections
(Automatic Possession Management Module).
In the Tokyo Metropolitan area, for instance, the ATOS (Autonomous decentralized Transport Operation control system) with “Maintenance management functions”
of ”Planning of maintenance work” and “Execution of maintenance work” is introduced.
While also achievable with today’s networking environment, at the time of centralisation it created the means for efficient, accurate creation of maintenance tickets
and results tracking. This data fed TSM efforts to eliminate root causes of failure.
Improved access to real time information and logs.
Improved information of failures due to remote monitoring and availability of information from infrastructure and trains.
Loss of local contacts and organisation means access to railway more bureaucratic.
17
3.4 Which kinds of problems (organisational, safety, quality of service…) were met / are expected?
WESTERN AUSTRALIA
AND NEW ZEALAND
GERMANY
Each Operations Centre represents an autonomous unit that functions independently of the others. Within an Operations Centre, its system architecture provides
for a high level of availability by means of provision of and clear delineation between highly reliable technical systems, which are designed as redundant features in
core areas. In addition, for imaginable disruption or failure scenarios, instructions exist for implementing corresponding countermeasures – on the technical level as
well as the operating and organisational levels.
Thus, as a result, no serious problems are expected in the future.
UK (NETWORK RAIL)
SPAIN
CZECH REPUBLIC
FINLAND
SWITZERLAND
SWEDEN
THE NETHERLANDS
FRANCE
JAPAN
NORTH AMERICA
(USA)
A specific issue relates to the supervision of level crossings. Many of the small signalboxes are located at level crossings where the signaller is responsible for
controlling the level crossing barriers and ensuring the crossing is clear of road vehicles before allowing a train to pass. At some larger control centres a significant
element of workload is supervision of level crossings via closed circuit television (CCTV). It is planned to automate these level crossings using radar-based
obstacle detector technology to check the crossing is clear of road vehicles.
Sometimes might be hard to get a permit for track work due to limited capacity of dispatchers in CTC centres. There is a rule how many working groups can be
under one dispatcher’s control at the same time.
Coordination between different layers of organisation and between train companies and infrastructure.
In the initial situation, an operator worked only in a small area with a very small number of signalboxes. In a CCR, he controls a larger area with an increased
number of signalboxes and installations. He may confuse the number of a signalbox or signalling information with another one and give a wrong instruction (track
possession…).
Specific measures are taken in numbering the signalboxes and/or the signalling information to avoid this kind of mistake.
Sometimes software errors cause sytem stoppages.
Occasional major system failures due to loss of central control systems.
Need to implement work-arounds to cover initial software problems.
ENGLAND METRO
Industrial relations issues with staff required to move, change role.
Staff selection needs to take into account competencies needed for changed roles whereas traditional railway processes favour seniority
Need to train staff on new systems requires extensive simulation facilities.
18
4 Development process and technical issue
4.1 Who wrote the functional specifications?
WESTERN AUSTRALIA
AND NEW ZEALAND
GERMANY
UK (NETWORK RAIL)
SPAIN
CZECH REPUBLIC
FINLAND
SWITZERLAND
SWEDEN
THE NETHERLANDS
FRANCE
JAPAN
NORTH AMERICA
(USA)
ENGLAND METRO
A consultant, after major discussions and interviews with operators, maintainers and owners.
The functional specifications were documented in technical and operational specification documents. Overall responsibility for the production of the specifications
as "requirements catalogues" from the point of view of future users lies with the technical and operating departments. The requirements will first be agreed
internally with all the departments involved. In agreement with the competent supervisory authorities, these departments will also ensure that the specifications – in
accordance with the process to be used for the purpose – will be introduced in a legally binding form.
Network Rail has produced a high level definition of business capabilities (see above). However the intention is to procure a Traffic Management System based on
a system which is proven in operating elsewhere in the world.
The functional specifications have been written by FTA.
SBB + Suppliers.
The functional specifications have been written by SNCF Engineering on the name and for the benefit of the Infrastructure Manager (RFF).
The functional specifications have been written by each operator.
The railroad created high level functional specifications, expanded and executed by the systems suppliers.
London Underground (Latterly Infracos = the infrastructure companies as part of the PPP but assimilated back into the Underground )
19
4.2 If several manufacturers were chosen, who wrote the functional specifications to ensure compatibility between them?
WESTERN AUSTRALIA
AND NEW ZEALAND
GERMANY
UK (NETWORK RAIL)
SPAIN
CZECH REPUBLIC
FINLAND
SWITZERLAND
SWEDEN
THE NETHERLANDS
FRANCE
JAPAN
NORTH AMERICA
(USA)
ENGLAND METRO
The functional specifications were written neutrally, insofar as manufacturers are concerned. In the company-specific development process, the compatibility of
technical solutions with the operator’s requirements must be certified by the manufacturers by means of technical specification documents.
It is intended that a single manufacturer will provide the Traffic Management system.
There are several suppliers in the country but each local CTC has equipment only from one supplier. FTA together with suppliers has written specification about
the needed information, what data has to be transfer between different CTCs (time table data, train numbers, etc...).
Only one manufacturer for each operation and dispatching. Not yet compatible.
For the MISTRAL control system currently deployed, there is only one manufacturer.
The new generation on control system is being specified by SNCF Engineering on the name for the benefit of RFF. RFF will decide which strategy will be applied
for the manufacturing process.
In many case only one manufacturer is chosen.
Each Class I railroad has chosen one of the suppliers for their control system core.
LU or Infraco.
4.3 Which is the SIL of the control centre management system in charge of route setting?
WESTERN AUSTRALIA
AND NEW ZEALAND
GERMANY
UK (NETWORK RAIL)
Not rated.
The operating and control systems (route setting) comply with SIL 4.
The business capabilities directly influencing route setting (remote interface and automatic route setting) are specified as SIL 2.
FINLAND
There is no SIL required in CTCs at the moment. Interlocking will take care ol SIL’s. Maybe in the future there will be some requirements depending on possible EU
regulations.
SWITZERLAND
SWEDEN
THE NETHERLANDS
FRANCE
JAPAN
NORTH AMERICA
(USA)
SIL-0, as a remote control of interlocking; SIL-2 critical commands.
SIL used to be SIL 0, but in recent years some functions require SIL ½ implementations
MISTRAL and the remote control systems are SIL 2.
Safety is guaranteed in the lower layer, e.g. interlockings and ATC.
No SILs are expressed. The current control centers are deemed safety related, but not safety critical. As Positive Train Control is being rolled out, the central office
PTC server is expected to be equivalent to perhaps SIL3 eventually.
20
ENGLAND METRO
SIL 2.
4.4 What is the required SIL of the control centre management system in charge of blocking?
WESTERN AUTRALIA
AND NEW ZEALAND
GERMANY
UK (NETWORK RAIL)
SPAIN
CZECH REPUBLIC
FINLAND
SWITZERLAND
SWEDEN
THE NETHERLANDS
FRANCE
JAPAN
NORTH AMERICA
(USA)
ENGLAND METRO
Not rated. System is considered and treated as non –vtial and overlayed on exiting controls.
Suitable relay signalboxes can be connected by remote control to an existing or new central computer and thereby be integrated into the electronic signalling
centre/Operations Centre control panel. In this way, they are equipped with an extended scope of function with standards suitable for automation. A pre-requisite
for this is that the old signalbox which is to be connected to them should have an adequate remaining service life (at least 15 years).
On the assumption this question refers to “reminders” that are set by the signaller to prevent route setting when there is a failure or a blockage of the line, and then
this is SIL 2. Note that additional protective measures are used (e.g. track circuit operating device) if a higher SIL protection is required.
There is no SIL in CTC, interlocking will take care of SIL’s. Maybe in the future there will be some requirements depending on possible EU regulations.
SIL-0, as remote control of interlocking; SIL-2 critical commands.
For blocking of routes, points etc… using route setting IT systems SIL ½ is required nowadays.
It was estimated that it is impossible technically or economically to remote control mechanical, electromechanical and some old relay interlockings. These
interlockings are progressively being replaced by new computerised interlockings compatibles with the new control system
SIL 4 but this is not traditionally centralised. Blocking and interlocking being local installations supervised by the control centre system.
For Moving Block systems SIL 4.
4.5 Which other projects were/will be technically impacted? GSM R? Passenger information?
Remote control is performed through 2 ways.
WESTERN AUSTRALIA
AND NEW ZEALAND
GERMANY
UK (NETWORK RAIL)
SPAIN
CZECH REPUBLIC
FINLAND
Direct interface to the electronic signalling interlocking.
- A industrial RTU or non-vital Microlok interfacing to the relay interlocking.
In both cases all communication is through 2 redundant links which utilise diverse paths and diverse technology. In general the primary link is a copper based
SDH/PDH link using modems or direct connection to the multiplexer. The secondary link is IP based through the PTA Gigabit Ethernet cloud using a dedicated
VLAN and QOS. All comms infrastructure is owned and operated by the PTA. All control to interlocking communications utilises the genisys protocol.
The telecommunications infrastructure in the Operations Centres will be adapted in stages to the latest GSM-R standard. Passenger information systems run in
parallel in functionally and spatially independent projects and are not affected.
Relay and electronic interlocking will be interfaced to the control centres via a “remote interface” (RIF), which will undertake the necessary translation between the
technology and supplier specific features of the interlocking to a standardised interface with other components of the Traffic Management system.
Almost every interlocking, which is able to be remote controlled, has already been implemented. In case of no remote control today, there will in the future be a
21
totally new interlocking to replace the old one. At the same that will also be connected to the CTC system.
SWITZERLAND
SWEDEN
THE NETHERLANDS
FRANCE
JAPAN
NORTH AMERICA
(USA)
ENGLAND METRO
There are some big stations (nodes) left and at the moment there are no plans to implement these to remote control (mostly SpDrS60-VR).
Separate system interfacing to all existing type of interlockings.
Most “old” (i.e. 1960’s all relay based interlockings) have been interfaced to the TCCs using dedicated electronic units or computer systems. Most of couputer
based interlockings have dedicated interface computers and/or protocol converters.
CCR deployment considers implementation of new transmission network and GSM-R facilities. In addition new information tools are being studied.
This is a moot question. 99,03% of interlocking have been remoted. The few exceptions are mostly interlocking that include movable bridged, where the
interlocking operator is also a bridge operator. Many of those have also been converted to remote operation including the bridge, using sensors and CCTV.
Traditionally by air working of signal frames, interlocking machines from local electronic controllers.
Currently solid state interlocking controlled from local computer controllers supervised from central control, mechanical interlocking being replaced by solid state
interlocking.
4.6 The project will be deployed during a long time (15 years or more). Different evolutions or geographical extension will be necessary during this
period. How the evolutivity of the management system will be obtained?
WESTERN AUSTRALIA
AND NEW ZEALAND
GERMANY
The passenger information system and scheduling system.
The central hardware components of the traffic control systems are presently migrating to a new platform. Subsequently, the software will be harmonised and also
functionally optimised with regard to the different applications.
GSM-R terminals will be provided to allow operators in the new control centres to speak to train drivers. Existing lineside voice communications to signals and level
crossings will be re-routed to the new control centres.
UK (NETWORK RAIL)
SPAIN
CZECH REPUBLIC
FINLAND
SWITZERLAND
SWEDEN
THE NETHERLANDS
FRANCE
Passenger information systems are fed with running information from a national IT message hub using information reported from the existing control centres. As
the new control centres are commissioned, they will take over the feed to the hub.
Asset protection systems are the subject of a separate initiative known as “Intelligent Infrastructure”. The control centre will not monitor asset protection systems
directly, but will receive alerts if operator action is required, e.g. to stop a train or reroute it to a maintenance depot.
There are some projects ongoing for constructing passenger information.
GSM-R is in operation for voice communications and beginning from some 2020’s for ETCS level 2 perhaps.
Network of hot box detectors covers the whole railway network. There is an ongoing project for wheel force detectors. MMIs will be located at the CTC centers.
All of the above.
GSM-R is rolled out nationwide and operated from the TCCs. Idem remaining lineside telephones. Hotbox detectors are used seldomly, but if they are they are
interfaced tot the TCC.
Tunnel Control.
Level Crossing alarm indications.
For the control system, the chosen hardware is standard. It does not depend on a specific manufacturer.
22
The software is designed to be as independent as possible from the hardware. It is composed of 2 layers: the generic software and the geographical parameters.
The structure of these parameters has been specifically designed to allow for geographical extension without modifying existing parameters and to avoid new trials
for the existing parameters. Only the new ones have to be tested.
JAPAN
NORTH AMERICA
(USA)
ENGLAND METRO
A new generation of control system is being specified as the deployment will last few decades and wille be an iterative process.
The control centers generally include monitoring of detectors and alarms for special assets. Passenger information systems and catenary control is included for
passenger operations. Railroads are in process of converting to all ip networks for voice, command, control, and date so switching, redundancy, diversity, are all
simplified. Positive Train Control (PTC) servers are being interfaced with the CAD and IT systems.
Train radio and staff radio (TETRA), Emergency services radio (TETRA).
CCTV systems on stations, for control centre operators and emergency services.
Real time information provision for passengers, drivers, station staff, managers, emergency services and public.
SCADA, signalling infrastructure and train health monitoring.
4.7 What interfacing is/will be required for the control centre management system to a Radio Block Centre (RBC) or equivalent e.g. incorporation of
Temporary Speed Restriction (TSR) functionality and trackside displays
WESTERN AUSTRALIA
AND NEW ZEALAND
GERMANY
UK (NETWORK RAIL)
SPAIN
CZECH REPUBLIC
FINLAND
SWITZERLAND
SWEDEN
THE NETHERLANDS
FRANCE
JAPAN
NORTH AMERICA
(USA)
ENGLAND METRO
Major works will be required to interface or convert all relay based interlocking to communicate vitally to a RBC.
It is envisaged that the remote interface (RIF) will provide an interface with RBCs as well as to interlocking.
The control centre will maintain the master record of network and traffic restrictions including temporary speed restrictions and advise changes to the RBCs in
ERTMS/ETCS level 2 areas, and to on-train driver advisory systems, as well as control centre functions such as conflict detection and automatic route setting.
There is no ETCS track in operation in Finland. Implementation strategy is under updating and it has not yet decided which ETCS level will be chosen for mainlines
in Finland.
Interface integrated in remote control for operators.
RBC’s are usually not operated directly but through the associated interlockings.
TSR management have to check, believe this is done by the maintenance department through technician’s terminals.
RBC’s are usually not operated directly but through the associated interlocking.
TSR management have to check, believe this is done by the maintenance department through technician’s terminals.
Positive Train Control (PTC) servers are being interfaced with the CAD and IT systems. Authorities and position information will shared with the CAD system. Train
makeup data is supplied from the business IT systems to determine train length, and car types.
For CBTC systems full integration with on board train system. Links to neighbouring railways.
Imposition of TSR’s being implemented through control centre, also bi-directional operation.
23
4.8 What interfacing is/will be required for the control centre management system the timetable system? Is this an open interface? Or specific to a
product?
WESTERN AUSTRALIA
AND NEW ZEALAND
GERMANY
UK (NETWORK RAIL)
SPAIN
CZECH REPUBLIC
FINLAND
SWITZERLAND
SWEDEN
THE NETHERLANDS
FRANCE
JAPAN
NORTH AMERICA
(USA)
The timetable system is a dedicated product based on an open interface, i.e. SQL and XML protocols.
There is an existing format for export of timetables from the national timetable planning system and this is a Network Rail standard that is freely available to
industry stakeholders, for instance it is used by passenger information systems managed by Railway Udertakings.
Every control centre has an interface to time table system and information from there will be transferred automatically.
Proprietary interface, not yet operable.
Route Setting is fed from the timetable systems with the daily plan. The interface is proprietary.
Route Setting is fed from the timetable systems with the daily plan. The interface is proprietary
In JR East the time table system is independent of the traffic management system. The interface is proprietary.
Timetables are used on Amtrak and the commuter operations only. They are bespoke systems.
Timetables compiled by IT system, crew information merged.
ENGLAND METRO
Simulation facilities to prove timetable and crew rostas.
Direct loading of timetables from IT system to central control system.
Interface specified by LU.
4.9 What system lifecycle is expected? In years
WESTERN AUSTRALIA
AND NEW ZEALAND
GERMANY
10 years.
-
UK (NETWORK RAIL)
SPAIN
CZECH REPUBLIC
FINLAND
SWITZERLAND
SWEDEN
THE NETHERLANDS
Network Rail usually asks for a 15 year system life for new electronic systems. For the Traffic Management system this will only correspond to 80% of the final rollout, so a strategy for continuous refresh will be needed.
Target is 20 years but some updating for hardware is possibly needed.
10-30 years.
24
FRANCE
JAPAN
NORTH AMERICA
(USA)
ENGLAND METRO
15- 20 years
-
4.10 Different evolutions or geographical extension will be necessary during this period. How is/will be the management system maintainability
achieved? Service Level Agreement or?
WESTERN AUSTRALIA
ANS NEW ZEALAND
A service elvel agreement with the installer.
GERMANY
-
UK (NETWORK RAIL)
-
SPAIN
CZECH REPUBLIC
FINLAND
SWITZERLAND
SWEDEN
THE NETHERLANDS
FRANCE
JAPAN
NORTH AMERICA
(USA)
ENGLAND METRO
It is recognised that there will be a continuous development of functions and geographical coverage, but the contract arrangement is not yet defined.
Almost every supplier has maintenance support agreement which will cover the whole lifecycle for systems in addition to basic maintenance.
Some parts may be replaced/upgraded during operational period.
Service contract with supplier in place.
The system must be recontructed or improved to meet the new needs.
Originally in house maintenance.
For new systems third and second line maintenance contracts with SLA. Requirement that LU (Infraco) staff are trained, supported. Reliability clause built into
contract with retention against achieving specified reliability.
25
5 The deployment process
5.1 What was the target? All the lines? Only the main lines?
WESTERN AUSTRALIA
AND NEW ZEALAND
All lines in the metro area. A small portion includes mixed traffic and freight only.
Only the main lines will be controlled and monitored online.
The operational control of signalboxes from the Operations Centres refers principally to lines in the long-distance and conurbation network
GERMANY
UK (NETWORK RAIL)
SPAIN
CZECH REPUBLIC
FINLAND
SWITZERLAND
SWEDEN
THE NETHERLANDS
FRANCE
JAPAN
NORTH AMERICA
(USA)
ENGLAND METRO
-
with premium passenger and freight traffic,
-
with very frequent regular-interval traffic in conurbations,
-
on major diversionary routes,
- on lines with risks of delay propagation throughout the entire network (network effect).
The target is to have 80% of the network controlled from the new control centres by 2029 and the remainder by 2044.
At the moment all mainlines have been equipped and most low density lines also. At the moment there are not any plans to implement other lines.
Entire network.
All lines that are signalled, except a few secondary lines with locally operated relay block systems.
In France, the target is only the main lines (14 000 km for 90% of the traffic).
All lines.
All lines.
All lines on a line by line basis.
26
5.2 What was/is the process of deployment?
The process of deployment was:
WESTERN AUSTRALIA
AND NEW ZEALAND
GERMANY
UK (NETWORK RAIL)
SPAIN
CZECH REPUBLIC
FINLAND
SWITZERLAND
SWEDEN
THE NETHERLANDS
-
Implement the stock standard, off the shell TCS supplied by the manufacturer.
- Implement additions and enhancements gradually after initial installation.
The commissioning process was a multistage conversion where stations on the old TCS were gradually decommissioned and swung across into the new system.
Issue with the interface between the old and new system were managed by the train controller.
The traffic control systems were set up in the 7 Operations Centre in the years 1998-2000 at the locations of the 7 branch offices (today: Regional Units) and the
15 former regional traffic control offices were abolished.
From the year 2000 onwards, the setting up of operating and control systems in the Operations Centres got underway. In the first stage, existing electronic
signalboxes were refurbished and connected to the control centres in the Operations Centres. As further electronic signalboxes are connected, the operating
capacity of the Operations Centre into which they are to be incorporated will be expanded in stages.
Eight of the most modern existing signalling control centres will be upgraded to become ROCs. Six more will be new buildings to be constructed by 2015. In the
early stages of deployment re-control of smaller signalboxes and control centres into the new control centres wille be prioritised as this gives significant operating
costs reductions using conventional signalling control technology, whilst the new Traffic Management tools are under development.
Latest CTC deployment was in south Finland (project ESKO). Interlockings stay unchanged, only CTC has been renovated. Same kind of strategy will be used also
on other parts of the railway network.
Area by area, over several decades.
The process of deployment will take few decades.
It is based on defined priorities for regeneration of the signalling installations, necessary reorganisations and productivity gains, both leading to achieve the
financial objectives conditioning the progressive deployment.
FRANCE
JAPAN
NORTH AMERICA
(USA)
ENGLAND METRO
There will be 2 phases:
-
The first phase consists in erecting the control centre buildings and in creating progressively “large area signalboxes”.
-
The second phase will consist in creating fully centralised control centres with a higher level of automaticity and without interruptions in the managed areas.
Interlockings were replaced only when life expired, or physical track routes were changed.
All lines on a line by line basis. Early central control system now being replaced due to obsolescence and increased requirements.
27
5.3 Are there any social issues and how were the social issues addressed?
WESTERN AUSTRALIA
AND NEW ZEALAND
GERMANY
-
Shorter commissioning times.
-
Better testing and verification prior to commissioning.
- Lower costs.
The required operating staff will be substantially reduced during the course of the project. Staff reductions were so far able to be organised in a socially acceptable
manner, in part due to demographic evolution. Nevertheless, there are to some extent serious problems in finding suitable staff, particularly in conurbations.
Existing relay and electronic interlocking will be retained and interfaced via a remote interface (RIF).
UK (NETWORK RAIL)
SPAIN
CZECH REPUBLIC
FINLAND
SWITZERLAND
SWEDEN
THE NETHERLANDS
FRANCE
JAPAN
NORTH AMERICA
(USA)
ENGLAND METRO
Mechanical interlocking cannot be interfaced to the new control centres, and so an important element of the migration plan will be an accelerated renewal
programme for these interlocking. Net work Rail and two suppliers are developing a “modular signalling” solution which is intended to reduce the capital costs on
re-signalling on the secondary routes where the mechanical interlocking are concentrated.
Effect on upgrading is to have block sections and more capacity. The problem in Finland is that about 90% of network is single track and upgrading interlocking
does not increase capacity very much.
Only mechanical and electro-mechanical ones were upgraded. Realys-IXL can be remote-controlled. Some BCI, some new relays interlocking.
A requirement to develop specific interfaces.
The number of operators will be divided by 2 in 20 years.
This reduction will be obtained on this long term by the managed demographic evolution and by offering other jobs inside SNCF to the operators who will accept.
Electronic interlocking have been used by the freight railroads for all new and upgraded locations. A few commuter agencies remain the only users of new relay
systems.
Greater reliability, tendency for fewer but longer delays.
28
5.4 Are there any social issues and how were the social issues addressed?
WESTERN AUSTRALIA
AND NEW ZEALAND
GERMANY
UK (NETWORK RAIL)
SPAIN
CZECH REPUBLIC
FINLAND
SWITZERLAND
SWEDEN
THE NETHERLANDS
FRANCE
JAPAN
NORTH AMERICA
(USA)
ENGLAND METRO
There will ve a reduction in signalling staff from 6,000 to 2,000, but it is expected to achieve this through normal retirement and turnover of staff without compulsory
redundancies.
Reducing staff continues but the major reduction has been done already during the last two decades.
Power of unions is very weak in Switzerland → development was accepted by personnel.
No. Union (syndicate) personnel had agreements renegotiated as necessary. Elimination of the lone tower operators reduced personal injuries and other problems
for the isolated employee.
Need to retrain staff, some not suitable for new systems.
5.5 Was the project delivered on time? If not on time haw late in months?
WESTERN AUSTRALIA
AND NEW ZEALAND
GERMANY
UK (NETWORK RAIL)
SPAIN
CZECH REPUBLIC
FINLAND
SWITZERLAND
SWEDEN
THE NETHERLANDS
FRANCE
JAPAN
NORTH AMERICA
(USA)
ENGLAND METRO
Initial implementation and decommissioning of old system was delivered on time. Enhancements were delivered 2 years over time.
The project is currently in procurement/planning stage.
The reduction of staff has been completed as originally planned.
Very long project over decades.
Delivered on time.
Schedules for consolidation are always very aggressive, and frequently extended for changes.
Lasted systems delivered approximately 1 year late.
29
6 Performances
6.1 Availability issues
What system availability is specified/achieved?
WESTERN AUSTRALIA
AND NEW ZEALAND
GERMANY
UK (NETWORK RAIL)
SPAIN
CZECH REPUBLIC
FINLAND
SWITZERLAND
SWEDEN
THE NETHERLANDS
FRANCE
JAPAN
NORTH AMERICA
(USA)
ENGLAND METRO
Target availability with 100% functionality is ~95%. Currently achieving 98-99%.
The high level of availability of the overall system is assured by special system architecture. In the system concept, selected components of the command and
control systems the power supply systems and the communications links are designed as redundant features.
The system availability is expected to be very high. A specific target figure is not published.
There is no total backup system in control centres. Some systems have redundant computers.
Communication has redundant system and power supply has been ensured by UPS.
Don’t know.
The availability of the control centre is based on a fully redundant architecture for the control system itself, the power supply, the transmissions up to the
interlocking...
The achieved availability of ATOS (for Tokyo metropolitan area lines) and COSMOS (for Tohoku & Joetsu Shinkansen lines) is 99.99%.
The systems are deemed “mission critical”. Everything is redundant with spares and technical staff on site in addition. Down time of a center that control signals
over 30-40,000 km would be a disaster. There was a sharp learning curve in the 1070’s as major consolidations began.
I dot not have this information yet.
6.2 Degraded modes:
What fallback provisions are provided? E.g. Local control of interlocking/override facilities/disaster recovery sites/duplication of systems/other.
WESTERN AUSTRALIA
AND NEW ZEALAND
An alternate control facility is available off site which caters for the scenario where both the main control centre needs to be evacuated or is destroyed. Facilities
are also available to place all through stations into a locally controlled fleeted mode and controlled locally through a laptop.
There is no "substitute Operations Centre" that could assume the tasks of another Operations Centre in case of catastrophe.
If the Operations Centre systems suffer partial or total failure, a multi-stage fallback level concept takes effect. This encompasses scenarios from short-term
through to longer-term failures. Short-term failures are as a rule bridged by automatic systems. This is inherent in the system.
GERMANY
In order to guarantee a high level of availability, it is planned to install the hardware components for a substitute control circuit in each Operations Centre, once for
each manufacturer’s type (i.e. as a rule twice per Operations Centre) and to keep these operational. Connected sub-centres will be transferred to this substitute
control circuit if the associated regular control circuit cannot be used over a longer period of time e.g. due to disruption to or destruction of components). Above and
beyond this, the possibility exists of locally staffing the emergency control desks in the signalboxes. Emergency programmes exist for this purpose and training
exercises are carried out regularly. Depending on the size of the signal box and the operational pressure, it is possible that limitations in the efficiency of the
system must then be expected.
30
UK (NETWORK RAIL)
SPAIN
CZECH REPUBLIC
FINLAND
SWITZERLAND
SWEDEN
THE NETHERLANDS
FRANCE
Local control of interlocking will not be provided. Communication links between the control centres and interlocking will be duplicated and diversely routed to
minimise the risk of loss of control. Each interlocking will also be provided with an “all signals on” control which will allow staff to stop all trains independently of the
Traffic Management software and the primary communication links.
It is intended that workstations in the new control centres will be reconfigurable so that control can be transferred between workstations or between control centres
in the event of equipment failure or to share workload.
Old relay interlocking have the functionality to be controlled locally. Also some computerised interlocking have centralised local operating workstations but not
every station has possibility to be operated locally.
Mostly no. No personnel available to locally control IXLs. Everything is highly reliable and redundant.
None but a fallback or off-line TCC facility is contemplated.
The management system MISTRAL is redundant (doubled modules). There is no redundant control centre. There is no more local command in the local
interlocking.
Our experience shows that, in case of failure, it takes less time to repair than to send operators to the local interlocking, supposing that you still have free operators
to go.
There is the second traffic control center of Tokaido Shinkanse in Osaka, which aims at the substiting traffic control at the traffic control center in Tokyo in the case
of a catastrophic situation.
In the case of Tohoku Shinkanse, a radio-based train control system is installed as fall-back in addition to track-circuit-based train control system (D-ATCS) .
JAPAN
NORTH AMERICA
(USA)
ENGLAND METRO
The traffic control system (ATOS) of the Tokyo metropolitan areas provides train diagram information to the station systems in advance, and the station systems
control interlocking systems, which are able to continue train operaions even in the case of traffic control center failures. This fallbak is regarded as an
“atoutonomous (distributed) system. ”
.
Redundant communications paths are used to access all field locations. Communications medium from the control centers are diverse paths, including fibre optics,
and microwave. Territories on a dispatcher’s console can be quickly reallocated to another desk. All interlocking are equipped with local control panels. Many
points machines are dual mode, as the have a hand throw lever that a train crew can use in control is lost.
Fall back control centre. Provision for local setting of routes. Specified that there should be no single point of failure.
31
6.3 What is the expected life time of the management system?
WESTERN AUSTRALIA
AND NEW ZEALAND
The technical service life of the central components is 20 years.
GERMANY
The Operations Centre concept has proven its worth and is firmly established in the operating process of DB Netz AG. Future developments should first and
foremost contribute to a substantial reduction in the high level of complexity and to a further optimisation of operations management costs. In the course of this,
functional adjustments will be implemented. Independently of this, the technical platform must be modernised.
Further synergies can be leveraged if the strategy of central signalling operations is continued.
UK (NETWORK RAIL)
SPAIN
CZECH REPUBLIC
FINLAND
SWITZERLAND
SWEDEN
THE NETHERLANDS
FRANCE
JAPAN
NORTH AMERICA
(USA)
ENGLAND METRO
The life time required for the management system is 15 years after its commissioning.
15-20 years.
Limited by requirements changes as the availability of new technology and the need to implement operational changes forces renewal. Current control centres
being replaced after 40 years! But have been augmented over the years.
32
7 The procurement
7.1 What was the procurement policy?
WESTERN AUSTRALIA
AND NEW ZEALAND
GERMANY
Stipulated by the State supply guidelines. Procurement is through open tender.
The procurement policy follows the EU rules: pre-qualification, tendering, award to the best bidder.
The procurement policy is as follows:
UK (NETWORK RAIL)
SPAIN
CZECH REPUBLIC
FINLAND
SWITZERLAND
SWEDEN
THE NETHERLANDS
FRANCE
JAPAN
NORTH AMERICA
(USA)
ENGLAND METRO
-
Announcement via OJEU,
-
Pre-qualification stage 1 – 12 suppliers,
-
Pre-qualification stage 2 – 6 suppliers – This is the stage reached in 2011,
-
ITT for a demonstration system – award contracts to 2-3 suppliers for proof of concept,
- Award of contract for full development and roll-out.
A normal EU-procedure and FTA will send a call for tender, first for pre-qualification and after that real call for tender for systems.
Single-Supplier procurement since decades.
RFF decided to send a call for tender and to develop the system with only one manufacturer with the obligation of sustaining the system 15 years after the last
system is put into service.
The manufacturer must deliver to RFF the integrality of the design documentation, the software and all the tools used to generate the documentation and the
software.
The procurement policy is due to each company’s rule.
Procurement procedures are totally up to the freight railroad. Since Amtrak and the commuter agencies all receive Federal funding, the must follow the complex
US.
Competitive tender.
33
7.2 How many different manufacturers? Which type of manufacturers (signalling, IT …)?
If several manufacturers, with the same functional specifications? With which compatibility constrains?
WESTERN AUSTRALIA
AND NEW ZEALAND
GERMANY
UK (NETWORK RAIL)
SPAIN
CZECH REPUBLIC
FINLAND
SWITZERLAND
SWEDEN
THE NETHERLANDS
FRANCE
JAPAN
NORTH AMERICA
(USA)
ENGLAND METRO
If several manufacturers, with the same functional specifications? Any which compatibility constraints?
1x signalling contractor and supplier for Train Control issues
1x IT supplier for all network and PC hardware
The contract for the construction of the traffic control systems in the 7 Operations Centres for the long-distance and conurbation network and an Operations Centre
for the Berlin S-Bahn was awarded in 1998 to a consortium of three manufacturers, whereby construction of the individual Operations Centres was in each case
placed under the leadership of a single manufacturer.
For the control and operating systems for the signalboxes, there are currently two companies in the market which manufacture signalling systems to the same
functional specifications. These are used in all Operations Centres. In terms of compatibility between them there are some minor limitations, which can be
compensated for by operating measures.
The intention is to have a single manufacturer. At PQQ Stage 1 there were a mix of signalling and IT companies, but the six short listed at PQQ Stage 2 are all
signalling suppliers.
All manufactures has the same functional specifications written by FTA. Some minor differences may occur due to different technology and generations of
equipment.
N/A.
As mentioned above, the control system is currently manufactured by one provider. However the overall architecture depends as well on interfaces with other
components provided by others. Communications compatibility is gained from the initial development to the necessary upgrades required to cope with evolutions
(e.g. IT Network).
Useally the traffic control center is manufactured by one provider, and this is decided on the contract basis. Some railway companies developed their own
advanced systems, and the providers are decided similarly.
The railroads drive their own functional specifications. Suppliers include major signalling suppliers, some control systems companies from general manufacturing,
and some railroads build the system with in-house IT staff.
Similar functional requirements but different implementations. Whole line central control systems implemented over last 40 years!! Requirements evolved over the
years.
34
7.3 How much new system/functional development is/was required. % of project
WESTERN AUSTRALIA
AND NEW ZEALAND
50%.
GERMANY
Concentration of control into large control centres with computer workstations with automatic route setting is already well proven in the UK, and this will deliver a
large part of the business benefit without new system development.
UK (NETWORK RAIL)
However the additional Traffic Management functionality is new to the UK and so the main criteria for short listing suppliers ware that they must be able to
demonstrate they have already delivered a comparable control centre elsewhere in the world. It is hoped that this will minimise the cost and risk of the new
development required, but realistically there will be a big effort to adapt to UK operating principles.
There is some new functional development for every project.
N/A.
On a case-by-case basis.
SPAIN
CZECH REPUBLIC
FINLAND
SWITZERLAND
SWEDEN
THE NETHERLANDS
FRANCE
JAPAN
NORTH AMERICA
(USA)
ENGLAND METRO
There is some new functional development for every project.
If several manufacturers, with the same functional specifications? Any compatibility constraints?
For latest systems 30% to 40%.
35
7.4 The financial business case:
What were the financial expenses taken into account? What were the savings taken into account? (Operation costs?, maintenance costs?,
performance regime fines avoided by Infrastructure Manager? Which percentage each?) Which percentages of productivity were targeted?
WESTERN AUSTRALIA
AND NEW ZEALAND
GERMANY
Productivity was not considered since it was a replacement project for obsolete equipment.
The financial business case is based on internal profitability calculations. All relevant investment, maintenance and operations management costs were taken into
account.
The business case is that an investment of £1,100 million will deliver operational savings of £250 million per year.
Costs taken account of in the business case were:
UK (NETWORK RAIL)
-
Development and support cost of new Traffic Management systems,
-
Building and equipping the new control centres,
-
Cost of re-control of existing relay/electronic interlocking,
-
Marginal cost of early renewal of mechanical interlocking.
Benefits taken into account were:
SPAIN
CZECH REPUBLIC
FINLAND
SWITZERLAND
SWEDEN
THE NETHERLANDS
FRANCE
JAPAN
NORTH AMERICA
(USA)
ENGLAND METRO
-
Reduction in operating costs (staff numbers down from 6,000 to 2,000) – 80% of total benefit,
-
Reduction in train delay penalty payments (2% improvement in on-time performance),
- Value of additional trains paths available through better regulation.
All signalling projects are financed by FTA, under budget of investment for track side.
Investment cost, maintenance cost and operational cost are covered by FTA, different department but inside FTA budget.
Don’t known, but with high Swiss salaries certainly an easy business case.
The financial business case is based on auto-financed deployment (known expenses to regenerate signalling installations and productivity).
Due to the scale of these projects, and the unsubsidised integrated railroad, there is a full financial accounting. Since the freight railroads are public share, for profit
enterprises, all cost possible that can be driven out while maintaining the effectiveness of the system is taken.
Costs:
Supply contract, installation costs, provision of infrastructure. Cost of train fitment. Cost of loss of service due to need for possessions for installation, test and
commissioning. Maintenance costs direct labour, support contracts, training. Operator training.
Benefits:
Improved passenger journey times, better headways and reduced station stops, reduced waiting times, and less overcrowding. All converted into a passenger
benefit figure.
36
Benefits in staff costs.
7.5 The financing policy
WESTERN AUSTRALIA
AND NEW ZEALAND
GERMANY
The major part of the investment was supported by the Federal budget. In accordance with the regulations applicable in each case, it is based on a financial mix of
interest-free loans, construction cost grants and equity. Third-party financing puts DB Netz AG under an obligation to retain the facilities until the end of their
technical service life.
Operational running costs are defrayed by equity.
UK (NETWORK RAIL)
SPAIN
CZECH REPUBLIC
FINLAND
SWITZERLAND
SWEDEN
THE NETHERLANDS
FRANCE
JAPAN
NORTH AMERICA
(USA)
ENGLAND METRO
The investment required has been included in Network Rail’s investment plan for Control Period 5 (2014-2019). If this is approved by the UK government Office of
Rail Regulation, Network Rail will be allowed to borrow the money to make the investment.
All financing comes from Finnish State budget.
Public funding of infrastructure.
The project must be financed by the economies it generates.
It does not take into account:
-
The cost of the national main IT Network which is deployed independently.
-
The regeneration of obsolete installations which would have been replaced even if this CCR project would have not occurred.
For freight railroads, all projects are financed from retained earnings as part of the annual capital program. Commuter facilities are usually upgraded incrementally
included in a turnkey project, such as add a new line. These are financed from public bond issue, or from federal and state funding allocations
-
37
8. Present situation
8.1 What is the present status of deployment?
WESTERN AUSTRALIA
AND NEW ZEALAND
Complete.
The Operations Centre concept has proven its worth and is firmly established in the operating process of DB Netz AG. Future developments should first and
foremost contribute to a substantial reduction in the high level of complexity and to further optimisation of operations management costs. In the course of this,
functional adjustments will be implemented. Independently of this, the technical platform must be modernised.
GERMANY
Further synergies can be leveraged if the strategy of central signalling operations is continued.
In the current year to date, 5 projects have begun in which the connection of parallel, decentrally constructed signalbox installations to the control installations
in the Operations Centres will be realised.
UK (NETWORK RAIL)
SPAIN
CZECH REPUBLIC
FINLAND
SWITZERLAND
SWEDEN
THE NETHERLANDS
FRANCE
JAPAN
The project is still at the planning/procurement stage.
There is ongoing project in Western part of Finland. Old CTC will replace by a new one but the old interlocking on the field will remain.
Almost everything remote controlled. Centralisation still going on.
Deployment has been completed for several years now and a second generation of TCCIT systems is being developed.
Two CCR operational buildings have been erected to integrate the first sectors of their respective control areas. The other sectors will be deployed
progressively dependant on the business plan of each CCR.
The other CCR buildings will be erected dependent on the priorities of the CCR business plan (some of them are being conceived, others will be deployed at a
later stage).
ATOS : We are installing the system for the last three lines in Tokyo Metropolitan area, and are preparing to replace the first Chuo line system.
COCMOS : Now we are installing the new system in Hokuliku and Hakodate Shinkansen lines.
Conventional systems : Almost completed.
NORTH AMERICA
(USA)
All major railways have consolidated control centers. Upgrades or additions such as Movement Planner and Positive Train Control are on-going.
Fully Centralised Control – Central Line, Northern Line (1970), Victoria Line (2011), Jubilee Line (2011).
Part centralised control Bakerloo Line, Piccadilly Line, Sub surface Railway (Circle, District, and Metropolitan).
ENGLAND METRO
Currently being upgraded – Northern Line, sub Surface Railway.
Northern installation commenced.
Subsurface railway – out to tender.
38
9 Lessons learnt
Time spent indentifying requirements is well spent.
All stakeholders need to be taken into consideration when setting requirements.
Change management must be strictly controlled.
ENGLAND METRO
Implementation stages need to be tightly defined and controlled. Planning of all aspects needs to be thorough (including timetable changes, staff training,
customer information, and maintenance preparation).
Interfaces (between parts of the system, to other systems, to neighbouring systems) must be clearly defined and managed.
Human Factors need to be considered from outset.
Simulation of functions, operator training, testing vital.
Time to correct software problems can be extensive, and need for workarounds to keep railway operating whilst upgrade implemented.
9.1 Are the financial expected savings obtained?
WESTERN AUSTRALIA
AND NEW ZEALAND
GERMANY
UK (NETWORK RAIL)
SPAIN
CZECH REPUBLIC
FINLAND
SWITZERLAND
SWEDEN
THE NETHERLANDS
FRANCE
JAPAN
NORTH AMERICA
(USA)
ENGLAND METRO
Maintenance costs are well over what was expected initially.
The savings effects in operations management costs forecast for the current state of affairs was achieved. With the successive connection of further
signalboxes to the Operations Centres, existing gaps in the areas served by Operations Centres will be filled and in the process, further synergy effects are
expected.
This question not applicable at this stage.
Some savings for operational cost has been obtained but target for savings has not yet been fully achieved.
Savings of the operational cost have been obtained, but more savings will be expected.
Longstanding savings have been substantial and continue.
Eventually!
39
9.2 Is the quality of service obtained?
WESTERN AUSTRALIA
AND NEW ZEALAND
GERMANY
UK (NETWORK RAIL)
SPAIN
CZECH REPUBLIC
FINLAND
SWITZERLAND
SWEDEN
THE NETHERLANDS
FRANCE
JAPAN
NORTH AMERICA
(USA)
ENGLAND METRO
QCS has been met.
The effects on quality of service are basically assessed as positive. Thanks to centralisation, control and coordination can be carried out on a larger scale and
decisions are implemented directly at the connected signalling level. As a result, traffic operations run more smoothly and are more efficient.
This question not applicable at this stage.
Co-operation between national management centre and local CTCs has improved the quality of service especially in exceptional situations.
Definitely.
In the case of Tokaido Shinkansen, its average delay time is 36 seconds (out of 120,000 trains per year). Tohoku & Joetsu Shinkansens’ average delay time
is 36 seconds (out of 120,000 trains per year).
On JR East conventional lines, their average delay time is 60 Seconds (out of 4,530,000 trains per year).
Quality of service improved tremendously as multiple layers were eliminated from the management and operations organisations, and as platforms were
established to support new technologies for optimisation, TQM driven improvements, and more cost effective responses to problems.
Yes particularly in terms of integration of services and speed of response to incidents, but initial problems can be expected.
9.3 Are the consequences on maintenance costs acceptable?
WESTERN AUSTRALIA
AND NEW ZEALAND
GERMANY
UK (NETWORK RAIL)
SPAIN
CZECH REPUBLIC
FINLAND
SWITZERLAND
SWEDEN
THE NETHERLANDS
FRANCE
JAPAN
NORTH AMERICA
(USA)
The consequences for maintenance costs are within the range expected. A concluding statement is however not yet possible at present.
This question not applicable at this stage.
Centralising the CTC enables also to concentration of knowledgeable maintenance experts in the vicinity of CTC. FTA has managed to keep CTC maintenance
cost in an acceptable level by utilising competitive bids for basic regional maintenance contracts (first line maintenance). In addition to basic maintenance
including the CTC maintenance, FTA has entered into maintenance support agreements (second line maintenance) with original equipment supplier, which
ensures the availability of deep software understanding and collaborative product lifecycle management with all the partners.
The consequences of maintenance costs are within the range expected.
Yes, the effect on maintenance costs was favourable.
40
ENGLAND METRO
Yes, but savings less than anticipated, and time for the system to settle down can be long (System includes software, maintenance staff capability,
development of operations skills).
9.4 Are there any consequence of safety?
WESTERN AUSTRALIA
AND NEW ZEALAND
GERMANY
UK (NETWORK RAIL)
SPAIN
CZECH REPUBLIC
FINLAND
SWITZERLAND
SWEDEN
THE NETHERLANDS
FRANCE
JAPAN
NORTH AMERICA
(USA)
ENGLAND METRO
There are no known negative consequences for safety. Thanks to the permanent further development of the software, the safety level will be continually
improved.
This question not applicable at this stage.
Centralising the traffic control has improved safety in common.
No negative ones to speak of.
Lessons are being learnt from the implementation of the first reflexions, the evolution of the organisations and different actors, or from the first deployments
(ergonomy and operators task analysis, maintenance organisation, contingency plans for the commissioning process, functionalities and information systems
to be developed...).
Safety is guaranteed locally (by interlocking systems and train protection/control systems), and traffic control/management contributes to enhancement of
productivity and quality of train operation services; there is no direct relation to safety.
Significant improvement in operational safety due to higher levels of automation.
Improvement in safety due to closer monitoring, provision of CCTV, linkage to emergency services and ability to control trains directly.
41
10. Any other observations
This questionnaire contains some estimates that will be refined with later access to data.
NORTH AMERICA
(USA)
The numbers given include the Canadian Class I railroads CN and CP, however only their USA date are in the numbers filed with the USA regulator. The
general case discussion applies equally to these roads and their Canada facilities.
A high level summary text discussion of the history of consolidation will follow at a later date.
ENGLAND METRO
Difficult to fill in as trying to cover range of lines, technologies.
Metro control centres more closely linked to station systems and integrated into city management.
42